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EW RF Armed Forces. Dossier
Every year on April 15, the Armed Forces (AF) of the Russian Federation celebrate the Day of an Electronic Warfare Specialist - a professional holiday established by a decree of Russian President Vladimir Putin dated May 31, 2006. Originally celebrated in accordance with the order of the Minister defense of the Russian Federation Igor Sergeev dated May 3, 1999
History of EW Troops
The history of the formation of the electronic warfare troops (EW) in Russian army counted from April 15 (April 2, O.S.), 1904. On this day, during the Russo-Japanese War, the signalmen of the squadron battleship Pobeda and the naval telegraph station on Zolotoy Gora managed, by putting radio interference, to disrupt the shelling by Japanese armored ships corrected by radio cruisers "Nissin" and "Kasuga" of the Russian squadron and the fortress of Port Arthur.
Since both sides used the same type of spark transmitters, the enemy’s message could be “hammered with a big spark” - more powerful signals from the device. This incident was the first step in world military history from organizing radio intelligence to conducting electronic warfare in combat operations. In the future, electronic warfare equipment was actively improved, and the practice of their use expanded significantly.
December 16, 1942 by resolution State Committee Defense signed by Commander-in-Chief Joseph Stalin as part of the Directorate military intelligence The General Staff (GSh) of the Red Army formed the Department for the management of the work of interfering radio stations and the task was to form three radio divisions with the means to "drive" the enemy's radio stations - the first parts of the electronic warfare in the USSR army.
On November 4, 1953, the apparatus of the assistant chief of the General Staff for electronic intelligence and interference was created. In the future, it was repeatedly reorganized and changed its name (the 9th department of the General Staff, the Electronic Countermeasures Service of the General Staff, the 5th Directorate of the General Staff, the EW Directorate of the Main Directorate of ACS and EW of the General Staff, etc.).
Current state
The range of modern tasks of the EW troops includes electronic reconnaissance and the destruction of electronic means of enemy command and control systems, as well as monitoring the effectiveness of measures taken to electronically protect their forces and means.
In the course of the large-scale reform of the RF Armed Forces that started in 2008, a vertically integrated electronic warfare system was formed, which is generally managed by the Office of the Chief of the EW Troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Ground and aviation units and electronic warfare units are part of the Special Forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
In the Ground Forces, separate EW brigades of four battalions have been formed in all four military districts. The brigades are armed with the Leer-2 and Leer-3 complexes with Orlan-10 drones, which allow reconnaissance and suppression of tactical radio communications and cellular communication. The electronic warfare unit is also part of a separate motorized rifle arctic brigade as part of the North Joint Strategic Command.
There are separate electronic warfare companies in each of the reformed motorized rifle tank brigades and divisions, as well as in most brigades and divisions of the Airborne Forces (VDV). By 2017, EW companies will receive all airborne units, and by 2020 they are planned to be re-equipped with new equipment.
In the Naval Forces (Navy), ground EW forces are integrated into separate EW centers in all four fleets. In the Aerospace Forces (VKS), separate EW battalions are part of the Air Force and Air Defense armies.
Technical equipment
Electronic warfare equipment for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is being developed by JSC Concern Radioelectronic Technologies (JSC KRET), which in 2009-2012. united Russian defense enterprises producing military radio electronics. In 2010-2013 state tests of 18 new types of electronic warfare equipment were successfully completed.
Since 2015, new technical means of radio suppression of communications, radar and navigation, protection against precision weapons, control and support facilities: complexes Krasukha-2O, Murmansk-BN, Borisoglebsk-2, Krasukha-C4, Svet-KU, Infauna, Judoist, etc.
The troops are supplied with Mi-8MTPR-1 helicopters equipped with Rychag-AV electronic warfare systems (such machines, in particular, can protect military transport aircraft). The Vitebsk electronic warfare systems are equipped with Su-25SM attack aircraft modernized for the needs of the Russian Aerospace Forces, and individual elements of the complex are installed on Ka-52, Mi-28, Mi-8MT, Mi-26 and Mi-26T2 helicopters.
A complex is being installed on the Su-34 front-line bomber electronic countermeasures"Khibiny". Project 20380 corvettes, which are currently replenishing the Russian Navy, carry the TK-25-2 and PK-10 Smely electronic warfare systems, and the TK-28 and Prosvet-M complexes are being installed on project 22350 frigates under construction.
The current state armaments program provides for bringing the level of provision of EW troops with promising equipment by 2020 to the level of 70%.
Share of the latest electronic warfare technology
The share of modern equipment in the electronic warfare troops in 2016 was 46%. In accordance with the plans for equipping electronic warfare units under the state defense order, about 300 basic models of equipment and more than 1,000 small-sized equipment were delivered to the troops.
The measures taken made it possible to re-equip 45% of military units and electronic warfare units with modern complexes, such as Murmansk-BN, Krasukha, Borisoglebsk-2 and others.
These are almost all groups of electronic warfare equipment: radio suppression equipment, radar and radio navigation, protection against WTO, control and support equipment. Considerable attention is paid to the development of electronic warfare technology against unmanned aerial vehicles.
Educational establishments
The training of officers for the EW troops of the Russian Armed Forces is conducted by the Air Force Academy named after Professor N. E. Zhukovsky and Yu. A. Gagarin in Voronezh, junior EW specialists for all types and branches of the RF Armed Forces are trained at the Interspecific Training Center and combat use EW troops in Tambov.
On the basis of the center, in 2015, a scientific company was created, in which graduates of the country's leading specialized universities are doing military service, combining it with research on the topic of electronic warfare. In 2016, a new Itog integrated training simulator complex will be equipped on the territory of the Interspecies Center.
Management
Chief of the EW Troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - Major General Yuri Lastochkin (since August 2014).
EW aviation systems
According to the former head of the electronic warfare service of the Air Force, now adviser to the first deputy general director of the Concern "Radioelectronic Technologies" (KRET) Vladimir Mikheev, the survivability of aircraft with modern electronic warfare systems increases by 20-25 times.
If earlier active jamming stations (SAP) were installed on aircraft, today all aircraft are equipped with airborne defense systems (ABS). Their main difference from the SAP is that the ACS is fully integrated and interfaced with all the avionics of an aircraft, helicopter or drone.
Defense complexes exchange with on-board computers all the necessary information:
About flight, combat missions,
about the purposes and flight routes of the protected object,
about the capabilities of their weapons,
about the real radio-electronic situation on the air,
about potential threats.
In the event of any danger, they can adjust the route in such a way that the protected object does not enter the fire impact zone, ensuring electronic destruction (suppression) of the most dangerous air defense and enemy aircraft, while simultaneously increasing the combat effectiveness of their weapons.
"Vitebsk"
Complex "Vitebsk"
One of the most effective airborne defense systems. It is designed to protect aircraft and helicopters from anti-aircraft missiles with radar and optical (thermal) guidance heads.
"Vitebsk" is installed on:
Modernized attack aircraft Su-25SM,
attack helicopters Ka-52, Mi-28N,
transport and combat helicopters of the Mi-8 family,
heavy transport helicopters Mi-26 and Mi-26T2,
special and civil aircraft and helicopters of domestic production.
The new modification of "Vitebsk", which is just beginning to enter the troops, will be installed on board aircraft and helicopters of transport aviation.
It is planned to equip the Il-76, Il-78, An-72, An-124, which are already in service with the Aerospace Forces of the Russian Federation, as well as the promising Il-112V transport aircraft, with this system.
The implementation of this program will make it possible to significantly increase the combat stability of transport aviation of the Russian Aerospace Forces in a short time.
