Passive ways to protect the object of the economy from the WTO. Scientific work in the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Russia

When building protection against HTO ground objects, it is important, along with the use of means of direct protection against attacking ammunition, to provide for measures to reduce the effectiveness of the use of HTO means. This is possible due to the distraction of a part of the combat order of the ATO assigned to the object by elements of remote and combined decoy positions in combination with maneuvering actions on the eve and in the intervals between strikes, the rational conduct of anti-aircraft missile fire on the ATO carriers, the use of weapons camouflage and military equipment(IWT) from all types of intelligence.

That is, the totality of measures to protect against WTO includes a set of measures to counter intelligence (camouflage of combat positions, creation of a system of false positions placed to withdraw part of the attacking assets to them, distortion of the configuration of combat positions and the use of combined false positions to make it difficult to recognize and select real elements of a combat formation), as well as a set of measures to counter directly attacking missiles and bombs (anti-aircraft missile fire, diversion of anti-radar missiles from RES to assigned radiation sources, creation of barrage aerosol screens to disrupt guidance and withdraw other types of high-precision weapons to the area of ​​​​safe detonation) .

The first group of measures is implemented by placing mock-ups of weapons and military equipment, simulators of weapons and military equipment in the radio and optical ranges, using camouflage tools at remote and combined false positions.

The second group of measures is implemented by a set of means of active (fire damage to the HTO) and / or passive (distraction, disruption of guidance, withdrawal) protection against the HTO.

There is a theoretical problem of evaluating the effectiveness of the joint use of all the above measures in order to prevent the destruction of protected objects. The indicator of efficiency in this task is the probability of maintaining the combat capability of the object after striking it with a burst of i WTO funds, for each of which organized countermeasures are being taken.

In real combat conditions, platoon commanders (companies, etc.) evaluate the effectiveness of camouflage qualitatively.

The effectiveness of camouflage is achieved if it is carried out continuously, at all stages of preparation and implementation of fortification measures on a fortified position (reconnaissance, equipping a position, occupying it with troops, etc.), with strict observance of camouflage discipline.

The effectiveness of measures to hide positions, areas and facilities largely depend on the location of positions, areas and structures on the ground.

It is advisable to choose positions for personnel and facilities for fire weapons at the edge of a forest, in groves, bushes, on the outskirts of a settlement, in spotty areas of the terrain and in other places that provide Better conditions concealment of equipment and structures. The selected positions and areas of location of units are masked under the surrounding background of the area.

Protection of objects from impact precision weapons- a set of measures taken to eliminate or minimize the impact of high-precision weapons (HOW) on objects of the economy and government controlled, fortifications and other vital objects. Protection of objects from the impact of OBT is achieved by: counteracting the technical means of reconnaissance and guidance of the enemy; camouflage of objects using special radio-heat-absorbing, radio-heat-dissipating and other coatings, radar and laser reflectors, aerosols (smoke), simulators (mock-ups) and other decoys, use of masking terrain properties; dispersal of objects and their duplication and a number of others.

In order to protect against high-precision enemy weapons, ravines, reverse slopes of heights, fields of radar invisibility and other masking properties of the terrain are used. Concealment of infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers) and tanks from guided (corrected) and homing ammunition of the enemy is achieved by reducing the radar, thermal and optical contrast of equipment in relation to the surrounding background, for which purpose deforming coloring of equipment, masking coatings are used, heat-dissipating surfaces are installed over the heat-radiating surfaces of the vehicles screens (visors). In addition, thermal simulators (traps), radar and laser reflectors can be used.

Conclusion

Tactical camouflage is one of the types of combat support. It is organized by the commander of a platoon (squad, tank) in accordance with the combat mission received, instructions for disguising the commander of the platoon company and the prevailing situation in order to achieve surprise in the actions of his subunits and maintain their combat effectiveness.

Tactical camouflage must be active, convincing, continuous and diverse, constantly updated and modified in accordance with changing modes of action of units, surrounding terrain and seasons. In all conditions of the situation, it is carried out by the forces of a platoon (squad, tank crew), while weapons and military equipment are masked in the first place. The restoration of the broken masking and the elimination of unmasking signs are carried out immediately.

Camouflage is a very broad concept, referring both to an individual soldier and to military installations and entire armies. Means and methods of camouflage are constantly being improved. AT recent times appeared the new kind concealment of one's actions - information disguise (information war).

Questions for self-control

1. Define disguise, name its purpose.

2. List the tasks of masking.

3. Give a classification of disguise.

4. Name the methods of masking.

5. Name the main types tactical intelligence probable adversary.

6. Name the camouflage.

7. Name the means of optical masking.

Literature

1. Combat regulations for the preparation and conduct of combined arms combat. Part 2 (battalion, company). M.: Military Publishing House, 2004

2. Tactics. Edited by V.G. Reznichenko. M. Military Publishing House, 1987. Pp. 175…278.

3. Lecture notes on General Tactics.

VK teacher

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signature, initials, surname

Therefore, we can only talk about a possible, promising system of protection against the WTO, the requirements for it, based on the application effective means and ways to protect OE.

The WTO protection system should include subsystems of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Security Service and the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Russia, as well as the forces and means of objects of the economy of different forms of ownership.

In general, the tasks of protecting economic objects from the WTO are:

Forecasting the application of the WTO on objects of the economy and its possible consequences;

Destruction of the WTO and its carriers in the areas of deployment, on trajectories and flight routes;

Opposition to reconnaissance and weapon guidance systems;

Reducing the vulnerability of OE, increasing the stability of their functioning under the influence of the WTO;

Protection from secondary damaging factors caused by the use of the WTO;

Elimination of the consequences of the application of the WTO on objects of the economy;

Restoration of the functioning of economic facilities (if necessary).

All tasks can be divided into three areas, which should be consistent with protection measures:

Prevention of the possibility of damage to economic objects;

Reduction (decrease) in the impact of the WTO on the objects of the economy;

Elimination of the consequences of the application of the WTO on the objects of the economy.

The protection system should be centralized, but on the condition that it can also function autonomously directly at economic facilities. The OE protection system, when used, should not interfere with the normal production process or provide for its shutdown for the time allowed by the technology requirements. The level of protection should be adequate to the degree of threat of a strike against an object of the WTO economy, which depends on the state and defense significance of the object. The cost of protecting the OE from the WTO should be acceptable for the owner of this object, significantly less than the amount of damage prevented from the destruction of the OE.

A generalized indicator of the effectiveness of protecting OE from WTO is the amount of prevented damage, which is characterized by a decrease in the probability of hitting an object or its critical element, a decrease in losses among the personnel of the facility and other characteristics. But it can be characterized by the magnitude of the required increase in the order of WTO samples so that the damage to economic objects is not lower than the required (given).

OE protection from WTO is carried out different ways, which is understood as one or another procedure, mode of action, method of implementing measures, achieving the goals of protection from the WTO.

All methods of protection can be divided according to the nature of the impact on the WTO into active and passive. Active methods include methods of direct destruction, destruction of WTO samples due to fire, information technology or other impact.

