Small river armored boats of project 1125. Marine suicide bombers in armored coffins

Project 1125 armored boat

Greetings to all lovers of military equipment and the history of our native land! Vyacheslav is with you.

My next story will be devoted to an unusual object of military equipment. Its unusualness is that it is not a model of ground weapons, and not even air, but sea. To be more precise - the river! We will talk about the project 1125 armored boat.

An object. Project 1125 armored boat.

Location: city of Perm, st. Towing, 4, at the checkpoint of the shipyard "Kama"

Coordinates: N 58°02'02.34 E 56°02'17.19.

Availability: satisfactory. You can drive up to the monument very close, there is also a parking place, but climbing it is very problematic. The boat is mounted on a three-meter-high concrete pedestal with sloping side walls. You can't climb without special tools. Maybe it's for the best?

Type history

The history of the creation of Soviet river armored boats dates back to November 1931, when the terms of reference for their development were approved by the Red Army command. In June 1932, the Lenrichsudoproekt organization took up the design of the boats. The chief designer was Julius Yulievich Benois.

As the main armament, it was proposed to use artillery pieces installed in standard tank turrets. Special requirements were also imposed on the dimensions of the boat. They had to meet the railway standards of the USSR when transported along railway on the platform.

By the end of 1932, two projects of boats were ready. Small (project 1125) - with the installation of one tank turret, and large (project 1124) with two tank turrets.

Since 1934, the serial construction of new ships began at the Zelenodolsk plant named after A. M. Gorky in Tatarstan.

In the course of production, the design of the boats changed several times, and, incorrectly, it was difficult to find two absolutely identical copies. For example, the gun turret was originally used from the T-28 tank with the short-barreled KT-28 cannon, then the gun was replaced with a more powerful L-10, and after the production of the T-28 tank was completed, turrets from "thirty-fours" were installed on armored boats, as welded from rolled armor plates, and cast hex "nuts".

Anti-aircraft weapons were also different. DT machine guns on turrets, DShK heavy machine guns in various combinations, and even Lender guns were placed on the decks of boats. During the war years, part of the armored boats were equipped with multiple launch rocket systems, turning into river Katyushas.

In just 10 years of production, 154 units of project 1125 armored boats were produced. In November 1942, in accordance with the order of the State Defense Committee, Perm Shipyard No. 344 also switched from manufacturing river tugs to the production of armored boats. Therefore, the monument to the armored boat in front of the entrance factories has the most compelling reasons for its existence. From 1942 to 1948, boats with factory numbers from No. 136 to No. 248 were manufactured at the Perm enterprise.

Small armored boats, nicknamed "river tanks", took an active part in the Battle of Stalingrad, and then the liberation of not a single large city standing on the river bank could do without them.

Small armored boat. Chronicle

Noted in history and a flotilla of boats on Lake Ladoga, which guarded the transportation along the "Road of Life", driving away German, Finnish and Italian ships. In order to prolong the navigation period of boats during the freeze-up period, savvy Soviet sailors "dressed" the ship's hull in a wooden "fur coat". Boards 40-50 mm thick protected the bottom and sides (100-150 mm above the waterline) of the ship. This so-called "fur coat" almost did not change the draft of the ship at all due to the buoyancy of the tree, but reliably protected its hull from floating ice floes, turning the boats into mini-icebreakers.

Another illustrative example of the actions of armored boats is associated with the landing and capture of the Imperial bridge across the Danube in Vienna. On April 11, 1945, a detachment of boats broke through to the only surviving bridge of the Austrian capital, landed assault groups on both banks, and then supported them with direct fire. The decisive actions of Soviet soldiers and boatmen made it possible to prevent the explosion of the bridge, and then to hold it and break the interaction of German units on different banks of the Danube, which became one of the decisive reasons for their imminent surrender and liberation of the city.

Surprisingly, but project 1125 boats can often be found today on pedestals in the cities of Russia and Ukraine. I know about 12 such monuments. Considering their total released number, we can say that every twelfth boat has become a monument.

Tactical and technical characteristics (TTX)

Full displacement, t - 32.2.

Length, m - 22.87.

Width, m - 3.54.

Draft, m - 0.56.

The power plant is a Packard gasoline engine 1x900 hp.

Travel speed, knots - 20 (37 km / h).

Armament: 1x1 - 76.2mm F-34 gun in the turret, 2x2 - 12.7mm turrets.

Crew, pers. - 12.

Instance History

And now, perhaps, about the most interesting.

What kind of boat is installed on a pedestal in Perm, it has not been possible to reliably establish until now. Wikipedia refers to it as AK-454 (artillery boat). The reclassification from BK (armored boat) to AK was indeed carried out in the 1950s. But boats BK-454 as part of fleets and river fleets Soviet Union did not mean. There was an AK-454 boat, but of a completely different project (project 191M built by the Izhora plant).

Armored boat. gun turret

The number “181” printed on board does not add clarity either. Perhaps this is the construction number of the boat, which corresponds to the tactical BK-140. Then it can be argued that it was laid down on 04/09/1944, and entered service on 03/13/1945. Included in the Dnieper flotilla and delivered to the river. Spee 06/12/1945, i.e. after the end of hostilities. In the 1950s he was transferred to the Amur Flotilla.

Armored boat. Machine gun

Unfortunately, these are just guesses. Before the start of the reconstruction of the boat and its installation on a pedestal, a fault finding of the vessel was carried out, but no mortgage boards or nameplates indicating what kind of boat it was, where and when it was built, were found. The only thing that was found was the stamps on the boat's main gun, but they did not make the task any easier. The thoroughness of the search is evidenced by such an example that an electrical switch found on board the ship, released in 1943, was recorded in the documents.

Armored boat. Nose
Armored boat. Stern

History of the monument

With the history of the monument itself, the situation is somewhat clearer.

All sources agree that the monument was created on the initiative of Ivan Pavlovich Timofeev, director of the Kama shipbuilding plant, who managed to bring a surviving specimen from the Far East from the Amur Flotilla. And on May 9, 1974, the boat took its place in front of the gates of the plant.

The west-facing boat sits on a concrete base lined with gray marble. On the north side 16 marble slabs are placed on the pedestal, on which the names of 192 workers and employees of the plant who died in the Great Patriotic War are carved, and in the center there is a metal plate with the inscription: “Here, on May 9, 1975, a capsule with the Appeal of veterans of the Great Patriotic War was laid Patriotic War, veterans of labor and shock workers of the IX five-year plan to the Komsomol members and youth of the year 2000. Open May 9, 2000"

In 2014, the monument underwent a major reconstruction. So solid that even the concrete pedestal was completely dismantled, and a new one was erected in its place. The boat itself also underwent a major overhaul, as a result of which the following work was performed.

1. Replacement of the bottom (place of interface with the pedestal). If this work would not have been carried out, the ship would have sunk on the pedestal.
2. The internal frames were replaced with new ones (welded into a channel box), which will enable the ship to stand for a long time.
3. The old paint has been removed. In places where corrosion ate the metal, there was a point replacement with a new material.
4. Anti-corrosion treatment of the entire ship was carried out, after which painting work was carried out.
5. Work was also carried out to replace lifelines, fenders, etc.
6. The ship was completed: bell, life buoys, etc.

Armored boat. General form

The Permian public was seriously excited by the scope of the work being carried out, not without reason fearing that the boat might “disappear” from the lists of monuments and “emerge” in one of the private collections. Fortunately, everything ended well, and by the 70th anniversary of the Victory, the boat returned to its rightful place.

It is interesting. And where did that very letter, put in a capsule for "Komsomol members and youth of the year 2000" go? There is information that during the restoration period, the capsule was kept in the safe of the municipal cultural institution "City Center for the Protection of Monuments." Where is she now?

Stalingrad is different from all cities in Russia - a narrow ribbon of residential development stretches down the Volga for 60 kilometers. The river has always occupied a special place in the life of the city - the central water artery of Russia, a major transport artery with access to the Caspian, White, Azov and Baltic Sea, a source of hydropower and a favorite vacation spot for Volgograd residents.

…if you go down the steep slope to the Volga on a warm spring evening, then on one of the piers in the central part of the city you can find a curious monument - a flat-bottomed longboat standing on a pedestal with hanging "whiskers" of anchors. On the deck of a strange vessel there is a semblance of a cabin, and in the bow - oh, a miracle! - a tower from the T-34 tank was installed.

In fact, the place is quite famous - this is the BK-13 armored boat, and the monument itself, bearing the name "To the Heroes of the Volga Flotilla" - is an integral part of the "Battle of Stalingrad" panorama museum. From here you have a beautiful view of the bend of the giant river. Modern "pioneers" come here to "swing at anchor." Volgograd seamen gather here on Navy Day.

The fact that the armored boat is a silent witness of that Great Battle is beyond doubt: this is clearly evidenced by a bronze plate on the wheelhouse with a laconic inscription:

The BK-13 armored boat as part of the VVF participated in the heroic defense of Stalingrad from July 24 to December 17, 1942

It is much less known that the BK-13 took part in the battles on the Dnieper, Pripyat and the Western Bug. And then, the “river tank”, deftly crawling over shallows and obstacles, penetrated the systems of European rivers and canals all the way to Berlin. The flat-bottomed “tin”, which is even difficult to call a ship (what kind of ship is it without a compAS, in whose interior you can’t stand up to your full height?) Has a heroic character that any modern cruiser will envy.

