TANK "PANTER" Ausf.A In February 1943, at the very beginning of the production of tanks "Panther" Ausf.D, it was decided to change the design of the commander's cupola. It was supposed to be cast, while increasing the thickness of the armor to 100 mm and instead of viewing devices

TANK "PANTERA" Ausf.G Tank "Panther" Ausf.G was, so to speak, the "illegitimate child" of the unrealized project "Panther II". As mentioned above, back in May 1943, it was decided to introduce a number of changes into the design of serial "panthers", developed in

TANK "PANTER" Ausf. F AND POSSIBLE FURTHER OPTIONS In many publications, the projects of the Panther II and Panther Ausf.F tanks are often considered as interconnected and being a continuation of each other. Meanwhile, these are two completely different modifications of the machine,

PANTER TANKS IN BATTLE

DEVICE OF THE T-28 TANK The T-28 tank passes through Uritsky Square. Leningrad, May 1, 1937. Vehicle manufactured in 1935, early-type road wheels (ASKM) are clearly visible. TANK BODY. For the entire time of mass production, T-28 tanks had two types of hulls: welded (from homogeneous armor) and

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15 cm sIG 33 auf Pz.Kpfw.I Ausf.B The second type of self-propelled guns, designed on the basis of the Pz.IB tank. Manufacturer - Alkett. In 1939, 38 units were manufactured. SERIAL MODIFICATION: the engine, chassis and most of the hull remained unchanged. In place of the tower, a 150-mm heavy

38 cm Panzerm?rser Sturmtiger Ausf.E The largest self-propelled mount used in World War II. It was used to destroy fortifications and shelling concentrations of enemy troops. From August 1944 to March 1945, Alkett manufactured (and

12,8 cm Jagdpanzer Jagdtiger Ausf.B (Sd.Kfz.186) The most powerful and heaviest anti-tank self-propelled unit of the Wehrmacht. In 1944-1945 Nibelungenwerke manufactured 79 units. SERIAL MODIFICATION: the chassis of the Pz.VIB Tiger II heavy tank was used as a base. In the middle part of the body instead of

CREATION OF A TANK WITH GTE Tank T-80UD of the 4th Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank Division on one of the streets of Moscow. August 1991 April 19, 1968 by a joint resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On the creation of gas turbine power plants for armored vehicles"

DESIGN OF THE T-80B TANK The T-80B tank inherited the layout of its well-known predecessors, including the T-64, with a control compartment in the front of the hull. The driver's seat is located here, in front of which on the bottom there are steering control levers, pedals

MODIFICATIONS OF THE T-80 TANK "Object 219 sp 1", 1969 - the first version of the prototype of the T-80 tank, modification of the T-64A: running gear like the T-64, gas turbine engine GTD-1000T; development of SKB-2 LK3. "Object 219 sp 2", 1972 - the second version of the prototype of the T-80 tank: a new undercarriage with a torsion

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My old article, almost a decade ago, which unexpectedly spread very widely on the net. I update the address and invite the general public to read and discuss it again.

In various books and TV shows, I constantly came across the assessment of the Panther as one of the best tanks of the Second World War. And in the program on the National Geographic channel, he was generally called absolutely ahead of his time.

Heavy tank PzKpfw V "Panther" Ausf D (SdKfz 171).

History reference:

, abbr. - German tank of the Second World War. This combat vehicle was developed by MAN in 1941-1942 as the main tank of the Wehrmacht. According to the German classification, the Panther was considered a medium tank. In the Soviet tank classification, the Panther was considered a heavy tank. In the departmental end-to-end system of designations for military equipment of Nazi Germany, the Panther had the Sd.Kfz index. 171. Starting from February 27, 1944, the Fuhrer ordered that only the name "Panther" be used to designate the tank.

The combat debut of the "Panther" was the Battle of Kursk, subsequently tanks of this type were actively used by the Wehrmacht and the SS troops in all European theaters of war. According to a number of experts, the Panther is the best German tank of the Second World War and one of the best in the world. At the same time, the tank had a number of shortcomings, was complicated and expensive to manufacture and operate. On the basis of the Panther, the Jagdpanther self-propelled artillery mount (ACS) and a number of specialized vehicles for the engineering and artillery units of the German armed forces were produced.

Battalions "Panther" Eastern Front. Period from the end of 1943 to 1945

The Panthers that survived on the Kursk Bulge were assembled as part of the 52nd tank battalion, which was renamed I. Abteilung / Panzer-Regiment 15 on August 24, 1943. The 51st battalion received new 96 Panthers in early August and remained in part of the grenadier division "Grossdeutschland". By the end of August, the 52nd Battalion had irretrievably lost 36 Panthers. As of August 31, 1943, the 52nd tank battalion had 15 combat-ready tanks, another 45 vehicles were under repair.

At the end of August 1943, 1. Abteilung / SS-Panzer-Regiment 2, which was part of the SS Panzer Division "Das Reich", arrived at the front. This battalion consisted of 71 Panthers. Three command tanks were at the headquarters, and each of the four companies had 17 vehicles: two in the headquarters section and five in each platoon. On August 31, 1943, the battalion had 21 combat-ready tanks, 40 vehicles needed repair, 10 were decommissioned.

The fourth Panther battalion that ended up on the Eastern Front was the II. Abteilung/Panzer-Regiment 23. The battalion had 96 Panthers, of which the majority were Ausf. D, but there were also several Ausf. A. The fifth was I. Abteilung/Panzer-Regiment 2, equipped with 71 Panthers, mostly Ausf. A. From the report of the 13th Panzer Division of October 20, 1943:

“Due to the threatening situation at the front, the battalion was thrown to the front line, barely having time to unload. The battalion operated in squadrons. Due to the haste, it was not possible to establish interaction with the grenadiers. Often unnecessarily turning into counterattacks, tank squads supported the actions of the infantry. As it turned out later, such use of tanks was contrary to basic tactical principles, but the situation at the front left no choice.

Below are excerpts from the reports of the commander of I. Abteilung / Panzer-Regiment 2. Hauptmann Bollert, covering the period from 9 to 19 October 1943:

"Tactical training.

Insufficient tactical training of the crews did not seriously affect the combat effectiveness of the battalion, since more than half of the battalion personnel have combat experience. In such an environment, young soldiers quickly improve their skills. Many young driver-mechanics, who had just graduated from tank school, kept their tanks in combat-ready condition with great diligence. In any case, it is highly desirable to have an experienced platoon leader.

Technical training in Germany:

During several weeks of training, drivers and technical staff did not always study what is required on the front line. Some of the soldiers were engaged all the time in any one task, for example, changing road wheels. Thus, many did not have a holistic view of the design of the PzKpfw V. Under the guidance of an experienced instructor, young soldiers sometimes achieved excellent results in a very short time. There is an opportunity to study the materiel at every plant that assembles tanks.

Mechanical problems:

Cylinder head seal burned through. Destroyed fuel pump shaft.

The bolts on the large final drive gear are torn off. Often there is a loss of plugs, which leads to leakage of oil. Oil also often leaks through the seam between the final drive housing and the side of the tank. The bolts that secure the final drives to the side of the hull often come loose.

The upper fan bearing often sticks. Lubrication is insufficient even if the oil level is normal. Fan damage is often accompanied by damage to the fan drive.

Driveshaft bearings fail. The drive of the hydraulic pump wears out.

Armament issues: Compressor clutch stuck, interfering with barrel scavenging system. The TZF 12 sight fails as a result of hits in the gun mantlet. Optics consumption for the sight is very high.

It is absolutely necessary to equip the tank with a forward machine gun to fight enemy infantry. The need for a course machine gun is felt especially acutely when the coaxial machine gun falls silent.

The frontal armor of the PzKpfw V is very good. 76.2 mm armor-piercing shells leave dents on it no deeper than 45 mm. "Panthers" fail with a direct hit by 152-mm high-explosive shells - the shell breaks through the armor. Almost all Panthers received frontal hits from 76-mm shells, while the combat effectiveness of the tanks practically did not suffer. In one case, the gun mantlet was pierced by a 45-mm projectile fired from a distance of 30 m. The crew was not injured.

However, the side armor is very vulnerable. The side of the tower on one of the "Panthers" was pierced by an anti-tank rifle. The side of another "Panther" was also pierced by a small-caliber projectile. All these damages occur during the fighting on the streets or in the forest, where it is not possible to close the flanks.

A direct hit by an artillery shell and the lower part of the frontal armor led to the fact that the welds burst, and a piece several centimeters long broke off from the armor plate. Obviously the seam was not welded to the full depth.

The skirt performed well enough. Sheet fastenings are not sufficiently reliable and are very inconveniently located. Since the sheets are suspended at a distance of 8 cm from the side of the tank, they are easily torn off by branches of trees and shrubs.

New road wheels did not cause any complaints. Almost all "Panthers" lost their course due to explosions of high-explosive shells. One track roller was pierced right through, three were damaged. Several road wheels broke. Although 45mm and 76mm shells penetrate tracks, they cannot immobilize a tank. In any case, the Panther can leave the battlefield under its own power. During long marches at top speed, rubber tires on the road wheels wear out quickly.

The gun proved to be excellent, only a few minor problems were noted. The frontal armor of the KV-1 confidently breaks through from a distance of 600 m. The SU-152 breaks through from a distance of 800 m.

The new commander's cupola has a rather successful design. The diopter, which greatly helped the tank commander in pointing the gun at the target, is missing. The three front periscopes should be moved a little closer to each other. The field of view through the periscopes is good, but it is impossible to use binoculars. When shells hit the turret, the periscope optics often fail and need to be replaced.

In addition, the driver's and radio operator's periscopes should be better sealed. When it rains, water gets inside and makes work very difficult.

Bergepanther tugs have proven to be excellent. One Bergepanther is enough to evacuate one tank in dry weather. In deep mud, even two tugs are not enough to evacuate one Panther. To date, Bergepanther tugs have evacuated 20 Panthers. In total, damaged tanks were towed over a distance of 600 m. Bergepanthers were used only to tow wrecked tanks from the front line to the near rear. The experience of the battalion shows that it is necessary to have at least four Bergepanther tugs, albeit at the expense of conventional 18-ton tugs. The equipment of tugboats with radio stations turned out to be handy. During the battle, the Bergepanther commanders received instructions by radio.

To tow one Panther in dry weather, two Zugkraftwagen 18t tractors are required. However, in deep mud, even four 18-ton tractors cannot move the tank.

On October 16, the battalion launched an attack with 31 tanks. Although the distance traveled was short, 12 Panthers failed due to mechanical failures. By October 18, 1943, the battalion had 26 combat-ready Panthers. 39 tanks needed repair and 6 vehicles had to be written off. Between October 9 and 19, the average number of combat-ready tanks was 22 Panthers.

Results: 46 tanks and 4 self-propelled guns were knocked out. 28 anti-tank guns, 14 artillery pieces and 26 anti-tank rifles were destroyed. Our irretrievable losses are 8 tanks (6 were hit and burned down during the fighting, two were dismantled for spare parts).

Due to the mechanical unreliability of the Panthers and the high level of losses. On November 1, 1943, Hitler decided to send 60 tanks without engines to the Leningrad Front, which were to be dug into the ground opposite the Kronstadt Bay. From November 5 to November 25, 1943, 60 Panthers (fully combat-ready) were sent to the command of the Army Group North.

On November 30, 1943, the command of the L Army Corps reported that 60 Panthers had come under the jurisdiction of the 9th and 10th Luftwaffe field divisions. "Panthers" were dug in threes along the line of defense, having a clear space of 1000-1500 m in front of them. If for some reason it was not possible to dig three tanks side by side, a single vehicle was reinforced with infantry and an anti-tank gun. The 10 most combat-ready vehicles were left on the move as a mobile reserve.

60 people were allocated from the I. Abteilung / Panzer-Regiment 29 (20 commanders, 20 drivers, 15 gunners and 5 gunners-radio operators). On December 26, III Panzer Corps was ordered to collect all Panthers that had retained mobility as part of I. Abteilung / Panzer-Regiment 29. The dug-in Panthers remained under the control of divisions.

In November 1943, two Panther battalions arrived on the Eastern Front. These were I. Abteilung / Panzer-Regiment 1, which numbered 76 Panthers (17 tanks in a company), as well as I. Ableilung / SS-Panzer-Regiment 1. fully equipped (96 Panthers), Both battalions operated as part of their divisions.

In early November, the 1st Battalion of the 15th Tank Regiment received reinforcements in the form of 31 Panthers. At the end of December 1943, the 1st Battalion of the 1st Tank Regiment received 16 new Panthers. Not counting the 60 Panthers sent to the Leningrad Front, a total of 841 Panthers were sent to the Eastern Front in 1943. By December 31, 1943, the Germans had only 217 Panthers, of which only 80 remained operational. 624 tanks were decommissioned (74% loss).

From 5 to 11 December 1943, 76 Panthers were delivered to the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Tank Regiment. Another 94 Panthers arrived as replacements for other battalions. However, all these tanks were first used in combat as early as January 1944.

“As the experience of recent battles has shown, the Panther has finally been brought to mind. A report dated February 22, 1944, received from the 1st Tank Regiment, states: “In the current version, the Panther is suitable for front-line use. It is significantly superior to the T-34. Almost all shortcomings are eliminated. The tank has excellent armor, armament, maneuverability and speed. Currently, the average mileage of the motor is in the range of 700-1000 km. The number of engine breakdowns has decreased. Final drive failures are no longer noted. The steering and transmission are reasonably reliable.”

However, this report from the 1st Panzer Regiment was premature. Indeed, the Panther felt good in winter on frozen ground, but already in a report dated April 22, 1944 from the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Tank Regiment, numerous technical problems caused by spring impassability were reported:

Engine Maybach HL 230 P30;

In general, the new engines are much more reliable than their predecessors. Sometimes the engine runs up to 1700-1800 km without repair, and 3 Panthers, having covered this distance, still remain on the move. But the nature of the breakdowns has not changed: the destruction of mechanical parts and damage to bearings.

"Panther" (PzKpfw V "Panther") what it is - a German medium or heavy tank during the Second World War. This combat vehicle was developed by MAN in 1941-1942 as the main tank of the Wehrmacht.

The Panther was armed with a smaller caliber gun than the Tiger and was considered a medium-armed tank (or just a medium tank) according to the German classification. In the Soviet tank classification, the Panther was considered a heavy tank, referred to as the T-5 or T-V. It was also considered a heavy tank by the Allies. In the departmental end-to-end system of designations for military equipment of Nazi Germany, the Panther had the Sd.Kfz index. 171. Starting from February 27, 1944, the Fuhrer ordered that only the name "Panther" be used to designate the tank.

The combat debut of the "Panther" was the battle on Kursk Bulge, subsequently tanks of this type were actively used by the Wehrmacht and the SS troops in all European theaters of operations. According to a number of experts, the Panther was the best German tank of World War II and one of the best in the world. At the same time, the tank had a number of shortcomings, was complicated and expensive to manufacture and operate. On the basis of the Panther, anti-tank self-propelled artillery mounts Jagdpanther and a number of specialized vehicles for engineering and artillery units of the German armed forces were produced.

History of creation

Work on a new medium tank designed to replace the PzKpfw III and PzKpfw IV began in 1938. The project of such a combat vehicle weighing 20 tons, which was worked on by Daimler-Benz, Krupp and MAN, received indexation: VK.30.01 (DB) - the project of Daimler-Benz, and VK.30.02 (MAN) - MAN project. Work on the new tank proceeded quite slowly, since the reliable and battle-tested medium tanks were quite satisfactory for the German military. However, by the fall of 1941, the chassis design was generally worked out. However, by this time the situation had changed.

