Submarine Teng. Naval Forces of the People's Republic of China

On October 25, 1944, at sunrise, the American submarine Tang, which was hunting for Japanese convoys, ended up in the Formosa Strait. It was her fifth military patrol in eight months of operations, and the ship's commander, Captain Richard H. O'Kane, was quite pleased with himself. Two nights before, in a surface attack on a Japanese convoy, he sank three tankers and two transport ships.

The night before, October 24, they intercepted the radio signals of another convoy and pursued it unnoticed all night, and at sunrise they again attacked already on the surface. The torpedoes hit right on target and damaged one of the escort ships; another volley covered the merchant ship "Matsumoto-maru" with a displacement of 7024 tons, it flared up and sank. Thus, the number of ships sunk by the Teng in her eight-month career came to twenty-four with a gross tonnage of 93,184 tons. None of the US Navy submarines could boast of such outstanding achievements.

But after this operation, only one torpedo remained on the Tenge. Lieutenant Bill Liebold, O'Kane's senior assistant, jokingly offered to keep it as a souvenir, but O'Kane thought he could use it in battle against an escort ship that had been damaged but not destroyed in a previous attack. The captain directed the submarine on a new course, settled behind the torpedo sight on the captain's bridge, moved the gun goniometer needle towards the forward torpedo room and gave the command to fire. “Now,” the captain thought, “the Tang will be able to sneak out of these dangerous waters and finally return to their base at Pearl Harbor."

Together with O "Kane, there were eight more people on the bridge. Suddenly, one of them gave a combat alarm. Several pairs of eyes discerned the phosphorescent trail of a torpedo fired in the direction of the submarine. It was at a decent distance from the bow, to the left along the side. O" Kane announced the alarm and immediately ordered an evasive maneuver. The submarine quickly increased speed, and the helmsman gave full starboard thrust.

The captain was frantically trying to figure out where he had been attacked from. There was no Japanese warship within range other than the one it had recently attacked, and the constantly sounding sonar did not detect the presence of any enemy submarine. The Teng was equipped with state-of-the-art detection equipment; it was impossible even to imagine that she could be taken by surprise.

But it was a fast-moving torpedo. O "Kane was absolutely sure that she would pass by, because he had taken the appropriate evasive maneuver in advance.

And suddenly the captain froze in place - the approaching torpedo did not go in a straight line, but seemed to be moving around the Tang in a large circle, the diameter of which was rapidly narrowing. The submarine was trapped.

The crew members did not yet know about the impending drama, until the moment when the ship was shaken by a terrifying explosion somewhere near the stern. At first it seemed that the "Tang" ran into a mine. The people in the three aft compartments had practically no chance of salvation.

Incredibly, however, O "Kane, literally a few moments before the torpedo hit, managed to give the order to batten down the hatch. Then, by the force of the explosion, he and eight others were thrown into the sea. Someone died immediately, and as a result, after a few seconds, only four remained on the surface: Oh "Kane, Liebold, Mechanical Engineer Lieutenant Larry Savadkin and Radio Operator Floyd Coverly. The latter, seconds before the explosion, went up on deck to report on the failure of part of the equipment.

Soon, under the weight of the water that flooded the boat, the Tenga's stern began to quickly sink into the water. The second impact, resembling an explosion, occurred when the stern hit the bottom at a depth of 180 feet. Most of the bow compartment was still above the water.

It was the instant reaction of O'Kane, who gave the order to batten down the hatch, that saved the lives of people, but their situation inside the submarine was desperate. The hopelessness of their situation was aggravated by the fire that broke out in the forward battery compartment. inner part the boats continued to fill with smoke from smoldering cables.

The thirty surviving crew members, led by torpedo commander Lieutenant Jim Flanagan, began to prepare to leave the submarine. Flanagan ordered four sailors into the rescue chamber. Half an hour later, the chamber was drained and opened. Inside it were still almost unconscious three nearly drowned people. Only one managed to get out, but, as it turned out later, he never made it to the surface.

They made another rescue attempt. The cell this time barely fit five people. The process of flooding and subsequent drainage took forty-five minutes, but in the end, Flanagan saw that only three got out.

By that time, Flanagan was so exhausted that another officer, Pierce, took over the rescue operation.

Four people entered the cell. Although each of them passed through the escape hatch, only one managed to make it to the surface alive.

Pierce convinced an exhausted Flanagan to leave the boat with the fourth group. Of the eighty-eight officers, foremen and privates, only fifteen people, picked up by Japanese courts, survived.

On August 29, 1945, the Omori POW camp, where the surviving sailors from the Tenga were being held, was liberated by American troops. Unfortunately, only nine of the fifteen survived. Among them were Captain O'Kane and Lieutenant Flanagan.

It was O'Kane who revealed the mystery of the Teng's death. It turns out that the boat itself sank itself with its last torpedo. own ship.

And Bill Liebold was right. They should have left their last torpedo as a souvenir...

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The U.S. submarine "Tang" was the lead in the class of large ocean-going submarines, which, during the decisive period of the war in the Pacific, when American transport task forces, lined up in battle formation, went on long voyages across the ocean to the Japanese inland islands, destroyed the Japanese fleet.

The Strait of Formosa was a favorable ground for such a hunt, and that is why the Tang boat turned up here at sunrise on October 25, 1944. It was her fifth military patrol in eight months of operations, and the ship's commander, Captain Richard H. O "Kane, had good reason to be pleased with himself. Two nights before, in a surface attack on a Japanese convoy, they destroyed three tankers and two transport ships. Then, the night before, October 24, they intercepted the radio signals of another convoy and pursued it unnoticed all night, and attacked again at sunrise on the surface.Torpedoes hit and damaged one of the escort ships; t, it exploded and began to sink in. This brought the number of ships sunk by the Tang in her eight-month career to twenty-four with a gross tonnage of 93,184 tons. , however, and no other ship among American warships.

As a result of this operation, only one torpedo remained on the Tenge. Lieutenant Bill Liebold - O'Kane's senior assistant - jokingly offered to keep it as a souvenir, but O'Kane had already decided to use it in battle against an escort ship, which was damaged in a previous attack, but not destroyed. He led the submarine on a new course, settled behind the torpedo sight on the captain's bridge, moved the arrow of the gun goniometer towards the forward torpedo room and gave the command to fire. Now, he thought, the Tang could slip out of these dangerous waters unnoticed and return to their base at Pearl Harbor.

Together with O "Kane, there were eight people on the bridge. Suddenly one of them gave a signal of combat alert. Several pairs of eyes discerned the phosphorescent trail of a torpedo fired in the direction of the submarine. It was still at a decent distance from the bow on the left side. O" Kane raised the alarm and immediately ordered an evasive maneuver. The submarine increased speed and the helmsman gave full starboard thrust.

Despite the turmoil, O "Kane tried to understand where he was attacked from. There was not a single Japanese warship within range, except for the one he recently attacked and which, quite obviously, was disabled, and the constantly sounding sonar did not detect the presence of any enemy submarine.The Tang was equipped with the most advanced detection equipment; it was impossible to even imagine that it could be taken by surprise.

And yet it was a torpedo. O "Kane was sure that she would pass by: after all, he had taken the appropriate evasive maneuver in advance.

But suddenly the captain froze, as after a strong blow - the approaching torpedo was not going straight. She seemed to be moving around the Teng in a large circle, but the diameter of this circle was rapidly narrowing. The submarine is trapped.

The crew members, located in different compartments, were unaware of the unfolding drama. They found out about it only when the ship was rocked by a terrible explosion somewhere near the stern. The first impression was that the Tang had hit a mine. The people in the three aft compartments had no chance of salvation. Their only relief was that, before the rushing water flooded the compartment, almost all of them were knocked unconscious by the impact.

A few moments before the torpedo hit, O "Kane managed to give the order to batten down the cockpit hatch. Then, by the force of the explosion, he and eight more rushed into the sea. Someone was injured, but there was no one to help them, besides, none of them had a life jacket. As a result, after a few seconds, only four remained on the surface: O "Kane, Liebold, mechanical engineer Lieutenant Larry Savadkin and radio operator Floyd Coverley - just before the explosion, he went up on deck to report on the failure of a piece of equipment.

