Reflexive management and Russian nuclear weapons as a deterrent to US aggression. The time has come Nuclear weapons as a deterrent

Sergey BREZKUN

However, the thesis about the priority role of nuclear weapons in the system of providing military security Russia. Another thing is that this role will be performed when we have: 1) correct conceptual views on the problem; 2) the clearly stated political will of the leadership; and 3) such nuclear weapons that are capable of providing a nuclear deterrence regime, that is, excluding aggression against Russia.

Speaking of will, I mean not the rattling of the atomic bomb, but a line that proceeds solely from the interests of Russia's nuclear power. While in nuclear sphere- if we discard the covers of patriotic rhetoric - the desire not to quarrel with the West and the United States at any cost really dominates. And this is manifested in Russia's continued readiness to minimize Russian nuclear weapons. But it has already been said more than once that it is important for us not so much what “they” have, but what will remain with us after “their” hypothetical first disarming strike.

The limits of a reasonable reduction in Russia's nuclear missile weapons from the standpoint of guaranteed exclusion of aggression have long been reached. What is required, on the contrary, is a reasonable build-up of nuclear weapons.

Alas, so far in Russia this view has not become ubiquitous.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE - THE IDEA OF STALIN AND BERIA

For example, Aleksey Arbatov is trying to introduce certain uncertainties into quite clear questions, perhaps the most representative figure of that part of the Russian expert community, which is focused on the unbridled desire to please America and the West and who recklessly, contrary to obviousness, calls Russia for loyal partnership with the West. Such experts are well acquainted with ideas from across the ocean, but they do not know well (or deliberately distort?) their own political history.

For example, Aleksey Arbatov argues that “nuclear deterrence is an invention of political scientists in the early 1950s. (primarily American authors Bernard Brody and Henry Kissinger)."

Yes, if you keep in mind the term, then the priority here is for the United States. But if we keep in mind the systemic essence, then the deterrent role of nuclear weapons (NW) as a guarantor of peace was already well understood by Joseph Stalin and the curator of the Soviet Atomic Project, Lavrenty Beria. Almost unknown is the fact that in the early 1950s. Beria, apparently with the knowledge of Stalin, ordered the preparation for open publication of a collection on the history of mastering atomic energy in the USSR.

The latest version of the draft version with Beria's notes is dated June 15, 1953, and there, in particular, it was said: “After the first copies of atomic bombs were manufactured and tested by the United States of America in 1945, aggressive US leaders dreamed of conquest with the help of a new weapon of domination over the world... The atomic hysteria was accompanied by widespread propaganda of the inevitability of an atomic war and the invincibility of the United States in this war. The peoples of the world are under the immediate threat of a new nuclear war, unprecedented in its devastating consequences. The interests of preserving peace forced Soviet Union create atomic weapon».

This is how Stalin and Beria looked at the problem, and it was quite modern look on the deterrent role of nuclear weapons.

Then it was said even more definitely: “In the Soviet Union, long before the war, there was a deep interest in the atomic problem, as there is an interest in everything new, advanced, in all the achievements of science and technology ... If there was no threat of an atomic attack and the need to create a reliable defense of the socialist state - all the forces of scientists and technicians would be directed to the use of atomic energy for the development of peaceful branches of the national economy of the country. In the USSR, the atomic bomb was created as a means of protection, as a guarantee of the country's further peaceful development ... The Soviet Union urgently needed to create its own atomic bomb and thereby avert the impending threat of a new world war.

As we can see, Russia's fundamental approaches to the role and significance of its nuclear weapons were formulated already in the early 1950s, and these were the approaches of a peace-loving nuclear power. For Russia, unlike the United States, nuclear weapons from the very beginning were not a means of ensuring their own world dictates, but a means of protecting themselves from someone else's dictates. And it is absolutely wrong to transfer the characteristic features of the pre-nuclear era to the nuclear era, declaring that armies were always intended to be used in wars, and nuclear weapons are no exception in this sense.

That's just the point, that an exception! In the pre-nuclear era, they not only wrote on the cannons: “The last argument of the king,” but they fired from these cannons. Guns with a sacramental inscription did not deter any aggression - unlike Russia's nuclear weapons. It was after the appearance of Soviet nuclear weapons on the world military-political arena that the situation changed radically: for the first time in its history, Russia itself received an absolute guarantee of the exclusion of external aggression against it, and the whole world as a whole received a guarantee from a global war.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IS EQUAL TO PEACE

There is an opinion (and a correct opinion!) that nuclear deterrence is a peacetime policy. If the aggression could not be contained, and the war broke out, it means that nuclear deterrence was not provided. However, specific weapons systems that are in service are the instrument of nuclear deterrence.

Accordingly, many (even among the officers of the Strategic Missile Forces) have a question - domestic systems nuclear weapons of several generations were created and were put into service for deterrence purposes, or were they created and deployed to perform specific combat missions and defeat specific targets according to operational plans for conducting a nuclear war?

For all the seeming trickiness of the question, the answer is simple and obvious.

Yes, Soviet and Russian nuclear weapons systems face specific combat missions to hit specific targets within the framework of developed retaliatory strike plans. But if these plans are based on such strategic nuclear forces of Russia that provide a deep retaliatory strike with infliction of unacceptable damage to the aggressor, then real aggression will be guaranteed to be ruled out. There will be no war, and this is the result of the nuclear deterrence of a potential aggressor.

So, the task of the commander of the combat crew of the Strategic Missile Forces does not directly include ensuring nuclear deterrence. He is required to competently operate the materiel entrusted to him and maintain it in constant readiness for the immediate execution of a combat mission. However, in a systemic sense, the commander of the combat crew of the Strategic Missile Forces and his subordinates are a personal element of the nuclear deterrence system. and their activities in Peaceful time is, among other things, the fulfillment of the main system task of the Strategic Missile Forces: due to the ability to retaliate to maintain a peaceful regime under any conditions, that is, to carry out nuclear deterrence of a hypothetical war.

Even such a specific nuclear weapons system as the 58 Mt Soviet super-bomb tested in 1961 was created not to wage war, but to intimidate, that is, to reduce the threat of war. And even more so, not for intimidation and not for military operations, the Soviet Union created the “royal” R-7 ICBM - it was a response to the network of US air bases that surrounded Russia. Solely for the purpose of deterrence, and not to prepare for the conduct of war, Russia deployed ICBMs of the R-36 type, etc.

Therefore, there is no "fundamental" paradox of nuclear weapons that is sometimes talked about. The same Aleksey Arbatov sees a paradox in the fact that nuclear weapons are “theoretically created and maintained for deterrence, but almost always serve the specific tasks of waging war,” however, such a statement in terms of Russian nuclear weapons is erroneous.

Even the so-called "non-strategic" Russian nuclear weapons have the systemic task of not waging war, but of ensuring regional deterrence.

Some argue that the concept Russian first a strike to prevent defeat in a conventional war by one's own country or its allies allegedly undermines the deterrence regime.

But here it is unacceptable to fall into abstractions, everything here is concrete. There is a first nuclear strike by a nuclear aggressor, there is a non-nuclear aggression by a nuclear or non-nuclear aggressor, and there is a first nuclear strike against the forces of non-nuclear aggression or against the territory of a non-nuclear aggressor.

The concept of the first unprovoked nuclear strike as an act of aggression has been and remains the basis of US nuclear strategy.

Another thing is the concept of the first nuclear strike of the victim of aggression as a retaliatory act of curtailing the non-nuclear aggression that has begun against him. Such a concept cannot in any way undermine the deterrence of aggression, both nuclear and non-nuclear. Russia's strategic approaches do allow for a first nuclear strike, but only as a response to non-nuclear aggression that has already begun. In the context of NATO's enduring aggressiveness and a sharp imbalance in conventional weapons, only such an approach by Russia can ensure the deterrence of a real regional war.

Another thing is that it is high time for Russia to officially accept the concept of a low-yield demonstration nuclear strike on the territory of a regional aggressor (aggressors) in order to de-escalate regional aggression.

Therefore, one cannot agree with the statements that the tasks of Russian nuclear weapons at the regional deterrence level supposedly "make a nuclear war more likely" and "undermine nuclear deterrence."

There is no dualism in nuclear deterrence, if we consider the issue in the context of "stability - instability." Only without fully understanding the essence of the matter (or deliberately muddying the waters) can one claim that nuclear deterrence allegedly "dialectically contains the seeds of its own failure and thus serves as the fuse for unleashing a nuclear war", that the nuclear deterrence regime is not only a tool to prevent war, but and at the same time trigger her untying...

Of course, nuclear deterrence is twofold insofar as the nuclear weapons on which nuclear deterrence is based are not only a military-political, but also a military-technical instrument of deterrence. However, I repeat, nuclear weapons - in any case, nuclear weapons in Russia - are an instrument of exclusion, not of waging war. Since they really exist in the military sphere, they must possess the entire range of qualities that ensure the effectiveness of real nuclear weapons systems in their hypothetical combat use. But the higher the purely military characteristics of our nuclear missile weapons, the stronger will be the regime of exclusion of war against Russia.