After the start of the war with Soviet Union German troops met with new Soviet tanks - T-34 and KV. Initially, Soviet technology did not arouse much interest among the German military, but by the fall of 1941, the pace of the German offensive began to fall, and reports began to come from the front about the superiority of new Soviet tanks - especially the T-34 - over the tanks of the Wehrmacht. To study Soviet tanks, German military and technical specialists created a special commission, which included leading German designers of armored vehicles (in particular, F. Porsche and G. Knipkamp). German engineers studied in detail all the advantages and disadvantages of the T-34 and other Soviet tanks, after which they made a decision on the need to implement such innovations in German tank building as an inclined arrangement of armor, a running gear with large rollers and wide tracks. Work on the 20-ton tank was discontinued, instead, on November 25, 1941, Daimler-Benz and MAN were given an order for a prototype 35-ton tank using all these design solutions. A promising tank received the code name "Panther". To determine the most suitable prototype for the Wehrmacht, the "Panzerkommissiya" was also formed from a number of prominent military figures of the Third Reich.

In the spring of 1942, both contractors presented their prototypes. The Daimler-Benz experimental vehicle even outwardly strongly resembled the T-34. In their desire to achieve similarities with the "thirty-four", they even suggested equipping the tank with a diesel engine, although the acute shortage of diesel fuel in Germany (it overwhelmingly went to the needs of the submarine fleet) made this option unpromising. Adolf Hitler showed great interest and a penchant for this option, the company "Daimler-Benz" even received an order for 200 cars. However, in the end, the order was canceled, and preference was given to a competing project from MAN. The commission noted a number of advantages of the MAN project, in particular, a more successful suspension, a gasoline engine, better maneuverability, and a shorter gun barrel reach. It was also argued that the similarity of the new tank with the T-34 would lead to confusion of combat vehicles on the battlefield and losses from their own fire.

The prototype of the MAN company was designed entirely in the spirit of the German tank building school: the front location of the transmission compartment and the rear - the engine compartment, an individual torsion bar "chessboard" suspension designed by engineer G. Knipkamp. As the main armament, the tank was equipped with the 75-mm long-barreled Rheinmetall gun specified by the Fuhrer. The choice of a relatively small caliber was determined by the desire to get a high rate of fire and a large transportable ammunition inside the tank. Interestingly, in the projects of both firms, German engineers immediately abandoned the Christie-type suspension used in the T-34, considering its design unusable and outdated. A large group of MAN employees worked on the creation of the Panther under the leadership of the chief engineer of the tank department of the company P. Vibikke. Also a significant contribution to the creation of the tank was made by engineer G. Knipkamp (undercarriage) and the designers of the Rheinmetall company (gun).

After choosing a prototype, preparations began for the fastest launch of the tank in mass production which began in the first half of 1943.

Prototypes of MAN and Daimler-Benz

Production

Serial production of the PzKpfw V Panther lasted from January 1943 to April 1945 inclusive. In addition to the development company MAN, the Panther was produced by such well-known German concerns and enterprises as Daimler-Benz, Henschel, Demag, etc. In total, 136 subcontractors were involved in the production of the Panther.

Cooperation in the production of "Panther" was very complex and developed. Deliveries of the most important units and assemblies of the tank were duplicated in order to avoid interruptions in supply in various kinds of emergency situations. This turned out to be very useful, since the location of the enterprises involved in the production of the Panther was known to the Allied air forces, and almost all of them experienced fairly successful enemy bombing attacks. As a result, the leadership of the Ministry of Armaments and Ammunition of the Third Reich was forced to evacuate some of the production equipment to small towns that were less attractive for massive Allied bombing attacks. Also, the production of units and assemblies of the Panther was organized in various kinds of underground shelters, a number of orders were transferred to small enterprises. Therefore, the initial plan for the production of 600 Panthers per month was never achieved, the maximum serial production fell on July 1944 - then 400 vehicles were delivered to the customer. A total of 5976 Panthers were produced, of which 1768 were produced in 1943, 3749 in 1944, and 459 in 1945. Thus, the PzKpfw V became the second largest tank of the Third Reich, yielding only to the PzKpfw IV in terms of output.

Design

Armored corps and turret

The hull of the tank was assembled from rolled surface-hardened armor plates of medium and low hardness, connected “in a spike” and welded with a double seam. The upper frontal part (VLD) with a thickness of 80 mm had a rational angle of inclination of 57 ° relative to the normal to the horizontal plane. The lower frontal part (NLD), 60 mm thick, was installed at an angle of 53° to the normal. The data obtained during the measurement of the captured Panther at the Kubinka training ground differed somewhat from the above: the VLD with a thickness of 85 mm had an inclination of 55 ° to the normal, the NLD - 65 mm and 55 °, respectively. The upper side plates of the hull 40 mm thick (on later modifications - 50 mm) are inclined to the normal at an angle of 42 °, the lower ones were installed vertically and had a thickness of 40 mm. The stern sheet 40 mm thick is inclined to the normal at an angle of 30°. In the roof of the hull above the control compartment there were manholes for the driver and gunner-radio operator. Manhole covers lifted up and moved to the side, as on modern tanks. The aft part of the tank hull was divided by armored partitions into 3 compartments, when overcoming water obstacles, the compartments closest to the sides of the tank could be filled with water, but water did not get into the middle compartment, where the engine was located. At the bottom of the hull there were technological hatches for access to the suspension torsion bars, drain valves of the power supply system, cooling and lubrication, the evacuation pump and the drain plug of the gearbox housing.

The Panther's turret was a welded structure made of rolled armor plates connected into a spike. The thickness of the side and rear sheets of the tower is 45 mm, the slope to the normal is 25 °. A gun was mounted in a cast mask in front of the turret. The thickness of the gun mask is 100 mm. The rotation of the tower was carried out by a hydraulic mechanism that took power from the tank engine; the turret rotation speed depended on the engine speed, at 2500 rpm the turret rotation time was 17 seconds to the right and 18 seconds to the left. A manual turret rotation drive was also provided, 1000 revolutions of the flywheel corresponded to a 360 ° turret rotation. The turret of the tank is unbalanced, due to which it was impossible to turn it manually with a roll of more than 5 °. The thickness of the roof of the tower was 17 mm, on the Ausf. G it was increased to 30 mm. A commander's cupola was installed on the roof of the tower, with 6 (later 7) viewing devices.

Engine and transmission

The first 250 tanks were equipped with a Maybach HL 210 P30 12-cylinder V-shaped carburettor engine with a volume of 21 liters. Maybach HL 230 P45 replaced it from May 1943. On the new engine, the piston diameters were increased, the engine displacement increased to 23 liters. Compared to the HL 210 P30 model, where the cylinder block was aluminum, this part of the HL 230 P45 was made of cast iron, due to which the engine weight increased by 350 kg. HL 230 P30 developed 700 horsepower. With. at 3000 rpm. The maximum speed of the tank with the new engine did not increase, but the traction reserve increased, which made it possible to overcome impassability more confidently. An interesting feature: the main bearings of the crankshaft of the engine were not sliding, as is customary everywhere in modern engine building, but roller bearings. Thus, the engine designers saved (at the cost of increasing the labor intensity of the product) the country's non-renewable resource - non-ferrous metals.

The transmission consisted of the main clutch, driveline, gearbox (gearbox) Zahnradfabrik AK 7-200, turning mechanism, final drives and disc brakes. Gearbox - three-shaft, with a longitudinal arrangement of shafts, seven-speed, five-way, with constant gear engagement and simple (inertialess) cone synchronizers for engaging gears from 2nd to 7th. The crankcase of the gearbox is dry, the oil was cleaned and supplied under pressure directly to the gear engagement points. It was very easy to drive the car: the gearshift lever set in the right position caused the main clutch to be automatically released and the desired pair to be switched.

The gearbox and the turning mechanism were made as a single unit, which reduced the number of centering work when assembling the tank, but the dismantling of the overall unit in the field was a laborious operation.

The tank control drives are combined, with a follow-up hydraulic servo drive with mechanical feedback.

Red Army soldiers inspect the Panther tank (Kpfw. V Ausf. D Panther, tactical number 312) of the 51st Tank Battalion (Panzer-Abteilung 51) of the 39th Tank Regiment (Panzer-Regiment 39) of the 10th Tank Brigade (Panzer-Brigade) 10), shot down during the offensive operation of the Wehrmacht "Citadel".

Chassis

The undercarriage of the tank with a "staggered" arrangement of track rollers designed by G. Knipkamp provided good running smoothness and a more uniform distribution of pressure on the ground along the supporting surface in comparison with other technical solutions. On the other hand, such a chassis design was difficult to manufacture and repair, and also had a large mass. So, to replace one roller from the inner row, it was necessary to dismantle from a third to a half of the outer rollers. On each side of the tank there were 8 large-diameter road wheels. Double torsion bars were used as elastic suspension elements, the front and rear pair of rollers were supplied with hydraulic shock absorbers. Drive rollers - front, with removable rims, caterpillar engagement is pinion. Small steel caterpillars, each of 86 steel tracks. Cast tracks, track pitch 153 mm, width 660 mm.

Armament

The main armament of the tank was a 75-mm KwK 42 tank gun manufactured by Rheinmetall-Borsig. The length of the gun barrel is 70 calibers / 5250 mm without muzzle brake and 5535 mm with it. The main design features of the gun include:

Semi-automatic vertical copier type wedge;
- anti-recoil devices:
- hydraulic recoil brake;
- hydropneumatic knurler;
- lifting mechanism of sector type.

Shooting from the gun was carried out only with unitary cartridges with an electric ignition sleeve, the electric ignition button was located on the flywheel of the lifting mechanism. In critical situations, the crew included an inductor [source not specified 1996 days] directly into the gun’s bolt circuit, the “button” of which, triggered by a gunner’s kick, provided a shot in any situation - the solenoid coil swung in the field of a permanent magnet gave out the necessary EMF to the electric fuse in the sleeve. The inductor was connected to the gate circuit with a plug, like a table lamp. The turret was equipped with a device for purging the channel of the gun after a shot, which consisted of a compressor and a system of hoses and valves. The purge air was sucked out of the sleeve catcher box.

The ammunition load of the gun consisted of 79 shots for modifications A and D and 82 shots for modification G. The ammunition load included cartridges with armor-piercing tracer shells Pzgr. 39/42, with sub-caliber armor-piercing tracer shells Pzgr. 40/42 and high-explosive shells Sprgr. 42.
These shots were only suitable for the KwK / StuK / Pak 42 gun with a barrel length of 70 calibers. The shots were placed in the niches of the turret box, in the fighting compartment and in the control compartment. The KwK 42 gun had powerful ballistics and at the time of its creation could hit almost all tanks and self-propelled guns of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. Only the Soviet IS-2 tank, which appeared in the middle of 1944, with a straightened VLD, had a frontal hull armor that reliably protected it from the shells of the Panther cannon at the main battle distances. American tanks M26 "Pershing" and limited-edition M4A3E2 "Sherman Jumbo" also had armor capable of protecting them in frontal projection from KwK 42 projectiles.

Tank "Panther" Pz.Kpfw. V battle group Mühlenkamp of the 5th SS Panzer Division (5.SS-Panzer-Division "Wiking") in the Nuzhets-Stacja area (Nurzec-Stacja). The division took part in the fighting in order to hold back the rapid advance of the tank units of the Red Army during Operation Bagration. The vehicle has an Ausf. A and the turret of the Ausf. G.

A 7.92-mm MG-34 machine gun was paired with the cannon, the second (forward) machine gun was placed in the front hull plate in a drag mount (in the front hull plate there was a vertical slot for a machine gun closed by an armored flap) on modification D and in a ball mount on modifications A and G. The commander's turrets of tanks of modifications A and G were adapted to mount an anti-aircraft machine gun MG-34 or MG-42. The total ammunition load for machine guns was 4800 rounds for Ausf. G and 5100 for Panthers Ausf. A and D.

As a means of defense against infantry, tanks of modifications A and G were equipped with a “melee device” (Nahkampfgerat), a 56 mm mortar. The mortar was located in the right rear of the roof of the tower, the ammunition included smoke, fragmentation and fragmentation-incendiary grenades.

The "Panthers" of modification D were equipped with a binocular telescopic breaking sight TZF-12, tanks of modifications A and G were equipped with a simpler monocular sight TZF-12A, which was the right tube of the TZF-12 sight. The binocular sight had a magnification of 2.5× and a field of view of 30°, the monocular sight had a variable magnification of 2.5× or 5× and a field of view of 30° or 15°, respectively. When changing the elevation angle of the gun, only the objective part of the sight deviated, the ocular part remained motionless; thanks to this, the convenience of working with a sight at all angles of elevation of the gun was achieved.

Also, the commander's "Panthers" began to mount the latest equipment - night vision devices: infrared searchlights-illuminators with a power of 200 W were installed on the commander's turrets, plus observation devices that made it possible to inspect the area from a distance of 200 meters (at the same time, the driver did not have such a device and drove the car, guided by the instructions of the commander).

To fire at night, a more powerful illuminator was required. To do this, a 6 kW Uhu infrared searchlight was installed on the SdKfz 250/20 half-tracked armored personnel carrier, which ensured the operation of the night vision device at a distance of 700 meters. Its tests were successful, and Leitz-Wetzlar produced 800 sets of optics for night devices. In November 1944, the Panzerwaffe received 63 Panthers equipped with the world's first mass-produced active night vision devices.

Modifications

V1 and V2(September 1942) - experimental models, practically no different from each other.

Modification a(D1)(German Ausführung a (D1)). The first Panthers, produced in January 1943 with the HL 210 P45 engine and ZF7 gearbox, were designated Ausf. a (not to be confused with A). The KwK 42 gun was equipped with a single-chamber muzzle brake, on the left side of the turret there was a ledge-tide under the base of the commander's turret. In February 1943, these machines received the Ausf. D1.

Modification D2(German Ausführung D2). The Panthers launched into gross production received the Ausf index. D2. A more effective two-chamber muzzle brake was installed on the gun, which made it possible to shift the commander closer to the gun and remove the tide of the commander's cupola. The tank was equipped with an HL 230 P30 engine and an AK 7-200 gearbox. The course machine gun was located in the frontal hull plate in a yoke installation. Ausf tanks. D2 was equipped with a TZF-12 binocular telescopic breakable sight. The ammunition load of the cannon and machine guns consisted of 79 shots and 5100 rounds, respectively.

Modification A(German Ausführung A). In the autumn of 1943, the production of the Ausf modification began. A. A new turret was installed on the tank (the same was installed on the later Ausf. D2 modifications). In the new turret, the hatches Verstandigungsoeffnung (one of the translations is "Latch for communication with the infantry") and loopholes for firing pistols were abolished. Tanks of this modification were equipped with a simpler TZF-12A monocular sight, as well as a commander's cupola, unified with the Tiger tank. Changes also affected the hull: the inefficient tow mount of the course machine gun was replaced with a more traditional ball mount. Several Panthers Ausf. A were experimentally equipped with infrared night vision devices.

Modification G(German Ausführung G). In March 1944, the most massive modification of the Panther tank went into production. Ausf version. G had a simpler and more technologically advanced hull, the driver's hatch was removed from the front plate, the angle of inclination of the sides was reduced to 30 ° to the normal, and their thickness was increased to 50 mm. On later vehicles of this modification, the shape of the gun mantlet was changed to prevent shells from ricocheting into the roof of the hull. Cannon ammo load increased to 82 rounds.