Under the weight of the water that flooded the boat, the Tenga's stern began to sink into the water at a terrifying speed. The second impact, like an explosion, occurred when the stern hit the bottom at a depth of 180 feet. A significant part of the bow compartment was still sticking out above the water.

The instantaneous reaction of O'Kane, who gave the order to batten down the hatch, undoubtedly saved the lives of people, but their position inside the submarine was desperate. was quickly extinguished, but the inside of the boat continued to fill with smoke from smoldering cables.

One of those remaining in the boat was a mechanic sailor named Clayton Oliver, who, upon regaining consciousness, saw that he was near the control device of the second ballast tank. He knew that the survivors could use their personal survival aids - the Momsen apparatus - but to get to them, the boat had to be in a more or less horizontal position. He activated the control device, and as soon as the water rushed into the ballast tank, the submarine began to sink. Oliver then took care of destroying the ship's documents in the control room's safe, and with a few of the survivors made his way to the forward torpedo room. Meanwhile, Japanese escort ships began randomly bombarding the waters near the convoy attacked by the Teng with depth charges. None of the depth charges exploded close enough to finish off the damaged submarine, but the attack continued for four hours, turning into a nightmare for the already shell-shocked and wounded people due to almost non-stop strikes. Someone lost consciousness. The rest had to give up trying to get out, because even at a great distance, the shock waves under water could be deadly.

When the attack ended, the thirty surviving crew members, under the direction of torpedo commander Lieutenant Jim Flanagan, prepared to leave the submarine. Flanagan ordered four sailors to enter the rescue chamber, where there was an inflatable rubber boat. Thirty minutes later, the chamber was drained and opened. Inside it were still almost unconscious three nearly drowned people. Only one managed to get outside, but, as Flanagan later learned, he did not make it to the surface either.

Flanagan gave the order for a second attempt. Five people squeezed into the cell this time. The process of flooding and subsequent draining took forty-five minutes, and when it was completed, Flanagan saw that only three had made it out. Two remained inside.

By that time, Flanagan was so exhausted that another officer, Ensign Pierce, took over the rescue operation.

At his direction, four more people entered the chamber, but although each of them passed through the escape hatch, only one rose alive to the surface.

Pierce convinced an exhausted Flanagan to leave the boat with the fourth group. As Flanagan struggled to pull himself up the cable from the rescue chamber to the buoy to the surface, he felt several jolts directly below him. Before leaving, Flanagan noticed that the flames had flared up again in the battery compartment - it was so strong that the paint began to bubble on the bulkhead separating the forward torpedo room from where the fire raged. In addition, from the intense heat, the rubber gasket began to smolder, forming a seal around the airtight door. Now those who were still walled up in the Tenga's hull had no hope of salvation.

Of the eighty-eight officers, foremen and privates who were part of the crew of the Tenga, only fifteen people, picked up by Japanese courts, survived.

When, on August 29, 1945, the Omori prisoner of war camp, where the surviving sailors from the Tenga were kept, was liberated by American troops, they found only nine of the fifteen survivors there. Among them were Captain O'Kane and Lieutenant Flanagan. O'Kane was later awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.

He revealed true story the death of the Tenga. The boat sank itself with its last torpedo. The torpedo came out of the gun barrel in perfect order, but then something went wrong in its steering mechanism, and, turning around, the torpedo aimed at its own ship.

Bill Liebold was right. They should have left their last torpedo as a souvenir...

Type of Tang was the result of the integration of captured German U-boat technology into U.S. Navy submarine design. In fact, they were a work of art in the field of non-nuclear submarine construction during the end of World War II and the post-war years, but at the same time they were quite expensive, which was the impetus for the implementation of the GUPPY program. It was their design that served as the basis for the design of the first nuclear submarines in the early 1950s. This type can be called transitional between modern submarines and submarines of the war years.

After being withdrawn from the US Navy, four of the six submarines were sold to Italy and Turkey, where they ended their careers in the late 1980s and early 2000s.

After analyzing the actions of submarine fleets during the Second World War and taking into account the actions of its own submarine fleet in the Pacific and Atlantic theaters of military operations, Bureau of Ships (English)(Ship Bureau) The US Navy has come to the conclusion that further hostilities between submarines will be of a completely different nature. The ongoing development of the technical capabilities of the submarine fleet, along with the weakening of the capabilities of the surface fleet of effective anti-submarine warfare, made it possible HMS Venturer (P68) open a new era in submarine battles - the time of the war of fully submerged submarines.

American analysts were skeptical about the ability of submarines to attack air targets and fast moving ships. However, after the end of World War II, relations between the recent allies began to deteriorate rapidly, and tensions in relations quickly increased. Against the backdrop of the intensive development of the USSR fleet, supported by US forecasts that the USSR would develop towards an increase in the size of submarines to unprecedented ones, the question of the possibility of Western countries ensure the security of transatlantic lines in the event of a new conflict.

The design of these boats was based on a detailed study of captured German Type XXI submarines. And it was on these submarines that the principle of priority of underwater speed over surface speed was first applied. The boats were shorter, had more streamlined contours and more capacious batteries than the military submarines that existed at that time. The SCB-2 project had a rounded nose and a small thin cabin without protruding parts with hidden and retractable instruments and a periscope as needed. While working on the project, the possibility of a complete abandonment of felling was also seriously considered.

Unlike the previous types, on the type Tang abandoned the installation of deck guns. Conducted in 1946, tests of models in the pool showed that the optimal ratio of the length of the submarine to its diameter would be 5:1. In practice, it was impossible to maintain such a ratio due to the need to fit a set of equipment and instruments into the hull of the boat to ensure its adequate performance. The developers, however, tried to bring the proportions of the vessel as close as possible to this ratio. This reason led to the fact that the first post-war ocean-going submarines were significantly smaller than their wartime predecessors.

One of the major innovations in the design Tang, which made it possible to significantly reduce the length of the boat, was the use of the General Motors 16-338 engine - light, compact and high-speed, built according to the scheme with a layered horizontal arrangement of cylinders, with a capacity of 850 hp. With. , instead of installing four standard and bulky diesel engines with a capacity of 4600 liters. With. This engine was radically different from the classic engines used in all previous submarines, built with a horizontal crankshaft and two rows of eight cylinders, and was an X-shaped diesel. It used a vertical crankshaft, with a generator suspended on its lower part, and the cylinders were arranged around it in layers in “blocks” of 4. Four of these 4.1-meter 8-ton engines could be installed in a single compartment, giving a total power 3400 l. With. In order to reduce noise, each motor-generator unit was installed on its own rubber foundation. These engines were used both to propel the submarine on the surface of the water, and when using a snorkel to charge batteries and move at periscope depth. Underwater Tang and moved on two electric motors, developing a power of 4610 liters. s., taking a charge from four sets of 126 batteries, like the rest of the boats, upgraded according to the later versions of the GUPPY program. In the lower part of the robust hull, on massive bases, two shafts were installed, extending beyond its limits, on which, in turn, two slowly rotating propellers were installed, behind which the rudders were located. This configuration of the engines made it possible to develop an underwater speed of 18.3 knots, and a surface speed of 15.5. The boats were able to travel submerged without the use of a snorkel for 43 hours at 3 knots, giving a submerged range of 129 nautical miles (239 km) at the same speed. The control system is automated as much as possible in order to ensure silence for effective use sonars.

boat type Tang could not avoid technical problems. One of them was a problem with the hydraulic system for loading and unloading torpedoes into vehicles. The changes made to the design of the submarine made the torpedo compartment heavier by 24 tons, which immediately affected the longitudinal stability of the vessel. To overcome this effect, it was necessary to increase the length of the hull by 6 feet (1.8), resulting in a total length of the submarine of 268 feet (82), which resulted in an increase in the total displacement from 1575 to 1616 tons. Shortly after the prototype entered service, another one was discovered a huge problem - this time with the engines. The unusual flat design of these motors and their compact design, in contrast to conventional motors, made them very attractive for short boats such as Tang. However, their failures due to their high speed of rotation (1400-1500 rpm) led to the fact that the ship returned to the port in tow. Suspended under the engines, the generators were subject to constant flooding with oil flowing from the engines. The second problem with the engines was their loudness, often exceeding 140 decibels, and the serious vibration that spread from them. As a result of this, in 1956 it was decided to replace them with Fairbanks-Morse 38D8-1 / 8 ten-cylinder diesel engines with oncoming piston movement. A 9-foot (2.7″) tie-in was added to the engine bay to provide the necessary space for all submarines, but even so, only three engines fit. Accordingly, the first four Tang a were modernized in and 1958, and Gudgeon and Harder, which were under construction, were lengthened and equipped with new engines while still on the stocks.