This is the dualism of nuclear weapons, and at the same time its “paradox”, but an apparent paradox, because it is, without a doubt, dialectical within the framework of all three basic laws of dialectics.

WHILE THERE IS A WEAPON, GOOD NEED A FIST

From the standpoint of the foregoing, it is also clear that the thesis that deterrence has allegedly become an anachronism, a means of “against the least likely dangers, which include a deliberate nuclear attack or large-scale aggression using conventional weapons,” is also clear.

Nuclear or non-nuclear aggression against Russia is, to this day, one of the least likely dangers for us because Russia has an effective nuclear weapons status that deters the threat of aggression against it.

Accordingly, the nuclear deterrence regime for the Russian Federation is not only not outdated, but is becoming an increasingly relevant and priority factor in Russia's security. But if Russia minimizes its nuclear weapons to levels that make deterrence problematic, then aggression against us (up to a deliberate nuclear attack) will become the most likely external danger.

The thesis is often put forward that the nuclear weapons of the USSR did not hold back the country from collapse, and therefore it is not so important for the Russian Federation either. But, firstly, the nuclear weapons of the USSR, like the nuclear weapons of the Russian Federation, were called upon to ensure external stability and security, and it performed this function. Secondly, it was the nuclear status of the Soviet Union that, without a doubt, smoothed out the processes of collapse and did not allow them to go as far as their initiators would like.

It is also unacceptable to "make up" the problems of nuclear deterrence with the problems of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, international terrorism, ethnic and religious conflicts, drug flows, cross-border crime, and so on. What does the regime of nuclear deterrence of external aggression against the Russian Federation have to do with all this?

It can also be said that the UN is virtually powerless against all the threats mentioned above. So, the UN is also an anachronism, and is it time to send it to the archive of history?

Moreover, for Russia, only a regime of unilateral nuclear capitulation, that is, complete or almost complete nuclear disarmament, can be a replacement for the nuclear deterrence regime.

And what will happen to us then?

Certain circles in Russia and in the world are actively promoting the idea of ​​"global zero", referring to Article VI of the NPT. At the same time, with the consistency of Admiral Nelson, who sometimes put a spyglass to his gouged eye, representatives of these circles ignore the fact that in Article VI each participant "undertakes in good faith" to negotiate not only nuclear disarmament, but also "a treaty on universal and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”.

Why don't those who refer to Article VI of the NPT as the basis for nuclear disarmament propose discussing the idea of ​​a complete renunciation of conventional weapons, where the elimination of nuclear weapons would not be the initial, but the final stage of the process? The attitude of certain countries and circles to such an idea is an excellent "litmus test" for assessing their true intentions. For example, modern America and the West are the main source of threats to peace and stability, because they cannot imagine world politics without forceful dictates. And forceful diktat is impossible without well-developed conventional weapons that actually participate in actions of forceful suppression of opponents.

How often in the last two decades have you heard that since the early 1990s. the Cold War is gone, de "irrevocably a thing of the past", that in relations between Russia and the United States "cooperation prevails, not rivalry."

I would be grateful for at least two or three specific examples of such cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation, which would be mutually beneficial. However, I would ask that agreements on the control of nuclear and conventional arms not be included in the list. All agreements on START (especially START-2) were unfavorable for Russia, not to mention those agreements that led to NATO's overwhelming superiority in conventional weapons.

The adherence of a number of Russian experts to the idea of ​​some kind of “joint” missile defense system between the US and Russia is no more justified. The US NMD is one of the elements of the two-pronged system of the US first strike with impunity against the means of the Russian retaliatory strike. The forces of the Russian Air Defense Forces are an element of the deterrence system by increasing the survivability of the means of a Russian retaliatory strike in the event of a US first strike.

At the same time, is it legitimate to compare the large-scale and ever-increasing work of the United States in the field of real NMD and paper discussions about what the aerospace defense of the Russian Federation should be like (although it is clear that protection of ICBM launches should become a priority)? As for the fact of negotiations on the joint development of missile defense systems, it proves one thing - the complete systemic incompetence of those who pushed through these negotiations from the Russian side.

But how much is the thought of the alleged expediency of the gradual abolition of "mutual" nuclear deterrence worth? And this is against the backdrop of the enduring aggressiveness of the West, which can only be contained by a reasonable massing of Russia's nuclear missile weapons.

If anything in the field of military-political relations between Russia and the West is outdated, it is the word "mutual" in relation to nuclear deterrence. Previously, the United States could somehow substantiate its fears about the first strike by the USSR, but only notorious hypocrites or political paranoids can fear the first aggressive strike by the Russian Federation.

America has no need to contain Russia. But Russia, alas, needs to contain America. There is no desire for confrontation in such a statement - none of the normal-minded citizens of Russia yearned for a "black and white" world cold war. But many yearned for a situation when our Motherland was a first-class industrial power with developed science, technology, culture, with strong social guarantees for anyone who wants to work for the good of society, with confidence in a peaceful future.

It would not hurt to return to the time when Russia was a powerful factor in global stability and was able to curtail the conflicts that arose with just one word - as it was during the triple aggression of Israel, France and England against Egypt in 1956. Russia has never been a supporter of confrontation , but she was often a peacemaker. As part of this historic mission, Russia was the first in the world to put forward the very idea of ​​general disarmament at the end of the 19th century, and for the last time it raised the question of convening a World Disarmament Conference with the participation of all states in September 1971 before the UN. We should not forget this.

Yes, in the field of armaments (and only in it), the world really urgently needs some kind of “global zero”. But this "zero" should mean the exclusion from the life of the world community of armed conflicts, unequal product exchange, the cult of violence, the destruction of traditional values, the dictates of the strong over the weak...

Accordingly, a reasonable planetary paradigm in the field of armaments is the idea of ​​general disarmament. However, it is necessary to start with just those weapons that are actually used in different parts of the globe in dozens of armed conflicts of various scales and which - unlike nuclear weapons - already after the Second World War claimed the lives of millions of people.

However, this is not what the West wants. He is the source of confrontation, and under these conditions, Russia must be strong according to the principle: "Kindness must be done with fists."

PERMANENT COLD WAR - WESTERN STYLE

It is believed that the Cold War dates back to Churchill's Fulton speech. Churchill really should rightfully be considered the progenitor of the Cold War, but for a different reason. Immediately after the end of the "hot" war, Churchill, with the knowledge of Truman, kept 400,000 German soldiers in Norway as a threat to Russia.

On July 25, 1945, the USSR delegation at the Potsdam Conference was forced to send a memorandum to the British delegation, stating: “The Soviet government received information that the surrender regime was not fully applied to the German troops stationed on the territory of Norway ... It is reported that the German troops stationed in the area between the cities of Moe and Trondheim in the amount of about 260 thousand people and in the Tromso area - 140 thousand people, have their own weapons and military equipment. The personnel of these troops are not interned and enjoy freedom of movement.”

This is what should be taken as the starting point of the Cold War! Since then, the West, having lost the opportunity to threaten nuclear Russia"hot" war, waged and to this day wages a permanent cold war against Russia. This is not an opinion, but historical reality. Perhaps someone does not want to admit it, but facts are stubborn things. And over the 70 years of the West's conduct of the Cold War against Russia, they have accumulated in order.

Moreover, the more moderate Russia behaves, the more brazenly the West acts, and the situation in Ukraine once again confirms the correctness of this conclusion.

It is believed that the "Ukrainian crisis" took everyone by surprise, but this is absolutely not the case - honest, civilly wealthy experts have long seen the danger of separating Ukraine and Russia. For example, on April 4, 1997, the State Duma of the Russian Federation, by Decree No. 1295-II of the State Duma, adopted the “Appeal of the State Duma to the peoples, presidents and governments” prepared by the author of this article Russian Federation and Ukraine and the Supreme Council of Ukraine", which began with the words: "We, deputies of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, appeal to you at a time of confusion of the minds and souls of peoples, at a time when centuries-old ties are easily broken and it is difficult to restore something in the name of which our ancestors shed a lot of sweat, tears and blood!

Recent years have convinced many of the tragedy of the mistakes made that led to the disintegration of the state unity of our peoples. We think that the hour is not far off when each of us will understand that the only creative way out can be a new unification of our states.”

The appeal was adopted by 254 votes, with 1 abstention and 29 against. Moreover, only deputy Alexei Arbatov actively protested against the adoption of this appeal. In other words, he was among those who prepared the current Ukrainian crisis with their position.

