military intelligence tactics. military intelligence

Observation, observation post, eavesdropping, features of observation in the mountains.

Observation

This is one of the main methods of reconnaissance, providing the most reliable information about the enemy.
Surveillance allows you to get the most reliable information about the enemy and the terrain. In combat formations of troops in all types of combat, it is conducted continuously by specially appointed observers and observation posts. Their number depends on the nature of the battle, the conditions of the situation and the terrain. An observer is usually appointed in a squad, in a platoon and in a company - one or two observers, in a battalion - an observer at the command and observation post and one or two observation posts.

Observation is organized in such a way as to provide the best view of the terrain in front of the front and on the flanks. At night and in other conditions of limited visibility, surveillance is carried out with the help of ground reconnaissance radar stations, night vision devices, terrain lighting equipment, and is supplemented by eavesdropping.

Observation is usually carried out in the sector. The width of the observation sector depends on the conditions of observation (terrain, visibility, etc.) and the number of available posts (observers). Sometimes an area (object) can be indicated to the observer for its detailed study, clarification of the position on the ground individual elements, detecting or confirming the presence of targets in it. In addition, observers and observation posts can monitor the actions of their subunits and neighbors, aviation (helicopters) and the results of their own artillery fire.

As practice shows, in the observation sector it is enough to have five to seven landmarks. Landmarks are chosen objects that are clearly visible and most resistant to destruction - road intersections, stones, characteristic points of relief, individual buildings, trees, etc. Landmarks are numbered from right to left and along the lines from oneself towards the enemy. One of the landmarks is designated as the main one. All landmarks indicated by the senior commander are mandatory, they retain the numbers and names assigned by this commander. On terrain poor in landmarks (desert, steppe, snowy plain), engineering structures and enemy barriers can be chosen as landmarks, or artificial landmarks can be created by artillery fire (places of breaks).
The place for observation should provide good review in the specified sector, camouflage and shelter from enemy fire, have open approaches from their units.

observation post

observation post- a group of military personnel assigned to jointly perform the task of observation. The observation post consists of two or three people, one of whom is appointed senior. At the observation post there should be observation devices, a map of landmarks, a large-scale map or a map of the area, an observation log, a compass, a clock, a flashlight with a nozzle that does not allow the beam of light to scatter, means of communication and signaling.
The senior observation post is obliged: to establish the procedure for continuous observation; organize the equipment of the place for observation and its camouflage; check the serviceability of surveillance devices, communication and warning devices; personally conduct surveillance, plot the detected objects (targets) on a map (diagram) and report in a timely manner to the commander who posted the post on the results of reconnaissance; immediately report on the discovery of important objects (targets), on sudden changes in enemy actions, and also when signs of preparation for the use of weapons of mass destruction are detected. Records are made in the observation log about the results of observation, the change of place and time of movement, and the surrender of the post.

At 19.15 25.10 post, radio station R-148 No. 013921, LPR-1 No. 0214KS.
Passed .... (title, signature)
Accepted. . . (title, signature)

An observation post is in service until the deadline or until it is replaced by another observation post; a post can move to a new place only with the permission or order of the commander who posted it. The movement is usually carried out by the entire composition of the post simultaneously with the observance of camouflage and security measures. The order of movement is determined by the senior observation post. When an observation post is located for a long time on a site contaminated with poisonous, radioactive and biological (bacterial) agents, personnel operates in personal protective equipment, and the change of observers is carried out more often. If the situation allows, the senior post organizes partial special processing of the observation post, personnel and weapons. At the same time, observation of the enemy and the terrain does not stop.
The observer in the subunit reports to the subunit commander and is responsible for the timely detection of the enemy in his sector (area). He must have observation devices, a landmark map, a compass and a clock, and, if necessary, means of communication and signaling.

The observer must: know the reconnaissance and unmasking signs of objects (targets), signs of the enemy's preparation for the use of weapons of mass destruction, for an offensive, withdrawal, etc.; skillfully use observation devices, prepare them for work and keep them in good working order; know landmarks, conditional names of local objects and be able to quickly find them on the ground; conduct continuous surveillance, search for targets, determine the range to them and their location relative to landmarks; timely report to the commander on the results of observation; observe the strictest discipline and comply with the requirements of disguise; know control signals and alerts.

An observer is a sentry on the battlefield, he does not have the right to stop observation without an order from the commander who appointed him, or until he is replaced by the next observer.
Having received the task and having specified the landmarks indicated to him on the ground, the observer determines the distance to them, if it was not indicated to him, studies the tactical properties of the terrain, the most characteristic local objects, and draws up a map of landmarks.

To draw up a map of landmarks, it is necessary to put a symbol of an observation post in the lower part of the sheet in the middle and draw a north-south direction through it. Then determine the distance to the main landmark, the magnetic azimuth to this landmark, and, orienting the sheet of paper in azimuth and distance, on a scale (for example, 5 cm - 1 km), put the landmark on the diagram. Using the observation device, measure the angles from the main one to the other landmarks, and after determining the distances to them, also scale them on the diagram; then put on the diagram characteristic local objects and distances to them and features of the relief.

All landmarks are applied in a perspective form, their conditional name, number and distance to the landmark are signed.

When conducting surveillance reconnaissance in the course of carrying out tasks in the Republic of Afghanistan, experienced observers, in preparing the landmark scheme, usually drew directions for each landmark. This helped them quickly find landmarks on the ground and report the location of targets.

Studying the tactical properties of the terrain, the observer, first of all, proceeds from the received task.
For example, he finds out: where, according to the conditions of the situation on the given terrain, the enemy is most likely to place his observation and command and observation posts, artillery positions, fire weapons, engineering structures and obstacles; from what direction and in what places can his tanks go; where manpower is most likely to hide and Combat vehicles and what are the possibilities for covert movement of the enemy.

Studying characteristic local objects, the observer remembers their relative position and appearance. Such local items as individual bushes, stumps, large stones should be counted. Knowing the number, relative position and appearance of local objects in his observation sector, he will more quickly detect camouflaged observers, fire weapons, snipers and other targets.

The observer mentally divides the specified sector according to depth into zones: near - a section of the terrain accessible for observation with the naked eye, usually to a depth of 400 m; medium - from 400 to 800 m; far - from 800 m to the limit of visibility.
The boundaries of the zones are outlined conditionally on the ground according to landmarks, local objects and are not applied to the diagram. Observation usually begins from the near zone and is carried out from right to left by sequential inspection of the terrain and local objects. The observer, having examined the near zone, returns to look at it back, as if checking himself, then examines the middle and far zones in the same order.

With sequential inspection of the area, open areas are examined faster, and less open areas are examined more carefully. Areas where signs of targets are found are examined especially carefully. Observation through optical instruments should be alternated with observation with the naked eye, since constant observation through an optical instrument tires the eyesight and, in addition, the field of view. optical devices limited. When observing with binoculars and other optical means, they need to be given a stable position. Target detection may require long-term observation of individual areas of the terrain (objects), as well as verification by repeated observation of already available reconnaissance results.