The Vitebsk complex is already being equipped with Ka-52 and Mi-28 attack helicopters, Su-25 attack aircraft, Mi-8MTV and Mi-8AMTSh transport and combat helicopters. It is designed to protect aircraft from enemy anti-aircraft missiles with infrared, radar or combined homing heads. This system allows you to track the launch of a missile within a radius of several hundred kilometers from the aircraft and "steer" the missile away from the target.
In the future, Vitebsk will receive military transport aircraft of the Il-76MD-90A type.
IL-76. Photo: Anton Novoderezhkin / TASS
There is also an export version of the complex called President-S, which is very popular on the foreign market and is supplied to a number of countries that operate Russian aviation equipment.
The airborne defense complex "President-S" is designed for individual protection of military and civil aircraft and helicopters from being hit by air and anti-aircraft missile systems, as well as anti-aircraft artillery air defense systems of the enemy, land-based and sea-based. "President-S", in particular, is installed on the Ka-52, Mi-28 and Mi-26 helicopters.
The complex is able to detect the threat of an attack by enemy fighters, anti-aircraft missiles and artillery systems against the protected aircraft. It can destroy and suppress the optical homing heads of aircraft and anti-aircraft guided missiles, including the homing heads of man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems.
"Lever-AB"
Electronic warfare complex "Rychag-AV". Photo: KRET.
According to the Deputy General Director of the Kazan Optical and Mechanical Plant, which produces this equipment, Alexei Panin, the supply of the basic version of the modernized Rychag-AV electronic warfare systems (EW) on the Mi-8MTPR-1 helicopter will be provided in the near future.
Currently, the concern "Radioelectronic Technologies" is completing development work on this product.
It is planned to manufacture new electronic warfare systems on the chassis of KamAZ trucks.
Earlier, the Russian military received ahead of schedule three Mi-8MTPR-1 electronic warfare helicopters, the equipment of which makes it possible to protect groups of aircraft, ships and ground equipment from air attacks within a radius of several hundred kilometers, suppressing several targets at once.
"Rychag-AV" actually provides electronic suppression of the guidance system for enemy aircraft and ground targets, that is, it can "blind" them.
In the conditions of interference from the Rychag system, anti-aircraft missile systems, as well as enemy interception aircraft systems, are deprived of the ability to detect any targets and direct guided missiles of the air-to-air, ground-to-air and air-to-ground classes at them, with As a result, the survivability and combat effectiveness of their aircraft are significantly increased.
The carrier of this complex is the most massive Russian helicopter Mi-8.
A specialized helicopter is a jammer whose main task is to provide electronic countermeasures and create a false environment for covering their aircraft or helicopters, as well as protecting the most important ground targets.
"Khibiny"
In 2013, the Khibiny electronic countermeasures complex, designed to protect aircraft from air defense systems, entered service with the RF Armed Forces.
The Khibiny complex differs from the stations of the previous generation by increased power and intelligence. It is able to help control the aircraft's weapons, create a false electronic environment, and also ensure a breakthrough in the enemy's layered air defense.
This happened to the American destroyer Donald Cook in 2014, when the Su-24 aircraft was taken for escort by naval air defense systems.
Then information appeared on the ship's radars that put the crew in a dead end. The plane either disappeared from the screens, then unexpectedly changed its location and speed, then created electronic clones of additional targets. At the same time, the destroyer's information and combat weapon control systems were practically blocked. Considering that the ship was located 12,000 km from US territory in the Black Sea, it is easy to imagine the feelings experienced by the sailors on this ship.
Now a new Khibiny-U complex for front-line aircraft, in particular the Su-30SM, is under development.
"Himalayas"
This complex is a further development of the Khibiny, it is “sharpened” for the fifth generation T-50 aircraft (PAK FA).
Fighter T-50. Photo: Sergey Bobylev / TASS
Its main difference from its predecessor is that the Khibiny is a kind of container that is suspended on the wing, occupying a certain suspension point, and the Himalayas are fully integrated into the board and are made in the form individual elements aircraft fuselage.
The antenna systems of the complex are built on the principle of "smart plating" and allow you to perform several functions at once: reconnaissance, electronic warfare, location, etc. The complex will be able to put active and passive interference on infrared homing heads of modern missiles, as well as modern and advanced radar stations.
The characteristics of this complex are still classified, because the T-50 aircraft is the latest fifth-generation fighter and has not yet been adopted by the Russian Aerospace Forces.
Su-34 equipped with electronic warfare
The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation received in 2016 several complexes that make it possible to make an electronic warfare aircraft (EW) out of the Su-34 bomber.
This complex allows the aircraft to protect not only itself, but the entire system. Thanks to these complexes, the survivability of aircraft is increased by 20-25%.
Fighter-bomber Su-34. Photo: KRET.
Ground-based electronic warfare systems
Modern ground complexes Electronic warfare systems operate in the digital signal processing mode, which helps to significantly increase their efficiency.
Digital technology has a large electronic memory library and reports to the operator the types of enemy equipment, and also offers him the most effective jamming signals and optimal algorithms for possible countermeasures.
Previously, the operator of the electronic warfare station had to independently determine the type of the tracked object from the characteristics of the reconnaissance signal and select the type of interference for it.
"Krasukha-S4"
This complex has absorbed all the best of the electronic warfare technology of previous generations. In particular, Krasuha inherited a unique antenna system from its predecessor, the SPN-30 jamming station.
Another advantage of the new system is the almost complete automation. If earlier the system was controlled manually, then in Krasukha-4 the principle is implemented: “do not touch the equipment, and it will not let you down”, that is, the role of the operator is reduced to the role of an observer, and the main mode of operation is centralized automated control.
Complex "Krasukha-C4". Photo: Rostec State Corporation.
The main purpose of Krasukha-S4 is to cover command posts, groupings of troops, air defense systems, important industrial facilities from aerial radar reconnaissance and high-precision weapons.
The capabilities of the complex's broadband active jamming station make it possible to effectively deal with all modern radar stations used by aircraft various types, as well as cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles.
"Krasukha-20"
This version of "Krasukha" is designed for electronic countermeasures American systems early warning and control (AWACS) AWACS.
AWACS is the most powerful reconnaissance and control aircraft with a whole crew on board. In order to "blind" this plane, you need a lot of energy. So, the power and intelligence of the second "Krasukha" is enough to compete with this aircraft.
The entire complex is deployed within a few minutes, without human intervention, and after deployment, it is able to “turn off” AWACS at a distance of several hundred kilometers.
"Moscow-1"
Complex "Moscow-1". Photo by KRET.
The complex is designed to conduct electronic reconnaissance (passive radar), interact and exchange information with command posts of anti-aircraft missile and radio engineering troops, aviation guidance points, issue target designation and control of interference units and individual means of electronic suppression.
The structure of "Moscow-1" includes a reconnaissance module and a control center for interference units (stations).
The complex is capable of:
Carry radio and electronic intelligence at a distance of up to 400 km,
classify all radio-emitting means according to the degree of danger,
provide road support
ensure target distribution and display of all information,
provide reverse control of the efficiency of the units and individual electronic warfare assets that it manages.
The “debut” of the Moskva complexes took place in March 2016 as part of the joint tactical exercises of the air defense and aviation forces in the Astrakhan region.
EW "Mercury-BM". Photo: Press Service of the Rostec State Corporation.
The state defense order for the Moscow-1 and Rtut-BM electronic warfare systems was completed ahead of schedule. In 2015, the Russian army received nine Moscow-1 electronic warfare systems.
"Infauna"
The complex, developed by the United Instrument-Making Corporation (OPK), provides radio reconnaissance and radio suppression, protection of manpower, armored and automotive vehicles from aimed fire from melee weapons and grenade launchers, as well as from radio-controlled mine-explosive devices.