The horrific reality of today's banderized Ukraine completely refutes the myth about allegedly taking place after 1991 cooperation between Russia and the West in the field of security. Encouraging separatism and subversive work within the Russian geopolitical space. Admission to NATO of the Baltic states and countries - former members of the Warsaw Pact. Bombing of Serbia and Libya. Intervention in the affairs of Ukraine… What are these acts of cooperation?

Genuine cooperation did take place, but between the West and the USSR within the framework of the Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe (CSCE), and its culmination was the Helsinki Accords of 1975, trampled by the West since the early 1990s. The current OSCE, compared to the CSCE, is a factor of discord and diktat, not cooperation.

At the same time, the very idea of ​​a pan-European meeting as a mechanism for achieving mutual understanding was put forward in 1966 in Bucharest by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact.

Have we forgotten about this too?

A dangerous myth is also the assertion that arose by the mid-1980s. on the basis of nuclear parity between the USSR and the USA, the world order was supposedly balancing on the verge of universal destruction.

On the contrary, by the mid-1980s massive nuclear weapons of the USSR for the first time in history made the war against Russia virtually unbelievable. Thus, a world conflict was guaranteed to be excluded, and by no means at the cost, as they often claim, of "enormous sacrifices and destructive material costs." As for “geopolitical rivalry”, this approach has always been characteristic in world politics not of Russians, but of the Anglo-Saxons - this was quite convincingly shown at the beginning of the 20th century by the Russian geopolitician General Vandamme.

Therefore, there is no need to worry about the threat of a new cold war - the West has never stopped it against Russia! And it won't stop as long as Russia maintains a deterrent capability. Rejection of a strong Russia is the style of the West and, above all, America.

The aggravation of the world situation is caused not by the actions of Russia, but by its frequent inaction, its lethargy in defending its completely natural rights, natural especially since America continually elevates open lawlessness and provocation to the rank of its own rights.

WHERE IS THE LOGIC?

A careful analysis of the position of the supporters of further nuclear arms reductions on the basis of negotiations at any cost reveals their strange "logic". Time after time, Russia is called upon to be loyal to the West, but not a single significant evidence of the West's minimal loyalty to Russia's interests is provided.

Considering this, there is no need to talk about any disarmament, let alone "nuclear zero". Nevertheless, the priority for pro-Western lobbyists is not to strengthen Russia's effective nuclear status through a reasonable buildup and modernization of nuclear weapons, but new negotiations and arms reduction treaties. Moreover, completely illegitimate attempts are being made to stretch the line of succession between the first talks in 1972 on the problem of nuclear weapons between the USSR and the USA and the talks on the same problem between the USA and the Russian Federation.

In fact, there is no systemic continuity between the "Soviet" SALT-1, SALT-2 (and even START-1) agreements and the "post-Soviet" START-2, START and START-3 agreements. These two groups of contracts are systemic antagonists.

All the “strategic” agreements of the Soviet period were based on the idea of ​​strict parity, and their military-technical base was such a massing of Soviet strategic nuclear forces, which guaranteed that the United States would not be able to unpunished disarming first strike on the means of a retaliatory strike of the USSR. That one thousand only intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with thousands of warheads (BBs) that the Soviet Union had by the mid-1980s would not have been able to intercept even the most developed NMD.

But the situation was additionally stabilized by dozens of Soviet SSBNs with their thousands of APs on SLBMs. Preventively knocking out such a number of boats or intercepting SLBM APs was also beyond America's power.

That is why America has taken a course towards minimizing Russian nuclear weapons, because only such minimization gives in the long term a chance for an unpunished disarming strike and elimination (if not physical, then systemic) of Russia from the sphere of world politics as one of its leading subjects. As a result, all post-Soviet agreements turned out to be the result of dangerous concessions by the Russian Federation in favor of US concepts. This was especially evident in the transformation of the preambles of the treaties. Previously, the preambles stipulated the inviolability of the ABM-72 Treaty, but today this is not the case, because America withdrew from the ABM-72.

I remember how, at the very first Duma hearings on START-2 in August 1995, representatives of the Russian Defense Ministry with generals' and admiral's epaulets declared that if the United States withdrew from ABM-72, START-2 would have to be abandoned.

The United States withdrew from ABM-72, but instead of adequately assessing this fact, Russia concluded with America the conceptually flawed Prague START-3 Treaty, which only vaguely stipulates "the existence of a relationship between strategic offensive weapons and strategic defensive weapons." At the same time, the line on minimizing the Russian strategic nuclear forces, and especially the Strategic Missile Forces, which America needs, was continued in START-3.

Now they are proposing to take the path of concessions even further, revising such elements as strict quantitative parity; hard limitation of missile defense systems; refusal to take into account non-strategic nuclear weapons and strategic systems in non-nuclear equipment. They also propose taking the nuclear potentials of third powers out of brackets. But for some reason they do not indicate who should revise certain conceptual approaches - Russia or America? For example, the principle of strict quantitative parity is reasonable, and on its basis one should move towards similar structures of the strategic nuclear forces of the parties and towards the implementation of the idea of ​​finding nuclear weapons on national territory for which the United States is not ready.

A strict limitation of missile defense systems exclusively to missile launch missile defense systems is also necessary, as is accounting for US sea-based cruise missiles, accounting for strategic systems in non-nuclear equipment, accounting for the nuclear potentials of third powers, which, again, America is opposed to. It is not going to abandon the NMD, to curtail the already deployed NMD systems, to include England and France, the US allies in NATO, in the balance of nuclear weapons.

So who and what should be reviewed in conceptual approaches?

If we recall that the equitable and stabilizing principle of strict quantitative and qualitative parity has always been the basis of the Soviet position, then, apparently, Russia is being proposed to revise it, as well as the principle of unacceptability for the Russian Federation of a large-scale US NMD.

At the same time, the maximum minimization of the Strategic Missile Forces is dangerous for Russia and desirable for the United States in two ways. On the one hand, minimizing the number of Russian ICBMs makes it easier for America to destroy our retaliatory strike capabilities in the first disarming strike. On the other hand, the fewer retaliatory missiles left in Russia, the easier it will be to intercept them completely (or almost completely) by the large-scale echeloned US NMD, the estimated “capacity” of which has long been determined at 200 resistant (that is, clearly Russian) warheads.

The US can allegedly go for minimization of its nuclear weapons, including because it is focused on the first strike, and this immediately gives America an overwhelming numerical advantage over Russia. After all, even with the formal equality of strike forces, the first strike provides the aggressor with at least a double or even triple advantage. Paying the price of several Russian AP retaliatory strikes missed by the American NMD for the irreversible withdrawal of Russia from the ranks of world powers is a completely acceptable option for the world elite and the US elite. This is well illustrated by the New York towers that collapsed in September 2001 with the knowledge and order of the elite.

The parity balance of strategic nuclear weapons - if not quantitative, then qualitative, systemic - is the cornerstone in the foundation of Russia's external security. So wouldn't it be better for America to reconsider its positions?

As for accounting for non-strategic nuclear weapons, everything is conceptually clear here too. For the United States, this is a weapon of war "for export" (not my assessment, but General V. Belous), and from the point of view of strategic stability, it is redundant for the United States.

For Russia, however, nuclear weapons of the continental and subcontinental classes (primarily Pioneer-type IRMs) are the most important instrument of regional deterrence and regional stability, and therefore its inclusion in the negotiating "clip" is, if possible, only on the basis of the approach stated above. That is, the recognition by America of the redundancy of continental systems for it and their necessity for the Russian Federation.

WHERE IS THE EXIT?

Speaking of constructive approaches to the problem, we must first turn again to the past. Once, speaking in the press, the same Academician Arbatov threw a condescending remark: “One gets the impression that the new generation Russian politicians and specialists believe that history begins with them, and they do not know or do not attach importance to the past. Meanwhile, the almost half-century chronicle of negotiations between the two powers on strategic arms shows that the parties periodically changed places both in showing interest in this problem as a whole and in relation to limiting specific systems weapons."

However, does Alexei Arbatov himself remember the past correctly? It has already been said above that it is absolutely wrong to consider the almost half-century chronicle of negotiations between the two powers on strategic arms as an integral process, successive on the part of Russia. On the part of the United States, yes, continuity has been ensured and is being ensured, because America's goal has always been to gain strategic superiority, first over the USSR, now over the Russian Federation. But if in the days of the USSR the military-political approaches and military-technical measures of the USSR overturned such intentions of the United States over and over again, then current Russia now and then plays along with the desires of America. In any case, she played along until very recently, and even now she is not free from such a line.

What is the continuity here?

The history of negotiations between the two powers shows that the Soviet Union was always interested in reducing the tension of the confrontation - even when a strong parity was ensured, and was always ready to negotiate. But the United States began to show interest in the problem of arms limitation and reduction only after they were convinced that their expectation of ensuring superiority was not justified, which was the case in Soviet times.

Alternatively, America is ready to negotiate when it expects to achieve superiority as a result of them, as was the case in the period after 1991.