Having found the target, the observer determines its position on the ground relative to landmarks (local objects) and reports to the commander (senior observation post).
When determining the position of the target on the ground, the observer determines the distance to the target in meters from his observation point and the angular distance (to the right or left) in thousandths from the nearest landmark to the detected target.
The report on the results of the observation should be short and clear - what was found and where. For example: "Landmark 2, right 0-10, 1200 meters, armored personnel carrier in a trench." In the absence of landmarks on the ground, the observer gives target designation, indicating the magnetic azimuth to the target and the distance to it. For example: "Azimuth 150 °, 3800 meters - landing of two helicopters."
The observer reports only what he sees. He reports his findings only at the request of the commander.

The change of observers is carried out within the time limits established by the commander (senior of the observation post). The shift time is determined depending on the situation and the weather: under normal conditions - usually after 3-4 hours, in unfavorable conditions - after 1-2 hours. When changing, the relieved informs the reliever about everything noticed in the enemy’s disposition, without fail showing the detected targets on the ground; reports what tasks were assigned to him and how they were completed; transmits observation devices, a terrain map and an observation log (if it is maintained by the observer). After the transfer of duties, the relieved one reports to the commander (senior) about the shift. During the shift, observation of the enemy does not stop.

In mobile types of combat, subunit observers are located and move along with their commanders and conduct observation on the move or from short stops. When operating on foot, the observer is five to eight paces away from the commander. Without stopping observation of the enemy, he must hear the commands given by the commander and see his signals. When the commander stops, the observer is located in the immediate vicinity of him and, hiding behind local objects, observes the enemy.

Long-term observation post (DNP)

This is an observation post prepared in advance, carefully camouflaged, as a rule, buried in the ground, located on the routes of probable movement and disposition of the enemy.
A long-term NP is a type of basing of the Special Forces RG behind enemy lines and is designed for long-term collection of intelligence information through observation, eavesdropping, the use of R and RTR equipment, reconnaissance and signaling, photo and video equipment, with the subsequent transfer of this information to the Center.
In the future, after leaving the DNP, the scouts can carry out special measures at enemy targets.

Variant of a long-term observation post.

DNP are often used sniper groups for conducting reconnaissance by observation and shooting enemy command personnel.
DNP can be used in Peaceful time to monitor the headquarters, bases, safe houses of terrorists, separatists and other illegal formations. In this case, photo and video equipment is widely used. In this case, DNP can be equipped both in residential and non-residential buildings, attics, sheds, etc.
The basing of scouts on the DNP, replenishment of their supplies, removal of waste products and exit from it is carried out under the cover of searches, raids, etc. mass events conducted by police forces.

As an example, let us cite the “control” of the caravan trail by scouts armed with night vision devices. Carrying out observation from a buried DNP, scouts carry out selective detonation of landmines (mines) using the PD-430 radio link.

DNP preparation

• The selection of DNP personnel (as a rule, four scouts) capable of staying in a confined space for a long time (up to several weeks), eat, sleep, relieve themselves in the presence of comrades, and carry out combat duty. This requires special training and truly angelic patience.
• Selection and preparation of the necessary equipment, tools and materials for the equipment of the DNP (timber, metal corners and mesh, ceilings, bags for soil, shovels, saws, axes, etc.)
• Selection and preparation of weapons, means of communication, surveillance and other equipment necessary for the performance of a combat mission
• Selection and preparation of equipment

The order of equipment DNP

First, the pit opens. Part of the soil (preferably dry) is folded into bags, the rest of the soil is secretly taken out and masked. The best option is to dump excess soil into the river. It is possible to use sawdust, needles, hay for stuffing bags. The only requirement is that they should not rustle. The walls and floor, as a rule, are laid out with stuffed bags, supports and ceilings are installed, ventilation pipes (boxes) are inserted, a roof is installed, a soil layer of at least 50 cm is poured and tamped, the roof, the entrance hatch, loopholes for observation or shooting are masked, immediately in front of occupation of the DNP by personnel, they install equipment (seismic sensors, SRPN-1, etc.) and minefields.

The procedure for organizing combat duty at the DNP

A reconnaissance patrol consisting of four scouts is located on the DNP.
Two scouts are observers, and their duties may differ. For example, the first one observes the object, the second one conducts reconnaissance "on itself", i.e. monitors the instruments technical means protection (intelligence), encrypts and transmits messages by radio to the Center. The third scout is ready to replace the observer, cooks food, maintains weapons and equipment, rests, etc. The fourth scout is resting (sleeping in a sleeping bag).
Quadruple DNP should contain only two sleeping bags for the rest shift. Bags should have quick-release zippers for emergency evacuation if necessary. Equipment is always assembled in backpacks. To accommodate it, four backpacks weighing no more than 40 kg should be enough. All scouts are required to know the contents of all backpacks.

Working on the DNP, scouts need special equipment and uniforms that allow them not to get sick from hypothermia and dampness in conditions of sedentary activity in a limited space. Radio traffic with the Center should be kept to a minimum, and the radio communication equipment used should minimize the likelihood of direction finding of your transmitter. The best radio facilities are satellite communication stations; stations using the speed mode and "frequency hopping".

Particular attention should be paid to observance of disguise. Light, smoke, smell are unacceptable. This is especially true for cooking. There are entire cooking kits consisting of insulated thermos containers and chemical cartridges. Perhaps, also, the use of gas stoves. But even when using these containers, beware of the spread of odors.

Despite the fact that open fire contact of scouts with the enemy is highly undesirable. It is necessary to be in constant readiness to attack the DNP when it is detected by the enemy. The installed explosive and signal means, silent weapons will minimize the accidental detection of the DNP by single military personnel, but when the enemy purposefully searches for the DNP and detects it, the scouts accept the battle, stun the enemy and dissolve in space.

Serious attention should be paid to the packaging of scouts' waste products (garbage, excrement, etc.). Waste should be carefully (hermetically) packed in double polyethylene bags of increased strength. At the same time, it costs two-thirds to fill them, since they have to be taken out in backpacks upon completion of the observation. Until the end of the observation, the waste bags located on the DNP should not cause inconvenience to the scouts.

Surveillance at night

Observation at night is much more difficult. It is carried out with artificial lighting of the area, and in unlit areas - with the use of night vision devices. Individual targets and enemy actions can be detected without illumination and the use of night vision devices by light and noise unmasking signs: a cigarette light is visible at a distance of up to 500 m, a burning match - 1-1.5 km; the light of an electric flashlight, flashes of shots when firing from a machine gun or machine gun are visible at a distance of up to 2 km; a fire, the light of the included car headlights is noticeable up to 8 km. At night, much further than during the day, various sounds are heard. For example, the noise of an evenly running tank engine is heard during the day from a distance of 300-400 m, at night - 1000 m or more.

