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Every year, 3-4 trips of US and UK nuclear submarines are carried out to the Arctic. Photo from www.navy.mil
Today, the Arctic theme is becoming more and more popular and logically fits into the framework of the state course for the restoration of Russia's geopolitical positions in all azimuths. Priority attention, which since the beginning of the 21st century has been given to the development of the Arctic territories, is determined by the long-term strategic interests of the state. The Fundamentals of the National Policy in the Arctic until 2020 have been developed, which provide for the transformation of the Arctic zone into the leading strategic resource base of Russia. As a result, already now the Arctic provides about 11% of the country's national income, 22% of the total Russian exports are created here, more than 90% of nickel and cobalt, 60% of copper, 96% of platinoids are mined and produced...
About a quarter of the world's hydrocarbon resources are concentrated in the Russian part of the Arctic. Unique gas fields have been discovered on the shelves of the Barents and Kara Seas. The fishery complex produces about 15% of the country's aquatic biological resources. The key role in the development of a unified transcontinental transport system belongs to the Northern Sea Route, which serves as the shortest route between the European and Far Eastern sea and river ports of Siberia.
"QUIET" REGION
The special geopolitical position and wealth of its raw material deposits have turned the Arctic into one of the main points of attraction not only for the Arctic states, but also for the very remote countries of the Northern Hemisphere.
Observer status of the Arctic Council received China, Japan, South Korea, India and Singapore, Netherlands, Spain, UK, Germany, France, Poland, Italy. In an effort to assert its institutional involvement in the Arctic affairs, the EU also claims the status of a permanent observer in the Arctic Council.
The states and their coalitions, claiming to participate in decision-making on the problems of the Arctic, without de jure questioning the jurisdiction of the coastal Arctic countries, are de facto trying to find ways to change the existing situation. The desire of many states to demonstrate their right to independent study of the Arctic, the development of the Arctic field allows us to predict an increase in confrontation, primarily between the main world geopolitical players: Russia, the United States, China, the states of the Arctic region and their coalitions. The confrontation can be carried out both within the framework of diplomatic negotiations and using a wide range of technologies of modern conflicts.
So far, the Arctic is considered a relatively calm region. Thanks to the professionalism of Russian diplomats, many important agreements for Russia have been signed and are being implemented within the framework of the Arctic Council: on cooperation in aviation and maritime search and rescue in the Arctic, on cooperation in the field of preparedness and response to marine oil pollution in the Arctic. In total, within the framework of the Arctic Council, Russia takes part in 80 projects. The UN Commission recently recognized the legitimacy of our claim for the continental shelf of the Sea of Okhotsk. Now it has actually become the Russian inland sea.
The opinions of a number of experts sound rather pacifying, arguing that the only significant open issue in the Arctic remains the definition of external borders and the delimitation of the continental shelf of a number of coastal states beyond 200-mile zones. At the same time, it is believed that this issue will not give rise to disputes and conflicts regarding access to natural wealth the Arctic, most of which is within the undisputed exclusive economic zones of coastal states. At the same time, the world has more than once encountered the fact that the position of the West has changed dramatically, and this has led to a radical transformation of situations, to a cynical denial of the sovereign rights of individual states, up to the use of military force against them. Their national interest The West defends resolutely and toughly, not paying attention to the norms international law when they conflict with his interests. So far, the situation in the Arctic, unlike problem areas, is relatively calm.
However, the world is changing, and strategies are also changing, allowing you to impose your will on the enemy not only by military force. In the context of globalization and the information revolution, the events related to the hybrid war waged against Russia can serve as a catalyst for abrupt and unpredictable changes in the Arctic region.
UNPREDICTABLE ENVIRONMENT
Given the volatility and unpredictability of the international situation, one should not lose sight of the possibility of implementing a strategy of indirect action in the course of a hybrid war that is unfolding against Russia in the Arctic.
In modern conflicts, technologies are increasingly being used to gradually prepare the conditions for an avalanche-like development of the situation. The calculation is made on the fact that everything should “go by itself”, without the noticeable participation of the main initiator of the conflict. According to one of the authors of the Anglo-Saxon strategy of indirect action, the British military theorist B.L. Garth, "you can arrange various relatively small nasty things, all the time reminiscent of the enemy, but he himself will not be visible."
The strategy of indirect action in the Arctic is only a link in the US global strategy, the goal of which is to establish world domination and achieve guaranteed access to all vital areas.
With regard to the Arctic region, for many years the United States and some other NATO countries have been coordinating their political, military, economic, and information efforts within the framework of solving a single task - to expand the economic presence in the regions of the North, to achieve the internationalization of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and, ultimately, to try to minimize the role of Russia in the region. At the same time, we note that the issue of control over the NSR for Russia is of critical importance, since this is so far the only transport route capable of integrating remote areas Far North countries and their resource potential in the national economy. Therefore, Russia cannot allow economic ties between individual regions of the country carried out via the NSR to be placed under international control.
The leading role in counteracting the legitimate interests of Russia in the Arctic belongs to the United States. The report of the Chief of Staff of the US Navy, Admiral D. Greenert, "Roadmap" for the Arctic 2014-2030, defines specific goals and objectives for various services and departments of the US Navy and their allies. The military infrastructure of the United States and Canada is already being created and developed in the Arctic. In particular, the US has decided to build two new advanced coast guard bases in Alaska at Barrow and Nome. The possibilities of ensuring the permanent presence of an aircraft carrier group in the Arctic and the allocation of additional patrol ships are being considered. Efforts are being stepped up for anti-submarine defense and deep landing operations. AT last years the scale and intensity of NATO operational and combat training in the Arctic has increased. Every year, 3-4 trips of multi-purpose nuclear submarines are carried out to the Arctic, at least three sorties of base patrol aircraft are made weekly.
