The US National Security Archives published for the first time a declassified list of 1956 priority targets for a nuclear attack on the USSR and allied countries a few months ago. The list of targets for "systematic destruction" includes the main cities and strategic installations of the Soviet Union, of Eastern Europe, China and North Korea, a total of about 1100 targets.

Today, the US and Russia control 93% of the world's nuclear weapons arsenal. The list of priority targets probably hasn't changed too much. Unfortunately, the nuclear bombardment of Russian cities will have catastrophic consequences not only for the Russian Federation, but for the whole world.

Experts from the non-profit research organization Future of Life Institute tried to most realistically calculate what the consequences of such a nuclear strike could be, depending on the power of the bombs (from 50 kilotons to 10 megatons) and the direction of the wind. The calculation results are presented on an interactive map. For example, they took the weather conditions for April 29, April 30 and May 1, 2016.

For example, here is the range of a 1.2-megaton bomb dropped on the strategic Vnukovo facility: fireball radius - 1.04 km, blast radius (5 psi) - 7.47 km, light radiation (3rd degree burns) - 13.2 km. 79,860 dead and 723,810 injured are predicted.

This is what a fallout map would look like if the 100-kiloton bombs were dropped on April 29, 2016.

5-megaton bombs would lead to radiation contamination of the entire European part of Russia and Eastern Europe.

The map of radioactive contamination depends on the direction of the wind on a particular day. Below is a simulation based on real meteorological conditions on April 29, April 30 and May 1, 2016 (100-kiloton bombs).

April 29

April 30

The 1 of May

The US currently has about 1,900 nuclear warheads on active aircraft carriers and ballistic missiles ready to launch within 30 minutes. Thousands more warheads are in reserve and require more time to bring to combat readiness.

With the conduct of hostilities of this magnitude, the onset of a nuclear winter is inevitable with the destruction of most of the flora and fauna on the planet, experts say.

At present, strategic weapons are understood as a system of weapons consisting of three components (triad). Ground grouping(NG) are intercontinental (ICBMs) with nuclear warheads and a firing range of over 5500 km. Maritime grouping(MG) are ballistic missiles of submarines (SLBMs) ​​with nuclear warheads and any firing range. Aviation group(ah) it heavy bombers(TB) with air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) with nuclear warheads and a flight range of over 600 km or with nuclear bombs.

Professor of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Doctor of Technical Sciences, laureate of the USSR State Prize Yury Grigoryev talks about the relationship of these three components and their difference from conventional weapons.

Modern strategic weapons

Exist five fundamental differences between strategic weapons and conventional weapons.

1. Conventional weapons are designed for warfare. Strategic weapons are designed not to conduct, but to prevent nuclear war.

2. The performance characteristics of conventional weapons are a state secret and are carefully hidden from foreign states in order to Peaceful time the potential adversary was unable to take the necessary measures to timely parry these characteristics in the event of a war, and at the beginning of the war they would have been a complete surprise to him.

The tactical and technical characteristics of strategic nuclear weapons, on the contrary, are brought to public attention so that the potential adversary clearly understands what awaits him if he unleashes a nuclear war. The only secret is the technology of manufacturing strategic nuclear weapons.

3. In informational materials about conventional weapons, various kinds of legends are sometimes used, aimed at disorienting a potential enemy in terms of tactical and technical characteristics, strength, locations and other parameters of our conventional weapons. Such disinformation is categorically unacceptable in information materials about strategic weapons, since it can lead to an inadequate reaction of the opposing side, which can result in unpredictable consequences.

4. In peacetime, military experts carefully study possible theaters of military operations, on the basis of which they draw conclusions about the types and types of conventional weapons needed to conduct combat operations in these regions. With regard to strategic weapons, such studies are meaningless, since, in view of the intercontinental firing range, the entire globe is the sphere of possible use of strategic weapons.

5. From the standpoint of conventional wars, politicians and military experts in peacetime predict possible options development of political and economic situations in order to determine the most likely enemy for the near future, assess its military potential and take all necessary measures to strengthen its defense capability in the event of a military clash.

From the standpoint of the concept of nuclear wars, such forecasting is meaningless. In the development of strategic weapons, we must always focus as a standard on the state that has the most powerful nuclear capability, regardless of what relationship we are in with him at this stage. It is currently the United States of America.

This does not mean at all that we constantly regard the United States as an enemy, and, moreover, it does not depend on what the presidents, politicians or experts say or sign. If tomorrow the most powerful strategic weapons are suddenly in the hands of the People's Republic of China or, for example, some South American state, then we will have to immediately reorient ourselves to this new standard.

Ways to use strategic weapons

Exist three ways of possible global use of strategic weapons.

1. First nuclear strike , the purpose of which is the destruction of all strategic weapons of the enemy, in order to exclude, thereby, any possibility of their delivering a retaliatory nuclear strike.

But a major nuclear power that has been attacked will always retain some of its strategic weapons to strike back, after which the aggressor side will find itself in approximately the same position as its victim.

Therefore, only a madman can deliver the first nuclear strike against a state possessing nuclear weapons. But in 1945, US President G. Truman demonstrated to the whole world how to easily and simply deliver a nuclear strike on a non-nuclear state, when he ordered nuclear strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, since he firmly knew that there would be no retaliatory strike from the Japanese side.

Who knows what our fate would have been if the leadership of the USSR had not taken emergency measures to create nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Pentagon had quite a few plans for a nuclear attack on the USSR in those years, but the appearance of strategic weapons in our country prevented a war.

2. Counterstrike , which is produced when a signal is received from the missile attack warning system (SPRN), i.e. during the alleged flight of enemy missiles, but before the moment when the explosions of their nuclear warheads actually began.

At the same time, it is assumed that our missiles will launch and leave the positional areas before the enemy’s warheads approach these areas, and the enemy, who has actually fired at the already empty launch silos, receives almost simultaneously a nuclear strike on his military and industrial facilities.

This is an extremely dangerous concept, since the signals of a nuclear attack from the early warning system can simply be erroneous as a result of technical failures in the system, and the leadership of the country that has been subjected to a nuclear attack has clearly not enough time to make a decision.

So, if the enemy struck ballistic missiles ground-based, it's only about 25 minutes, which will be distributed approximately as follows:

- 5 minutes to trigger the early warning system (EWS);
- 5 minutes for the analysis and assessment by the military of the reliability of the information received from the early warning system and a report to the highest official of the state - the President;
- 10 minutes for consultations of the President with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense;
- 5 minutes for the President to issue a command to conduct a retaliatory strike.

But if the enemy launched a strike with sea-based missiles located not far from our coasts, and if these missiles also fly along flat trajectories, then the flight time will be reduced to 15 minutes, and the President simply will not have time to give any orders to launch a retaliatory strike.