The night requires special attention, caution and discipline from the personnel. An undisciplined scout can unmask himself and his comrades by careless handling of lighting devices, noise, smoking, etc.

When preparing for combat work at night, observers prepare optical and electronic-optical devices, tablets and circuits, means of illuminating the area and lighting for work before dark, cover the trench with a cape or tarpaulin, study the area, remember the outlines and the relative position of night landmarks and local items.

Darkness is chosen as night landmarks tall trees, buildings, factory chimneys, and other local objects that can be seen silhouetted against the sky. In addition, directions to landmarks can be hung with white pegs, light points, seen with a compass or angular values ​​on the scales of observation devices. Sometimes, in the absence of clearly defined landmarks, light landmarks (not observed by the enemy) are set up at a distance not closer than 50 m from the place of observation.
Before darkness falls, observers adjust the eyepieces of optical instruments according to their eyes and memorize the corresponding division. This allows, when observing at night, to quickly restore the lost aiming of the device.

To determine at night the direction to a target that briefly unmasks itself with light signs (flashes of shots, headlights, etc.), the observer sticks a freshly planed (white) peg 30-40 cm high and a finger thick into the ground at a distance of several meters from him. Then he takes a shorter peg (about 20 cm) and, noticing the flash of a shot, sticks it into the ground right in front of him so that he is on target with the previously set peg and flash (shine). The correctness of the position of the nearest peg is specified during subsequent observations of flashes (sparkle). After that, the position of the target on the ground is determined.

During the fighting in the Republic of Afghanistan, military reconnaissance observers at outposts at night used a very simple but effective method of detecting mortar firing positions ( launchers rockets) of the opponent. To do this, a circle with a goniometric scale (like an artillery circle) was made from plexiglass, plexiglass, or even plywood with a movable sighting device attached to it. This device (the post on which it was installed) was accurately tied to the map and oriented to the cardinal points.

For orientation, with the help of precise angle measuring instruments (artillery compass, laser reconnaissance device, radar station, etc.), the angle was measured to some remote landmark visible from the post. Then the circle was aimed at this landmark and rigidly fixed in this position. As soon as the enemy fired a mortar (launching a rocket), one of the observers quickly aimed the target arrow at the flash of the shot and measured the elevation angle of the target. Another observer at this time, using a stopwatch, noted the time during which the sound from the shot from the moment of the flash would reach the observation post, and determined the distance to the target.
At the same time, the accuracy of determining the location of the target on the ground with trained observers turned out to be sufficient for its destruction by artillery fire. An increase in accuracy was also achieved by increasing (to reasonable limits) the diameter of the goniometric circle and reducing the division value of the goniometric scale.
Scouts often used this method in the daytime, pinpointing the target location by the dust and smoke generated during the shot, however, in this case, the accuracy of determining the distance is reduced, since the observer detects these signs with some delay from the moment of the shot.

The human eye is not capable of immediately adapting and clearly distinguishing objects during a sharp transition from light to dark. Therefore, before you start observing at night, you need to stay in the dark for 20-30 minutes and not look at the light source. When observing, you should always remember that if you just look at the light for a short time, the adaptation of the eyes will be lost again and it will take at least 20 minutes to restore it again. In order not to disrupt the adaptation of the eyes, it is necessary to close one eye when taking readings from instruments, when working with a map, diagram, which are illuminated, and it is best to use a flashlight with a red light. You should not peer into the darkness for a long time, so as not to tire your eyesight. It is recommended to periodically close your eyes for 5-10 seconds. Such a short rest allows you to get rid of fatigue. Under artificial lighting, you can not look at the light source; it is recommended to cover the eyes from the lighting with a visor or palm and observe only the illuminated area and the enemy.

When visually determining distances on a terrain illuminated by artificial light sources, it should be borne in mind that objects located in illuminated areas seem closer than they really are, and dark, unlit objects appear smaller and more distant.
An observer (observation post) can illuminate the area with rockets only at the direction of the commander.

In the dark, the attention of the observer is important, therefore, during reconnaissance at night, one should not be distracted by any extraneous thoughts, conversations, actions, but it is necessary to direct attention exclusively to observation - this increases the sensitivity of vision by 1.5 times. To increase attention and sensitivity of vision, it is recommended to observe in a sitting position.
Deep breathing (full inhalation and exhalation eight to ten times per minute), wiping the forehead, eyelids, temples, neck, nape with cold water cause a significant increase in the sensitivity of vision and reduce the time for complete adaptation to darkness from 30-40 to 10 minutes. Temporarily increase visual acuity, relieve drowsiness and fatigue, pharmacological agents: cola preparations, caffeine, glucose, etc. half an hour after taking and lasts 1.5-2 hours. These methods of increasing the sensitivity of vision and attention, relieving fatigue and drowsiness are applicable by scouts not only when acting as observers, but also when they perform combat missions in other ways.

For observation at night, various night vision devices are widely used. Night binoculars and sights do not require artificial illumination of the terrain in the infrared spectrum and therefore do not unmask observers. At the same time, night vision devices are most effective on a bright starry or moonlit night. Rain, fog, dust significantly reduce the detection range. Weak artificial illumination of the area with the help of conventional lighting means significantly increases the range of night vision devices. Bright lighting devices (searchlights, headlights, bonfires, fires, tracers) falling into the field of view of devices create interference and impair the effectiveness of observation.
Detection and recognition of targets in night vision devices require certain skills acquired by training. This is due to the fact that when viewed through night vision devices, the natural coloring of the terrain and local objects does not differ. Various objects are recognized only by their shape (silhouette) and by the degree of contrast.
The range of vision increases if the target is located on a light background (sand, snow), and decreases if the target is located on a dark background (arable land, tree trunks, etc.).

At night, observation of the enemy is also carried out with the help of radar stations, which make it possible to detect moving ground targets, determine their nature (type) and polar coordinates (range and direction).
Radar stations should be located in areas of the terrain that have an excess over the reconnaissance area. It is not recommended to place such a post in the immediate vicinity of large metal surfaces (bridges, cranes, parking lots), power and telephone lines, large buildings; these objects distort the radiation pattern and increase errors in determining the coordinates of the target.
When masking radar stations, wet objects (branches, grass, camouflage net, etc.) should not be allowed to fall within the radiation pattern.

Eavesdropping

Eavesdropping as a method of reconnaissance at night and in other conditions of limited visibility supplements observation and is used when troops operate in direct contact with the enemy, as well as when reconnaissance agencies operate behind enemy lines. In order to conceal their actions and intentions, the enemy will seek to carry out many activities at night: the withdrawal of nuclear attack weapons and artillery to positions, the movement of command posts and troops, taking up a starting position for an offensive, etc. These actions, with all the caution of the enemy, will be accompanied by characteristic sounds and noise, listening to which experienced scouts determine where and what the enemy is doing.