In the Arctic sector and on the border territory of the Russian Federation, the activities of the US intelligence services and their NATO allies have intensified. In addition to military forces and means, Norwegian research vessels are involved in reconnaissance, various non-governmental organizations are used, especially environmental ones, as was the case, for example, in 2013 during the Greenpeace campaign on the Prirazlomnaya platform. The presence of foreign researchers is noted in areas of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago and in the throat of the White Sea - where Russia is testing its nuclear submarines. In Norway, they are talking about plans to change the demilitarized status of Svalbard, and the development of a concept for the use of national armed forces in the Arctic region is being completed.
NATO's position on military presence in the Arctic has not yet been determined. In this regard, the issue of the alliance's policy in the Arctic was not reflected either in the strategic concept of the alliance adopted in 2010, or in the decisions of subsequent summits of the bloc. The lack of involvement of NATO in solving the problems of the Arctic is associated with different approaches and unequal interest of the allies. But supporters of a more visible NATO presence in the northern latitudes do not stop trying to change the situation, appealing to the fact that five NATO member states (USA, Canada, Norway, Denmark and Iceland) and two important partners (Sweden and Finland) are Arctic countries. Thus, it is proposed to expand the number of NATO member states participating in the Arctic confrontation with Russia.
Along with military activities in the northern latitudes, Washington is increasing its efforts in the information sphere, using the means of traditional and public diplomacy to consolidate allies and undermine Russia's positions. The breeding ground for the implementation of the preparatory phase of the strategy of indirect action in the Arctic is a complex of hybrid threats that can serve as a catalyst for building confrontation between Russia and other contenders for the wealth of the region.
Main hybrid threats for the Russian Federation in the Arctic zone are due to a combination of the following military, political, economic, informational factors: the intensification of military activities of the Arctic states and their allies, the growth of its scale in the Arctic and adjacent water areas; implementation of ideas about common and equal access to the use of the Northern Sea Route and the resources of the Arctic for all subjects of the world community; the implementation by the Arctic states and their allies of informational measures to discredit the Russian Federation; Norway's actions to forcibly oust the Russian Federation from traditional fishing areas in the Barents and Norwegian Seas; the desire of the United States and its allies to establish control over the nuclear facilities of the Russian Federation in the Arctic; the desire of the leadership of the countries of the Asia-Pacific region to receive for their naval forces base points in the Arctic zone, etc.
Given the trend towards an increase in the number of participants claiming their share in the Arctic, it is possible to predict the formation of situational coalitions in the composition of states, relations between which are by no means always examples of friendship and mutual understanding. But given the unresolved number of legal aspects in relation to the problems of the Arctic, it seems quite realistic to coordinate the activities of individual states in order to weaken the position of Russia and achieve a favorable decision for them by international authorities. The actions of such rivals of Russia are characterized by purposeful, adaptive use of both military force methods and coordinated steps to weaken the enemy economically, use subversive information technologies. The use of indirect asymmetric actions and methods of conducting hybrid wars both against the whole state and in relation to its individual large regions makes it possible to deprive the opposing side of actual sovereignty without seizing territories by military force.
Thus, a hybrid war is being waged against Russia in the Arctic, which requires appropriate “hybrid” countermeasures. Some of these measures are provided for in the document adopted by the Security Council of the Russian Federation in 2008 - "Fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the period up to 2020 and beyond." The Fundamentals reflect the main goals and strategic priorities of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic, the main tasks, measures and mechanisms for its implementation. Among the tasks in the field of ensuring military security, it is required to "bring the capabilities of the border agencies in line with the nature of the threats and challenges of the Russian Federation in the Arctic."
Based on the spirit and letter of the "Osnovy", Russia plans to create an Arctic group of troops by 2020 to protect its economic and political interests in this region. The document refers to the strengthening of the border troops of the FSB of Russia and the need to create a coast guard of the Russian Arctic borders.
So far, there are no clear signs indicating the existence of a consolidated anti-Russian strategy aimed at realizing the interests of the Arctic states and countries located far from the Arctic. However, for a hybrid war in the Arctic as the largest geopolitical region, the following is important: nothing prevents each of the participants from realizing their intentions without the direct use of armed forces and even without declaring war at all. If the interests of a group of participants coincide, it may be appropriate to create their situational coalition to “push through” the desired solution.
Therefore, it is also important for Russia to use such coalitions to its advantage, using disagreements between various actors. In this context, it is also important to use the opportunities of the SCO, EAC, cooperation with Japan and South Korea. A program of long-term cooperation with neutral Sweden and Finland should be developed and cooperation in the Arctic should be included in it in order to prevent these states from being drawn into anti-Russian maneuvers.
ARC OF INSTABILITY
The strategic importance of the Arctic region determines its coverage by the so-called "system of arcs of instability", which is the main tool by which the most important systemic security problems of Eurasia in general and the Russian Federation in particular are created. According to Professor Vladimir Kolotov, "the system of arcs of instability creates a geopolitical "climate", which in every possible way contributes to the conduct of controlled regional destabilization." This system covers the territory located between four oceans: Pacific, Indian, Atlantic and Arctic. It consists of eight operating segments of varying degrees of "readiness".
The arctic segment of the arc of instability is in the process of formation. The interests of the parties are defined, attempts are being made to ensure their compatibility on the basis of an internationally recognized legal framework, which, in turn, is characterized by a high degree of underdevelopment, which creates uncertainty regarding the rights of the participants to use various parts of the Arctic field in their interests. As part of the US-proclaimed strategy of geopolitical dominance in the Arctic segment, in parallel with the build-up of forces and the creation of military infrastructure, operations are being deployed in other areas of preparation and conduct of a hybrid war.