Marshal Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov, the man who directly led the defense of Stalingrad, spoke unambiguously about the importance of armored boats in the Battle of Stalingrad:

I will briefly talk about the role of the sailors of the flotilla, about their exploits: if they were not there, the 62nd Army would have died without ammunition and food.

The combat history of the Volga military flotilla began in the summer of 1942.
By mid-July, bombers with black crosses on their wings appeared in the sky of the Southern Volga region - armored boats immediately began to escort transports and tankers with Baku oil, rising up the Volga. Over the following month, they led 128 caravans, repelling 190 Luftwaffe air attacks.

And then the real hell began.

On August 30, the sailors went on reconnaissance to the northern outskirts of Stalingrad - there, behind the tractor factory, the German units broke through to the very water. Three armored boats moved silently in the night darkness, engine exhausts at low speed were displayed below the waterline.
They secretly went out to the appointed place and were already about to leave, when the sailors saw the Fritz squealing with joy, scooping water from the Russian river with helmets. Embraced by righteous anger, the crews of armored boats opened a hurricane of fire from all barrels. The night concert was a full house, but suddenly an unaccounted factor came into play - tanks standing on the shore. A duel began, in which the boats had little chance: German armored vehicles were difficult to detect against the background of the dark coast, at the same time, soviet boats were visible at a glance. Finally, the “armored” board, only 8 mm thick, protected the ships from bullets and small fragments, but was powerless against the power of even the smallest artillery ammunition.

The fatal shot hit the side - an armor-piercing projectile pierced the boat through and through, putting the engine out of action. The motionless "tin can" was pressed against the enemy shore by the current. When only a few tens of meters remained before the enemy, the crews of the remaining boats managed, under fierce fire from the shore, to take the damaged boat in tow and take it to a safe place.

On September 15, 1942, the Germans broke into Mamaev Kurgan - height 102.0, from where an excellent overview of the entire central part of the city opens (in total, Mamaev Kurgan was captured and recaptured 8 times - a little less than the Railway Station - it passed from the hands of the Russians into the hands of the Germans 13 times , as a result of which there was no stone left unturned). From that moment on, the boats of the Volga military flotilla became one of the most important connecting threads of the 62nd Army with its rear.

Even native Volgograd residents do not know about this rare place. The pillar stands on the forecourt right in front of the running crowd - but rarely does anyone pay attention to the ugly scars on its surface. Top part the pillar is literally turned inside out - fragmentation ammunition exploded inside. I counted two dozen marks from bullets, fragments and several large holes from shells - all this on a pole with a diameter of 30 centimeters. The density of fire in the station area was simply terrifying.

During daylight hours, armored boats hid in the numerous backwaters and tributaries of the Volga, hiding from enemy air raids and deadly artillery fire (in the afternoon, German batteries from the mound shot through the entire water area, leaving the sailors no chance to land on the right bank). At night, work began - under the cover of darkness, boats delivered reinforcements to the besieged city, while simultaneously making daring reconnaissance raids along the German-occupied sections of the coast, providing fire support to Soviet troops, landing troops behind enemy lines and shelling German positions.

Fantastic figures are known about the combat service of these small, but very nimble and useful boats: during their work at the Stalingrad crossings, six armored boats of the 2nd division transported 53 thousand soldiers and commanders of the Red Army, 2000 tons of equipment and food to the right bank (besieged Stalingrad). During the same time, 23,727 wounded soldiers and 917 civilians were evacuated from Stalingrad on the decks of armored boats.

But even the most moonless night did not guarantee protection - dozens of German searchlights and flares continuously snatched out of the darkness areas of black icy water with "river tanks" rushing through it. Each flight ended with a dozen combat damage - nevertheless, during the night the armored boats made 8-12 flights to the right bank. The whole next day, the sailors pumped out the water that had entered the compartments, sealed up holes, repaired damaged mechanisms - in order to set off again on a dangerous voyage the next night. The workers of the Stalingrad ship repair plant and the Krasnoarmeyskaya shipyard helped to repair the armored boats.

And again a mean chronicle:

October 10, 1942. Armored boat BKA No. 53 transported 210 soldiers and 2 tons of food to the right bank, took out 50 wounded, received holes in the port side and stern. BKA No. 63 transported 200 fighters, 1 ton of food and 2 tons of mines, took out 32 wounded fighters ...

Winter 1942-43 turned out to be unusually early - already in the first days of November, autumn ice drift began on the Volga - ice floes complicated the already difficult situation at the crossings. Fragile plank hulls of launches broke through, ordinary ships did not have enough engine power to withstand the pressure of ice - soon armored boats remained the only means for delivering people and cargo to the right bank of the river.
By mid-November, the freeze-up finally took shape - the mobilized ships of the Stalingrad river fleet and the ships of the Volga military flotilla froze into the ice or were taken south, to the lower reaches of the Volga. From that moment on, the supply of the 62nd Army in Stalingrad was carried out only through ice crossings or by air.

During the active phase of hostilities, the guns of the "river tanks" of the Volga military flotilla destroyed 20 units of German armored vehicles, destroyed more than a hundred dugouts and bunkers, and suppressed 26 artillery batteries. From fire from the side of the water, the enemy lost up to three regiments killed and wounded personnel.
And, of course, 150 thousand soldiers and commanders of the Red Army, the wounded, civilians and 13,000 tons of cargo transported from one bank to the other of the Great Russian River.

Own losses of the Volga military flotilla amounted to 18 steamships, 3 armored boats and about two dozen minesweepers and mobilized passenger boats. The intensity of the fighting in the lower reaches of the Volga was comparable to naval battles in the open ocean.
The Volga military flotilla was disbanded only in June 1944 - when the work on mine clearing of the river water area was completed (irritated by the actions of river ships and ships, the Germans plentifully "sowed" the Volga with sea mines).

Soviet boats on the Danube

Armored boat in the capital of Austria. Photo from the collection of V. V. Burachka

But the armored boats left the Volga region already in the summer of 1943 - having loaded their "river tanks" on the railway platforms, the sailors went to the West, following the fleeing enemy. Battles raged on the Dnieper, Danube and Tisza, "river tanks" made their way through the territory of Eastern Europe through the narrow canals of King Peter I and Alexander I, landed troops on the Vistula and Oder ... Ukraine swept overboard the armored boats, then - Belarus, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Poland and Austria - up to the very lair of the fascist beast.

... The armored boat BK-13 was in European waters until 1960, serving as part of the Danube military flotilla, after which it returned to the banks of the Volga and was transferred as an exhibit to the Volgograd State Museum of Defense. Alas, for an unknown reason, the museum staff limited themselves to removing several mechanisms, after which the boat disappeared without a trace. In 1981, it was found among scrap metal at one of the enterprises of the city, after which, at the initiative of veterans, BK-13 was restored and placed as a monument on the territory of the Volgograd shipbuilding and ship repair plant. In 1995, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Victory, the grand opening of the monument to the Heroes of the Volga Military Flotilla on the Volga embankment took place, and the armored boat on the pedestal took its rightful place. Since then, the "river tank" BK-13 has been looking at the endlessly flowing water, recalling the great feat of those who, under deadly fire, brought reinforcements to the besieged Stalingrad.

From the history of river tanks

Despite its curious appearance (the hull, like that of a flat-bottomed barge, a tank turret), the BK-13 armored boat was by no means a self-made impromptu, but a well-considered decision made long before the start of World War II - the conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway demonstrated an urgent need for such equipment that happened in 1929. Work on the creation of Soviet "river tanks" began in November 1931 - the boats were intended primarily for the Amur military flotilla - the protection of the eastern borders became an increasingly pressing problem of the Soviet state.

BK-13 (sometimes BKA-13 is found in the literature) is one of 154 built small river armored boats of project 1125. * "River tanks" were intended to fight enemy boats, combat support for ground forces, fire support, reconnaissance and combat operations in water areas rivers, lakes and coastal areas.
*also, there was a project of larger twin-turret boats of project 1124 (the so-called "Amur" series, several dozen units were built)

The main feature of the 1125 project was a flat bottom with a propeller tunnel, shallow draft and modest weight and size characteristics, which provide armored boats with mobility and the possibility of emergency transfer by rail. During the war years, "river tanks" were actively used on the Volga, on the Ladoga and Onega lakes, on the Black Sea coast, in Europe and the Far East.
Time has fully confirmed the correctness of the decision made: a certain need for such a technique remains even in the 21st century. Despite the missile and high technology, a highly protected boat with heavy weapons can be useful in counter-guerrilla raids and in low-intensity local conflicts.

Brief characteristics of the project 1125 armored boat:

Full displacement within 30 tons

Length 23 m

Draft 0.6 m

Crew 10 people

Full speed 18 knots (33 km / h - quite a lot for the river area)

Engine - GAM-34-VS (based on the AM-34 aircraft engine) with a power of 800 hp *
* part of the armored boats was equipped with foreign engines "Packard" and "Hall-Scott" with a power of 900 hp.

