Precision-guided weapons (HTO) are an improved type of conventional weapons, which include fire and strike weapons that use guided and homing munitions and missiles capable of hitting targets with a probability of at least 0.5 from the first shot (launch). High-precision weapons are combined with automated reconnaissance and control systems into reconnaissance-strike (fire) complexes.

The main method of radar camouflage of troops (objects) from WTO reconnaissance means is the use of fields (zones) of radar invisibility formed by natural masks: hills, beams, ravines, forests, tree plantations, high bushes, reeds, urban-type buildings and other objects.

To hide moving equipment, the routes of movement must be chosen within the fields (zones) of invisibility. The movement of military equipment along open sections of roads is masked by a linear interference mask made of WMD corner reflectors (Fig. 27), metal meshes, frame masks filled with branches, small trees, mats from local material. The thickness of the mats should be: from fresh brushwood with foliage - at least 3 cm; from dry brushwood - 6 cm; from poles - 5 cm; from straw-12 cm.

AT winter time to mask the movement of troops, snow banks with a thickness of at least 50 cm and a height exceeding the height of the masked equipment by at least 50 cm can be used.

When equipment is located in place for radar camouflage, the parapet of shelters for equipment (from the enemy side) is made increased in height (110-120 cm) from the soil, earth-bearing bags, etc.

Protection of military equipment from means of destruction with infrared guidance heads is carried out by reducing the thermal radiation of military equipment with the help of heat-reflecting coatings with heat-reflecting screens, the creation of false thermal targets (LTTs), heat traps on traffic routes and in areas of location.

Each serviceman must perfectly know and keep his weapons and military equipment in constant combat readiness, masterfully use them and skillfully use them, and be ready to replace a comrade who has fallen out of action.

Every soldier must:

know the methods and techniques of action in combat, have skills worked out to automatism with weapons (when arming a combat vehicle) on the battlefield in various conditions environment;

know and understand the task;

know control signals, interactions, notifications and the procedure for actions on them;

· to be able to conduct reconnaissance of the enemy and the terrain, while performing a combat mission, constantly monitor, effectively use weapons (armament of a combat vehicle), timely detect and hit the enemy;

· be able to correctly select and equip a firing position (shooting place), use the protective and camouflaging properties of the terrain and combat vehicles to counter enemy fire;

Know the size, volume, sequence and timing of the equipment of fortifications; be able to quickly equip trenches and shelters, including using explosives, carry out disguise;

• act steadfastly and stubbornly on the defensive, boldly and resolutely on the offensive; show courage, initiative and resourcefulness in battle; help a friend;

be able to fire at low-flying aircraft, helicopters and other air targets of the enemy from small arms;

know how to defend against weapons of mass destruction and precision weapons enemy; skillfully use the terrain, personal protective equipment and the protective properties of combat vehicles; overcome barriers, obstacles and infection zones; install and neutralize anti-tank and anti-personnel mines; carry out special processing;

Do not leave your place in battle without the permission of the commander; in case of injury or damage by radioactive, toxic substances, biological agents, as well as incendiary weapons accept necessary measures self-help and mutual assistance and continue to complete the task;

be able to prepare weapons and ammunition for combat use, quickly equip clips, magazines, tapes with cartridges; keep track of the consumption of ammunition and refueling of the combat vehicle with fuel, promptly report to your commander on the consumption 0,5 and 0,75 stock of missiles (ammunition) and refueling; in case of damage to the combat vehicle, take measures to restore it.

Each sergeant and soldier is obliged to protect the commander in battle, in case of his injury or death, feel free to take command of the unit.

In combat, depending on the nature of the terrain, the conditions of the situation, and the impact of enemy fire, a soldier, when operating on foot, can move at an accelerated pace or run (at full height or crouching), running and crawling.

Areas hidden from observation and enemy fire are overcome at an accelerated pace or run. The pace of accelerated walking is on average 130-140 steps per minute, step length is 80-90 cm.
Step lengthening is achieved due to faster and more complete extension of the standing leg behind and greater extension of the other leg with the hip forward. Long-term movement at an accelerated pace is tiring, therefore, with high-speed movement, it is advisable to use alternating walking and running. In the same way, the soldier moves during the attack. In this case, the weapon is held in position for the immediate opening of fire.
For covert movement in terrain with low shelters (low bushes, tall grass, ditch, etc.), crouching is used. With this method of movement, it is necessary to bend the knees, move the body forward, look ahead and move with a wide step. All movements are performed freely, without tension.
Depending on the nature of the terrain, movement on it has its own characteristics. Movement up the slope is made with a shortened step with the body tilted forward. With a large steepness, the ascent should be made in zigzags, i.e., move alternately with the right, then with the left side to the slope slightly bent legs, leaning with the ribs of soles and heels on the ledges of the mountain. Steep climbs can also be climbed straight, holding hands on branches, bushes, tufts of thick grass, etc., placing the legs on the entire foot in a herringbone pattern (with toes spread apart).
Moving down the squabble is done with a free step with the foot on the heel, tilting the body back. Descent along steep slopes can be done sideways, with side steps, if possible, holding on to the unevenness of the slope with your hand.
Movement on viscous or slippery ground is done in short steps; legs should be rearranged quickly so that they do not have time to sink deep into the soil or slide off the support. It is necessary to put the foot on the entire foot and try to choose more solid areas for support (bumps, furrows, protrusions, roots, etc.).
Running can be used to overcome certain areas of the terrain (slow, high-speed and at an average pace).
Slow running is used for long distances. When running, the body leans forward slightly more than when walking. The pace of running is 150-165 steps per minute with a stride length of 70-90 cm.
Running at an average pace is done with a free swing step. At the same time, the body is held with a slight inclination forward. Rapid forward movement is ensured by an energetic rear push, after which the leg, bent at the knee, is carried forward with the hip up and placed on the entire foot. The shin should not be carried much forward, and the foot should not be placed on the ground far from the projection of the center of gravity, since with such a placement of the leg on the ground, the braking effect of the front push, directed in the opposite direction, increases. Running pace - 165-180 steps per minute, stride length - 85 - 90 cm.

