Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons - Seven years of work to ensure the prohibition of one of the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction

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In December 1997, Russia joined the new international Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and became a full party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use chemical weapons and about its destruction. Almost all UN members (168 countries) have signed this agreement.

The convention brings Russia into new stage disarmament. It prohibits all types of activities with chemical weapons, except for those permitted, requires the destruction of existing stocks, obliges to dispose of or convert former weapons production facilities, creates prerequisites for cooperation, assistance and trade in chemical products and technologies, puts into circulation a mechanism of international control.

Russia, which has inherited the world's largest stockpiles of chemical weapons (40,000 tons of poisonous substances), will have to solve the entire spectrum of disarmament tasks. Since 1987, its production facilities have been idle and should be demolished. There is a question about the conversion of some of them. Russia will receive 30-40 international OPCW inspections per year at its facilities subject to the Convention.

The most difficult tasks are the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons and former production facilities. Their scale is unprecedented. No other country in the world has yet disposed of such huge stockpiles of chemical weapons in the shortest possible time (10-15 years), taking into account environmental and safety standards and on an industrial basis.

International Civil Defense Organization (I

international organization civil defense(ICDO) was established in 1931. The headquarters is in Geneva. In accordance with the charter, the goal of the ICDO is to develop and improve civil defense, methods and technical means to prevent or reduce the consequences of peacetime and wartime dangers. ICDO interacts with the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO), formed in 1971 by decision General Assembly UN. UNDRO is a United Nations agency dedicated to assisting countries in distress. By decision of the IX session of the General Assembly of the International Civil Defense Organization (ICDO), in the member countries of this organization, including Russia, March 1 is celebrated as the World Day of Civil Protection.

Intergovernmental Oceanic Commission (IOC)

Intergovernmental Oceanic Commission (IOC) was established in 1960 to explore the importance of the ocean to mankind. Soon more than 250 international treaties, agreements, conventions of environmental importance were signed. Among them are such important ones as the Moscow Treaty of 1963 "On the prohibition of nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, outer space and under water", which was signed by more than 100 countries. In May 1972, an intergovernmental agreement was signed between the USSR and the USA, covering 11 major problems within the framework of 39 specific projects.

World Meteorological Organization (WMO)

World Meteorological Organization (WMO) is an international intergovernmental organization. It began its activity in 1951 and unites 185 countries. Location - Geneva. WMO cooperates in the field of meteorological observations and research, exchange of information, etc. In 1976, WMO issued the first statement about the threat to climate. In 1979, WMO established the World Climate Program (WCP), which became the basis for international climate action.

The program provides for strengthening the capabilities of member countries in the field of climate monitoring, detecting climate change, developing climate databases, conducting historical surveys, as well as applying climate information in various types of socio-economic activities. An important component of the WCP is the World Climate Research Program (WCRP), which coordinates scientific research into the climate system, its variability and predictability through various projects, including the World Ocean Circulation Project and the global energy and water cycle.

After the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention, opened for signature in January 1993. In 2013, the OPCW was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

The main tasks are to ensure control over compliance with the ban on the use of chemical weapons, the elimination of their stocks, the promotion of cooperation in the field of peaceful chemistry, assistance to states in ensuring protection against chemical weapons, and ensuring the nonproliferation of chemical weapons.

The headquarters is located in The Hague (Netherlands).

Structure of the OPCW

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has three main bodies: Conference of States Parties, Executive Council and Technical Secretariat.

Conference of States Parties

Conference of States Parties - main body OPCW. It includes all members of the Organization. The meeting takes place at least once a year and considers issues within the scope of the Convention. The Conference oversees the implementation of the Convention, takes steps to promote its object and objectives, and reviews compliance with it. The Conference supervises the activities of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat. Every five years, the Conference of the States Parties meets in special session to review the operation of the Convention.

The OPCW Executive Council is executive body Organizations. The activity report is presented at the annual meeting of the Conference. The Executive Council acts in accordance with the decisions of the Conference and ensures their implementation. The task of the Executive Council is to promote the implementation and compliance with the Convention, behind the activities of the Technical Secretariat. The Executive Board consists of 41 members. Each State Party has the right to be a member of the Executive Council. The meetings of the Executive Council shall be held four times a year, or more if so requested by the Member States of the Council or by the Conference.

Technical Secretariat

The Technical Secretariat assists the Conference and the Executive Council in the performance of their functions. The Technical Secretariat carries out the measures provided for by the Convention to verify compliance with it, receives and systematizes the initial and annual data of the States Parties (information on stockpiles of chemical weapons, on former facilities for its production, etc.). The Technical Secretariat is composed of CEO(appointed by the Conference of the States Parties on the recommendation of the Executive Council), who is its head and chief administrative officer, inspectors and other political, administrative and technical staff.

Chemical disarmament

As of early 2004, 95% of States Parties had submitted their data to the OPCW. Six states have declared that they have stockpiles of chemical weapons (Albania, India, Libya, Russia, the United States and another state party that wished not to be named in official OPCW documents). In total, these stocks amounted to about 70 thousand tons of poisonous substances various types. Of these, nerve agents - (28%), sarin (22%), soman (13%) accounted for 63%, blister agents (mainly mustard gas and lewisite) 35%. The remaining 2% were binary chemical weapons and various toxic waste.