As a result of all modifications, the final length of submarines of the type Tang was 82.06 m, a width of 8.28 m, and a draft depth of 5.5 m. The total surface displacement increased to 1,821 tons, and underwater to 2,260 tons.

In addition to everything tengi were built from HY42 steel with an elastic limit of 19t ( New brand steel HY75 did not appear until the mid-1950s.), which made it possible to increase the immersion depth to 700 feet (210), which was 75% higher than their predecessors, the Balao and Tench types. Considering the US Navy standard safety margin of the time of 1.5, the estimated pressure hull failure depth is 1,100 feet (340 in).

The acoustic equipment of the boat consisted of an AN / BQS-4 active sonar system and an AN / BQR-2 passive system with 48 hydrophones located in a dome under the front of the keel, which completely repeated the similar GHG sonar system used on German boats type XXI. However, initially an AN / QHB-1 active sonar was installed in front of the boats, covered with domes from the side of the deck and keel, and only then separate active sonars were replaced by the aforementioned AN / BQS-4 transmitter and AN / BQR-2 antenna. In 1967, Tang, Wahoo, Gudgeon, and Harder received additional 15 ft (4.6 ) or 18 ft (5.5 ) sections to accommodate PUFFS passive sonars (English) operating at distances up to 9 nautical miles (16.7 km).

The torpedo launch is controlled by the fire control system Mk. 101, located on the starboard side next to the sonar control station along with other electronic equipment such as the AN / BPS-12 radar and AN / CRL-1, AN / CRL-3, AN / CRL-10 and AN / BRD radar detection alert devices -6 . The arrangement of periscopes on representatives of this type differed from boat to boat. Some were equipped with two periscopes, one on each side, while others, such as on Trout, they were paired in tandem.

Some researchers say that submarines could carry up to 26 torpedoes - 22 of them bow and 4 stern defensive. Of the 22 bow torpedoes, 6 were stored directly in the vehicles, and the remaining 16 were stored on racks. Of the 4 feed 2 were also in the vehicles and 2 in stock. Mark 43 torpedo tubes were installed in the bow of the boat, and smaller Mark 44 torpedo tubes in the stern. USS Trout (SS-566) and USS Harder (SS-568) were later equipped with the Mark 45 and Mark 46. Mk. 43 and Mk. 45 were 249.8″ (6345 mm) long hydraulic launch vehicles, while the Mk. 44 and Mk. 46 were intended for free-exit torpedoes and were 139.8″ (3551 mm) long. Initially, the Mark 27 Mod 4 was used as a defensive torpedo for stern TAs (the first version of the Mark 27 was introduced in 1944 as a weapon for anti-submarine escort ships). It was her fourth modification for the first time for the US Navy that became capable of attacking a submerged enemy submarine. The Mark 27 Mod 4 torpedoes were later replaced by new Mark 37s. Some sources say that the list of equipment USS Trigger (SS-564), USS Trout (SS-566) and USS Harder (SS-568) from 4 divisions of submarines (SUBRON 4 (English)), based at Naval Submarine Base New London (English) included FIM-43 Redeye MANPADS. Other sources, however, do not confirm this.

In October 1946, the first two submarines were ordered. USS Tang (SS-563), which gave the name to the whole type, was built on the Portsmouth NSY, and USS Trigger (SS-564) at the Electric Boat shipyard in Groton, Connecticut. In 1947, Portsmouth NSY was contracted to USS Wahoo (SS-565) and from Electric Boat to USS Trout (SS-566). And then, in 1948, they added a similar pair of contracts for USS Gudgeon (SS-567) and USS Harder (SS-568).

The names for the boats come from a list of six US Navy submarines that died during World War II in battles with Japanese surface ships, taking the lives of most of the crew with them: USS Trout (SS-202), USS Gudgeon (SS-211) type "Tambor"; USS Trigger (SS-237), USS Wahoo (SS-238), USS Harder (SS-257) type "Gato"; USS Tang (SS-306) Balao type. The names of these boats, in turn, were borrowed from fish: Trout, Minnow, Triggerfish, Wahoo, Mullet and Surgeonfish, respectively.

All submarines that were in good technical condition and not decommissioned at the end of the war were re-equipped under the GUPPY program, which improved their ability to move under water, and continued their service in the 1950s. A parallel research program led to the creation of a boat USS Albacore (AGSS-569) with a brand new body. In addition to this, experiments in the creation of nuclear power sources, which took place since 1939, led to the fact that in 1956 the head of naval operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke, decided to stop building non-nuclear submarines, which, in turn, put an end to US government funding for programs air independent engine research. However, this did not stop private research, and later their results were used, for example, in the Apollo program in the form of fuel cells.

All Tang-class submarines began their service in the US Navy from October 1951 to November 1952.

USS Trigger (SS-564) carried out her tasks based in New London and Churlston. Together with nuclear boat USS Nautilus (SSN-571) carried out Arctic expeditions. Participated in naval maneuvers

On March 26, 1944, the USS Tullibee was sunk by its own torpedo during an attack on a Japanese convoy.

Doom warship from the impact of one's own weapons is not a unique event in world history. Of course, the most frequent cases of the death of ships as a result of the explosion of their own ammunition. But the “active” use of weapons is not so rare that it “goes sideways” not to the enemy, but to the one who used this weapon.

For example, the Yenisei minelayer RIF, at the very beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, on January 29, 1904, died on his own mine, which he had just installed. And this is not the only such case. But a mine is a passive weapon, it floats (more precisely, it sits) under water and waits for someone to “run over” it. Own - someone else's - it doesn't matter. But when you shoot at the enemy, and you get it yourself - this is already a paradox and "disorder"!

The case mentioned at the beginning of the article is very sparingly disclosed in the literature. The fact is that there was only one witness left “from the side of the attack”, and even that one was not very informed. The attacked side did not know about this attack at all.

On the night of March 26, a group of Japanese ships departing from the Palau Islands entered the position of the Tallibi submarine (Balao class). The boat made radar contact with a large convoy, and Brindupke rendezvoused with it on the surface. Visual contact with the ships of the convoy could not be established due to stormy weather. Soon Brindupke, according to radar data, fired two torpedoes from bow tubes.

The scheme of the submarine type "Balao"

About a minute and a half later, the boat shuddered from a strong explosion and sank almost instantly. The foreman from the Tallibi, who was captured by them, told the Japanese about the death of the boat - the only one who escaped from the lost ship. The Japanese did not take credit for the destruction of the submarine: they did not see the Tallibi on any of their escort ships and could not counterattack it.

Since the Japanese deny the attack of the submarine by escort ships, the only version is that the submarine was sunk by one of their own fired torpedoes (the second torpedo hits the target).

As a result of the loss of the Tallibi, a gap formed in the curtain of submarines off the Palau Islands, through which many Japanese ships broke through.

The hit of one's own torpedo, in this case, is only a hypothesis, however, practically a fact. No minefields were found in this area, the enemy did not know about the boat, the explosion was external, after the launch of a torpedo ... Theoretically, there remains the possibility of an attack by another boat, the crew of which then "modestly kept silent" about the fact of the attack. But this is very unlikely!

If in the case of " Tullybi "There were some doubts when determining the cause of her death, it is reliably known that another American submarine, the Tang, died from her own circulating torpedo. On October 24 of the same year, she launched an attack on the surface of the damaged Japanese transport. The first of the fired torpedoes hit the target, but the transport remained afloat. The commander ordered a second torpedo to be fired, but it veered to the left and began to circulate, which was clearly visible from the bridge of the boat along the trail of air bubbles from the torpedo engine. The command to give full speed and start evading was late, and after a while a strong explosion rocked the submarine. As a result of the explosion, the Teng sank, and the submariners who escaped from it were taken prisoner.