High-speed running is used when running, when running out of shelters to combat and transport vehicles, when taking a run before overcoming obstacles.

The body leans forward more than when running at an average pace, and the repulsion of the leg and the movement of the arms are more energetic. An increase in the length of the step is provided by the rear push with the foot and the rapid removal of it with the hip forward. The leg after repulsion is carried forward upward bent at the knee and gently placed on the front of the foot, followed by support on the entire foot. The pace of running is 180-200 steps per minute, the stride length is 120-150 cm.
Dashing is used to quickly approach the enemy in open areas.
To run from a prone position, you must first put the weapon on the safety lock, outline the path of movement and a sheltered stopping place on a preliminary command, then, on the executive command, quickly jump up, as when executing the “Get up” command, and quickly run to the intended place. At the place of a stop with a run, lie down on the ground, crawl a little to the side, and having reached the place indicated in the command, in addition, get ready for firing.
The length of the dash between stops depends on the terrain and enemy fire and should be on average 20-40 paces. The more open the area and the stronger the fire, the faster and shorter the dash should be.
Crawling is used to quietly approach the enemy and covertly overcome areas of terrain that have little cover, uneven terrain and are under observation or shelling of the enemy.
Depending on the situation, the terrain and the fire, crawling is done in a plastunsky way, on half-fours and on the side. As before the dash, you must first outline the path of movement and the shelter of the place to stop.
When moving at a run, at an accelerated pace, and when rushing, the weapon is held with one or two hands, as it is more convenient.

The preparation of an offensive in a platoon begins with the receipt of a combat mission. It provides for a complex of measures, the most important of which are: organization of the battle; preparing a platoon for a combat mission; preparation of the starting position (source area); organization and conduct of political work; practical work the platoon commander, his deputies in subdivisions and other measures. Combat organization includes: the platoon commander making a decision on the offensive, reconnaissance, setting combat missions by the squad; organization of interaction, fire engagement of the enemy, comprehensive support and control. The order and content of the work of the platoon commander in organizing the battle are determined by the conditions of the situation and, above all, by the methods of transition to the offensive, the combat mission and the availability of time. So, when going on the offensive from a position of direct contact with the enemy, the platoon commander has the opportunity to carry out all the work of organizing the battle directly on the ground. or change of defending units. Moreover, when going on the offensive after regrouping from a defensive position, the organization of combat on the ground (in the direction of the offensive) is carried out during the period when the platoon is in a strong point (defense area) under enemy fire. Under the conditions of a transition to the offensive with a simultaneous change of defending subunits or on the move, combat is organized on the ground, respectively, in the area of ​​concentration and in the initial area, out of contact with the enemy.
Sometimes, when attacking on the move, it will not be possible to travel with subordinate commanders to the terrain. In this case, the organization of the battle is carried out in the initial area on the map or on the layout of the area. However, during the movement of subunits to the line of transition to the attack and with the beginning of the attack, the commander specifies their task and the order of interaction.
In a situation where one has to participate in breaking through the defense (as a rule, hastily taken up) in the course of the development of the offensive, the platoon commander) is forced to make a decision on the map and set tasks for the subunits in the course of their advancement to the enemy’s defense. During the period of deployment in pre-combat, combat formations and with the beginning of the attack, the tasks and order of interaction are specified for the subunits.

The platoon leader begins work on organizing combat by clarifying the task. When clarifying the task, the platoon commander must understand the task of the company and platoon, what objects (targets) are hit by the means of the senior commander in the direction of the platoon, the tasks of neighbors and the order of interaction with them, as well as the time of readiness to complete the task. As a result of clarification of the task, the platoon commander draws conclusions, in which he determines the direction of concentration of the main efforts, the content and depth of the combat mission, the formation of the battle order, how much time is available to prepare the offensive.
Then the commander proceeds to assess the situation during which he must study:

• the composition, position, possible nature of the enemy's actions, the location of his fire weapons;
• condition, security and capabilities of the platoon and attached units;
• composition, position, nature of actions of neighbors and conditions of interaction with them;
• the nature of the terrain and its influence on the actions of subunits, its protective and camouflage properties, advantageous approaches, barriers and obstacles, conditions for observation and firing.

In addition, the platoon commander takes into account the state of the weather, the season, the day and their influence on the preparation and conduct of combat. Assessing the composition, position and possible nature of the enemy’s actions, the location of his fire weapons, the platoon commander studies:

• the outline of the front line of the enemy's defense and the presence of obstacles in front of it;
• the number of forces and assets in front of the platoon offensive front;
• disposition of enemy forces and means in the nearest depth.