But the most important thing is not in this, but in the fact that the President cannot be one hundred percent sure of the reliability of the information received from the early warning system. Thus, according to the US Center for Defense Information, from 1977 to 1984, US missile attack warning systems generated 20,784 false signals about an attack on the United States.

Most of the false alarms were routine and easily brushed aside, but some of them were serious enough from the American point of view to start prelaunch preparations. According to von Hippel et al. (Scientific American), similar situations occurred in Russia, which was the subject of consideration in the US Congress.

If the information from the early warning system turns out to be false, then the President's order to deliver a retaliatory strike automatically turns into an order to launch the first strike, but not against the mines, as it should be with a normal first strike, but against the cities, since the mines are considered empty .

What happens next does not require much explanation. A state that did not attack us turns into nuclear dust, and the retaliatory strike of all its surviving missiles launched in a retaliatory strike turns us into the same nuclear dust.

Thus, although the technical level of modern strategic weapons, in principle, allows a retaliatory strike, but the concept of such a strike puts the country's top leadership in an extremely difficult position before having to make a decision of an unusually high level of responsibility in the face of an acute shortage of time and possible technical malfunctions in early warning systems or errors operators.

This does not exclude the possibility of an inadequate assessment of the situation by the head of the allegedly attacked state and the adoption by him of a decision leading to a worldwide catastrophe. Therefore, any kind of reasoning about the power of our strategic weapons in a retaliatory strike is meaningless and dangerous.

3. A retaliatory strike on the cities and industrial centers of the aggressor inflicted by ICBMs and SLBMs, preserved after the first nuclear strike by the enemy. At the same time, the decision on retaliatory actions should be made even during the flight of enemy missiles, but the retaliation strike itself should begin only after the first explosion of the enemy warhead, which eliminates the danger of an accidental war due to a false warning.

The technical basis for an effective retaliatory strike is, first of all, the high survivability of strategic weapons, which ensures that the combat capability of such a number of missiles after an enemy attack is sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy.

All efforts should be directed to the technical support of the possibility of implementing a guaranteed powerful retaliatory nuclear strike in any development of the situation, in any way the aggressor attacks. And any aggressor must be firmly aware of this.

Any concealment of our ability to ensure the survival of our strategic missiles under the conditions of a nuclear or any other attack, ostensibly in the interests of preserving state secret, is categorically unacceptable, just as any unsubstantiated advertising of some supernatural capabilities of our missiles is unacceptable.

The enemy must know our capabilities, and they must be preserved. Only this will keep him from ill-conceived decisions. In case the first strike of the enemy destroys or isolates the leaders of the state, who have the right to order a retaliatory strike, or disrupts government communication channels, a backup system was created in the USSR called, which in the Western press is called "dead hand" (" dead hand).

This system makes it possible to guarantee retaliation even in the event that an enemy attack put our leadership out of action before it had time to issue an order for retaliatory action. The "Perimeter" system is designed to automatically and autonomously bring a combat order to launch in retaliation to ground-based missiles, rocket strategic purpose and strategic bombers.

The structure of this system includes highly protected mines with command missiles placed in them, as well as equipment for analyzing the situation. A transmitter is installed in the head part of the command missile, which transmits commands to start during the flight of the head part, and corresponding receiving devices are mounted on the mines of combat missiles, ships and aircraft.

The decision to launch a command rocket and bring the team to the launch to the rockets is made by the Perimeter system independently based on the results of a comprehensive analysis of information coming from numerous sensors. The first launch of a command rocket with the equivalent of a transmitter was successfully carried out on December 26, 1979.

In the course of flight tests, the developed complex algorithms for interfacing all systems involved in the launch were tested, the possibility of providing the rocket with a given flight path for the rocket warhead with transmitters, the operation of all service systems of the warhead in the normal mode, and the correctness of the adopted technical solutions was confirmed.

Flight tests of the command rocket were successfully completed in March 1982. In January 1985, the Perimeter system was put on alert. Thus, each side is trying to have such a structure and level of protection of strategic nuclear forces that, in the event of an enemy nuclear missile attack on its launchers and position areas, such a number of strategic missiles are guaranteed to survive and maintain combat readiness, which is sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor.

Vitality of strategic missile systems

The survivability of missile systems is their ability to maintain their performance characteristics under the influence of the enemy. There are four fundamentally possible directions for ensuring the high survivability of strategic missile systems, which ensure a guaranteed retaliatory strike.

1. Ensure the survivability of stationary silo missile systems by increasing the strength of the launch silo, improvement of the missile damping system, installation of protection against penetrating radiation, electromagnetic radiation and other damaging factors of a nuclear explosion.

But there are objective limits to such improvements. With a ground explosion of a nuclear charge with a capacity of 0.5 megatons, a funnel with a diameter of about 300 meters is formed, so that with the accuracy of firing enemy missiles commensurate with the radius of the funnel, no improvements will help.

2. Deprive the enemy of reliable knowledge of the exact coordinates of targets, which can be done in the following four ways:

- mix launchers with live missiles among a large number false launchers with missile simulators and constantly change the location of real launchers among false ones, but such a scheme cannot be implemented, since the number of launchers and their coordinates are stipulated by the current Treaties

- move mobile launchers along random law in camouflaged zones, for example, underground tunnels, thereby forcing the enemy to consider the entire zone (tunnel) as a target, i.e. forcing him to switch from shooting at points to shooting at areas, but this is a very expensive scheme

- relocate missile systems according to a random law, placing them on mobile, for example, unpaved or railway vehicles. This scheme was implemented in our ground-based mobile (railway and soil) based missile systems.

- constantly move missile systems, placing them, for example, on surface ships or submarines. Placement on surface ships is prohibited by the current Treaties, and placement on submarines is implemented (USA, Russia, France, Great Britain, China)

3. Get away from the impact to a safe distance, i.e. change the location of mobile launchers with missiles after the launch of enemy missiles upon receipt of a signal about this from . In principle, one can imagine a ground-based mobile launcher that, along a good road at high speed, goes to a safe area, but the huge costs of building an extensive network of first-class unpaved or railways, bridges and other engineering structures make this option unrealistic.

It is most advisable to use an aircraft for this purpose, which, together with the missiles placed on it, would be at the airfield in a state of high combat readiness and, a few minutes after receiving a signal from the early warning system, would be able to take off and leave for a remote safe zone, where it would stay for long time, waiting for further developments of the situation.

The main advantage of this option is insensitivity to possible errors of the early warning system, since the launch of missiles from the aircraft is carried out only after additional analysis of the real situation and receipt of the appropriate command, and if the alarm turns out to be false, the aircraft simply returns to the airfield. This significantly reduces the possibility of erroneous actions and makes it possible to transfer the right to make a decision on the take-off of aircraft with missiles to lower authorities.