A priori, one thing is clear - the more effectively and on a large scale Russia strengthens, develops and builds up its retaliatory strike potential, the more the United States will insist on negotiations in order to prevent Russia from restoring its nuclear and missile power.

One has to hear that in the foreseeable future we should only expect a reduction in the levels of Russia's strategic nuclear forces below the ceilings of the Moscow Treaty in 2010. But objectively, that is, due to political realities, the opposite scenario is due to reaching higher levels. In any case, this is the goal that Russia should set for itself. And this goal is objectively achievable - unless, of course, we consider the system of the oligarchy that is draining Russia as a “sacred cow”.

Of course, it is possible to further reduce the nuclear armaments of Russia and the United States, if the new treaty, which is referred to as START-4, was based on three pillars:

1. Preliminary curtailment by America of the already deployed NMD systems and the conclusion of a new ABM treaty, allowing the parties to create and deploy only missile launch ABM.

2. Limiting the deployment of nuclear weapons by the parties to the national territory and the continental shelf while minimizing the US and NATO ASW strike weapons, while retaining only the means of controlling the aquatic environment.

3. Further minimization of nuclear weapons in Russia and America while minimizing nuclear weapons in England and France as US allies in NATO and not building up nuclear weapons by China.

Only such a conceptual approach strengthens peace and strategic stability. And further reductions in Russian nuclear weapons on the existing conceptual basis provide America with the possibility of either a real disarming strike on the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation or a new atomic blackmail.

Such a prospect is quite possible if Russia does not implement a program to restore such a qualitative and quantitative image of its strategic nuclear forces, which will continue to ensure an effective nuclear deterrence regime (more precisely, nuclear stability). Such a regime is ensured only while maintaining the possibility of a deep retaliatory strike against the aggressor in any situation.

Yes, this will require effort and resources, but there is no need to frighten the society with the prospects of “the beginning of economic stagnation”, “recession and growing budget deficit” ... Of course, while maintaining the regime of unrestrained oligarchy, Russia will not be able to ensure a nuclear deterrence regime. However, it is logical to draw quite definite public and state conclusions from such a statement.

Finally, the last.

It is by no means possible to agree with the resounding complaints about the allegedly excessive range of Russian ICBMs. It should be wider than that of the United States, because US ICBMs and SLBMs are, in fact, first-strike weapons, unlike Russian nuclear weapons, which should be more diverse. In addition, the range of threats for us is much wider than for the United States.

Russian nuclear weapons do not exist in a vacuum. Their role in ensuring the country's security is determined by how well Russia's strategic balance compares to that of the United States and other countries. nuclear powers. If he is wealthy, then nuclear deterrence is ensured. And, as already mentioned, ensuring a nuclear deterrence regime is tantamount to peace for Russia.

Sergei Tarasovich BREZKUN - Professor of the Academy of Military Sciences, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems

Nothing can be stronger than ideas whose time has come. Victor Hugo

January 26, 2004 CEO International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohammed ElBaradei said that "the danger of nuclear war has never been so great as it is now." According to the head of the IAEA, "an ingeniously organized nuclear black market" has emerged in the world: plans are made in one country, centrifuges are manufactured in another, which are then sent through a third country to an unknown end user. “Enterprising nuclear experts, unscrupulous firms, even government agencies are involved. Obviously, in recent years, the international export control system has been completely helpless,” ElBaradei painted a gloomy picture. “It must be admitted that the IAEA inspectors could not stop Pakistan, India and Israel from developing a nuclear bomb.The so-called tactical mini-nuclear bombs now being developed in the US could also lower the deterrence threshold for a nuclear strike.I fear that nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of dictators and terrorists.The threat of nuclear war will come closer if we do not think about new international control system".

ElBaradei has previously argued that 35 to 40 countries currently have the capability to build nuclear weapons: "The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as it exists, does not prevent a state from producing enriched uranium or even from purchasing anyone in possession of nuclear materials that could be used for military purposes.If any of these 35-40 countries that are in this moment adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, decide to withdraw from it, then they can create nuclear weapons in a matter of months."

"In recent years, the system of international control has been helpless"

Information that some countries sell nuclear technology to others is not new. Moreover, this is done under a thick cover of secrecy in order to circumvent the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Only occasionally information about transactions is leaked to the media - as a rule, thanks to leaks in the secret services. Here are just a few facts from recent history.

In 1969, a German cargo ship set sail from Antwerp with 200 tons of uranium on board. This metal was required by an Italian company for the production of catalysts used in the chemical industry. On the way to the port of destination Genoa, the ship with uranium disappeared without a trace. Many months later, it reappeared in a small Turkish port, but with a different cargo. The security service of "Euratom" (European Atomic Energy Community) could not find out anything about the fate of the cargo. It wasn't until nine years later that one of the CIA officials let it slip: the entire shipment - 561 tightly corked and sealed barrels - was sold to Israel. This uranium should have been enough to produce enough weapons-grade plutonium to power 33 small atomic bombs.

This incident became known to the public, but it is clearly not the only one. According to official data alone, in the mid-1970s, 4 tons of enriched uranium and plutonium mysteriously disappeared from the United States. This was reported by the international press in early 1978. According to the British Atomic Energy Authority, an inventory conducted in 1978 showed that in 1971-1977, 100 kilograms of plutonium disappeared from British nuclear power plants.

By the way, China tested an atomic bomb in 1964, and a thermonuclear one in 1968. India conducted nuclear tests in 1974, Pakistan claimed to have an atomic bomb in 1984, and tested in 1998. Sweden announced that it had all the resources to create an atomic bomb within 6-7 years at the beginning of 1957, but in 1968 it signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). By 1989, the military arsenal of the Republic of South Africa contained six nuclear charges, but in 1991 South Africa also joined the NPT. Most of these countries could not develop nuclear weapons and/or produce enough uranium and plutonium for bombs on their own in the time frame in which they did so. Consequently, they bought both the blueprints and the fissile material somewhere.

Thus, ElBaradei's words that "the system of international control has turned out to be helpless" only "in recent years" are an obvious distortion of facts. Most likely, the IAEA never controlled anything, and the countries with nuclear weapons sold (and perhaps sometimes donated) nuclear technology to other states when they saw fit.

In recent years, the problem has naturally come out. Currently, Arab countries are unsuccessfully seeking international inspections in Israel. According to various sources, this small country has the ability to create hydrogen bombs and has at its disposal three hundred nuclear warheads, including on submarine-launched cruise missiles. Further, in early January 2004, American specialists visited a number of nuclear facilities in North Korea, but did not clarify the question of whether this country has nuclear weapons. Thus, experts from the United States argue that the DPRK is not capable of producing nuclear weapons, Pyongyang said that it has enough plutonium to produce six warheads in the near future, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies believes that the DPRK already has from four to eight in its arsenal. nuclear weapons, and over the next two years, production volumes will reach 8-13 warheads per year.

At the end of January 2004, Libya refused to continue its military nuclear program and handed over the drawings of its bomb to the IAEA. In 2003, suspicions of the presence of nuclear weapons were removed from Iraq and Iran - the first was occupied and inspected by the States and Britain, and the second opened the doors to international inspectors voluntarily.

In October 2003, the New York Post, citing Major General Aharon Zeevi, an IDF intelligence spokesman, reported that Saudi Arabia was negotiating with Pakistan to purchase nuclear warheads. Naturally, official Jerusalem, Riyadh and Islamabad immediately denied this information.

A month later, under the pressure of evidence presented by the IAEA, Iran admitted that it received nuclear technology, in particular, a centrifuge for uranium enrichment from Pakistan. Pakistan stated that the authorities were unaware of this fact, and unscrupulous Pakistani scientists were engaged in illegal trade in private. To confirm this, the Pakistani intelligence services arrested the head of one of the research centers Mohammed Farooq and even the "father" of the Pakistani bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan, which is unlikely to deceive anyone, since journalists got into the hands of an advertising brochure circulating in arms dealer circles, which described in detail the products of the A. Q. Khan Research Laboratories, which created the Pakistani atomic bomb .

"Brilliantly orchestrated nuclear black market"

What is this ingeniously organized nuclear black market that ElBaradei is talking about? If we sum up all the leaks (of course, it is extremely rare for officials to admit that their countries are violating the NPT), we can conclude: we are talking not so much about the mysterious black market, but about government supplies under secret bilateral agreements.

It is known that in 1945-1946 the United States transmitted information about the bomb to Sweden. In the 1970s, the US and possibly some other NATO countries transferred nuclear material and technology to Israel. In 1974, the United States, France, Germany and Israel shared atomic knowledge with South Africa. In 2003, Russia began building a nuclear power plant in Iran, scheduled for commissioning in 2005. The main routes for the spread of nuclear technology around the world often coincide with the routes for the spread of rocket technology. They are as follows: in 1956-1960, as part of the Soviet-Chinese program for the transfer of nuclear missile technologies and the training of Chinese students in the universities of the USSR, atomic secrets ended up in the PRC, the PRC sold them to India, Pakistan and North Korea, and Pakistan and the DPRK sold them to Iran and Libya . Today, Pakistan plans to sell the bomb to Saudi Arabia. Argentina, Brazil and Syria may be on their way to building a nuclear bomb.