Fuel supply on board - 2.2 tons

The boat is designed for operations in 3-point waves (during the years of the Second World War, there were cases of long sea crossings of boats during a 6-point storm)
Bulletproof booking: board 7 mm; deck 4mm; deckhouse 8 mm, deckhouse roof 4 mm. The side armor was carried out from frames 16 to 45. The lower edge of the "armored belt" fell 150 mm below the waterline.

Armament:
A lot of improvisations and an extraordinary variety of designs took place here: tank turrets similar to the T-28 and T-34-76, Lender anti-aircraft guns in open towers, large-caliber DShKs and rifle-caliber machine guns (3-4 pcs.). On the part of the "river tanks" were installed jet systems volley fire caliber 82 mm and even 132 mm. During the modernization, rails and butts appeared to secure four sea mines.

Another rarity. The fire boat "Gassitel" (1903) - in addition to its direct purpose, was used at the Stalingrad crossings as a vehicle. In October 1942, she sank from her injuries. When the boat was raised, 3.5 thousand holes from shrapnel and bullets were found in its hull

Armored boats in Moscow, 1946

Crossing crossing, rough snow, ice edge ...

Facts and details about the use of armored boats are taken from the article “River tanks go into battle” by I.M. Plekhov, S.P. Khvatov (BOATS and YACHTS No. 4 (98) for 1982)

Armored boats of the Great Patriotic War. In fact, suicide bombers who entered the line of direct torpedo attack under heavy fire from the best warships in the world.
It is not for nothing that dozens of armored boats stand on pedestals around the country - a reminder of our reckless heroic ancestors who went on suicidal attacks and won. Even death.

"At dawn on June 25, armored boats Nos. 725, 461 and 462, carrying out intense fire from cannons and machine guns, came close to the Romanian coast in the Satu-Nou area, where they landed a company of paratroopers. After a short battle, the enemy soldiers fled and took refuge in the floodplains. Captured seven prisoners, two field guns and 10 machine guns.
At 6 a.m. on June 26, the 4th detachment of armored boats of the Danube flotilla transferred the 23rd rifle regiment. After 2.5 hours, he captured the city of Old Kiliya. Up to 200 enemy soldiers and officers were killed, and 720 were taken prisoner. The trophies of the Soviet soldiers were 8 cannons and 30 machine guns. By the end of the day, the regiment's units captured several surrounding villages ... "
This is not yet the liberation of Romania in 1944. This is the third and fourth day of the war. 1941 A dozen of our armored boats ensured the capture of a bridgehead along a front of 76 km and a depth of up to 15 km on the Romanian bank of the Danube. We were able to deliver "a little blood, a mighty blow." But they didn't. A lot of photos of those years under the cut.

It is curious that a large river flotilla of the enemy never tried to engage in battle with the armored boats of the Danube flotilla. The Romanians had seven powerful monitors with a displacement of 600-700 tons, and the Danube Flotilla had five ships of the same class with a displacement of 230-250 tons. Romanian monitors had eight 152-mm and twenty-six 120-mm guns, while ours had two 130-mm and eight 102-mm guns. However, the main striking force of the Soviet flotilla was 22 armored boats of project 1125. They can be safely called river tanks. It was purely Russian know-how.

PROJECTS 1124 and 1125

On November 12, 1931, the command of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Fleet (RKKF) approved the terms of reference for two types of armored boats. The large armored boat for the Amur River was supposed to be armed with two 76-mm guns in the towers, and the small one with one of the same gun. In addition, it was planned to install two light turrets with 7.62-mm machine guns on the boats. The draft of a large boat is at least 70 cm, and a small one is 45 cm. Armored boats had to fit into the railway dimensions of the USSR when transported by rail on an open platform. On June 22, 1932, this technical assignment was issued to Lenrichsudoproekt. At the same time, the types of towers, guns (from the T-28 tank) and engines (GAM-34) were chosen.

In October 1932, Lenrechsudoproekt completed the work. The large armored boat was named "Project 1124", and the small one - "Project 1125". They were very close in design.

The first series of boats of both projects were equipped with GAM-34BP engines. The large armored boat had two engines, the small one had one. The maximum engine power (800 hp for the GAM-34BP and 850 hp for the GAM-34BS) was achieved at 1850 rpm. It was then that the boats could pick up the most full speed. Moreover, the movement at maximum speed corresponded to the regime transitional from displacement navigation to gliding.

Since 1942, most of the armored boats of projects 1124 and 1125 were equipped with imported Hall-Scott four-stroke engines with an HP 900 power. With. and "Packard" with a capacity of 1200 liters. With. They were much more reliable than the GAM-34, but they required more highly qualified service personnel and better gasoline (B-87 and B-100 grades).

Initially, the armored boats were armed with 76-mm tank guns of the 1927/32 model, 16.5 caliber long in the towers from the T-28 tank. However, at the beginning of 1938, the production of these guns at the Kirov plant was discontinued. But in 1937-1938, the same plant mass-produced 76-mm L-10 tank guns with a length of 24 calibers. They were installed on several boats in the same towers.

It should be noted that the maximum elevation angle of the mentioned tank guns did not exceed 250. Accordingly, the towers from the T-28 were also designed for it. After all, tanks were intended mainly for hitting targets with direct fire. The river armored boat had a very low height of the line of fire above the water, and therefore, when firing at direct fire, a very large undamaged space arose, closed by the coast, forest, bushes, buildings, etc. That is why in 1938-1939, especially for armored boats of projects 1124 and 1125 created the "MU" turret, which allowed an elevation angle of 700 for a 76 mm gun. (By the way, the development was carried out by the "sharaga" OTB, which was in the Leningrad prison "Crosses".)

In 1939, the L-10 gun was installed at the Kirov Plant in MU. The turret with this gun passed field tests at the Artillery Research Experimental Range (ANIOP). The results were unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, by the end of 1939, plant No. 340 completed the construction of an armored boat armed with the L-10. At the beginning of 1940, it was supposed to be tested in Sevastopol.

At the end of 1938, the Kirov Plant curtailed the production of L-10 guns, but mastered the serial production of 76-mm L-11 guns. In fact, it was the same L-10, only with a barrel extended to 30 calibers, and now the L-11 was installed in the MU tower. The elevation angle (700) did not change, but additional reinforcements had to be made in the tower, since the recoil of the L-11 was somewhat greater than that of the L-10. However, only a few armored boats received the L-10 and L-11 guns.

MODERNIZATION DURING THE WAR

In 1942, armored boats of projects 1124 and 1125 began to be armed with F-34 guns, which were in the towers from T-34 tanks. However, they had a maximum elevation angle of 250. Periodically, there were projects to create towers with high gun elevation angles, but they all remained on paper. By the way, in memoirs there are sometimes stories that our armored boats shot down enemy bombers with fire from 76-mm cannons. So, in such cases we are talking about the Lender anti-aircraft guns of the 1914/15 model, which were not in the towers, but were openly installed on several boats.

Projects 1124 and 1125 armored boats were not to be equipped with mine weapons. But already in the first days of the war, the sailors of the Danube Flotilla on armored boats of project 1125 managed to set up minefields using various improvised means. Since the spring of 1942, on the aft decks of boats handed over by industry, rails and butts for attaching mines were mounted. Project 1124 armored boats took 8 mines, and project 1125 - 4 mines. Again, already during the Great Patriotic War, they received a new powerful weapon- 82 mm and 132 mm rockets.

In the course of hostilities on freezing rivers and lakes, it was necessary to lengthen the navigation time of armored boats. It was not easy to do this - the light hull of the armored boat could not ensure safe navigation even in broken ice. Plates of young ice peeled off the color, which caused corrosion. Thin plates of propellers were often damaged.

The commander of the boat, Yu. Yu. Benois, found an original way out. The armored boat was dressed in a wooden "fur coat". Boards 40-50 mm thick protected its bottom and sides (100-150 mm above the waterline). "Shuba" almost did not change the draft due to the buoyancy of the tree. Another question is that the armored boat in the "fur coat" had a lower speed. In turn, engineer E. E. Pammel designed a propeller with thicker blade edges, and the maximum speed of the boat with reinforced propellers decreased by only 0.5 knots.

So our armored boats turned into mini-icebreakers. This was especially important on the Ladoga and Onega lakes, where river tanks were able to conduct combat operations two to four weeks longer than the ships of the Finnish fleets.

In our Navy, there were cases when different (at least by epochs ...) ships had the same numbering of projects ... There are many examples of this, and in particular the armored boat of project 1124, while the same project number was also worn are known to all MPK .... Baltic Fleet. A ship with standard armament: two 76-mm turrets of the T-34 tank variant. There were ships of this project armed with 76-mm anti-aircraft guns of the Lender system, mixed versions with the same anti-aircraft guns + rocket launchers, as well as various mixed options with artillery towers from the T-35 + launchers "8-M-8" and " M-13-M-1".

FROM THE BATTLE CHRONICLE

14 armored boats of the Volga military flotilla (VVF) participated in the Battle of Stalingrad, of which two were project 1124, and the rest were single-gun ones - project 1125. Several armored boats had launchers of 82-mm M-8 missiles, and armored boat No. 51 was armed with a launcher 132 -mm missiles M-13.