Intelligence by eavesdropping is carried out by observers and observation posts. If necessary, special eavesdropping posts can be created. The eavesdropping post is made up of two or three scouts, one of them is appointed senior. If the conditions allow one to hear the spoken language of the enemy, then for eavesdropping it is necessary to appoint scouts who know the language of the enemy.
The task of the eavesdropping post is set, as a rule, before dark on the ground. At the same time, the following are indicated: landmarks visible at night; information about the enemy; place of post; what to install and what sound signs to look for Special attention; reconnaissance time and report order. If an eavesdropping post is sent beyond the forward edge (guard line) of friendly troops, then the scouts are told the order of advancement and return, admission and withdrawal. Fire weapons are assigned to cover their actions.

If time permits, the observers assigned to conduct reconnaissance by eavesdropping, in advance (before dark) study the position of the enemy, the terrain in the indicated area, and the routes of advance and return. At a specified time, usually after dark, the observers (scouts) move secretly to the place indicated by them for eavesdropping and proceed to the task.
Observation posts, eavesdropping posts, individual "hearers" and scouts operating behind enemy lines must be able to understand sounds, determine the direction to the sound source and the distance to it.
The direction to the sound source can be determined by pointing the device (finder) or by fixing the direction. The observer, having heard the sound, notices an object in this direction, points the observation device (finder) at it and waits for the target to reappear. By correcting (specifying) the pointing of the device (finder) at the sound source, each time it appears, the direction to the target is determined.

Approximately, the range to the sounding target, as well as its nature, can be determined by the maximum audibility of sounds. In this case, it is necessary to take into account the individual capabilities of each scout and weather. On a calm night, in fog, with high humidity, after rain, in winter, audibility increases.

Approximate limits of audibility of sounds at night

The direction of the wind should also be taken into account: it not only worsens or improves audibility depending on the direction, but also carries the sound to the side, creating a distorted idea of ​​the location of the sound source.

Mountains, forests, buildings, ravines, gorges and deep ravines also change the direction of the sound, creating an echo. Generate echo and water spaces, contributing to its spread over long distances.
The sound seems different when the source moves over soft, wet, or hard ground, along a street, along a country or field road, over a pavement, or over leafy ground. Keep in mind that dry ground or railroad tracks transmit sounds better than air. Therefore, they listen with their ear to the ground or to the rails.

To better listen to the enemy's earthworks, the scout puts his ear to a dry board laid on the ground, which acts as a sound collector, or to a dry log dug into the ground. You can use a medical stethoscope or make a homemade water stethoscope, which was often used by reconnaissance sappers during the war years. To make it, you need to fill a glass flask or a thin-walled glass bottle with water up to the beginning of the neck and close it with a cork with a hole. Then, insert a tube (preferably glass) into the hole of the cork, on which to put a rubber tube. The other end of the rubber tube, equipped with a tip, is inserted into the ear. The bottle is buried in the ground to the level of water in it. To check the sensitivity of the installed device, you need to hit the ground with your finger at a distance of 4 m from it - the sound from such a blow should be clearly heard through the rubber tube.

Features of observation in the mountains

When operating in the mountains, observers and observation posts are located at dominant heights with a large horizon and a small number of fields of invisibility. However, not every high point Might be a good place to watch. For observation, first of all, such places are chosen that are distinguished by a good close outlook. For observation, one should not be located directly on the top of the mountain (topographic ridge), it is more advantageous to choose a place for observation on inconspicuous slopes at some distance from the top. When placing observers near local objects, it is necessary to position and observe from the shadow side of the objects. It is not recommended to occupy trees with bird nests for observation, the screams and disturbing flight of which can unmask the observer.

Before starting observation in a mountainous area, it is necessary to understand the settlements lying ahead, where each path goes, the conditional names of landmarks and characteristic local objects (heights, peaks, gorges, etc.). It must be remembered that in the mountains the distances to landmarks and local objects are greatly concealed. At each observation post, it is advisable to have a scheme of invisibility fields and take measures to organize additional observation of them

The most reliable place for observers is the trench. But it is not always possible to equip it in the mountains, especially in rocky soil, therefore, stones must be used to equip an observation post: a parapet is formed from them, and then covered with earth and carefully masked. It is advantageous to equip a position for an observation post from stones and boulders on rocky slopes, on which it merges well with the surrounding area.

At night, some observers are recommended to be located at the foot and on the slopes of heights in such a way as to observe from the bottom up and see the enemy against the sky, remaining unnoticed. When observing using means of illuminating the terrain, one must take into account the formation of shadows that hide the movement of the enemy.

Observation in the mountains at night is complemented by eavesdropping. The sound in the mountains increases sharply, especially in fog, near the river, in the presence of snow cover, as well as after rain and in the morning, when the air humidity is high. However, when organizing eavesdropping, it should be borne in mind that sounds in the mountains often change their original direction (mountain echo) and reach the reconnaissance from the side opposite to the actual position of the source.
The task of the eavesdropping post is placed on the ground, as a rule, before dark, from a point from where the place intended for eavesdropping can be seen. At the post, the scouts are located in a triangle (angle forward). The older one is usually in front. Duties are distributed as follows: one listens to everything that is done in front of him and to the right, the second - in front and to the left, the third - behind. This method of action allows you to eavesdrop in all directions, without scattering attention.

This is a specific type of combat operations that requires special training of personnel and the use of special means.

The reconnaissance group is created from specially trained personnel of the reconnaissance unit military intelligence usually within a department. The reconnaissance group is designed to operate behind enemy lines to open objects of nuclear and chemical attack, precision weapons, command posts, reserves, airfields and other facilities. A reconnaissance group can be sent behind enemy lines by helicopters (aircraft) with parachute or landing methods, on combat vehicles and other vehicles, on foot, and in coastal areas - by means of the fleet. A reconnaissance detachment (RO) is sent from a unit or formation in various types of combat. A reinforced reconnaissance (motorized rifle, tank) company or battalion is assigned to the reconnaissance detachment.

The actions of intelligence agencies to obtain intelligence information are carried out different ways. A reconnaissance method is a technique (method) of actions of reconnaissance forces and means in order to obtain reconnaissance information. The main methods of conducting ground tactical (military) reconnaissance are: observation, eavesdropping, search, raid, reconnaissance ambush, reconnaissance in force, interrogation of prisoners (defectors), interrogation local residents.

Observation is the main method of reconnaissance. It is organized and conducted in all types of combat activities of the troops continuously, day and night, at any time of the year and in any situation.

Eavesdropping as a method of reconnaissance is used in direct contact with the enemy, as well as during the actions of reconnaissance units in his rear. It is carried out at any time of the day, especially at night and in conditions of limited visibility (snowfall, fog, blizzard). Eavesdropping reconnaissance can be conducted by ear or by using technical means. Eavesdropping complements surveillance and is used in conjunction with it.

The search is organized for the purpose of capturing prisoners and is carried out, as a rule, before an offensive, mainly at night and in other conditions of limited visibility. It consists in a covert approach of a group (subunit) to a previously planned studied object, a surprise attack on it in order to capture prisoners, documents, weapons and equipment, and a quick retreat to the location of their troops.