13 states have declared existing 64 facilities at the time of entry into the Convention or in the past of chemical weapons production capacities (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, China, France, India, Libya, Iran, Japan, Russia, UK, USA, Yugoslavia and in another state -participant).

As of early 2004, 5,466 civilian chemical industry facilities had been declared by States Parties to fall under the scope of the chemical industry verification regime, as well as the transfer of chemicals listed in the Convention.

Between 1997 and early 2004, the OPCW destroyed more than 8,000 tons of poisonous substances in 4 states that declared they had stockpiles of chemical weapons. On April 29, 2003, Russia completed the first stage of the destruction of Category I chemical weapons provided for by the Convention, eliminating 400 tons of poisonous substances (1% general reserves) on the first Russian facility for destruction in the village. Mountain Saratov region.

OPCW inspection activities

The inspection department of the Technical Secretariat is responsible for the preparation, planning and analysis of inspection results.

The majority of inspection activities (about 60% of inspections) are carried out at chemical weapons facilities. At the facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons (CWDF), during the period of their operation, the constant presence of inspectors is ensured. Thus, in 2003, 74 rotations of inspectors were carried out at the CWDF. In 2002, 85 such inspections were carried out.

The Chemical Weapons Convention provides for the possibility of inspections upon request. A challenge inspection may be carried out in any State Party at the request of another State Party, without the right to refuse, for the purpose of clarifying or resolving any issue relating to possible non-compliance with the Convention. The State requesting an inspection is required to confine the inspection request to the Convention and to provide in the request all relevant information giving rise to the concern. Each State Party must refrain from making unreasonable requests, avoiding abuse. The inspected State is required to grant access within the requested location solely for the purpose of establishing facts relevant to concerns about possible non-compliance with the Convention. But during the years of the Convention, not a single State Party has requested such inspections.

The Convention provides for the provision of assistance and protection to member states in the event of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons against them. In accordance with the provisions of the Convention, such assistance may include the provision to States Parties of detection and alarm systems, protective and decontamination equipment and degassing equipment, medical antidotes and treatments, and advice on any protective measures.

In accordance with the Convention, each State Party has undertaken to either contribute to the voluntary fund of assistance established by the First Conference of the States Parties or to announce what kind of assistance it may provide at the call of the Organization.

The international cooperation

States Parties have the right to conduct research, develop, produce, acquire, store, transfer and use chemicals, exchange equipment and scientific and technical information for purposes not prohibited by the Convention. The Convention also states that its participants shall not establish any restrictions among themselves that would hinder or impede trade, as well as the development and dissemination of scientific and technical knowledge in the field of chemistry for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes.

The organization carries out a number of programs aimed at promoting cooperation in the field of chemistry. These programs are aimed at training scientists and engineers from developing countries or countries with economies in transition, to support seminars and conferences on the development of the chemical industry, trade in chemicals, etc. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which has been ensuring the prohibition of chemical weapons regime for seven years , is one of the main components of the system international security working to destroy the most dangerous type of weapons of mass destruction.

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Excerpt characterizing the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

- What is health? Crying at an illness - God will not let death, - said Karataev and immediately returned to the story he had begun.
“... And now, my brother,” Plato continued with a smile on his thin, pale face and with a special, joyful gleam in his eyes, “here, you are my brother ...
Pierre knew this story for a long time, Karataev told this story to him alone six times, and always with a special, joyful feeling. But no matter how well Pierre knew this story, he now listened to it, as to something new, and that quiet delight that Karataev apparently felt while telling, was communicated to Pierre. This story was about an old merchant who lived decently and God-fearing with his family and who once went with a friend, a wealthy merchant, to Macarius.
Stopping at the inn, both merchants fell asleep, and the next day the merchant's friend was found stabbed to death and robbed. The bloodied knife was found under the old merchant's pillow. The merchant was judged, punished with a whip, and, pulling out his nostrils, - as follows in order, said Karataev, - they were exiled to hard labor.
- And now, my brother (at this place Pierre found Karataev's story), the case has been going on for ten years or more. The old man lives in hard labor. As it should, he submits, he does no harm. Only the god of death asks. - Good. And they get together, at night, hard labor then, just like you and me, and the old man with them. And the conversation turned, who suffers for what, what God is to blame for. They began to say that he ruined the soul, that two, that set it on fire, that fugitive, so for nothing. They began to ask the old man: why, they say, grandfather, are you suffering? I, my dear brothers, say, I suffer for my own and for human sins. And I didn’t destroy souls, I didn’t take someone else’s, except that I clothed the poor brethren. I, my dear brothers, are a merchant; and had great wealth. So and so, he says. And he told them, then, how the whole thing was, in order. I, he says, do not grieve about myself. It means that God found me. One thing, he says, I feel sorry for my old woman and children. And so the old man cried. If the same person happened in their company, it means that the merchant was killed. Where, says grandfather, was it? When, what month? asked everyone. His heart ached. Suitable in this manner to the old man - clap at the feet. For me, you, he says, old man, disappear. The truth is true; innocently in vain, he says, guys, this man is tormented. I, he says, did the same thing and put a knife under your sleepy head. Forgive me, says grandfather, you are me for the sake of Christ.
Karataev fell silent, smiling joyfully, looking at the fire, and straightened the logs.
- The old man says: God, they say, will forgive you, and we all, he says, are sinners to God, I suffer for my sins. He burst into tears himself. What do you think, falcon, - brighter and brighter, beaming with an enthusiastic smile, said Karataev, as if what he had now to tell contained the main charm and the whole meaning of the story, - what do you think, falcon, this murderer showed up most according to his superiors . I, he says, ruined six souls (there was a big villain), but all I feel sorry for this old man. Let him not cry at me. Showed up: written off, sent the paper, as it should. The place is far away, while the court and the case, while all the papers have been written off as they should, according to the authorities, that means. It came to the king. So far, the royal decree has come: to release the merchant, to give him rewards, how many were awarded there. The paper came, they began to look for the old man. Where did such an old man suffer innocently in vain? The paper came out from the king. They began to search. - Karataev's lower jaw trembled. “God forgave him—he died.” So, falcon, - finished Karataev and for a long time, silently smiling, looked in front of him.
Not this story itself, but its mysterious meaning, that enthusiastic joy that shone in Karataev’s face at this story, the mysterious meaning of this joy, now vaguely and joyfully filled Pierre’s soul.