Mobility, the ability of VVF armored boats to take cover in the numerous channels of the Volga and Akhtuba made them less vulnerable to German aviation and artillery.

Here is a chronicle of just one day of the defense of Stalingrad - September 14, 1942. At 10:40, according to the intelligence department of the army, the Germans, with a strength of up to two regiments of infantry and 60 tanks, advanced on the Barrikady plant. At 10:50 a.m. an order was transmitted by radio to the Northern Group of Ships - to immediately open fire on the area of ​​the Barrikady plant. Ammunition consumption amounted to 200 rounds and RS.

From 12:30 pm until 12 h 40 min. armored boat No. 13 fired at the village of Kuporosnoye and dispersed an enemy infantry group, having used up 15 shells. Three hits in the dugouts were noted.

At 13:10 armored boat No. 14 fired 18 high-explosive shells at German trenches and bunkers.

At 9:35 p.m. armored boat No. 41 went to the Volga south of the village of Rynok and fired two volleys of rockets at the accumulation of German tanks and infantry in the area of ​​​​Sukhaya Mechetka, southeast of height 101.3.

The winter of 1942-1943 turned out to be very cold, by November 10, ice had begun on the Volga from Yelets to Saratov. Therefore, on November 1, People's Commissar of the Navy N. G. Kuznetsov ordered the transfer of most of the ships and vessels of the Volga Flotilla to Guryev.

However, the Usyskin and Chapaev gunboats and 12 armored boats remained in the Stalingrad area. They froze into the ice, but continued to fire at the enemy. The sailors of the VVF fired their last salvo on January 31, 1943 at 15:27.

Our armored boats were also active on Lake Onega. Here is one of the typical combat episodes. At 7 am on September 14, 1943, a detachment consisting of an armored boat No. 12 and torpedo boats No. 83 and No. 93 near Lesnoy Island discovered a Finnish tugboat standing off the coast. At 7:26 a.m. was fired from a distance of 4400 m from rocket launchers. The shells landed at the target location. At the same time, Finnish coastal batteries opened fire on the boats. Nevertheless, our sailors, having reloaded the launchers, at 0808 hours. fired a second volley - already at the enemy's batteries. According to the report of the detachment commander, five of the six firing guns were put out of action, and a fire broke out on the ship.

In June 1944, in connection with the start of the offensive Soviet troops On Petrozavodsk, the commander of the Karelian Front ordered to prepare a landing force and land it in Uiskaya Bay, 21 km south of the capital of Karelia. With a favorable development of events, the paratroopers were supposed to, leaving separate detachments (barriers) on the road, move towards the city.

To participate in the operation, 3 gunboats (mobilized tugs), 7 armored boats, 7 torpedo boats, as well as 10 small patrol boats and 3 wheeled tugs were assigned.

June 27 at 19:00 a detachment of ships, lining up in two wake columns, left the Lake mouth into Lake Onega. At 16:00 On June 28, the paratroopers landed right in the port of Petrozavodsk. The Finns fled, burning the city in many places. Parts of the Red Army entered the capital of Karelia only late in the evening.

A feat of arms unprecedented in history was accomplished by the sailors of the Danube Military Flotilla (DVF). In 1941 they left the Danube and at the end of 1942 ended up in Tuapse and Poti. But in 1944 they returned back and fought through four capitals - Belgrade, Budapest, Bratislava and Vienna.

On a campaign up the Danube in 1944, the Far East Fleet included five captured Romanian monitors and our Zheleznyakov monitor. However, at first the flotilla command took care of them, considering them too valuable ships, and armored boats were the main striking force of the Far Eastern Fleet.

By the way, it is a pity that it is impossible to quote without cuts how our boatmen commemorated the Western allies of the USSR. The British and Americans began to lay magnetic and acoustic mines on the Danube not in 1941, or at least in 1943, but at the end of 1944 - the beginning of 1945, and precisely in those areas where the armored boats of the Danube flotilla were heading.

During the Belgrade operation, units of the Red Army failed to capture the right bank of the Danube from Sotin to Batin. On this 115-kilometer coastal section, the Germans created a powerful line of defense and mined the river. Thus, the possibility of a breakthrough of the Far Eastern Fleet ships upstream was completely excluded.

However, our sailors found a way out. To break through the armored boats to the Apatin bridgehead, they decided to use the old canals of King Peter I and King Alexander I, bypassing the ill-fated German bridgehead Sotin - Batin.

The 123 km long King Peter I Canal connects the Danube with the Tisza River. The depth of the channel is about 2 meters. It had at that time seven locks 56 meters long and 4.8 meters wide.

The canal of King Alexander I ran between the cities of Novi Sad and Sambo (Sombor). Its length is 69 km, and the average depth is 2 meters. It had four locks 42.6 meters long and 9.3 meters wide. Dozens of ships, fragments of bridges, pontoon bridges of our troops, etc. were flooded in the canal.

A. Ya. Pyshkin, a participant in the transition, recalled: “Navigating along a narrow artificial channel was a new, unusual thing for armored boats ... In many places, boats had to be advanced by personnel at the ends, footstocks and support hooks. The passage under the destroyed bridges was the most dangerous - fragments of reinforced concrete, trusses closed the already shallow fairway of the canal ...

The scuttled ships encountered in the channels by the forces of the crews turned around and pushed closer to the shore in order to clear the passage. The passage of armored boats through the canals continued in the dark and daylight hours. Without resting for a single hour, the personnel sought to go around by a detour by the scheduled date. It was especially difficult for the minders who worked in one shift, since everyone else was busy clearing the fairway. The helmsmen were constantly on watch.”

Gone! We went behind enemy lines and forward - up the Danube! The armored boats stopped only in the area of ​​​​the Austrian city of Linz ...

The operational zone of the Red Banner Amur Flotilla covered the rivers: Amur - from the source (the village of Pokrovka) to the village of Novo-Troitskoye (in the lower reaches), 2712 km; Ussuri - from Lesozavodsk to the mouth, 480 km; Sungach - from source to mouth, 250 km and Lake Khanko; Shilka - from Sretensk to Pokrovka, 400 km; Zeya - from Surazhevka to Blagoveshchensk, 190 km; Bureya - from Malinovka to the mouth, 77 km. The total length of the operating zone of the flotilla was 4119 km.

By the beginning of hostilities with Japan, the flotilla had five Lenin-type monitors and one Active monitor; gunboats of special construction "Mongol", "Proletary" and "Red Star"; 8 gunboats converted from mobilized river steamers; 52 armored boats; 12 minesweepers, 36 minesweepers.

Armored boats of the Amur flotilla attacked the Japanese on a 4,000 km front, from the Sretensk area to Lake Hanko. A detailed account of this would not fit in even the thickest volume. I'll only tell you about the raid on Harbin.

At 8 pm on August 18, the commander of the Amur flotilla ordered a detachment of eight armored boats to go to the capital of Manchuria. The exit was scheduled for 3 am on 19 August.

The detachment arrived at the Harbin raid at 8 am on August 20. The enemy showed no resistance, the boats moored to the pier not far from the headquarters of the Japanese Sungarian flotilla. After some time, the paratroopers brought the commander of the Japanese flotilla on board the BK-13 boat. It was an elderly Chinese man with the rank of lieutenant general...

The author is unaware of facts that testify that war correspondents "with a watering can and a notebook, or even with a machine gun, were the first to break into the cities." But our armored boats really broke into the first dozen capitals. And this is confirmed by numerous documents from domestic archives.

V.M. Molotov in the 41st BTK of the Black Sea Fleet ....

"Vospers" in Constanta...

TKA division of captain 3rd rank Dyachenko in Yalta...

Boats of the 41st BTK ....


Soviet armored boat type "D" and the monitor of the project SB-12 "Shock".
"Shock" was the flagship of the Danube River Flotilla, participated in the battles from the first days of the Great Patriotic War. Defended the Danube, Odessa, Nikolaev, Kherson. Sunk by German aircraft in September 1941. Armored boats of type "D" (patrol) of American construction were delivered to Russia in 1916.

At the end of 1962, a large anti-submarine ship project 61 Komsomolets Ukrainy, which has been developed at TsKB-53 since 1956. It was the first fairly large serial BNK equipped with a gas turbine plant, and as a result, it became a milestone not only in domestic, but also in world military shipbuilding. Despite the fact that the construction of this project according to the program had been planned since 1959, even then it was clear that having only one torpedo tube and four RBU from anti-submarine weapons, such a ship could not effectively deal with modern enemy nuclear submarines. Therefore, already in 1958, the TTZ was issued to the group of B.I. Kupensky for the design of a more armed BOD according to project 1125. Its main difference was that it had to carry on board the RBU-24000 six-barreled launcher for Vikhr anti-submarine missiles with a nuclear warhead and have one or two permanently based anti-submarine helicopters.

According to the results of the pre-draft design, the displacement of the ship was: standard 5,900 tons, normal 6,650 tons, total 7,400 tons. To speed up the work, the project was carried out in the destroyer hull Project 58 with dimensions of 160 x 16 x 6 meters and with its own boiler and turbine plant with a capacity of 2 x 45.000 hp. The full speed of the ship was assumed to be 40 knots, which would make it possible to quickly overtake submarines with the highest 30-knot underwater speed.