In the autumn of 1944, it was planned to start production of a new modification of the tank. ausf. F. This modification was distinguished by more powerful hull armor (front 120 mm, sides 60 mm), as well as a new turret design. The Schmalturm 605 tower (“cramped tower”) developed by Daimler-Benz had a slightly smaller size compared to the standard one, which made it possible to increase frontal armor up to 120 mm at an angle of inclination of 20 ° to the normal. The sides of the new tower had a thickness of 60 mm and an angle of inclination of 25 °, the thickness of the gun mantlet reached 150 mm. Until the end of the war, not a single completed prototype appeared, although 8 hulls and 2 turrets were produced.

Modification "Panther 2"(German: Panther 2).

Taking into service in the autumn of 1943 the Tiger II tank, the Ministry of Armaments and Ammunition issued an assignment to develop a new Panther II tank, with the condition of maximum unification of the units of these two vehicles. The development of the new tank was entrusted to the design bureau of Henschel & Sons. The new "Panther" was like a lightweight "Tiger II" with reduced armor thickness, equipped with a Schmalturm turret. The main armament is an 88 mm KwK 43/2 tank gun. with a barrel length of 70 calibers. The main problem was the lack of a suitable engine for the heavier machine, options for installing MAN / Argus LD 220 engines with a power of 750 hp were worked out. s., Maybach HL 234 with a capacity of 850 liters. With. and others, but the work was not completed.

At the end of 1944, the Ordnance Department issued an order for the manufacture of two Panther IIs, but only one hull was produced, on which a turret from the serial Panther Ausf was installed for testing. G. But the tests were not carried out, and this tank was captured by US troops. The hull of this tank is kept at the Patton Cavalry and Armored Forces Museum at Fort Knox.

Modification Command tank "Panther"(German Panzerbefehlswagen Panther, Sd.Kfz. 267).

Since the summer of 1943, on the basis of the "Panther" modification D, the production of command tanks began, which differed from linear vehicles by installing additional radio stations and a reduced ammunition load. Two variants of tanks were produced: Sd.Kfz. 267 with radio stations Fu 5 and Fu 7, for communication in the link "company - battalion", and Sd.Kfz. 268, with Fu 5 and Fu 8 radios providing communication at the battalion-division level. Additional radio stations Fu 7 and Fu 8 were located in the hull, and the standard Fu 5 was located on the right side of the machine's turret. Outwardly, the tanks differed from the linear tanks by the presence of two additional antennas, one with a whip and the second with a characteristic “panicle” at the top. The communication range for the Fu 7 reached 12 km when working by telephone and 16 km when working by telegraph, Fu 8 could work for 80 km in telegraph mode.

Machines based on the "Panther"

"Jagdpanther" (Sd.Kfz. 173)

After the debut of the Ferdinand heavy tank destroyer on the Kursk Bulge, the leadership of the Ministry of Armaments of the Third Reich issued an order for the development of a similarly armed combat vehicle on a more technologically advanced and mobile chassis. The best option was to use the Panther base to install an armored cabin with a long-barreled 88-mm StuK43 L / 71 cannon on it. The resulting self-propelled gun - tank destroyer was named "Jagdpanther" and became one of best cars world in his class. The frontal armor of the Jagdpanther, like that of other German tank destroyers, was recruited from sheets of "sea" armor taken from the stocks of the Kriegsmarine. Armor of pre-war production, this achieves high projectile resistance of the frontal projection.

Bergepanther (Sd.Kfz. 179)

To evacuate wrecked combat vehicles from the battlefield under enemy fire, a specialized armored recovery vehicle (BREM) Bergepanther was developed on the basis of the Panther. Instead of a turret with weapons, an open platform, a crane boom and a winch were installed on the Panther chassis. The first samples were armed with a 20 mm automatic cannon, the subsequent ones with a 7.92 mm MG-34 machine gun. The crew, in addition to the commander and driver, included up to ten repairmen. Bergepanther is often called the best ARV of the Second World War.

Prototypes and projects

Panzerbeobachtungswagen Panther- tank of forward artillery observers. There was no cannon on the machine; instead, a wooden mock-up was installed in a non-rotating turret. The armament consisted of an MG-34 machine gun mounted in a mask. The tank was equipped with a TSR 1 circular rotation commander's periscope, a TSR 2 wide-angle periscope that could rise to a height of up to 430 mm above the turret, two TBF 2 tank periscopes and a horizontal-base stereoscopic rangefinder. The crew consisted of a commander, an observer, a driver and a radio operator. According to some sources, a single copy was built, according to others - a series of 41 cars.

Self-propelled gun projects based on the Panther

The Panther chassis was supposed to be used for a number of combat vehicles with various artillery weapons, but all these projects remained only on paper, some of them are listed below:

Self-propelled 150-mm howitzer on the chassis of the VK 3002 tank from MAN, working title Grille 15.
- self-propelled guns armed with a 128-mm anti-tank gun PaK 44 L / 55 - Grille 12.
- self-propelled guns armed with a 150-mm heavy field howitzer sFH 18/4 from Rheinmetall - Gerät 811.
- self-propelled guns armed with a 150-mm Rheinmetall sFH 43 heavy field howitzer - Gerät 5-1530.
- self-propelled guns armed with a 128-mm Rheinmetall K-43 cannon - Gerät 5-1213.
- Self-propelled armored installation for launching unguided rockets of 105 mm caliber from Skoda - 10.5-cm Škoda Panzerwerfer 44.

ZSU projects based on the Panther

Since the autumn of 1942, the development of projects for anti-aircraft self-propelled guns (ZSU) based on the new tank began; the first of these was a self-propelled anti-aircraft gun on the Panther chassis, armed with an 88-mm FlaK 18 anti-aircraft gun (later FlaK 40). However, the project was rejected in favor of ZSU, armed with rapid-fire small-caliber automatic guns. In December 1942, the design of versions of the ZSU based on the Panther, armed with 37-mm and 50-55-mm automatic guns, began.

Only in January-February 1944, a project was developed for a turret armed with two 37 mm FlaK 44 automatic cannons. The new ZSU was to be called the Flakpanzer "Coelian". However, only a prototype ZSU was built. The prototype was not made.

The Red Army soldiers walk past the wrecked Panther tank Pz.Kpfw. V Ausf. D (No. 322) of the 51st Tank Battalion of the Panzergrenadier Division "Grossdeutschland" (Panzergrenadier-Division "Großdeutschland"). In the background, we can distinguish the silhouette of another Panther tank. District of the city of Karachev.

Organizational structure

The top leadership of the Wehrmacht and the Ministry of Armaments assumed that the Panther tanks were to replace the PzKpfw III and PzKpfw IV and become the main tank of the Panzerwaffe. However, the production capabilities could not meet the needs of the tank troops, the tank turned out to be difficult to manufacture, and its price was also higher than planned. Therefore, a compromise decision was made: to re-equip only one battalion of each tank regiment with Panthers, while simultaneously increasing the production of PzKpfw IV.

The staff of the battalion included:

8 headquarters tanks (3 in the communications platoon and 5 in the reconnaissance platoon).
- 4 companies of 22 "Panthers" (in the company 2 command tanks and 4 platoons of 5 linear vehicles). Subsequently, the number of tanks in the companies was reduced several times, first to 17 vehicles, then to 14, and by the spring of 1945 there were 10 tanks in the companies (wehrmacht tank companies K.St.N. 1177 Ausf. A, K.St.N 1177 Ausf. B and K. St. N. 1177a).
- An air defense platoon armed with Möbelwagen, Wirbelwind or Ostwind anti-aircraft tanks.
- Sapper platoon.
- Technical company.

In total, the battalion according to the state was supposed to have 96 tanks, but in practice the organization of the units rarely corresponded to the regular one, in the army units the battalion consisted of 51-54 Panthers, in the SS troops there were several more - 61-64 tanks.

Combat use

In total, from July 5, 1943 to April 10, 1945, 5629 Panther tanks were lost in combat. There are no later statistics, but the final number of destroyed machines of this type is somewhat higher, since the battles with their participation went on in the Czech Republic until May 11, 1945.

Battle of Kursk

The first units to receive new tanks were the 51st and 52nd tank battalions. In May 1943, they received 96 Panthers and other state-of-the-art equipment, a month later both battalions became part of the 39th Tank Regiment. In total, the regiment had 200 vehicles - 96 in each battalion and another 8 tanks of the regiment headquarters. Major Laukert was appointed commander of the 39th Tank Regiment. Before the start of Operation Citadel, the 10th Tank Brigade was formed, which included the 39th Tank Regiment and the tank regiment of the Panzergrenadier Division "Grossdeutschland". Colonel Dekker was appointed commander of the brigade. The brigade was operationally subordinate to the division "Grossdeutschland".

The 1st battalion of the 2nd tank regiment of the SS division "Das Reich" (German: I. Abteilung / SS-Panzer-Regiment 2), which left for Germany on April 17, 1943 to receive new equipment - Panther tanks, returned to front after the end of the Battle of Kursk.

On July 5, 1943, the German units went on the offensive on a broad front near Kursk. The 39th tank regiment attacked the positions of the Soviet troops near the village of Cherkasskoe and, despite the stubborn resistance of units of the 67th and 71st rifle divisions, as well as the counterattack of the 245th separate tank regiment, occupied the village by evening. At the same time, for the first day of fighting, losses amounted to 18 Panthers. On July 6, the tanks of the 10th Tank Brigade, together with units of the Grossdeutschland division, attacked in the direction of Lukhanino, but were stopped by units of the 3rd Mechanized Corps, the losses amounted to 37 Panthers. The next day, the offensive continued and, despite the desperate resistance of the Soviet troops, units of the 10th tank brigade occupied the village of Gremucheye, repulsing the attacks of Soviet tanks and infantry all day. By the end of the day, only 20 combat-ready tanks remained in service.

In the following days of fighting, the strike power of the 39th regiment decreased significantly; on the evening of July 11, 39 tanks were combat-ready, 31 vehicles were irretrievably lost and 131 tanks needed repair. On July 12, the 39th regiment was withdrawn from the battle to put the materiel in order. A new attack of the 10th brigade took place on July 14, the unit again suffered losses and by the evening had 1 PzKpfw III, 23 PzKpfw IV and 20 Panthers combat-ready. Despite the good work of the repair services (up to 25 vehicles returned to service per day), the losses of the 39th regiment were significant, and by July 18, the 51st battalion had 31 tanks in service and 32 needed repairs, in the 52nd battalion there were 28 combat-ready vehicles and 40 Panthers needed to be repaired. The next day, the 51st tank battalion handed over the remaining tanks to the 52nd and departed for Bryansk for new tanks, having (according to German data) 150 Soviet tanks knocked out and destroyed, irretrievably losing 32 Panthers in combat. Subsequently, the battalion was included in the tank regiment of the "Grossdeutschland" division.

The 52nd battalion was transferred to Bryansk during July 19-21, continued to fight already as part of the 52nd Army Corps, and then was included in the 19th Panzer Division. In subsequent battles, the battalion suffered heavy losses and lost the last Panthers in the battles for Kharkov.

The first experience of the combat use of Panther tanks revealed both the advantages and disadvantages of the tank. Among the advantages of the new tank, German tankers noted the reliable protection of the forehead of the hull (at that time, the former was invulnerable to all Soviet tank and anti-tank guns), a powerful cannon that made it possible to hit all Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns in the forehead, and good sights. However, the protection of the remaining projections of the tank was vulnerable to fire from 76-mm and 45-mm tank and anti-tank guns at the main battle distances, and several cases of penetration of the frontal projection of the turret by 45-mm sub-caliber and 76-mm caliber armor-piercing shells were also recorded.

Tank "Panther" Pz.Kpfw. V Ausf. A. 1st SS Panzer Regiment (SS Panzer-Regiment 1) of the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (1. SS-Panzer-Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler), shot down on a narrow country road.

As noted above, after the failure of the German offensive on the Kursk Bulge, the remaining Panthers were assembled as part of the 52nd tank battalion, which in August 1943 was renamed I. Abteilung / Panzer-Regiment 15. The 51st tank battalion was understaffed in Germany and remained in the division "Grossdeutschland". Until November 1943, another 3 battalions arrived on the Eastern Front, equipped with new tanks:

I. Abteilung / SS-Panzer-Regiment 2, which was part of the SS division "Das Reich" ("Reich") - 71 "Panther".
- II. Abteilung/Panzer-Regiment 23 - 96 Panthers.
- I. Abteilung / Panzer-Regiment 2 - 71 "Panther".

During the autumn battles, a large number of technical problems were again noted in the engine and transmission of the tank; again, the KwK 42 gun and frontal armor protection received compliments from German tankers.

In November 1943, 60 tanks were sent to Leningrad, where they were transferred to the 9th and 10th airfield divisions (Luftfelddivisionen). The tanks were dug into the ground and used as long-term firing points, the 10 most combat-ready vehicles remained on the move as a mobile reserve. In the same month, two more tank battalions equipped with Panthers arrived on the Soviet-German front. In December, all tanks on the move were transferred to the 3rd Tank Corps.

In total, 841 Panther tanks were sent to the Soviet-German front in 1943. As of December 31, 1943, 80 vehicles remained in combat readiness, another 137 tanks needed repair, and 624 Panthers were lost. In the future, the number of "Panthers" at the front constantly increased, and by the summer of 1944 the number of combat-ready tanks reached a maximum - 522 vehicles.

However, during the large-scale summer offensive of the Soviet troops, Germany again suffered heavy losses in armored vehicles, and 14 tank brigades were formed to replenish the tank forces, each of which had a Panther battalion. But only 7 of these brigades ended up on the Eastern Front, the rest were sent to Normandy to repel the Allied offensive that had begun.

In total, from December 1, 1943 to November 1944, 2116 Panthers were lost on the Soviet-German front.

The last episode of the mass use of tanks by the Germans was a counterattack in Hungary, in the area of ​​​​Lake Balaton. Subsequently, units of the Wehrmacht and SS troops equipped with Panther tanks took part in the defense of Berlin and battles in the Czech Republic.

Destroyed German tank PzKpfw V modification D2, knocked out during the operation "Citadel" (Kursk Bulge). This photo is interesting because it has a signature - "Ilyin" and the date "26/7". This is probably the name of the gun commander who knocked out the tank.

Panthers in Italy

The first Panther tanks appeared in Italy in August 1943 as part of the 1st Battalion of the 1st SS Panzer Division. In total, the battalion had 71 Panther Ausf. D. This unit did not see combat and was sent back to Germany in October 1943.

The first unit to take part in the battles was the 1st Battalion of the 4th Tank Regiment, which had 62 Ausf. D and Ausf. A. The battalion took part in the battles in the Anzio region and suffered serious losses in several days of fighting. So, on May 26, 1944, he already had 48 tanks, of which only 13 were combat-ready. By June 1, only 6 Panthers remained in the battalion. 16 wrecked and destroyed tanks were examined by the Americans, and of these, only 8 vehicles had traces of combat damage, and the rest were blown up or burned by their crews during the retreat.

On June 14, 1944, the 1st battalion had 16 Panthers, of which 11 were combat-ready; in June - July, the battalion received a replenishment of 38 tanks, in September - another 18 Panthers, and the battalion received the last replenishment of 10 vehicles on October 31, 1944. In February 1945, the unit was renamed the 1st Battalion of the 26th Tank Regiment, and it remained in Italy until the surrender of the entire Italian grouping of German troops in April of that year.

The use of "Panthers" on the Western Front

On the Western Front, the first units to receive new tanks were I. Abteilung / SS-Panzer-Regiment 12 (1st battalion of the 12th SS tank regiment) and I. Abteilung / Panzer-Regiment 6 (1st battalion of the 6th tank regiment ). In June and July, 4 more Panther battalions were sent to Normandy. These units entered the battle already at the beginning of June 1944, and by July 27, the irretrievable losses of the Panthers amounted to 131 tanks.