– A vos places! [In places!] – suddenly shouted a voice.
Between the prisoners and the escorts there was a joyful confusion and the expectation of something happy and solemn. The cries of the command were heard from all sides, and from the left side, trotting around the prisoners, cavalrymen appeared, well-dressed, on good horses. On all faces there was an expression of tension, which people have in the vicinity of higher authorities. The prisoners huddled together, they were pushed off the road; the convoys lined up.
- L "Empereur! L" Empereur! Le marechal! Le duc! [Emperor! Emperor! Marshal! Duke!] - and the well-fed escorts had just passed, when the carriage thundered in a train, on gray horses. Pierre caught a glimpse of the calm, handsome, fat and white face of a man in a three-cornered hat. It was one of the marshals. The marshal's gaze turned to the large, conspicuous figure of Pierre, and in the expression with which this marshal frowned and turned his face away, compassion and a desire to hide it seemed to Pierre.
The general who led the depot, with a red, frightened face, urged on his thin horse, galloped behind the carriage. Several officers came together, the soldiers surrounded them. Everyone had excited faces.
- Qu "est ce qu" il a dit? Qu "est ce qu" il a dit? .. [What did he say? What? What?..] – heard Pierre.
During the passage of the marshal, the prisoners huddled together, and Pierre saw Karataev, whom he had not seen this morning. Karataev was sitting in his overcoat, leaning against a birch. In his face, in addition to the expression of yesterday's joyful tenderness at the story of the merchant's innocent suffering, there was also an expression of quiet solemnity.
Karataev looked at Pierre with his kind, round eyes, now covered with tears, and, apparently, beckoned him to him, wanted to say something. But Pierre was too scared for himself. He acted as if he hadn't seen his eyes and hurried away.
When the prisoners started off again, Pierre looked back. Karataev was sitting on the edge of the road, by a birch; and two Frenchmen said something over him. Pierre did not look back anymore. He walked limping up the hill.
Behind, from the place where Karataev was sitting, a shot was heard. Pierre heard this shot clearly, but at the same moment he heard it, Pierre remembered that he had not finished the calculation he had begun before the marshal's passage about how many crossings were left to Smolensk. And he began to count. Two French soldiers, one of whom held a shot, smoking gun in his hand, ran past Pierre. They were both pale, and in the expression of their faces - one of them looked timidly at Pierre - there was something similar to what he saw in a young soldier at an execution. Pierre looked at the soldier and remembered how this soldier of the third day burned his shirt while drying at the stake and how they laughed at him.
The dog howled from behind, from the place where Karataev was sitting. “What a fool, what is she howling about?” thought Pierre.
The comrade soldiers, walking next to Pierre, did not look back, just like he did, at the place from which a shot was heard and then the howling of a dog; but a stern expression lay on all faces.

The depot, and the prisoners, and the convoy of the marshal stopped in the village of Shamshev. Everything was huddled around the fires. Pierre went up to the fire, ate roasted horse meat, lay down with his back to the fire and immediately fell asleep. He slept again in the same dream as he slept in Mozhaisk after Borodin.
Again the events of reality were combined with dreams, and again someone, whether he himself or someone else, spoke to him thoughts, and even the same thoughts that were spoken to him in Mozhaisk.
“Life is everything. Life is God. Everything moves and moves, and this movement is God. And as long as there is life, there is the enjoyment of the self-consciousness of the deity. Love life, love God. It is most difficult and most blessed to love this life in one's suffering, in the innocence of suffering.
"Karataev" - Pierre remembered.
And suddenly Pierre introduced himself as a living, long-forgotten, meek old man who taught geography to Pierre in Switzerland. "Wait," said the old man. And he showed Pierre the globe. This globe was a living, oscillating ball, without dimensions. The entire surface of the sphere consisted of drops tightly compressed together. And these drops all moved, moved, and then merged from several into one, then from one they were divided into many. Each drop strove to spill out, to capture the greatest space, but others, striving for the same, squeezed it, sometimes destroyed it, sometimes merged with it.
“This is life,” said the old teacher.
“How simple and clear it is,” thought Pierre. How could I not have known this before?
- God is in the middle, and each drop seeks to expand in order to largest sizes reflect it. And it grows, merges, and shrinks, and is destroyed on the surface, goes into the depths and emerges again. Here he is, Karataev, here he spilled and disappeared. - Vous avez compris, mon enfant, [You understand.] - said the teacher.
- Vous avez compris, sacre nom, [You understand, damn you.] - shouted a voice, and Pierre woke up.
He got up and sat down. By the fire, squatting on his haunches, sat a Frenchman, who had just pushed a Russian soldier away, and fried the meat put on the ramrod. Wiry, tucked up, overgrown with hair, red hands with short fingers deftly turned the ramrod. A brown, gloomy face with scowling brows was clearly visible in the glow of the coals.
“Ca lui est bien egal,” he grumbled, quickly addressing the soldier behind him. - ... brigand. Va! [He doesn't care... Rogue, right!]