BOD armament Project 1125 in addition to RBU-24000, it consisted of two M-1 Volna air defense systems with two-beam launchers, two twin universal 76.2-mm AK-726 gun mounts, two RBU-6000 rocket launchers and two five-tube 533-mm torpedo tubes. In the aft part, a runway and an under-deck hangar for a helicopter (or two), as well as aviation fuel supplies and an air ammunition cellar, were provided.

In the end from project 1125 abandoned in favor of serial BOD Project 61, and PLRK "Whirlwind" (but already in the form of a rechargeable two-beam launcher) received only aircraft-carrying anti-submarine cruisers Project 1123 and 1143 . First of all, the decision to refuse was made in favor of the industry, as a result of which our fleet missed the chance to deploy a more powerful anti-submarine system than was later created. After all, many such ships could be built, based on their serial cost. Besides, project 1125 could subsequently be upgraded with the advent of new weapons, which categorically could not be done with Project 61 due to its overly compacted layout.

MAIN PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS
Displacement, tons: standard normal complete	-
Main dimensions, m: maximum length maximum width average draft	- 160 16
Main power plant: 4 steam boilers KVN-95/64 2 GTZA TV-12, total power, hp (kW)	boiler turbine - 90 000 (66 150)
2 shafts; 2 propellers
Travel speed, knots: greatest economic	- up to 40
Cruising range, miles (at speed, knots)	4000 (24)
Autonomy, days
Crew, pers. (including officers)
WEAPONS
Anti-submarine missile: PU PLRK "Whirlwind" PLUR 82-R	- 1 X 6
Anti-aircraft missile: PU ZIF-101 SAM M-1 "Wave" SAM V-600	- 2 X 2
Artillery: 76.2 mm gun AK-726	- 2 X 2
Torpedo: 533 mm PTA-53-61	- 2 X 5
Anti-submarine: RBU-6000 "Smerch-2" ammunition RSL-60	- 2 X 12
Aviation: helicopter Ka-25PLO ("Hormone A")	-

RADIO-ELECTRONIC WEAPONS
BIUS
General detection radar	1 X MP-300 "Angara"
NC detection radar	1 xn/d
NRLS	1 xn/d
	"Titanium"
electronic warfare equipment
fire control radar	2 X 4P-90 "Yatagan"for SAM "Volna" 2 X MP-105 "Turret"for AU
means of communication
state identification radar

HISTORY OF CREATION

On November 12, 1931, the terms of reference for two types of armored boats were approved. The large armored boat (for the Amur River) was supposed to be armed with two 76-mm guns in the towers, and the small one with one such gun. The main armament of both types of boats was supplemented by two light turrets with 7.62 mm machine guns. The draft of a large boat is at least 70 cm, and a small boat is 45 cm.

In October 1932, Lenrechsudoproekt completed the design of a large armored boat (Project 1124). The chief designer of the project was Yu. Yu. Benois, the only engineer in a well-known family of artists and ornithologists.

A little later, Lenrechsudoproekt began designing a small armored boat, pr. 1125. The project manager was also Benois, who brought both armored boats to his arrest in 1937.

DEVICE OF ARMORED BOATS PR. 1124 and 1125

The large and small armored boats were very close in design, so we will give a joint description of them.

The armored boats had to have a shallow draft and had to fit into the railway dimensions of the USSR when transported by rail on an open platform. The middle part of the BKA corps was occupied by an armored citadel. There were turret compartments with ammunition, an engine room, fuel tanks, a radio room. The fuel tanks were covered with double protection (14 mm) - two armor plates were riveted together. The armor plates served as the deck and armored outer skin, dropping 200 mm below the waterline. Thus, the structures of the citadel simultaneously provided the overall strength of the hull.

Above the citadel in the armored combat (navigation) cabin there was a ship control post. Communication with the engine room was carried out using a speaking tube and a machine telegraph, and with artillery and machine-gun towers - by telephone (on ships built during the war years).

BKA pr. 1124 had nine watertight transverse bulkheads, and pr. 1125 had eight. All bulkheads had hatches, which provided access to any compartment without a dangerous appearance on deck during the battle. The presence of hatches in the bulkheads violated the textbook design rule for warships, however, as battle experience showed, it was fully justified. All these manholes were located above the calculated emergency line of flooding and were closed with waterproof covers, on the traverses of the citadel - with armored ones.

The hull design was mixed: the armor part was made riveted, the rest was welded. All parts of welded structures were butt-jointed. The set and armor were riveted, and the skin outside the citadel was welded.

The contours of the BKA pr. 1124 and 1125 were similar. To ensure a small draft, the hulls were made practically flat-bottomed with vertical sides. This eliminated the need to bend the armor plates and greatly simplified the technology.

Both types of boats are characterized by a smooth rise of the keel line in the bow. This allowed the boat to approach the shore with its nose almost back to back, which greatly simplified the landing.

On SKA, built before 1939, at low and medium speeds, due to the small collapse of the sides, the bow of the upper deck (up to the bow cabin) was heavily flooded. On already built boats, it was necessary to weld sheets in the bow, increasing the collapse of the frames, and install a bulwark. When adjusting the projects in 1938, the bow frames were given a strong bend along the cheekbone.

The living quarters had a height from the flooring to the edges of the under-deck set on BKA pr. 1124 - about 1550 mm, and on BKA pr. 1125 - about 1150 mm. It was impossible to straighten up, standing up to his full height. The area of ​​the largest 9-bed cabin was less than 14 m 2 . It was literally crammed with lockers, hanging cots and folding tables. There was only one cockpit on the small BKA, so we had to place hanging berths in both machine-gun compartments. Naturally, the living conditions of the boats were terrible.

The deck and sides were insulated with crushed cork. The ventilation was natural. The residential compartments were heated with hot water from the engine cooling system and had natural light (side windows with waterproof covers). In the frontal wall of the cabin there was a window with triplex glass. In addition, there were portholes in the rear wall and armored doors of the cabin. The windows were covered with armored shields with narrow viewing slots.

On BKA pr. 1124, the anchor device included one anchor weighing 75 kg, drawn into the hawse (from the port side), and on BKA pr. 1125 - an anchor weighing 50 kg, laid on the deck.

The rudders were suspended, balancing, not protruding beyond the main plane. BKA pr. 1124 had two rudders, and pr. 1125 had one. The drive of the rudders was carried out from a manual steering wheel.

The layout of the armored boat pr. 1125

BKA pr. 1125. A cast turret of the T-34 tank is installed on the boat: and machine-gun turrets DShKM-2B

The circulation diameter was about three hull lengths. BKA pr. 1124, which had a twin-shaft installation, turned around almost on the spot and without a rudder, and with the help of the engines, it was discordant.

ENGINES OF ARMORED BOATS

The first series of boats pr. 1124 and 1125 were equipped with GAM-34BP engines. The large BKA had two engines, the small one had one. The GAM-34 engine (Alexander Mikulin's gliding engine) was created on the basis of the AM-34 four-stroke 12-cylinder aircraft engine. In the gliding version, a reverse gear was added to reduce the number of revolutions and reverse. B-70 gasoline was used as fuel.

The maximum engine power (800 hp for the GAM-34BP and 850 hp for the GAM-34BS) was achieved at 1850 rpm. At this number of revolutions, the fullest stroke was achieved.

According to the instructions of plant No. 24 (engine manufacturer), it was allowed to have a speed of over 1800 for no more than one hour, and then only in a combat situation. The maximum number of engine revolutions in combat training actions was allowed no more than 1600 rpm.

A serviceable motor started in 6-8 seconds. after switching on. The maximum permissible number of revolutions in reverse is 1200. The engine's operating time in reverse is 3 minutes.

After 150 hours of operation of the new motor, its complete bulkhead was required.

The movement of armored boats at maximum speed corresponded to the transitional regime from displacement navigation to gliding. At the same time, water resistance increased sharply. To further increase the speed, it would be necessary to switch to gliding, and for this, with the same engines, the weight of the BKA would have to be significantly reduced, i.e., sacrificing weapons and armor.

On armored boats, pr. 1125, the side height was 1500 mm, so the engine could not be placed below deck. Then, a local elevation of 400 mm was provided above the engine room. The engine room also housed an L-6 type gas generator, batteries, water-oil cooling radiators (engines were cooled in a closed cycle, sea water was supplied to the radiators by gravity from high-speed pressure), a carbon dioxide fire extinguishing station, which had local and remote (from the wheelhouse) control , thanks to which it was possible to direct gas to any of the fuel tanks. There was also an electric fire pump, which was used as a drying agent. Gasoline was stored in four (at BKA pr. 1124) and three (at BKA pr. 1125) detachable steel gas tanks located in the most protected place - under the conning tower.

To prevent explosions of gasoline vapors when a fuel tank was damaged, engineer Shaterinkov developed an original fire protection system - the exhaust gases were cooled in a condenser and again fed into a tank divided into several compartments, after which they were removed overboard. An underwater exhaust was used to reduce noise. The onboard electrical network was powered by generators hung on the main engine and batteries. On project 1124, three-kilowatt generators were additionally installed, powered by a car engine (usually ZIS-5).