The new German tank turned out to be an unpleasant surprise for the Allies, since its frontal armor was impenetrable by all standard anti-tank weapons, with the exception of the British 17-pound tank and anti-tank guns. This circumstance gave rise to the myth that most German tanks on the Western Front, it was destroyed by allied aviation, which dominated the air, as well as by hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers. However, the statistics of the affected tanks suggests otherwise. For 2 summer months In 1944, the British examined 176 wrecked and abandoned Panther tanks, the types of damage were distributed as follows:

Armor-piercing shells - 47 tanks.
- Cumulative shells - 8 tanks.
- High-explosive shells - 8 tanks.
- Aviation missiles - 8 tanks.
- aircraft guns- 3 tanks.
- Destroyed by crews - 50 tanks.
- Abandoned during the retreat - 33 tanks.
- Could not determine the type of damage - 19 tanks.

As can be seen from this list, the percentage of Panthers destroyed by aircraft and HEAT shells is quite small. Much more often, the Germans had to destroy and abandon equipment due to a lack of fuel or technical malfunctions. The Allies grossly underestimated the number of Panthers they expected to see in France. By analogy with the Tigers, it was assumed that the Panthers were concentrated in separate heavy tank battalions, and meetings with them would be an infrequent occurrence. Reality showed the complete failure of such assumptions - "Panthers" accounted for about half of all German tanks in France, as a result of which the losses of the Allied tank forces turned out to be much higher than expected. The situation was worsened by the fact that the gun of the main Allied M4 Sherman tank was ineffective against the frontal armor of the Panthers. The solution to the problem could be Sherman Firefly tanks, armed with an English 17-pounder gun with powerful ballistics, as well as the widespread use of sub-caliber shells. However, both were few. As a result, the successful fight against the "Panthers" was based on a significant numerical advantage of the Allies and the dominance of their aircraft, whose attacks on the rear of the Wehrmacht significantly reduced the combat effectiveness of German tank units.

Two abandoned German medium tanks Pz.Kpfw.V Ausf.A "Panther" of the early series

"Panthers" in other countries

Germany's allies made attempts to obtain tanks of this type, but they were unsuccessful. There were plans to mass-produce Panthers in Italy; Five tanks were ordered by Hungary and one by Japan, but these orders were not fulfilled. In 1943, one "Panther" Ausf. A was sold to Sweden. A certain number of captured Panthers were used by the Soviet troops (for example, in the 20th Tank Corps), the first such case dates back to August 5, 1943. However, due to the complexity of maintenance, the need to use high-quality fuel and their own ammunition, their use was not widespread. In the post-war period, captured Panthers served for several years in the troops of France, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Hungary.

Tank turret bunkers (Pantherturm-bunkers)

In addition to tanks, Panther turrets were used for installation as long-term firing points (DOT). For this purpose, they were used as regular tank turrets of modifications Ausf. D and Ausf. A, as well as special towers, which were distinguished by a roof reinforced to 56 mm and the absence of a commander's cupola.

There were 2 modifications of bunkers with turrets from Panthers:

• Pantherturm I (Stahluntersatz) - the turret was mounted on an armored base welded from sheets 80 mm thick, the thickness of the turret base was 100 mm. The base consisted of two modules, combat and residential. A tower was installed on the upper module, and the ammunition load was also placed in it. The lower module was used as a living compartment and had two exits, the first - through a secret door to the exit from the bunker, the second - to the transitional section to the combat module.
• Pantherturm III (Betonsockel) - a variant of the bunker with a concrete base, differed from Pantherturm I in slightly larger modules made of reinforced concrete, but had no special design differences.

There were also simplified versions of pillboxes, when the tower was mounted only on the upper combat module.

Similar firing points were used on the Atlantic Wall, on the Gothic Line in Italy, on the Eastern Front, and also on the streets of German cities. Often, damaged Panther tanks buried along the turret were used as pillboxes.

By the end of March 1945, 268 Pantherturm bunkers had been produced.

Project evaluation

The assessment of the "Panther" is a difficult and controversial issue to resolve, the literature contains diametrically opposed statements on this subject, burdened by the propaganda of the parties involved in the war. An objective analysis of the Panther should take into account all aspects of this tank - design, manufacturability and reliability in operation, the development potential inherent in the vehicle, combat use. From the point of view of the realities of the war, this tank fully reflected the military doctrine that became defensive after the defeats on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. Even more resistant frontal armor and even greater armor penetration. Small turret and significant vertical aiming angles. High accuracy of guns and expensive shells. All this character traits defensive tank. On the contrary, breakthrough tanks had developed side armor and large-caliber guns, for example, the IS-2 had a muzzle brake, which greatly unmasks the tank after a shot and sharply reduces the defensive potential of use (the Panther’s gun, taking into account the caliber, is still much more secretive, both the flash of the shot and dust/snow kicked up by the rollback). The side armor of the tank was about 20% inferior to the side armor of the T-34 and in the offensive did not provide protection against many anti-tank weapons, including anti-tank rifles. It was not possible to create a universal tank. As a result, the Panther became one of the most massive Wehrmacht tanks.

Burnt German tank Pz.Kpfw. V Ausf. G "Panther" of the 11th Panzer Division on the side of the road

Design and development potential

The Panther fully complies with the canons of the German school of tank building during the Second World War - the location of the transmission in the frontal extremity of the vehicle, the fighting compartment with a turret in the middle of the hull and the engine in the stern. The suspension is individual with the use of double torsion bars, large-diameter road wheels are arranged in a “staggered” order, the drive wheels are front-mounted. Accordingly, such layout and design solutions determine the overall set of advantages and disadvantages of the Panther. The former include good running smoothness, even distribution of mass on the hardpoints, placement of the turret in the center of the hull, no hatches on the upper frontal part of the hull, and a large volume of the fighting compartment, which increases the comfort of the crew. The disadvantages are the high height of the vehicle due to the need to transfer torque from the engine to the transmission units through cardan shafts under the floor of the fighting compartment, the greater vulnerability of the transmission units and drive wheels due to their location in the frontal part of the vehicle most susceptible to shelling, worse working conditions for the mechanic - the driver and the gunner-radio operator due to noise, heat and odors emanating from the transmission units and assemblies. In addition, in addition to better visibility on the battlefield, the high height has a negative effect on the total mass of the vehicle, reducing its dynamic characteristics compared to tanks of a different layout.

Another advantage of the Panther's layout was the placement of fuel tanks outside the inhabited areas of the tank, which increases the fire safety and survival of crews in the event of a vehicle being hit. In Soviet tanks, the dense layout forced the fuel tanks to be placed directly in the fighting compartment. It should also be noted the presence of an automatic fire extinguishing system in the engine compartment of a German tank. At the same time, the layout did not guarantee the protection of the tank from fires, since the transmission units were located in the control compartment of the Panther, and the hydraulic drive of the turret rotation mechanism was located in the fighting compartment. The engine oil in the transmission units and the fluid in the hydraulic drive ignited easily, more than once the fires of the wrecked tanks were located precisely in the frontal end of the vehicle.

It is interesting to compare the "Panther" with the Soviet medium tank T-44, which was put into service in the middle of 1944, but did not take part in the hostilities. The Soviet tank, with a significantly lower weight and dimensions (especially in height), had stronger frontal and especially side armor protection of the hull than the Panther. German designers were forced to increase the mass and dimensions of their new machines during the war, while Soviet engineers managed to develop new machines due to the reserves incorporated in the layout. "Panther" was created "from scratch", without continuity with existing designs, which gave rise to production difficulties. It is noteworthy that the projects of equipping the Panther with a more powerful 88-mm gun and strengthening its armor protection turned out to be unfeasible, that is, the potential for developing the basic design was small.

On the other hand, the German designers were lucky in the sense that their English colleagues managed only by the end of the war to create an alternative to the Panther in the form of the Comet, which was inferior to the Panther in armor, but surpassing it in maneuverability, and the American heavy tank M26 " Pershing, approximately equal in performance to the Panther, entered the army in small numbers, mostly for combat testing in February 1945, and did not play any significant role in the battles of World War II.

Manufacturability

"Panther" was planned as the main tank of the Panzerwaffe with a very significant production volume - 600 tanks per month. However, the large mass of the vehicle, the complexity and lack of refinement of the design compared to the reliable and well-mastered PzKpfw III and PzKpfw IV in production led to the fact that production volumes were significantly lower than planned. At the same time, the deployment of mass production of the Panther took place in the spring-summer of 1943, when the Third Reich officially entered the stage of "total war" and a significant part of the skilled workers, on whom German industry was based to a certain extent, was drafted into the Wehrmacht (and subsequently - and Volkssturm). Since their forced replacement by German women was unacceptable to the leadership of the Third Reich for ideological reasons, they had to use prisoners of war and civilians forcibly driven to work in Germany from the occupied countries of Western and Eastern Europe. The use of slave labor, the attacks of Anglo-American aviation on the factories involved in the production of the Panther and its components, assemblies and components, the evacuation and redirection of cargo flows associated with this did not contribute to the implementation of production plans.

Thus, with the possible withdrawal of both PzKpfw III and PzKpfw IV from production, technological difficulties in mastering a new tank could lead to a sharp failure in tank production, which would be unacceptable for the Third Reich.

As a result, the Germans had to keep in production the PzKpfw IV, which was planned for removal, and it was he, and not the Panther, who became the most massive tank (if we count all the produced "fours"; approximately an equal number of these vehicles were produced in 1943-1945) Germany during World War II. Thus, in the role of "main battle tank"of the Wehrmacht at that time, the Panther turned out to be "on an equal footing" with the PzKpfw IV and lost to the T-34s or Shermans, which were the most massive tanks of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and which in 1943-1945 were produced much more than the Panthers . Some historians are of the opinion that the adoption of the Panther was a mistake; as an alternative, they consider the hypothetical possibility of increasing the production of PzKpfw IV.

Mühlenkamp battle group of the 5th SS Panzer Division (5.SS-Panzer-Division "Wiking") in the Nuzhets-Stacja area (Nurzec-Stacja). In front of the Sd.Kfz.251 armored personnel carrier, SS Untersturmführer Gerhard Mahn. Counterattacks were undertaken in an attempt to contain the rapid advance of the tank units of the Red Army during Operation Bagration. In the background, the tank "Panther" Pz.Kpfw. V Ausf. G.

Reliability

Sent to the front in the summer of 1943, the PzKpfw V Panther tanks were distinguished by their low reliability for German vehicles - non-combat losses among them were the largest. In many ways, this fact was due to the lack of knowledge of the new machine and the poor development of its personnel. In the course of mass production, some of the problems were solved, while others pursued the tank until the very end of the war. The “chessboard” design of the chassis contributed to the low reliability of the machine. The mud that accumulated between the road wheels of the vehicle often froze in winter and completely immobilized the tank. Replacing the internal road wheels damaged by mine explosions or artillery fire was a very time-consuming operation, sometimes taking more than a dozen hours. Compared to the most massive enemy tanks - the Sherman, and even more so the T-34 produced in 1943, the Panther is clearly in a losing position.

Evaluation of combat use

The assessment in terms of combat use is the most controversial among all aspects related to the Panther. Western sources tend to completely trust the German data on the combat use of the Panther, often memoirs, and completely ignore Soviet documentary sources. This approach is seriously criticized in the works of Russian tank building historians M. Baryatinsky and M. Svirin. Below are some facts that allow you to form a more objective opinion about the advantages and disadvantages of the "Panther" in combat.

The tank had a number of undoubted advantages - comfortable working conditions for the crew, high-quality optics, high rate of fire, large ammunition capacity and high armor penetration of the KwK 42 gun are beyond doubt. In 1943, the armor penetration of the KwK 42 cannon shells ensured an easy defeat of any tank of the anti-Hitler coalition countries that fought at that time at distances up to 2000 m, and the upper frontal armor plate well protected the Panther from enemy shells, to some extent even from 122-mm or 152- mm large-caliber due to ricochet (although there were weak spots in the frontal projection of the tank - the gun mantlet and the lower frontal part). These undeniable positive qualities served as the basis for the idealization of the "Panther" in popular literature.

Captain James B. Lloyd, communications officer of the US 370th Fighter Group, inspects a German Pz.Kpfw V Panther tank, which was destroyed by P-38 Lightning heavy fighters from the same group in the area town of Houffalize in Belgium during the Battle of the Bulge.

On the other hand, in 1944 the situation changed - the armies of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain adopted new models of tanks, artillery pieces and ammunition. The lack of alloying elements for armor steel grades forced the Germans to use surrogate substitutes for them, and the shell resistance of late-production Panther frontal armor fell sharply compared to those produced in 1943 and early 1944. Therefore, the fight against the "Panther" in a head-on collision has become less difficult. British tanks and self-propelled guns, armed with a 17-pound cannon with sub-caliber shells with a detachable pallet, hit the Panther in the frontal projection without any problems. The 90-mm guns of the American M26 Pershing tanks (which were first used in combat in February 1945) and the M36 Jackson self-propelled guns also had no difficulty in solving this problem. The 100, 122 and 152 mm caliber guns of the Soviet IS-2 tanks and self-propelled guns SU-100, ISU-122, ISU-152 literally broke through the armor of the Panther, which was distinguished by increased fragility. The use of blunt-headed shells with a ballistic tip of the BR-471B and BR-540B types largely solved the problem of ricocheting, but even when using sharp-headed shells, fragile armor could not withstand (the fact of the Panther's defeat by a 122-mm sharp-headed projectile at a distance of about 3 km is known, when after its ricochet, the frontal armor was split, and the tank itself was disabled). Soviet firing tests showed that the 85-mm armor of the Panther's upper frontal part was pierced by a 122-mm blunt-headed projectile at a distance of 2500 m with a significant margin for increasing the firing distance, and when it hits the turret at a distance of 1400 m, the latter breaks down with a through penetration shoulder strap and is displaced by 50 cm from the axis of rotation. According to the results of firing at the range, it was also found out that the 100-mm BR-412 sharp-headed armor-piercing projectile from the D-10S cannon of the SU-100 self-propelled gun is capable of penetrating the frontal armor of the PzKpfw V Panther Ausf. G at a distance of 1500 m, surpassing the calculated data and tabular armor penetration.

The claims of the German side about the superiority of the Panther over the heavy tanks of other countries in 1944-1945 were to a certain extent obtained by a sample of data favorable to the German side. For example, the conclusion about the superiority of the Panther over the IS-2 in frontal combat does not at all specify which Panther is against which IS-2 (there were 6 submodifications of the latter). The German conclusion is valid for the "Panther" with high quality frontal armor against the IS-2 model 1943 with a cast "stepped" upper frontal part and sharp-headed armor-piercing ammunition BR-471 for its gun - in fact, for the conditions of the beginning - mid-1944. The forehead of such an IS-2 was penetrated by a KwK 42 cannon from 900-1000 m, while the upper frontal part of the Panther had a significant chance to reflect the sharp-headed projectile BR-471. However, there is a high probability of failure of the gearbox and final drives of the tank. However, this case can be excluded from consideration by the fact that damage to the transmission will not lead to the immediate irretrievable loss of the tank. A more serious counterargument to the German assessment is the complete disregard for the case of a Panther battle with low-quality frontal armor against an IS-2 model 1944 with rolled straightened frontal armor and blunt-headed BR-471B projectiles. The upper frontal part of the IS-2 of this model was not pierced by any 75-mm caliber shells when fired at point-blank range, while the similar armored part of the Panther was pierced or split at a distance of more than 2500 m, and damage in this and most cases led to the irretrievable loss of the car. Since the lower frontal part and gun mantlet of the compared tanks were equally vulnerable to both sides, this puts the late production Panther with equal crew training at a clear disadvantage against the IS-2 model 1944 with rolled frontal armor. In general, this conclusion is confirmed by Soviet reports on the statistics of the irretrievably disabled IS-2s in 1944. They claim that 75 mm projectile hits were the cause of irretrievable losses in only 18% of cases.