The commander himself survived here, commanding the attack and seeing its development. So there is much more information.

USS Tang "Tang" belonged to the Balao class submarines and was laid down at the Mare Island Naval Shipyard (California) on January 15, 1943. Launched on August 17, 1943.

"Tang" leaves the shipyard
For five military campaigns, the Teng managed to seriously annoy the Japanese by sending 33 ships to the bottom, with a displacement of 116,000 tons (according to American data), thus becoming one of the most productive submarines in the American fleet. Fate favored the submarine and its crew, but as life has shown, only for the time being...

In her last military campaign, the boat sank 7 enemy ships. One episode from the combat biography of this boat is interesting, not connected with the hunt for Japanese transports. The Tang submarine was ordered to rescue pilots from downed aircraft participating in air raids from aircraft carriers on the Truk Islands at the end of April. At 04:00 on April 30, 1944, the Teng took up a position near the atoll within range of Japanese coastal batteries.

36 min. later the first planes were seen. At 6 o'clock. 10 min. the watchman on the bridge saw the first plane descend over Doubloon Island. A group of unidentified aircraft forced the submarine to go deep, and within 13 minutes. she had to stay under water, although the planes could be their own. Floating to the surface, the submarine watched the bombers bombing the Truk Islands. At 10 o'clock. 25 min. received the first report of the downed aircraft. The submarine headed for the place indicated in the report, which was at a distance of 2 miles from Fourup Island. On the way to this area, the Tang submarine had to pass near the coastal batteries on Ollan Island.

Three pilots were sailing on a raft at a distance of almost 4 miles to the west of the place originally indicated in the report. American fighters came to the aid of the boat. As a result, these three pilots, who jumped out on parachutes after hitting the plane with several Japanese shells, were picked up. No sooner had the "Tang" managed to cope with the first three selected pilots and to go full speed, as she received new signal that a plane was shot down at a distance of 2 miles east of Ollan Island. The commander decided, without diving, to pass by the enemy and fire on his batteries. The submarine gunners fired 20 rounds at the enemy gun emplacements as the boat passed them. There was a return salvo from the Japanese batteries, and the boat had to submerge. The boat remained under water for 40 minutes, then she headed at full speed to the area east of the Truk Islands.

From here, the submarine zigzag course to explore the area, signaling with green flares every 15 minutes. hoping to get a response signal from the pilots. One of the rescued pilots later said that he saw a signal from a submarine, but was afraid to answer it. Several hours of fruitless search for pilots ended with a meeting with a Japanese submarine. The captain of the boat dived to follow, but the boat disappeared. When the Tang surfaced again, her crew laid out a banner on the deck confirming the detection of an enemy submarine. A report was also sent to the commander of the task force about the discovery of a Japanese boat. In turn, the Tang submarine received a report that a life raft was drifting two miles southwest of Ollan Island.

“Before we reached the raft, a floatplane based on the battleship North Carolina, as a result of a large swell, turned over while trying to save the pilots,” wrote the boat commander. — Another plane made a dangerous landing on the water. At the moment when we approached, he towed the raft a considerable distance from the island. This helped us a lot, since we were expecting enemy shelling from Ollan Island: moreover, our fighters were already shelling Japanese firing points.

In the afternoon, the Tang submarine picked up the pilots she had been looking for during the previous night. Thus, three more pilots were added to the three rescued earlier. The fighter jets circling above the boat then directed it to another life raft. Three more pilots were taken on board. Immediately, a report was received about three life rafts drifting near Kuop Atoll, and the boat headed at full speed to the indicated place. “Since our submarine approached the atoll in the morning, we requested and immediately received good air cover,” said the boat commander. - Operating near the island of Mesegon, between Kuop Atoll and the Truk Islands, we expected that the enemy would force us to withdraw. But the attack aircraft covering us, obviously, prevented the enemy from doing this. The enemy artillery did not react to the actions of the boats when American planes appeared over the area. The Japanese obviously did not want their firing positions to be discovered and attacked by bomber aircraft. The boat commander continued to demand fighter cover; such cover was provided for him, and the boat acted accurately and without delay. During the raids on the Truk Islands, 35 pilots were shot down. The Tang submarine rescued 22 of them. The rest were almost all shot down directly over the target or over the central part of the atoll, which could not be reached.

The submarine "Tang" during one combat patrol saved 22 pilots, which no other American submarine could achieve during the whole year. It resolved all doubts about the value of the cover provided by the fighters. Since then, such cover has become commonplace during all air raids carried out by aircraft carriers. The operational plan of the carrier forces during the operation in the Mariana Islands provided for air cover for each submarine serving to rescue pilots, and set four special tasks for the fighters: a) aircraft were to help submarines locate the surviving pilots; b) to cover submarines from attacks from the air or from attack by small patrol ships; c) prevent their aircraft from forcing the submarine to go deep; d) serve as an indicator of the location of a particular submarine in such a way that the pilots of the downed aircraft can determine exactly where the submarine is and, if possible, move towards it.

"Tang" with the rescued pilots returns to the base.

The success of the Teng submarine in rescuing pilots not only confirmed the importance of using fighter cover, but also convinced everyone of the need to make extensive use of submarines to rescue pilots. Requests for the organization of the rescue of pilots by submarines came from all sides: from parts of the bomber aviation in the Solomon Islands, the Admiralty Islands, New Guinea and in remote areas of China. As a result of these requests, from the beginning of the summer of 1944, one submarine was sent to the area of ​​the Truk Islands, and the other to the area of ​​the Yap-Woleai Islands to rescue pilots from bombers based on coastal airfields. They were supposed to operate in these areas until the autumn of that year. On 14 July, the submarine Guavina, operating off Yap Island, rescued four crew members of a 13th Air Force Liberator-class aircraft that had crashed the day before. Five days later, she picked up eight pilots who parachuted out of another Liberator aircraft.

The work of rescuing pilots in the area of ​​the Caroline Islands at first was combined with regular patrolling. Each submarine in the area was assigned this task as an additional one. But the situation changed after the enemy bases in the Caroline Islands remained in the rear; the movement of Japanese merchant ships in these waters almost completely stopped and the possibilities of action against them were sharply reduced. In this regard, such submarines as the Planger, Pollack, Permit and Tarpon, which have only six torpedo tubes each, began to be used only in these areas. As a result of such measures, the latest submarines, each with ten torpedo tubes, were freed up for operations on enemy sea lanes. In the end, these enemy bases in the Caroline Islands were neutralized and, in fact, they were no longer used. When they ceased to be of interest as targets, the need to use submarines to rescue pilots disappeared.

But back to the unfortunate last trip of the Tang boat. Although at the beginning it was difficult to consider the campaign unsuccessful.

Having gone on his fifth campaign, the Tenga commander O "Kane led the boat between the southern border of the minefields located along the Nansei Islands and the northern tip of Formosa, into the strait. This position allowed the boat to attack enemy ships going south to the Philippines before they even entered the area between Formosa and the Philippines and before they met with Christie's boats deployed further south. As expected, in this dangerous area, O "Kane found many enemy ships. On October 11, the Tang met the convoy north of Formosa and attacked it twice, sinking two small ships (although in Japan it was believed that one of these ships was killed by a mine).

October 23 "Tang" discovered a convoy of five ships in the Formosa Strait itself.Early in the morning, the boat spotted a Japanese merchant ship and fired three torpedoes at it one after the other. When the ship exploded, O "Kane realized that one torpedo was enough; the other two left uselessly. So the next time he fired only one torpedo and saw that he was not mistaken.

Then a Japanese task force consisting of a cruiser and two destroyers was discovered, and the boat began to pursue until it was driven off by shots from eight-inch guns. Shortly after midnight, the Tenga's radar installation located the convoy: three tankers, two transports, and an escort from anti-submarine ships. The Tang overtook them and stopped to wait, readying her torpedoes. Six bow torpedoes were aimed at tankers, and four stern torpedoes were aimed at transports. The ambush was excellent.

The convoy continued on course. When the distance between him and the submarine was only three hundred yards, the Hash fired a salvo. Two torpedoes were fired at the first tanker, one at the second and two at the third. One remained in stock, but it was not needed.