Since 1942, most BKA pr. 1124 and pr. 1125 were equipped with imported four-stroke Hall-Scott engines with a capacity of 900 hp. With. and "Packard" with a capacity of 1200 liters. With. These engines were more reliable than the GAM-34; but they demanded higher qualification of service personnel and better gasoline (brands B-87 and B-100).

During the war years, BKA with GAM-34 engines were named 1124-1 and 1125-1, with Hall-Scott engines - 1124-I and 1125-II, and with Packard engines - 1124-III and 1125-III.

Turret armored boat project 1124/1125 with a 76-mm cannon mod. 1927/32

WEAPONS BKA PR. 1124 & PR. 1125

A lot of tales have been written about the armament of pre-war armored boats by shipbuilding historians. This is how V. N. Lysenok describes the armament of the BKA pr. 1124: “two 76.2 mm PS-3 tank guns, 16.5 calibers long”; V.V. Burachek: “Turrets from the T-26 tank, which had a 45 mm caliber gun, were placed on the boats. When did the production of towers with 76-mm guns for famous tank"T-34", this made it possible to significantly strengthen the armament of armored boats. And, finally, a large team of authors says that in 1939-1940. "The former main-caliber turrets (from the T-28 tank) were replaced by new ones with 76.2-mm F-34 guns (barrel length 41.5 caliber, elevation angle 70 °)". One can only guess where the venerable authors got such fantastic information from.

In fact, according to the original design of the BKA, pr. 1124 and 1125 were armed with 76-mm tank guns mod. 1927/32, 16.5 klb long in towers from the T-28 tank. In some documents, these guns are referred to as 76-mm guns KT or KT-28 (KT - Kirov tank for the T-28 tank). There were no 45-mm guns on the BKA pr. 1124 and 1125.

The issue of installing 76-mm PS-3 cannons on the BKA could be considered, but the matter did not go beyond talk. By the way, this gun had a length of not 16.5, but 21 klb. PS-3 (Syachentov gun) were manufactured in 1932-1936. in small batches, but it was not possible to bring it to mind. Syachenov himself “sat down”, and PS-3s were not even installed on serial tanks, not to mention the BKA.

S-40 armored boat with T-28 tank turret

Destroyed BKA-42 Stalingrad, 1942-43

At the end of the 30s, a crisis arose with the armament of the BKA. Production of 76 mm guns mod. 1927/32 was discontinued by the Kirov Plant in early 1938.

In 1937-1938. the same plant mass-produced 76-mm L-10 tank guns 24 klb long, which were installed on T-28 tanks. Naturally, a proposal arose to install L-10 guns on the BKA.

It should be noted that all 76-mm tank guns mod. 1927/32, PS-3 and L-10 had a maximum elevation angle of +25°. Accordingly, the tank towers from the T-28 were designed for this elevation angle. Such an elevation angle was more than sufficient for tanks intended for direct fire only. The river armored boat had a very low height of the line of fire above the water, when firing direct fire it had a very large undamaged space, closed by the coast, forest, bushes, buildings, etc.

Therefore, in 1938-1939. specifically for BKA pr. 1124 and 1125, the MU tower was designed, which allowed an elevation angle of + 70 ° for a 76-mm gun. Apparently, the "MU" project was carried out in the "sharaga" of the OTB, located in the Leningrad prison "Crosses".

In 1939, the Kirov Plant installed a 76-mm L-10 gun in the MU turret. The MU turret with the L-10 cannon passed field tests at the ANIOP. The results were unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, by the end of 1939, plant No. 340 completed one boat with an L-10 gun, which was supposed to be tested in Sevastopol at the beginning of 1940.

At the end of 1938, the production of 76-mm guns L-10, the Kirov plant stopped, but mastered mass production 76 mm guns L-11. In fact, the new gun was the same L-10, only with a barrel lengthened to 30 klb. The Kirov Plant proposed to install the L-11 in the MU tower, which was done. The vertical guidance angle remained the same - + 70 °, but additional reinforcements were made in the tower, since the recoil of the L-11 was slightly higher.

However, the L-10 and L-11 guns did not take root on the BKA, and at best were installed on several boats. The fact is that the guns L-10 and L-11 designed by Makhanov had original recoil devices in which the compressor fluid was directly connected with the air of the knurler. In some modes of fire, such an installation failed. This was taken advantage of by Makhanov's main competitor Grabin, who managed to displace Makhanov's guns with his own F-32s 30 klb long and F-34s 40 klb long.

The idea to equip the BKA with the 76-mm F-34 cannon could not have arisen before 1940, since it passed field tests in the T-34 tank only in November 1940. In 1940, 50 F-34 cannons were manufactured, and in the next year - already 3470, but almost all of them went to the T-34 tanks, and until the second half of 1942, the F-34 guns in the T-34 tank turrets were not placed on the BKA.

At the end of 1941 - the beginning of 1942, several boats of pr. 1124 and 1125 without weapons accumulated near the wall of plant No. 340. They even wanted to equip them with turrets from captured German tanks. But, in the end, instead of tank turrets, 30 armored boats received 76-mm open pedestal installations with 76-mm Lender anti-aircraft guns mod. 1914/15 And only at the end of 1942, turrets from the T-34 with F-34 guns began to arrive at the BKA, which became the standard armament of the BKA project 1124 and 1125.

The gun in the turret had a maximum elevation angle of 25 - 26°, which, as mentioned earlier, was extremely inconvenient for the BKA. From time to time there were projects to create towers with a high elevation angle of the guns, but they all remained on paper. Naturally, the elevation angle increased only for mounted shooting. To conduct effective anti-aircraft fire, installations were required that were close in size to 34-K, which could not be placed on boats pr. 1124 and 1125. The memoirs tell of the downing of bombers with 76-mm cannons of our BKA. Apparently, we are talking about the 76-mm Lender anti-aircraft guns, which by 1942 continued to be a fairly effective means of combating aircraft at medium altitudes, having a special anti-aircraft sight and anti-aircraft shells (remote fragmentation grenades, bullet and rod shrapnel). The effectiveness of anti-aircraft fire from turret guns mod. 1927/32 and F-34 was close to zero due to the low elevation angle, the lack of an anti-aircraft sight, the inability to install a remote tube in the tower, etc. Although, theoretically, some aircraft could be accidentally shot down by a projectile F-34. After all, even cases of downing aircraft with 82-mm mines are known, and one An-2 is already in Peaceful time was hit by a vodka bottle.

76 mm gun mod. 1927/32 had a piston breech and a practical rate of fire of 2-3 rds/min. The 76-mm guns L-10 and F-34 were equipped with wedge semi-automatic breechblocks. On the range machine, the rate of fire of the F-34 reached 25 rounds per minute, and the actual rate in the turret was 5 rounds per minute. All of our tank guns of that period did not have ejection devices, and the gas contamination in the towers during frequent firing was extremely high.

BKA-31 (project 1124) with 76 mm Lender gun

The vertical aiming of the gun was carried out manually, and the horizontal guidance on the BKA with the T-28 turret - manually, and with the T-34 turret - from the electric motor.

In BKA pr. 1124, the ammunition load was 112 76-mm unitary rounds per turret, and in pr. 1125 - 100 rounds.

Shells for cannons mod. 1927/32, L-10, L-11 and F-34 were the same. But the gun mod. 1927/32 fired cartridges from the regimental cannon mod. 1928, and the guns L-10, L-11 and F-34 - with more powerful cartridges from the divisional gun mod. 1902/30. The main projectiles were a steel long-range high-explosive fragmentation grenade and an old Russian high-explosive grenade. The firing range of a grenade at a cannon arr. 1927/32 was 5800 - 6000 m, while the F-34 had 11.6 km (for the OF-350) and 8.7 km (for the F-354).

For firing at armored targets, armor-piercing projectiles of the BR-350 type could be used. Theoretically, with a range of 500 m and a normal hit, the armor penetration of the gun mod. 1927/32 was 30 mm, and the F-34 was 70 mm. In reality, their armor penetration was much lower, and guns mod. 1927/32, in fact, they could not fight tanks without the use of cumulative shells, and the F-34 could operate quite successfully on German tanks types Pz.I, Pz.II, Pz.HI and Pz.IV. The author has no information about the supply of cumulative and sub-caliber shells to armored boats.

Theoretically, all boat guns could fire shrapnel, but, as already mentioned, the installation of remote tubes in the towers was practically impossible.

Everything related to chemical munitions is the strictest secret. But, apparently, they were part of the regular ammunition of armored boats. During the civil war, the use of 76-mm chemical shells by red river fleets was noted. Between the wars, the Red Army received a large number of chemical shells. Among them were 76 mm chemical shells KhN-354 and KhS-354 and fragmentation-chemical projectiles (with a solid poisonous substance) ОХ-350.

It is worth mentioning the mortar version of the BKA. In 1942, at the Zelenodolsk plant No. 340, two armored boats of the S-40 project were armed with army 82-mm mortars. After their tests, the People's Commissar of the Navy allowed the installation of mortars on other boats.