In 1944, in the battles against the Soviet troops, cases were noted when the Panther's turret could not withstand a fragmentation projectile. This was due to the fact that by that time Germany had already lost the Nikopol manganese deposit, and without manganese the production of high-quality steels (including armor) is impossible.

American sources also claim that the frontal armor of the heavy tanks M26 Pershing and M4A3E2 Sherman Jumbo is good against any 75-mm enemy guns. At the same time, it should be noted that the IS-2 was a specialized breakthrough tank and, in the general case, was not aimed at solving anti-tank tasks, while the number of M26s and Sherman Jumbo was small. The main enemy of the Panthers remained the T-34 and Sherman, whose armament did not provide a reliable defeat of the German tank in the forehead, and the armor did not provide reliable protection from the fire of the Panther's guns.

The main weakness of the Panther, recognized by all authors, was its relatively thin side armor. Since the main task of the tank in the offensive is to fight the entrenched infantry, artillery and fortifications of the enemy, which can be well camouflaged or form a network of strong points, the importance of good side armor cannot be underestimated - the probability in such conditions to expose the side to enemy fire is high. Unlike the "Tiger" and self-propelled guns "Ferdinand", the sides of the "Panther" were protected only by 40-mm armor instead of 80-mm. As a result, even light 45-mm anti-tank guns achieved success when firing at the sides of the Panther. 76-mm tank and anti-tank guns (not to mention the 57-mm ZIS-2) also confidently hit the tank when firing into the side. That is why the Panther did not cause shock among the Soviet troops, unlike the Tiger or Ferdinand, which in 1943 were practically impenetrable by regular anti-tank weapons even when firing at the side. At the same time, it should be noted that the weakness of the side armor was characteristic of all mass medium tanks of the Second World War: the sides of the PzKpfw IV were protected only by 30 mm vertical armor, the Sherman - 38 mm, T-34 - 45 mm with a slope. Only specialized heavy breakthrough tanks, such as the KV, Tigr and IS-2, had well-armored sides.

Another disadvantage was the weak effect of 75-mm high-explosive fragmentation projectiles on unarmored targets (due to their high muzzle velocity, the projectiles had thick walls and a reduced explosive charge).

The Panthers showed themselves best of all in active defense in the form of ambushes, shooting off advancing enemy tanks from long distances, counterattacks, when the effect of the weakness of the side armor is minimized. Especially in this capacity, the Panthers succeeded in the cramped circumstances of the battle - in the cities and mountain passes of Italy, in the thickets of hedges (bocages) in Normandy. The enemy was forced to deal only with the solid frontal protection of the Panther, without the possibility of a flank attack to defeat the weak side armor. On the other hand, any tank in defense is much more effective than in the offensive, and therefore it would be wrong to attribute such efficiency solely to the merits of the Panther. In addition, later design studies to improve the Panther tanks by replacing weapons with an even more powerful 75-mm L / 100 gun or an 88-mm KwK 43 L / 71 gun indicate that in late 1944 - early 1945, German specialists in fact, they recognized the insufficient effect of the 75-mm KwK 42 on heavily armored targets.

Military historian M. Svirin evaluates the Panther as follows:

- Yes, the Panther was a strong and dangerous enemy, and can be considered one of the most successful German tanks of World War II. But at the same time, one should not forget that this tank was very expensive and difficult to manufacture and maintain, and with competent opposition, it burned no worse than others.

Soviet soldiers inspect a German tank Pz.Kpfw captured in the city of Uman. V Ausf. A "Panther" three days after the liberation of the city from the invaders on March 10, 1944. In the background are various other German armored vehicles.

Analogues

In the weight and size category of 40-50 tons, only Soviet tanks of the KV-85 and IS-1, IS-2 types and the American M26 Pershing can act as analogues of the Panther (a medium tank with a long-barreled gun of unitary loading). Soviet vehicles were officially heavy breakthrough and direct infantry support tanks, but their main weapons - the 85 mm D-5T tank gun and the 122 mm D25T tank gun - were also conceived as a means of combating new German heavy tanks. From this point of view, they (like tank guns) are inferior to the Panther (85 mm in terms of penetration, 122 mm in terms of rate of fire and ammunition), although there were equivalent chances of success even in the most advantageous frontal battle for the Panther (at a distance of up to 1000 m for 85 mm D-5T and more than 2500 m for 122 m D-25T). The M26 Pershing was an extremely belated reaction to the appearance of the PzKpfw V, but in terms of its combat qualities it was quite consistent with the level of the Panther, the reviews of American tankers about their new heavy tank were very positive - it allowed them to fight the Panther on equal terms. The most massive Soviet heavy tank IS-2 of the late period of the war, with all the outward similarity of its weight and size characteristics with the Panther, was used not as the main tank (the primary purpose of the Panther), but as a breakthrough tank with a completely different balance of armor and weapons. In particular, much attention was paid to good side armor and the power of fire against unarmored targets. The power of the 122-mm D-25T gun in the IS-2 was almost twice as high as that of the 75-mm KwK 42, but the declared armor penetration is quite comparable (in this case, one should take into account different methods for determining armor penetration in the USSR and Germany, as well as the absence of D -25T sub-caliber projectile). In general, both machines were well adapted to defeat their own kind, albeit on the basis of different approaches to solving this problem.

Also, the concept is close to the "Panther" English modification of the medium tank "Sherman" - "Sherman Firefly", which had comparable to the "Panther" (if not superior) armor penetration of its gun. However, this tank was much lighter in weight and had weaker frontal armor and was released at the end of 1944. English tank The Comet, which had 102 mm turret forehead armor and was armed with a QF 77 mm HV tank gun, was somewhat inferior in armor to the Panther, weighed 10 tons less and had higher firepower, speed and maneuverability.

Among the late German tanks, the PzKpfw V Panther was the lightest, but had more powerful frontal hull protection than the Tiger I, and better mobility than both the Tiger I and Tiger II. Considering these circumstances, as well as the higher declared armor penetration of the 75 mm KwK 42 gun compared to the 88 mm KwK 36 gun of the Tiger I, some experts rate the Panther as the best German heavy tank of World War II. On the other hand, such estimates are to a certain extent conditional and do not take into account the weakness of the Panther's side armor and the low action of the 75-mm high-explosive fragmentation projectile against unarmored targets.

The performance characteristics of the Panther tank

Crew, people: 5
Layout scheme: control compartment in front, engine rear
Developer: MAN
Manufacturer: Germany MAN, Daimler-Benz, MNH, Henschel-Werke, Demag
Years of production: 1942-1945
Years of operation: 1943-1947
Number of issued, pcs.: 5976

Panther tank weight

Dimensions of the Panther tank

Case length, mm: 6870
- Length with gun forward, mm: 8660
- Hull width, mm: 3270
- Height, mm: 2995
- Clearance, mm: 560

Panther tank armor

Type of armor: rolled low and medium hardness surface hardened
- Forehead of the hull (top), mm/deg.: 80/55°
- Forehead of the hull (bottom), mm/deg.: 60/55°
- Hull board (top), mm/deg.: 50/30°
- Hull board (bottom), mm/deg.: 40/0°
- Hull feed (top), mm/deg.: 40/30°
- Hull feed (bottom), mm/deg.: 40/30°
- Bottom, mm: 17-30
- Hull roof, mm: 17
- Tower forehead, mm / city: 110/10 °
- Gun mask, mm / city: 110 (cast)
- Board of the tower, mm/deg.: 45/25°
- Feed tower, mm/deg.: 45/25°

Armament of the Panther tank

Gun caliber and make: 7.5 cm KwK 42
- Barrel length, calibers: 70
– gun ammunition: 81
- Machine guns: 2 × 7.92 MG-42

Panther tank engine

Engine type: V-shaped 12‑cylinder carburetor
- Engine power, l. p.: 700

Panther tank speed

Highway speed, km/h: 55
- Cross-country speed, km / h: 25-30

Power reserve on the highway, km: 250
- Specific power, l. s./t: 15.6
- suspension type: torsion bar
- Specific ground pressure, kg/cm²: 0.88.

Tank Panther - video

Photo of the Panther tank

A destroyed German tank Pz.Kpfw is on fire. V Ausf. G "Panther". 3rd Belorussian Front. A broken hole by a 122 mm IS-2 projectile is visible in the frontal. The crew most likely stayed there, after such a hit it is almost impossible to survive.

A column of German armored vehicles destroyed from an ambush by Soviet artillery on the border of Hungary and Austria, near the city of Detritz. In the foreground is the Pz.Kpfw. V "Panther" and Soviet soldiers examining it.

Tank Pz.Kpfw. V "Panther" Ausf. G, who was fourth in the column. A breach in the tower from a large-caliber projectile, the muzzle brake was fired. The number of the Soviet trophy team is "75". A column of German armored vehicles destroyed from an ambush by Soviet artillery on the border of Hungary and Austria, near the city of Detritz.

Films about tanks where there is still no alternative to this type of armament of the ground forces. The tank was and probably will remain a modern weapon for a long time due to the ability to combine such seemingly contradictory qualities as high mobility, powerful weapons and reliable crew protection. These unique qualities of tanks continue to be constantly improved, and the experience and technologies accumulated over decades predetermine new frontiers of combat properties and military-technical achievements. In the age-old confrontation "projectile - armor", as practice shows, protection from a projectile is being improved more and more, acquiring new qualities: activity, multi-layeredness, self-defense. At the same time, the projectile becomes more accurate and powerful.

Russian tanks are specific in that they allow you to destroy the enemy from a safe distance, have the ability to perform quick maneuvers on impassable roads, contaminated terrain, can “walk” through the territory occupied by the enemy, seize a decisive bridgehead, induce panic in the rear and suppress the enemy with fire and caterpillars . The war of 1939-1945 was the most ordeal for all mankind, since almost all countries of the world were involved in it. It was the battle of the titans - the most unique period that theorists argued about in the early 1930s and during which tanks were used in large numbers by almost all the warring parties. At this time, a "check for lice" and a deep reform of the first theories of the use of tank troops took place. And it is the Soviet tank troops that are most affected by all this.

Tanks in battle that became a symbol of the past war, the backbone of the Soviet armored forces? Who created them and under what conditions? How did the USSR, having lost most of its European territories and having difficulty recruiting tanks for the defense of Moscow, be able to launch powerful tank formations on the battlefield already in 1943? This book, which tells about the development of Soviet tanks "in the days of testing ", from 1937 to the beginning of 1943. When writing the book, materials from the archives of Russia and private collections of tank builders were used. There was a period in our history that was deposited in my memory with some depressing feeling. It began with the return of our first military advisers from Spain, and stopped only at the beginning of forty-third, - said the former general designer of self-propelled guns L. Gorlitsky, - there was some kind of pre-stormy state.

Tanks of the Second World War, it was M. Koshkin, almost underground (but, of course, with the support of "the wisest of the wise leader of all peoples"), who was able to create the tank that, a few years later, would shock German tank generals. And what’s more, he didn’t just create it, the designer managed to prove to these stupid military men that it was his T-34 that they needed, and not just another wheeled-tracked “highway”. The author is in slightly different positions that he formed after meeting with the pre-war documents RGVA and RGAE Therefore, working on this segment of the history of the Soviet tank, the author will inevitably contradict something "generally accepted". this work describes the history of Soviet tank building in the most difficult years - from the beginning of a radical restructuring of all the activities of design bureaus and people's commissariats as a whole, during a frantic race to equip new tank formations of the Red Army, the transfer of industry to wartime rails and evacuation.

Tanks Wikipedia the author wants to express his special gratitude for the help in the selection and processing of materials to M. Kolomiyets, and also to thank A. Solyankin, I. Zheltov and M. Pavlov, the authors of the reference publication "Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. 1905 - 1941 ", since this book helped to understand the fate of some projects, which was unclear before. I would also like to recall with gratitude those conversations with Lev Izraelevich Gorlitsky, the former Chief Designer of UZTM, which helped to take a fresh look at the entire history of the Soviet tank during the Great Patriotic War Soviet Union Today, for some reason, it is customary to talk about 1937-1938 only from the point of view of repressions, but few people remember that it was during this period that those tanks were born that became legends of the wartime ... "From the memoirs of L.I. . Gorlinkogo.

Soviet tanks, a detailed assessment of them at that time sounded from many lips. Many old people recalled that it was from the events in Spain that it became clear to everyone that the war was getting closer to the threshold and it was Hitler who would have to fight. In 1937, mass purges and repressions began in the USSR, and against the backdrop of these difficult events, the Soviet tank began to turn from a "mechanized cavalry" (in which one of its combat qualities protruded by reducing others) into a balanced combat vehicle, which simultaneously had powerful weapons, sufficient to suppress most targets, good cross-country ability and mobility with armor protection, capable of maintaining its combat effectiveness when shelling a potential enemy with the most massive anti-tank weapons.

It was recommended that large tanks be introduced into the composition in addition only special tanks - floating, chemical. The brigade now had 4 separate battalions of 54 tanks each and was reinforced by the transition from three-tank platoons to five-tank ones. In addition, D. Pavlov justified the refusal to form in 1938 to the four existing mechanized corps three more additionally, believing that these formations are immobile and difficult to control, and most importantly, they require a different organization of the rear. The tactical and technical requirements for promising tanks, as expected, have been adjusted. In particular, in a letter dated December 23 to the head of the design bureau of plant No. 185 named after. CM. Kirov, the new chief demanded to strengthen the armor of new tanks so that at a distance of 600-800 meters (effective range).

The latest tanks in the world when designing new tanks, it is necessary to provide for the possibility of increasing the level of armor protection during modernization by at least one step ... "This problem could be solved in two ways. Firstly, by increasing the thickness of the armor plates and, secondly," by using increased armor resistance". It is easy to guess that the second way was considered more promising, since the use of specially hardened armor plates, or even two-layer armor, could, while maintaining the same thickness (and the mass of the tank as a whole), increase its durability by 1.2-1.5 It was this path (the use of specially hardened armor) that was chosen at that moment to create new types of tanks.

Tanks of the USSR at the dawn of tank production, armor was most massively used, the properties of which were identical in all directions. Such armor was called homogeneous (homogeneous), and from the very beginning of the armor business, the craftsmen strove to create just such armor, because uniformity ensured stability of characteristics and simplified processing. However, at the end of the 19th century, it was noticed that when the surface of the armor plate was saturated (to a depth of several tenths to several millimeters) with carbon and silicon, its surface strength increased sharply, while the rest of the plate remained viscous. So heterogeneous (heterogeneous) armor came into use.

In military tanks, the use of heterogeneous armor was very important, since an increase in the hardness of the entire thickness of the armor plate led to a decrease in its elasticity and (as a result) to an increase in brittleness. Thus, the most durable armor, other things being equal, turned out to be very fragile and often pricked even from bursts of high-explosive fragmentation shells. Therefore, at the dawn of armor production in the manufacture of homogeneous sheets, the task of the metallurgist was to achieve the highest possible hardness of the armor, but at the same time not to lose its elasticity. Surface-hardened by saturation with carbon and silicon armor was called cemented (cemented) and was considered at that time a panacea for many ills. But cementation is a complex, harmful process (for example, processing a hot plate with a jet of lighting gas) and relatively expensive, and therefore its development in a series required high costs and an increase in production culture.