Passive methods mean by themselves those methods that create barriers on the flight path of the WTO to the target and interfere with the operation of weapon guidance systems. These are usually methods of engineering protection, camouflage, increasing the stability of the functioning of economic objects, etc.

hit cruise missiles, planning bombs and other types of WTO at the target is ensured only by the use of the GPS satellite navigation system when pointing them at the desired object. Each missile, each bomb is equipped with a GPS receiver, which receives signals from the satellites included in this system. These signals are used to measure the current geographical coordinates, and - with an accuracy of units of meters. And although cruise missiles still have an inertial guidance system that is not subject to any interference, it does not provide the guidance accuracy that high-precision weapons need.

From the foregoing, an important conclusion follows: in order to increase the miss of high-precision weapons, it is necessary to “mute” GPS receivers with interference. The task is quite solvable. A similar precedent was already in 2003 in the early days of the war in Iraq. There were Russian transmitters of interference to GPS receivers - the so-called "jammers". Their use led to the fact that high-precision weapons could not measure their current location, and therefore, information was not received for the development of flight control commands. Cruise missiles missed, and some of them flew in an unpredictable direction.

According to the scale of solving problems of protection, it can be divided into zonal and object. This division is most typical for active protection. Zonal is understood as such a method when active funds cover from the WTO an operational direction, a region, large territories where settlements with economic facilities, points and bodies of state and local government can be located.

Under object protection from the WTO is meant the protection of a separate object of the economy, an element of its infrastructure, or an object with infrastructure.

Similarly, for moving objects, methods of group and individual protection against the WTO can be used. With the group method, a group of moving objects is protected at once by one protection system. With an individual - one movable object.

Protection methods can also be classified depending on the damaging effects of the WTO. In this case, they can be divided into methods of protection against direct exposure to WTO (mechanical and thermal) and methods of protection against secondary damaging factors (indirect impact), which include methods of protection against fires, chemical, biological and radioactive contamination.

All protective equipment can be classified into the following groups:

Fire (air defense) anti-aircraft missile systems of various types, including portable ("Igla", ("Igla-S"), anti-aircraft artillery;

Rescue military units Russian Emergency Situations Ministry

In accordance with Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of September 30, 2011 No. 000 “On Rescue Military Units of the Ministry of the Russian Federation for civil defense, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters "on the basis of formations, military units and organizations of civil defense troops, rescue military units of the EMERCOM of Russia (hereinafter referred to as rescue military units, SVF) were created.

The same decree approves the Regulations on rescue military formations, as well as their structure and composition. The regular number of military personnel of the SVF is set at 7230 units, civilian personnel - at the number of units.

Rescue military formations of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Russia intended to protect the population and territories, material and cultural values ​​from the dangers arising from the conduct of hostilities or as a result of these actions, as well as in the event of emergency situations (ES) of a natural and man-made nature, including outside the territory of the Russian Federation.

Rescue troops are integral part civil defense forces.

The activities of rescue military units of the EMERCOM of Russia are carried out from the moment a state of war is declared, the actual outbreak of hostilities or the introduction of martial law by the President of the Russian Federation on the territory of the Russian Federation or in its individual areas, as well as in Peaceful time during natural disasters, epidemics, epizootics, major accidents, catastrophes that endanger public health and require emergency rescue and other urgent work.

Rescue military formations in accordance with the Federal Law of January 1, 2001 "On Defense" may be involved in the performance of certain tasks in the field of defense.

Rescue military formations are armed with special equipment, as well as combat hand-held small arms and edged weapons. Servicemen of rescue military formations are issued identity cards of the established form confirming their status, and international distinctive signs of civil defense.

The main tasks of the rescue military formations are:

a) in peacetime:

carrying out measures to maintain the readiness of rescue military formations to fulfill the tasks assigned to them;

use, deployment and timely renewal of weapons, equipment and other material technical means designed for rescue and other urgent work (ASDNR);

participation in measures to prevent and eliminate emergencies;

participation in the training of forces and means for the prevention and liquidation of emergency situations, as well as training the population in the field of civil defense;

participation in research and development work on the creation, testing and implementation of new technical means to protect the population and territories, material and cultural values ​​in emergency situations, as well as on the development of technologies for conducting ASDNR;

b) during the liquidation of emergency situations in peacetime:

participation in the conduct of radiation, chemical and non-specific bacteriological (biological) reconnaissance in emergency zones, as well as on routes of advance to them;

participation in the ASDNR for the operational localization and elimination of natural and man-made emergencies on the territory of the Russian Federation, as well as on the territories of foreign states with which the Russian Federation has agreements;

participation in carrying out pyrotechnic works related to the neutralization of aerial bombs and land mines, as well as in humanitarian demining;

participation in the delivery of goods transported to emergency zones, including as humanitarian aid to foreign states;

participation in providing the affected population with food, water, basic necessities, other material resources and services, housing for temporary residence, as well as in providing first aid to the affected population;

participation in activities for the evacuation of the population, material and cultural values ​​from emergency zones;

participation in carrying out work on the restoration of life support facilities for the population;

jointly with the troops (forces) and means of the federal executive bodies of counteraction against terrorism;

c) in war time:

participation in the conduct of radiation, chemical and non-specific bacteriological (biological) reconnaissance in the places of emergency rescue and other urgent work, as well as on the routes of advance to them;

participation in ensuring the entry of civil defense forces into the centers of destruction, zones of infection (pollution) and catastrophic flooding;

participation in carrying out ASDNR in the foci of damage, zones of infection (pollution) and catastrophic flooding;

participation in carrying out pyrotechnic works related to the neutralization of aerial bombs and land mines;

participation in carrying out works on sanitary treatment of the population, disinfection of buildings and structures, special treatment of equipment, property and territories;

participation in activities for the evacuation of the population, material and cultural values ​​from the centers of destruction, zones of infection (pollution) and catastrophic flooding;

participation in the liquidation of the consequences of the use of weapons of mass destruction by the enemy;

participation in the implementation of certain measures of territorial defense and in ensuring the regime of martial law;

participation in carrying out work on the restoration of life-support facilities for the population.

The use of rescue military formations in peacetime is carried out by the Minister of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense, Emergency Situations and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters (hereinafter referred to as the Minister), in wartime - on the basis of an order of the President of the Russian Federation.

The provision of human and transport resources to make up for the losses of rescue military units in wartime is carried out by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

The procedure for fulfilling the tasks assigned to the rescue military formations is determined by the Regulations on the rescue military formations, as well as:

in peacetime - by the relevant action plans of rescue military units approved by the Minister and heads of regional centers for civil defense, emergency situations and elimination of consequences of natural disasters;

in wartime - by the Plan of Civil Defense and Protection of the Population of the Russian Federation, approved by the President of the Russian Federation.

Rescue military formations in peacetime and wartime for the period of carrying out work to prevent and eliminate emergencies, rescue and other urgent work or other tasks of civil defense, territorial defense can be transferred to the operational subordination of the heads of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, the military command in accordance with action plans ( interaction) for the prevention and elimination of natural and man-made emergencies in the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, plans for civil defense and protection of the population of the Russian Federation and constituent entities of the Russian Federation, as well as plans for territorial defense.