Broadband radio reconnaissance equipment significantly increases the radius of protection of covered mobile objects from radio-controlled mines. The ability to install aerosol curtains allows you to hide equipment from high-precision weapons with video and laser guidance systems.
Currently, these complexes on a unified wheeled chassis K1Sh1 (BTR-80 base) are mass-produced and supplied to various units of the Armed Forces.
"Borisoglebsk-2"
Complex "Borisoglebsk-2". Photo: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
This electronic countermeasures complex (REW), also developed by the OPK, forms the technical basis of the electronic warfare units of tactical formations.
Designed for radio reconnaissance and radio jamming of HF, VHF ground and aviation radio communications, subscriber terminals for cellular and trunk communications in tactical and operational-tactical control levels.
The complex is based on three types of jamming stations and a command post located on MT-LBu armored personnel carriers, a traditional tracked base for ground-based electronic warfare systems. Each complex includes up to nine units of mobile equipment.
The complex implemented fundamentally new technical solutions construction of radio intelligence equipment and automated systems management. In particular, broadband energetically and structurally secretive signals are used, which provide noise-proof and high-speed data transmission.
The range of reconnaissance and suppressed frequencies has been more than doubled compared to previously supplied jamming stations, and the frequency detection rate has been increased by more than 100 times.
Marine electronic warfare systems
These complexes are designed to protect ships of various classes from reconnaissance and fire damage. Their peculiarity lies in the fact that for each ship, depending on its type, displacement, as well as the tasks it solves, there is a special set of electronic warfare equipment.
The composition of ship complexes includes:
Radio and electronic intelligence stations,
active and passive means of electronic warfare,
automata that provide ship camouflage in various physical fields,
devices for shooting false targets, etc.
All these systems are integrated with the ship's fire and information assets to increase the survivability and combat effectiveness of the ship.
TK-25E and MP-405E
They are the main ship-based electronic warfare systems. They provide protection against the use of radio-controlled air and ship-based weapons by creating active and passive interference.
TK-25E ensures the creation of impulse misinformation and imitation interference using digital copies of signals for ships of all main classes. The complex is capable of simultaneously analyzing up to 256 targets and providing effective protection for the ship.
MP-405E- for equipping ships of small displacement.
It is able to prevent detection, analyze, and classify the types of emitting electronic means and their carriers according to the degree of danger, as well as provide electronic suppression of all modern and promising means of reconnaissance and destruction of the enemy.
Russian electronic warfare equipment surpasses Western counterparts
Photo: Donat Sorokin/TASS
Russian electronic warfare equipment is superior to Western counterparts in a number of characteristics, including range.
To the main benefits domestic technology electronic warfare in front of foreign counterparts can be attributed to a greater range of its action, which is achieved through the use of more powerful transmitters and more efficient antenna systems.
Russian electronic warfare equipment has advantages in terms of the number of target objects, the possibility of its more effective combat use due to the implementation of a flexible control structure, both for electronic warfare systems and for individual models of equipment operating autonomously and as part of mated pairs.
The material was prepared on the basis of open sources of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation,
Rostec State Corporation, Radioelectronic Technologies Concern and TASS.
Overall rating of the material: 5
SIMILAR MATERIALS (BY MARKS):
"Infauna": a weapon that "cuts down" an entire fleet
Following an analysis of the use of military equipment in Syria, Supreme Commander Vladimir Putin asked the military department in 2017 to continue the development of high-precision weapons, modern means of communication, intelligence, control and electronic warfare.
Electronic warfare (EW)
is a set of coordinated activities and actions to:
Radio-electronic defeat of enemy radio-electronic objects (functional defeat; electronic defeat; defeat by homing weapons),
Information support (collection, analysis and generalization of data on the electronic situation; technical reconnaissance of enemy electronic objects; comprehensive technical control of the state and protection from technical means of reconnaissance of one's own objects),
Electronic protection (protection against means of electronic destruction; protection against unintentional interference (ensuring electromagnetic compatibility); protection of troops and facilities from technical reconnaissance equipment).
The command and control system of troops and weapons makes it possible to implement the principles of conducting network-centric wars, which imply a transition from the territorial concentration of forces to their functional (information) integration. Naturally, in this case, the role of electronic warfare increases and its capabilities increase (potentially - a reduction in the combat power of the enemy by a factor of three).
Taking into account the state of the electronic warfare equipment produced for the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, it is customary to talk about integrated electronic warfare systems that combine about 50 different complexes and means for various purposes (see table). Wherein main problem is the creation of a single information space for electronic warfare technology.
Until recently, the most secret in the entire arsenal of Russian electronic warfare equipment was the Krasukha-2 jamming station. It seems that at present the palm has passed to the Murmansk-BN communication line suppression station, which is capable of jamming more than two dozen frequencies at a distance of up to 5 thousand kilometers. However, there is no reliable evidence that the newest complex has such characteristics. Judging by the photographs available in open sources (several four-axle off-road trucks with multi-meter towers), where, in addition to the main antennas, characteristic low-frequency stretch antennas are visible, it can be assumed that this complex is capable of jamming signals in the range from 200 to 500 MHz. The Murmansk-BN coastal complex even outwardly bears little resemblance to the fact that the Russian ground forces are used to protect and counter the enemy. Some experts, commenting on the information about the combat duty of these complexes in the Russian army, note that in the case of "Murmansk-BN" we are talking on strategic electronic countermeasures. The thing is that the main task of the unique telescopic antennas and transmitters of the electronic warfare complex is the disruption of communication and control channels over vast distances.
The main directions for the development of electronic warfare in the Russian Federation are as follows:
Creation of highly mobile ground-based multifunctional electronic warfare systems for zonal and object protection weapons and military equipment from electronic intelligence systems and destruction by guided weapons;
Creation of wide-range complexes and electronic warfare equipment for group and individual protection of air, sea and land-based weapons and military equipment;
Development of means of radio-electronic suppression of radio-electronic means (RES) with complex broadband signals, including those with rapidly tunable (from pulse to pulse) parameters;
Development of means of electronic suppression of multi-position systems of radar reconnaissance, target designation and weapon control;
Improving the accuracy of executive electronic intelligence to determine the location of emitting objects.
The main domestic manufacturers of electronic warfare equipment (market share):
JSC Concern Radioelectronic Technologies, KRET (60%),
JSC "Concern" Constellation "" (20%),
JSC "Central Research Institute of Radio Engineering named after Academician A.I. Berg", TsNIRI (10%),
JSC "Scientific and Technical Center for Electronic Warfare", Scientific and Technical Center for Electronic Warfare (5%),
LLC "Special Technology Center" (5%).
The leading enterprise is JSC KRET. In many sectors, the concern occupies a practically monopoly position in the Russian market in the supply of electronic warfare equipment with electronic intelligence and weapon control systems. The electronic warfare equipment and systems developed by KRET are equipped with Su-25, Su-27SM, Su-30, Su-34, Su-35, Il-76, Il-78, Il-96, Tu-214 aircraft, Mi helicopters -8, Mi-26, Mi-28, Mi-35 and Ka-52, as well as surface ships of projects 1144, 1164, 1155, 956, 11540, 22350, 20380, 21631. The most favorable situation for the concern is in the market of aviation complexes and electronic warfare equipment. The reasons for this, in addition to the global growth in demand for electronic warfare in the world, are: 1) the expected growth in the supply of Russian aircraft (LA); 2) a predicted increase in the share of aircraft supplied with electronic warfare equipment for individual and group protection; 3) the purchase of electronic warfare equipment by foreign states within the framework of the program for the modernization of their own fleet of Russian/Soviet-made aircraft.