Based on the study of the enemy, the platoon leader determines:

• strong and weak sides in the defense of the enemy;
• objects of attack by squads, means of reinforcement and the direction of the continuation of the offensive.

Studying the state, security and capabilities of the platoon and attached units, the commander evaluates:

• staffing of the platoon and attached units;
• moral and physical condition personnel;
• technical condition of infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers), weapons, protective equipment, availability of ammunition.

Assessing the composition, position, nature of actions of neighbors and the conditions of interaction with them, the platoon commander determines:

• with which of the neighbors it is necessary to maintain the closest interaction;
• the procedure for maintaining communication with neighbors;
• flank security arrangements.

Assessing the nature of the terrain, its protective masking properties, the commander studies:

• general character terrain (open, semi-closed, closed);
• advantageous approaches to the front line of the enemy's defense;
• conditions for observation and firing while moving on the attack;

In defense, engineering support is carried out in order to create favorable conditions for the timely and covert advance of subunits and units to designated areas (areas) of defense, deployment and maneuver, increase the effectiveness of the combat use of weapons and protect personnel, weapons, equipment and materiel from destruction, as well as inflicting losses on the enemy and hindering his actions by using engineering ammunition.

The main tasks of the engineering support of a defensive battle are: engineering reconnaissance of the enemy terrain and objects; clearance of terrain and objects; fortification equipment of positions and defense areas; arrangement and maintenance of engineering barriers; preparation (production) of destruction; preparation and maintenance of troop movement and maneuver routes; equipment and maintenance of field water supply points and participation in countering enemy reconnaissance and weapon guidance systems, concealment (camouflage) of subunits (units) and objects.

The tasks of engineering support can be carried out in several ways: only by the forces and means of subunits and units of military branches, special troops; with their reinforcement by units (crews) of engineering troops; by the forces and means of the senior chief in the interests of the subdivision (unit).

At each stage of a defensive battle, the subunit (unit) commander determines those engineering support tasks, the fulfillment of which determines the stability of the defense and the fulfillment of the assigned task.

The stability of the defense is largely achieved by a skillfully organized system of artillery fire, small arms, air strikes and skillful use of the terrain and its fortification equipment. For the fortification equipment of the area and the performance of other tasks of engineering support, the personnel of all units of the armed forces, special troops, technical support and rear (30-35% of the personnel of anti-aircraft, missile units and communications units, 70-75% of the personnel of the remaining units) with the maximum use of engineering weapons and local materials.

Management of subunits (personnel) consists in the purposeful activity of the commander to maintain them in constant combat readiness, prepare subunits (personnel, weapons and military equipment) for combat (performance of the assigned task) and guide them in the performance of tasks.

Control should be stable, continuous, operational and hidden, ensure the constant combat readiness of units, effective use their combat capabilities and the successful completion of assigned tasks on time and in any situation.

Management sustainability is achieved by: correct understanding of the task set by the senior boss; persistent implementation of the decisions made; skillful organization of work on means of communication; maintaining stable communication with the senior boss, with subordinate and interacting units.

Continuity of control achieved: constant knowledge and comprehensive assessment of the current situation; timely decision-making and clear assignment of tasks to subordinates; skillful use of communications; restoration of impaired control in the shortest possible time.

Efficiency of management achieved by: rapid response to changing conditions; timely influence on the actions of units in the interests of fulfilling the assigned tasks.

Stealth control is achieved by: covert placement and movement of the command and observation post (commander in order of battle); strict observance of the rules and procedures for the use of communication facilities, the established modes of their operation and radio masking measures; education of personnel in the spirit of high vigilance.

When supporting a platoon (squad, tank) battle with artillery fire, air strikes or other means of destruction, the commander is obliged to indicate the line of safe removal from explosions of his shells (rockets, mines).