Within the framework of the hybrid war that the West is waging against Russia, the Arctic theater occupies a special place, determined by a number of objective factors. Among them: extreme natural and climatic conditions; the large length of the coastline and the focal nature of the deployment of border guard forces; low population density; lack of a unified industrial and economic complex and remoteness from the main industrial centers, high resource intensity and dependence of economic activity and the livelihood of the population on the supply of fuel, food and essential goods from other regions; low stability ecological systems that determine the biological balance and climate of the Earth, and their dependence on even minor anthropogenic impacts.
An important factor of a subjective nature is the still insufficiently coordinated system of state administration in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation. The imperfection of state regulation measures in the economic and social spheres has led to a critical state of the basic transport, industrial, border, information, scientific and social infrastructures. Disproportions in regional development are growing, there is an outflow of population from the region.
The danger is recognized by the authorities, and as a result of energetic measures taken, the situation is rectified. However, the competitive potential of the Arctic zone of Russia is still far from being fully used.
NONLINEAR APPROACH
The strategy and goals of a hybrid war are formulated taking into account the vulnerability of the Arctic part of Russia to the use of hybrid technologies aimed at destabilizing the situation in vast areas.
First, as already mentioned, the most important goal is to undermine the economic potential of the state. This predetermines the place of Russian economic facilities in the Arctic, communications and control systems as the primary goals of the hybrid war. Forces and means are being created to influence the objects of this group, including special operations forces, cyber weapons, and theater reconnaissance is being organized. It is necessary to predict the expansion of the use of UAVs for reconnaissance purposes.
Secondly, the length of the coastline and the sparsely populated areas of land complicate the task of protecting the border, preventing the penetration of sabotage and reconnaissance groups of special operations forces.
Thirdly, an important feature of the theater is the high sensitivity of the environment in the Arctic to environmental factors, which makes it possible to predict the use of special operations forces in a hybrid war to disrupt the ecological balance. Here, one can fully expect the use of the nonlinearity property of a hybrid war, when the consequences of using indirect methods related to the impact on the ecology of the region lead to disproportionately high catastrophic consequences that can cause an avalanche-like change in the military-strategic and political situation. These can be, for example, acts of sabotage at oil-producing facilities, pipelines, and transport. High degree threats are posed by cyber operations against the control systems of the above facilities.
When developing protective measures in the Arctic region, one should resolutely abandon the traditional linear vision of war, which implies the possibility of establishing direct and proportional relationships between cause and effect, disturbing influence and results. In a hybrid war built on a non-linear strategy, small impacts can produce big results. The non-linearity factor of a hybrid war significantly changes the degree of reliability of predicting the possible consequences of a conflict both on the scale of the Arctic region and on a global scale.
In a hybrid war, the consequences of using indirect methods create an extremely dangerous situation, often beyond the control of the initiators. As a result of the violation of the direct connection between cause and effect, vast zones of uncertainty are created associated with the actions of heterogeneous actors, and the actions of one of them can cause an avalanche-like change in the entire military-strategic and political situation. These and some other factors create serious obstacles when trying to foresee the course and outcome of a hybrid war.
Fourth, hybrid warfare is illegitimate. All existing laws of war are designed, as a rule, for conflicts between two belligerents, usually states pursuing interests that each of the participants considers legitimate. For traditional war, the UN adopted the concept of "aggression", there are laws that protect the rights of combatants, prisoners of war and the civilian population, prohibiting the use of certain types of weapons. The existing legal and regulatory framework serves as a tool for political decision makers and military leaders. There is nothing like this for a hybrid war.
And finally, the concept of “parties to the conflict”, which act as carriers of the conflict, needs to be clarified. A hybrid war in the Arctic is not declared, the parties to the conflict are not defined, while it is traditionally believed that a conflict as a phase of contradiction is possible only when its parties are represented by subjects. Where there is no subject, there can be no conflict.
If in a hybrid war one of the obvious subjects is the state - the victim of aggression, then it is not easy to define the aggressor himself as the other side of the conflict.
At the same time, the fact of hybrid aggression does not become obvious immediately. This thesis should be primarily attributed to the important components of a hybrid war - information and cyber wars. In both cases, it is difficult to determine the subject of aggression. These and some other factors create serious obstacles in predicting the situation and strategic planning of measures to counter a hybrid war in the Arctic.
"FRICTION OF WAR"
Taking into account the uniqueness of the Arctic theater, the phenomenon of the concept of “friction of war” introduced by K. Clausewitz is of great importance for understanding hybrid warfare as a sphere of uncertainty and uncertainty. In his writings, the military theorist rightly emphasized that "friction is the only concept that, in general, distinguishes a real war from a paper war." In other words, in war there can be a huge distance from what is conceived to what is actually being implemented. The validity of this judgment is especially true for a hybrid war in the Arctic, given the unpredictability and uncertainty of the conflict, the special sensitivity of possible targets to small impacts that can lead to large-scale consequences. The peculiarities of hybrid warfare as an indefinite and unreliable conflict, in which heterogeneous forces and means are involved, turn friction into a source of significant perturbing influences on the course of actions, which, under the influence of the friction of war, often become an uncontrollable and even uncontrollable process.
For traditional warfare, there are seven sources of general friction: danger; physical stress; uncertainty and unreliability of information on the basis of which decisions are made; random events that cannot be predicted; physical and political restrictions on the use of force; unpredictability resulting from interaction with the enemy; gaps between the causes and effects of war.
For a hybrid war in the Arctic region, the list of friction sources can be expanded.
Firstly, taking into account the scale of economic interests of the states claiming their share in the Arctic field, the geography of their location and the specific approach to existing problems, psychological tension and stress increase, which increases the likelihood of error.
It is known that many modern conflicts occur on intercivilizational faults. The influence of this factor on the possible aggravation of the situation in the Arctic increases due to the expansion of the civilizational diversity of contenders for the Arctic field.
Secondly, a powerful source of disturbing influences that provoke failures in control systems are actions in cyberspace directed against control systems at oil and gas production facilities and pipelines.
Thirdly, disinformation is already widely used in the information war to manipulate the activities of environmental groups, which contributes to the creation of an environment of chaos and confusion.