Tank of the war years, even in operation, these hulls were less successful than homogeneous ones, since for no apparent reason cracks formed in them (mainly in loaded seams), and it was very difficult to put patches on holes in cemented slabs during repairs. But it was still expected that a tank protected by 15-20 mm cemented armor would be equivalent in terms of protection to the same, but covered with 22-30 mm sheets, without a significant increase in mass.
Also, by the mid-1930s, in tank building, they learned how to harden the surface of relatively thin armor plates by uneven hardening, known since the end of the 19th century in shipbuilding as the "Krupp method". Surface hardening led to a significant increase in the hardness of the front side of the sheet, leaving the main thickness of the armor viscous.

How tanks shoot videos up to half the thickness of the plate, which, of course, was worse than carburizing, since despite the fact that the hardness of the surface layer was higher than during carburizing, the elasticity of the hull sheets was significantly reduced. So the "Krupp method" in tank building made it possible to increase the strength of armor even somewhat more than carburizing. But the hardening technology that was used for sea armor of large thicknesses was no longer suitable for relatively thin tank armor. Before the war, this method was almost never used in our serial tank building due to technological difficulties and relatively high cost.

Combat use of tanks The most developed for tanks was the 45-mm tank gun mod 1932/34. (20K), and before the event in Spain, it was believed that its power was enough to perform most tank tasks. But the battles in Spain showed that the 45-mm gun could only satisfy the task of fighting enemy tanks, since even the shelling of manpower in the mountains and forests turned out to be ineffective, and it was only possible to disable a dug-in enemy firing point in the event of a direct hit . Shooting at shelters and bunkers was ineffective due to the small high-explosive action of a projectile weighing only about two kg.

Types of tanks photo so that even one hit of a projectile reliably disables an anti-tank gun or machine gun; and thirdly, to increase the penetrating effect of a tank gun on the armor of a potential enemy, since, using the example of French tanks (already having an armor thickness of the order of 40-42 mm), it became clear that the armor protection of foreign combat vehicles tends to be significantly increased. There was a right way to do this - increasing the caliber of tank guns and simultaneously increasing the length of their barrel, since a long gun of a larger caliber fires heavier projectiles at a higher muzzle velocity over a greater distance without correcting the pickup.

The best tanks in the world had a large caliber gun, also had a large breech, significantly more weight and increased recoil reaction. And this required an increase in the mass of the entire tank as a whole. In addition, the placement of large shots in the closed volume of the tank led to a decrease in the ammunition load.
The situation was aggravated by the fact that at the beginning of 1938 it suddenly turned out that there was simply no one to give an order for the design of a new, more powerful tank gun. P. Syachintov and his entire design team were repressed, as well as the core of the Bolshevik Design Bureau under the leadership of G. Magdesiev. Only the group of S. Makhanov remained at liberty, who from the beginning of 1935 tried to bring his new 76.2-mm semi-automatic single gun L-10, and the team of plant No. 8 slowly brought the "forty-five".

Photos of tanks with names The number of developments is large, but in mass production in the period 1933-1937. not a single one was accepted ... "In fact, none of the five air-cooled tank diesel engines, which were worked on in 1933-1937 in the engine department of plant No. 185, was brought to the series. Moreover, despite the decisions on the highest levels of the transition in tank building exclusively to diesel engines, this process was held back by a number of factors.Of course, diesel had significant efficiency.It consumed less fuel per unit of power per hour.Diesel fuel is less prone to ignition, since the flash point of its vapors was very high.

Even the most finished of them, the MT-5 tank engine, required reorganization of engine production for serial production, which was expressed in the construction of new workshops, the supply of advanced foreign equipment (there were no machine tools of the required accuracy yet), financial investments and strengthening personnel. It was planned that in 1939 this diesel engine with a capacity of 180 hp. will go to mass-produced tanks and artillery tractors, but due to investigative work to find out the causes of tank engine accidents, which lasted from April to November 1938, these plans were not fulfilled. The development of a slightly increased six-cylinder gasoline engine No. 745 with a power of 130-150 hp was also started.

Brands of tanks with specific indicators that suited the tank builders quite well. Tank tests were carried out according to a new methodology, specially developed at the insistence of the new head of the ABTU D. Pavlov in relation to combat service in wartime. The basis of the tests was a run of 3-4 days (at least 10-12 hours of daily non-stop traffic) with a one-day break for technical inspection and restoration work. Moreover, repairs were allowed to be carried out only by field workshops without the involvement of factory specialists. This was followed by a "platform" with obstacles, "bathing" in the water with an additional load, simulating an infantry landing, after which the tank was sent for examination.

Super tanks online after the improvement work seemed to remove all claims from the tanks. And the general course of the tests confirmed the fundamental correctness of the main design changes - an increase in displacement by 450-600 kg, the use of the GAZ-M1 engine, as well as the Komsomolets transmission and suspension. But during the tests, numerous minor defects again appeared in the tanks. The chief designer N. Astrov was suspended from work and was under arrest and investigation for several months. In addition, the tank received a new improved protection turret. The modified layout made it possible to place on the tank a larger ammunition load for a machine gun and two small fire extinguishers (before there were no fire extinguishers on small tanks of the Red Army).

US tanks as part of modernization work, on one serial model of the tank in 1938-1939. the torsion bar suspension developed by the designer of the Design Bureau of Plant No. 185 V. Kulikov was tested. It was distinguished by the design of a composite short coaxial torsion bar (long monotorsion bars could not be used coaxially). However, such a short torsion bar did not show good enough results in tests, and therefore the torsion bar suspension did not immediately pave its way in the course of further work. Obstacles to be overcome: rises not less than 40 degrees, vertical wall 0.7 m, overlapping ditch 2-2.5 m.

Youtube about tanks work on the production of prototypes of D-180 and D-200 engines for reconnaissance tanks is not being carried out, jeopardizing the production of prototypes. 10-1), as well as the amphibious tank version (factory designation 102 or 10-2), are a compromise solution, since it is not possible to fully meet the requirements of the ABTU.Variant 101 was a tank weighing 7.5 tons with a hull according to the type of hull, but with vertical side sheets of case-hardened armor 10-13 mm thick, because: "Sloped sides, causing serious weighting of the suspension and hull, require a significant (up to 300 mm) broadening of the hull, not to mention the complication of the tank.

Video reviews of tanks in which the power unit of the tank was planned to be based on the 250-horsepower MG-31F aircraft engine, which was mastered by the industry for agricultural aircraft and gyroplanes. Gasoline of the 1st grade was placed in a tank under the floor of the fighting compartment and in additional onboard gas tanks. The armament fully met the task and consisted of coaxial machine guns DK caliber 12.7 mm and DT (in the second version of the project even ShKAS appears) caliber 7.62 mm. The combat weight of a tank with a torsion bar suspension was 5.2 tons, with a spring suspension - 5.26 tons. The tests were carried out from July 9 to August 21 according to the methodology approved in 1938, with special attention paid to tanks.

The tank was developed by MAN and put into mass production on January 1, 1943. Tells The creation of this tank marked a leap in German tank building. Compared to the T-IV tank, the Panther T-V tank had a more rational hull shape, borrowed to a certain extent from the Soviet T-34 tank. The tank was armed with a new 75-mm tank gun with a barrel length of 70 calibers, an armor-piercing projectile of which at a distance of 1000 meters pierced armor 130 mm thick, and a sub-caliber projectile at the same distance - up to 160 mm. A lot of technical innovations were also implemented in the design: hydraulic control of the brakes, a multi-radius planetary rotation mechanism with a synchronizer, a device for blowing the barrel with compressed air after a shot, the use of a hydraulic drive to rotate the turret, etc., however, the abundance of innovations had its minus: the tank was difficult to manufacture and operate, its technical reliability was relatively low. Nevertheless, it turned out to be the best German tank, very dangerous for enemy tanks. The tank was produced until the end of World War II and entered tank divisions to replace the T-IV. In total, about 6,000 tanks of this type were produced.

Tank "Panther". History of creation

One of the biggest shocks experienced by the German armored forces in the entire history of the Second World War was, without a doubt, the first meeting with the Russian T-34 tank. In his memoirs "Memoirs of a Soldier" Heinz Guderian tells how in October 1941 near Mtsensk " a large number of Russian T-34s were thrown into the battle and caused heavy casualties among the German tanks". Further, Guderian admits that if up to this point the Germans considered their tanks to be far superior to any enemy armored vehicles, then with the advent of the Russian T-34, the situation completely changed. Moreover, according to Guderian, if the high command had not been so proud of its undoubted advantage, the Germans would have managed to avoid the bitterness of disappointment. This idea is confirmed by the story given in the memoirs about how in April 1941, at the personal invitation of Hitler, the Soviet delegation visited German tank-building factories and tank schools. Guderian candidly relates that the Russians have repeatedly made it clear that the Germans are fooling them by hiding their latest tank designs, which Hitler personally ordered to show them. They could not believe that the PzKpfw IV was actually the best and heaviest German tank at that time. Such skepticism led many, including Guderian himself, to conclude that the Russians had heavier and more modern tanks than those that the Third Reich had at that time.

However, the victorious start of Operation Barbarossa, when the Germans managed to easily crush the Russian armored forces, dispelled these suspicions. That is why the meeting with the T-34 was a real shock. The situation was exacerbated by the need to respond in an extremely short time frame. In his report to the commander of the army group, Guderian demanded that a special commission be sent to the front as soon as possible to discuss the problem on the spot. On November 20, 1941, the commission, which included representatives from the Armaments Directorate of the Ground Forces and the Ministry of Armaments, as well as the leading tank designers F. Porsche and Dr. Aders, and representatives of the largest tank building companies, arrived in the 2nd Panzer Army. The members of the commission not only examined the wrecked tanks, but also talked with the soldiers and officers of the tank units who were directly involved in the confrontation with the "thirty-fours". It is curious that the opinions of the military and designers turned out to be diametrically opposed. Front-line officers unanimously suggested copying the T-34 and immediately starting production of exactly the same tanks in Germany, but designers and manufacturers took this proposal with hostility. Tank VK 3002 company "Daimler-Benz" outwardly strongly resembled the T-34, and this was the main reason for the rejection of the proposed project.

The main objection was that in combat conditions the soldiers would confuse it with the T-34. Much more promising was the project of the firm "MAN". Her VK 3002 tank also had a longer range than the competitive Daimler-Benz vehicle. On February 3, 1942, MAN received a recommendation to complete the construction of the prototype within seventeen weeks, which was done. Prototype tests were carried out at the training ground of the 2nd Tank Regiment in Berk. Describing this conflict in his memoirs, Guderian completely takes the side of the manufacturers. He argues that the designers were not motivated by "aversion to imitation", but by a clear idea of ​​​​the technical impossibility of the task set by the military. In particular, the T-34 did not use a carburetor engine, like all German tanks, but an aluminum diesel engine as a power stop. However, the shortage of non-ferrous metals in Germany made the production of such motors impossible. In addition, German alloy steel, the quality of which was steadily declining due to the lack of raw materials, was significantly inferior to Russian.

As a result, a compromise decision was made: firstly, to start production of the previously developed design of the Tiger tank, weighing almost 60 tons, and secondly. to design a lighter type of tank weighing about 35 tons, which was to become the prototype of the future Panther.

On November 25, 1941, the Army Ordnance Department gave Daimler-Benz AG and MAN the task of designing a new medium tank. The conditions of the tactical and technical task were as follows: width up to 3150 mm, height - 2990 mm, minimum thickness of frontal armor - 60 mm, sides and feed - 40 mm each; the hull shape is rational, borrowed from the T-34; 650-700 hp engine; maximum speed - 55 km / h, cruising speed - 45 km / h. The project was given the general name VK 3002 (actually VK 3001, was created in October 1941, and was a logical development of the draft version assault tank developed back in 1937. Despite the fact that the VK 3001 project had a lot in common with the future Panthers, it had the greatest influence on the creation of the Tigers.

Daimler-Benz AG presented the VK 3002 (DB) project, which weighed 34 tons and looked very much like the T-34. Unlike all German tanks, the Daimler-Benz AG project had a rear engine compartment and drive wheels, a Daimler-Benz MB507 diesel engine was used as a power plant, and large-diameter road wheels were assembled in pairs into carts in the undercarriage and hung in a checkerboard pattern on leaf springs. The new tank was supposed to be armed with a 75-mm cannon with a barrel length of 48 calibers.

The 35-ton project of the MAN company, VK 3002 (MAN), created under the direction of engineer Paul Wiebike, was much more similar to traditional German combat vehicles. The silhouette of the tank was somewhat wider and taller than that of the T-34, the hull had sloping armor plates, and the spacious turret moved back somewhat in order to install a long-barreled (70 caliber) 75-mm gun. The Maybach HL210 carburetor engine was installed in the stern, the driver and machine gunner were located in the front compartment. The track rollers were also staggered, but had an individual torsion bar suspension.

The process of creating a new tank could not do without the intervention of Hitler. At first, the Fuhrer liked the Daimler-Benz AG project, with the condition, however, that the developers replace the tank gun with a more powerful one. The company had already received an order for the creation of 200 advanced combat vehicles of the VK 3002 (DB) type, when the Army Weapons Directorate intervened. As it turned out, high-ranking management officials were very skeptical about the Daimler-Benz AG project. Firstly, they were embarrassed by the silhouette, so strongly reminiscent of the T-34 that in combat conditions the tanks could easily be confused. Secondly, as already mentioned, equipping the tank with a diesel engine created many additional problems. As a result, the opinion of the customer's representatives began to lean towards the MAN project. All that remained was to persuade Hitler to change his mind. The Fuhrer was most influenced by the argument that it would be impossible to install the required powerful gun in the small turret of the VK 3002 (DB) tank. From now on, the Daimler-Benz project was finally buried.

The Armaments Directorate of the Ground Forces recommends that MAN make a prototype of its armored steel tank as soon as possible. Already in September 1942, the V-1 prototype was sent to a test site near Nuremberg. The second prototype V-2 was tested at the tank track in Kummersdorf. The tests were carried out under the guidance of chief engineer G. Knipkampf, who personally took part in the development of the undercarriage of the MAN project. Knipkampf was one of the key figures in the development of German tank building in the pre-war period and during the Second World War.

As a result, the MAN prototype was approved for mass production and received the designation PzKpfw V Panther (SdKfz171). Initially, it was planned to produce 250 new-type combat vehicles per month, but at the end of 1942 this figure was increased to 600 Since the resources of the MAN company were clearly insufficient to ensure such production volumes, Daimler-Benz AG had to be involved in the production of Panthers. After some time, two more industrial giants - Hannover MNH and Henschel and Son AG (Kassel) and later DEMAG, as well as many smaller firms that carried out individual orders from the main manufacturers .

In mid-July 1941, Rheinmetall-Borzing received an order to develop and create a tank gun capable of penetrating 140 mm armor from a distance of 1000 m, and along the way to prepare a design for a turret adapted to be equipped with such a gun. By the beginning of 1942, a prototype of the 75-mm KwK L / 60 gun was created, however, during the tests, the gun did not reach the required armor penetration, so Rheinmetall-Borzing received a categorical order until June 1942 to bring the barrel length to 70 calibers. The order was completed on time, and this time the gun completely satisfied the customer. The 75 mm KwK42 tank gun was put into mass production. Initially, it was equipped with a single-chamber muzzle brake, which was later replaced by a two-chamber one. It was, without exaggeration, a powerful weapon that terrified the Allied tank forces and infantry.

This is how the production of the tank began, which many experts and specialists consider the best combat vehicle of the Second World War. In total, more than 6,000 Panthers were produced, quickly gaining fame as the easiest German tanks to manufacture. In fact, it took the same amount of time to create two Panthers as it took to produce one Tiger. Serial production began with the release of 20 vehicles by MAN, which received the designation PzKpfw V Ausf.A (later they will receive a new name).