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) - international organization, established with the support of the UN on April 29, 1997, after the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, opened for signature in January 1993. In 2013, the OPCW was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

The main tasks are to ensure control over compliance with the ban on the use of chemical weapons, to eliminate their stockpiles, to promote the development of cooperation in the field of peaceful chemistry, to help states in ensuring protection against chemical weapons, and to ensure the nonproliferation of chemical weapons.

The headquarters is located in The Hague (Netherlands).

Structure of the OPCW

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has three main bodies: Conference of States Parties, Executive Council and Technical Secretariat.

Conference of States Parties

The Conference of the States Parties is the main body of the OPCW. It includes all members of the Organization. The meeting takes place at least once a year and considers issues within the scope of the Convention. The Conference oversees the implementation of the Convention, takes steps to promote its object and objectives, and reviews compliance with it. The Conference supervises the activities of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat. Every five years, the Conference of the States Parties meets in special session to review the operation of the Convention.

The Executive Council of the OPCW is the executive body of the Organization. The activity report is presented at the annual meeting of the Conference. The Executive Council acts in accordance with the decisions of the Conference and ensures their implementation. The task of the Executive Council is to promote the implementation and compliance with the Convention, behind the activities of the Technical Secretariat. The Executive Board consists of 41 members. Each State Party has the right to be a member of the Executive Council. The meetings of the Executive Council shall be held four times a year, or more if so requested by the Member States of the Council or by the Conference.

Technical Secretariat

The Technical Secretariat assists the Conference and the Executive Council in the performance of their functions. The Technical Secretariat carries out the measures provided for by the Convention to verify compliance with it, receives and systematizes the initial and annual data of the participating States (information on stockpiles of chemical weapons, on former facilities for their production, etc.). The Technical Secretariat consists of the Director General (appointed by the Conference of the States Parties on the recommendation of the Executive Council), who is its head and chief administrative officer, inspectors and other political, administrative and technical staff.

Chemical disarmament

As of early 2004, 95% of States Parties had submitted their data to the OPCW. Six states have declared that they have stockpiles of chemical weapons (Albania, India, Libya, Russia, the United States and another state party that wished not to be named in official OPCW documents). In total, these stocks amounted to about 70 thousand tons of poisonous substances of various types. Of these, nerve agents accounted for 63%: (28%), sarin (22%), soman (13%); blistered skin (mainly mustard gas and lewisite) 35%. The remaining 2% were binary chemical weapons and various toxic waste.

13 states have declared 64 facilities that existed at the time of entry into the Convention or in the past of chemical weapons production capacities (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, China, France, India, Libya, Iran, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, Yugoslavia and in another state -participant).

As of early 2004, 5,466 civilian chemical industry facilities had been declared by States Parties to fall under the scope of the chemical industry verification regime, as well as the transfer of chemicals listed in the Convention.

Between 1997 and early 2004, the OPCW destroyed more than 8,000 tons of poisonous substances in 4 states that declared they had stockpiles of chemical weapons. On April 29, 2003, Russia completed the first stage of the destruction of category I chemical weapons stipulated by the Convention by eliminating 400 tons of poisonous substances (1% of the total stocks) at the first Russian destruction facility in the village of Mountain Saratov region.

OPCW inspection activities

The inspection department of the Technical Secretariat is responsible for the preparation, planning and analysis of inspection results.

The majority of inspection activities (about 60% of inspections) are carried out at facilities related to chemical weapons. At the facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons (CWDF), during the period of their operation, the constant presence of inspectors is ensured. Thus, in 2003, 74 rotations of inspectors were carried out at the CWDF. In 2002, 85 such inspections were carried out.

The Chemical Weapons Convention provides for the possibility of inspections upon request. A challenge inspection may be carried out in any State Party at the request of another State Party, without the right to refuse, for the purpose of clarifying or resolving any issue relating to possible non-compliance with the Convention. The State requesting an inspection is required to confine the inspection request to the Convention and to provide in the request all relevant information giving rise to the concern. Each State Party must refrain from making unreasonable requests, avoiding abuse. The inspected State is required to grant access within the requested location solely for the purpose of establishing facts relevant to concerns about possible non-compliance with the Convention. But during the years of the Convention, not a single State Party has requested such inspections.