And finally, as a result of friction, seemingly insignificant phenomena and facts occurring at the tactical level receive the power and ability of a strategic catalyst capable of influencing the course of an entire military campaign. There are cascading amplification mechanisms that allow small events in the course of a war to trigger completely unexpected and unpredictable processes that cannot be quantified within the framework of any theory. In the Arctic sector, in a hybrid war against Russia, cascade mechanisms-catalysts can be man-made man-made disasters at civilian and military facilities, terrorist attacks on communications with a large number of victims, disruption of the supply of vital products and funds to hard-to-reach Arctic regions.
The sum of friction sources usually turns out to be more than their simple sum, since some types of friction interact with others, which further increases their destructive result.
Friction in zones of uncertainty in a hybrid war is associated with the manifestation of many accidents and causes phenomena that cannot be taken into account in advance. This increases the likelihood of random incidents that widen the scope of the conflict. This is especially dangerous in a hybrid war in the Arctic, in which the interests of nuclear powers are involved.
Thus, the sources of friction largely determine the structural properties of hybrid warfare, the effectiveness of operations, and the strategy and tactics of counteraction.
As in any other war, in the hybrid war in the Arctic there are some kind of “lubricants” that can reduce friction in any military machine, including in a hybrid war. This is the use of flexible adaptive political strategies in diplomacy. Availability is important combat experience and military training participants, special equipment, military equipment and weapons, rational deployment of forces and means, strict discipline, a well-thought-out information strategy, the early creation of effective channels for obtaining, transmitting, processing and analyzing situational data, etc.
For a hybrid war, a unique “grease” is its complete lack of legitimacy and subordination to international norms and rules, which makes it possible on this basis to carry out the dirtiest provocations with the involvement of special operations forces, the use of manipulated terrorist groups and organized crime. The use of bacterial agents against animals, for example, pathogens of anthrax, foot-and-mouth disease, plague, glanders, false rabies, etc., cannot be ruled out.
LEGAL CONCLUSIONS
The Arctic is an extremely tasty region for Russia's geopolitical adversaries, who have repeatedly demonstrated the ability to violate any international agreements, if this is in their national interests. Historical experience does not allow counting on unconditional respect for the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of Russia enshrined in treaties in the Arctic waters and on the shelf. Such factors, along with well-known problems with the justification of the outer boundaries of the Russian continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean outside the exclusive economic zone, create conditions for attempts by the Arctic, some non-Arctic states and their coalitions to use a sophisticated strategy of indirect actions to put pressure on Russia, built on the formation and implementation of the spectrum hybrid threats.
The effectiveness of countering a hybrid war in the Arctic will depend on how fully it will be possible to foresee and take into account its features in order to adequately and promptly adapt to a rapidly changing environment, which will get ahead of rivals and prevent the transformation of challenges and risks into real dangers and threats to the national interests of the state in vital region.
The increased interest in the practical development of the Arctic space, shown in recent years by the international community, is caused by both geopolitical and economic, as well as defense factors. A huge territory north of the Arctic Circle with a total area of about 27 million square meters. km (for comparison, the area of \u200b\u200bthe whole of Europe is 10.5 million sq. km) is the object of close attention not only of the Arctic countries: Russia, the USA, Canada, Denmark and Norway (whose legal status for this territory is enshrined in relevant international agreements), but also geographically very distant China, Japan, South Korea and some other European and Asian states. It should be noted that out of the entire length of the border Arctic coast, which is 38,700 km, our country accounts for most of its 22,600 km. Maintaining the unconditional status of ownership of these vast northern expanses, using their raw materials, logistics and defense potential with maximum efficiency, both in the real and in the long term, are the priorities of the Russian leadership.
Contrary to the short-sighted opinion of some opposition skeptics who consider it impossible in the conditions of the economic crisis to spend budget funds on the development of “ephemeral and unpromising” northern territories, the President of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation, with the legislative support of the Parliament of the Russian Federation, not only guarantee the strict implementation of the decisions already taken on this issue , but also continue to build up the Russian "Arctic potential", incl. taking into account the latest domestic and foreign scientific forecasts.
According to the conclusions of reputable climate scientists, the effect of global warming extends to the greatest extent to the Arctic region. The data obtained allow us to conclude that the area of the glacial layer is reduced to 5 million square kilometers annually. And this means that by 2030, during the summer period, most of the Northern Ocean will be available for navigation, industrial extraction of bioresources, exploration and use of hydrocarbon sources, as well as other minerals. Along with the effect of global warming, the effects of a partial (i.e., ice jams can be found in certain sections of the Northern Sea Route, which is far from safe for navigation in this area, in some years of the general climatic cycle) cooling, which indicates the complexity of the processes, occurring in the Arctic, although the general warming is quite obvious.
According to experts, the Arctic contains about a third of the world's natural gas reserves and up to 13% of oil. In addition, huge reserves of coal, gold, copper, nickel, tin, platinum, and manganese lie on the shelf. At the same time, more than 70% of oil and over 88% of gas reserves of all domestic offshore areas are located in the Russian part of the Arctic possessions. The total value of explored and forecast resources of energy and mineral raw materials exceeds 15 trillion US dollars. In addition, most of the Arctic deposits are located on the continental shelf at a depth of less than 500 meters and on flat bottoms. Therefore, from a technical point of view, the process of searching for and extracting hydrocarbons will not be associated with such difficulties as, for example, in the Gulf of Mexico, but there are also problems in this matter.
One of the first successful examples of the development of the oil-bearing Arctic shelf was the project of the state company Rosneft, which is developing a new field of ultra-light oil, the reserves of which are comparable to the entire resource base. Saudi Arabia. Now this field bears the symbolic name Pobeda. Despite the rather high cost of production (according to experts, the price per barrel is higher than in other regions of the country), the company's management is not afraid to work for the long term. According to the corporation's analysts, in a decade and a half, with the depletion of traditional hydrocarbon sources, there will be no alternative to Arctic oil to saturate the world market. And this is the guarantee of the future energy security of the country.