"The danger of nuclear war has never been greater than it is now"

Science fiction writer Stanislav Lem, who is also a futurist scientist, wrote in 1983: "Shortly after the atomic destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, American scientists founded the monthly Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and placed on its cover an image of a clock, the hands of which showed ten minutes to 12. Six years after the first successful tests hydrogen bomb they moved the arrow five minutes ahead, and when the Soviet Union became the owner thermonuclear weapons, the minute hand moved closer to twelve by another three minutes. Her next move was supposed to mean the end of civilization, in accordance with the doctrine proclaimed by the Bulletin: "One world or none." It was believed that the world would either unite and survive, or inevitably perish. Not one of the scientists called the "fathers of the bomb" imagined that, despite the growth of nuclear arsenals on both sides of the ocean, despite the placement of ever larger charges of plutonium and tritium in increasingly accurate ballistic missiles, the world, although disturbed by "conventional" regional conflicts, will last until the end of the century".

Continuing Lem's thought, we note that in 1963 this famous hand indicated 25 minutes to midnight, after the end of the Cold War in 1996 - half past eleven, and in 2000 - 23:00. Nuclear weapons have been a deterrent all along, not a battlefield weapon. However, in 2001, nuclear scientists, reacting to the spread of nuclear weapons in the third world, set their clocks at seventeen minutes to nuclear midnight. In 2002, India and Pakistan announced the possibility of inflicting atomic strikes on each other. In 2003, the United States officially announced the resumption of the program to create low-yield atomic bombs. A mini bomb can destroy underground bunker or city, but no more than that, and radiation contamination will also be limited to the line of the destroyed city. Such a bomb is delivered to the target not with ballistic missiles, but with the help of aircraft or artillery pieces, and in the future, mortars and grenade launchers. There are nuclear mines in Russia as well. If this technology spreads around the world, then it seems that we will have to get used to the fact that weapons of mass destruction will be used in combat, and not stored in a warehouse. The hands of the clock will close.

Weapons of mass destruction have already been used in combat. In 1945, the USA dropped nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (about 105 thousand people died), in 1983 Saddam Hussein used chemical weapon in the war with Iran (according to various sources, from 20 thousand to 250 thousand Iranians died), in 1988 - against the Kurds (from 20 thousand to 100 thousand dead), and in 1995 the Aum Shinrikyo sect sprayed nerve gas in the Tokyo subway (killed 12 people).

All of the above means: the atomic weapon has been created, and its time has come. "The danger of nuclear war has never been greater than it is now," ElBaradei said. In this and only this he is right.

Nikolai Dzis-Voynarovsky

In June 2014, the Pentagon held a "staff" exercise - a kind of war game between Russia and NATO. The scenario of military exercises was that Russia puts pressure on NATO members Estonia and Latvia. Can NATO protect these countries? “The results were disappointing,” writes Foreign Policy.

Even if all the US and NATO troops stationed in Europe were transferred to the Baltic - including the 82nd Airborne Division, which is believed to be ready to move within 24 hours - the US will lose. “We just don't have that kind of force in Europe,” explained one of the top officials, a US Army general. “Then the other thing is that the Russians have the best surface-to-air missiles in the world and they are not afraid to use heavy artillery.”

Russia's victory was not the first and not the only one. The Americans have conducted such exercises 16 times, with various scenarios favorable to NATO, and always with the same conclusion.

The Russians were simply invincible. Against this backdrop, the hasty Turkish action, when they shot down a Russian warplane, carries grim news for NATO. Since Turkey is a member of NATO, if the Russian Aerospace Forces hammer a clear understanding of the situation into the heads of the Turks, at least in theory, all other members of the US-led military bloc are bound by treaty to come to the aid of the Turks.

While the chances of the Americans risking New York for Istanbul are slim to none - which leaves a highly nervous Turkey in a position of its own - the possibility of hotheads in NATO wanting to attack Russia should never be ruled out. A nuclear exchange would no doubt be disastrous for both sides - and probably for the entire planet - but there are certain factors that could tip the battlefield in Russia's favor.

Megaton capabilities of nuclear weapons

According to the exchange of data between Moscow and Washington on October 1, 2014, Russia has 1643 deployed strategic warheads, while the United States has 1642. The difference in numbers is minimal, but Russian ground-based strategic forces have a TNT equivalent capacity that is an order of magnitude greater than anything else at the disposal of the USA.

Moscow's main deterrent is the powerful R-36M "Satan", one that can destroy an area the size of New York - not only a city, but a state. To appreciate the destructive power of the nuclear-powered R-36M Satan, one has only to look at the nuclear weapons that the United States used to destroy the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima was a primitive 15 kiloton charge that wiped out a city of 70,000 in a matter of seconds. R-36M "Satan" according to NATO classification SS-18 - carries 10 warheads, each 750-1000 kilotons. Some of these missiles carry only one warhead per 20,000 kilotons - that's 1333 Hiroshima.

At the same time, 80% of the American population lives in the eastern and west coast, so well-aimed missiles could wipe out all life on these densely populated coastal strips. Russia's population is only half that of America's, but it is scattered across a vast area, so that in a nuclear bombing, many people can survive both the first and the second strike.

And Russia has another trump card up its sleeve - its fleet of Tupolev Tu-160 supersonic bombers. These aircraft, with a maximum speed of more than Mach 2, can take off from well-protected air bases located in the heart of Russia, fly over north pole, launch nuclear cruise missiles from a safe distance over the Atlantic and return home to watch the destruction on CNN. That is if CNN is still there. After all, the Russian strategic fleet of bombers can single-handedly wipe out any major city in the United States.

It is precisely because the Americans know the capabilities of Russia's nuclear forces that they have made every effort to destroy doomsday weapons like the R-36M "Satan" through negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons and intermediate and short-range missiles.

Tactical nuclear warheads

Prior to the use of strategic nuclear weapons, Russia could have damaged forward NATO bases with tactical – or front-line – nuclear weapons. Russian military doctrine highlights the use of small nuclear weapons as an element of waging World War III in the early stages of a conflict in order to overwhelm and confuse NATO forces by affecting their ability to think and act appropriately.

After tactical nuclear artillery has decimated forward-based NATO troops, Russia could launch a small-warhead strike with medium-range cruise missiles that would destroy the next line of military bases with limited civilian casualties. At this point, the US would be faced with the option of retaliating with strategic weapons and facing a crushing response from Moscow. You probably wouldn't use this option.

After all, no American president would risk even a single US city for the sake of a dozen European ones. John F. Kennedy did not take the risk in 1962 for precisely this reason: the loss of even one city is too high a price.

State strategic forces USA

How reliable is US Strategic Nuclear Command? If you're an American, you wouldn't be so sure after reading that Presidents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton both “reportedly lost the startup passwords that presidents should have at all times; Clinton for months, according to the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And Carter, it seems, sent the password card along with the suit to the dry cleaners.”

In any conflict - especially in high-stakes nuclear confrontation - morale, preparation and discipline are key factors. The Russian officers who decide when and where to deploy nuclear missiles have advanced degrees and are required to act decisively.

On the other hand, American personnel with the same tasks are beset by alcoholism, depression, and fraud. Nothing can hide the crisis that has engulfed US strategic forces. In October 2013, Major General Michael Carey, who is in charge of 450 nuclear missiles, was fired for drinking while on a visit to Russia. A few days earlier, Vice Admiral Tim Giardina, who has high-level responsibility for the country's nuclear arsenal, was relieved of duty after he was caught with counterfeit gambling chips in an Iowa casino.

Think it's scary?

Take a look here. A US Air Force general who was on a mission to provide nuclear forces for US Strategic Command was an alcoholic. Gen. David K. Urich kept a bottle of vodka on his desk and drank constantly on duty, so much so that another officer told investigators that "if he hadn't had alcohol, he would have blown his mind."

Rot was spreading among the US missilemen, they cheated on proficiency tests, endangering the readiness of American ICBMs. Again, in February 2014, the US Navy said it was investigating allegations that contract sailors had cheated on inspections of nuclear reactors on submarines and aircraft carriers.

US strategic forces are also suffering from systemic neglect, with ICBM bases in North Dakota and Montana reporting “leaky roofs.” Rocketeers working in explosion-proof bunkers located 60 feet below the ground are forced to defecate in buckets and urinate in jugs, and take it all with them after 24 hours of work. What will be the readiness of these personnel when they have to respond to Russian missile strikes is a big question.