In the United States, to confirm the possibility of launching ballistic missiles from an aircraft, several full-scale launches were carried out, in which the ballistic missile was removed in a horizontal position from the aircraft by a parachute system and, after the rocket assumed a vertical position, the first stage engine was started, the parachute fired back, and the rocket continued its normal flight .

We also carried out the necessary research, but this direction - the creation of air-to-ground ballistic missiles (ASGM) - did not receive further development, since it was prohibited by the SALT-2 and START-1 treaties. However, at the present time, due to the expiration of these agreements, all paths to the creation of the SKRM are open.

4. Intercept most of the enemy's missiles or their warheads on their flight paths and destroy or deflect them from their intended aiming points, thereby retaining a significant portion of one's own missiles sufficient to deliver an effective retaliatory strike. The interception of strategic missiles and warheads on their flight paths is the task of the missile defense system.

conclusions

1. Strategic stability is ensured not by the numerical equality of strategic weapons, but by the equality of the parties' capabilities to guarantee the infliction of unacceptable damage on the enemy in a retaliatory strike in any development of the conflict.

2. Strategic stability is based on two specific human traits: distrust of another person and fear of retribution. The world has been balancing on these two pillars for decades, maintaining the so-called strategic balance.

3. Only absolute confidence in the inexorable inevitability of one's own death as a result of a retaliatory nuclear strike is guaranteed to keep any aggressor from delivering a first strike and save the world from nuclear madness.

4. Making the main bet on a retaliatory strike is unacceptable, and none of the sane specialists makes such a bet. Otherwise, why then are we building highly protected mines and creating mobile missile systems? With a stake only on a retaliatory strike, missiles could be installed directly in an open field, without any protection.

5. All our efforts should be directed to the creation of strategic weapons that remain combat-ready in the face of a nuclear and non-nuclear attack by the enemy and capable of delivering a guaranteed powerful retaliatory strike in any development of the situation, including when the aggressor has a deployed missile defense system.

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Nuclear missile strike (RN)

Strike missiles with nuclear weapons; form of employment of military formations armed with nuclear missile weapons. According to the number of participating RNU facilities, it can be: single, group, massive. A single RNU is applied by one rocket with a monoblock warhead or a multiple warhead against one or a group of objects (targets). A group RN is applied by several missiles at one or more objects (targets). Massed nuclear weapons are deployed simultaneously or within an extremely short time by a large number of missiles to destroy large groupings of troops, objects of military-economic potential, and other strategic objects of the enemy. By the time of application of the RN, m.b. - anticipatory, counter-reciprocal, reciprocal. A preemptive RN is applied to the enemy before the launch of his nuclear weapons carriers. The retaliatory RNU is applied in response to the launches by the enemy of its nuclear missiles before they approach the targets according to information from the nuclear missile attack warning system. A retaliatory RN is applied to the enemy during or after the end of the impact of his nuclear weapons on the objects of the opposing side. According to the sequence U.R.-I. m.b.: the first (first massed) and subsequent RNs. The first massive RN is inflicted by all or most of the combat-ready nuclear missile weapons to inflict unacceptable (specified) damage to the enemy; the main content of the strategic operation of nuclear forces and combat operations of the Strategic Missile Forces and the Naval Strategic Nuclear Forces. The subsequent RN is applied by reserve and restored missiles for reliable destruction of previously planned and newly identified enemy targets.

According to the purpose, RNU can be point and area. A pinpoint RNU is applied to destroy a small-sized object that has a high degree of protection from the damaging effects of a nuclear explosion. Areal RN is applied to destroy a set of weakly protected objects located at a considerable distance from each other, as well as mobile objects, the location of which is unknown at the time of the strike.

In terms of its content, the RNU covers the actions of the troops in the direct preparation and conduct of combat missile launches, the spatio-temporal formation of nuclear missile weapons on flight paths, the detonation nuclear charges warheads (see. Nuclear explosion) and the direct impact of damaging factors on enemy targets. the actions of the troops in the direct preparation and conduct of combat launches of missiles are carried out with the receipt of funds combat control appropriate orders (signals). Given the state importance of the tasks being solved, the Strategic Missile Forces and the strategic nuclear forces as a whole have taken special measures to ensure guaranteed delivery of orders (signals) to the troops, as well as guaranteed protection against unauthorized actions with nuclear missile weapons. The spatio-temporal construction of the strategic nuclear forces on flight trajectories is carried out taking into account the provision of high reliability of overcoming the enemy's missile defense system. The detonation of AP nuclear charges is carried out at specified points of the flight trajectory, taking into account the prevention of their mutual destruction and ensuring that the required level of damage is inflicted on enemy objects.

The high readiness of the Strategic Missile Forces for RNU is ensured by the correct organization of the quality of management of a group of stationary and mobile missile systems, and high combat training of personnel. Stationary-based missile systems have high combat readiness, a degree of protection and are intended mainly for delivering a retaliatory strike. Formations armed with mobile-based missile systems have high survivability, which makes it possible to ensure their high efficiency in a retaliatory strike.

The effectiveness of a nuclear missile strike is determined by the quality and method of using combat and support systems used in a strategic operation of nuclear forces under specific conditions. The result of RN is usually assessed by a characteristic of the damage delivered to the enemy in a strategic operation of nuclear forces.

The study of the effectiveness of RN is carried out using models. The model of a nuclear missile strike is a simplified representation (description) of the conditions for delivering a strike and its results. It is used for planning and evaluating the effectiveness of the impact of the Strategic Missile Forces on enemy targets. The RN model can be verbal and mathematical. The verbal model is a description in natural language of the conditions for striking. The mathematical model establishes the dependence of strike efficiency indicators on the quantity and quality of weapons (warhead power, accuracy, reliability, security, etc.) and the conditions for its combat use (combat use plan, characteristics of targets and enemy actions).

More detailed description For methods of RN modeling, see the article Modeling in military affairs.

The planning of the RN of the main grouping of the Strategic Missile Forces is carried out in advance, in peacetime directly by the General Staff of the Armed Forces with the appointment of a target and type of explosion for each warhead. Further, the calculation of flight tasks is carried out and, according to the relevant orders, they are entered into the automation systems of missiles and warheads. The planning of the RN of a reserve grouping can be carried out in the course of hostilities.

Taking into account the complexity, significant labor intensity and special significance of the task of planning a nuclear facility, highly qualified military specialists are involved in its solution, who are fluent in modern computer equipment and special software. Based on the results of the planning of the RN, appropriate plans for the combat use of groupings are being developed. missile troops(forces), which are approved by the highest state and military officials of the state. Only the Supreme Commander-in-Chief - the President of the country has the right to make a decision to put these plans into effect.