The evolution of electronic warfare systems has accelerated dramatically. At the end of the 20th century, the Ministry of Defense demanded a service life of 15-20 years. Today, the life cycle of electronic warfare devices has been reduced to four to five years. Electronics is developing too fast. Therefore, leading manufacturers are moving to modular device schemes. The basis of the system, the platform, can serve for 20 years, but there are modules standardized in terms of mounting and interface, which allow you to improve the equipment, changing not the whole complex, but individual blocks. In other words: put a new "advanced" block in the scientific plan - got new opportunities!
The re-equipment of the EW troops with new models of equipment is based on the results of a military-scientific justification of the composition of the EW troops and proposals for the draft state armament program for the period 2018-2025. By 2020, the EW troops should effectively ensure the fulfillment of the following tasks of the RF Armed Forces:
Disorganization of the state and military administration of the enemy (including its industrial infrastructure);
Disorganization of command and control of enemy troops (forces) and weapons in hostilities of various scales and intensity;
Reducing the capabilities of the enemy's global specific space reconnaissance;
Countering missile defense systems;
Reflection (disruption) of an aerospace attack of the enemy;
Protection of objects, military equipment from high-precision weapons.
The main efforts to develop the system of weapons of the EW troops are planned to be focused on the implementation of one traditional and five innovative areas.
The innovative development path involves, firstly, the creation of controlled radio interference fields on enemy territory using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and thrown jamming transmitters. Secondly, it is planned to create means of defeating RES by electromagnetic radiation. Thirdly; a special program impact is being developed. Fourth, importance is given to the imitation of the electronic situation and the introduction of disinformation into the system of command and control of enemy troops and weapons. Finally, fifthly, it is planned to increase the level of information security of EW control agencies and points.
Among specialists, the term "Intellectual suppression" has come into practice. It is based on well-known technologies for creating imitation (relay) interference. The peculiarity is that due to the placement in the protected zone of small-sized low-power repeaters of the signals of suppressed radio-electronic means and the control of these repeaters according to special algorithms, it becomes possible to create a false virtual radio-electronic environment and provide an effect hidden from the enemy on his command and control systems of troops and weapons. The "intellectual" nature of the suppression is provided mainly by the mathematical apparatus implemented in the system and modern communication technologies.
Practical implementation of the whole range of planned improvement measures electronic warfare systems will predictably lead to a significant increase in the contribution of electronic warfare to gaining superiority in command and control of troops (forces) and the use of weapons. At the same time, the volume of tasks performed by the EW troops in various strategic directions by 2020 will increase by 2-2.5 times.
"We are working ahead of the curve"
As Yuri Ivanovich Maevsky, deputy CEO JSC "Concern" Radioelectronic Technologies "" for R&D of electronic warfare equipment, general designer, "we are working ahead of the curve. There are various methods forecasting, and, developing our advanced systems, we model the capabilities of a conditional adversary in 2030. Of course, some uncertainty remains, and we put in our complexes an excess of opportunities that can fend off this uncertainty.
World electronic warfare market currently valued at about $14 billion a year. In the coming years, the average annual growth rate is expected to be at the level of 4%, the market volume will reach $19 billion by 2025.
The main competitors of Russian enterprises in the world market: American (Lockheed Martin Corporation, Northrop Grumman Corporation, The Boeing Company, Raytheon Company, ITT Corporation, BAE Systems), European (Thales Group, Elettronica, Indra) and Israeli manufacturers (Elta Systems, Rafael).
In the USA under the AST program Northrop Grumman is conducting research and development work on the creation of solid-state broadband aircraft active phased array antennas (APAA) capable of performing radar and EW tasks in the centimeter wave range. As part of the creation of a new generation jamming station (NGJ) for the EA-18G Grouler jammer aircraft, commissioned by the US Navy, Raytheon is developing solid-state broadband AFARs of the decimeter and centimeter wavelengths.
The main characteristics of the main domestic electronic warfare devices
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Note: only the names are absolutely reliable (column 1).
Technical means of electronic warfare.
Since I do not know EW technology very well, or rather, I have only a general idea about it, I give the floor to Major General Igor Burakov, since 2001 - Head of the EW Service of the Ground Forces. And although it is not directly related to the Strategic Missile Forces, the equipment used in the electronic warfare of both the Ground Forces and the Strategic Missile Forces is often the same:
"- You have already said about the structure of your troops. And what can you say about the means that are in service with the EW units?
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Each level has its own means, which differ in range, emitter power, and radio frequency at which they operate. For some time, for example, our Spetsnaz radio battalions were armed mainly with communication radio stations of the RAT and SCR-399 type with R-328r and R-328s control and management devices. As well as jamming stations R-330. In the 60s, new means appeared (the R-325, R-325M, R-330, R-330A jamming station and the R-100, R-110 and R-102 radio stations with a control and control device).
Radio engineering battalions were armed with SPB-1 radar jamming stations and R-814 aircraft control VHF radio communication stations with Arfa-3 prefixes. Subsequently, new radar jamming stations of the type SPB-5, SPB-7, SPO-8 and SPO-10, as well as aircraft radio stations R-824, R-834 and R-834 with Arfa-3 prefixes, were received.
In 1976 - 1977 kits of electronic warfare units of the front, army and army corps were developed. They were engaged in the suppression of short-wave communications at the operational and operational-tactical level, covering objects and troops of the front.
As for the 80s, the formation of new electronic warfare units was significantly hampered by the limited supply of jamming stations for airborne radars from industry (SPN-30, SPN-40, and in subsequent years - SPN-2, SPN-3 and SPN-4). In the second half of the 90s, developments were completed and fundamentally new models of radio interference technology for space radio communications were put into service. But the end of the century was perhaps the most difficult in terms of admission new technology. And only since about 2000, the situation gradually began to improve.
And Colonel V.S. speaks directly about the level of technical equipment of the electronic warfare units of the 50th missile army. Kuznetsova [6]:
"...... Chiefs of the EW of the Military Districts (Belarusian, Leningrad, Baltic, Moscow air defense districts, Baranovichi Air Defense Corps), meeting me at their headquarters, they said: “The rich owner has arrived!”. I even sometimes had, of course, with the permission of the General Staff of the Strategic Missile Forces and the army commander, to transfer, according to the relevant documents, some samples of this equipment (for example, reconnaissance equipment) to the districts as mutual assistance ... "
Colonel V.S. Kuznetsov :
“... In the late 70s and all 80s, the personnel of our missile army he knew how to practically act to overcome the US anti-missile defense (ABM), to defend himself against enemy high-precision weapons (HTO), countered foreign technical intelligence (ITR), knew how to work in conditions of radio interference to our communications, i.e. in the entire frequency spectrum of "white noise" ... "
The following is a description of some of the technical means of electronic warfare, which were in service with the 23rd separate electronic warfare battalion. Only open data found on the Internet are given. I would be grateful for clarifications and additions ...
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Radar stations P-15 (1RL13) and P-19 (1RL134)
 Radar P-15 |
The P-15 decimeter range radar was developed by VNIIRT (Moscow) and is designed to detect low-flying targets. Development started in 1952, adopted in 1955. It is used as part of radar posts of radio engineering formations, control batteries of anti-aircraft artillery and missile formations of the operational level of air defense and at control points of air defense of the tactical level.
The P-15 station is mounted on one vehicle together with an antenna system and is deployed to a combat position in 10 minutes. The power unit is transported in a trailer.
 Radar P-19 |
The P-15 and P-19 stations were produced at the Murom Plant of Radio Measuring Instruments (MZ RIP), and the introduction of the P-15 into production (the design bureau of the plant began processing technical documentation) took place as early as 1956. Subsequently, the P-15 was repeatedly modernized: P-15M , P15M2, P-15MN, P-15N, P-15U. In fact, one of the upgrades of the P-15 can be considered the P-19 with its modifications: P-19-2, P-19-5, P-19Sh, P-19Sh3, P-19Sh3-1. Currently, both stations are out of production, but can be upgraded.