On the other hand, the Russian strategic forces are considered the most elite troops. The quality of Russian personnel can be judged by the actions of Lieutenant Colonel of the Russian Strategic Forces Stanislav Petrov. September 26, 1983 Russian satellite system early warning determined the launch of five US nuclear missiles. Tensions between Washington and Moscow after the downing of the South Korean plane were extremely high, and Petrov had only a few minutes to react. With very little incoming information, he considered the alarm to be false, justifying it like this - “when people start the Third world war they won't start it with just five rockets."

This is the highly qualified staff.

When you're right in front of enemy nuclear missiles, crammed into a bunker 60 feet below the ground, nervousness, insomnia, and depression become a part of you. Everyday life. Unable to deal with this, less educated staff will abuse alcohol and drugs and even engage in criminal behavior. On the other hand, educated and motivated officers will keep their cool even in the event of a thermonuclear duel.

A nuclear war does not necessarily involve a rapid exchange of ballistic missiles. According to Peter Vincent Pry, director of the U.S. Nuclear Strategy Forum, author of Fear of War: Russia and America on the Nuclear Fringe, Russian strategic forces are prepared to “deliver nuclear pre-emptive or retaliatory strikes, survive the devastating blow of a massive enemy nuclear attack, conduct subsequent nuclear strikes, and to control military action in a prolonged nuclear war that could drag on for weeks or months."

In such a protracted, agonizing scenario Russian specialists in nuclear warfare, they clearly have an advantage.

Reflexive Control: The Ultimate Weapon

Disinformation, camouflage, and military stratagems are some of the methods that can influence the outcome of a war. The Russians took this ancient art to another level with the help of the theory of "reflexive control" (RU).

Developed by Russian military strategists in the 1960s, reflexive control is aimed at conveying to the enemy such information that would influence him so that he voluntarily makes decisions desirable for the initiators of actions. This can be used both against people and against decisions made on the basis of computer calculations. Russia applies this not only at the strategic and tactical levels in the war, but also in the field of geopolitics.

Major General of the Russian Army M. D. Ionov was among the earliest proponents of reflexive control, following this concept since the 1970s. In a 1995 article, he noted that the purpose of reflexive control is to force the enemy to make decisions that will lead to defeat by influencing or controlling his decision-making process.

General Ionov considers this a form of high art, based on the need for a deep knowledge of human thinking and psychology, military history, the roots of a particular conflict and the capabilities of competing combat forces and assets.

Timothy L. Thomas wrote in the Journal of Slavonic Studies:

“In a war where reflexive control is applied, the side with the highest level of reflection (the one that can best imitate the thinking of the other side or predict its behavior) has the best chance of winning. The level of reflection depends on many factors, the most important of which are analytical abilities, general erudition and experience, and the extent of knowledge about the enemy.”

If it is successfully achieved, then reflexive control of the enemy makes it possible to influence his battle plans, his vision of the situation and how he will fight. RD methods are varied and include camouflage (at all levels), disinformation, inducement, blackmail and compromise of various officials and officers.

According to Robert C. Rasmussen of the Center for International Maritime Security, “It was this type of application of reflexive control that Vladimir Putin studied during his initial work at the 401st KGB School and during his career as a KGB/FSB officer.” Since every battle is first fought mentally before the first shot is fired, Russia's long experience in reflexive control would be a key factor in its fight against the US for survival.

Let's hope that Russia's advantage in the manufacturability and power of nuclear weapons will be able to prevent the Third World War, which, in terms of the scale of destruction and loss of life, will be able to surpass all the wars of mankind.

"Independent military review" №2. 2005

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS A KEY TO STABILITY

Under the pretext of the uncertainty of events in the world, the United States adheres to the concept of using nuclear weapons first

The main trump card of Russia's strategic nuclear forces is Topol-M. Photo from the catalog "Weapons of Russia

The complex process of globalization and "restructuring" of the world order that has unfolded in recent years, along with some positive shifts, inspires serious fears that both the monopolar and multipolar systems in the foreseeable future are unlikely to be able to provide the much-desired stability in the world. Under these conditions, the role of nuclear policy is preserved and even implicitly strengthened, primarily by the United States and Russia, which inherited huge arsenals of nuclear weapons and established views on their role and importance in the system of international security from the Cold War.

THE CONCEPT OF DETERRENCE

Some positive changes in the sphere of relations between the two states at the political level were initiated by the Camp David meeting of the leaders of Russia and the United States in 1992. Even then, they proclaimed a refusal to consider each other as potential adversaries, announced the establishment of friendship and partnership; on the adoption of measures to implement reductions in nuclear arsenals, prohibition of the proliferation of WMD and the latest military technologies, on the fight against terrorism and the drug mafia, on the active promotion of free trade and economic cooperation; on the desire to unite states on the basis of partnership against common dangers, threatening the world. However, as we see today, before the implementation of these good intentions - "a huge distance."

In conditions transition period The maintenance of strategic stability in relations between the two nuclear superpowers - Russia and the United States - becomes especially relevant to the emerging system of the world order. Strategic stability is based on the concept of nuclear deterrence, which is based on the model of mutual assured destruction (MAD), which ensures the defeat of the aggressor in any conditions of unleashing a war: "he who shoots first, dies second." Many years of experience in the confrontation between the two countries showed that in the absence of a system collective security The stability of military-strategic stability is adversely affected by both the very high level of military confrontation and the excessively low level that may develop as a result of ongoing reductions in the armed forces of the parties. This means that objectively there is some optimal level that provides the required stability margin of the system.

More than ten years have passed since the Declaration was proclaimed, and the most tangible changes in relations between Russia and the United States are noticeable at the political level, which has been repeatedly confirmed by declarative statements by the leaders of the two countries, accompanied by numerous incantations about partnership and the onset of a new stage in relations between the two powers. However, the burden of accumulated problems and contradictions between them in various fields turned out to be so great that it will take a lot of effort and time to establish a genuine (not in words, but in deeds) partnership, confirming the old truth: “You can’t go to bed as opponents in the evening and wake up in the morning.” allies." The paradox of the current situation is that, despite numerous peace-loving assurances, the strategic nuclear weapons of Russia and the United States are still aimed at each other. According to political scientist Alexei Arbatov, the entire course of the nuclear policy of the superpowers pursued by them in recent years indicates that both countries, while making significant efforts to implement Article 6 of the NPT, in practical terms do not essentially consider the idea of ​​complete nuclear disarmament as an indispensable condition for international security in foreseeable future.

He emphasizes that nuclear weapons continue to manifest themselves as the most important factor in world politics, primarily due to the significant advantages inherent in nuclear weapons that no other types of weapons possess and that their owners do not want to part with. This, in particular, was reflected in the latest documents of the two countries in the military field. The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved by the President of the country, states: "Nuclear weapons, with which the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are equipped, are considered by the Russian Federation as a factor in deterring aggression, ensuring the security of the Russian Federation and its allies, maintaining international stability and peace" ("NVO" # 15 , 2000). At the same time, the main common purpose of both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons is deterrence on a global and regional scale. At the same time, there are certain differences between these types of weapons. They are especially pronounced when deterrence has proved ineffective: for strategic nuclear forces, the main task is to deliver "retaliatory" retaliatory strikes and de-escalate hostilities, while for tactical weapons - to repulse large-scale aggression of the armed forces.

certain Negative influence on the state of approximate nuclear parity between Russia and the United States and, consequently, on the state of strategic stability, which became more complicated in the 1990s. the economic situation in Russia, as well as the exaggerated rumors spread about the imminent failure of various types of strategic offensive weapons as a result of their obsolescence. In reality, a planned reduction in strategic offensive arms will be carried out in accordance with the treaties, the replacement of obsolete weapons, and a significant part of the weapons, after modifications, will extend the warranty period of operation. There is serious confidence that the military-political leadership of Russia will take all necessary measures to maintain START within the limits established by the START Treaty.

Despite significant difficulties in the course of the negotiations, in May 2002, the SOR Treaty was signed in Moscow, according to which Russia and the United States form the composition and structure of the strategic nuclear forces in accordance with their plans and economic capabilities, with the expectation to have by 2012 in combat consisting of no more than 1700-2200 operationally deployed warheads. A very favorable moment for Russia is the possibility of retaining ground-based multi-charge missiles in the combat composition of the strategic nuclear forces, the complete elimination of which the American side persistently sought in the course of all previous negotiations. Along with the overall positive nature of the Treaty, its main drawback is the lack of a system for monitoring its implementation, as well as the possibility of creating a significant "return potential", in which the United States will have a multiple superiority over Russia (4,000 units for the United States versus 550 for Russia).