Assessing the economic potential of the Arctic region, it is necessary to mention the richness of its biological water resources. Today, about 15% of the total volume of fish products in Russia is produced here, and for Norway and Canada, the Arctic seas are the main source of fishing. The Bering and Barents Seas and the coastal waters of Greenland and Iceland produce a significant proportion of the world's marine fish. For example, over half of the US catch comes from the Bering Sea. About four-fifths of Iceland's export income comes from fishing. Global warming and ever-rising food prices are making Arctic waters increasingly attractive to the fishing industry.
The melting of Arctic ice with each navigation allows increasing the traffic of cargo and passenger ships along the Northern Sea Route. According to the forecast, the cargo turnover in this direction will increase almost tenfold by 2021: from one and a half million tons to fifteen million tons per year. Logisticians call the Arctic routes the new Panama or Suez Canal. And there is every reason for this. The Northern Sea Route from Europe to Asia is almost two times shorter than other similar routes. The distance from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok along the Arctic artery, for example, is 14,280 km, through the Suez Canal 23,200 km, and around the Cape of Good Hope 29,400 km.
It is also important that the northern traffic connects not only European and Asian ports, but also the mouths of all navigable Siberian rivers into a single all-Russian transport system, being the main communication for supplying the subarctic regions. Northern delivery, covering hundreds of thousands of residents of forty regions of Siberia and the Far East, has a huge socio-economic component in the life of these territories remote from the center. According to disappointing statistics, northerners often manage to get no more than 70% of the required volume of goods during the delivery. In particular, 15.2 thousand tons of the planned 33.3 thousand tons of oil products were not delivered to Indigirka during the 2013 navigation. The development of water transport, which makes it possible to reduce the cost of delivery by 8 times in comparison with the railway, and 20 times with motor transport, will be able to stabilize the schedule of deliveries that are significant in the socio-economic terms.
Since most of the northern maritime traffic is under Russian jurisdiction, both domestic and foreign investments will be directed to the creation of our new ports, associated logistics complexes, manufacturing enterprises, housing and social infrastructure facilities. The cities of the northern outskirts will have the opportunity to turn from a raw material periphery into real centers of international trade.
In addition to geopolitical and socio-economic factors, the Arctic region is the most important link in the national defense strategy. It houses components of the missile attack warning system, as well as interceptor missiles from the United States (Alaska) and Russia (the coast of the Arctic Ocean). The Russian nuclear test site is located in the southern part of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago. Severomorsk (Murmansk region) is the base of the Russian Northern Fleet. In addition, dozens of military airfields of the Russian Aerospace Forces and other military facilities are deployed in coastal areas. In this way, Russian Arctic is the first line of defense in the event of a military conflict.
Taking into account the above factors, the aspirations of the countries of the “Arctic alliance” and states that do not have direct geographical access to this territory to consolidate and expand their geopolitical, economic and military influence in the Arctic Circle are quite understandable. To date, own programs for the development of the Arctic territories have been developed and are being actively implemented by the governments of Northern European (Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Iceland, Finland), American (USA, Canada), and Asian (China, India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea) countries. The task of Russia, at the same time, is to defend its legitimate and historically justified interests in the Arctic latitudes, without repeating the mistakes made earlier.
In 1990, the leadership Soviet Union more than 60% of the water area of the Bering Sea adjoining the Arctic Ocean was transferred free of charge to the United States (but at present this treaty has not been ratified by Russia, despite its ratification by the United States). This gross diplomatic miscalculation subsequently received a very negative foreign policy response for us. Other partners in the "Arctic Alliance" did not fail to take advantage of this precedent and with enviable tenacity come up with territorial claims to the original Russian Arctic possessions. In recent years, all new players have been joining the Northern Solitaire: Iceland, China, South Korea, Japan, etc. For example, in order to defend common interests in ensuring access to the resources of the Arctic, as well as the right to free use of the northern sea routes, the so-called “Asian Forum of Polar Research” was formed in 2004 (PRC, Japan, South Korea, Thailand and Malaysia). As part of the implementation of this program, our Chinese partners are actively building a strong icebreaking fleet.
At the same time, the Russian Federation demonstrates an open and sincere desire to peacefully resolve disputes over the delimitation of spaces and water areas.
The five coastal states of the Arctic Ocean region, the United States, Canada, Denmark, Norway and Russia, bound themselves back in May 2008 by the provisions of the so-called Ilulissat Declaration and pledged to resolve all contentious issues related to conflicts of sovereign rights within the framework of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. In recent years, the authority of the Arctic Council of the eight Arctic states, as well as representatives of indigenous peoples, has grown significantly.
At the same time, certain plans of foreign partners create a direct threat to Russia's strategic interests in the Arctic space. In particular, Norwegian, Danish and especially Canadian-American projects to transform the Russian Northern Sea Route into an international commercial transit route raise concerns. The United States and Canada oppose the mandatory escort of ships by Russian pilots and icebreakers and dispute the right of the Russian Federation to regulate navigation on certain sections of the Northern Sea Route, which we should not do in any case, because. it is not in our national interest.
Increasingly, the North Atlantic partners are voicing proposals to revise the boundaries of the continental shelf. In the United States, to implement these tasks, under the auspices of the State Department, a special closed interdepartmental group was created, which, under conditions of increased secrecy, organizes work on measurements with the help of multibeam sonars of the Arctic ocean floor. To speed up these studies, Washington is actively using its submarine and icebreaker fleet, hoping to submit a reasoned application to the UN for the right to own the Arctic territories rich in hydrocarbons based on the data obtained. The group includes representatives from the Navy, the Coast Guard and the Mineral Resources Management Service. According to Western media, American experts have been tasked with expanding the American shelf zone by 4.1 million square miles at the expense of the Arctic latitudes. It is symptomatic that the US State Department announced the creation of a new diplomatic post of Special Representative for the Arctic Region.