The Convention provides for the provision of assistance and protection to member states in the event of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons against them. In accordance with the provisions of the Convention, such assistance may include the provision to States Parties of detection and alarm systems, protective and decontamination equipment and degassing equipment, medical antidotes and treatments, and advice on any protective measures.

In accordance with the Convention, each State Party has undertaken to either contribute to the voluntary fund of assistance established by the First Conference of the States Parties or to announce what kind of assistance it may provide at the call of the Organization.

The international cooperation

States Parties have the right to conduct research, develop, produce, acquire, store, transfer and use chemicals, exchange equipment and scientific and technical information for purposes not prohibited by the Convention. The Convention also states that its participants shall not establish any restrictions among themselves that would hinder or impede trade, as well as the development and dissemination of scientific and technical knowledge in the field of chemistry for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes.

The organization carries out a number of programs aimed at promoting cooperation in the field of chemistry. These programs are aimed at training scientists and engineers from developing countries or countries with economies in transition, to support seminars and conferences on the development of the chemical industry, trade in chemicals, etc. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which has been ensuring the prohibition of chemical weapons regime for seven years , is one of the main components of the international security system, working to destroy the most dangerous type of weapons of mass destruction.

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (hereinafter referred to as the CWC or the Convention) was opened for signature by the UN Secretary General (Depository of the Convention) in Paris on January 13, 1993 and entered into force on April 29, 1997 (through 180 days after the deposit of the 65th instrument of ratification, article XXI CWC). Russia, which had the largest stocks of chemical weapons in the world (about 40,000 tons), became a full party to the Convention on December 5, 1997.

The CWC is an international legal document aimed at solving two important tasks. The first is the elimination of a whole class of dangerous weapons mass destruction under strict international control (disarmament), the second is the prohibition of the production and use of chemical weapons (prevention of their proliferation). The convention is perpetual.

To oversee the implementation of the CWC, the participating States established the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), headquartered in The Hague, the Netherlands. The OPCW is an international platform for discussing all issues related to the implementation of the Convention.

There are currently 193 States parties to the CWC. Myanmar and Angola joined the Convention in 2015, and the State of Palestine in 2018. Israel and South Sudan(signed the Convention, but not yet ratified), North Korea and Egypt.

Governing bodies of the OPCW

The governing bodies of the OPCW are: the Conference of the States Parties (CSP), the Executive Council (EC) and the Technical Secretariat (TC).

The OSP is made up of all 193 member states of the OPCW. The Conference meets in ordinary sessions annually. In addition, CWC review conferences are held every five years. The Fourth Review Conference took place on November 21-30, 2018.

The EC is accountable to the CSP and consists of 41 members who are elected for a period of two years on a rotation basis. It is headed by a chairman elected for one year. When forming the composition of IS Special attention given to equitable geographical distribution, the importance of countries' chemical industries, and political and security interests. The seats in the EC are distributed among the regional groups: African and Asian - 9 each, Eastern European - 5, the group of Latin American countries and the Caribbean - 7, Western European and other states - 10. There is also one place, which is alternately occupied every two years by countries of Latin America and Asia groups. The EC holds its regular sessions three times a year.

The TC (reported to the EC) is headed by a Director General, appointed by the CSP upon submission of the EC for a period of four years, renewable for one four-year period. Since July 25, 2018, the Spaniard Fernando Arias Gonzalez has been the General Director of the Customs Union (term of office expires on July 24, 2022).

To facilitate the implementation of the object and objectives of the Convention, the TC is composed of inspectors, scientific, technical and administrative staff of various qualifications. The TC carries out verification and inspection activities in the States Parties to confirm compliance with the provisions of the CWC, assists the CSP and EC in the implementation of their functions, and performs other tasks entrusted to it by these governing bodies of the OPCW.

Deadlines for the elimination of chemical weapons

In accordance with the provisions of the CWC, all stockpiles of chemical weapons in the world were to be destroyed 10 years after its entry into force - April 29, 2007. By decision of the States Parties, this period was extended for 15 years - until April 29, 2012 (paragraphs 24 -28 Annexes to the CWC on Implementation and Verification).

Based on the above provisions, at the 11th session of the CSP (December 2006) for Russia and USA the deadline for the elimination of national chemical marsenals was postponed to 2012. In accordance with the decisions of the 46th (July 2006) and 48th (March 2007) sessions of the EC, there were the terms for the destruction of chemical weapons left by Japan in China after the end of World War II have been extended, and elimination Italy"old chemical weapons" (defined in the CWC, paragraph 5 of Article II).

Japan and China presented at the 67th session of the EC (February 2012) a plan for the elimination of the abandoned Japanese chemical weapons, according to which its destruction "preferably" be completed no later than the end of 2016, with the exception of the burial in the area of ​​Haerbalin, where the destruction process will last until 2022 According to some estimates, between 700 thousand and 2 million pieces of "abandoned" ammunition are buried in China.

Pursuant to the decision of the 16th session of the CSP, during the 68th session of the EC (May 2012), the holder states submitted detailed plans destruction of chemical weapons remaining in their possession after April 29, 2012. Russia announced December 31, 2015 as the end date for the completion of its chemical disarmament program, USA– September 30, 2023, Libya– December 31, 2016

In December 2014, during the 19th session of the CSP, a decision was made to complete the destruction of chemical weapons in Russian Federation no later than 2020.