According to some reports, the station 1RL13 also has the name "Path" (although I met the name "NEBO-SV" in one source), and 1RL134 - "Danube-15".
The station has three modes of operation:
Amplitude;
Amplitude with accumulation;
Coherent-pulse.
The station has protection from active, frequency-targeted interference - by quickly tuning to one of four frequencies, and from passive interference - a compensation circuit from dipole interference and local objects.
 Radar P-15 |
In 1970, the P-15MN radar was tested, on which flickering equipment and ground-based radar interrogator (NRZ) equipment were additionally introduced. In the early 70s, the P-15MN radar was largely transferred to a new element base and equipped with a new NRZ. As a result of this modernization, the station was named P-19 (1RL134) and was put into service in 1974.
The P-19 radar is intended for conducting reconnaissance of air targets at low and medium altitudes, detecting targets, determining their current coordinates in azimuth and identification range, as well as for transmitting radar information to command posts and to interfaced systems. It is a mobile two-coordinate radar station placed on two vehicles.
The first vehicle accommodates receiving and transmitting equipment, anti-interference equipment, indicator equipment, equipment for transmitting radar information, simulating, communicating and interfacing with consumers of radar information, functional control and equipment for a ground-based radar interrogator.
 Radar P-19 |
The second car houses the radar antenna-rotary device and power supply units.
Difficult climatic conditions and the duration of operation of the P-15 and P-19 radar stations have led to the fact that by now most of the radars require restoration of the resource.
The only way out of this situation is the modernization of the old radar fleet based on the Kasta-2E1 radar.
The modernization proposals took into account the following:
Keeping intact the main radar systems (antenna system, antenna rotation drive, microwave path, power supply system, vehicles);
Possibility of carrying out modernization in operating conditions with minimal financial costs;
The possibility of using the released P-19 radar equipment for the restoration of products that have not been upgraded.
As a result of the modernization, the P-19 mobile solid-state low-altitude radar will be able to perform the tasks of monitoring airspace, determining the range and azimuth of air objects - airplanes, helicopters, remotely piloted aircraft and cruise missiles, including those operating at low and extremely low altitudes, at background of intense reflections from the underlying surface, local objects and hydrometeorological formations.
The radar can be easily adapted for use in various systems military and civilian purposes. It can be used for information support of air defense systems, air force, coastal defense systems, rapid reaction forces, civil aviation aircraft traffic control systems. In addition to its traditional use as a means of detecting low-flying targets in the interests of the armed forces, the modernized radar can be used to control airspace in order to prevent the transport of weapons and drugs by low-altitude, low-speed and small-sized aircraft in the interests of special services and police units involved in the fight against drug trafficking and arms smuggling.
The upgraded radar is all-weather and can be operated in various climatic zones.
Main characteristics:
| P-15 | P-19 | |
| View area in azimuth, deg. | 360 | 360 |
| Instrumental range, km | 10-160 | 160 |
| Height viewing area, m | up to 6000 | up to 6000 |
| Review rate, s | 6, 12 | 6, 12 |
| power, kWt | 310 | 310 |
| Receiver sensitivity, W | 2 x 10-14 | 2 x 10-14 |
| DND width in azimuth, deg. | 4,5 | 4,5 |
| Frequency range (waves) | decimeter | decimeter |
Reconnaissance and radar countermeasure station SPN-30 (1RL237)
 SPN-30 |
NOTATION
Brief: SPN-30(Station Jamming - 30)
Customer index: 1RL237
NATO: paint box
PURPOSE
Designed for electronic jamming (REW) in an extended operating frequency range of existing ones, including those that have undergone modernization, air-based radars to protect ground and air facilities. Provides suppression of the main beam and side lobes of the following classes of airborne radar:
Side view;
Reconnaissance and strike complexes;
Weapon control;
Providing flights at low altitudes;
Multifunctional.
The station generates the following types of interference:
Quasi-continuous;
Multiple-pulse or response in time;
Noise sighting in frequency and conjugate in spectrum.
 SPN-30 |
As a result of modernization, the SPN-30 station acquires a modern look, speed, reliability, maintainability increase, weight and size characteristics improve, and power consumption decreases.
The upgraded station includes:
Antenna machine;
Control machine;
Power station;
Set of cables and harnesses;
Operational documentation.
Active jamming station SPN-40 (1RL238)
 SPN-40 |
NOTATION
Brief: SPN-40(Station Interference - 40)
Customer index: 1RL238
The Russian military-industrial complex successfully demonstrated its latest technical innovations at the Army-2017 exhibition held in August. Hundreds of ground, air and sea-based equipment samples were presented at this international forum, which was held in the Moscow region, and hundreds of thousands of guests visited it. This highly publicized event culminated in Russia signing contracts totaling almost 170 billion rubles ($3 billion). The most important achievements of the Russian defense industry include the supply of latest systems electronic warfare, such as "Vitebsk", "Krasukha" and "Moscow".
The Russian daily online publication Svobodnaya Pressa published analytical article about opportunities Russian electronic warfare as of today, highlighting the West 2017 military exercise and NATO's concerns about it. The article notes that the qualitative superiority of Russia over the West in the means of electronic warfare is also quantitative, since beyond last decade State tests and inspections have passed more than a dozen new systems. These include Borisoglebsk-2, Algurit, Mercury-BM, Infauna, Krasukha-4, Moscow-1, Parodist, Lorandit-M, Leer-3 , "Lesochek", "Less", "Magnesium-EW", "Field-21", "Khibiny" and "Vitebsk". Among them there are complexes designed for action at a short distance. These are systems that protect aircraft, ships and personnel in a limited area of combat operations. And there are also means to neutralize fuses in improvised explosive devices and other devices. This list also includes powerful complexes with a large cover zone, such as Krasukha-4 and Moskva-1. Further in the article it is noted that the last two systems are built on principles that were not previously used in radio engineering. To suppress radio signals in their entire spectrum, a large set of radiating antennas and huge powers to create power interference are no longer required. Modern means of detection and processing allow you to get an exact copy of the signals. And you can form your own similar signal by changing the parameters in its structure that are necessary for counteraction. A false signal in such a distorted form is returned to the enemy. Such opposition is called "non-energy interference".
According to Svobodnaya Pressa, the Moscow-1 complex, developed by KRET (Radioelectronic Technologies Concern), belongs to the means of electronic intelligence. It collects information on sources of electromagnetic radiation within a radius of 400 kilometers, which include aircraft, missile homing heads, radar stations of mobile and stationary air defense systems, radio transmitters and other objects that emit radio waves. In this case, the analysis of signals, direction finding and classification of their sources is carried out. In the event of a massive attack against the enemy, the collected information is transmitted to nine electronic warfare systems, which are supposed to “blind” the targets, generating interference, as well as to the Russian air defense units. The publication notes that all the specifics regarding the characteristics and technical details of the operation of electronic warfare systems is classified information. However, with the help of Moskva-1, in the event of a massive enemy attack, it is possible to obtain information on all objects necessary for their detection, type recognition, tracking and target designation for each target. This information is extremely useful for electronic warfare systems, as they receive information about the type of enemy equipment and how to optimally suppress the operation of their electronics.