A raid is usually carried out by a reconnaissance patrol in order to capture prisoners, documents, samples of weapons and equipment of the enemy, as well as to destroy an important object. It consists in a sudden attack on a pre-selected (designated) enemy object. In contrast to the search, which is carried out as silently as possible, the actions of scouts during a raid are based on a skillful combination of fire, surprise, and a swift strike, ending, as a rule, in a short hand-to-hand fight.

A reconnaissance ambush is carried out by a reconnaissance patrol, as well as by a platoon (squad, tank group) specially assigned for this purpose in order to capture prisoners, documents, samples of weapons and equipment of the enemy. It consists in the advance and covert location of a group subdivision on the expected or probable enemy movement routes for a surprise attack on him in order to capture prisoners, documents, weapons, military equipment and equipment. Important information can be obtained by interrogating prisoners, defectors, and interviewing local residents.

Reconnaissance in combat is an extreme but effective measure in obtaining data on the strength and armament of the enemy. It is carried out by attacking the alleged camouflaged positions of the enemy, who has gone over to the defensive. Most often, reconnaissance in combat is carried out in cases where other methods of reconnaissance cannot provide command with the necessary data about the enemy and his intentions, or when it is not possible to obtain them by other means. In military practice, reconnaissance in combat is most often used if the operational situation requires the speedy advance of troops. Reconnaissance in force consists in a sudden attack by a predetermined and prepared subunit in order to take possession of a certain object in the position of the enemy. During the Great Patriotic War reconnaissance found wide application and usually gives positive results. It provided the most complete and reliable data on the location, forces, grouping and system of fire of the enemy, as well as on the nature of the terrain equipment in his location.

Time for a thorough analysis of the information obtained by tactical intelligence is limited, and they quickly become outdated. In this case, inaccurate or inaccurate information may lead to big losses, and even to the defeat of the troops who used them.

Study the enemy, improve intelligence - the eyes and ears of the army, remember that without this it is impossible to beat the enemy for sure.

Order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin to front-line scouts, 1944

Military intelligence, or tactical intelligence, is military intelligence that provides combat operations of troops at the tactical level (within the formations, units and subunits that are in contact with the enemy). This is one of the main types of combat support. It reveals data about the enemy's combat capabilities (including his plans), his vulnerability and the area of ​​​​operations (including terrain and weather conditions). It is conducted in the interests of units and formations of the ground forces by reconnaissance, motorized rifle, tank and paratrooper units. In order to organize a battle and control forces and means in the course of its conduct, each commander needs to know where the enemy is and what he is doing, his intentions, combat composition, weapons and grouping of troops, strong and weak sides, as well as the nature of the terrain in the area of ​​forthcoming actions. The clarification of these questions constitutes the range of tasks solved by military intelligence. All questions that the military intelligence agencies have to resolve ultimately boil down to the following: to obtain timely information about the enemy, the terrain, the population and local means; study them and systematize, and then report to their command, higher headquarters and bring them to the troops. Intelligence can successfully fulfill these tasks only if the work of all its organs and means is clearly organized and coordinated. All efforts of military intelligence should be aimed at helping to solve the main combat mission of the unit (combination).

For successful combat, it is important to know where field artillery, tanks, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, machine gun firing positions, observation posts and enemy control posts are located. Therefore, opening the areas of their location (firing positions) is one of the main tasks tactical intelligence. Tactical reconnaissance is also entrusted with determining the nature and degree of engineering equipment for enemy positions and areas of location of enemy subunits and units, the system of his barriers, and the degree of terrain passability. The most important task facing tactical reconnaissance has also always been to identify new means of armed struggle, methods and methods of conducting combat operations. Intelligence information is obtained by interviewing local residents, interrogating prisoners and defectors, radio interception, studying documents, equipment and weapons captured from the enemy, ground and air reconnaissance.

Combat experience of the enemy.

MILITARY THOUGHT No. 7/1993, pp. 55-62

ColonelV.E. SHULGIN ,

candidate of military sciences

ColonelYu.L. FESENKO ,

Doctor of Technical Sciences

MILITARY conflicts of recent decades, despite their local nature, have made it possible to discover what is usually carefully hidden by all the armies of the world - new military equipment. In addition, they marked new stage in the development of means of armed struggle, since a creative understanding of the experience of military operations was a powerful impetus to continue research and improve weapons. In this respect, the war in the Persian Gulf zone is no exception. A number of publications in the domestic and foreign press are devoted to the analysis of its results. In this case, special attention, as a rule, is paid to the actual side of military operations, as well as to the forecast of changes in the forms and methods of their conduct. Without denying the importance of such an approach to the study of foreign combat experience, we consider it necessary to dwell on the main trends in the development of operational and tactical intelligence, which were most clearly manifested in the course of this military conflict.

The choice of this issue is not accidental, since the success of Operation Desert Storm and the subsequent offensive actions of the MNF was predetermined by the fact that they had modern means reconnaissance, its skillful organization and conduct in difficult conditions. The Iraqi side paid much attention to operational and tactical camouflage measures, using new ones along with traditional means - inflatable models of aircraft, tanks, launchers coated with metallic paint and equipped with thermal emitters. The use by the Iraqis of the camouflage properties of the terrain, various structures (tunnels, bridges, overpasses, etc.), standard camouflage coverings, the creation of a system of false positions and trenches, and imitation of combat activity significantly complicated the collection of intelligence data by the MNF. For example, Iraq managed to hide the location of air defense systems not only from US reconnaissance satellites, but also from reconnaissance aviation of the Ministry of Forces, whose command was subsequently forced to admit that "up to 50% of strikes against air defense facilities were on false targets." Nevertheless, the military leadership of the MNF was able to obtain fairly complete data on the plan of action, the composition of the groupings of troops, the construction of the defense and the nature of its engineering equipment, as well as to establish the location of fire weapons, command posts and enemy rear facilities. This became possible thanks to the integrated use of space, air, ground, sea, special reconnaissance and ensured the effectiveness of fire strikes and troop actions. It is no coincidence that a high level of operational and tactical intelligence is attributed by US military experts to the main components of victory in the war. And vice versa, the lack of long-range (space and air) reconnaissance assets on the Iraqi side, as well as its weak organization, did not allow timely revealing the directions of the main attacks of the MNF and doomed the artillery group, which was superior in number, equipped with long-range systems, to inactivity, which was one of the most important reasons for the defeat .

The role of fire damage, especially in modern operations, can hardly be overestimated. Constituting the main content of hostilities, it has long acquired a complex character. Its main task was to defeat enemy groupings, destroy nuclear attack weapons, gain fire superiority and provide continuous fire support for troop actions in solving operational and tactical tasks.