Progress in the Elimination of Chemical Weapons in the Possessor States

The Russian Federation has completed the destruction of its national stockpiles of chemical weapons ahead of schedule, three years ahead of schedule, under effective international control. The last chemical munition, on the instructions of the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin, was liquidated on September 27, 2017 at the specialized facility "Kizner" (Udmurt Republic). Total Russia destroyed 39 thousand 967 tons of poisonous substances.

In the third quarter of 2015, in addition to the chemical weapons destruction facilities Gorny (Saratov Region) and Kambarka (Udmurt Republic), where chemical weapons destruction was completed in 2005 and 2009. accordingly, in 2016, chemical reserves were completely eliminated at four more Russian facilities: Maradykovsky ( Kirov region), Leonidovka (Penza region), Shchuchye (Kurgan region) and Pochep (Bryansk region).

IN THE USA, who joined the Convention on April 29, 1997 and had 31,500 tons of toxic substances in their arsenal (they were the second largest owner of chemical weapons stocks), the process of eliminating national stocks of chemical weapons has not yet been completed. By December 2018, about 91.19 percent of stocks of poisonous substances. The work is being carried out at a facility commissioned in September 2016 in Pueblo (Colorado). Another facility (Blue Grass, Kentucky) is scheduled to be put into operation in 2020. The process of complete chemical demilitarization of the United States should be completed only in 2023.

Libya, which became a member of the CWC in 2004, destroyed 31.1 tons of mustard gas by February 2014 and then began preparations for the elimination of less hazardous chemicals. In 2016, Tripoli announced the impossibility of destroying stockpiles of chemical weapons on time (December 2016). Due to the fact that the security situation in Libya remained difficult, in order to prevent the remaining Libyan stockpiles of chemical weapons from falling into the hands of terrorist groups, it was decided to take them out of the country for subsequent destruction abroad. At the same time, Russia insisted that this decision complied with the provisions of the CWC and was carried out according to the "Syrian scenario", that is, with the obligatory adoption of a UN Security Council resolution on this matter (No. 2298 of July 22, 2016). In 2017, under the control of the OPCW, the destruction of about 500 tons of chemical weapons precursors removed in 2016 from the territory of Libya was completed at the German chemical plant GEKA (Munster).

Iraq, which joined the CWC in 2009, submitted to the OPCW preliminary information on the composition and structure of declared stockpiles only in October 2011. Two bunkers for the storage of chemical weapons from the times of S. Hussein were liquidated by the continuous concreting method.

Syria signed the Convention on September 14, 2013 and officially acceded to it 30 days after signing - on October 14, 2013. By June 23, 2014, all chemical weapons components on its territory were removed from Syria. They were destroyed at the end of 2015.

In accordance with the requirements of the CWC and the relevant decision of the EC, since the end of 2014, with the assistance of the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), work has been carried out to eliminate 12 former Syrian chemical weapons production facilities (7 aircraft hangars and 5 underground bunkers). At the end of December 2017, 7 hangars and all underground bunkers were destroyed.

Within the framework of the "Syrian dossier" there are still a number of questions related to the clarification of the initial declaration of Damascus on the CWC and information about the use of chemical weapons in Syria. For these purposes, the Director General of the OPCW Technical Secretariat established two special missions. The first is the OPCW Mission to Clarify Syria's Initial Declaration under Article III of the CWC - MEP (established in April 2014 under pressure from Western states). Its task is to clarify the situation with the allegedly incomplete declaration of part of the military-chemical potential of Syria. Despite the fact that the Syrians are showing unprecedented openness in cooperation with the Ministry of Environmental Protection, which has been repeatedly confirmed in the documents of the OPCW and the UN, claims against them still persist.

The second is the Mission to establish the facts of the use of chemical weapons in Syria - the FMS (established in April 2014). The FSA's terms of reference state that its purpose is to establish facts relevant to cases of alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria. Currently, both missions continue their work.

Since November 2015, the OPCW-UN Joint Mechanism to Investigate the Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria (JIM), established on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 2235 (2015), began its work. In 2016, his mandate was extended for another year (UN Security Council resolution 2319 of November 17, 2016). The purpose of his work was to identify those responsible for the relevant crimes and present their findings to the UN Security Council.

The first two reports were mainly of a general informational nature. On August 24, 2016, the JIM issued a third report in which it made completely unconvincing conclusions based on unreliable and often falsified facts regarding the involvement of the Syrian military in two chlorine incidents (Talmenes - April 21, 2014 and Sarmin - March 16, 2015) and ISIS's guilt in the use of mustard gas (Marea - August 21, 2015), which, unlike the first two cases, is not in doubt.

On October 21, 2016, the fourth report was released, in which the blame for another "chlorine incident" was placed on government forces (Kmenas settlement - March 16, 2015). For five additional incidents, the JIM concluded that the information provided was either contradictory or insufficient, and therefore further investigation into them was discontinued.

Based on the need to consolidate anti-terror efforts in the context of the use of chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq, Russia agreed to the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2319 (2016), which provided for the extension of the JIM for another year. At the same time, they proceeded from the importance of expanding the mandate of the Mechanism to the countries adjacent to Syria and giving it a clear anti-terrorist orientation.