MOSCOW, May 3. /TASS/. The United States, due to its missile defense system, is capable of inflicting a surprise nuclear strike on Russia, said at the VI Moscow Conference on international security Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, Lieutenant-General Viktor Poznikhir. Why the blow can become sudden for the Russian Federation told TASS Chief Editor magazine "Arsenal of the Fatherland" Viktor Murakhovsky.

Poznikhir said in his report that "the presence of American missile defense bases in Europe, missile defense ships in the waters of the seas and oceans close to Russian territory creates a powerful hidden strike component for a possible surprise nuclear missile strike on the Russian Federation."

We may not see

As Murakhovsky explained, surprise can be ensured by the fact that the United States precision weapons destroy the ground component of the Russian missile attack warning system. This system is supposed to detect launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles during a nuclear strike.

"Cruise missiles, which can be mounted at missile defense facilities in Romania and Poland, as well as placed on ships, will have a conventional part. They will strike, for example, at Russian missile attack warning facilities, and they will also strike at strategic nuclear forces on the territory of the European part of Russia, in terms of their combat control systems, in places of deployment. Behind this first non-nuclear strike, which will both "blind" us and significantly reduce the response potential, a massive nuclear strike is possible from the territory of the United States in order to disarm Russia, "- said the expert.

Impact potential cruise missiles The United States in Europe and on ships is precisely "hidden," Murakhovsky added, since it is impossible to determine which missile is currently in the US missile defense installation.

"We are talking about universal launchers Mk-41. In addition to anti-missiles, they can also be equipped with cruise missiles of the Tomahawk type. The Russian General Staff will not know what exactly is there," the specialist noted.

A thousand Tomahawks

Poznikhir also noted that more than a thousand Tomahawk cruise missiles could potentially be deployed on US missile defense ships, and patrols of missile defense ships in the waters of Chernoy and Baltic Seas poses a threat to facilities in the European part of Russia.

In early April, the United States once again showed cruise missiles in action. US destroyers fired 59 missiles at the Shayrat air base in Syria. As a result, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense, six Syrian aircraft were destroyed, and the runway of the base remained intact.

According to Murakhovsky, this attack is "not the most smart move With military point sight", since such missiles should "work" on more important targets. They are needed to break through air defense, disrupt command and control and communications of troops, and disrupt the combat capability of the enemy's armed forces.

"Such long-range cruise missiles operate on command posts, communication centers, radars of missile attack warning systems, key infrastructure facilities, the destruction of which makes it possible to disable the country's transport system (for example, bridges across wide water barriers, railway junctions). Also, targets for cruise missiles are nuclear and conventional power plants that provide energy to large objects of the military and civil industry, ground-based space communications and control of space constellations. Also, these are the headquarters of the armed forces, operational and operational-strategic levels," the expert said.

"When used as intended, a thousand missiles (Tomahawk" - TASS note) are a serious threat to Russia, Murakhovsky said.

The specialist noted that the use of "Tomahawks" in Afghanistan and Syria is more a way to work out the technology and train US troops. "The use of such weapons against Iraq in 2003 is more typical. There, the main targets were just more important targets than aircraft shelters, and they were included in the list I have given. In Iraq, using about 700 missiles, the Americans practically eliminated the air defense system and destroyed the country's unified communications and power supply system. The Iraqi army lost communications and air defense systems, and then was subjected to conventional air strikes," Murakhovsky said.

What will the Pentagon create by 2020

According to the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, the Pentagon has begun to create promising strike complexes instant global impact. The arrival of the first such complexes in the Armed Forces is planned for 2020.

We are talking about hypersonic percussion devices, Murakhovsky noted. “We are talking about the device that the Americans are testing, it has already gone into near space. This hypersonic strike vehicle is accelerated by an ordinary carrier in the atmosphere, and then in the high layers of the atmosphere and at the border with space, this device is capable of traveling long distances in hypersound. Air defense such products are not intercepted," the expert said.

He pointed out that to intercept such devices, an anti-missile with comparable energy is required, it must at least develop the same speed.

"The existing anti-missiles for the destruction of ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missile - approx. TASS), which fall without maneuvering ballistics, turn out to be huge. You can look at the missiles of the American GBI system deployed in Alaska - their mass is about 13 tons, and their length is more than 12 meters "And the hypersonic vehicle, which is being developed, can also maneuver both in height and in direction, it does not fly along a ballistic trajectory. Even higher energy is required on the means of interception to stop it," Murakhovsky said, noting that such means of interception are not known to him.

What can Russia oppose

Poznikhir in a report at the VI Moscow international conference on security did not touch on the topic of countering the US missile defense system.

He only noted that "Russia is forced to take adequate retaliatory measures aimed at preventing the violation of the existing balance of forces in the field of strategic weapons and minimizing possible damage to the state's security as a result of further building up US missile defense capabilities."

Murakhovsky noted that "military experts know that the United States will target such objects (ABM systems - TASS note) as conventional means Russia, and possibly nuclear."

"For example, these facilities are within the reach of Russian sea-based cruise missiles, which are deployed on ships. And within the reach of operational-tactical missile systems of the Iskander-M type,” the expert said.

Mexico0 23-08-2013 02:52

Kind everyone..

In the ward, we often discuss how to fight off sadomite aliens, whether an asteroid will fly past when global cooling / warming comes, we tell our dreams about a nuclear war, but we don’t always imagine what can be said at all nearby, there is a danger no less terrible, no less global , more real for all of us as residents of one country, one state, one people.

We read about nuclear wars in science fiction books, but how often do we imagine numbers, scales, data even remotely close to reality?

In this topic, I will show you a small part of one document, namely, some calculations and plans, calculations made not in years cold war, and more recently.
Which of our cities are possibly planning / planning to strike, at what time, what losses and based on what they calculate.
I think it will be interesting, especially given the latest events in the world.

My translation, do not throw stones, translated as far as time, patience and strength allowed.

Immediately a huge request to all those living in the cities that have been mentioned and not mentioned in this document, not to write, not to argue, not to discuss, not to spread about how, where, when, what production, civil defense, utilities, various objects, social AND ECONOMIC, CRIMINOGENIC LEVEL ARE, IN WHAT STATE AND OTHER OTHER EVEN SEEMS TO YOU HAVE NO VALUE, VALUE? THINGS AND DETAILS.

ALL THIS CAN BE USEFUL TO OUR POTENTIAL "FRIENDS".

US ATTACK ON RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR FORCES.

Calculation of an attack scenario on Russia using land-based and sea-based strategic missiles to deliver from 1124 to 1289 warheads with a capacity of 294.9 and 320.6 megatons,
depending on the time of year, shows that the use of 1289 warheads will result in a number of casualties from 11 to 17 million people, including 8 to 12 million dead.

As of mid-2001, Russia has 360 operational ICBM bunkers and 52 interconnected command and control bunkers distributed across six zones: Kozelsk, Tatishchevo, Uzhur, Dombarovskiy, Kartalay, and Aleysk.
These zones line up in a 3700 km arc from the west of Moscow to the east of Siberia.
We, Russia, will have to dismantle many of these bunkers according to agreements within the framework of START.