Panther tanks PzKpfw V Ausf.B can be briefly described as a modification with a Maybach-OVLAR gearbox. Since this modification was unsuccessful, the tanks of version B did not hit the active units. Some sources indicate that 20 Ausf. tanks were in fact the so-called zero series. This statement is based on the fact that tanks that do not have any differences from the prototype cannot be considered a "version". Since the PzKpfw V A tanks were actually exact copies of the VK 3002 prototype, one can quite agree with this point of view.

The first Panthers were equipped with a Maybach HL210P45 carburetor engine and a ZF 7 gearbox. The thickness of the frontal armor was 60 mm. These vehicles were equipped with 75 mm KwK42 cannons with a single chamber L/70 muzzle brake. Since the beginning of 1943, some changes have been made to the design of the Panthers: for example, due to an increase in bored cylinder bores, the engine capacity is increased from 21 to 23 liters and receives the designation Maybach HL250P30. Other changes concerned an increase in the armor of the frontal part of the tank (up to 80 mm), as well as a shift of the commander's turret slightly to the right (in order to simplify the production of the turret).

It is still unknown which tanks received (and received) the designation PzKpfw V С. One can only assume that this designation was reserved for other tank modifications. Anyway, but the first large-scale version of the tank "Panther" was the Ausf.D.

In order to avoid confusion, from February 1943, the PzKpfw V Ausf.D tanks began to be designated PzKpfw V Ausf.D2, (the PzKpfw V Ausf.D1 tanks were, respectively, the former PzKpfw V Ausf A). Tanks of the new model were produced by all four major tank building companies - MAN, Daimler-Benz AG, Henschel and Son AG and MNH. The cost of one serial tank was set at 117,000 Reichsmarks (for comparison, PzKpfw III cost 96,163 Reichsmarks, PzKpfw IV - 103,462 RM, and on June 4, 1942, Minister A. Speer ordered that 250 Panthers be ready by May 12, 1943. The first D (D2) tanks entered service with the 51st and 52nd Tank Battalions, the 23rd and 26th Tank Regiments, as well as the SS Das Reich and SS Life Standard Adolf Hitler divisions. months - from January to September 1943, the German industry produced more than 600 new vehicles.However, such a rush had the most adverse effect on the quality of the first large-scale Panthers. Almost all of them had low technical reliability, and above all, this concerned the transmission and chassis. This was largely due to a design miscalculation that assumed the use of the same transmission and steering for the Panthers as for the previous, light, German tanks. The fact that a heavier machine with a more powerful engine requires an appropriate undercarriage design. The same applied to the Maybach HL230P30 engine with a capacity of 700 hp. With. which at first overheated greatly, and often even ignited.

The changes made in the PzKpfw V Ausf.D2 tanks mainly affected the commander's cupola and the KwK42 gun muzzle brake, which became a two-chamber one. The thickness of the frontal armor was increased to 80 mm. They installed a new Maybach AK7-200 gearbox, later it was mounted on the Panther Ausf.A and G tanks. On the PzKpfw V Ausf D tanks, produced in the first half of 1943, a commander's cupola was installed with viewing slots covered with 50-mm armored glass, as on heavy tanks PzKpfw 4 Ausf.H1. On the first Panthers, two 3-barreled 90-mm NbK39 launchers for smoke grenades were mounted.

The armor of the PzKpfw V Ausf.D tanks, produced in the second half of the same 1943, was covered with zimmerite coating, in addition, 5-mm armor screens - bulwarks - were hung on these vehicles. The features of the D2 model tanks include: the absence of a ball mount for the MG-34 course machine gun, which was located inside the hull (and was inserted into a special loophole closed with an armored cover only for firing), the presence of a round bed on the left side of the turret for removing spent cartridges, as well as loopholes for firing from personal weapons in the sides and at the stern of the tower. In addition, these machines had twin exhaust pipes located symmetrically on the aft armor plate. Tanks modification D2 latest releases had exhaust pipes covered with special flame arresters and armored casings. A total of 851 PzKpfw V Ausf.D1 and D2 tanks were produced.

In March 1943, Guderian, newly appointed inspector general of the armored forces, presented Hitler with a report in which he outlined his views on the prospects for the development of German armored forces for 1943-1945. Soberly assessing the real situation, Guderian bluntly stated that he did not consider it expedient to use the technically imperfect Panthers until July-August 1943. During this period, according to the inspector general, it is necessary to eliminate the existing technical shortcomings of the new tanks. However, Hitler did not want to hear about any delay, although, as it turned out later, Guderian's cautious forecasts turned out to be even too optimistic. Here is what Lieutenant Colonel von Grundherr wrote in his diary immediately after the first combat use of the Panthers on the Eastern Front:

“...Honestly, I just can't help but say a few words about this sad story, whose name is "Panther". Everything happened exactly as I expected ... How many people had special hopes for the use of this new, never yet tried weapon! Needless to say, what a depressing effect the last defeat had on them. And it all started with the order of the Fuhrer, with those supernatural expectations that he gave rise to ... It just doesn’t fit in my head, how can you create a powerful, modern, expensive weapon, and at the same time supply it with an absolutely unnecessary gasoline pump, a bunch of extra gaskets and other rubbish? ! I have not a shadow of a doubt that most of the technical problems stem from the use of unsuitable materials that do not meet elementary quality requirements. The “efficiency” of the Panthers deserves special attention, the author caustically remarks and continues. From a distance of 7224 m, the T-34 hit them with one shot. Of the 200 tanks that made their debut near Kursk, 160 failed by the end of the first day, and after another 9 days only 43 Panthers remained in service. Many broke down already on the way from the railway to the front line, and the heavy weight of the vehicles made towing much more difficult ... "

Subsequently, most of these problems were successfully eliminated, and the Panthers gained well-deserved fame as the best Panzerwaffe battle tank. In the future, during the further operation of the Panthers, the crews and designers often had to deal with various technical problems. Guderian treated with great responsibility the introduction of new types of military equipment into the operating units. The pages of his diary serve as proof of this. So, on June 15, the inspector general of the armored forces writes: “I was engaged in our ward children - the Panthers, who turned out to have out of order side gears and revealed shortcomings in optics.” All this forces Guderian to report this to Hitler the very next day, adding that the Panthers need further refinement before they can be successfully used on the Eastern Front.

Tank "Panther". Design and layout

The layout of the "Panther" was normal for the Second World War and did not differ from the standard for German tanks. The control compartment and transmission compartment were located in front, the fighting compartment and turret were in the center, the engine compartment was in the aft. The driver and gunner-radio operator were in the front of the hull, and the gunner, loader and tank commander were in the turret. As in all German tanks, the seats of the crew members were located close to each other. This gave the tankers considerable moral support, allowed them to communicate by touch or, if necessary, read lips, which was important in the roar and confusion of the battle. AT emergency- in case of injury, misfire or when supplying ammunition - they could help each other.

Chassis and suspension

The undercarriage of the tank consisted of eight staggered track rollers on each side. The track rollers were located on double torsion bars lying across the hull. The outer end of the lever was attached to the track roller, the inner end, through a swinging lever, to another twisting rod, the second end of which was fixed on the side of the tank. The Panther received the best suspension system of all German tanks.

A set of road wheels mounted on one axle was assembled from two rubber-coated discs, combined into a pair. On one axis, the inner and outer disks were located close to each other, and on the other - at some distance. Due to the fact that the Panther road wheels were staggered, the disks of one road wheel fell between the disks of the other. This sequence was maintained along the entire length of the tank. The staggered arrangement of the road wheels made it possible to install more suspension elements. Thus, the softness of the ride was improved and a more uniform distribution of the load on the tracks was ensured than in tanks with the usual arrangement of road wheels. In practice, mud and snow could clog between the rinks, freezing there in the conditions of the Russian winter and jamming the rinks. From a repair point of view, one of the most important disadvantages of such a suspension was that four others had to be removed to replace one "inner" road wheel.

The road wheels themselves were 860 mm in diameter and had rubber tires. Starting in September 1944, MAN began to install Ausf. G steel road wheels with internal rubber dampers. The same track rollers were installed on some "Tigers I" and all " king tigers". Steel rubberized track rollers were installed on some of the last Ausf.G Panthers, which MAN produced in March-April 1945.

The suspension system was complemented by a pair of front drive and a pair of rear idler wheels, two hydraulic shock absorbers and support rollers on each side. To simplify production, after October 1944, the rear shock absorbers were removed from the Ausf.G tanks. As a result, the course of the "Panther" over rough terrain has become not so soft. This system rotated the caterpillars of the Kgs 64/660/160.86 brand tank, the caterpillar tracks were cast from manganese steel. They were fastened with a single cotter pin. The number 660 in the caterpillar designation meant that its width was 660 mm, 160 was the distance between the cotter pins of the tracks in millimeters, the tracks were designed for a prototype weighing 35.5 tons, and their width did not increase for installation on a heavier machine. But with such a caterpillar, the Ausf.D model had a specific ground pressure quite acceptable for such a heavy machine - 0.723 kg / cm2. Models Ausf.D and G had a ground pressure of 0.9 kg/cm2 and 0.8 kg/cm2, respectively. In September 1943, the installation of tracks from tracks equipped with spurs began, designed to increase traction and reduce slip when driving on ice, as well as on surfaces such as large pebbles. On tanks of the Ausf.A model, the use of track pads was provided as winter equipment. Linings were installed on every fifth or seventh track in order to improve patency when driving on snow-covered roads. But at the same time it was recommended to move at a speed not exceeding 15 km / h.

Hull and armor

Until 1942, German tanks were mostly rectangular in shape. The frontal and side armor plates were connected at a right angle. At the Panther, the upper front armor plate was set at an angle so that shells falling into it would ricochet upwards. Its thickness was 80 mm, the angle of inclination was 55 degrees. The thickness of the side armor was 40 mm, but the armor plates were mounted vertically. The armor of the aft part of the turret was also 40 mm thick, but its inclination was 30 degrees. The thickness of the roof was 16 mm, the bottom - from 16 mm to 30 mm. The hull and superstructure were welded from thick rolled sheets of homogeneous steel. The armor was softer than before. Surface hardening of steel was not applied.

The 75-mm M3 guns, which were armed with the American Sherman tanks and the British Cromwells and Churchills, did not penetrate the frontal armor of the Panther at any distance. Only A4 Shermans with their M1A1 7b-mm cannons and Soviet T-34/85s could penetrate the frontal armor of the Panther turret. To hit the Panther for sure, it was necessary to get close to her from the flank or from the rear. The angle of inclination of the upper wall of the Panther Ausf.G hull was reduced from 40 to 29 degrees. To maintain equivalent protection, the wall thickness was increased from 40 mm to 50 mm. Starting in April 1943, side screens began to be installed on the sides of the Panther hull. They were made of soft steel sheets 5 mm thick and were intended to protect the tank from the fire of Soviet anti-tank rifles at close range.

The screens were also well protected from 75 mm high-explosive fragmentation projectiles. They also provided effective protection against cumulative projectiles, although they were not designed for this - hitting the screen, the projectile exploded, and the jet dissipated before reaching the tank hull. In September 1943, all new tanks of the Ausf.D model began to be coated with zimmerite (anti-magnetic coating) directly at the factories. Zimmerite was applied to all parts of the armor that a person standing on the ground could reach. The purpose of using this composition was to protect the tank from magnetic anti-tank mines. It was applied to the armor in an uneven layer, providing a safety space between the armor and the mine's magnets. Unable to attach themselves to the metal, or at least get close to it at a sufficient distance, the magnets could no longer hold the mine on the tank armor. However, in September 1944, the 6th Division ordered that the application of zimmerite to the Ausf.G Panthers be stopped in order to save labor costs, and also because it took 6 days to dry the composition.

Panther engine

The Panther's engine was located at the rear of the hull. On the sides of the engine were cooling radiators and exhaust fans. The Panther was equipped with engines developed by the Maybach company from Friedrichshafen and built at the Maybach and Nordbau plant in Berlin. Initially, it was planned to install the Maybach HL210 P30 engine on the Panthers. And this engine was installed on the first 250 Panthers Ausf. D. Its power was 600 hp. at 3000 rpm. However, this power was insufficient. Therefore, the HL210 P30 was replaced by the HL230 P30. At its core, it was the same engine, but its volume increased from 21 liters to 23 liters by increasing the cylinder diameter.

The HL230 P30 was a short 12-cylinder water-cooled carbureted engine with four Solex carburetors. The cylinders were arranged in a V-shape. The weight of the engine was 1300 kg. The power of the HL230 P30 was 700 hp. With. at 3000 rpm. The speed of the Panther has not increased, it can now accelerate faster, climb faster and move over rough terrain with less engine load. The Ausf.G model had a power-to-weight ratio of 15.6 hp/t. "Panther" developed a fairly high speed on the highway - 46 km / h and 24 km / h off-road. The cruising range of the tank was 170 km when driving on the highway and 89 km on rough terrain. Beginning in June 1944, steel caps were welded onto the sides of the exhaust pipes. They were supposed to hide the exhaust pipes, which were heated and were clearly visible at night.

Driver mechanic

The driver's workplace was located in the left front of the hull. To his right was the gearbox. "Panther" had a conventional mechanical transmission. The gearbox of the company "Zanrad-technik" (a subsidiary of "Maybach") provided seven forward speeds and one reverse. The gearbox, together with the clutch and the driven gear of the final drive, weighed 750 kg. A dry clutch LAG 3 / 70H was installed. The Panthers were radically different from other German tanks, so MAN developed a new steering and braking system. The driver drove the tank as usual, using the Argus disc brakes. However, to facilitate control, a planetary gear could also be used. The car could move in each gear along a curve of a fixed radius. Therefore, the system could be described as a control system of a single radius. The driver looked ahead through a viewing slot in the front armor plate, covered with triplex. During the battle, the viewing slot was closed with an armored shutter. In combat conditions, the driver could observe through two fixed episcopes, one of which was facing forward and the other forward to the left in the 10.30 position. The driver had a rather limited field of vision. therefore, the episcopes were soon replaced by a rotating periscope. Therefore, it became possible to abandon the driver's viewing device and make the front armor plate smooth on the driver's side.

Gunner-radio operator

The workplace of the gunner-radio operator was in the right front of the hull. On the first tanks of the Ausf.D model, the gunner-radio operator fired a 7.92 mm MG-34 machine gun through a letterbox-shaped hatch located in the upper inclined armor plate. Such a system did not function satisfactorily, so it was replaced with an armored ball mount, in which the MG-34 machine gun was mounted. The machine gun could deviate 5 degrees to the right and left, and in the vertical plane - from -10 to +15 degrees. On the Ausf.D tank, the gunner-radio operator monitored using two fixed periscopes located on the roof of the hull above his head. Periscopes provided visibility ahead and to the right.

On the Ausf.A and G models, the periscopes were abandoned and replaced with the KZF2 telescopic sight, which was supplied with the new machine gun. The breakable monocular sight provided a magnification of 1.75 times and a viewing angle of 18 degrees. The radio equipment was located to the right of the gunner-radio operator in the sponson, which hung over the caterpillar. All Panthers were equipped with the Fu5 radio station. The range of the radio was from 4 to 6 km, depending on the nature of the terrain and atmospheric conditions. In addition, it was used for internal communication between crew members. The driver and gunner-radio operator got into their places through hatches located in front of the hull. Since the hatches often turned out to be blocked depending on the angle of rotation of the turret, drop hatches were installed so that, if necessary, the driver and radio operator could quickly leave the tank.