10. Comprehensive protection of economic facilities from high-precision enemy weapons. The protection of economic and infrastructure facilities, ensuring their sustainable functioning in modern armed conflicts (wars) can be achieved by using active means (air defense fire weapons, air force) and passive ways and means, including carrying out activities for light and other types of camouflage. Effective protection of economic facilities and infrastructure from high-precision weapons (WTO) requires advance preparation and coordinated activities of various departments and organizations. The goals of complex protection of facilities are to minimize the likelihood of damage to economic and infrastructure facilities by high-precision weapons, to reduce the amount of possible damage and losses. These goals are achieved by solving the following main tasks: hiding objects on the ground through the use of static and dynamic aerosol interference, screen masks, radio and heat-absorbing coatings and green spaces; changing the physical fields of objects due to a decrease in contrast, the construction of decoys and the setting of static interference; countering the guidance systems of high-precision weapons by setting "dynamic" interference based on the use of interference ammunition; a rational combination of measures aimed at preserving objects and increasing their physical stability; reduction of stocks of toxic and explosive substances, the use of means and methods of masking critical elements of economic facilities. The main principles of organization and effective implementation of comprehensive protection are:Principle of strategic mobility, which provides for the advance development of plans and the creation of groupings of forces and means for carrying out the protection of objects, taking into account the prompt response to changes in the nature of armed conflicts and military dangers in strategic directions. The principle of complex application of various means and methods of protection, involving the use of a complex of various means that ensure the change of all unmasking features of the object and the creation of interference a wide range for guidance aids. The principle of a differentiated approach to the protection of objects, which provides for the priority of objects, taking into account their significance and applicability modern means defeat. The principle of reasonable sufficiency, which takes into account that the economic costs of protecting objects should be adequate to military threats and not exceed the economic effect of preserving the object. The principle of priority use of dual-use measures, which provides for the priority planning and implementation of organizational measures that can ensure the preservation of objects in peaceful and war time. The most likely objects of WTO influence in armed conflicts are: the most important objects of state administration; enterprises of defense industries, fuel and energy complex, mechanical engineering, chemistry and petrochemistry, transport, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, enterprises for the production of radio electronic equipment; transport communications; power plants (nuclear power plants, hydroelectric power stations, hydroelectric power stations) and nodal substations providing industrial centers with electricity; large railway junctions, bridges, airfields; sea ​​and river ports; control points, communication centers and some of the most important radio, radio relay stations and switching centers; federal food bases (warehouses), water, electricity and heat supply facilities, healthcare facilities. The list of specific most important objects protected in the depths of the country in wartime by means of armed struggle and camouflage is approved by the Government of the Russian Federation on the proposal of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Russian Ministry of Economic Development and the Russian Emergencies Ministry, with their distribution in strategic areas according to priorities of importance. The establishment of priorities for the protection of objects is carried out on the basis of the following features: the importance, structure and nature of the production process, the allowable time of failure, the degree of danger of secondary damaging factors. There are three levels of protection priority:To objects of the first priority include state administration points, communication centers, broadcasting stations, television centers, railway junctions, airfields, sea and river ports, railway and road bridges of the main directions, warehouses and bases of state reserves, pumping stations of pipelines. To objects of the second priority include nuclear, thermal and hydroelectric power plants, power transmission line substations, fuel depots, oil depots, large water, electricity and heat supply facilities. To objects of the third priority include oil refining and chemical industries, enterprises of the defense complex, non-ferrous and ferrous metallurgy, mechanical engineering, electrical industry, large hospitals and hospitals. 11. Organization of complex camouflage in order to protect objects from modern weapons. To counteract modern systems for detecting and guiding enemy precision weapons, the system of “non-fire” protection of objects includes engineering camouflage (changing all or the main unmasking features of objects in the radiation ranges of their physical fields) and electronic countermeasures, including: radar (in the radio frequency and microwave ranges of the spectrum ); thermal (in the infrared range); optical (in the visible range of the radiation spectrum); acoustic (sound range of the spectrum). Light camouflage of objects is one of the varieties of engineering camouflage. It is carried out in the optical range of radiation in order to reduce the visibility of objects, cities and other settlements at night to prevent the identification of an object by optical means of guiding carriers and weapons of an air enemy. Complex camouflage in order to protect objects is carried out by: imitation and concealment of objects and landmarks around them, which can be used by the enemy as auxiliary aiming points when bombing and launching missiles; premature undermining of combat units of the WTO at a safe distance for protected objects; adjusting the physical fields of objects during civil defense activities to increase their physical stability, duplication and redundancy of vulnerable elements of objects; shielding of individual elements of objects with simultaneous setting of false targets. Hiding protected objects is usually achieved by the use of aerosols, screen masks, thermal and light decoys, the use of radio and heat-absorbing coatings, green spaces, etc. The integrated use of all these types and means of camouflage, according to preliminary data, can reduce the estimated probability of detection and destruction of economic objects in 3-4 times. Premature undermining of combat units WTO is achieved by using response noise generators; the creation on the flight path of the WTO of zones of false targets-traps created by combined interference munitions (in the radio, infrared and light ranges) fired by launchers located at the objects. With optimal control of the setting of interference-traps to the enemy's HTO means, the guaranteed disruption of the attack can be 0.9 or more. Adjustment of unmasking signs(physical fields) of objects is achieved by changing the contrast of radiation, reducing their intensity (temporary cessation), demonstrating false radiation in combination with mock-up of false elements of objects. The last of the masking methods is the most effective for protecting areal objects from WTO. Most effective shielding is achieved by setting aerosol curtains in combination with the simultaneous creation of static and dynamic decoys on the flight paths of the WTO. Such a shielding method makes it possible to control the amount of miss (“withdrawal” of the WTO to a given area for detonation at a safe distance), preventing possible damage to those close to the protected object. Complex application of various types and means of engineering camouflage and electronic warfare allows several times to reduce the probability of hitting protected objects (critical elements) by means of the enemy's HTO. The regular military equipment developed and currently used for engineering camouflage is not fully suitable for camouflaging rear objects. The development and improvement of these tools is carried out in the direction of expanding the range of counteraction to the means of detecting the WTO; their integration with electronic warfare equipment; automation of control, increasing readiness and reliability, combining different types of means into automated and autonomous unified systems of object camouflage (non-fire protection); development of methods for the use of standard complexes for masking various types of potentially dangerous objects. Traditional light and radio reflectors can be used as structural elements of object camouflage complexes; balloons with built-in radio reflectors; radio-absorbing and radio-scattering universal camouflage coatings; models of false radio, heat and light emitting elements of objects in stationary and mobile versions; munitions jamming-traps of the WTO, stuffed with radio reflectors, smoke-forming compositions, infrared traps, reflectors and other means electronic countermeasures, generators of response interference of the WTO. The use of involved means of complex camouflage is largely determined by the geometric parameters of objects. With this in mind, all masked objects of the economy and infrastructure are conditionally divided into four types. "Point"- their dimensions coincide with the radius of destruction of one high-precision munition (for example, the compressor station of the main gas, oil, product pipeline, the central substation of the state district power station, etc.). areal objectswith side parameters 200x300 meters(technological installations of petrochemical industries, electric steel-smelting, foundry-mechanical shops, and other areas of production, the defeat of which leads to the shutdown of the entire production cycle). Areal objects with an area of ​​400x600 meters, the defeat of which can cause fires, contamination of large areas with emergency chemicals (radiation contamination) and cause large-scale losses among the population. Long (linear) objects with a length of more than 1200 meters(for example, hydroelectric dams, railway and road bridges on water barriers, etc.). In the general list of rear objects camouflaged on the territory of Russia, the share of objects of the first type can be up to 65%, the second - up to 20%, the third - up to 10%, the fourth - 5%. To camouflage objects, object camouflage complexes can be used in the following composition: 1st type - large smoke bombs (BDSH-15) for camouflage in the visible (optical) range; mirror corner reflectors to simulate an object in the optical range. 2nd type - launchers of the KT-216 type for fired ammunition of aerosol interference-traps to the enemy's HTO systems in the visible, infrared and radar ranges of electromagnetic waves; Doppler detectors of carriers and warheads of the WTO for the formation of the “setting a curtain-trap” command; sensors for detecting laser irradiation of an object to determine the direction of attack; heat direction finders - to detect the moment of launch by the carrier on the object of the enemy's WTO means. 3rd type - laser stations of response interference, designed to detect and and suppress laser means of detection (target designation) of carriers and warheads of the WTO; means of creating laser false targets for "withdrawal" on them and undermining the warheads of the WTO at a safe distance. The calculated efficiency of the created camouflage effect with the full consumption of camouflage resources for typical economic objects is shown in the table. All this does not exclude the need to create conditions in advance for organizing effective camouflage of objects in wartime. The need for an adequate response to military threats is taken into account at the stages of design, construction and reconstruction of facilities, including measures to disperse hazardous technological processes, place facilities in terrain folds, use protective vegetation cover and use special means adjusting the reflectivity of objects and terrain. In the future, in order to protect rear facilities in the depths of the country in armed conflicts, it is necessary to create effective complexes means of masking typical objects, on the basis of which it is possible to optimize the protection system for unique hydrodynamic, radiation, explosion, fire, chemical and other potentially dangerous objects throughout the country.