Figure number and comments go BELOW the picture.

Figure 4.1
360 active (red) and 711 dismantled (blue) missile silos in Russia and the former Soviet Union. Some were in Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

US military analysts have calculated that to seriously damage a Russian bunker, an overpressure explosion of 10,000 to 25,000 pounds per square inch may not be enough.

The fortress of Russian bunkers has a significant impact on the planning of the war by American nuclear forces.

While ground explosions provide a higher chance of destroying bunkers, they also have a wider impact. Achieving a significant probability of destroying a bunker requires at least one MX warhead, or one W88, in the bunker, especially for SS-11/19 III-G type MOD mines. To increase the likelihood of serious damage, two of these warheads per bunker are required.

Figure 4.3 Double hit of W87 and W88 warheads on the Russian SS-18 and SS-11/19 mine depending on the height of the explosion.

Figure 4.4
A strike on all of our active ICBM launchers. This takes into account the calculation of winds typical for June. Radiation doses are given for the first two days after an attack on an unprotected population.
Total losses of 16 million fatalities.
More than 175,000 square kilometers will be contaminated with radioactive fallout to such an extent that the probability of death of the unprotected population is 50%

Figure 4.7
Monthly dynamics of losses upon impact on our ICBM bunkers. Wind speed and direction are taken into account.

W87 warheads for each of the ten SS-24 and 20 SS-27 silos (also assuming they are type III-G MOD), and a combination of W87 and W88 (Trident II) warheads for 180SS-18 silos (assuming they apply to type III-F).
US strikes on Russian mines use 500 W87 warheads (all available) and 220 W88 warheads (with a total yield of 250,000 kilotons).

They calculated that 93% of the SS-19, SS-24 and SS-27 mines would be severely damaged (167 out of 180 mines) and 94% of the SS-18 mines (169 out of 180 mines) would also be severely damaged.
Only 24 mines will not be seriously damaged.
The attack uses 500 W87 warheads, equivalent to all MM III missiles, converting to W87 monoblock missiles, with improved accuracy to 91 meters.
The attack also uses about half of the available W88 warheads - slightly more than the maximum number of warheads that can be deployed on board a single Trident.

Figure 4.8
Monthly dynamics of losses upon impact on our ICBM mines. Achievement of the targets of 80% of warheads and shelters in the form of typical residential buildings is taken into account. Wind speed and direction are also taken into account.

Figure 4.9
Victims as a result of a combination of strikes on cities:
Aleysk - 28.5 megatons; Dombarovskiy-31.2 megatons; Kartaly - 26.6 tons; Kozelsk-36 tons; Tatishchevo - 72 megatons, Uzhur - 49.4 megatons.

Figure 4.11
Kozelsk. Calculated for the month of June. The estimated dose is given for the unprotected population. Total loss of 16,100,000 people, 13,300,000 of which were fatal.

Mine strikes pose a far greater threat to Russian civilians and the environment than attacks on the other seven categories of targets that make up nuclear forces Russia.

Figure 4.4 shows the results of MAO-NF strikes on all active Russian mines, assuming the most likely winds in June and a 50 percent shot split for all weapons.
The fallout has spread over 175,000 square kilometers and threatens some 20 million Russian civilians.

Recall that the purpose of the attack is to destroy 360 Russian missile silos.
Our conclusions about losses from radioactive fallout depend on weather conditions, shelter of the population, and division of warheads.
To evaluate these changes, we calculated 288 possible attack scenarios:
For twelve months of the year, 83 weather conditions, 94 types of shelter. 288 calculations for each of 360 mines.

The number of victims from radioactive fallout ranges from 4.1 million to 22.5 million.[
people in the absence of shelter, and from 1.3 to 15.1 million if all
affected people could remain inside residential or high-rise structures for at least two
days after the attack (see Figure 4.5).

Calculations using the assumption that there is no shelter illustrate the total number of civilians at risk.
Assuming no shelters, the death toll from radioactive fallout ranges from 3.2 million to 17.6 million.
If all victims can remain inside residential or high-rise structures for at least two days after the attack, then the death toll drops to between 0.8 million and 3.8 million (see Figure 4.6).

A large difference in the number of victims at a given level in the shelter depends primarily on the monthly change in wind direction and speed.

Figure 4.7 shows this change in losses per month under conditions of a 50 percent split rather than sheltering the population, and fig. Figure 4.8 shows this loss change per month assuming a split between 80 percent and residential shelters.
We find the maximum number of victims in the month of June (see figures 4.7 and 4.8).

This month, fallout winds blow from the Kozelsk zone directly towards Moscow.

Figure 4.8. The death toll in June is not much higher than for other months, as the assumption of a residential shelter limits the deadly area to just outside of Moscow.
The numbers 4.9 and 4.10 show how the number of casualties and casualties depends on the specific area of ​​the missile attack.

While significant seasonal fluctuations exist, an attack on two zones in the European part of Russia (Kozelsk and Tatishchevo) will lead to more victims, orders of magnitude greater than the blow to Siberia, due to the larger number and population density.
Figures 4.11 and 4.12 show close-ups of the consequences of attacks on the Kozelskaya zone near Moscow and the Tatishchevo zone, as well as missiles on the Volga.

Figure 4.13 provides a close-up of the aftermath of a model attack on Siberia, showing the infestation of large areas of Kazakhstan.

Figure 4.12.
Tatishchevo. Calculated for December. Doses are calculated for the population sheltered in multi-storey buildings. For these inputs, the total loss is 450,000, including 270,000 fatalities.

Figure 4.13
Kazakhstan. Attack on missile silos in Dombarovskiy and Kartaly. This calculation takes into account winds for February. The dose is calculated for the unprotected population. For these input parameters, the total casualties are 977,000, including 745,000 dead.
Population density, shown in grey, overlaid on Fallout models.
60,000 square kilometers of northern Kazakhstan will be contaminated with radioactive fallout to such a level that half of the unprotected people will die.

Quantitative estimates of damage and casualties depend on weather conditions and our assumptions regarding the shelter of the population and the division of US warhead shares.
To assess these weather conditions and uncertainty, we conducted 288 calculations for each of the SS-25 bases and garrisons.
The number of victims depends on the proximity of the targets to major cities. To illustrate the changes, we compare attacks using W76 warheads on the Nizhny Tagil SS-25 Teikovo base.

Figure 4.20 shows the impact of twelve ground strikes against the SS-25 base in Nizhny Tagil.

As shown in Figure 4.21, a W76 attack on an SS-25 base/garrison at Teikovo would result in lethal conditions in the city of Ivanovo (1,989,481,000 population).

Figure 4.20


dividing the shares of 80 percent.