On February 13, 2017, the fifth report was released, in which the conclusions of the two previous ones were actually confirmed.

The sixth report of the JIM was submitted on 23 June 2017. The document was mainly technical in nature, since after the renewal of the mandate of the Mechanism and the change of its leadership, it was virtually inactive for several months, forming a new team of experts.

On April 4, 2017, after a chemical incident with the use of sarin in the Syrian settlement of Khan Sheikhoun, the United States, Great Britain and France accused the Syrian armed forces of a “new” chemical attack and, bypassing the UN Security Council, launched a missile attack on the Shayrat air base, where sarin used in Khan Sheikhoun was allegedly stockpiled.

The purpose of the seventh report, issued on October 26, 2017, was to identify those responsible for the alleged use of chemical weapons in two cases: in the settlement of Khan Sheikhun (April 4, 2017) and in the settlement of Marat Um-Hosh (September 16, 2016). As a result, the JIM placed responsibility for the use of sarin in N. p. Khan Sheikhun to the Syrian authorities, mustard gas in n.p. Um Hosh is on ISIS. In its work, the JIM relied mainly on the results of the activities of the FFM, which, largely on the basis of data provided by the Syrian armed opposition, came to the conclusion that sarin was indeed used in Khan Sheikhoun.

For more than two years of its activity, the JIM has not been able to create the necessary expert potential and technical tools for conducting professional and objective investigations into cases of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. On November 17, 2017, the mandate of the JIM expired, but the unwillingness of the United States and its allies to depoliticize and optimize its activities did not allow the functioning of this structure to be extended.

On April 7, 2018, at the suggestion of the Syrian opposition structures, information began to come in that government troops allegedly launched a chemical attack on the territories held by the militants in the city of Douma (Eastern Ghouta). AT in social networks a video filmed by the terrorist group-affiliated NGO White Helmets was circulated showing first aid local residents, as if injured by a chemical attack.

The site of the alleged chemical incident in the city of Duma was promptly examined by Russian military experts - no evidence of the use of poisonous substances was found. On April 10, 2018, the Syrian authorities officially asked the TC to send specialized experts to the scene of the alleged incident to establish all the circumstances of the incident. The FFM expert group formed by the Director General of the Customs Union left for Syria on April 12, 2018, but was able to arrive in Damascus only on April 15, 2018.

Nevertheless, already on April 14, 2018, the United States, Great Britain and France, without waiting for the completion of the investigation, launched a missile attack on the Research Center in the city of Barza and other Syrian military and civilian infrastructure facilities, where chemical weapons used in Eastern Ghouta.

On April 26, 2018, together with Damascus, a briefing was organized at the OPCW and a press conference with the participation of Syrian citizens who allegedly suffered from a chemical attack in the city of Douma and were shown in the White Helmets pseudo-report. Majority Western countries refused to attend the briefing.

On July 6, 2018, the FFM's preliminary report on the chemical incident in Douma was released, stating that there were no traces of nerve agents in all samples taken by OPCW experts.

As of January 2019, the final report has not yet been submitted.

On November 24, 2018, militants shelled residential areas in the suburbs of Aleppo with shells filled with chlorine. At the insistence of the Syrian and Russian sides on January 5 of this year. The OPCW Technical Secretariat sent experts from the FFS to Syria to clarify the circumstances of the incident. Based on the results of the Mission's work, a corresponding report will be prepared.

Anti-Russian campaign in the OPCW

In March 2018, the United Kingdom accused Russia of being involved in the incident with the poisoning of the former GRU colonel, double agent S. Skripal and his daughter Yu. Skripal in the city of Salisbury on March 4, 2018, with a nerve agent, known in the West as “Novichok” . However, no evidence of this was presented.

Neither the OPCW Technical Secretariat nor the British laboratory at Porton Down were able to determine the country of origin of the chemicals used in Salisbury and later Amesbury. At the same time, the fact that the synthesis of substances of the Novichok family was carried out in a number of states, primarily in Great Britain itself, as well as the USA, the Czech Republic, Sweden and others, is hushed up. In the US alone, more than 140 patents have been issued related to the combat use of poisonous substances of this type and protection against them.

On June 26-27, 2018, a special session of the Conference of the States Parties (CSP) of the CWC was held in The Hague, which was convened at the initiative of the UK with the support of Australia, Bulgaria, Germany, Canada, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, the USA, France and Japan. As a result of the vote, London and its allies managed to “push through” their draft decision, which provides for the empowerment of the OPCW Technical Secretariat with unusual powers “to identify those responsible” for the use of chemical weapons in Syria.

At the regular 23rd session of the CSP (November 19-20, 2018), under pressure from Western countries, the OPCW budget for this year, which provides for the allocation of funds to finance the attributive mechanism imposed by them.

At the meeting held on January 14 this year. At the 62nd Extraordinary Session of the OPCW Executive Council, at the initiative of Western countries, a decision was made with a recommendation regarding the advisability of including two new “families” of toxic chemicals in the CPCW control lists. Consideration of the Russian proposal in this regard is scheduled for the end of February 2019.

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)- an international organization established with the support of the UN on April 29, after the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, opened for signature in January 1993.