The leadership of the rescue military units is carried out by the President of the Russian Federation.

Rescue military formations are managed by the Minister:

rescue military formations of central subordination - directly;

rescue military formations of regional subordination - through regional centers for civil defense, emergency situations and elimination of consequences of natural disasters.

The recruitment of rescue military formations with specialists in the field of civil defense, protection of the population and territories from emergencies is carried out at the expense of graduates of federal state educational institutions of higher professional education of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Russia, specialists of other specialties - at the expense of graduates of other federal state educational institutions of higher vocational education.

The recruitment of rescue military formations with soldiers, sergeants and foremen who are serving under a contract is carried out in the manner established for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in accordance with the federal laws of 01.01.01 "On Defense" and of 01.01.01 "On military duty and military service.

The list of military positions to be filled by soldiers, sergeants and foremen who are doing military service under a contract, as well as ensigns and female military personnel, is approved by the Minister.

Rescue military units are staffed with civilian personnel. The number of civilian personnel is established by the President of the Russian Federation. The list of positions occupied by civilian personnel is approved by the Minister.

The training of rescue military formations is carried out in accordance with the programs and plans for the training of personnel approved by the Minister.

Training of officers of rescue military formations is carried out in federal state educational institutions of higher professional education of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Russia, as well as in other federal state educational institutions of higher professional education.

The training of sergeants and specialist soldiers for rescue military formations in peacetime (war) is carried out in rescue military formations, training centers Russian Emergency Situations Ministry.

Structure and composition of rescue military formations

Russian Emergency Situations Ministry

Rescue military units in their activities are guided by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal constitutional laws, federal laws, acts of the President of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation, orders and directives of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, regulatory legal acts of the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense, Emergencies and elimination of consequences of natural disasters, regulatory legal acts of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, international treaties, as well as the Regulations on rescue military formations.

Divisions of the federal fire service

Fire protection - a set of created in in due course management bodies, divisions and organizations designed to organize the prevention of fires, extinguish them and carry out the rescue operations assigned to them.

Fire protection is divided into the following types:

state fire service;

departmental fire protection;

private fire department;

volunteer fire department.

The main tasks of the fire department are:

organization and implementation of fire prevention;

rescue of people and property in case of fires, first aid;

organization and implementation of fire extinguishing and rescue operations.

The State Fire Service is an integral part of the forces for ensuring the security of the individual, society and the state and coordinates the activities of other types of fire protection.

The State Fire Service includes:

federal fire service;

fire service of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation.

The Federal Fire Service includes:

structural subdivisions of the central office of the federal executive body authorized to solve problems in the field of fire safety, which manage and coordinate the activities of the federal fire service;

structural subdivisions of the territorial bodies of the federal executive body authorized to solve problems in the field of fire safety - regional centers for civil defense, emergency situations and the elimination of consequences of natural disasters, bodies authorized to solve civil defense tasks and tasks for the prevention and elimination of emergency situations in subjects of the Russian Federation;

executive authorities and state institutions subordinate to them authorized to carry out federal state fire supervision (hereinafter referred to as state fire supervision bodies);

fire-technical, research and educational institutions;

subdivisions of the federal firefighting service created in order to ensure the prevention of fires and (or) their extinguishing in organizations (object subdivisions);

subdivisions of the federal firefighting service created for the purpose of organizing the prevention and extinguishing of fires in closed administrative-territorial formations, especially important and sensitive organizations (special and military units);

units of the federal fire service, created in order to organize the prevention and extinguishing of fires in settlements(territorial divisions);

subdivisions of the federal firefighting service created for the purpose of protecting the property of organizations from fires on a contractual basis (contractual subdivisions of the federal firefighting service).

The organizational structure, powers, tasks, functions, procedure for the activity of the federal fire service are determined by the regulation on the federal fire service, approved in the prescribed manner.

BUTemergency rescue formations

The emergency rescue service is a set of governing bodies, forces and means designed to solve the problems of preventing and eliminating emergency situations, functionally combined into a single system, the basis of which is emergency rescue teams.

An emergency rescue unit is an independent structure or a part of the emergency rescue service, designed to carry out emergency rescue operations, the basis of which are rescue units equipped with special equipment, equipment, equipment, tools and materials.

The main tasks of emergency rescue services, emergency rescue teams, which are mandatory assigned to them, are:

maintenance of command and control bodies, forces and means of emergency rescue services, emergency rescue teams in constant readiness to advance to emergency zones and carry out work to eliminate emergency situations;

control over the readiness of serviced facilities and territories to carry out work on them to eliminate emergency situations;

liquidation of emergencies at serviced objects or territories.

In addition, in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation, emergency rescue services, emergency rescue teams may be assigned the following tasks:

participation in the development of plans for the prevention and elimination of emergency situations at the serviced facilities and territories, plans for interaction in the elimination of emergency situations at other facilities and territories;

participation in the preparation of decisions on the creation, placement, determination of the nomenclature and volume of reserves of material resources for the elimination of emergency situations;

promotion of knowledge in the field of protection of the population and territories from emergency situations, participation in the preparation of the population and employees of organizations for actions in emergency situations;

participation in the development of regulatory documents on the organization and conduct of rescue and urgent work;

development of proposals to state authorities on the legal and technical support of the activities of emergency rescue services, emergency rescue teams, social protection of rescuers and other workers of emergency rescue services, emergency rescue teams.

In accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation, emergency rescue services, emergency rescue teams can be created:

on a permanent full-time basis - professional emergency services, professional emergency rescue teams;

on a non-standard basis - non-standard emergency rescue teams;

on a voluntary basis - public emergency rescue units.

Professional emergency rescue services, professional emergency rescue units are created:

in federal executive bodies - by decisions of the Government of the Russian Federation on the proposals of the relevant ministries, departments and organizations of the Russian Federation, agreed with the federal executive body specially authorized to solve problems in the field of protecting the population and territories from emergencies, and other interested federal executive bodies ;

in the constituent entities of the Russian Federation - by the executive authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation;

in organizations engaged in one or more types of activities, in the implementation of which the legislation of the Russian Federation provides for the obligatory presence of organizations of their own emergency rescue services, emergency rescue teams, - by the management of organizations in agreement with the management bodies under the executive authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, specially authorized to solve problems in the field of protecting the population and territories from emergency situations;

in local self-government bodies - by decision of local self-government bodies, unless otherwise provided by the legislation of the Russian Federation.

Non-standard emergency rescue units are created by organizations from among their employees on a mandatory basis, if this is provided for by the legislation of the Russian Federation, or by decision of the administrations of organizations in the manner prescribed by the legislation of the Russian Federation.

Public emergency rescue formations are created by public associations whose statutory tasks are to participate in the work to eliminate emergency situations.

Freelance emergency rescue units(NASF) are part of the civil defense forces.

Being directly at the enterprise (facility) as part of a working shift, the NASF can take the necessary emergency measures on civil defense warning signals, as well as to prevent or localize an emergency at the very early stage threats and start rescue and other urgent work even before the arrival of the main forces.