Protection against weapons of mass destruction is organized in full in combat, both with and without the use of weapons of mass destruction. It is a set of tactical and special measures carried out in order to minimize the destruction of subunits by nuclear, chemical and biological (bacteriological) weapons of the enemy, maintain the combat capability of the platoon personnel (squad, tank crew) and ensure the successful completion of the assigned combat mission.

Protection against weapons of mass destruction provides for:

• 1. Engineering equipment of the occupied stronghold (initial, firing position, location) and the use of protective and masking properties of the terrain and equipment;
• 2. Warning of personnel by established signals about an immediate threat and the beginning of the use of weapons of mass destruction by the enemy, about their own nuclear strikes, as well as warning about radioactive, chemical and biological (bacteriological) contamination;
• 3. Carrying out anti-epidemic, sanitary-hygienic and special preventive medical measures;
• 4. Ensuring the safety and protection of personnel during operations in contaminated zones, areas of destruction, fires and floods, and eliminating the consequences of the use of weapons of mass destruction by the enemy.

The content and procedure for implementing subunit defense measures depend on the specific situation, the enemy's ability to use weapons of mass destruction, the availability of time, forces and means to organize defense, and other factors. Depending on the nature of the actions of the subunits and the situation, these measures can be carried out either in full or in part. Protection against weapons of mass destruction is carried out both on their own and in cooperation with units of special forces. The interaction is:

• - in a coordinated warning and warning system, in the exchange of information on the use of nuclear, chemical and biological (bacteriological) weapons by the enemy, zones of contamination, destruction, fires and floods;
• - in rendering assistance in eliminating the consequences of the use of weapons of mass destruction by the enemy, as well as in carrying out anti-epidemic, sanitary-hygienic and special preventive measures.

The engineering equipment of the occupied stronghold (initial firing position, location) consists in the construction of fortifications, open and closed.

Open fortifications (trenches for motorized rifle squads, military and other equipment, trenches, communication passages, the simplest structures for observation and pit shelters) are equipped with the forces of the units themselves and significantly reduce the impact of damaging factors nuclear explosion, as well as protect against incendiary substances and direct contamination with liquid droplets and aerosol poisonous substances.

Closed fortifications (covered gaps, dugouts, shelters) provide the most reliable protection for personnel from all damaging factors of nuclear weapons, from chemical weapons and from incendiary means. Under normal conditions, a covered slot is equipped for a squad, and a dugout for a platoon. Trenches (shelter trenches) are being equipped for equipment.

In order to increase the degree of protection of personnel in military equipment from neutron weapons and incendiary substances, it is advisable to arrange wood-and-earth screens above the trenches.

The use of protective and camouflaging properties of terrain and equipment weakens the impact of WMD damaging factors on personnel, weapons, military equipment and material resources. The protective properties of the area are determined by the nature of the relief and vegetation cover.