Figure 4.21
Twelve Warhead attacks on Teikovo SS-25 garrisons and bases.
In the month of December, assuming the insecurity of the population and the warhead division of the proportion of 80 percent.
The total number of victims is 804,000 people, of which 613,000 are fatal.

Figures 4.22 and 4.23 show the range of casualties and casualties due to seasonal changes in wind speed and direction depending on population shelter and fractionation warhead for an attack of 100 W76 warheads on 50 SS-25 targets.

The figures show that the extent of total casualties or deaths depends more on the shelter of the population than on the proportion of warhead fission. The total number of casualties is between 344,000 and 2 million if shelter is not available, and between 142,000 and 757,000 if all affected individuals can remain inside residential or high-rise structures for at least two days after impact.

If shelter is not included in the calculation, the fallout death toll ranges from 244,000 to just over one million.
If all affected people could remain inside residential or high-rise structures for at least two days after the attack, then the death toll drops to between 105,000 and 527,000.

Figure 4.24 shows how the monthly change in winds affects the number of victims.

Figure 4.25 shows the maximum losses for individual bases/garrisons for four cover values.
For most SS-25 bases / garrisons, in particular Irkutsk and Novosibirsk, by sheltering the population in the residential sector during the first two days after the attack, the estimated number of victims from the consequences will be drastically reduced.

Figure 4.22
Summary of data on the victims of the attack on the SS-25 garrisons. Losses are plotted taking into account population shelter, fission warhead, seasonal fluctuations, most likely wind speeds and direction.

What, without going into the philosophical and political flood, ordinary Prepper, comrade Ganzovets, can draw useful, practical conclusions from this topic?

1. The month most likely for a nuclear strike and dangerous in terms of consequences for the MSC and the nearest regions is JUNE.

3. The number of warheads that, in the event of nuclear weapons, will have to fall on Kozelsk and its environs - it will be much more than what will fall on Moscow and its environs. Just because there are dozens of mines, and you can only hit them with a direct hit. And most importantly, the explosions will be GROUND, so they will be accompanied by the release of a huge amount of radioactive soil into the atmosphere.

Moreover, you won’t have to guess “whether it will fly in or not” - in the event of any war with the USA, it will fly there GUARANTEED, because the pendos also want to live, and for this they need to take out all our missiles with a guarantee. Well, how many can fly to Moscow and its environs? At best, a dozen warheads, most of them airborne. And more than a hundred will fly to Kozelsk, and all of them will be land-based.

That is, if you estimate the amount of radioactive rubbish in the atmosphere, which will later fall out in the form of radioactive fallout (the notorious fallout) - one attack on Kozelsk will give MUCH more than all the other explosions in the region (including what could hypothetically fall on Moscow in the worst scenario) .

4. When choosing a drape / shelter / jokerville route, you should try to be as far away from Kozelsk as possible and in general Kaluga region. For there, in the case of JV, it will bake well, very unchildishly.

5. When evacuating in the event of a nuclear explosion, you need to monitor the wind, watch where it will carry radioactive fallout and choose the route accordingly. So: in the calculations it will be necessary to take into account not only and not so much the nearest mushrooms as Kozelsk. And if you already find yourself on the leeward side of Kozelsk, then you need to dump to the side even if there is no danger in the immediate vicinity. And the sooner the better.

To be continued..

P.S. Thanks to BAU member.
The document has an important continuation, where at the end the authors call for a reduction in the number of warheads, an end to the development of missile defense systems, the declassification of nuclear strike plans, the deactivation of flight missions in carriers, and other pacifist appeals to the Pentagon.

RECOMMENDATIONS
Fortunately there are better options. We recommend the following.
1. Unilaterally reduce U.S. nuclear forces and challenge the Russians to do the same.
As a first step, we should unilaterally reduce the U.S. strategic arsenal to a few
hundred survivable nuclear warheads, and challenge the Russians to do the same.
The United States would still have a more than adequate nuclear deterrent while we
waited for Russia to act. Regardless of our actual targeting policy, under their worstcase planning assumptions, our friends in Russia would know that our weapons
hold millions of people at risk.
2. Clarify the U.S. relationship with Russia and reconcile declaratory and employment
policy. We also recommend a step that derives directly from our findings in this
report. We stress the fact that the act of targeting an individual, a group, or a
nation defines it as an enemy. It is this first step that we must reverse. We do not
target friends or allies-Canada, Britain, Italy, for example-but we do target
Russia, China, and several others. The United States still seems to be confused
about our relationship to Russia. In his speech at the National Defense University,
President Bush said, "Today's Russia is not our enemy." But our actions with
regard to nuclear war planning project the exact opposite implication and assumption. If our words and our actions are to correspond, then it is obvious that changes
must take place in the way the United States postures its forces and plans for their
use. Having a permanent war plan in place that demands widespread target
coverage with thousands of weapons on high-alert is a recipe for unceasing arms
requirements by the Pentagon and a continuing competition with Russia. It is
for this reason that we conclude that the overambitious war plan is the key source
of the problem.
3. Abandon much of the secrecy that surrounds the SIOP and reform the process. A
corollary problem with the war plan is the high level of secrecy that surrounds it.
Because the guidance and the SIOP are so closely guarded, no one can question the
assumptions or logic. The fact that USSTRATCOM has responsibility for drawing

Taraz999 23-08-2013 08:10

broke my head over this card
I absolutely don’t understand why Nizhnevartovsk and Yakutsk are on it

tigershark 23-08-2013 08:30

For that matter, the most likely time of impact is winter.

Botany Bay 23-08-2013 08:31

Komrad, what year is the report? According to START-3, that we, that ams, should have no more than 1.5K warheads per database.
Not long ago, infa slipped through, about the minimum number of targets and which ones in the Russian Federation need to be covered in order to cause irreparable damage to it. Obamka ordered such a study to his experts. There are only 50 goals in the answer (though without goals for nuclear triad and country leaders). Indirect confirmation of this is also the fact that the Obama administration wants an even larger reduction in nuclear weapons. To have less than a thousand charges on each side.
In total, as an option, it seems to me that now the concepts have changed a lot. No one is going to harass the population under the root bombardment of nuclear weapons. It will die out on its own from starvation, disease and radiation.
That's why I would dance. Those. if a loaf has not flown into your city, this does not mean that you are lucky. On the contrary, all the fun is just beginning.

Pivnic 23-08-2013 08:42

Nuclear war is too cool, scary, expensive and environmentally unsafe) Enough of the price tag of 8 ye for oil.

Botany Bay 23-08-2013 08:42

quote: Originally posted by tigershark:
Discovered America. This plan is over 10 years old. At the moment it is irrelevant, because. U.S. war doctrine has changed and revised several times. That's why it's made available to the public.
For that matter, the most likely time of impact is winter.