In the course of the implementation of the agreements, according to the SIPRI-2003 Yearbook, at the beginning of 2003, the Russian strategic nuclear forces had 4852 warheads, including 680 ICBMs (2916 warheads), 14 submarine missile carriers (232 launchers with 1072 warheads), 79 heavy bombers (864 cruise missiles). The deterrence potential (retaliatory strike force) includes 342 Topol mobile ground-based launchers, as well as part of submarine missile carriers, which, in the event of an aggravation of the situation, will be able to covertly enter combat patrol areas. In peacetime, 1-2 submarines are constantly at sea. The above figures show that in the strategic nuclear forces, the group of ICBMs is currently and in the foreseeable future the most significant component of the deterrence potential.

By the beginning of 2003, the US strategic forces included 500 Minuteman ICBMs (1,200 warheads) and 40 Peacekeeper MX (400 units), 360 Trident SLBMs (2,680), 93 B-52 heavy bombers and 21 B- 2 (1660). In total, 5950 warheads are on strategic launchers in full combat readiness. It is obvious that the basis of the US strategic deterrence potential is submarine missile carriers. There is no doubt that the current nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States, despite reductions by about half compared to 1991, are excessively redundant, and understanding this opens the way for further reductions in nuclear weapons.

According to a number of military experts, maintaining a balance of strategic offensive weapons consists in approximate equality, not so much in the number of warheads, but in terms of the combat capabilities of the nuclear forces of the parties: in terms of counterforce potential, in terms of the ability to withdraw combat weapons from under attack (in terms of the effectiveness of retaliatory actions), in terms of the number of warheads delivered to targets under conditions of a deep retaliatory strike (in terms of deterrence potential). At the same time, with further reductions in START nuclear countries will approach the threshold when the necessary and sufficient condition for stability is the equality of the potentials of a retaliatory strike. This, in essence, can be seen as a "minimum" level of deterrence, which is one of the most significant intermediate goals on the path to complete nuclear disarmament.

The content of the Nuclear Posture Review, which became public in early 2002, testifies to the long-term US plans for nuclear weapons. The US administration believes that the threat of nuclear conflict is currently growing, the main reason for which is the increasing spread of international terrorism. As a result, "traditional deterrence has become an anachronism of the Cold War, which is ineffective in modern conditions and against modern threats". The entire content of the "Review" convinces that there is practically no situation in which the United States could not use nuclear weapons. The role assigned to nuclear weapons is also evidenced by the plans for the further development of strategic nuclear forces, in accordance with which the United States by 2012 will be armed with 14 SSBNs with Trident missiles, 500 Minuteman-3 ICBMs, 76 V-52N and 21 V-2 bombers with a total number of warheads of about 2,200 units. weapons: ICBMs - by 2020, SLBMs - by 2030, TB - by 2040

In the concept of nuclear deterrence, especially on a regional scale, a significant role is assigned to non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons. In accordance with the unilateral obligations of the USA and the USSR in 1991-1992. both countries carried out significant reductions in tactical nuclear weapons, which, according to experts, at that time amounted to 10-12 thousand and 15-18 thousand units, respectively. As a result of the reductions, according to SIPRI, by the beginning of 2003, the US Army had 1,120 tactical warheads in service, while Russia had 3,380. strategic level, located in Europe. Leaving 120 tactical warheads at 12 air bases in six NATO countries, despite their small number, creates the conditions necessary for maintaining the nuclear infrastructure there, certifying aircraft carriers of nuclear weapons, and conducting appropriate training of aircrew to perform combat missions using nuclear weapons.

At the same time, it should be taken into account that, in accordance with the NATO Charter, in the event of war, American tactical nuclear weapons in Europe practically pass into the hands of US allies, which immediately increases the likelihood of its combat use. The principle of nuclear redistribution was rather frankly formulated by one of the members of the Council on national security The United States in a memorandum, which at that time (1964) was secret: "... NATO's non-nuclear partners during the war actually become nuclear powers." In practice, this means that when an aircraft with nuclear warheads taxis to the runway in preparation for takeoff, control of nuclear weapons passes to non-nuclear states.

Relying on military force The United States is making persistent efforts to secure a special position in the world, firmly occupy a leading position in the system of international security, and secure overwhelming military superiority over any potential adversary that may challenge America in the future. One manifestation of such egocentrism is the US withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty and the beginning of the deployment of a missile defense system. In the near future, this system will have rather modest combat capabilities for intercepting missiles and therefore will not have any noticeable impact on the balance of forces of the parties (Russia and the United States), on the state of strategic stability. However, as the combat capabilities of the missile defense system increase, its influence on the balance of power will become more and more noticeable, changing it in favor of the United States. Numerous assurances by American officials that this missile defense will not be directed against Russia, but only against "rogue states" can hardly serve as a serious guarantee of this.

THE CONCEPT OF THE FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

In contrast to the previous document "Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine" of 1993 and from the obligations previously declared in the USSR not to be the first to use nuclear weapons Special attention experts were attracted by the assertion contained in the 2000 Doctrine: “The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons against it and / or its allies mass destruction, as well as in response to large-scale aggression in situations critical for the national security of the Russian Federation. "This was a fundamentally new provision of the Doctrine on the possibility of using nuclear weapons in conditions of large-scale aggression by the enemy using conventional weapons, i.e., using them first.

At the same time, it is noteworthy that in the Doctrine there is no division of nuclear weapons into strategic and tactical. This approach is not accidental, it is due to the fact that the border between them is very conditional and from the point of view of combat use they have much in common, although there are significant differences. This provides some flexibility in its use, giving the country's high command the opportunity to choose one or another type of weapon, depending on the prevailing situation.

The possibility of using nuclear weapons first in the context of large-scale aggression against Russia, when it poses a direct threat to the existence of the state, is determined primarily by profound changes in the geostrategic situation, which are especially sensitive to the security of Russia and its national interests. Such aggression can be undertaken with extensive use ground forces, aviation, navy. Considering Russia's huge territory, its long land and sea borders, its presence of powerful military groups in its vicinity, the ongoing expansion of NATO, whose armed forces are about four times larger than Russia's, the maintenance of the US TNW grouping in Europe, demographic pressure and hidden territorial claims from some states, as well as the presence on the territory of Russia of huge reserves of raw materials, along with their gradual depletion in the traditional regions of the world - all this determines the need to take into account the possibility of the emergence of military threats. One can agree with the statements of some analysts that the likelihood of a large-scale conflict against our country is really very small at the present time, but one must keep in mind the extremely high price that will have to be paid if it is unleashed against an unprepared Russia.

In the context of the nuclear confrontation between the USSR (Russia) and the United States, deterrence was openly based and continues to be based on the threat of the use of strategic nuclear forces, which are constantly in high degree combat readiness. In the event of a large-scale aggression against Russia using conventional weapons, the use of strategic nuclear forces is unlikely to be appropriate. Although the Doctrine does not specify the tasks that may be assigned to nuclear forces in this case, there is no doubt that it is TNWs that will have to carry out the main task of defeating the invading enemy. Therefore, from the standpoint of deterrence, it becomes necessary to clearly identify for eventual adversaries those limits of development military-political situation beyond which entails a real threat of using nuclear weapons against them.

The unsuitability of strategic nuclear forces to repel the aggression of conventional armed forces is primarily due to the fact that fighting, especially in the first stage, will be carried out by invading troops on the territory of Russia or its allies. In this case, strikes against the invading enemy with strategic nuclear weapons with warheads with a yield of hundreds of kilotons will inevitably lead to huge losses among the population of the areas under attack, great economic and environmental damage, and will seriously complicate the conduct of hostilities for Russian troops. It should be directly recognized that in the event of such a development of the military situation, Russia has no other options for repulsing aggression, except for using tactical nuclear weapons as a last resort.

It is known that for an objective assessment of a phenomenon, an appropriate criterion is needed, which will allow us to answer the question posed. In this case, it seems appropriate as such a criterion for assessing the probability of the first use of nuclear weapons to use the nature of its influence on the main function of nuclear weapons - deterrence. How will the effectiveness of deterring a potential aggressor from an attack be affected by an open statement about the possibility and readiness to use nuclear weapons against him in the event that he unleashes aggression against Russia? There is hardly any doubt that the demonstrated determination to use nuclear weapons to repel aggression, which the eventual adversary must be convinced of, will strengthen the deterrent function. It follows from this that deterrence must be convincing and supported by real measures that testify to the readiness of tactical nuclear weapons for combat use. Otherwise, it becomes a bluff and, conversely, can provoke aggression.

This is quite convincingly confirmed in an analytical report prepared by the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (Moscow) and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington): to use nuclear weapons first. In any case, a purely declarative policy means little or even misleads. It is the preparation for the first use of nuclear weapons that is reflected in the deployment of weapons, operational plans and exercises."