When determining the number of emergency rescue teams, the predicted situation that may develop in the organization (on the territory) in peacetime and wartime is taken into account. At the same time, the formations should be equipped with modern technology and equipment, be mobile and more functional.

Non-standard emergency rescue teams are independent structures created on a non-standard basis, equipped with special equipment, equipment, equipment, tools and materials, prepared for emergency rescue and other urgent work in the foci of destruction and emergency zones.

NASF are created by organizations:

having potentially hazardous production facilities and operating them;

having important defense and economic importance;

representing a high degree of danger of emergency situations in wartime and peacetime;

other organizations from among their employees.

The executive authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and local governments can create, maintain and organize the activities of the NASF to solve problems in their territories.

Non-standard emergency rescue teams are created in accordance with the Indicative list of non-standard emergency rescue teams being created (Appendix No. 1 to the order of the EMERCOM of Russia dated 01.01.2001 No. 000 "On approval of the Procedure for creating non-standard emergency rescue teams"). The provision of non-standard emergency rescue teams is carried out in accordance with the Approximate norms for equipping (charting) the NASF with special equipment, equipment, equipment, tools and materials (Appendix No. 2 to the order of the Russian Emergencies Ministry No. 000).

Depending on local conditions and in the presence of the material and technical base, other non-standard emergency rescue units can be created.

The main tasks of the NASF are:

carrying out emergency rescue operations and the priority life support of the population affected during the conduct of hostilities or as a result of these actions;

participation in the liquidation of natural and man-made emergencies, as well as in the fight against fires;

detection and designation of areas subjected to radioactive, chemical, biological (bacteriological) and other contamination (contamination);

sanitary treatment of the population, special treatment of equipment, buildings and disinfection of territories;

participation in the restoration of the functioning of life support facilities for the population;

provision of civil defense measures on the protection of public order, communications and warning, protection of animals and plants, medical, motor transport.

The composition, structure and equipment of the NASF are determined by the heads of organizations in accordance with the order of the Russian Emergencies Ministry No. 000 and methodological recommendations for the creation, training, equipment and use of emergency rescue teams (" Guidelines on the creation, training and equipping of emergency rescue teams, M: 2005), based on the tasks of civil defense and protecting the population, and are agreed with the territorial bodies of the EMERCOM of Russia - bodies specially authorized to solve civil defense tasks and tasks for the prevention and elimination of emergency situations for the subjects of the Russian Federation.

MILITARY THOUGHT No. 6/1994

(Methodological foundations)

ColonelA.N. ZAKHAROV ,

Candidate of Military Sciences, Associate Professor

CHANGE in the spectrum of the political palette of the world had a significant impact on the theory and practice of applying military force in interstate relations. The probability of the outbreak of large-scale wars has decreased, but the question of finding forces and means to achieve victory in armed clashes of a smaller scale has become very acute. Among them, weapons and military equipment with damaging factors approaching nuclear weapons, - high-tech weapon systems, including high-precision weapons (WTO). The reliability of these assumptions, and, consequently, the prospects for the development of the armed forces, is quite convincingly confirmed by the experience of using the WTO in the war in the Persian Gulf zone.

The current situation significantly exacerbates the problem of combating the enemy's WTO in combined arms operations of various scales that arose before military science and practice in the late 1980s. The success of this solution depends primarily on the truth and depth of scientific study of the complex of initial installations - the methodological foundations of the struggle. These include: the concept of "precision weapons" and the fight against the enemy's WTO, the purpose of the fight, the content, composition of the participating forces and means, the principles of its conduct.

The concept of "precision weapons", which is now being used in military scientific circles, was developed at the turn of the 90s. It unites combat systems, weapon systems and means of destruction capable of implementing the principle of "shot - defeat" within their reach through the use of weapons and ammunition controlled on a trajectory. At the same time, the modern interpretation of the “shot-kill” principle assumes that the target is hit by the first launch (shot) with a probability of at least 0.5, regardless of the conditions combat use weapons.

In theoretical terms, it is recommended to understand the fight against the enemy's WTO as a set of measures taken to disrupt or maximally weaken its impact on troops or rear facilities. However, based on the fact that any operation is a combination of various actions of associations, formations and parts to fulfill their tasks, then this definition, in our opinion, should be interpreted in the following edition. The fight against the WTO in combined arms operations is a combination of the most effective action troops aimed at preventing the enemy’s high-precision weapons from destroying weapons, military equipment, manpower, important rear facilities and elements of operational theater equipment located and functioning in the combat space of the formation.

The term "prevention" in this definition combines two concepts. One of them - "disruption of the use of WTO systems" means the actions of the troops, which may not allow the enemy to use the WTO. The other is "reducing the effectiveness of the impact of weapons already used" - the actions of the troops aimed at preventing or minimizing the degree of defeat.

Rice. 1. The content of the phenomenon of "fighting the opponent's WTO"

The content of the fight against WTO can be imagined based on the following axiomatic premise: it is based on well-known measures taken to combat traditional types of weapons - the defeat of weapons, individual protection from ammunition, etc. They constitute one part of the struggle. Another is the measures that compensate for the peculiarities of the properties, composition and methods of functioning of the WTO, which singled it out from the entire set of samples of traditional conventional weapons (Fig. 1).

Let us dwell on the peculiarities of the WTO, which predetermine the second part of the struggle. First of all, this is the increased need for HTO systems in comparison with traditional weapons for information about targets, their location, terrain and atmosphere. It is necessary for the maximum realization of the combat capabilities of the damaging element. This is due to the fact that the process of controlling high-precision weapons, unlike the discrete process of controlling conventional weapons, which consists of one cycle "detection - target designation", is continuous and combines two, three and even four such cycles.

In general, this important feature WTO allows us to call it the first type of new information-intensive weapon that requires unconventional methods of combat.

Let's get one more distinguishing feature closely related to the previous one. Permanent reconnaissance and additional reconnaissance of the object of destruction, which underlie the functioning of the WTO, are carried out by technical means. Therefore, the effectiveness of the WTO application depends on the degree, so to speak, of the “normality” of the position and state of each WTO subsystem, each object of destruction and environment(atmosphere, terrain, vegetation cover, etc.) in the areas of placement of subsystems of the WTO, objects of destruction and on the trajectory of the flight of ammunition.

To ensure high information content of the WTO, the scope of application is sharply expanding and the importance of managing the subsystems of navigation and timing, meteorological and logistics support is increasing.

The goal of fighting WTO the enemy - to compensate as much as possible for the features of this type of weapon, which means: in addition to the known and ongoing actions to defeat the enemy and his electronic warfare, deprive the means of reconnaissance of data on the objects of destruction of our troops; constantly violate the "normal" position of the WTO subsystems and the "normal" state of the atmosphere in the entire space of the use of guided weapons, as well as in the areas where the objects of our troops are located; actively influence the subsystems of navigation, time and meteorological support and elements of automated control systems.