All three ships were engulfed in flames. Now it was the turn of the transports, but they noticed the submarine by the light of the fire, changed course and clearly intended to strike at it. It was useless to dive under water: during the dive, the boat became even more vulnerable. It was pointless to fire stern torpedoes as well, since none of the transports was any longer a convenient target.

To get out of a difficult situation, O'Kane relied on the high maneuverability of the boat on the surface.

Rudder right! Full speed ahead! Lie down on the countercourse! - quickly commanded the commander. And the boat went slowly, very slowly, listing to the port side and rounding the bow of the transport from which the greatest threat emanated. In response to this maneuver, the Japanese ship turned to port, intending to strike the middle of the Tenga's hull and cut it in two. O "Kane watched and waited, and then, when the decisive moment came, he commanded:

Left hand drive! - And the stern of the boat slipped past the transport at a distance of only a few feet.

Towering over the submarine, the Japanese opened fire on it with machine guns. Only one person was needed on the bridge, so O "Kane ordered the rest to go down. Having barely escaped danger himself, he was already preparing to strike again. Meanwhile, one of the two transports trying to crush him was about to run into the other. to prevent a collision, the transport continued to turn around and, as a result, became vulnerable to attack. O'Kane was not slow to take advantage of this. He quickly maneuvered and fired all four stern torpedoes.

The torpedoes came out one after the other at intervals of ten seconds and were perfectly aimed and timed. Getting into the transport was inevitable. But that's not all. The transport did not manage to maneuver, and its collision with another ship turned out to be inevitable.

Both happened at the same time, at the moment of the fantastic tension of the battle. Two huge ships, like mad dogs, clung to each other, accompanied by a clang and gnash of mangled metal. And at this time, torpedoes began to burst. Terrible explosions followed one after another at intervals of ten seconds.

O "Kane did not linger. The caravan, which consisted of five ships, was destroyed.

The next day, the radar on the Tenge found another convoy in the strait. O'Kane had eleven more torpedoes left, and he decided that he had a great opportunity to get rid of them. A series of routine maneuvers was carried out, and the boat again overtook the convoy to set up a night ambush.

This time the Japanese were on their guard. Escort ships scurried along the caravan of ships and fired into the darkness. Suddenly, one of them began to give signals to the ships with a large searchlight, illuminating O'Kane's objects of attack, which did him a great favor. O'Kane clearly distinguished three huge ships - two transports with landing equipment and a heavily loaded tanker.

The Tang slipped between them like a shadow and distributed her usual six forward torpedoes among the three targets.

All torpedoes hit their target and all three ships sank. Another tanker and transport approached from behind, and O'Kane made a full turn, preparing to strike with stern torpedoes.

Stern torpedo tubes, tovs! he commanded.

There is tovs!

Pli!

Three torpedoes rushed forward. At the same moment, a salvo of Japanese guns was heard, and columns of water rose around the cabin of the submarine.

Full speed ahead! - commanded O "Kane. The submarine crashed into the water with screws and began to quickly move away.

O'Kane, carefully peering into the darkness behind the stern, saw the silhouette of a large destroyer. He had no doubt that it was this ship that was the culprit of the last salvo. He had only a few seconds to think; but when these seconds passed, there was nothing to decide, for the three fired torpedoes did their job: one blew up the transport, the second - the tanker (judging by the force of the explosion, it was full of oil), and the third miraculously hit the same destroyer that was chasing the boat.A column of smoke immediately rose above it to the very clouds.

There was no need to break away at full speed now. O'Kane still had two more torpedoes. While they were put on alert, he checked if anything was left of the caravan. It turned out that the transport that the torpedo had hit had not yet sunk. O'Kane made a deceptive maneuver and fired one of the torpedoes, which rushed towards the damaged ship. To be sure, since there was nothing else to do, he sent one more, last, torpedo after him.

Well, now to the base! All torpedoes have been used up, the Tang submarine has successfully completed its combat mission.

When the last torpedo was fired, the entire personnel boats shouted enthusiastically. But then O'Kane's alarmed voice was heard:

Fullest forward!

It turned out that the torpedo launched by the boat was not moving towards the intended target. Something went wrong in her (perhaps the steering), and she went to the left in a circle. And this is associated with mortal danger, since the circle usually closes where it began.

There was no time to dive into the water. The only hope for salvation is to avoid a collision with a torpedo on the surface in time.

Rudder right! - commanded O "Kane, when the boat began to move.

O "Kane, with nine crew members, stood on the bridge and looked at the torpedo, which was walking in a completely correct circle, leaving a slightly phosphorescent trail behind it. So she made an almost complete turn and rushed towards the boat like a boomerang. People stood and could not do anything. At the same moment, the torpedo hit the boat.

The blow fell on the aft torpedo room. Three compartments were destroyed, and the boat immediately began to sink with a trim to the stern.

The crew members located in different compartments did not even suspect about the unfolding drama. They found out about it only when the ship was rocked by a terrible explosion somewhere near the stern. The first impression was that the Tang had hit a mine. The people in the three aft compartments had no chance of salvation. Their only relief was that, before the rushing water flooded the compartment, almost all of them were knocked unconscious by the impact.

O "Kane managed to give the order to batten down the hatch. Then, by the force of the explosion, he and eight more were thrown into the sea. Someone was injured, but there was no one to help them, besides, not one had a life jacket. As a result, after a few seconds Only four remained on the surface: O "Kane, Liebold, mechanical engineer Lieutenant Larry Savadkin and radio operator Floyd Coverly - just before the explosion, he went up on deck to report on the failure of part of the equipment.

Very soon, under the weight of the water that flooded the boat, the Tenga's stern began to sink into the water at a terrifying speed. The second explosion-like impact occurred when the stern hit the bottom at a depth of 180 feet. A significant part of the bow compartment was still sticking out above the water.

It was the instantaneous reaction of O'Kane, who gave the order to batten down the hatch, that undoubtedly saved the lives of people, but their position inside the submarine was desperate. was quickly extinguished, but the inside of the boat continued to fill with smoke from smoldering cables.

There were people on the boat. One of them was a sailor engineer named Clayton Oliver, who, upon regaining consciousness, saw that he was near the control device of the second ballast tank. He knew that the survivors could use their personal survival aids—the Momsen apparatus—but to reach them, the boat had to be more or less level.
He actuated the control device, and as soon as the water rushed into the ballast tank, the submarine began to sink. Oliver then took care of destroying the ship's documents in the control room's safe, and with a few of the survivors made his way to the forward torpedo room.

Meanwhile, Japanese escort ships began randomly bombarding the waters near the convoy attacked by the Teng with depth charges. None of the depth charges exploded close enough to finish off the damaged submarine, but the attack continued for four hours, turning into a nightmare for the already shell-shocked and wounded people due to almost non-stop strikes. Someone lost consciousness. The rest had to give up trying to get out, because even at a great distance, the shock waves under water could be deadly.

Damage plan

Finally the attack ended, and the thirty surviving crew members, under the direction of torpedo commander Lieutenant Jim Flanagan, prepared to leave the submarine. Flanagan ordered four sailors into the rescue chamber. Thirty minutes later, the chamber was drained and opened. Inside it were still almost unconscious three nearly drowned people. Only one managed to get outside, but, as Flanagan later learned, he did not make it to the surface either.

Try again. Five people squeezed into the cell this time. The process of flooding and subsequent draining took forty-five minutes, and when it was completed, Flanagan saw that only three had made it out. Two remained inside.

By that time, Flanagan was so exhausted that another officer, Ensign Pierce, took over the rescue operation. He ordered four more people to enter the cell. Although each of them passed through the escape hatch, only one made it to the surface alive.

Drawing on the theme - the sailors are trying to leave the submarine "Tang"

Then Pierce convinced the exhausted Flanagan to leave the boat with the fourth group. As Flanagan struggled to pull himself up the cable from the rescue chamber to the buoy to the surface, he felt several jolts directly below him. Before leaving, Flanagan noticed that the battery compartment had flared up again - it was so strong that the paint began to bubble on the bulkhead separating the forward torpedo room from where the fire was raging.
In addition, from the intense heat, the rubber gasket began to smolder, forming a seal around the airtight door. Now those who were still walled up in the Tenga's hull had no hope of salvation. Of the eighty-eight officers, foremen and privates who were part of the crew of the Tenga, only fifteen people, picked up by Japanese courts, survived.