Autumn.
The fallout and the fuel problem won't allow the harvest... and then winter will come. Without heat, fuel, clean water and food.

Botany Bay 23-08-2013 08:44

quote: Originally posted by Pivnic:
Nuclear war is too cool, scary, expensive and environmentally unsafe) Enough of the price tag of 8 ye for oil.

You first lower it to such a level all over the world and don’t die yourself at the same time ...

Lovecraft 23-08-2013 09:00

US ATTACK ON RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR FORCES

What for? Bring in UN troops and appoint a new administration. Putin to The Hague.

Renegad 23-08-2013 09:09

Don't be ridiculous... UN troops... we'll shower them with hats, hats.
And what will he do there, in this Hague? Maybe it's better in Gaga? In defiance of Kabaeva?

sauer 23-08-2013 09:26

quote: Originally posted by Taraz999:
broke my head over this card
I absolutely don’t understand why Nizhnevartovsk and Yakutsk are on it

Most likely due to the fact that in those days the troops of the Strategic Missile Forces howled inside and near the city.

The settlement of Vladimirovka, military unit 29408, is the Vega complex (trajectory measurement station), which was part of the Plesetsk cosmodrome, as a measuring point IP-9. Disbanded November 1, 1997.
People often call this unit - military unit 16519. In fact, military unit 16519 is OKIK-17 "Hercules", which is on the DSC.
The confusion occurred because at the military points above Vladimirovka (where, in addition to the military unit itself, there were points: towers and "green platforms") there were and in some places remained iron sheets with a list of cities: Sverdlovsk (this city was definitely written). .. Yakutsk ... and the designation of military unit 16519. Apparently, "Vega" was subordinate to "Hercules"? But again, confusion. The system of trajectory measurement stations, which included the Vega complex, included the following six cities: Yakutsk, Vorkuta, Severodvinsk, Norilsk, Baikonur, Kapustin Yar. Sverdlovsk is not. Maybe they confused the adversary with those iron sheets? However, "Vega" was subordinate to "Hercules".
In the winter of 1993, there was a major fire on our Vega at a technical position in the central control building. They flooded the fire with a huge amount of water - a huge ice hill was formed. Part of the equipment that had not yet burned down was damaged. The complex collapsed. But by inertia, it lasted another four years.
A signalman who served in YARVK swore that the Vega had definitely had anti-aircraft missiles.

Now everything is abandoned, everything is taken out and the mines are filled up.

Taraz999 23-08-2013 09:28

quote: Most likely due to the fact that in those days

Yes, I already understood that the card is at least 15 years old

dima745511 23-08-2013 10:45

Non-nuclear - much more likely.

However, it is foolish to completely discount the nuclear threat. As long as the potential adversary has nuclear missiles, the probability of a strike on our territory remains. And there are plans for such strikes, including modern and owls. secret.

Vovchik MD 23-08-2013 11:02

As long as the potential adversary has nuclear missiles, the probability of a strike on our territory remains. And there are plans for such strikes, including modern and owls. secret.

The use of nuclear weapons may well be implemented if the "controlled war" becomes uncontrollable. And, as you know, everything that can go wrong will go wrong.

Nespjashiy 23-08-2013 11:04

quote: Originally posted by dima745511:

A nuclear strike is unlikely, especially on such a large scale.

Vovan Lawer 23-08-2013 11:11

Better think about why they rebuilt part of their strategic nuclear boats, which were created under ICBMs, under Tomahawks. The war of the future in their understanding is a massive launch of missiles without nuclear warheads, or with low-yield warheads. No one will turn the territory of Russia into an uninhabitable desert. Do not rely on air defense, the entire North is open. That is why they want to bring the old MIG-31s ​​back to life, but how many of them are left?

Paraglider 23-08-2013 11:18

quote: Originally posted by Mexico0:

The garrisons and bases of Nizhny Tagil (1989 439,500 population) are located only 22 km from the nearest SS-25 garrison, several small towns lie in the path of the downfall, and the computer casualty model for the unprotected population (and assuming a fractional division of 50 percent) ranges from 47,000 to 171,000 dead, between 45,000 and 113,000 depending on the month.
If, in the unlikely event that fallout goes to Nizhny Tagil, the death toll would be four to six times higher.

nothing in this text bothers you?

ah few casualties? Then here are the other numbers:

quote: Originally posted by Mexico0:

Twelve Warhead attacks on Nizhny Tagil SS-25 garrisons and bases
For the month of November, assuming an unprotected population and warheads
dividing the shares of 80 percent.
The total number of victims is planned to be 162,000,
132,000 of which were fatal.

IMHO it was all written by ordinary non-professional journalists to order. It is not difficult to guess who the customer might be.
In general, you just need to follow the recommendations of the Ministry of Emergency Situations in this case. Here they are interesting to read. where, where and how to evacuate.

Malakhov 23-08-2013 11:25

http://lurkmore.to/Third_world_war

Nespjashiy 23-08-2013 11:35

quote: Originally posted by Malakhov:

Bunker from a sea container. Stayed 2 weeks. Odel OZK took the PM and hit the road ...

Come on - if you really dream, then do not deny yourself anything: three-level underground bunker deep location on shock-absorbing supports with multi-layer anti-nuclear protection and an autonomous life support system. In a month or two it will be possible to leave without OZK.

dima745511 23-08-2013 11:38

quote: Originally posted by Vovchik MD:

"If in the first act there is a gun hanging on the wall, then in the last it will go off"
The use of nuclear weapons may well be implemented if the "controlled war" becomes uncontrollable. And, as you know, everything that can go wrong will go wrong.

Most likely, you are right: they consider nuclear weapons as "reserve", in case of failure in a "conventional" war. And as for "not so" ... Somehow I doubt that this "not so" will be large-scale. As practice shows, even Russian army capable of conducting operations without large jambs (the Georgian war is an example of this) ....

dima745511 23-08-2013 11:43

quote: Originally posted by Vovan-Lawer:
Better think about why they rebuilt part of their strategic nuclear boats, which were created under ICBMs, under Tomahawks. The war of the future in their understanding is a massive launch of missiles without nuclear warheads, or with low-yield warheads. No one will turn the territory of Russia into an uninhabitable desert. Do not rely on air defense, the entire North is open. That is why they want to bring the old MIG-31s ​​back to life, but how many of them are left?

Nespjashiy 23-08-2013 12:02

quote: Originally posted by dima745511:

They want to place them at a completely unusable island airfield in order to allegedly cover the North, and even without AWACS aircraft, without air defense, without a marine garrison ... Like a pimple out of the blue. I’m already silent about the living conditions there for the flight technical staff ...

Where are the firewood from? I have other information.

Why so loudly hysteria and mislead others?

http://www.izvestia29.ru/economy/2013/02/04/3441.html
The Ministry of Defense abandoned the idea of ​​​​permanently basing an air group of long-range MiG-31 interceptor fighters on Novaya Zemlya.