In general, the fight against the enemy's WTO in the operation, as well as the process of using these weapons, should have a polymeric character. It can be qualified as an integrated content of the fight against the WTO, the essence of which lies in the successive and simultaneous, complex and disparate actions of associations, formations, units and subunits to localize, distort and destroy information about the objects of our troops, elements of operational theater equipment and the environment; destruction of weapons, ammunition, means of obtaining, collecting, processing, storing, distributing and transmitting information, orientation of weapons, ammunition and other subsystems of the WTO in space, external and internal control, systems of collective protection, basing and logistic support of the WTO; changing the normal conditions for the functioning of the listed combat means in the environment and depriving them of the ability to maneuver; creating a threat of loss of the combat properties of the WTO before the shot (launch) or the destruction of their objects; destruction, distortion of information functioning in WTO systems and suppression of exchange channels; changing the true parameters of the optical, optoelectronic, radio, radio engineering, radar, thermal and other conditions at the locations and functioning of WTO facilities; discrepancy between the information used by guided weapons, ammunition and homing combat elements (SBE) when entering the object of our troops, with the initial information received by reconnaissance equipment at the time of its discovery or available to the enemy; creating conditions that impede the process of entry of the already applied WTO into energy contact with the target; prohibition of penetration to the objects of our troops already used guided munitions and SBE; reducing the effectiveness of their action at the target.

The composition of the participants in the process fight is determined by the composition, properties and capabilities of its first and most important group - the adversary's WTO grouping. This includes means of destruction of high-precision combat systems and weapons complexes, deployed and maneuvering within the combat space of the formation, guided weapons and ammunition, as well as other military equipment, systems, facilities and subunits of military branches and special forces, enemy fortifications and elements of operational theater equipment that participate or are used in ensuring their combat functioning. The WTO grouping can include up to six subgroups of objects, as well as zones and areas of the environment (Fig. 2).

The first - means of destruction (WTO systems) - warships, submarines and combat aircraft with cruise missiles and other precision-guided munitions, artillery and tanks, used guided munitions, means remote mining terrain and other military equipment.

Summarizing their properties, we emphasize that existing and prospective HTO systems are distinguished by high combat effectiveness (virtually guaranteed destruction of an object), increased range of destruction, high targeting accuracy, short reaction time and a short engagement cycle, the use of ammunition with various systems guidance and homing. According to the plans of military experts, WTO weapons should reliably hit buried command posts, runways, air defense and aviation control radars, OTR and TR in positions, groups of armored objects (including mobile ones), artillery groups, and individual point important objects for various purposes.

Each WTO system has three functionally related main elements: reconnaissance, control, destruction. They are either separated in space or united by a common rigid shell.

Along with this, recently in the armies of developed foreign countries, the concept of the so-called multifunctional HANDS (MFRUK) is gaining more and more popularity. MFRUK is a comprehensive integration on the scale of connecting and combining means of destruction, support (intelligence, communications, navigation, meteorology), electronic suppression and command and control of troops and weapons into a single system. This trend is confirmed by the experience of military operations in the Persian Gulf zone. From the very beginning of the conflict, the command of the multinational forces created a unified information support system based on the technical means of all types of intelligence. Practically all types of WTO used in war were "connected" to it as needed.

The second is the intelligence systems involved in the functioning of the WTO. These include: spacecraft for photographic, optical-electronic, photo-television and radio-technical reconnaissance; aerial reconnaissance means; aircraft tactical aviation solving reconnaissance tasks; ground reconnaissance equipment (radio, radio engineering, optical-electronic, sound and reconnaissance and signaling devices "Rsmbass"). It is necessary to highlight high-precision radio and electronic intelligence systems.

The third one is control objects: PU of associations and connections; tactical aviation control centers; ground control centers (NTC) RUK; advanced aviation gunners; PU ROCK; PU divisions and batteries using precision-guided munitions.

Fourth - objects of navigation, time and meteorological support: the Navstar space navigation system, as well as systems for determining the location of objects of combined arms and artillery units.

Fifth - objects of collective protection of WTO systems: security units, electronic warfare equipment, including reconnaissance and interference systems, air defense equipment and units, technical intelligence and security systems, fortifications and other artificial structures.

Sixth - logistics and basing facilities: naval bases, airfields and bases for tactical aviation and combat helicopters, warehouses of guided weapons and ammunition, areas where objects of the WTO grouping are located, roads, column tracks and elements of operational equipment on them.

Finally, a special (seventh) subgroup - zones and areas of the environment in which the normal state of the optical, optoelectronic, radio, radio engineering, radar, thermal, acoustic and seismic conditions can change in the interests of disrupting the functioning of objects of the first - sixth subgroups.

Let's move on to the second group of participants in the process of combating the WTO - the objects of our troops that have a certain level of individual protection, as well as the environment in which they exist and conduct combat operations. There are nine types of objects here.

The first one is objects detected by radio emission and affected by guided munitions with radar homing heads: air defense radar, airfield aviation drives radar, control radar aviation, radio-electronic means of PU associations, etc.

The second is weakly protected areal (simple and complex) objects, detected mainly by optoelectronic means and affected by single-block warheads and SES of cluster warheads of conventional high-explosive action: ICBM units at launch positions, fuel depots, airfield runways, airplanes and helicopters in open parking lots, communication centers of launchers, units of OTR and TR at starting positions, rear bases, junction railway stations, chemical industry enterprises, etc.

The third is individual fixed targets detected by the principle of radar, thermal or radiometric contrast and affected by guided munitions and SBEs of the type of precise aiming (guidance) combat elements: tanks, self-propelled howitzers, infantry fighting vehicles, anti-tank systems, combat vehicles of command posts, etc.

The fourth is group fixed targets detected by the principle of radar contrast. These are tank and motorized rifle units, firing platoons of SGs, launchers of missiles, ATGM batteries at firing positions and in areas of location.

The fifth and sixth types are the third and fourth types of targets in motion.

Seventh - weakly protected fixed point objects detected by most reconnaissance means and hit by guided munitions with conventional high-explosive charges: bridges on the most important railways and highways, crossings, water treatment plants, individual unarmored targets.

Eighth - well-protected fixed point targets, detected by most reconnaissance equipment, but hit only by penetrating warheads: mine launchers of the Strategic Missile Forces, stationary launchers of associations, nuclear ammunition depots, aircraft in shelters, nuclear power plants, etc.

Ninth (special) - zones and areas of the environment that are used by the enemy when collecting and transmitting information about the objects of our troops of the first - eighth type: areas of location and movement lanes of group objects, areas of distortion of the true operational-strategic situation (false areas of location of troops, positions, objects of weapons and military equipment, routes, elements of the operational equipment of the theater), as well as zones airspace and areas of the earth's surface, within which it is necessary to change the "normal" state of the optical, optoelectronic, radio, radio engineering, radar, thermal, acoustic and seismic conditions, including areas of the terrain that can serve to correct the flight routes of cruise missiles .