Canada and Denmark, making similar measurements, are trying to prove that the Lomonosov Ridge is docked with the Canadian island of Ellsmere and Greenland. Thus, the territory claimed by Canada is 1.75 million square kilometers. Denmark expects to add 62,000 square miles. Not a bad "Arctic appetite" and Norway. It plans to additionally acquire 96 thousand square miles of the Arctic bottom and reserve the right to further expand its possessions. It should be noted that we are talking about the redistribution of the Arctic zone, which is under Russian jurisdiction. Norway's actions are also aimed at forcibly ousting the Russian Federation from traditional fishing areas in the Barents and Norwegian Seas.
Under the pretext of the imposed anti-Russian sanctions in 2014-2015. unilaterally, the participation of our country in international economic and technological projects for the development of the Arctic was practically frozen. In particular, Norway, in violation of the current agreement, imposed restrictions on the work of Russian researchers in Svalbard. The Russian Federation should develop a Federal Law on the activities of the Russian Federation in the Svalbard archipelago.
In addition, there is a tendency to build up the military presence of a number of states in the Arctic zone, seeking to significantly reduce the role of the Russian Federation in this region.
The United States has stepped up the activity of air defense systems aimed at intercepting Russian strategic aviation patrolling the Arctic and North Atlantic. The grouping of the American nuclear submarine fleet in the Barents Sea, armed with high-precision long-range missiles. The Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway and Finland), planning to create a military bloc in the region like a “mini-NATO”, regularly conduct military exercises in the Arctic, including in the zone of shelf territories disputed with Russia. In addition, Norway announced the relocation of its main military structure of the headquarters of the operational command to Reitan, located above the Arctic Circle.
In recent years, the NATO alliance has carried out dozens of military tactical maneuvers in the immediate vicinity of the northern borders of the Russian Federation with the participation of nuclear submarines, strike aircraft carrier fleets, and dozens of combat aircraft. They were attended by units of the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Finland (note that the latter are not members of the North Atlantic bloc and de jure subarctic states). At the same time, the military was given the conditional task of destroying the enemy in the person of the "annoying neighboring state" in the non-existent "northern disputed zone." Such demonstratively forceful actions are primarily aimed at ousting Russia from the Arctic Circle, revising in their favor existing international legal agreements and acts on the lines of delimitation of the continental shelf and on the boundaries of economic zones in the Arctic region.
In addition, within the framework of an extended information war, intensified attempts are being made to discredit the Russian Federation regarding its economic and military activities in the Arctic zone, and a negative image of our country is being formed in the eyes of the world community. In particular, Western media actively publish various insinuations on the topic of our deliberate pollution of the polar latitudes, Russia's inability to effectively use and develop its northern possessions without external interference.
In this regard, the Russian military-political leadership has taken a whole range of adequate response measures aimed at protecting the national sovereignty, geopolitical, socio-economic and defense interests of the country. The most important state document that defines the strategy of our policy in the northern latitudes states the need “... to ensure a favorable operational regime in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, including maintaining the necessary combat potential of groupings of general-purpose troops (forces) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and authorities in the region.
In the Russian Arctic zone in December 2014, a new strategic territorial association, the Northern Fleet, appeared; arctic motorized rifle brigades were formed; on Novaya Zemlya, the New Siberian Islands, Wrangel Island, as well as at Cape Schmidt, groupings of troops equipped with the most modern coastal missile systems"Frontier" and anti-aircraft missile and gun systems "Pantsir-S1".
In order to comprehensively ensure the security of the Arctic region and unified command and control of military forces and assets in the zone from Murmansk to Anadyr, a new strategic command based on the Northern Fleet began to function, which included submarine and surface forces, naval aviation, coastal troops and air defense.
At the same time, the restoration of airfields on the New Siberian Islands and Franz Josef Land, the reconstruction of the airfields of Tiksi, Naryan-Mar, Alykel, Vorkuta, Anadyr and Rogachevo, the construction of 10 technical positions of radar departments and aviation guidance points is proceeding at an intensive pace.
The forces of the ships of the Northern Fleet have established constant military patrols in the problematic areas of industrial fishing adjacent to the Svalbard archipelago; along the Northern Sea Route; near the Shtokman and Prirazlomnoye oil and gas fields in the Barents Sea.
Strengthening the country's defense capability in the Arctic zone is directly related to its economic and infrastructural development. All the main strongholds on the coast of the Arctic Ocean from Soviet times to this day have a dual purpose. Therefore, the process of the non-alternative return of the Russian military presence in the Arctic should take place in direct conjunction with the solution of the general economic problems of this region, strengthening the mutual military-civilian potential.
Along with serious progress, there are also a number of significant problems. Among them, insufficient material and technological equipment; the need to refine equipment and equipment for their operation in a harsh climate; lack of spare parts; shortage of special heated inflatable modules (including tents for receiving and heating victims), as well as life support systems for rescuers; lack of modern satellite and shortwave means of communication and monitoring. In this regard, close cooperation between the military-industrial complex and civilian industries should yield tangible results. Already, the Russian military-industrial complex is actively involved in the design of equipment for the Arctic engineering industry, intended for the development of the continental shelf. The Arctic economy is maximally open to innovation. Therefore, military and civilian enterprises have a large platform for close integration cooperation, which involves the creation of joint research and training centers, departments, laboratories, shared use centers, design offices, etc., the launch of targeted training programs for specialists, R&D, and joint applied research . Thus, an additional impetus is created for innovative scientific and industrial development Russia.