Context
The main thing is to destroy American satellites
The National Interest 05/15/2017Military lessons of Donbass from the point of view of Americans
InoSMI 13.09.2017The American army is not ready to fight the Russians in Europe
Politico 04.09.2017Data from Moscow-1 is also useful for anti-aircraft missile systems, including the S-400, which has the same object detection range as the Moskva-1. The publication notes that in the event of an enemy attack, the S-400 radar simply sees a certain “object”, determining its speed, direction of flight and tracking its movements. "Moskva-1", unlike him, reports what it is - a rocket or an airplane, and what type. This makes interception easier. Until recently, it was impossible to place such a complex with such serious capabilities on three wheeled chassis. The breakthrough was made as a result of the transition from analog to digital technologies. At the same time, the power of the computer, which processes the information taken from the antennas in large volumes, has also increased significantly. The increase in computing performance has led to the fact that it has become possible to use new, more advanced data processing algorithms.
Further, Svobodnaya Pressa says that the Krasukha-4 complex, also built on a digital element base, is designed to cover command posts, groupings of troops, industrial and administrative facilities from enemy attacks. The complex suppresses the functioning of stationary and mobile objects, the operation of which is provided by electronics, acting with the help of interference, called the publication "intelligent". The fact is that the complex can distinguish its signals from the signals of the enemy in its area of operation. The complex is capable of “blinding” not only enemy fighters or bombers, but also ground-based radars, AWACS aircraft and even spy satellites, since the range of Krasukha (both horizontally and vertically) reaches 300 kilometers. The complex also copes with enemy drones, as well as with unmanned systems. The article points out that the complexity of the complex "is evidenced by the time spent on its creation." Work began in 1995, and the adoption of the complex into service took place only in 2012. In the final version, the complex turned out to be quite compact, since it is placed on two wheeled chassis, which facilitates its transportation.
In 2015, the Krasukha-4 complex was deployed in Syria at the Russian military base Khmeimim. During the attack on the airfield of the Syrian army with Tomahawk missiles fired from an American destroyer, there were reports in the media that it was Krasukha that took some of the missiles away from the target. Critics categorically disagree with this assessment, since the Tomahawks have a homing head that is not radar, but optoelectronic with a high-resolution matrix. But it has electronic components that could be affected by Krasuha. The complex repeatedly participated in the exercises, repelling air attacks of a mock enemy. At the same time, Su-24 front-line bombers and completely new Su-34s, once in the Krasukha zone of action, could not detect targets and returned to their bases without completing their assigned tasks.
The third sample mentioned in the article is the Vitebsk airborne defense system, designed to protect Mi-8 helicopters from fire from man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems. In addition, it can be used in attack aircraft and attack helicopters when striking ground targets when they fly at low altitudes, exposed to danger from Stinger missiles. "Vitebsk" includes an infrared and ultraviolet direction finder for launching missiles, equipment for detecting laser and radar radiation, an optoelectronic suppression station, an active radar jamming station and a decoy launcher. “In other words,” Svobodnaya Pressa reports, “it provides protection against all types of interference – radar (both active and passive), thermal, laser and optoelectronic.”
The Russian military is also working on the creation of other electronic warfare systems capable of performing fast and effective action against Western unmanned systems that are constantly being improved. One such new complex is called Repellent. It is designed to detect and electronically suppress unmanned aerial vehicles at a distance of up to 35 kilometers. Russian designers claim that "Repellent" is able to detect miniature drones day and night, in bad weather, and "to operate even in the harshest conditions of the Arctic at a temperature of minus 45 degrees and strong wind". To achieve maximum efficiency in the fight against swarms of miniature drones (namely, American military designers have focused on such technologies), a portable version of the complex will also be developed that can be carried and quickly deployed by several people.
The development and adoption of so many EW systems of all kinds does not bode well for the US and NATO military, who have been voicing concern over Russian success for years. In 2016, US Air Force General Breedlove acknowledged that the Pentagon's neglect of electronic warfare over the past two decades has given the Kremlin an advantage in this area. The commander of the US ground forces in Europe, Lieutenant General Ben Hodges (Ben Hodges) said that the success of the Russian electronic warfare in Syria "incredible." In 2015, when Russia stepped up its military operations in Syria, Lieutenant General Edward Cardon said that the United States “is not moving forward (in developing electronic warfare capabilities) fast enough as emerging threats require.” In the same year, it became clear to the US military that Russia, thanks to its investment in electronic warfare, could surpass everything that is available in the West. And Colonel Jeffrey Church, head of electronic warfare in ground forces ah the United States, noted that the Russian army has entire companies, battalions and brigades that perform electronic warfare tasks and have special equipment and combat control systems.
But in 2017, the US military began to make efforts to ensure that the US military received the necessary equipment and capabilities to counter Russian advances. The Department of Defense is now considering making the electromagnetic spectrum a separate area of warfare, like air, sea, and land. The ground forces are demanding that their long-range drones be fully equipped with electronic warfare. It should be noted that one of the next successes of Russian developers was the creation of the Orlan-10 multifunctional unmanned medium-range complex, which is included in the Leer-3 electronic warfare complex and provides jamming of cellular communications. There is no doubt that the United States is keeping a close eye on this system as it is used in eastern Ukraine and Syria. There is now a lot of effort being made in the US in the right direction, but the huge variety of Russian EW systems and their modern characteristics can pose a serious danger to US and NATO troops, because, as mentioned above, they pay insufficient attention to this problem and do not allocate insufficient funds to solve it. After the Russians tested their electronic warfare equipment in Syria and their possible application in Ukraine, western observers got another opportunity to see what their military might face - at the Zapad-2017 exercise.
Observing how Russian electronic warfare equipment is used will greatly help the United States develop appropriate principles for countering and attacking. Free Press cites military theorists who have calculated that electronic warfare means can increase the combat potential of ground forces by up to two times and reduce aviation losses by up to six times. The stakes are very high, and therefore the arms race in the field of electronic warfare will only intensify in the coming years.
Samuel Bendett is a CNA Corporation Research Fellow writing for the RealClearWorld.com blog. Previously, he worked at the National Defense University, dealing with new breakthrough technologies and their use in crisis situations.
The materials of InoSMI contain only assessments of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the editors of InoSMI.
It became a means of armed struggle. Today, the United States practically does not conduct military operations without the active use of electronic warfare (EW), which was clearly shown by the events in Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria. This is of particular relevance in connection with the situation in Ukraine, which our counter-partners sleep and see in NATO, as well as with the deployment of a third missile defense position area in Poland and Romania.
What will Russia oppose? This and other questions are answered by the Acting Chief of the Electronic Warfare Troops of the Armed Forces Russian Federation Yuri Lastochkin.
Addiction effect
- What are the latest trends in the development of electronic warfare, what are our priorities?
- The emphasis of the armed struggle is increasingly shifting to the information sphere. With regard to modern technically developed states, it can be quite reasonably argued that their power is largely a consequence of the use of high technologies, primarily information. This process is based on the large-scale (total) introduction of radio-electronic means and computer technology into all spheres of military operations, as well as the construction on their basis of network control (network-centric) structures within a single information space.
Recent armed conflicts have shown that the degree of realization of the combat potential of a force grouping is growing to a large extent, not only and not so much due to the use of high-precision weapons, but primarily due to gaining superiority in command and control of subordinate forces and means. It is achieved and maintained through the rational use of modern means of reconnaissance and command and control.
Thus, by receiving more accurate and complete information on the battlefield in a timely manner, making adequate decisions and promptly communicating them to subordinates, the side of the conflict that has superior command and control becomes able to defeat the enemy that is many times superior to it.
The technical basis of all modern weapons and military equipment systems, primarily such as intelligent, high-precision and robotic, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, control and communications, is radio electronic means (RES). In order to achieve the goals of operations, they are usually combined into systems of various levels of complexity and purpose.