Rice. 3. The logic of the formation of the principles of combating the enemy’s WTO grouping in combined arms operations

The third group of participants in the process under consideration includes four subgroups: forces and means of influence on all components of the adversary's WTO grouping; forces and means of localization of information subsystems of WTO systems; forces and means of collective protection of association objects; forces and means of localization, distortion and destruction of information about objects (radiated by the objects of our troops and characterizing not only their physical condition, but also the nature of actions, as well as the situation in the operational formation of troops). This group includes reconnaissance units and subunits of all types of the Armed Forces and combat arms; fighter, fighter-bomber, bomber, attack aircraft and aviation ground forces; OTR and TR divisions; RUK and ROK; rocket, barrel and anti-tank artillery; air defense systems; combined arms units and divisions; engineering units, EW troops and RKhBZ; partisan and other formations operating in the territory occupied by the enemy.

One of the central positions in the methodological foundations is occupied by principles of combating the enemy's WTO in general operations. We emphasize that these are general scientifically based rules, recommendations for the practical activities of commanders, headquarters and troops in preparing and conducting a fight against the enemy’s WTO grouping. The logic of the formation of these principles is shown in Figure 3.

On the present stage development of the problem under consideration, more than twenty principles have been formulated. Let's dwell on some of them.

Primarily - principle of operational subordination and expediency. It prescribes to fight against the WTO of the enemy in within the framework of a combined-arms operation in accordance with the goals, objectives, nature, forms and methods of conducting combat operations by combined-arms formations, formations and units according to a single plan and concept in the interests of the immediate capture (interception) of the initiative, fire, electronic and information superiority, mismatch of military operations of the WTO grouping the enemy and the disruption of his sudden actions.

The principle of conformity predetermines the conduct of the fight in accordance with the level of combat capability of each of the objects of the WTO grouping and the methods of their use, the deployment of groups of opposing sides, the combat readiness of the forces and means of our troops and objects of engagement with high-precision weapons.

The high level of saturation of the enemy's operational formation with WTO objects, which, as a rule, will be hidden by all available means, forces us to formulate the principle of guaranteed reliability. In accordance with it, the fight must be carried out only with reliably reconnoitered and identified objects of the WTO group, information arrays and flows within them and between them, as well as between weapons and objects of our troops.

One of the most important laws of the fight against the WTO reflects the principle of priority. He recommends resolutely focusing efforts on combating information functioning in the contour of the WTO grouping and emitted by objects, disrupting the energy contact of guided weapons and ammunition with the objects of our troops, as well as on influencing those means of destruction of the enemy grouping that determine the level of its combat capabilities in what - any point in time during the execution of this operational task.

Taking into account the high dependence of the effectiveness of the WTO on the "normality" of all parameters of the process of its application, we can single out the principle of constancy. It expresses the need to influence the environment, especially the atmosphere, to constantly change the "normal" placement of objects of our troops in operational formation, to destroy and distort the information they emit.

The principle of individual sequencing reflects the complexity of the WTO systems themselves and the significant structural differences between them. It requires the choice of an individual for each object of the WTO grouping of the sequence of disruption of the processes of its functioning in time and space, starting with the destruction of information, through the suppression of control to the destruction of weapons. Finally, the principle of complex impact. It requires a comprehensive simultaneous impact on all energy and robotic systems of WTO facilities, information arrays, flows and communications involved in the process and determining their combat capability at this stage of the operation.

The main measures to combat the enemy's WTO within the framework of combined arms operations must be viewed through the prism of the actions of the troops implementing them. They should be aimed at performing (in appropriate ways and in certain forms) a certain set of combat missions in four areas. In the field of impact on the objects of the WTO grouping, this is the defeat of the intelligence subsystems of the WTO grouping, command posts, WTO systems, guided weapons and ammunition, command posts and elements of the automated control systems of the Ground Forces, Air Force, intelligence and electronic warfare, elements of navigation-time and meteorological support systems, collective protection WTO, warehouses of guided weapons and ammunition, as well as their transports on supply routes; the exit of combined-arms subunits to the areas where the subsystems of the WTO are located, maintaining close contact of subunits of the first echelon with the advanced elements of the enemy’s battle order; destruction, distortion of information permanently stored in the media of all WTO subsystems and obtained by the enemy, restriction or prohibition of access to it and disorganization of the operation of software and hardware.

In the field of localization of WTO information subsystems, this is the suppression of technical means and channels for the exchange of information in the subsystems of intelligence, navigation and time support (NVO), control and destruction of WTO systems, between these subsystems, between them and control points of the ground forces, air force, intelligence and electronic warfare and collective protection systems; creation of space zones excluding the possibility of using WTO systems; environmental impact.

The field of collective defense of our troops' facilities is represented by the tasks of deflecting guided weapons and ammunition on approach to the target, fortification and other equipment of areas, positions and lines, guarding the facilities of our troops by combined arms units, creating and ensuring the functioning of technical security systems.

In the field of localization, distortion and destruction of information about the objects of our troops, the main tasks are: concealing the deployment and movement of troops, terrain and elements of operational theater equipment using various means and methods of camouflage; the use of masking and protective properties of the terrain; creation of false areas for the location of troops, positions, objects, routes, terrain and elements of the operational equipment of the theater; imitation of troop actions in false areas; conducting demonstrative actions; disinformation; elimination of unmasking signs of objects of our troops; environmental impact.

In addition, the fulfillment of a number of tasks makes it possible to simultaneously solve the issues of combating the WTO grouping in the field of both the collective protection of objects of our troops and the localization, destruction and distortion of information emitted by them. Let's call them: reduction of coverage of weapons and military equipment in the ranges of all radiation spectra; fortification and other equipment of areas, positions and lines; impact on the environment within the combat space of the association; expedient construction of marching, pre-battle formations and dispersal of troops; change of location areas, lines and positions; the implementation of the maneuver; withdrawal of troops from WTO strikes; elimination of the consequences of the use of the enemy's WTO.

Special attention should be paid to the reconnaissance activities of our troops. They are carried out in all of the above areas and cover the reconnaissance of the subsystems of the WTO, launcher and automated control systems, information exchange channels, collective protection systems for the objects of the WTO grouping, warehouses of guided munitions, weapons and their delivery routes, basing elements and maneuver routes of the WTO subsystems, identification of unmasking signs of the objects of association , the state of the environment, as well as the detection of the beginning of the work of the technical means of reconnaissance of the enemy.

In conclusion, let us briefly dwell on the prospects of the considered phenomenon. Saturation modern armies precision weapons has a steady upward trend. It should be expected that at the beginning of the 21st century, the WTO will constitute the bulk of the conventional means of destruction of the belligerents. Accordingly, the armed clash will take the form of the confrontation described in general terms. Therefore, even today the most important task of military science is the detailed theoretical development of the issues of combating the enemy's WTO on an operational-strategic scale as the basis and prototype of future combined-arms operations.