For a comprehensive solution of the entire spectrum of the tasks listed above, in September 2008, the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the period up to 2020 and beyond were adopted. According to the document, “The Arctic is the northern region of the Earth, including the deep-sea Arctic basin, shallow marginal seas with islands and adjacent parts of the continental land of Europe, Asia and North America. Within the Arctic there are five subarctic states Russia, Canada, the United States of America, Norway and Denmark, which have an exclusive economic zone and a continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean.
The Arctic zone of the Russian Federation is fully or partially constituted by the territories of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions, Krasnoyarsk Territory, Nenets, Yamalo-Nenets and Chukotka Autonomous Okrugs, as well as lands and islands located in the Arctic Ocean.
In February 2013, the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin approved the "Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Ensuring national security for the period up to 2020". The document consolidates the action plan of the Russian Federation aimed at realizing the sovereignty of the country and national interests in the Arctic.
The Arctic zone, according to the adopted strategy, should contribute to a significant supply of needs for hydrocarbon, water and biological resources, as well as other types of strategically important raw materials. Specific measures are envisaged to protect the state interests of Russia in the development of relevant deposits, protection of the boundaries of the continental shelf, effective development of sources of chromium, manganese, tin, alumina, uranium, titanium, zinc on the islands of the Arctic Ocean, the Kola Peninsula, in the mountains of the Polar Urals, and as well as primary gold deposits in the eastern regions of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation.
For the period up to 2020, the tasks were set to complete hydrographic work; avoiding spatial losses and worse legal conditions for Russia's activities in the Arctic compared to other Arctic coastal states; creation and development of the coast guard of the FSB of the Russian Federation in the Arctic zone; creation of an integrated information and telecommunications infrastructure; development of the emergency preparedness system; development of a unified national system monitoring of the state and pollution of the environment.
As a follow-up to the fundamental documents, in 2014 the State Program “Socio-economic development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation for the period of 2020” was approved, and then special governing bodies for the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation were created: the State Commission for the Development of the Arctic and the Council for the Arctic and Antarctic under the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly Russian Federation.
At the end of last year, at a joint meeting of the State Commission for the Development of the Arctic and the Council on the Arctic and Antarctic, which was held in the Federation Council, it was decided to develop a draft federal law "On the development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation" as a tool for implementing previously adopted fundamental documents.
Council for the Arctic and Antarctic under the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, formed by order of the Chairman of the Federation Council V.I. Matvienko in December 2015, as a permanent expert advisory body, is called upon to solve the following tasks: analyzing the legislation of the Russian Federation and law enforcement practice on the implementation of state policy and ensuring the national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic and Antarctic; preparation of proposals for amendments to the relevant Russian legislation; expertise of national and international projects; monitoring the implementation of state policy in these regions. Member of the Defense and Security Committee of the Federation Council V.A. Shtyrov.
The Council included the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for International Cooperation in the Arctic and Antarctic, Chairman of the Scientific and Expert Council of the State Commission for the Development of the Arctic, the famous polar explorer A.N. Chilingarov, chairmen and members of relevant committees of the Federation Council and the State Duma, heads of regional and municipal bodies, leading specialists of research organizations, representatives public associations and business communities involved in the practical development of the northern territories.
According to the general opinion of the members of the Council and the authoritative experts involved in its work, today's Russia is able and must defend its national interests in the vast expanses of the Arctic. Namely, to finally secure the boundaries of the continental shelf by the relevant international legal acts; in the interests of defense capacity to strengthen its military presence in the Arctic; to implement global oil and gas and other resource projects in the zone of the designated jurisdiction; create profitable and safe maritime Eurasian traffic under its control; ensure the progressive socio-economic development of the Russian northern regions.
At present, all conditions for this are available.
Aleksey Ivanov, Executive Secretary of the Council for the Arctic and Antarctic under the Federation Council of the Russian Federation, Acting State Counselor of the Russian Federation 3 classes.
Georgy IVANOV,member of the Arctic Council andAntarctica under the Federation Council of the Russian Federation,captain 1st rank,doctor of military sciences.
VILLAGE SABETTA / Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug /, August 30. /TASS/. Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, called for the continued creation of an effective security architecture in the Arctic, avoiding ultimatums and threats.
“We need to continue to build an effective security architecture that will become a guarantee against any attempts to destabilize the [Arctic] region,” he said, opening the VII international meeting of representatives of the member states of the Arctic Council, observer countries in the Arctic Council and the foreign scientific community.
"The Arctic countries speak different languages, but it is in our power to make sure that the language of threats and ultimatums is never heard in the North," the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation added.
“Today, when energy security issues have acquired a global scale and often turn into a political dimension, the topic of Arctic resources is more relevant than ever,” Patrushev noted. “According to modern estimates, hydrocarbon reserves in the region amount to 90 billion barrels of oil, 47 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, as well as 44 billion barrels of gas condensate."
"At the same time, an irresponsible race for resources can lead to environmental disasters and the destruction of the traditional ways of life of the peoples of the North, the Secretary of the Security Council warned. - The unique features of the Arctic can instantly turn any negative incident into a real disaster. Therefore, caring for the wealth of the region should be a top priority for all of us."
Patrushev urged, despite individual interstate disagreements, to unite efforts in the name of a common cause - the preservation of the Arctic as a unique natural and cultural heritage of all mankind. "This implies a number of difficult, but still solvable tasks," he said. In particular, there is a need for a comprehensive dialogue on economic issues. "The harsh conditions of the region make many undertakings so difficult that their implementation is possible only in close international cooperation, - stressed the Secretary of the Security Council of Russia. “You already know, for example, that the Yamal LNG project involves Russian, Chinese and French capital, contractors and partners from dozens of countries around the world.”
Patrushev also called for increasing the role of the Northern Sea Route and developing transport infrastructure in the Arctic.