However, in conditions of high saturation of all spheres of armed struggle with them, a paradoxical situation has arisen. On the one hand, the ability to achieve the goals of operations (combat operations) is sharply increased, on the other hand, a violation of the normal functioning of the RES can negate all the advantages, even cause a complete loss of combat capability. Thus, the so-called effect of the dependence of the armed forces of technically developed states on the quality of the functioning of the RES as part of the weapons and military equipment systems becomes quite obvious.
Under such conditions, it is electronic warfare, as a relatively low-cost and fairly easy-to-implement method of disorganizing the work of individual enemy REM and protecting one's own, that comes to the fore. Under certain conditions, it is the use of electronic warfare methods that can be considered as asymmetric measures that level the advantages of high-tech systems and means of armed struggle.
However, all of the above requires a systematic approach to electronic warfare. Under this, one should consider a purposeful system with the appropriate properties, that is, the presence of system-forming, system-preserving factors, synergy, emergence, multiplicity, etc. It should be remembered that only a system with no less complexity can successfully resist the system. In addition, the practice of using electronic warfare means shows their higher efficiency in combination with means of influence (protection, reconnaissance) of another functional purpose.
A significant expansion of the frequency range, a reduction in radiation power and communication distances, an increase in the data transfer rate, special operating modes, the formation of network structures, the widespread use of air, space and unmanned systems and means suggest a number of promising directions development of the electronic warfare system in general and individual means in particular. These areas include:
- expanding the functionality of individual electronic warfare equipment and increasing their versatility;
— use of an open construction architecture with the possibility of changing their functionality by adding additional modules;
- the inclusion of electronic warfare as an element in the composition of almost all systems of armed struggle;
- shifting efforts to defeat electronic systems on enemy territory, the widespread use of unmanned and abandoned (carried) electronic warfare systems;
- the emergence of a technique for the functional defeat of the enemy's RES - a weapon of powerful directed electromagnetic radiation;
- the use of special means to disrupt the operation of computerized control systems built according to the network principle;
- selection as priority targets for the impact of airborne, unmanned, robotic and satellite RES control and intelligence systems;
- development of new methods of violation (change) of the conditions for the propagation of radio waves;
- creation of technologies for reducing the visibility of weapons and military equipment in the interests of countering enemy reconnaissance;
- creation of a complex radio-electronic environment for technical means of reconnaissance of the enemy and imitation in areas of operations (combat actions).
It is obvious that these areas can undergo a transformation in the medium term and, even more so, the long term, which follows from the logic of the development of armed struggle, science and technology, and as a result, should be the object of close attention of the scientific community.
- How is the development of the electronic warfare troops going after the stagnation and large-scale reduction of the Armed Forces in 2012?
- AT last years the intensity of combat training has increased significantly. Since the beginning of 2014, more than 15 exercises of various sizes have been conducted in the EW troops alone. In addition, to create a complex and dynamic environment for active enemy electronic influence on all operational and combat training activities, military units and electronic warfare subunits are involved. The quality of training of officers and personnel as a whole has grown.
Main educational institution EW troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and federal executive authorities is the military educational and scientific center of the Air Force "Air Force Academy" (Voronezh). It organizes training in all major electronic warfare specialties. And junior specialists are trained by the Interspecific Center for Training and Combat Use of Electronic Warfare Troops (Tambov).
The center met the 110th anniversary of electronic warfare with serious results. Over 1,500 junior specialists in electronic warfare, radio and electronic intelligence in more than 15 specialties were trained in the four-month program during the academic year. As an experimental platform for testing new models of electronic warfare and radio intelligence equipment, the center takes an active part in military-technical cooperation with defense industry enterprises, including OJSC Tambov Plant Revtrud, FSUE TNIIR Efir, CJSC Signal.
As for the development of the electronic warfare equipment of the RF Armed Forces as a whole, it is currently being carried out in accordance with the State Armament Program for 2011-2020 (GPV-2020), approved by the President of the Russian Federation on December 31, 2010. The implementation of SAP-2020 activities is carried out as part of the annual state defense orders (GOZ). Fulfillment of the SAP-2020 parameters will make it possible to increase the level of provision of EW troops with promising equipment by 2020 to 70%.
Lessons for Russia
- What experience of using electronic warfare in past military conflicts is of professional interest to you and why?
- First of all, Iraq and Yugoslavia, although it would seem that those events are long behind us. But, firstly, not everything was told about. Secondly, such techniques, methods of using electronic warfare are still being used, for example, during an operation against Libya, for example. Thirdly, it is useful to once again analyze those events from the height of our time.
Judge for yourself. In the war with Iraq (1991), in the interests of the EW MNS, a space grouping of reconnaissance equipment (up to 40 satellites) and ground (1550) posts of radio and electronic intelligence and direction finding were created.
As part of the EW aviation group, there were 108 aircraft to suppress radar, radio communication lines and destroy air defense systems with anti-radar missiles. All attack aircraft of the US Air Force, Great Britain, France and ships have individual stations installed to protect against detection by electronic means and defeat by guided weapons. A significant part of aviation is equipped with hanging containers with EW equipment for collective protection.
In the conflict area, the ground forces grouping deployed 60 ground stations and 37 EW helicopters, which made it possible to solve the tasks of reconnaissance and electronic suppression of KB, VHF and radio relay communications at the tactical and operational-tactical control level at a distance of up to 120–150 km.
The main task of the US electronic warfare was to suppress and disorganize the Iraqi air defense control system nationwide. Without the successful solution of this problem, the massive use of aviation would have entailed significant losses in military equipment and personnel. As a result of the use of RTR, REB and control aircraft together with anti-radar missiles (almost in the absence of electronic countermeasures from the Iraqi forces), up to 80 percent of all combat-ready Iraqi radar stations were disabled in the first 10 days of hostilities.
In fact, for the first time in the practice of conducting electronic warfare, a form of "electronic strike" was implemented, as a result of which it was possible to create favorable conditions for the sudden use of aviation and ground groupings of troops (forces), high-precision weapons, and to achieve overall superiority in control.
During the second campaign in Iraq (2003), an electronic warfare operation was simultaneously carried out, which, in addition to powerful jamming barrage and targeted suppression of state and military radio-electronic means, included many high-precision fire strikes on radio-emitting objects with special high-precision missiles with dusty graphite and metallized filling of warheads that hit transformer substations and relay automation of power plants. The share of their use in comparison with the previous conflict increased by 30%.
For the first time during the operation, an experiment was conducted to suppress the information potential of the enemy - television and radio stations, repeaters, editorial offices of electronic and print media, which were used to cover the course of hostilities and propaganda. As a result, the information and propaganda potential of Iraq has been completely suppressed.
The NAVSTAR navigation system was widely used to target precision weapons. The share of such weapons in the war was 95 percent (in 1991 - 7 percent). The experience of the described armed conflicts confirmed the well-known views of the US and NATO command on electronic warfare as an integral part of military operations of any scale, on the methods of its organization and conduct, once again showing in practice that electronic warfare has grown from a means of operational (combat) support into a means of armed struggle.
- What new things did the Americans use in Yugoslavia?
- The actions of the US and NATO in the spring and summer of 1999 in Yugoslavia became the prototype of the sixth generation war. It was a non-contact local war, based on the air-space-sea operation and information confrontation.
In the course of hostilities, as part of the information confrontation, NATO forces carried out an electronic warfare operation, which, in addition to electronic suppression, included many high-precision fire strikes on radio-emitting objects. For the first time, an experiment was carried out to suppress the information potential of Yugoslavia.
New AGM-109 sea-launched cruise missiles, carried by US Navy ships and submarines, have been tested. Interestingly, they were aimed at targets using the GPS space navigation system, and the flight was carried out in complete radio silence without emitting electromagnetic energy to measure the height of their flight. Only in the final section, directly in the target area, the DSMAS optical system was activated for precise targeting at a specific critical point of the object.