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SCIENCE AND MILITARY SECURITY No. 4/2007, pp. 6-9

Colonel I.M. BYKOV,

chairman of the scientific and technical committee

Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus,

candidate of technical sciences, associate professor

The conceptual foundations for building an integrated system for countering high-precision weapons (HTO) to protect cover objects of the Republic of Belarus are a variant of the system of views that defines the goal, main tasks, principles, priority areas for building and developing an integrated system for countering high-precision weapons to protect cover objects of the Republic of Belarus. They can be used to plan the development and technical equipment of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus (AF RB) in order to increase their capabilities to counter external threats of armed influence, carried out using modern WTO tools on cover objects that determine the stability of the functioning of the most important state systems of the country.

The proposed option is based on the results of threat analysis military security state, tendencies and directions of development of means and methods of armed struggle.

characteristic features the use of forces and means of armed struggle in local wars at the beginning of the 21st century are:

overwhelming military-technical and information superiority of the attacking side;

increasing the multifunctionality of means of armed influence and the role of high-precision weapons;

the transition from the destruction of manpower, weapons and military equipment to the selective destruction of infrastructure;

increase in the scale-time scope of operations;

transition from physical impact to information;

massive use of long-range precision weapons, remotely piloted and robotic aircraft;

the growing role of geospatial information in the period of preparation and conduct of armed struggle.

The expected nature and dynamics of the development of possible military conflicts are shown in Figure 1.

aim building and developing an integrated system of countering the WTO is to reduce the effectiveness of its application and minimize the damage caused by the WTO to cover objects. It is achieved by centralized planning and implementation of organizational and technical measures for the development and use of forces and means of countering the WTO in the course of training and employment of the Armed Forces.

Main tasks construction and development of an integrated system of counteraction to the WTO can be considered:

modeling of the confrontation process during the application of the WTO and the practical implementation of measures to reduce its effectiveness;

maintaining in a state of readiness for use and increasing the capabilities of forces and means intended to counter the WTO, by modernizing the models (complexes) of weapons, military and special equipment (AMSE) in service, improving existing and developing new means and methods of their use;

consistent build-up of the capabilities of the integrated system of counteraction to the WTO as the tactical and technical characteristics of the WTO and the methods of its combat use are improved;

operational-tactical, scientific, technical and feasibility study of the need to develop and serial production promising means of detecting and destroying WTO elements, means of passive protection of cover objects, means of controlling forces and means of countering WTO, ensuring the conditions for their compatibility in a single organizational and technical system of the Armed Forces.

Priority directions construction and development of an integrated system of counteraction to the WTO can be:

centralized planning and implementation, according to a single plan, of organizational measures for reconnaissance, fire damage, radio-electronic and optical-electronic suppression of the WTO and its individual elements, passive protection of cover objects within the Armed Forces (military organization of the state);

the creation of a unified warning and warning system for missile attacks, the transfer of the integrated anti-WTO system to the highest levels of readiness to repel strikes;

development of promising methods and means of countering the intelligence and information subsystems of the WTO space, air and ground-based. Wide application complex signals providing signal masking electronic means and means of communication, overload and suppression of electronic intelligence receivers;

modernization of existing and creation of new jamming-proof means of detecting, destroying and suppressing the WTO and its individual elements;

mastering the production of new domestic means of active and passive protection of cover objects from the WTO, as well as the purchase of individual elements, the development and production of which by enterprises of the defense sector of the economy of the Republic of Belarus is impossible or impractical;

increasing the effectiveness of the integrated system of countering the WTO through the development and testing of new methods of combat use of existing and promising models (complexes) of AMSE included in this system.

Figure 2 shows a possible variant of an integrated system for countering the WTO, which includes:

WTO detection subsystems;

active countermeasures subsystems WTO;

subsystems of passive counteraction to the WTO;

means of managing the complex system of counteraction to the WTO.

The basic principles for the construction and development of an integrated system of counteraction to the WTO should be determined based on the above tasks and priority areas its development.

It is expedient to determine the main directions of development of the WTO detection subsystem:

integration of means of radio and radio engineering (RR, RTR), radar (RLR) and optoelectronic reconnaissance (OER) of various ranges, purpose and subordination in order to increase their information content, adapt operating modes to the conditions of modern electronic countermeasures;

automation of the processes of receiving, collecting, registering, processing, displaying and communicating intelligence information about the operational situation and WTO facilities in real time;

development and use of non-traditional methods for obtaining and processing information about WTO objects (multi-position radar, location of air objects in the field of third-party radiation sources, electrostatic, acoustic and seismic location; unmanned reconnaissance vehicles, aerostatic type vehicles).

To the priority tasks of the development of the WTO detection subsystem should include the following:

modernization, development and purchase of electronic intelligence systems, automated hardware and software systems for radio intelligence, radar stations with synthesized antenna systems, low-altitude target detection systems, as well as means of protecting radar stations from WTO;

development of prototype and experimental samples of passive detection systems for cruise missiles and other aircraft based on various physical principles using electromagnetic, electrostatic, acoustic, seismic and other fields;

development effective ways, methods, algorithms and technologies for detection - measurement - recognition of attacking elements of the WTO and their carriers against the background of simulating and masking interference;

development of principles for the construction and justification of the structure and composition of small-sized radar stations short range that meet modern and future requirements, taking into account the trends in the development of the WTO;

improvement of the navigation support system of the Armed Forces, creation of promising means of coordinate-time support of mobile reconnaissance equipment;

development and purchase of complexes of radio and radio engineering, radar and optical-electronic reconnaissance placed on board UAVs and balloons.

The main directions of development of the subsystem of active counteraction to the WTO can be:

modernization of existing anti-aircraft missile and combat aviation systems based on the use of advanced detection tools with increased information capabilities in the context of the use of electronic interference; introduction of new methods of guidance of guided missiles, providing an increase in the probability of hitting HTSC;

development and creation of means of functional destruction of WTO elements based on new physical principles; means and complexes of electronic suppression of control systems of the WTO (including means of radar, radio engineering and optical-electronic reconnaissance of air and space-based, communication and data transmission lines, means of satellite radio navigation and HTSC guidance);

radio-electronic protection of REM from deliberate interference and radiation-homing weapons both in the course of designing new models of REM, and in the development and practical development of documents for their combat use in conditions of electronic countermeasures;

creation of integrated automated systems for the destruction of high-temperature superconductors, designed for the active protection of cover objects by forming a single contour of fire damage, electronic suppression and an integrated reconnaissance system;

purchase and delivery to the troops of new anti-aircraft missile systems, ensuring the destruction of aircraft of strategic and tactical aviation, ballistic targets and HTSC.

The priority tasks for the development of the subsystem of active counteraction to the WTO include (Figure 3):

1. Increasing the combat capabilities of fire weapons of elements of the HTO and HTSC due to:

modernization of anti-aircraft missile and combat aviation systems in service by improving the reconnaissance subsystem, introducing the latest achievements in the field of reducing visibility in all EMW ranges and increasing their combat capabilities to defeat high-temperature superconductors;

integration and joint use of modernized anti-aircraft missile systems with jamming stations for aircraft airborne radars and satellite navigation systems.