The machine gun armament of the BKA consisted mainly of 7.62 mm DT tank machine guns with air cooling and magazine feed, and 7.62 mm Maxim machine guns with water cooling and belt feed. DT machine guns were placed in tank turrets from T-28 and T-34, and "Maxims" - in special machine-gun turrets. The Maxim machine guns were much more effective than the DT machine guns, but the shipbuilders did not want to change the structure of the tank turrets, which led to inconsistency in machine gun armament.

The projects of many ships and boats in the 30s included 12.7 mm DK machine guns, 20 mm ShVAK automatic cannons, etc. However, in reality, they were not on the ships. Only now they are periodically "put" on ships by many authors of articles and monographs.

Since 1941, on some boats, the Maxima machine-gun turrets have been replaced by 12.7-mm DShK machine guns.

The DShKM-2B turret with two 12.7 mm DShK machine guns was specially designed for the BKA in TsKB-19 in February 1943. The machine guns had a BH angle of -5°; +82°. Theoretically, the HV velocity was 25°/sec., and the HV velocity was 15°/sec. But since the calculation of the tower consisted of one person, the guidance drives were manual, the weight of the swinging part of the installation was 208 kg, and the rotating part was 750 kg, then practical speed guidance was clearly less. The DShKM-2B installation had a ShB-K sight. Armor thickness - 10 mm. The total weight of the tower is 1254 kg.

The first samples of the tower were put into operation in August 1943. However, there are documents that several DShKM-2B towers were in service in 1942. In addition, in 1943-1945. on some BKA twin turret mounts with 12.7-mm machine guns were installed (both domestic DShK and imported Colt and Browning),

Thus, until 1943, our BKA did not actually have anti-aircraft weapons. And this is not the fault of shipbuilders. Due to criminal negligence and illiteracy, Deputy. People's Commissar of Defense for armament Tukhachevsky and the leadership of the Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, anti-aircraft guns were not given due attention. On the other hand, there was a fascination with chimeras such as universal divisional anti-aircraft guns, dynamo-reactive guns, etc. The only plant that produced anti-aircraft guns (No. the fact that the Germans in 1930 supplied the plant with samples of guns, a lot of semi-finished products and a complete set of technological documentation.

Before the start of the war, only one 70-K naval anti-aircraft gun was put into production. The 37-mm 70-K assault rifles had significant weight and size characteristics for armored boats, and most importantly, they were not enough even for large ships. Therefore, 70-K never got to the BKA.

The 12.7 mm DShKM-2B turrets were inconvenient for firing at high-speed low-flying aircraft; in this respect, turret mounts were more convenient.

Meanwhile, the air defense of armored boats could be solved very simply. In 1941, a powerful 23-mm VYa aircraft gun was put into service (projectile weight - 200 g, muzzle velocity - 920 m / s, rate of fire - 600-650 rds / min per barrel). The VYa gun was immediately put into large-scale production. So, in 1942, 13.420 guns were manufactured, in 1943 - 16430, and in 1944 - 22820 guns. During anti-aircraft fire, armor protection only interfered, so the installation could only have four side walls with bulletproof armor, which reclined when fired.

Smoke equipment data

Installation 24-M-8 on BKA pr. 1124

Installation of BM-13 on BKA pr. 1124

Unfortunately, 23-mm anti-aircraft guns based on VYa were created only after the war. The heirs of VYA - ZU-23 and Shilka - to this day rumble in the vastness of the CIS. During the war, the BKA was saved from enemy aircraft not so much by anti-aircraft machine guns as by the fighter cover of our Air Force and successful camouflage against the background of the coast.

In the second half of the 1930s, smoke-generating equipment was specially designed for the BKA. A mixture of a solution of sulfur dioxide in chlorosulfonic acid was used as a smoke-generating substance, which was supplied to the nozzles with the help of compressed air and sprayed into the atmosphere. In the early 1940s, the smoke generating equipment was dismantled from the BKA and replaced with smoke bombs.

Equipping mine weapons BKA pr. 1124 and 1125 was not provided. But already in the first days of the war, the sailors of the Danube Flotilla managed to put up minefields with the BKA pr. 1125 using improvised means. BKA project 1124 took 8 minutes, and project 1125 - 4 minutes. In the Black Sea alone, in 1941, the BKA carried out 84 minelayings, and in 1943 - 52 minelayings.

ARMORED BOATS WITH ROCKETS

In February 1942, the AU of the Navy issued a technical task for the Special Design Bureau of the Moscow Compressor Plant (No. 733) for the design of ship-based AUs for M-13 and M-8 rockets. The development of these projects was completed by the Design Bureau under the leadership of V. Barmin in May 1942.

The M-8-M installation ensured the launch of 24 82-mm M-8 shells in 7-8 seconds. The M-8-M installation was of a tower-deck type and consisted of a swinging part (a block of guides on a farm), an aiming device, guidance mechanisms and electrical equipment. The swinging part could change the elevation angle in the range from 5 ° to 45 °. The swivel device with a ball shoulder made it possible to rotate the oscillating part of the installation at an angle of 360° along the horizon. On the rotary part of the base of the installation, in its above-deck part, the guidance mechanisms, aiming and braking device, gunner's seat (aka shooter), firing device and electrical equipment were attached.

The M-13-MI installation ensured the launch of 16 M-13 projectiles from eight I-beams (beams) in 5-8 seconds. The M-13-MI installation was of an above-deck type and could be mounted on the roof of the conning tower of the BKA (at the suggestion of the Special Design Bureau) or installed instead of the aft artillery tower of the BKA pr. 1124.

In May 1942, the first M-13-MI installation was sent from the Kompressor plant to Zelenodolsk, where it was installed on the BKA pr. 1124. A little later, the M-8-M installation was also delivered to Zelenodolsk. 1-13MI was installed on BKA No. 41 (since August 18, 1942 No. 51), head. No. 314, project 1124, and a prototype of the M-8-M unit - on BKA No. 61 (plant No. 350) project 1125.

By order of the People's Commissar of the Navy dated November 29, 1942, the M-8-M and M-13-MI rocket launchers were put into service. The industry was given an order for the manufacture of 20 M-13-MI units and 10 M-8-M units.

In August 1942, the M-13-M11 launcher for 32 132-mm M-13 shells was manufactured at the Kompressor plant. The M-13-MP was of a tower-deck type, its design scheme was similar to that of the M-8-M launcher. In Zelenodolsk, the M-13-M11 launcher was mounted on BKA No. 315 pr. 1124 instead of the aft artillery turret. In the autumn of 1942, the installation was tested and was recommended for adoption. However, it was not accepted into service, and the prototype remained in the Volga flotilla.

The combat operation of the M-8-M and M-13-M launchers on the seas, rivers and lakes revealed a number of their design flaws. Therefore, in July-August 1943, the SKB Compressor Plant began designing three ship launchers of an improved type 8-M-8, 24-M-8 and 16-M-13. The designed installations differed from the previous ones in a more reliable locking of rockets on guides in a storm at sea; increasing the speed of aiming the installation at the target; reduction of efforts on the handles of the flywheels of the guidance mechanisms. An automated firing device with foot and hand control was developed, which allows firing single shots, bursts and volley fire. Sealing of the rotary device of the installations and their fastening to the decks of the ship was ensured.

Artillery Directorate of the Navy proposed to shorten the length of guides for 132-mm projectiles from 5 to 2.25 m. However, experienced firing showed that with short guides, dispersion of projectiles is very large. Therefore, on launchers 16-M-13, the length of the guides was left the same (5 m). The guides of all launchers used on the BKA were I-beams.

Work on the 82-mm PU M-8-M, at the direction of the customer (AU Navy) was stopped at the stage of preliminary design.

In February 1944, the Special Design Bureau of the Kompressor plant completed the development of working drawings for the 24-M-8 installation. In April 1944, Plant No. 740 produced two prototypes of the 24-M-8. In July 1944, the 24-M-8 installations successfully passed ship tests in the Black Sea. September 19, 1944 installation 24-M-8 was adopted by the Navy.

M-8-M installation on BKA pr. 1125

Working drawings of the 16-M-13 rocket launcher, designed to launch 16 M-13 missiles, were completed by SKB in March 1944. A prototype was manufactured by the Sverdlovsk plant No. 760 in August 1944. sea ​​in November 1944. In January 1945, the 16-M-13 launcher was adopted by the Navy.

In total, during the Great Patriotic War, the industry manufactured and delivered to fleets and flotillas 92 M-8-M units, 30 M-13-MI units, 49 24-M-8 units and 35 16-M-13 units. These systems were installed both on BKA pr. 1124 and 1125, and on torpedo boats, patrol boats, captured German landing barges, etc.

On armored boats, sometimes, in the absence of special installations for launching rockets, they also made “home-made products on the knee”. Here, for example, in the winter of 1942-1943. on its own initiative, in the 7th division of boats of the OVR of the Leningrad Naval Base, on two BKA pr. 1124 (BKA-101 and BKA-102), home-made launchers for 82-mm M-8 shells were made. The simplest guides made of steel rails were hung on the barrels of 76 mm F-34 guns. A rail was placed on top of each barrel and attached to it with clamps to launch one projectile.

Both BKAs fired M-8 shells on the enemy coast several times, and after the shells were launched, the guns could fire normally. And once, according to the memoirs of the division commander V.V. Chudov, BKA-101, being northwest of about. Lavensaari, fired two M-8 shells at a German T-type small destroyer.