“Efforts must be made to increase the accessibility of the Arctic region,” stressed the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. “We are talking primarily about increasing the role of the Northern Sea Route, for the development of which the Russian side is making great efforts, including in terms of operating the nuclear power plant, which has no analogues in the world. icebreaker fleet. "The accessibility of the Arctic also implies the creation of infrastructure for tourism and the attraction of qualified specialists to the region," he added.
Patrushev noted the need for scientific and technological support for the development of the Arctic. “Arctic technologies are not a tribute to fashion, but a profitable area of activity,” he is sure. “In our country, they have already realized that successful use in harsh Arctic conditions is a unique quality mark that instantly makes technology in demand and competitive.”
The Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation considers it necessary to work to increase the popularity of the Arctic, to draw the attention of the international community to the issues of its development and conservation. “The development of Arctic tourism is of great importance here,” Patrushev explained. “We can count on a careful attitude to this region only when all of humanity, and not just the Arctic states, realize the enduring value of the Arctic as a common heritage of mankind.”
The Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation stressed that the Arctic today is facing challenges that, it would seem, are long gone. He said that at the end of the meeting, the participants would be shown presentations on the elimination of an anthrax outbreak that occurred in Yamal in 2016. “Here I would like to note that at that time we managed not only to stop the spread of a dangerous disease in time, but also to restore the property lost by the indigenous people in the shortest possible time. local residents, Patrushev said. “This proves once again that even when faced with extraordinary challenges in the Arctic, we can respond to them with the highest standards of social responsibility.”
Vladimir Artamonov, Tamara MusienkoArctic geopolitics of Russia: security issues
Artamonov Vladimir Sergeevich
Secretary of State - Deputy Minister of the Russian Federation
on business civil defense, emergencies
and disaster relief
doctor of military sciences, doctor of technical sciences, professor
Musienko Tamara Viktorovna
St. Petersburg State Fire Service EMERCOM of Russia
doctor of political sciences,
Deputy Head of the University for Research
Professor of the Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences
Artamonov Vladimir Sergeevich
EMERCOM of Russia
State Secretary - 1st class State Counselor of the Russian Federation,
Doctor of Engineering Science,
Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor
Email: [email protected]
Musienko Tamara Viktorovna
St. Petersburg University of the State Fire Service of EMERCOM of Russia
Doctor of Political Sciences, Deputy Chief for Research
Professor of the Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences
Email: [email protected]
UDC - 3.30.32.303.01
ARCTIC GEOPOLITICS OF RUSSIA: SECURITY PROBLEMS
annotation. The article actualizes the problem of developing an effective geopolitical strategy for ensuring Russia's security in the Arctic. The essence of modern Russian geopolitics in the Arctic, its focus on minimizing threats to the sustainable development of the region is revealed. The role of an effective system for protecting the population and territories, critical and potentially dangerous objects in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation from emergencies natural and man-made nature in the implementation of the Arctic geopolitics of the country.
Keywords: regional security complex, integrated security, geopolitics, geoeconomics, transport infrastructure, Arctic, Northern Sea Route, monitoring and forecasting system
GEOPOLITICS OF RUSSIA IN THE ARCTIC: SECURITY PROBLEMS
Summary. The article actualized the problem of developing an effective geopolitical strategy for the security of Russia in the Arctic. The essence of modern Russian geopolitics in the Arctic, its orientation to minimize threats to sustainable development in the region is defined . The role of an effective system of protection of population and territory, critical and potentially dangerous objects in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation from emergency situations of natural and man-made in the implementation of the country’s Arctic geopolitics is reflected.
keywords: regional security complex, integrated security, geopolitics, geo-economics, transport infrastructure, the Arctic, the Northern Sea Route, monitoring and forecasting system
with calls and XXI century, creating risks of national security, the problem of ensuring security in the Arctic region is connected.
In the "Strategy for the development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and ensuring national security for the period up to 2020", developed in pursuance of Fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the period up to 2020 and beyond, approved by the President of Russia on September 18, 2008 and approved by the President of the Russian Federation in 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the Strategy 2020), a list of the main risks and threats is presented, among which we will primarily highlight the following:
— extreme natural and climatic conditions, including low temperatures air, strong winds and the presence of ice cover in the waters of the Arctic seas;
- focal nature of industrial and economic development of territories and low population density;
— remoteness from the main industrial centers, high resource intensity and dependence of economic activity and life support of the population on supplies of fuel, food and essential goods from other regions of Russia;
- low stability of ecological systems that determine the biological balance and climate of the Earth, and their dependence on even minor anthropogenic impacts.
— negative demographic processes in the majority of the Arctic regions of the Russian Federation, the outflow of labor resources (especially highly qualified) to the southern regions of Russia and abroad;
— the critical state of housing and communal services, insufficient provision of the population with clean drinking water;
— depreciation of fixed assets, especially transport, industrial and energy infrastructure;
the underdevelopment of the basic transport infrastructure, its marine and continental components, the aging of the icebreaker fleet, the lack of small aircraft;
- insufficient development of navigation, hydrographic and hydrometeorological support for navigation;
- lack of means of permanent integrated space monitoring of the Arctic territories and water areas, dependence on foreign funds and sources information support all types of activities in the Arctic (including interaction with aircraft and ships);
— the absence of a modern information and telecommunications infrastructure that allows the provision of communication services to the population and business entities throughout the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation;
- underdevelopment of the energy system, as well as an irrational structure
generating capacities, high cost of generation and transportation of electricity;
- in the field of science and technology, there is a shortage of technical means and technological capabilities for the study, development and use of the Arctic spaces and resources, insufficient readiness to switch to an innovative path of development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation;
- in the field of nature management and environmental protection, an increase in the technogenic and anthropogenic load on the environment is distinguished with an increase in the probability of reaching its limit values in some waters of the Arctic Ocean adjacent to the Russian Federation, as well as in certain territories of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, characterized by the presence of particularly unfavorable zones , potential sources of radioactive contamination, a high level of accumulated environmental damage.