High-ranking source in the main command Air force told Izvestia that the proposal to Sergei Shoigu was prepared at the end of last year and has now been approved by the minister.

The proposal was made after a comprehensive analysis by our specialists, - the source emphasized.

According to him, the former leadership of the Ministry of Defense decided to transfer the air group to the Novaya Zemlya airfield Rogachevo last fall as part of the development of a general concept for the defense of the Arctic.

http://lenta.ru/news/2013/04/04/mig31
For air defense industrial facilities of the Novosibirsk region, the crews of a new air group of MiG-31BM fighter-interceptors took up combat duty. It is reported by RIA Novosti with reference to the press service of the Ministry of Defense.

"The deployment of additional duty forces and means is associated with the strengthening of the aviation group responsible for the security of the airspace of Siberia," the Defense Ministry said in a statement.

Where the MiG-31BM will be based is not specified. In all probability, we are talking about the Kansk airfield in the Krasnoyarsk Territory, which is subordinate to the 2nd Air Force and Air Defense Command. In December 2012, six modernized MiG-31BM fighter-interceptors arrived at the airfield.

dima745511 23-08-2013 12:13

quote: - The offer was made after a comprehensive analysis by our specialists, - the interlocutor emphasized.

Nespjashiy 23-08-2013 12:21

quote: Originally posted by dima745511:

Yes, to understand the absurdity of deploying these aircraft on Rogachevo, you need to be a major specialist ... I already began to be proud of myself

dima745511 23-08-2013 12:27

In comparison with those goofballs that just recently ruled the Ministry of Defense - any SA reserve sergeant is a specialist

And what, were they shot or sent to logging? Maybe without pensions, at least they were fired?

diamond_d 23-08-2013 12:29

quote: Originally posted by Nespjashiy:

quote:
Originally posted by dima745511:

A nuclear strike is unlikely, especially on such a large scale.

Of course, because the Pindos have long pissed away their nuclear weapons, removed the nuclear stuffing from the warheads and let it into nuclear fuel for reactors. And the rest of the world continues to be misled by their "large nuclear arsenal." However, amers are no strangers to lies, an example of this is SDI and the "gold reserve" of the Nazi states of America.

a799da 23-08-2013 12:38

MiG-31 is an AWACS aircraft and an interceptor in one bottle, just don’t mention the nonsense of Khramchikhin and Ivashov about 100500.

Boatman61 23-08-2013 12:43

quote: Originally posted by Nespjashiy:

In comparison with those goofballs that just recently ruled the Ministry of Defense - any SA reserve sergeant is a specialist

Strongly said.

Nespjashiy 23-08-2013 12:43

quote: Originally posted by diamond_d:

Throw a link on this issue comrade. Something I have not heard that they pissed away all their nuclear weapons.

FSE slander like the Kushkins, but am I, Aivazovsky, am I not allowed?

If without jokes, there was an article on the Eye of the Planets, will I find it, the question is ...
It was said there that the real number of nuclear weapons carriers with nuclear warheads on combat duty was greatly exaggerated. As well as the number of nuclear charges in storage is exaggerated. Let's just say that there are big and justified doubts. It's just that the Americans are great deceivers, they fool the whole world not only with the dollar. Once forcing the world to think that they are a great nuclear power - in the absence of the USSR, who will climb to check?

tonyweiss 23-08-2013 13:11

I wonder if they fall into one of the "seven categories of goals" mentioned by the authors of the map.

dima745511 23-08-2013 13:21

quote: Originally posted by tonyweiss:
When I was in the military, I met with colleagues from the railway troops (I don’t know if such troops still exist or not) who talked about trains with ballistic missiles disguised as a freight train.
I wonder if they fall into one of the "seven categories of goals" mentioned by the authors of the map.

No, BZHRK (http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%...%EF%EB%E5%EA%F1) is no more. Therefore, they cannot be mentioned as targets.

Mexico0 23-08-2013 13:22

Relate.

------------------
Sincerely, Yaroslav. autokanal.com

dima745511 23-08-2013 13:27

Ah, well, yes ... These plans are up to 2005 ...

Strannik888 23-08-2013 14:36

It is unlikely that the United States will start such a campaign against Russia. It is impractical, it is time for them to bomb the countries of the Middle East.

dima745511 23-08-2013 15:16

quote: Originally posted by Strannik888:
It is unlikely that the United States will start such a campaign against Russia. It is impractical, it is time for them to bomb the countries of the Middle East.

Everything has its time...

plombir 23-08-2013 15:51

quote: Originally posted by dima745511:

I completely agree! It's not even a "bell", it's Christmas trees, sticks, just some kind of bell! How deaf do you have to be to not hear such an alarm?!

With those moments, by the way, they are also in the spirit of the times ... They want to place them at a completely unusable island airfield in order to allegedly cover the North, and even without AWACS aircraft, without air defense, without a marine garrison ... Like a pimple out of the blue. I’m already silent about the living conditions there for the flight technical staff ...

Well, still dima745511 would not "agree" with Vovan-Laer

As for "they place it in the wrong place and not enough" - be sure to write to Sportloto! "Like a pimple out of the blue!" - write like that, they will understand there, there are also THE SAME strategists ...

It's good that you bring up the right topic. In general, it is true (especially since I wrote some of it myself), but there are a couple of clarifying points.

quote: 1. The month most likely for a nuclear strike and dangerous in terms of consequences for MSCs and nearby regions is JUNE.

2. For at least two days after the impact, you must be in shelter.

1. June is the most severe month in terms of consequences, but not the most probable. The date of the start of the war (if it happens) will be determined by the political situation and only by it. At the same time, the situation can develop very rapidly, canceling out any preliminary plans and dictating "inevitable" decisions to politicians (as in 1914, google "August guns"). The time of year, and even more so the nuances of radioactive contamination in this scenario will not play any role.

Accordingly, there is no need to write about June, it’s more correct not to relax throughout the year and keep your nose to the wind.

2. ERROR! Under than such, that can cost many lives. Why?
Yes, because there is a problem of Kozelsk and the warheads aimed there. The cloud from there will not reach Moscow in 3 hours, but when it gets there, it will fry everything very thoroughly.

Accordingly, the first days can and should be used to get the radioactive cloud out of the way as far as possible. If there is a relatively small local infection (one or two strikes in Moscow and / or Moscow region), it may turn out that it is better to neglect receiving some dose and evacuate than to wait for Kozelsky precipitation.

In any case, there is no "universal" solution. Specific Solution should be taken on the basis of an analysis of a number of factors: the wind rose, the distance from the epicenter of local explosions, measurements of the "background", etc. And only this way. Stupidly following a pattern can be fatal.

I propose to fix it.