The relief and vegetation cover of the area limit the effect of the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion, have a significant impact on the depth of distribution and the degree of contamination of the area with radioactive, poisonous substances and biological (bacterial) agents.

The degree of radioactive contamination of the area is significantly affected by the soil, which, being exposed to gamma rays and neutrons, depending on its chemical composition, becomes radioactive.

Such induced radioactivity is most characteristic of solonchaks, clayey and loamy soils and, to a lesser extent, of chernozem and swampy soils. In addition, the looser and drier the soil, the stronger the radioactive contamination of the area. Dry field fine-grained soils contribute to an increase in the size and saturation of the cloud formed by a nuclear explosion with radioactive dust. Darkened areas of the terrain behind the reverse slopes in relation to the center (epicenter) of the explosion, where there is no damage by light radiation, have protective properties.

The shock wave has the property of flowing around hills, which leads to a decrease in pressure in its front by 2-3 times.

Increasing the slope slope by 10° increases (lowers) by 10% the pressure in the front of the shock wave on the front (reverse) slope of the hill, and this leads to an increase (decrease) in the radius of the affected area by 1.2-1.5 times.

The magnitude of radioactive contamination of the surface of slopes along the trail of a radioactive cloud located on the windward (leeward) side will be several times greater (less) compared to the flat terrain.

Ravines, gullies, gullies, hollows also have protective properties, provided that their direction does not coincide with the direction of propagation of the shock wave. On average, we can assume that the radius of destruction of personnel and equipment with the location of units in such an area will be 1.5 times less than in open areas. The protective properties of the terrain can be manifested when large landforms are sufficiently saturated with microrelief.

The terrain with a developed network of ravines in combination with individual forests and shrubs has high protective properties. The greatest protection is created by ravines, gullies, quarries, dredging, the depth of which exceeds their width.

The terrain, in which the heights and hollows are indented with small folds, has the best protective properties. Hollows and ravines, elongated along large valleys or being their continuation, are inexpedient to occupy, since the shock wave will propagate along the valley and the damage to personnel will intensify.

Hollows and ravines that cross the main valleys and large ravines at right angles are more advantageous places for the location of units. It is necessary to avoid the location of subunits in bowl-shaped hollows surrounded by heights, since the explosion of a nuclear weapon above the center of such a foundation pit sharply increases the effect of the shock wave.

Floodplains of the rivers are directing channels for the propagation of the shock wave. The most favorable places for the location of units will be the bends of river valleys, as well as ravines and hollows that go to their banks.

In the mountains, under the influence of a nuclear explosion, collapses, falling stones, scree and snow avalanches, which can occur far beyond the affected area, so the location of units on rocky and snowy slopes is dangerous. Mountain gorges are also unfavorable for the deployment of troops, where the shock wave of a nuclear explosion can penetrate and the danger of collapses and destruction is great. Places behind small hills at the foot of the mountains will be more profitable. Underground workings seem to be important elements of the protective properties of the area, so units should use them first. Settlements are the least pleasant for the deployment of troops, since under the influence of a shock wave large zones of destruction, blockages, and fires are created. However, in populated areas, basements with solid floors, and especially various underground structures (subway, city sewers, etc.), can serve as a reliable shelter from shock waves.

Of the vegetation cover, the forest has the greatest protective properties.

In the forest, depending on the depth, the pressure of the shock wave to the front begins to decrease at a distance of 50-200 m from the edge. It is not advisable to place subunits in the depths of the forest, as this creates additional difficulties when leaving it after the formation of blockages. Personnel should be deployed in clearings and clearings covered with shrubs or young growth, at a distance of 150-200 m from the edge of the forest and 30-50 m from main roads. A forest with developed crowns protects personnel from damage by light radiation and reduces the dose of penetrating radiation by 15-20%. In forest areas, the level of radiation is 2-3 times less than in open areas.

Forests, hollows, quarries, ravines, settlements contribute to the stagnation of RH, and heights - to dispersion. The persistence of RH in the forest is 10 times greater than in open areas. Consequently, a platoon in combat, on the march and when deployed on the spot must be able to use forests, ravines, hollows, reverse slopes of heights, underground workings, caves and other natural shelters to protect against weapons of mass destruction.

Vehicles provide protection against blast overpressure causing mild injury to unprotected personnel. Cabins of all machines and bodies, equipped with an awning, to a certain extent protect personnel from contamination by radioactive, drop-liquid poisonous substances and biological (bacterial) agents, and the concentration of aerosols (vapors) in them will be two times in one or two minutes after application. less than in the surrounding air. Exposure doses to personnel in vehicles are two times less than in an open location.

Infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers provide protection against a shock wave at such a distance from the center (epicenter) of a nuclear explosion at which an openly located personnel can receive a moderate injury. They also protect against damage by light radiation, in the presence of a filter-ventilation unit and contamination with radioactive, toxic substances and biological (bacterial) agents. The exposure of personnel inside the infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, in areas contaminated with radioactive substances, will be two times less than in cars, and four times less than in open areas.

Tanks protect crews from a shock wave at such a distance from the center (epicenter) of a nuclear explosion, where the excess pressure significantly exceeds that dangerous for the body, they provide protection from exposure to light radiation and from contamination by radioactive, toxic substances and biological (bacterial) agents. Tank armor reduces the dose of penetrating radiation of radioactive exposure in contaminated areas by 8-12 times.