On August 29, 1945, the Omori prisoner of war camp, where the surviving sailors from the Tenga were kept, was liberated by American troops. They found only nine of the fifteen survivors here. Among them were Captain O'Kane and Lieutenant Flanagan. O'Kane was later awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.

And Bill Liebold, who suggested, judging by one source, to shoot with one torpedo, turned out to be right. They should have left their last torpedo as a souvenir...

This is not the end of the adventures of American boats with their own torpedoes. Fortunately, there were no more victims. Although, who knows, maybe some of the missing boats also died from their own torpedoes?

Here's how it happened. The submarine's radar located the target at a truly fantastic distance of over 30 miles. The laying showed that the ship was on a constant course. Three, or even all four hours, "Tinos" in the surface position was approaching the target, intending to reach the point of the volley. Obviously, atmospheric conditions helped to detect the enemy at such a far distance. Approaching the enemy ship for several hours, Tinosa accurately determined its course and speed. Dick decided to fire the stern tubes, since none of the stern torpedoes had yet been fired. The Tinosa sank. Soon the perfect moment for a salvo arrived. With the help of the torpedo firing control device, the following data were obtained: the firing range was about 1100 meters, the torpedo meeting angle with the target was 90 ° at zero gyroscope installation angle. To ensure a hit, Latham decided to fire three torpedoes.

- Well, how are they going? Latham asked the hydroacoustic as three "fish" slipped out of the seventh, eighth and ninth vehicles.

“Going straight for the target, everything is in order,” he replied, focusing all his attention on the three torpedoes rushing towards their target.

Suddenly he straightened up in fright and almost shouted:

“Sir, one of the torpedoes is changing course quickly!”

The commander rushed to the sonar screen.

“This is the second torpedo, from the eighth apparatus,” the acoustician explained. Suddenly, his voice trembled with horror: "She describes the circulation, sir!" circulation! She's coming!

Latham listened to this terrible news with his usual calmness. Dick was never at a loss, but he knew only too well that for a submarine there is nothing worse than its own torpedo, which, like a released dove, returns home again, carrying, however, not an olive branch, but about 300 kilograms of explosives, sufficient to to send the ship that released her to the forefathers. Circulation is the movement of a torpedo in a circle. If the torpedo's steering device is damaged, it stops moving towards the target and begins to describe a circle, the boundary of which may include the ship that fired the shot.

In this case, the torpedo from the eighth apparatus became such a “dove” returning home and was about to hit the Tinos if immediate action was not taken. At a speed of 35 knots, the torpedo does not need much time to return back. The piercing howl of its propellers, audible even without hydroacoustic instruments, penetrated through the hull of the submarine. At first, the sound was barely audible, but with every second it became louder and sharper. The torpedo came closer and closer to the boat, in order to rush off again in a moment along its terrible unknown path.

On board the submarine, everyone already knew that death was inexorably approaching them. The message that the torpedo describes a circulation spread around the entire ship. The announcer desperately urged that watertight doors and hatches be battened down to somewhat reduce the risk of flooding in the event of a torpedo hit, although everyone understood how hopeless this precaution was. For a second, everything seemed to be petrified. The people seemed to stop breathing, as if a low, rising howl had taken their lives. The Tang and Tallibi were, however, on the surface and therefore were better targets for their torpedoes than the deeply submerged Tinosa. However, there were no guarantees that the boomerang torpedo would not go deep.

Before the rapidly approaching torpedo could overtake the submarine, Commander Latham, whom nothing seemed to be able to unbalance, gave the command, and she breathed life into the petrified figures of the submariners.

— Fill the main ballast. Full speed ahead! Urgent dive, he ordered in a low, even voice. He was afraid to unsettle someone by speaking louder than usual. - Dive to a depth of 210 meters! he added.

The circulation of a torpedo is very rare, and it causes such fear that even a commander who has all his feelings hidden behind a reliable armor of external calm can be forgiven for a moment of confusion. Apparently, Dick was also confused for a moment: after all, 210 meters is much lower than the maximum diving depth.

Less than a second after giving the order, the Tinosa began to sink rapidly, having a bow trim of 15 °.

After a while the mechanic reported:

— Sir, we have gone 75 meters deep. How deep to dive?

Dick had already recovered from the momentary shock and calmly, as if he had never mentioned 210 meters, answered:

- Dive to a depth of 90 meters.

All these events are closely related to something else. Moments before the second torpedo began to circle, a fourth was fired at the target. By this time, the first torpedo hit the enemy ship, but did not explode. There was only a small explosion - perhaps a tank of compressed air exploded in the torpedo. The torpedo from the ninth apparatus did not hit the target. The same fate befell the fourth torpedo from the tenth apparatus: when it approached the target, the enemy ship changed course. At high speed, it suddenly turned around and headed for the place where, according to the Japanese captain, the submarine was supposed to be. He clearly decided to take revenge and prepared unpleasant gifts for Tinos.

20.50. The crew of the submarine felt the shock from the explosion of the first depth charge.

20.53. The former target sent another business card.

21.00. Dick Latham ordered to surface from a depth of 90 meters. Perhaps the circling of the torpedo, which drove the Tinos to such a depth, saved her from depth charges. None of them exploded close, since they were all set to explode at a shallower depth. Dick was beside himself with rage. He was fed up with the Japanese "merchant" who, it turns out, had depth charges on board and imagined he could attack. He will show him. I will sink this ship, Dick decided to himself firmly.

During the ascent of the Tinos, an enemy ship dropped another bomb. “But what were they worth after we had heard enough of the howling of the torpedo,” Latham wrote in the logbook. “That eerie howl is still in our ears.”

When Dick Latham's submarine surfaced to sink a freighter that was trying to bombard the boat with depth charges, it had already disappeared. Latham simply did not believe that such a noticeable target could go further than 60 cables. Dick made a thorough radar reconnaissance. Finally, at a distance of about 45 cables, the ship was discovered, but at the same time it turned out that the Tinosa had already entered the Bonefish square for 35 miles, and Latham stopped the pursuit.

All? Perhaps not! May 22, 1968 died nuclear submarine USA "Scorpion" ( SSN -589). She died on a training trip, in the ocean, with 99 crew members. They searched for the sunken boat for 5 months, using 60 ships and 30 aircraft. "For the company" found a German submarine from the Second World War. Found "Scorpio" at a depth of 3 km. Examined her bathyscaphe "Trieste". The cause of death is not EXACTLY known until now, although the main version is considered to be the explosion of a Mark-35 torpedo inside the boat. Although there were exotic versions - up to the attack of a Soviet submarine!

A few years ago, a rather large translated article flashed by, stating that the reason for the death of the Scorpion was the hit of its own (!) Combat torpedo, which was fired in an emergency due to overheating of the battery compartment.

USS "Scorpion"

There is information about a secret warning that was
sent in mid-May 1968 to a department later renamed Naval Armaments Command. That warning described a defect in the MK-46 battery, which was designed to power the Mark 37 torpedo, the fastest weapon against Soviet submarines. This refers to the warning of the testing laboratory, sent to Rear Admiral Artur Gralla, who led this command.

In its warning, the laboratory reported that the torpedo battery burst into flames during the vibration test. The defect was a small foil diaphragm, costing only a few cents. The battery was about 1 meter long and 43 cm wide. It was mounted at a distance of less than 3 cm from the torpedo warhead, each warhead having more than 150 kg of HBX-type explosive.

The laboratory's warning recommended that all batteries in this production batch "be withdrawn from use at the earliest opportunity." It was further stated that during the test of the prototype, heat was generated sufficient to overheat the warhead and risk the death of the boat.