The results of the combat use of the latest high-precision weapons and electronic warfare during the war in the Persian Gulf were so impressive that they made it possible to conclude aboutthe possibility of achieving operational-strategic goals without the invasion of ground forces into enemy territory. That is why, in the domestic and foreign press, the period of the war in the Persian Gulf zone before the start of offensive operations by ground forces was called the electronic fire phase, or electronic fire operation.

The steady increase in the role of fire damage, the expansion of the range of tasks it solves, a significant increase in the firepower of weapons of destruction (range and accuracy of fire, rate of fire, power of ammunition) led to an increase in the importance intelligence data mined in order to plan and carry out fire engagement, their shares in the total volume of tasks performed by operational and tactical intelligence.

However, the development of operational and tactical intelligence within the framework of the so-called vertical integration was determined primarily by the needs of a particular type of armed forces (arms of service). Only for reconnaissance means directly integrated with means of destruction was the task of obtaining reconnaissance data, the reliability, timeliness and accuracy of which would ensure the possibility of their use to destroy detected objects, considered as the main one. This facilitated the management of reconnaissance means, limited the flow of information to the volumes necessary for planning and command and control. In the development of other reconnaissance means, the requirement to obtain data that could be directly used in the interests of enemy fire engagement was by no means always presented. Thus, the main purpose of radio reconnaissance equipment usually consisted in intercepting enemy radio communications, and the task of determining the location of his radio stations, if any, was usually limited to determining their areas of location, which excluded the possibility of using the received data in interests of fire damage control points. Relapses of this approach have not been eliminated even now, when, for example, in the development of electronic intelligence equipment, they are limited to information that, at best, allows clarifying the type and organizational affiliation of the detected radars, which practically excludes the possibility of their fire damage.

Such an approach does not correspond to the general trend of increasing the role of fire damage in armed struggle. When preparing an electronic fire operation, the main thing is not so much obtaining information for a general operational-tactical assessment of the situation as obtaining data, the timeliness, reliability, accuracy and completeness of which would ensure the delivery of effective fire strikes using conventional and high-precision weapons, as well as electronic suppression of enemy troop and weapon control systems.

Calculations show that in modern operations over 85% of intelligence information is obtained by the technical means of radio-electronic systems deployed on ground, air and space carriers, therefore, it is they who must ensure the receipt of data in the interests of fire damage. Such a requirement in the armies of a number of states has become the main one in the creation of technical reconnaissance equipment, regardless of their organizational affiliation.

A good example is the Jistars airborne reconnaissance and strike control system. The capabilities of this system are not limited to determining the coordinates of detected targets. Its most important task is to guide weapons and determine meeting points for firing field artillery at moving objects. Consequently, "Jistars", along with the actual reconnaissance function, includes shock system elements, which significantly expands its capabilities.

Thus, obtaining data in the interests of fire damage (electronic suppression) and bringing them to headquarters and fire weapons (electronic warfare equipment) on a time scale close to real is put forward as the main requirements for reconnaissance technical means (systems), regardless of their organizational affiliation. Along with this, in recent times more and more often they are assigned the task of aiming weapons at detected targets.

The experience of the war in the Persian Gulf shows that not all of the reconnaissance assets of the MNF made it possible to effectively solve the listed tasks. I had to make adjustments already in the course of combat operations. In this regard, the experience of using the launch detection system is indicative. ballistic missiles Imeus (USA). Initially, it was intended for preliminary notification of the command posts of the Patriot air defense system and target designation of strike aviation groups of the MNF about missile launch sites, but this was not enough to deliver timely strikes against Iraqi mobile missile systems, who had time to leave the starting positions before the appearance of strike groups. The prompt introduction of changes in the procedure for receiving and processing the information received by the system significantly increased the timeliness and, consequently, the effectiveness of target designation for strike aircraft. Similar tasks were set before reconnaissance means before, and they were often considered the main ones, for example, for reconnaissance means of RV and A of the ground forces. Moreover, it was they who determined the need for vertical integration of reconnaissance and destruction means, when each military formation was equipped with its own reconnaissance means, which, along with giving them a certain tactical independence, made it possible to significantly reduce the time for transmitting information to means of destruction.

The vertical integration of reconnaissance and destruction assets also had negative sides. The point is that when developing them, as a rule, only the needs of the type of armed forces (arms or formation) in whose interests these funds were created were taken into account. This led to an unjustified dissipation of finances, an increase in the cost of development and production of weapons. There were also shortcomings in the use of intelligence information, when only those that were determined by the needs of the corresponding type of armed forces (type of troops or formation) were taken into account from their total volume, while part of the intelligence information could be lost or come to headquarters too late. In case of overlapping of reconnaissance lanes (zones, sectors), part of the data obtained by reconnaissance means various formations, duplicated each other, while important objects located outside the reconnaissance lanes could turn out to be unexplored. All this confirms the experience of using heterogeneous weapons in the Persian Gulf zone. As noted in the Pentagon report to the US Congress, “due to the imperfection of the technical means of reconnaissance of the ground forces, the Air Force and the Navy, as well as the unsatisfactory coordination of their efforts during Operation Desert Storm, numerous cases were noted when, for example, naval aviation struck at previously hit targets, bypassing those that, according to intelligence, were considered destroyed. Similar facts took place in the actions of the means of destruction of the ground forces, the Air Force, which also repeatedly struck at previously struck (destroyed) targets.

The above facts confirm an important regularity that is manifested in the development of weapons on present stage: the more destructive power and independence in solving fire missions increases, the more the effectiveness of their use depends on the timeliness, reliability, accuracy and completeness of intelligence data. Nevertheless, the development of reconnaissance equipment, even when creating reconnaissance-strike complexes, abroad was originally supposed to be carried out on the basis of vertical integration. For example, the first sample of the Assolt Breaker RUK was focused on its own means of reconnaissance and target designation - the Pave Mover radar station, placed on an air carrier. In the promising Djisak RUK, which is being developed in two versions (for the ground forces and the Air Force), it is also planned to have independent reconnaissance assets: in ground forces it was supposed to use the OV-1D Mohawk aircraft as the carrier of the side-looking radar, and the Air Force - TR-1 and C-18 aircraft. Subsequently, it was decided to use in both versions of the RUK a radar system for aerial reconnaissance of ground targets and control of the Gistars strike. This meant, if not a rejection of the traditional form of vertical integration of reconnaissance and destruction means, then at least a transition to the creation of reconnaissance systems in the interests of several branches of the armed forces. The combination of reconnaissance and strike capabilities in the Gestars system contributed to the improvement of the management of heterogeneous weapons.