Warning of personnel about an immediate threat and the beginning of the use of weapons of mass destruction by the enemy, about their own nuclear strikes, as well as notification of radioactive, chemical and biological (bacteriological) contamination is carried out by established signals.

Upon receipt of a warning signal of an imminent threat and the beginning of the enemy's use of weapons of mass destruction, the personnel carry out their assigned tasks and put the means of protection in the "ready" position. On this signal, the platoon (squad, tank) commander is obliged to take all measures to strictly observe the established limits for the dispersal of units, to maximize the use of the protective properties of the terrain, military equipment and fortifications. Upon receiving a warning about their nuclear strikes, the personnel take all measures of individual and collective protection by the specified time.

Personnel not engaged in combat missions must take refuge in fortifications, military equipment and terrain. At this signal, measures are taken to protect personnel, military equipment, materiel and water sources from contamination by poisonous substances and biological (bacterial) agents.

When an enemy inflicts a nuclear strike, personnel take protective measures in response to an explosion: when they are in infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers) - close doors, loopholes, hatches, turn on the system of protection against weapons of mass destruction; when in an open armored personnel carrier - must bend down; when located outside the car - quickly take the shelters available nearby or lie on the ground with your head in the direction opposite to the explosion. After the passage of the shock wave, the personnel continue to perform the task.

Notification of subunits about radioactive, chemical and biological (bacteriological) contamination is carried out immediately through all means of communication by single and permanent signals: about radioactive contamination - "Radiation hazard", about chemical and biological (bacteriological) contamination - "Chemical alarm".

The notification is organized for immediate protective measures and is carried out when the nature of the danger is known and the order of actions of the units is predetermined. The signal is transmitted only to those units that may be in the direction of the spread of the cloud of contaminated air to the entire depth. On warning signals of radioactive chemical and biological (bacteriological) contamination, personnel operating on foot or in open vehicles, without stopping the combat mission, put on personal protective equipment, and those in closed armored personnel carriers put on only respirators (gas masks), in combat vehicles infantry and tanks closes hatches, doors, loopholes and includes a system of protection against weapons of mass destruction (in shelters - a system of collective protection). At the signal "Radiation danger" the personnel put on respirators (gas masks), at the signal "Chemical alarm" - gas masks.

Personal protective equipment is removed only with the permission of the senior commander.

The implementation of anti-epidemic, sanitary-hygienic and special preventive medical measures is achieved by strict adherence to the established hygiene requirements for the accommodation and nutrition of personnel, as well as compliance with the rules of personal and public hygiene, skillful and timely use of personal medical equipment.

Anti-epidemic measures are aimed at preventing the spread of infectious diseases among personnel. These include:

• - study of the sanitary and epidemic state of the areas of operations and the location of units;
• - conducting preventive vaccinations for personnel;
• - use of emergency prophylaxis;
• - restriction of communication of personnel with the population and units of other troops;
• - carrying out disinfection.

The sanitary and epidemic state of the areas of operation and location of units is determined by the medical unit constantly and regardless of whether biological (bacteriological) weapons were used or not.

Protective vaccinations are carried out both in terms of prevention and according to epidemic indications. The timing and nature of planned vaccinations are established by orders of unit commanders and senior commanders.

Isolation-limited measures are to establish a regime of observation or quarantine.

With the receipt of data on the use of biological weapons by the enemy and until the type of bacterial agents is established, as well as in the event of the appearance of mass infectious diseases of an established etiology, excluding especially dangerous ones, an observation regime is established by order of the division (regiment) commander.

The mode of observation includes:

Specially trained sentinel squads (crews) on regular combat vehicles can be sent to determine the bypass routes and directions for overcoming zones with high levels of radiation. If it is impossible to bypass areas of infection, they are overcome without changing the marching order of units, along routes that provide the least contamination (along paved roads, columnar paths with moist soil and less vegetation).

The convoy must move along the contaminated area with increased distances between cars, without stopping and overtaking, in order to eliminate or significantly reduce the dusting of cars. In the event of a forced stop of the vehicle and the impossibility of towing it, the personnel are transferred to another vehicle. When eliminating the consequences of the use of weapons of mass destruction by the enemy, rescue operations are carried out, first medical aid is provided to the injured, their removal (removal) from the contaminated zones, dosimetric and chemical control.

Measures to eliminate the consequences of the use of weapons of mass destruction by the enemy are carried out by the platoon commander, as a rule, with his own forces and means in cooperation with units of special troops.

Emergency prophylaxis is carried out in case of suspicion of infection of the personnel of the unit located in the epidemic focus of infectious diseases, or when the enemy uses biological (bacteriological) weapons. It includes the use of antibiotics, immunoglobulins and other medicines. The terms and procedure for conducting emergency prophylaxis are determined by the order of the division (regiment) commander.

Sanitary and hygienic measures consist in the strict observance of the established hygienic requirements for the accommodation, food and water supply of units, and the observance of the rules of personal and public hygiene. In a combat situation, general sanitary and hygienic measures are carried out in relation to specific developing conditions.

Isolation-limited measures are to establish a regime of observation or quarantine. With the receipt of data on the use of biological weapons by the enemy and until the type of bacterial agents is established, as well as in the event of the appearance of mass infectious diseases of an established etiology, excluding especially dangerous ones, an observation regime is established by order of the division (regiment) commander.