The submarine Scorpion was carrying 14 Mark 37 torpedoes and was lost a few days after the letters were sent out
warning. Horrified by the news of the death of the Scorpion submarine,
laboratory engineers specifically requested the naval command
weapons about which torpedoes were on board the Scorpion submarine. The Navy keeps a record of the serial numbers of all sets of torpedoes and their places of production. One of the laboratory engineers recalled that he was told orally that one of the batteries that powered the torpedoes on the Scorpion submarine was indeed from the same production batch as the battery that exploded during tests at Keyport. (Other lab engineers said they didn't hear this.)
Over the past few years after the sinking of the Scorpion submarine, one of
The engineers requested credentials for these batteries using their Freedom of Information Act right. He hoped that the answer would finally dispel all doubts. But twice the answer came that the credentials could not be found.

The battery incident that forced me to write
warning, was the most serious of those that had previously occurred in
laboratories. The accident during the tests occurred on Saturday afternoon, when three engineers subjected one of the 120-kilogram batteries to severe vibration. As soon as they left the room where the tests were carried out, a terrible explosion was heard, from which a wooden door more than 5 cm thick trembled. Engineer Holman opened it and ran into the room. The mechanism designed to swing and vibrate the battery was engulfed in a greenish-blue flame that rose 3 meters to the ceiling.
"Fire!" shouted the engineer and grabbed a fire extinguisher. The room began to quickly fill with black smoke and fire. At this time, fire trucks drove up to the laboratory, screeching their brakes.

Chemical fire extinguishers failed to put out the flames. Throwing wet rags over their faces, people began to unscrew the bolts in order to remove the still burning battery from the vibrator. The battery exploded a second time, dousing them with streams
potassium hydroxide, which was used in batteries as an electrolyte.
Shrapnel crashed into the ceiling and walls. Engineers struggled to get the burning battery out of the building. Its thick steel body was ripped apart like foil, and the silver coating on the vibrator was partially melted. With all their might, they rushed to the shower room of the first aid station to rinse themselves with water. Then three laboratory workers and three firefighters were taken to the hospital due to smoke poisoning and chemical
burns. Two or three days after the incident, the laboratory sent
a letter about the withdrawal of all batteries of this production lot.

A similar defect in the battery on the Scorpion submarine was enough to cause the warhead to explode. But the warning was sent too late to save the boat and her crew. The phrase "to be taken out of service as soon as possible" was usually interpreted to mean that the removal should have taken place the first time the boat entered port. When this recommendation was received by Ordnance Command, the submarine Scorpion was either already dead or on its way to Norfolk, where the batteries were supposed to be removed.
Nonetheless naval administration weapons did not recognize that
the Scorpion submarine was in danger of detonating a torpedo, and even the fact that its torpedoes were powered by batteries that had an unsuccessful design. After the sinking of the boat, the Naval Subsea Systems Center in Newport, Rhode Island, vigorously challenged the conclusion of the laboratory tests.

The Naval Ordnance Department withdrew information about the failed battery design even after another battery on a torpedo began to overheat aboard a submarine in the Western Pacific, a few months after the sinking of the Scorpion. The crew of this submarine reported that the temperature of the battery became so high that it had to be constantly poured with water to cool it. The water turned into steam. The torpedo continued to be poured with water until it was possible to lay it in the torpedo tube and fire it.

Only a year after the Scorpion sank, the Naval Ordnance Department issued an order for a new battery design. In the new project, the thin foil diaphragm was replaced with two stronger diaphragms.

According to the new project, both diaphragms could only be destroyed when they were mechanically pierced with a special device like a cutter for opening cans. Now the danger that the vibration on board the boat could cause a fire in the battery with a subsequent explosion was excluded.

The Americans were not the only participants in the Second World War who experienced difficulties with torpedo weapons. The “unshaven boys” of Admiral Doenitz constantly complained about the quality of the torpedoes. True, this mainly concerned the quality of the fuses, which either did not work, especially at an acute angle of contact with the target, or initiated a premature detonation of the torpedo (for example, in the wake of the target).

But it seems that there is also a skeleton “in the German closet” ... It is called U-377.

German submarine type VII C , belonged to this type U -377

The order for the construction of the submarine was given on October 16, 1939. The boat was laid down on April 8, 1940 at the Howaldswerke shipyard, Kiel, under construction number 8, launched on August 15, 1941, and entered service on October 2, 1941 under the command of Lieutenant Commander Otto Kühler.

The boat made 12 military campaigns, but did not achieve success. U-377 was part of the following "wolf packs":

There are three versions of the death of the boat. In September 2003, one of the researchers, whose father was a member of the missing crew of U-377, substantiated that the boat was sunk on January 17, 1944 in the North Atlantic southwest of Ireland, in the area with coordinates 49 ° 39′ N. sh. 20°10′ W (G) (O) depth charges from the British destroyer HMS Wanderer and the British frigate HMS Glenarm. 52 dead (entire crew).

But many earlier sources indicate that the boat was sunk on January 15, 1944 by her own acoustic torpedo of the T-5 type (approximate coordinates 46 ° N 20 ° W (G) (O)). That day, the Kriegsmarine command received at least two unsigned coded emergency signals, but at least one of them was sent from U-305.

According to the third version, U-377 was sunk on January 15, 1944 in the Atlantic by rockets and depth charges from aircraft of the American escort aircraft carrier USS Santee.

The death of the entire crew makes the reason for the sinking of the boat "guessable", but the appearance of a hypothesis about an explosion on one's own torpedo already indicates the presence of problems (cases of torpedo deviations from the course are widely known). Again, the Germans lost a fairly large number of boats under unknown circumstances. Some might not be lucky...

German acoustic torpedo T5 "Zaunkenig"

The Soviet fleet did not encounter problems with torpedoes, judging by the literature. Although this is not entirely true, the example below shows this. But with the case of "self-flooding" - it happened! True, the Soviet submarine was "on the other side." She was the party under attack. The attacker was the Finnish TFR, and this happened during the Finnish war ...

On the eve of the war, the "pike" (Shch-324, Lieutenant Commander A.M. Konyaev) was sent on patrol to the Digsher lighthouse (Gulf of Finland), but on November 29 it was recalled to the base. On December 4, the submarine entered the area north of the Bogsher lighthouse (position No. 8). Already on the first night of the patrol, Konyaev had a rare chance to attack an enemy submarine. It turned out to be the Finnish “Vetekhinen”, which left the anchorage of Khusyo in the Libava region to hunt the icebreaker “Ermak” (on December 4 it passed to Libava through the Baltic straits, about which the Finns received information from the Swedes). Knowing that S-1 sent to the Gulf of Bothnia could be in the vicinity of the position, Konyaev refrained from attacking. It must be admitted that in that situation this decision turned out to be quite justified - a day later, Shch-318 passed through the position of the "pike", which, if Konyaev had shown less caution, could easily have died from an attack by his own. However, shortly before noon on December 9, the commander had another chance to succeed. This time, the Vetehinen returning to the base (the boat found the Yermak, but could not attack, having lost its target in the fog) was reliably identified, but the attack did not take place. The fact is that Shch-324 torpedoists, who were used to firing air during exercises, got confused in a combat situation and filled the torpedo tube with water not from the trim tank, but from behind. The boat went deep, and when it surfaced, the target had already passed the lead angle. "Pike" traced the unsuspecting Finnish submarine to the entrance to the skerry fairway, where she unsuccessfully kept watch for the next four days. Several new opportunities to open a combat account were missed on December 17, the day when the area of ​​the Aland Islands was included by the Soviet government in the blockade zone. First, the boat found one of the icebreakers of the Finnish icebreaking flotilla, but when trying to get close to it, it was noticed. A few hours later, two transports appeared, moving in eastbound. This time the preparation for the shot went off without disturbance, but the very first torpedo fired began to describe the circulation, and Konyaev considered it good to dive to 15m. After surfacing 14 minutes later, the commander tried to attack the second transport, but the torpedo passed astern. The next day, the "pike" returned to Tallinn.