The main tasks are to ensure control over compliance with the ban on the use of chemical weapons, the elimination of their stocks, the promotion of cooperation in the field of peaceful chemistry, assistance to states in ensuring protection against chemical weapons, and ensuring the nonproliferation of chemical weapons.

The headquarters is located in The Hague (Netherlands).

Structure of the OPCW

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has three main bodies: Conference of States Parties, Executive Council and Technical Secretariat.

Conference of States Parties

The Conference of the States Parties is the main body of the OPCW. It is composed of all members of the Organization. The meeting takes place at least once a year and considers issues within the scope of the Convention. The Conference oversees the implementation of the Convention, takes action to promote its object and objectives, and reviews compliance with it. The Conference supervises the activities of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat. Every five years, the Conference of the States Parties meets in special session to review the operation of the Convention.

The Executive Council of the OPCW is the executive body of the Organization. The activity report is presented at the annual meeting of the Conference. The Executive Council acts in accordance with the decisions of the Conference and ensures their implementation. The task of the Executive Council is to promote the implementation and compliance with the Convention, behind the activities of the Technical Secretariat. The Executive Board consists of 41 members. Each State Party has the right to be a member of the Executive Council. The meetings of the Executive Council shall be held four times a year, or more if so requested by the Member States of the Council or by the Conference.

Technical Secretariat

The Technical Secretariat assists the Conference and the Executive Council in the performance of their functions. The Technical Secretariat carries out the measures provided for by the Convention to verify compliance with it, receives and systematizes the initial and annual data of the States Parties (information on stockpiles of chemical weapons, on former facilities for their production, etc.). The Technical Secretariat consists of the Director General (appointed by the Conference of the States Parties on the recommendation of the Executive Council), who is its head and chief administrative officer, inspectors and other political, administrative and technical staff.

Chemical disarmament

As of early 2004, 95% of States Parties had submitted their data to the OPCW. Six states have declared that they have stockpiles of chemical weapons (Albania, India, Libya, Russia, the United States and another state party that wished not to be named in official OPCW documents). In total, these stocks amounted to about 70 thousand tons of poisonous substances of various types. Of these, nerve agents - VX (28%), sarin (22%), soman (13%) accounted for 63%, blister agents (mainly mustard gas and lewisite) 35%. The remaining 2% were binary chemical weapons and various toxic waste.

13 states have declared existing 64 facilities at the time of entry into the Convention or in the past of chemical weapons production capacities (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, China, France, India, Libya, Iran, Japan, Russia, UK, USA, Yugoslavia and in another state -participant).

As of early 2004, 5,466 civilian chemical industry facilities had been declared by States Parties to be subject to the chemical industry verification regime, as well as the transfer of chemicals listed under the Convention.

Between 1997 and early 2004, the OPCW destroyed more than 8,000 tons of poisonous substances in 4 states that declared they had stockpiles of chemical weapons. On April 29, 2003, Russia completed the first stage of the destruction of category I chemical weapons provided for by the Convention by eliminating 400 tons of poisonous substances (1% of the total stocks) at the first Russian destruction facility in the village of Mountain Saratov region.

OPCW inspection activities

The inspection department of the Technical Secretariat is responsible for the preparation, planning and analysis of inspection results.

The majority of inspection activities (about 60% of inspections) are carried out at chemical weapons facilities. At the facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons (CWDF), during the period of their operation, the constant presence of inspectors is ensured. Thus, in 2003, 74 rotations of inspectors were carried out at the CWDF. In 2002, 85 such inspections were carried out.

The Chemical Weapons Convention provides for the possibility of inspections upon request. A challenge inspection may be carried out in any State Party at the request of another State Party, without the right to refuse, for the purpose of clarifying or resolving any issue relating to possible non-compliance with the Convention. The State requesting an inspection is required to confine the inspection request to the Convention and to provide in the request all relevant information giving rise to the concern. Each State Party must refrain from making unreasonable requests, avoiding abuse. The inspected State is required to grant access within the requested location solely for the purpose of establishing facts relevant to concerns about possible non-compliance with the Convention. But during the years of the Convention, not a single State Party has requested such inspections.

The Convention provides for the provision of assistance and protection to member states in the event of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons against them. In accordance with the provisions of the Convention, such assistance may include the provision to States Parties of detection and alarm systems, protective and decontamination equipment and degassing equipment, medical antidotes and treatments, and advice on any protective measures.

In accordance with the Convention, each State Party has undertaken to either contribute to the voluntary fund of assistance established by the First Conference of the States Parties or to announce what kind of assistance it may provide at the call of the Organization.

The international cooperation

States Parties have the right to conduct research, develop, produce, acquire, store, transfer and use chemicals, exchange equipment and scientific and technical information for purposes not prohibited by the Convention. The Convention also states that its parties shall not establish any restrictions among themselves that would hinder or impede trade, as well as the development and dissemination of scientific and technical knowledge in the field of chemistry for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes.

The organization carries out a number of programs aimed at promoting cooperation in the field of chemistry. These programs are aimed at training scientists and engineers from developing countries or countries with economies in transition, to support seminars and conferences on the development of the chemical industry, trade in chemicals, etc. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which has been ensuring the prohibition of chemical weapons regime for seven years , is one of the main components of the international security system, working to destroy the most dangerous type of weapons of mass destruction.

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