It includes:

• - restriction of departure (exit), entry (entrance) and contacts of personnel with military personnel of other units and the local population;
• - early detection and isolation of the diseased, carrying out the necessary treatment-and-prophylactic and anti-epidemic measures.

When establishing the fact that the enemy has used especially dangerous infections, as well as diseases of etiology that are spreading epidemically and threatening the combat capability of units, quarantine is introduced in the focus of biological contamination by order of the senior commander. It includes:

• - armed protection of the area where the quarantined units are located;
• - prohibition of exit (exit) from it and the withdrawal of weapons, equipment and other materiel without prior disinfection;
• - the maximum restriction of entry into the area;
• - Carrying out sanitary and hygienic, anti-epidemic measures.

First of all, it is necessary to monitor the observance of the rules of personal hygiene, the organization of food and water supply, as well as the removal of sewage and waste from the areas where sewage is located.

Special preventive medical measures include the use of antipodes, antibiotics, anti-radiation and other drugs.

Anti-radiation drugs are issued to all personnel. They are used before operations in areas contaminated with radioactive substances, by order of the commander (from the battalion commander and above).

When organizing protection against weapons of mass destruction, the platoon commander indicates:

• - the sequence of the fortification equipment of the stronghold (initial, firing positions, location) and the procedure for using the protective properties of the terrain;
• - the procedure for warning about an immediate threat and the beginning of the enemy's use of weapons of mass destruction, about his own nuclear strikes, as well as warning signals about radioactive, chemical and biological (bacteriological) contamination and the procedure for acting on them;
• - timing of medical events;
• - security measures for operations in contaminated zones, areas of destruction, fires and floods.

Protection against high-precision weapons

Simultaneously with the organization of protection against weapons of mass destruction, the platoon commander also organizes protection against high-precision weapons, for which he provides:

• -increasing the distance between infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers), tanks when operating in an open, unengineered area;
• - warning squads (tank crews) about an immediate threat and the beginning of the use of reconnaissance and strike systems by the enemy, with the receipt of which the squads (tanks), continuing to perform the task, take measures that increase their protection from high-precision weapons, and also perform camouflage, engineering and chemical supply.

a set of measures taken to eliminate or minimize the impact of high-precision weapons (HOW) on economic and public administration facilities, fortifications and other vital facilities. Protecting the objects of the Armed Forces, civil defense troops and other power structures of the Russian Federation within their competencies. Protection of objects from the effects of OBT is achieved by: countering the technical means of reconnaissance and guidance of the enemy used in OBT systems (electronic suppression, the introduction of restrictions on the use of electronic means, special protection of technical means for receiving, storing, processing and transmitting information, countering space, air, sea , ground-based thermal and optoelectronic means of reconnaissance and guidance of OBT, etc.); camouflage of objects using special radio-heat-absorbing, radio-heat-dissipating and other coatings, radar and laser reflectors, aerosols (smoke), simulators (mock-ups) and other decoys, use of masking terrain properties, etc.; dispersal of objects and their duplication; organizational and technical measures that increase the security of objects from OBT, and a number of others.

• - a system of measures aimed at preventing acts of sabotage at especially important facilities, as well as facilities of great state and national economic importance ...

  Counterintelligence Dictionary

• - a set of organizational, engineering and other measures carried out at the facility in order to ensure its operation in the conditions of the damaging effects of emergencies, to prevent or reduce the threat ...
• - actions and measures to prevent or reduce the impact of weapons on their vital elements in order to reduce damage and maintain the ability to produce products in the planned volume and ...

  Civil protection. Conceptual and terminological dictionary

• - a system of measures preventing the detection, selection, capture, escort and destruction of WTO objects. Protection against WTO is carried out by destroying them, masking protected objects with electronic ...

  Civil protection. Conceptual and terminological dictionary

• - a set of measures carried out in order to preserve the vital activity of the population, environment and ensuring the survivability of the economy in the face of the use of all types of weapons of mass destruction by the enemy. In a number of states,...

  Civil protection. Conceptual and terminological dictionary

• - activities aimed at preventing the impact on the protected information of errors of its user, failure of hardware and software of information systems, natural phenomena or other ...
• - activities aimed at preventing the impact on protected information in violation of established rights and rules to change information, leading to its distortion, destruction, blocking ...

  Emergency Glossary

• - a set of measures taken to eliminate or minimize the impact of conventional weapons on the population, life support facilities and the environment. Achieved by: camouflage...

  Emergency Glossary

• - actions and measures to prevent or reduce the impact of weapons on their vital elements in order to reduce damage and maintain the ability to produce products in the planned volume ...

  Emergency Glossary

• - a set of measures carried out in order to prevent or to the maximum weaken the defeat of the population, objects and equipment by incendiary weapons ...

  Emergency Glossary

• - comes down to its destruction, suppression of control equipment by interference, as well as evasion from it ...

  Marine vocabulary

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  Official terminology

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  Official terminology

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  Official terminology

• - "...; protection of the population: a set of civil defense measures to prevent or reduce population losses from the impact of enemy attack weapons ..." Source: "GOST R 42.0.02-2001. Civil defense ...

  Official terminology

• - a set of measures taken to protect troops, population and facilities National economy countries from nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons enemy...

  Great Soviet Encyclopedia

"Protection of objects from the effects of high-precision weapons" in books

Quick word (weapon protection)