There was little use for “home-made on the knee” at sea (another question is the use of home-made launchers for rockets on land, especially during street battles, where they were literally indispensable). Their accuracy of fire was very poor, and the installations themselves "did not provide security", that is, they represented great danger for the team than for the enemy. In connection with this, the order of the People's Commissar of the Navy dated January 24, 1943 prohibited the design and manufacture of rocket launchers without the knowledge of the Navy General Staff.

The table shows the data of the most widely used variants of the M-8 and M-13 shells. The same M-13 projectile had many other options: M-13 with TC^t6 (range 8230 m), M-13 with TC-14 (range 5520 m), etc. All these shells could be included in the ammunition load of armored boats. For example, the author found marine firing tables for the M-13 projectile weighing 44.5 kg with the ballistic index TS-29. Its maximum firing range is 43.2 cabs (7905 m).

Installation	24-M1-8	16-M-13
Projectile caliber, mm	82	132
Number of guides	24	16
Guide length, m	2	4
Installation loading time, min	4-8	4-8
Volley duration s	2-3	2-3
Elevation angle	-5°; +55°	-5°; +60°
Handle force, N	30-40	30-40
Angle of horizontal guidance	360°	360°
Combat crew, people:
when shooting	1	2
when loading	2-3	3-4
Overall dimensions of the installation, mm:
length	2240	4000
width	2430	2550
YOU "OCH	1170	2S2P
Installation weight without shells, kg	975	2100

Data from jet siards M-8 and M-13

projectile	M-8	M-13	M-13	M-13
Projectile ballistic index	TS-34	TS-13	TS-46	TS-14
Index GRAU Projectile	O-931	OF-941	OF-941	-
Adoption time	1944	06.1941	1942	1944
Projectile caliber mm	82	132	132	132
Projectile length without fuse, mm	675	1415	1415	1415
Wingspan stabilization, mm	200	300	-	300
Projectile weight full, kg	7,92	42,5	42 5	41 5
BB weight, kg	0,6	4,9	4,9	4.9
Powder engine weight, kg	1,18	7,1	7,1	-
Maximum projectile speed, m/s	315	355	-	-
Firing range, m	5515	8470	8230	5520
Deviation at maximum range, m:
by range	106	135	100	85
lateral	220	300	155	105

How expedient was it to install launchers with M-8 and M-13 rockets on armored boats? In the opinion of the author, this is a controversial issue. For boats of project 1124, when installing jet weapons, artillery power was halved. The boats of Project 1125 had a significant increase in draft and a decrease in speed. Launch missiles were not armored, their loading and guidance was carried out by servants who were not protected from enemy fire. Finally, even a single bullet hitting a rocket on the launcher could lead to the death of the boat. In fact, after the installation of jet weapons, the boat ceased to be an armored boat. All the same installations for rockets were also installed on other sea and river vessels of almost all types - from crew and torpedo boats to fishing seiners. Therefore, in the opinion of the author, it was more expedient to put rockets on unarmored ships and boats, and BKA should have been used as purely artillery ships. Another question is that in the absence of other watercraft, there was no other way out.

During the war, the BKA was often called "amphibious tanks". This name is largely true, but you can not bring the matter to the point of absurdity! If the tank commander does not see the target on rough terrain, he can go to the hillock and hit the target with direct fire. An armored boat, of course, cannot do this - its line of fire is always below the coast. Therefore, from a tank gun with an elevation angle of 25 °, an armored boat cannot hit a target invisible from the tower. Except, of course, the use of chemical projectiles. Therefore, the maximum angle of elevation of the boat guns should be 60-75°. In the 30s, the Red Army had a sufficient number of powerful and relatively light artillery systems that ensured effective mounted fire. Among them are the 122-mm regimental howitzer "Scrap" (prototypes), 122-mm howitzer mod. 1910/30 (large-scale production), 122-mm howitzer M-30 mod. 1938 (large-scale production), 152-mm mortar mod. 1931 (small-scale production), 152-mm howitzer mod. 1909/30 (large-scale production) and 152-mm howitzer M-10 mod. 1938 (large-scale production). Thus, there was plenty to choose from.

Naturally, the BKA should have had special naval turrets, and not tank turrets. And it's not just the angle of elevation. Why do we need a tower with 40-50 mm armor with a side armor thickness of 7 mm. Just a joke - the upper half of the gunner's body is covered with anti-ballistic armor, and the lower half is anti-bullet. Why protect part of the ammunition load with 50 mm armor when the rest of the ammunition load is protected by 7 mm armor?

Why do we need such cramped quarters in the BKA turret as in a tank turret? The tightness in the tower is, first of all, the great fatigue of the crew, especially during a long stay in the tower. This is a strong gas contamination during firing, which no domestic fans could cope with. In a cramped turret, the rate of fire of cannons is 5-7 times lower than when firing from the same cannon on a range machine. By reducing the thickness of the turret armor and increasing the amount of reserved space, one can only win in weight.

BKA pr. 1125 with an installation for firing rockets. Dnieper flotilla.

Let's not forget that in the 30s, and especially in 1941-1943. there were not enough tank turrets for tanks, and they were made for BKA to the detriment of tank troops.

MODERNIZATION OF ARMORED BOATS PR. 1124 AND 1125 DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

At the very beginning of hostilities, it turned out that on the BKA pr. 1125, the servants of the bow turret with a 7.62-mm machine gun could not fire simultaneously with the cannon turret located directly behind. In this regard, on the boats under construction, the bow turret was dismantled.

To increase the survivability of radio communications, whip and handrail antennas were used, located along the perimeter of the wheelhouse.

The project provided for observation from the conning tower through the cracks in the armor plates. In combat conditions, this turned out to be extremely inconvenient, it was necessary to raise the shields, open the windows, look out through the ajar armored doors, which increased the losses in the crew. Therefore, a tank rotary periscope was installed on the roof of the cabin. In addition, tank observation blocks were used.

During the war, telephone communications were installed on the armored boats of both projects. The commander could now easily contact the calculations in the towers, with the engine room and the aft (tiller) compartment.

To reduce the fire hazard on the boats, the Shaternikov system was used, in which cooled exhaust gases were injected into the gas tanks.

In the course of hostilities on freezing rivers and lakes, it was necessary to lengthen the navigation time of the BKA. It was not easy to do this - the light hull of the armored boat could not ensure safe navigation even in broken ice. Plates of young ice peeled off the color, which caused corrosion. Thin plates of propellers were often damaged. Sludge and fine ice clogged the cooling system, causing the boats' engines to overheat.

Commander Yu.Yu. Benois found an original way out. The armored boat was dressed in a wooden "fur coat". Wooden boards 40-50 mm thick protected the bottom and sides of the boat (100-150 mm above the waterline). The wooden "fur coat" almost did not change the draft of the boat due to the buoyancy of the tree. Another question is that the BKA in the "fur coat" had a lower speed.

E.E. Pammel designed a propeller with thicker blade edges, and the maximum speed of the boat with reinforced propellers decreased by only 0.5 knots. In parallel, Pammel proposed a profiled device specially designed by him, which was installed so that the propeller worked as if in a half-nozzle. This not only improved the traction qualities of the complex, but also served as additional protection for the propeller. Only because of the technological difficulties of wartime, this half-nozzle did not go into series and was installed on only one armored boat.

To strengthen the hull, the portholes in it were sealed. An exception was made only for the commander's cabin and the cockpit.

To protect the cooling system, F.D. Kachaev proposed to install an ice box in the engine room - a cylinder, the height of which exceeded the draft of the boat. A lattice partition was placed inside, which delayed the ice coming along with the sea water. Accumulated fine ice or sludge could be removed without leaving the engine room. This simplest device, as the autumn-winter navigation of 1942-1943 showed, turned out to be very reliable.

To improve living conditions in 1944, Yu.Yu. Benois proposed installing specially designed stove-boilers that served both for heating and for cooking (instead of uncomfortable primus stoves). They worked on both liquid and solid fuels and earned the full approval of the personnel of the armored boats.

Alterations were also made in the steering system. The rudders, despite being protected by tunnels, were often damaged. And the removal of the steering wheel and its repair in front-line bases that did not have special equipment was very difficult. As a result, the design was greatly simplified.

To increase the maximum speed of the BKA, K.K. Fedyaevsky suggested using "air lubrication". The compressed air supplied under the hull of the boat had to spread along the bottom and, changing the nature of its flow around it, reduce the friction resistance. According to calculations, the speed should have increased by 2-3 knots. At the beginning of 1944, working drawings were developed, and by the beginning of navigation on the Volga, one of the boats, project 1124, was prepared for the experiment. Slots were cut in the bottom skin in the plane of one of the bow frames. Above them, inside the hull, waterproof boxes were welded, to which compressed air was supplied through pipes from a supercharger. But tests showed that when air was supplied, the speed did not increase, but decreased. Since the main engines went “out of order”, it could be assumed that air entered the tunnels, propellers, working in a mixture of water with air, became “light”. It was not possible to eliminate the ingress of air to the screws, and the system had to be dismantled.

To be continued