The new concept of using the Gistars radar system provides for its use not only in the interests of the RUK, but also in planning fire engagement in army corps and divisions. Its use during the war in the Persian Gulf (to track Iraqi reserves and detect batteries at ranges exceeding the capabilities of the radar reconnaissance of the American divisions' counter-battery systems) confirmed that the horizontal integration of reconnaissance and destruction, along with vertical, significantly increases the effectiveness of the use of reconnaissance information and capabilities of weapons. This allows us to take a significant step in solving one of the urgent problems of intelligence - increasing the reliability of intelligence information in the interests of fire damage. Since most of the most important targets (launchers, batteries of self-propelled guns, MLRS, etc.) are mobile, their effective engagement is possible only if it is carried out immediately after detection, when it is difficult or practically absent to confirm the reliability of data about them. According to foreign military experts, the solution to this problem lies in the horizontal integration of reconnaissance assets of formations (formations) based on the creation of reconnaissance control systems. An example is the automated system for processing and analyzing intelligence data of the air army (army corps, division) ASAS. The deepest integration of various types of reconnaissance has been achieved at the divisional level (see table).

Automated system for processing and analyzing intelligence data of the ACAS division

Radio reconnaissance (interception and direction finding points of the Trailerblazer radio intelligence complex, Quick-Fix helicopter complex) and radio engineering (Timpeks ground-based radio intelligence complex, Maltyuz helicopter complex) reconnaissance transmit information to interfacing posts with reconnaissance equipment ASAS system, from where, after primary processing, it enters the division's technical intelligence and electronic warfare center, where one of the centers of this system is located. Here, intelligence is processed, analyzed and transmitted to a similar center located at the divisional combat operations control center (TsUBD). It also receives decoded radar reconnaissance data from the radar reconnaissance of moving targets (AN / TPQ-58), the Firefinder counter-battery radar system (radar AN / TPQ-36 and AN / TPQ -37), sound reconnaissance, optoelectronic means of advanced artillery observers (PAN), as well as from the Jistars air reconnaissance system, air surveillance equipment, etc. In the TsUBD, the received data is processed and combined into a single overall picture of the object situation with the recognition of subunits, units and formations. The final information is issued in the form of an electronic map of the current objective situation, which facilitates its operational-tactical assessment, revealing the enemy's action plan, and developing recommendations for fire engagement. However, the main thing is that Comparison of intelligence information received from various sources makes it possible to significantly increase its reliability and, consequently, the effectiveness of the use of weapons. In addition, automatic duplication of intelligence data bases available at each of the intelligence control points in the division, army corps and air army (connection of these points to each other) makes it possible to use all available reconnaissance means to fill in the missing information in the interests of any fire control authority. The ability to include a reconnaissance asset in the system at the request of command instances (including the TsUBD) is a significant step in improving the management of operational and tactical intelligence, as it allows you to manage all reconnaissance assets of a formation (connection) from a single center, which significantly increases its capabilities when solving the problems of an electronic fire operation.

It should be noted that, while forming large-scale horizontal structures, automated intelligence control systems do not exclude their already established vertical integration. Being structured into such formations as RUK, ROK, field artillery units and subunits, reconnaissance assets, as before, will support their combat activities. At the same time, their integration into the reconnaissance system of a formation (connection) increases the reliability of reconnaissance information received by command and control authorities, where direct planning of fire engagement is carried out, ensuring clear coordination of the actions of various means of destruction.

Consequently, the creation of intelligence management systems based on both horizontal and vertical integration of intelligence assets of a formation (connection) makes it possible to use them more efficiently. combat capabilities to improve the reliability of intelligence information. In addition, including them in common system combat control and interfacing with subsystems of weapons of destruction provides operational and tactical reconnaissance with the required activity and purposefulness when obtaining data in the interests of planning and implementing an electronic fire operation, it facilitates the achievement of clear and coordinated actions in it by heterogeneous means of destruction and electronic suppression.

An analysis of the capabilities of the ASAS system makes it possible to reveal another important trend in the improvement of operational and tactical intelligence - providing various command authorities with reconnaissance information about objects located at distances significantly exceeding the reach of the fire weapons at their disposal. When implementing the concept of an air-ground operation, this will make it possible to conduct effective reconnaissance in the zone of a potential threat of consolidation (linkage), provide an opportunity to reveal the intentions of the opposite side in a timely manner, plan preemptive fire strikes in advance, seize the initiative and achieve defeat of the enemy in parts. More greater value acquires the availability of intelligence data in the context of a reduction in the number of armed forces, when a decrease in the number of troops on the battlefield will lead to the absence of a clearly defined line of contact between them. Besides, an increase in the reconnaissance range will make it possible to track objects (targets) long before they appear in the range of weapons. The possibility of a retrospective review of the objective situation provides a more complete assessment of the reliability of intelligence data. Search, detection, recognition, determination of coordinates and other characteristics of objects, as well as the transfer of these data to the appropriate command instances, are accompanied by certain time costs that characterize the "inertia" of intelligence. The creation of intelligence management systems will make it possible to practically solve this problem. According to calculations by US military experts, the reconnaissance equipment with which divisions and army corps should be equipped by the mid-1990s, during the most intense periods of hostilities, will be able to create flows of reconnaissance information (each with tens of thousands of targets) with an intensity of about 80-110 messages. per minute. Therefore, they rightly believe that timely processing of intelligence information is possible only in automatic or semi-automatic mode. This is how it will be possible to ensure the “inertia-free” intelligence, to bring all intelligence information into a single picture of the objective situation on a time scale close to real. It is quite obvious that reducing the time for planning an operation (by automating the processes of command and control of troops and weapons) loses its meaning if the collection and processing of intelligence information about the enemy continues to be carried out for several hours.

The resolution of this contradiction consists in the introduction of cybernetic methods and elements of "artificial intelligence" into the technology of searching, detecting, recognizing targets and determining their coordinates, collecting and processing intelligence information. The use of standard sets of objective signs of various targets, electronic "templates" for recognizing the type and determining the organizational affiliation of detected electronic means, self- and cross-correlation methods for identifying individual and group targets, as well as assessing their reliability, machine synthesis of a general picture of the object situation based on sets of individual and group targets - this is a far from complete list of methods for automating the processes of detection, recognition, and location of objects developed in the interests of creating the ASAS system, as well as other reconnaissance systems.

Undoubtedly, the widespread introduction of methods for automating intelligence management processes was determined by the needs of practice, but the technological base of modern technical means played a significant role in this. Exactly radio-electronic complexes, which are currently the basis of technical means of reconnaissance, turned out to be the most suitable for the perception of cybernetic methods for automating the processes of processing signals-carriers of reconnaissance information. This accelerated the technical implementation of tasks exact definition coordinates of stationary and moving targets, as well as automation of calculations related to predicting their location for targeting weapons and delivering fire strikes.

It should be noted that these methods for decoding intelligence information carrier signals, recognizing targets and determining their coordinates are universal and can be used in systems and devices, regardless of their belonging to one or another type of armed forces (arms of service) and the purpose of reconnaissance means. This will allow, in order to create them, to combine the efforts of research and production institutions of various departments, which will undoubtedly contribute to a significant reduction in financial costs and time for creating new technology.

Consequently, the transition from individual assets and reconnaissance complexes to automated reconnaissance systems and reconnaissance control systems, which represent the highest degree of integration of reconnaissance assets in the interests of operational and combat support for the actions of troops in an electronic fire operation, is the essence of the most important trend in improving operational and tactical reconnaissance.