Immediately after the completion of navigation repairs, on the evening of December 30, Shch-324 entered the Aland Sea to replace Shch-318, which left the area due to a breakdown of the electric motor, but already on the way the boat was redirected to a new position No. 10 off the northern coast of Oland Island - it was just there that main waterway between Finland and Sweden. On the afternoon of January 2, the submarine crossed the South Kvarken Strait in a submerged position. During the patrol, Konyaev repeatedly discovered enemy ships and vessels, but, considering them shallow-drafted, each time he refused to attack. Opportunity turned up only in the afternoon of January 13th. On this day, the commander discovered a convoy consisting of the ships Anneberg, Hebe, Bore I ", auxiliary patrol ships "Aura II and Tursas. Despite the fact that the distance to the target was only 4 kbt, Konyaev was late with the shot, and the torpedo passed between the ships. To top it all off, the escort noticed the cabin of the boat. It is not known how the ensuing counterattack would have ended if the depth charge loaded into the right aft bomb launcher of the Aura II "(563 tons), did not explode when fired. From the explosion of 135 kg of TNT, the ship turned the stern and he promptly sank along with the commander, Lieutenant Tere and 25 more sailors, and the "pike" escaped with several burnt out light bulbs. Neither before nor after our submariners had ever won such a curious victory. In the following days, the raging sea and hard frost. So, on January 15, the excitement reached 11 points at a temperature of 18 °. Even despite the storm, the sea continued to be covered with an ice shell, which by the 18th had already spread to 11-16 miles from the coast. On the morning of January 19, the boat received an order to return, given by the command with an obvious delay and putting the submariners in extremely difficult conditions. With dawn ahead on the course was observed continuous ice with small leads. At about 9 o'clock in the morning, Konyaev sank and began to move under the ice. The commander did not know the ice situation, did not have the South Kvarken navigation and echo sounder, which made it possible to clarify the dead reckoning according to the characteristic depths. Only amazing luck can explain the fact that the "pike" did not run aground and did not meet with Finnish mines, which were located east of the Mer-ket lighthouse. Having established by reckoning that the strait was left behind, Konyaev gave the boat a slight positive buoyancy and, having broken 10-12-centimeter ice, at 18.19 surfaced southwest of the Gislan lighthouse. An attempt to continue moving on the surface had to be abandoned an hour later, after the discovery of an unknown ship ahead of us.

Shch-324

The submarine went under the ice for another 10 miles (for a total of 31.3 miles) and, finally, in the area of ​​​​the Svenska-Byrne lighthouse, reached clean water. The way to Tallinn was blocked by thick ice, and on the evening of January 21 Shch-324 moored in Libava. Her boolean tanks, superstructure and gun barbettes were deformed, her antenna struts were broken. The hardest trip ended with the victory of our submariners over difficult weather conditions. April 21, 1940 the commander of the boat was awarded the title of Hero Soviet Union, and the ship was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

The former yacht of the President of Finland, she is the TFR "Aura II"

To be honest, I think that awarding the title of hero for "self-propelled guns" is unnecessary. Overcoming the forces of nature, "aggressed on the boat" - a good start for the novel, but for such an award, as it were, does not "pull" either. Although, this boat was the first in the Navy to cross a fairly large ice field (South Kvarken Strait). But, as they say, the authorities know better, and the country needs heroes ...

The further fate of the boat, to put it mildly, did not work out. The boat met the Patriotic War “under repair”.Not having completed the post-repair organizational period, the submarine (captain-lieutenant G.I. Tarkhnishvili) on the morning of July 24, 1941 went on a military campaign in the Pomeranian Bay. The commander held his position stiffly, at a relatively large distance from the coast, and in all three cases of meeting with enemy transports he was unable to take a position for an attack. On August 12, the submarine returned to Tallinn, and three days later moved to Kronstadt. In September, technical problems were revealed on it, because of which the ship had to stand against the wall of one of the Leningrad factories. November 1 "pike" was again in Kronstadt and the next day went to the Baltic Sea. At the first stage of the campaign, she had to patrol in front of the mouth of the Gulf of Finland, covering the evacuation of Hanko, and then move to a position in the Memel-Vindava area. On the night of November 5, 1941, Tarkhnishvili reported his arrival at the position, but this message turned out to be the last from the submarine. Considering that her position was in the northern part of the Apolda enemy minefield, the ship's finale is easy to imagine.

A more favorable fate turned out to Konyaev, he survived the war, did not go to sea, worked in staff positions throughout the war and commanded a division of submarines under construction.

Instead of an epilogue

A long time ago, in a galaxy far, far away, there was another case:

The photo was found on the Internet without explanation ...

NUCLEAR SUBMARINE WITH BALLISTIC

ROCKETS TYPE 096 TANG (CHINA)

NUCLEAR SUBMARINE WITH BALLISTIC MISSILES

TYPE 096 TANG (CHINA)

11.06. 2011
CHINESE SURPRISE FOR US

Quite unexpectedly, American reconnaissance satellites discovered the latest Chinese Type 096 SSBN in the Bohai Gulf.
US analysts at first mistook her for a further development of the Type 094 boat, but it quickly became clear that the new Chinese missile submarine was much larger and more powerful than its predecessor.
According to Global Defense Magazine, Type 094 boats have three variants, classified as "boat number 1", "boat number 2" and "boat number 3". The first two variants have 16 SLBM launchers (“boat number 1” is considered the prototype 094), the third submarine is large and can be equipped with 20 or even 24 launchers (type 096).
The PLA Navy is often engaged in the modernization of the same type of submarines, using hulls similar in appearance, as is the case with destroyers of types 052B and 052C (submarines of types 093 and 094 were developed according to the same system). By tradition, ships of various modifications receive letter designations, for example, A, B and C.
The West has always suspected that China could have up to three Type 092 (Xia-class) SSBNs in service, but until recently, most reports, including the Military Balance handbook published by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, claim that the Navy China has only one combat-ready SSBN, although it is known that the SSBN 094 (class - Jin) has been in service with the PLA Navy for two years now (it is believed that the new Chinese SSBNs, even if they exist, do not have missile weapons, since the new JL- 2 is still under testing).
As a result, Western military experts often confuse boat types 092, 094 and 096.
The Chinese news agency reported that the new type of submarine had already spent its first 18 patrols in the Bohai Bay and was included in the navy.
The US Department of Defense and the CIA have repeatedly made claims that China is building new submarines at a secret underground facility. China's main goal is to hide the truth, confuse and deceive the American and other Western intelligence agencies, thereby misleading the US and Europe in determining the size of its military potential, or at least hide its work so that the West learns about them late.
Of course, this gives rise to many rumors. Determining a new type of submarine from a satellite is much more difficult than identifying an aircraft or a surface ship. However, rest assured that China has a new type of strategic nuclear submarine.
As early as the mid-to-late 1990s, China had the technology for gas-cooled nuclear reactors and achieved a major breakthrough in this area. New nuclear submarines are built using these technologies. Satellite photos show China has built a "very large volume" submarine.
Type 096 SSBN is estimated to be 150 m long (type 094 - 140 m), 20 m wide (094 - 12.5 m) and have a submerged displacement of about 20,000 tons, or at least 16,000 tons ( 094 - 12.5 thousand tons). The boat has a two-hull design, two pressurized water reactors and two steam generating units, maximum speed under water should be up to 32 knots. In addition, the use of high-strength materials can allow the boat to descend to depths of up to 600m.
The submarine is equipped modern systems soundproofing, which makes the boat quiet (the noise level can be as low as 95-100 dB - for a boat 094 - 115 dB). Thus, we can conclude that the PLA Navy has successfully completed the construction of a new Type 096 SSBN.
http://www.lzmmil.cn

14.11.2013


For the first time in the country's history, strategic forces nuclear deterrence China's naval bases will be close to initial combat readiness, according to an upcoming report by the US Congressional Commission on China, Defense News reported Nov. 11.
Later this year, the new JL-2 solid-propellant SLBMs with a range of 4,000 miles (7,400 km) are expected to be operationally deployed, which will allow China to strike nuclear strikes across the continental United States. The missiles will be deployed on two of the three Type 094 Jin SSBNs built. By 2020, the PLA Navy may adopt two more strategic submarines of this class. China is also deploying two new types of nuclear submarines - multi-purpose Type 095 and strategic Type 096. It is noted that US military facilities on about. Guam is already within range of Chinese conventional missiles.
In June of this year, the PLA Air Force adopted 15 new H-6K bombers with an increased flight range, capable of carrying long-range missiles. In addition, China is working to increase the range of its DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles from 810 miles (1,500 km) to 1,600 miles (3,000 km). These missiles can threaten US warships throughout the Western Pacific.