The main targets of the defeat were key military and economic facilities, infrastructure and communications of Serbia and Kosovo. In the vast majority of cases, they were successfully struck. According to official data from the Pentagon, 1,200-1,500 high-precision cruise missiles, most of which were experimental, were used to strike at 900 economic targets. That is to say, democracy in action.
- Space reconnaissance facilities were used with the same intensity?
“They not only played an extremely important role in the operation, but were the backbone military-technical instruments of combat operations. The United States has created a powerful constellation of 50 satellites for various purposes. Above the theater of war, there were 8-12 spacecraft at the same time, which, together with air and sea carriers, were the basis of reconnaissance and strike combat systems.
From space, continuous observation of TVD satellites was carried out optical intelligence KN-1 (USA), Helios-1A (France), Lacrosse radar reconnaissance (USA), as well as control, navigation, communications and meteorological support. US GPS spacecraft navigated the latest high-precision air and sea-launched cruise missiles.
Special spacecraft "Spot" (France) transmitted a television image of the earth's surface and documented experimental attacks on economic and infrastructure facilities in Serbia and Kosovo in order to determine the real effectiveness of high-precision cruise missiles.
As a result, the air defense of Yugoslavia was completely suppressed by electronic warfare. NATO forces' high-precision anti-radar missiles destroyed almost every source of radio emission. As a rule, after the first launch of an anti-aircraft missile, even the most advanced anti-aircraft missile system The air defense of Yugoslavia, which uses the principle of active radar in its work, was doomed to defeat, regardless of whether it remained on or off after that.
Each radar station that briefly emitted electromagnetic energy was invariably destroyed either by an anti-radar missile or by a missile guided by the thermal radiation of the engine vehicle The radar or its power units when the radar itself is turned off. This led to the fact that during the first two or three days of the war, 70% of the divisions of the S-125 and S-75 mobile air defense systems were disabled.
During the operation, NATO forces, simultaneously with the fire destruction of air defense systems and infrastructure facilities, carried out an electronic warfare operation, which, in addition to powerful jamming barrage and targeted suppression of Yugoslav state and military electronic equipment, included many high-precision fire strikes on other radio-emitting objects. Anti-radar missiles aimed at any fixed sources of electromagnetic energy radiation destroyed radars, air defense systems, radio communication stations, conventional and cellular communication centers, television stations, broadcasting stations, computer centers.
During the EW operation, the information potential of the enemy was suppressed - television and radio stations, repeaters, electronic and print media, which were used to cover the course of hostilities and propaganda. When choosing targets, the United States and other NATO countries did not always adhere to the norms of international humanitarian law governing the rules of war, as evidenced by the defeat of a purely civilian television and radio center.
The main means of electronic warfare were the EU-1 ZON and EA-6V aircraft, which operated outside the Yugoslav air defense zone, as well as tactical fighters for delivering high-precision missiles homing to the radiation source to the launch lines.
The electronic information impact on the automated command and control networks of the Yugoslav Armed Forces was a new element for the United States in the conduct of information warfare, used for the first time in a real armed conflict. Previously, they were limited to more crude methods of influence, such as disabling automated systems by overloading them with extraneous information.
"Alurgit", "Infauna" and others
- What experience did the troops take away from the fight against gangs in the North Caucasus in 2000 in the use of forces and means of electronic warfare?
- Before the active phase of combat operations, with the financial assistance of a number of foreign states, the militants created an operational and flexible communication and control system, the technical basis of which was a large number of various, including portable means of radio, radio relay and satellite communications, as well as mobile cellular and trunk connection.
The task of identifying and suppressing them, especially in mountainous and wooded areas, is much more difficult. This is primarily due to the peculiarities of the propagation of electromagnetic waves, short communication distances, restrictions in the choice of positions for electronic warfare equipment.
Based on the experience of the previous campaign to restore constitutional order in 1994-1996 and widely using theoretical and experimental developments in the field of creating the latest electronic warfare equipment and systems, new and modernized models of special equipment were quickly developed and practically tested during combat operations. Under conditions of intensive use of electronic warfare equipment and systems, equipment that failed was quickly restored by mobile repair teams. This, to a large extent, made it possible to successfully solve the problems of electronic warfare in the North Caucasus region.
The objectives of the electronic warfare were to reduce the ability of illegal armed formations to control forces and means, to ensure the stable operation of the radio-electronic means of the Joint Group of Forces. These goals were achieved by coordinated actions of the forces and means of electronic warfare, reconnaissance, other branches of the armed forces and special troops of the United Forces.
The presence of maneuverable EW groups in each combined-arms formation made it possible to determine with high accuracy the location of the radio stations of the field commanders of bandit formations and, in some cases, after additional reconnaissance, eliminate them with artillery fire and air strikes.
Thus, the complex use of reconnaissance, fire destruction and electronic suppression made it possible to disable the most important electronic objects in the command and control system of illegal armed formations, suppress their main radio communication channels with radio interference and, in general, disrupt the control of bandit formations in the main areas of military operations. As a result, the leaders almost completely lost control and were forced to use small-sized portable communications equipment, the work of which was quickly and effectively suppressed.
In the course of performing combat missions in the North Caucasus, a wealth of experience has been accumulated, which is taken into account in the educational process, in the implementation of programs for the development of electronic warfare technology, and the improvement of forms and methods of conducting electronic warfare.
- What new models of weapons and military equipment are being delivered to the troops today in accordance with the State Defense Order? What is their advantage?
- In recent years, positive prerequisites have been created for a radical upgrade of the EW weapon system. The scientific and technical groundwork formed within the framework of SAP-2015 and SAP-2020 made it possible to successfully complete state tests of 18 new types of electronic warfare equipment in the period 2010-2013. These are Borisoglebsk-2, Alurgit, Krasukha-2O, Krasukha-C4, Moscow-1, Parodist, Lorandit-M, Leer-2, Leer-3 , "Lesochek", "Less", "Magnesium-EW", "Field-21", etc.
Newly developed tools for the first time will allow:
- to provide the possibility of radio reconnaissance and radio suppression of integrated communication systems and data transmission of collective use, to increase the probability of selection of targets of suppression by 1.5-1.8 times, to reduce the reaction time by 10 times;
- to implement the possibility of covert, selective by location and (or) system address blocking of subscriber terminals of cellular communications of the enemy, to increase the size of the zone of effective influence through the use of non-traditional (non-energy) methods of intelligent blocking of subscriber terminals of cellular communications up to four times and much more.
In addition, such electronic warfare equipment will meet the following basic requirements:
— complex and effective impact on a wide range of radio-electronic and computer systems and facilities;
- implementation of complex technical control of measures for masking objects in all physical fields and RES, ensuring the protection of information from leakage through technical channels and damage by means of software (software and hardware) impact;
- conflict stability in the conditions of the use by the opposing side of means of electronic destruction and weapons homing in radiation;
- high operational characteristics (reliability, maintainability, ergonomics, etc.) and a large modernization potential.
Thanks to the several-fold increase in the supply of weapons and military equipment, more than 10 electronic warfare units have been completely re-equipped with modern and promising means.
- And the last question. With which defense industry enterprises do you work most closely?
- I would like to emphasize the growing role of integrated structures in the development and production of electronic warfare equipment. At present, two such structures have been formed and are effectively functioning: OJSC Concern Sozvezdie (Voronezh) - in the direction of development of electronic warfare technology with command and control systems, and OJSC Concern Radioelectronic Technologies (Moscow) - in the direction of development of electronic warfare technology with weapon control systems . Close cooperation with defense industry enterprises allows us to look to the future with confidence.