In connection with the widespread introduction of various automated reconnaissance systems, it is appropriate to note that they are only elements of the general reconnaissance and fire system of formations and formations, which ensures their integrated use.

Reforming the Russian Armed Forces requires clear guidelines. Therefore, today it is especially important to deeply study the main patterns and trends in the development and combat use weapons and military equipment. The experience of the war in the Persian Gulf once again confirmed that victory in armed struggle under modern conditions is possible only if high degree awareness of the intentions and actions of the enemy, which can be achieved only by equipping the troops with highly effective reconnaissance equipment, their skillful and comprehensive use. Very promising in this regard, especially in the context of a sharp reduction in appropriations for the creation of weapons and military equipment, is the trend of horizontal integration of reconnaissance means through the development and implementation of reconnaissance systems in the interests of several types (arms) of the Armed Forces. Along with a significant increase in the efficiency of reconnaissance, the reliability of the data obtained by it and the accuracy of determining the coordinates of the objects (targets) being struck, this promises a significant reduction in the financial and time costs for the creation of new equipment. In addition, the development and implementation of automated reconnaissance and reconnaissance control systems facilitates the creation of unified reconnaissance, electronic warfare and fire control centers, which fully corresponds to their role in an electronic fire operation. The results of the use of diverse forces and means of destruction in MNF operations have shown that it is necessary to integrate reconnaissance systems and means of destruction based on modern means of control into a single technological reconnaissance and fire control system for fire damage, electronic suppression and reconnaissance, and this requires a clear coordination of the work of various institutions and departments in the creation of advanced models of weapons.

This path does not contradict the scientific and technical policy of Russia, aimed at increasing the firepower of formations and formations by increasing the quality parameters of weapons and military equipment.

military thought. - 1991. - No. 5. - P.65.

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Anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, firing positions machine guns, observational posts and enemy command posts. Therefore, revealing the areas of their location (firing positions) is one of the main tasks of tactical reconnaissance.

Tactical reconnaissance is also responsible for determining the nature and degree of engineering equipment for enemy positions and areas of location of enemy subunits and units, the system of his obstacles, and the degree of terrain passability ( engineering intelligence).

The most important task facing tactical reconnaissance has also always been to identify new means of armed struggle, methods and methods of conducting combat operations.

Intelligence information is obtained by interviewing local residents, interrogating prisoners and defectors by radio interception, the study of captured from the enemy documents, equipment and weapons, ground and aerial reconnaissance.

Ground tactical reconnaissance is carried out by reconnaissance, motorized rifle, airborne and airborne assault, regimental divisions. Use of observers, observation posts, sentinels branches(tanks), reconnaissance, combat reconnaissance, individual reconnaissance, officer intelligence patrols, reconnaissance detachments , reconnaissance groups, groups for holding searches , ambush, divisions for carrying out reconnaissance in force.

Intelligence methods

Methods of conducting ground tactical reconnaissance are: observation, eavesdropping, Search , plaque , ambush , interrogation, reconnaissance in combat.

For motorized rifle/parachute/tank battalion/battalion marines such unit was intelligence platoon (RV). task RV was the collection of intelligence data necessary to solve the combat missions assigned to battalion. Personnel RV consisted of 16-21 fighters and consisted of three branches - two intelligence departments and one engineering intelligence department.
Reconnaissance platoons in the battalions in Soviet army in the postwar period were introduced experimentally Afghan war.

... In October 1984, full-time reconnaissance platoons were formed in motorized rifle and airborne battalions ...

The machine guns and machine guns that were in service with the scouts had a version with folding butts and straps for attaching night sights. In the 80s it was AKS-74N and RPKS-74N. Regular weapons of commanders branches was an automatic AKMSN with silencer PBS(at the end of the 80s, the troops began to receive PBS-4 and subsonic cartridges for AKS-74N, which made it possible to switch to a single caliber small arms in the department). Commander reconnaissance platoon had a pistol as an additional service weapon PB. In addition, the scouts were equipped with night sights, night vision devices, periscopes(scout pipe) mine detectors, climbing equipment, camouflage gowns and masks.

Gathering information about the tactical situation necessary to solve the combat missions assigned to regiment /brigade, was engaged intelligence company (RR). RR consisted of two shelf) or three (for brigades) reconnaissance platoons and company management- consisted of personnel of 50-80 fighters (the number depended on a regular car or armored vehicles).

The ORB included separate platoons at the battalion headquarters - a supply platoon, a communications platoon and a reconnaissance surveillance platoon (VRN). The tasks of the VRN were to monitor the enemy on the line of contact of the troops, through powerful optical systems and with the help of portable ground reconnaissance radar stations (for example, product 1RL133 PSNR-5).

1st and 2nd reconnaissance companies as part of the ORB consisted of two reconnaissance platoons and tank platoon. tank platoon was intended for fire support during reconnaissance in force and was armed with light amphibious tanks PT-76(for ORB consisting of OKSVA - T-55/62) in the amount of 3 units.

reconnaissance airborne company consisted of two reconnaissance airborne platoons and one special intelligence platoon(This platoon was intended to carry out reconnaissance and sabotage activities). In each reconnaissance company in service was one multifunctional combat reconnaissance vehicle BRM-1K assigned to the company commander.

Regardless of which division ( tank or motorized rifle) belonged to ORB, his military personnel military service wore the emblems of the buttonholes, while the color of shoulder straps and sleeve chevrons, as well as the emblem of the military branch on the chevron, were established according to the belonging to the military branch of the formation (division).

military personnel DDR unofficially allowed to wear emblems airborne troops on the buttonholes of red (motorized rifle division) or black (tank division) colors. Servicemen of the ORB in the composition OKSVA wore the emblems of the tank troops.

For artillery units combined arms armies of some military districts collected intelligence data reconnaissance army artillery regiment (RAAP). Example - 1451st RAAP (Leningrad Military District) or 2323rd RAAP (Transcaucasian Military District) . Junior commanders (on non-commissioned positions) for artillery reconnaissance units prepared 932nd Training Reconnaissance Artillery Regiment (Moscow Military District, Mulinsky garrison).

It should be noted a rare exception in the structure of reconnaissance formations. As part of USSR Armed Forces for 16 years, there were unique reconnaissance brigades that had nothing to do with GRU General Staff. it 20th and 25th separate reconnaissance brigades as part of Soviet troops in Mongolia. These brigades consisted of 4 separate reconnaissance battalions, a separate artillery and a separate anti-aircraft missile and artillery battalion, helicopter squadrons and departments combat and logistic support. A feature of the reconnaissance battalions was the presence in their composition tank companies and mortar batteries. Such an unusual state for reconnaissance units was due to the vast desert-steppe territory on which the brigades had to conduct possible military operations, which required them to have sufficient autonomy and the necessary firepower. Both brigades were in fact connections which included separate