An analysis of the military-strategic position of Russia shows that at present and in the foreseeable future it is much more vulnerable than the position of the United States, Britain, France, which, in turn, complicates the process of concretizing the composition of many factors that together determine the conditions for the transition to the use of nuclear weapons. These factors in war time include: prospects for the development of aggression against Russia on its national territory and the territory of its allies: losses personnel, military equipment and weapons, inflicting strikes by the enemy on objects of strategic nuclear forces and systems of state and military control, inflicting strikes on the most sensitive infrastructure objects of the country, concentrating aviation forces and groupings of ships in threatened directions, etc. The combination of these factors makes it possible for the enemy to inflict "unacceptable losses" with conventional weapons that undermine Russia's ability to actively resist.

Obviously, in such conditions, to repel aggression, neutralize these factors, Russia has no other effective means, except for nuclear weapons, in most cases tactical, which, in terms of its combat capabilities, is the main deterrent to repel multifaceted aggression. This means that the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will have to comprehensively assess the fact of aggression, its nature and scale, the degree of threat, the prospects for its build-up, for which it must have all the modern components of the information and intelligence system and, based on the processing of the information received, prepare a draft combat order of the Supreme Commander to the use of nuclear weapons. Of course, various options for conducting combat operations are being prepared even in peacetime based on an analysis of the state and prospects for the development of the military-strategic situation in various theaters of military operations, taking into account possible indicators of damage from each specific factor and their combination.

About the increase in recent times The attention of the Russian military leadership to repelling aggression with the use of tactical nuclear weapons for this is evidenced, in particular, by the Russian-Belarusian command and staff exercises "Allied Security-2004" held in July 2004. In the course of them, in order to repel a sudden offensive by superior enemy forces, it was planned to deliver virtual strikes with tactical nuclear weapons. According to experts, this development of events is typical for the use of nuclear weapons against the troops of the invading enemy. This is also evidenced by the increased attention to the creation of the Iskander operational-tactical missile system, which is capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to a distance of up to 280 km and which should enter the troops to replace the similar Oka missile system, which was destroyed during the INF Treaty due to irresponsibility and short-sightedness of the then political leadership of the USSR.

Attention is drawn to the differences in approaches to the problem of the first use of nuclear weapons in Russia and the United States. According to the Pentagon, for the United States, such a "large-scale" threat is of a specific nature - it is an increasingly less controlled process of the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. In this regard, the National Security Doctrine of 2002 states: "...our enemies have openly declared that they set as their goal the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, and everything indicates that they are stubbornly pursuing this goal...". This led to the revival of the concept of "preventive war", including the first nuclear strikes against WMD possessors. Iraq's experience shows that accusations against a country of possession of WMD may not be true, but they give carte blanche for the use of military force against it.

Under the pretext of world uncertainty, US leaders also argue that NATO must remain committed to the concept of being the first to use nuclear weapons. Its preservation is considered a guarantee of the stability of the entire structure of European security, and the rejection of it could lead to the formation of an independent European nuclear policy with the strengthening of the role of Great Britain and France in it, as well as the possible acquisition of nuclear status by Germany. Such a development of events in no way corresponds to the geopolitical interests of the United States, which came to Europe "once and for all." The attempt by German Foreign Minister Fischer to introduce into NATO's military doctrine a provision renouncing the concept of the first use of nuclear weapons is well known. The leadership of the alliance simply refused to seriously discuss this problem, and a sharp cry followed from the United States, which put an end to this initiative. At the same time, it should be recalled that a number of Eastern European countries seeking to join NATO, as an indicator of their loyalty, loudly declared their readiness to deploy nuclear weapons on their territory. Considering the geostrategic situation in Europe, there is no doubt that the main purpose of the American TNW on the continent is still to "contain" Russia, although in the current political situation and the balance of power of the parties, this has absolutely no reason.

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The nuclear deterrence theory is a set of justifications for the political functions of nuclear weapons, involving the prevention of the use of nuclear weapons by any of the countries of the first fear of unacceptable damage that will be inflicted in a retaliatory nuclear strike. The theory (concept) of nuclear deterrence, being elevated to the rank of a principle of the state policy of a nuclear power in the field of nuclear weapons, becomes the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

Nuclear deterrence is a political-psychological mechanism, not a military-technical or legal one. American President John F. Kennedy compared nuclear weapons to "the sword of Damocles hanging over our heads on the thinnest thread." The presence of nuclear weapons in one of the parties deters the other from the use of nuclear weapons by the first, but for this the first side must be sure (a) that the enemy has nuclear weapons, (b) in the technical ability, as well as the political and psychological readiness of this enemy to use nuclear weapons. weapons in a retaliatory strike, (c) the unacceptability of the consequences of such a potential retaliatory nuclear strike for the state and society. In the early stages of the development of nuclear weapons in the 1960s. American Secretary of Defense R. McNamara formulated threshold criteria for the unacceptability of damage (the so-called "McNamara criteria"), which assumed that no state would launch a first nuclear strike if it risked losing at least a third of the population and at least 70% in a retaliatory strike industrial potential. However, such “criteria” significantly depend on specific historical conditions, national psychology: at present, many politicians and experts consider the consequences of even a single nuclear explosion in a populated industrial region to be unacceptable (especially considering the power of modern nuclear charges, which have increased many times over since the 20-kiloton explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki).

Nuclear deterrence does not necessarily require nuclear parity between potential adversaries. A classic example of nuclear deterrence is the so-called. The Cuban (Caribbean) Missile Crisis of 1962, when the United States resorted to threats to use nuclear weapons, demanding the withdrawal of Soviet nuclear missiles from Cuba, but refrained from such use for fear of a retaliatory strike. At the same time, the USSR at the time of the crisis had about 17 times less nuclear and missile arsenal than the United States, however, even this ratio turned out to be enough to trigger the psychology of nuclear deterrence.

Nuclear deterrence can be a mutual strategy of two or more nuclear powers or potential adversaries, and then the deterrence formula becomes mutual assured destruction (MAD) in retaliation. However, nuclear deterrence can also be directed against a non-nuclear adversary, and then a state's nuclear weapons are interpreted as a unilateral emergency means of countering an attack by superior conventional armed forces (or countering the use of chemical or biological weapons) in a situation critical for the state's survival.

An attempt to break out of the limits of nuclear deterrence was the development in the 1970s. the concept of "limited nuclear war" (limited nuclear war), which implies the operational use of high-precision nuclear weapons against military targets without switching to a massive exchange of unacceptable nuclear strikes. However, the strengthening of the mentality of nuclear deterrence was facilitated by the study in the 1970s and early 1980s. consequences of the potential massive use of nuclear weapons for the ecology, climate and biosphere of the planet (including a mathematical model of the so-called "nuclear winter" - a complex of the deepest almost irreversible planetary scale consequences of a nuclear catastrophe that would lead to the death of mankind and many other forms of biological life on Earth ).

The theory of nuclear deterrence became the conceptual basis of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between the USSR and the United States, which for 30 years prevented the development of defense technologies against nuclear missile attacks by the parties, and such a ban was introduced precisely with the aim of making a retaliatory nuclear strike unacceptable in any scenario of escalation of hostilities. and thus both deter the parties from being the first to use nuclear weapons and slow down the nuclear-missile arms race. The US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002 is accompanied by attempts to replace the doctrine of nuclear deterrence with the doctrine of guaranteed survival of only one of the nuclear powers and to base nuclear policy on a balance of defensive and offensive nuclear weapons.

The Russian military doctrine calls Russia's nuclear weapons a factor in deterring aggression, ensuring the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies, and maintaining international stability and peace. Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of WMD against it and (or) its allies, as well as in response to large-scale aggression with the use of conventional weapons in situations critical for the national security of the country.

Nuclear deterrence, although it was formed as a theory and political doctrine in the global confrontation between the US and the USSR during the Cold War, is not necessarily a military-political phenomenon on a global scale. With regard to the nuclear arsenals of both the five largest nuclear powers and India, Pakistan, and Israel, one can speak of regional nuclear deterrence, as well as nuclear deterrence as a private component of the state's overall military strategy. At the same time, it is significant that nuclear deterrence, by definition, can only work in a situation of confrontation between states, but does not work or does not work adequately in relation to non-state actors. international relations(terrorist organizations, radical movements, etc.).

The modern evolution of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence involves a transition from "hard" nuclear deterrence (when each element nuclear triad should have the ability to inflict maximum damage in a retaliatory nuclear strike in any scenario of escalating a nuclear conflict) to "soft" or "limited" deterrence (when the survival of only individual elements of the triad is guaranteed, a nuclear strike is not aimed at maximum damage to the population and industrial potential, but remains "counterforce" aimed at enemy military facilities, and military planning is based on the most probable, and not on the "worst" options). Nevertheless, nuclear deterrence remains, on the whole, an inhuman political and psychological mechanism that bases the prevention of war on the fear of a catastrophic striking force weapons of mass destruction and the inability to defend against their use. In the future, replacing nuclear deterrence as a “negative mechanism” with positive mechanisms of international peace guarantees, trust, interaction and cooperation, along with the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons, remains a promising task for restructuring the international security system in the 21st century.