2. Increasing the capabilities of means of electronic destruction (suppression) of HTSC control systems and their means of delivery due to:

modernization of the main types of interference stations for communications and on-board radio electronic equipment, their automated control points, the creation of radio interference stations for radio navigation systems;

deep modernization of helicopter complexes electronic warfare in order to ensure the solution of the tasks of radio-electronic suppression of the RES of the enemy attack aircraft;

development of effective small-sized means of suppressing on-board navigation (laser and GPS) HTS systems;

conducting research aimed at developing means of microwave destruction, including electromagnetic bomb based on a bulk free electron laser.

The main directions of development of the subsystem of passive counteraction to the WTO should be determined:

conducting research in the field of reducing the visibility of weapons and military equipment in the radar and optical regions of the EMP spectrum, reducing the availability of electronic and optoelectronic reconnaissance, simulating the radiation of real objects;

development and creation of materials and technical means of masking objects and samples (complexes) of AMSE;

development and practical testing of combat documents (manuals, instructions) that provide effective application technical means of disguise.

The priority tasks of developing the subsystem of passive counteraction to the WTO include:

development and creation of technical means for masking objects, samples (complexes) of AMSE based on highly porous cellular materials and composites, fibers, paints and foams with physical properties, providing a distortion of their spectral visibility in the frequency ranges of the WTO guidance means;

development and creation of hardware-software complexes for simulating the operation of radio-electronic means;

development of aerosol countermeasures for WTO, increasing the controllability of setting up aerosol curtains with a given speed and duration.

layout development high degree detailing the main types of weapons and military equipment in service with the Armed Forces, primarily weapons Air force and air defense troops, as well as missile troops.

The main directions of development of the subsystem of management of the complex system of counteraction to the WTO can be:

further automation of the processes of receiving, processing and issuing intelligence information, control of combat assets and means of electronic countermeasures through the use of modern computing tools and information technologies;

creation of automation tools for all elements of an integrated system of protection against WTO, their integration into a single automated control system based on network structures with the implementation of the principles of distributed processing, storage and delivery of information;

development and creation of noise-proof means of communication and data transmission with a high level of cryptoprotection, the transition to digital methods of information transmission, the creation of an integrated system for protecting high-speed digital channels from WTO in the main information areas;

development and creation on the basis of inertial systems and satellite radio navigation equipment of mobile navigation and geodetic complexes, as well as instruments, stations and complexes for determining navigation parameters for positioning elements of an integrated system for countering high-precision weapons and cover objects on a time scale close to real.

The priority tasks for the development of the management subsystem of the integrated system of counteraction to the WTO include:

development and creation of an automated system for collecting, processing information and managing duty forces and means of electronic intelligence;

development and creation of an integrated automated control system for combat assets of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces based on the existing ACS of the operational-tactical level;

modernization of existing and development of new automated electronic warfare control points used in the interests of countering the WTO;

creation of a unified information support system for the Armed Forces within the framework of solving the problem of counteracting the WTO based on distributed data banks, data transmission facilities and a geographic information system for military purposes.

Implementation of the Conceptual Framework can be carried out in two stages.

On the first stage:

conducting research and development aimed at substantiating the appearance of an integrated system of countering the WTO, modernizing existing means of countering the WTO;

creation of a technological basis for the development of a new elemental base and advanced samples of means for detecting the WTO, control, active and passive protection of cover objects.

On the second stage:

completion of applied research and development in the interests of creating samples (complexes) for detecting, recognizing and tracking the WTO, controls, active and passive protection of cover objects;

creation of the necessary domestic scientific, technical and technological base for the planned implementation of the results of the completed R & D, development and production of new serial samples (complexes) of AME, intended for use in the integrated system of countering the WTO.

Literature

1. Maltsev L.S. Fundamentals of the military doctrine of the state. - Minsk: VA RB, 2007.

2. Slipchenko V.I. Wars of the sixth generation. Weapons and military art of the future. - M.: Veche, 2002.

3. Kosachev I.M. Tactical and technical characteristics, basics of combat use and mathematical models of anti-radar missiles. - Minsk: VA RB, 2006.

4. Radzievsky V.G. Modern electronic warfare. - M.: Radio engineering, 2006.

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Complex masking of economic objects- this is a set of measures to hide objects and landmarks near them, imitate their work, carried out in cooperation with the air defense (AD) of the Armed Forces using various kinds and means of engineering and, electronic warfare, to counter high-precision and conventional means of defeating an air enemy.

The use of various types and means of engineering camouflage achieves shielding, lowering or changing the levels of objects (critical elements) in all operating ranges of targeting and navigation electronic systems of a potential enemy. An imitation of the functioning of objects is created by demonstrating to the enemy a group of false objects (physical fields of objects) at a safe distance from the object in order to “withdraw” and undermine combat units of the WTO on false targets.

Hiding protected objects is achieved by using aerosols, installing screen masks, zones of thermal (light) decoys, using radio and heat-absorbing coatings, green spaces, etc. Hiding individual landmarks near objects is carried out for those that can be used by an air enemy in as secondary aiming points precision munitions(RPV, guided bombs and missiles).

Methods and means of electronic warfare (electronic countermeasures of the WTO and their carriers) used to protect objects may include jamming stations for aircraft radar systems and weapon control systems. These means have a pre-emptive or reciprocal nature of the impact of electronic interference on the enemy's radio-electronic systems. They are able to almost instantly affect the main components of the "homing" weapons of the enemy and disrupt their functioning.

Premature undermining of the WTO by means of electronic warfare (EW) (“withdrawal” of the warhead from the target) can be achieved by creating on the flight path of the enemy’s weapon many decoys - “traps” delivered to the calculated meeting point by ammunition of interference fired launchers deployed at or near the facility. In possible armed conflicts between Russia and an adversary possessing a variety of “inconspicuous” high-precision weapon systems capable of one or two munitions (guided bombs-UAB, homing missiles-UR and remotely piloted aircraft - RPV) to hit the most important "critical" elements of objects, the problem of complex counteraction to these means becomes especially urgent.

The problem of protecting objects from high-precision weapons cannot be effectively solved only by fire weapons of the air defense of the Armed Forces or by the differentiated use of various types and means of engineering camouflage. These tasks are most effectively solved by means of complex (non-fire) object protection. Complex object protection assumes the maximum possible counteraction to each attack of the enemy's WTO on the object and a decrease in the total number of attacks.

The effect of protecting economic and infrastructure facilities (critical elements of facilities) from HTO using integrated object protection is achieved by creating zones of interference-traps on the HTO flight path, simulating the physical fields of objects for radio-electronic (opto-electronic) aiming and navigation systems of the enemy's HTO, causing "withdrawal "and undermining at a safe distance the warheads of missiles, guided bombs and enemy UAVs.

The complex of object protection includes means for detecting WTO and its carriers, means for electronic and optical-electronic suppression, stations for counter-interference with means of laser irradiation of objects, means for engineering camouflage of objects and aerosol countermeasures. The use of complex object protection reduces the risk of hitting a covered object to a level of 0.2–0.1.

Sources: Paly A.I.Electronic warfare. - M., 1974; Kostrov A.V. To the problem of prevention of emergency situations initiated at facilities and territories // Problems of safety in emergency situations. 1995. Issue 7. pp. 36–61.