Tower

The 8.12-ton tower had sloping walls and a rounded frontal part, into which a convex cast armored gun mantlet was mounted. The frontal armor plate and side armor plates were connected using the dovetail method on the Ausf.D models and end-to-end on the Ausf.A and G models, which greatly facilitated production. The thickness of the frontal armor plate was 100 mm, the slope was 12 degrees, the thickness of the armor of the gun mask was also 100 mm. The thickness of the side armor was 45 mm at a slope of 25 degrees, the thickness of the armor of the turret roof was 16 mm. Armor-piercing shells often bounced down from the initially installed gun mantlet, penetrating the armor of the hull roof or falling into the vulnerable shoulder strap of the turret. From September 1944, Ausf.G tanks began to install a new mask shape, from which the shells bounced up. The floor of the tower rotated with it. The rotation of the tower was carried out from the secondary shaft, which lay between the two axle shafts and was installed in the housing, which contained the drive for turning the tower.

Tower calculation

The tank commander was located in the left rear of the tower, he was provided with excellent means of observation. The famous urn-shaped commander's cupola with six viewing devices was installed on the Ausf.D model tank. In the process of upgrading the Ausf. D at the Demag plant, they began to install a TSR1 surveillance periscope on the commander's turret, which allowed the tank commander to observe the area even from a shelter hiding a tank with a turret. On the Ausf.A model, a new commander's cupola was installed with a cast armor insert with seven episcopes protected by armor casings. The commander also had a turn indicator, marked with numbers from 1 to 12, placed on a ring in the turret. The hatch with a turret did not open up, but moved to the side. The tower was often supplied with a machine for mounting an MG-34 anti-aircraft machine gun. In addition to the radio station, the tank commander had at his disposal a set of flags and a signal pistol.

The gunner's position was to the left of the gun. He aimed the gun at the target using the Leitz TzF12 binocular articulated telescopic sight with fixed eyepieces and a movable illuminated reticle, providing a 2.5x magnification. In late November-early December 1943, this sight was replaced by a monocular TzF12a with a 2.5x magnification and a 28-degree field of view when detecting, identifying and locating a target and a five-fold increase and a field of view reduced to 14 degrees when accurately aiming at a target on great distance. An adjustable range scale allowed the gunner to accurately determine the distance to the target.

Like the commander, the gunner was provided with a horizontal aiming angle indicator. He fired from a gun using an electric trigger mounted on a vertical guidance flywheel, and from a course machine gun coaxial with a gun using a pedal in the turret floor. The loader was located to the right of the KwK42 gun and was also responsible for loading and servicing the course machine gun. Starting with the Ausf.A model, the loader was provided with an episcope.

The turret of the Ausf.D model was hydraulically rotated at a maximum speed of 360 degrees in 60 seconds, regardless of the engine speed. On the Ausf.A model, they began to install an improved turret traverse system, in which the turret traverse speed depended on the engine speed. A full rotation of the tower was carried out in 15 seconds. However, after November 1943, when the number of revolutions of the Maybach HL230 P30 engine was limited to 2500, the turret rotation rate was 360 degrees in 18 seconds. Turning the turret with the help of hydraulics made it possible to quickly aim the gun at the target. Nevertheless, the gunner carried out precise aiming manually using flywheels for horizontal and vertical aiming. With the engine turned off, the gunner could rotate the turret manually, while the loader helped him by rotating the auxiliary manual drive. The vertical aiming angle of the main armament ranged from -8 to +18 degrees.

The number of holes in the tower was kept to a minimum. The driver could enter the turret through a hatch located in front on the right on the roof, and the tank commander through the commander's cupola. The loader entered the turret through a large round hatch in the rear wall, through which the ammunition was loaded. There was a small hole on the left wall of the tower under the commander's cupola. It was often mistaken for a shell ejection window. In fact, through this hole, the tank commander communicated with the accompanying infantry. Starting in July 1943, it was decided to abandon the hole. On the right and left sides of the tower, as well as in the rear wall, there were loopholes through which the crew could fire from a personal small arms. The embrasures were abandoned in March 1944, when the Ausf. And they began to install "melee weapons" ("Nahverteidigungswaffe"). But it cannot be argued that it was installed on all tanks.

Armament

The KwK42 was an excellent anti-tank gun, capable of hitting targets with the first shot at distances in excess of 1000 m. Initial reports contained information about the destruction of the T-34 at a distance of 3000 m. During control tests, the gun hit a target 2 high and 2 wide with a 100 percent probability .5 m projectile Pzgr 39/42 at a distance of 1500 m. At a distance of 2000 m, the probability of hitting was reduced to 92 percent, at a distance of 3000 m - to 55 percent. During practical exercises, a typical gunner - adjusted for the characteristics of the gun and ammunition - hit the same target with a probability of 97 percent at a distance of 1000 m, 49 percent at a distance of 2000 m and 18 percent at a distance of 3000 m. This level of accuracy did not reflect the actual probability of hitting targets in real combat conditions. Naturally, due to errors in determining the distance to the target, movement and stress, the probability of hitting the target from the first shot was significantly reduced. However, the average gunner in combat conditions could achieve indicators close to those of practical exercises from the second shot, first firing a tracer projectile.

The 75-mm rifled gun KwK42 L / 70 was fired using an electric ignition tube. The recoil device consisted of a hydraulic recoil brake and an air-liquid knurler. The gun was equipped with a semi-automatic breech with spring opening and closing and a vertical wedge breech. The gun was balanced using a hydropneumatic cylinder. To reduce recoil, the gun was equipped with a muzzle brake. It used the kinetic energy of the gases generated during the combustion of the propellant charge and exiting the barrel after the projectile to pull the barrel forward. Initially, the KwK42 gun had a single-chamber muzzle brake, then it was replaced with a two-chamber one, but the inner chamber was removable. After April 1943, they began to install a compressor for pumping out powder gases that fell into the fighting compartment. These gases irritated the eyes and respiratory tract of crew members.

The armor penetration of the KwK42 gun was impressive. The non-standard ammunition was the Pzgr 39/42 armor-piercing projectile with an armor-piercing tip and a tracer. The peculiarity was that a ballistic tip was put on an armor-piercing tip made of hardened steel. It had an elongated conical shape and was designed to reduce air resistance. By itself, the ballistic tip reduced armor penetration, but increased it when firing at medium and long distances. This was due to the fact that he reduced the braking caused by air resistance, and therefore the projectile retained a high impact speed. Pzgr 39 was a projectile weighing 6.8 kg, the initial speed of which was 935 m / s. Sometimes the Panther's ammunition included several Pz.gr 40/42 rounds for firing at heavy Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns.

KwK42 pierced the frontal armor of the British Cromwells at distances up to 2500 m, and the Churchills - up to 1700 mm. At the same time, the Panther remained invulnerable to their guns. The gun was equally effective when firing at American Sherman guns, however, it only penetrated the frontal armor plate of this vehicle from a hundred-meter distance, while the Panther itself remained invulnerable to the 75-mm M3 gun. Against the Panther, the American Shermans, armed with a more powerful 76-mm M1A1 cannon, as well as the British Sherman Firefly tanks, had a chance. 76-mm guns pierced the Panther turret at a distance of 700 m. Their 7.7 kg shells could pierce the gun mantlet and frontal armor of the turret from a normal distance, but they did not penetrate the hull armor.

The Panther's ammunition consisted of 79 rounds for the KwK42 (models Ausf.A and D) and 82 rounds for the Ausf.G model (as a result of the modernization of the hull, there was more space for storing ammunition). It was recommended that the ammunition load should consist of 50 percent Pzgr 39/42 armor-piercing shells and 50 percent Sprgr42 high-explosive fragmentation shells. Three shots were stored under the turret platform, 40 shots were stored in a horizontal position along the sides of the tank's turret superstructure, and 36 shots were stored vertically in niches along the sides of the hull. Three additional shots for the Ausf.G model were also stored in stowage along the sides of the turret superstructure.

Coaxial with a cannon and hull machine guns (as well as anti-aircraft guns, if installed) were variants of a single 7.92 mm MG-34 machine gun, which was developed and produced by Rheinmetall. The machine gun was developed in the early 30s, had air cooling. He worked on the principle of recoil of the barrel with a short withdrawal. The shutter locking method developed by Mauser was used. The machine gun had a very high rate of fire - 800-900 rounds per minute.

The machine gun version that was installed on the Panthers was called the MG-34m. It was specially adapted for installation on tanks and other armored vehicles and had a thick armored barrel. The machine gun ammunition consisted of 4104 rounds for the Ausf.D model and 4200 rounds for the Ausf.A and G models. It was stored in bags, each of which contained a tape for 150 rounds.

As an auxiliary armament, the first Ausf.D tanks were equipped with smoke screen launchers - three on each side of the turret. In June 1943, this practice was discontinued following a report of an incident that took place in February of the same year, when, as a result of shelling a tank with small arms, the launchers were triggered, leading to the incapacitation of the crew.

It was decided to abandon the embrasures for firing small arms in the sides and rear of the tower, since in December 1943 the installation of the so-called "melee weapons" ("Nahverteidigungswaffe") began. It was installed on the roof of the tower in the right rear corner. The melee weapon was a 26-mm mortar, the ammunition load of which included smoke, fragmentation and fragmentation-incendiary shells. The mortar could be rotated 360 degrees, its elevation angle was 50 degrees. However, it was not possible to equip all tanks with it. As a personal weapon of the crew members, 9-mm MP-40 submachine guns, 9-mm R-38 pistols or (rarely enough) R-08 automatic pistols were used.

Tank "Panther". More about upgrades and modifications

The Panthers were supposed to replace the Pz III and Pz IV tanks in combat units, but the pace of mass production did not meet the needs of the troops. In the end, the Inspector General of the Wehrmacht tank troops, Colonel-General G. Guderian, after consultations with the Minister of Armaments A. Speer, decided that only one battalion in a tank regiment was to be re-equipped with new tanks. The battalion consisted of four companies of 17 tanks each. The headquarters consisted of 8 tanks, a sapper platoon and an air defense platoon armed with Mobelwagen or Wirbelwind self-propelled guns. There was also a technical company in the battalion, equipped with evacuation tractors and various vehicles. In practice, the organization of the units never corresponded to the state. In parts of the Panzerwaffe, there were an average of 51 - 54 Panther tanks, and in the SS troops (Waffen SS) 61-64.

The first military units to be equipped with Panthers were the 51st and 52nd tank battalions. Their formation ended by June 15, 1943. They made up the 10th Tank Brigade (Panther-Brigade 10). As part of the SS troops, they also formed the Panther Brigade. In total, in the middle of 1943, about 240 modification D tanks were in operation. 196 tanks took part in Operation Citadel. Their combat debut was not successful - only for technical reasons, 162 Panthers failed. For the first time, the Panthers took part in hostilities during the Battle of Kursk, the dates of which the Nazi command deliberately postponed in order to be able to throw their new tanks against the Soviet troops. The results of the Battle of Kursk confirmed all of Guderian's darkest fears. The Panthers were definitely not ready for combat use. So, when a tank brigade was advanced to its initial position for an offensive, about one quarter simply failed as a result of technical problems.

To make up for the losses suffered in the battles near Kursk, starting from August, a monthly production plan was set - 250 Panthers. However, in August, only 120 tanks were produced - as a result of the bombing of the Allied aviation, the factories of the MAN company in Nuremberg and DaimIer-Benz in Berlin were badly destroyed. It was not possible to fulfill the plan in September (197 vehicles), and only in October the factory shops left 257 tanks.

In late August - early September 1943, mass production of the next modification began "Panthers" - PzKpfw V Ausf.A. Its main difference from the previous model was the replacement of the MG 34 detachable course machine gun with a standard machine gun in a ball mount. The system of exhaust pipes has also changed, the number and location of the roller bearings has increased, there is no small access hatch in the side wall of the tower and hatches for shooting, instead of a two-lens sight, a single-lens type TZF 12a has appeared. The angle of vertical guidance of the gun was from -8 ° to + 18 °. A number of changes were made to the design of the commander's cupola. The loader had his own periscope.

Version A tanks were produced until March 1944, after which they were replaced by "Panthers" - PzKpfw V Ausf.G. This modification was the most numerous. The German industry produced 374 (machines of this type "Panther" version G had new type frontal armor, in which there was no longer a rectangular inspection hatch for the driver. The side walls of the hull were installed at an angle of 61 °, and their armor increased to 50 mm. The shape of the entrance hatches of the driver and gunner-radio operator has changed. On a number of tanks, the guns received cylindrical masks with a special lapel, which prevented shells from entering the base of the tower. Vehicles produced from the end of 1944 had an additional power compartment fan, covered with armor protection, located immediately behind the turret, etc. Versions A and G tanks were equipped with additional armored screens to protect the upper branches of the tracks.

From the middle of 1944, the development of a new version of the Panther began, which received the designation Ausf.F. The machines of this version differed significantly from the tanks of previous modifications. The most important improvement was the installation of a new type of tower - the so-called "narrow tower", designed by Daimler-Benz. It was also planned to develop a narrow turret for an 88-mm cannon. Compared to the standard turret of the G version, the new one was smaller and had a different armor system. The gun was installed in a new "pig's snout" type mask, similar to the one used on the PzKpfw VI "Tiger" II tanks. The thickness of the frontal armor of the turret increased to 120-125 mm, side and rear - up to 60 mm, roof - up to 30 mm. Additional equipment appeared: a night vision device and a stereoscopic rangefinder.

Changes also affected the armament of the tank: instead of the MG-34 machine gun, the MP-44 7.9-mm assault machine gun was installed in the hull. It could be placed in any of the two slots provided for this. The main armament was a 75 mm KwK44 L/70 cannon with a muzzle declination of -8° and an elevation of +20°. In addition, the Rheinmetall-Borzing MG-42 7.9 mm machine gun was installed in the turret. The commander's cupola was adapted to mount an MG-34 machine gun, from which it was possible to fire at air targets. The installation of weapons in the tower was carried out by the firms Krupp and Skoda. The modified 75-mm gun KwK44 / 1 was completely produced at the enterprises of the Skoda company.

Tanks "Panther" Ausf.F(since February 26, Hitler banned the use of the PzKpfw V designation, leaving only the name) should have been equipped with a Leitz TZF13 sight with a magnification of 2.5 to 6 times and a Zeiss stereoscopic rangefinder, which provided a 15x magnification The rangefinder had a length 1320 mm and was installed along the front wall of the tower. The objectives were in protective covers protruding from the sides. The TZF13 sight was placed in the center under the gun. The hydraulic turret rotation drive has also undergone some changes.

Not only the turret was modified, but also the hull of the tank. Reservation of the top of the hull increased from 12 mm to 35 mm, the shape and size of the entrance hatches for the driver and radio operator changed. It was also planned to develop a narrow turret for an 88-mm cannon. The production tanks of the F version were equipped with an improved KwK 44/2 gun, but in 1944 Krupp twice developed projects for re-equipping Panther tanks with 88-mm KwK43 L / 71 guns. In February 1943, it was decided to unify the production of the new Tiger II and Panther II tanks. It was quite easy to implement this solution, since both machines were produced at the Henschel plant in Kassel.

According to the project, the Panther II tank had a narrow turret with a diameter of 1750 mm and a modified hull with a different arrangement of hatches for the driver and gunner-radio operator, as well as air intakes for the engine. The armor of the new vehicle was strengthened: the thickness of the frontal armor increased to 100 mm, the side armor to 60 mm. and the stern and top of the hull - up to 40 mm. It was assumed that the tank would be armed with an 88 mm KwK43 L/71 cannon with a depression angle of -8° and an elevation of +15°. The turret was adapted to mount a rangefinder. In 1945, the design of a turret with 150 mm thick frontal armor began. The estimated combat weight of the Panther - 50.2 tons - forced the designers to look for a new power plant. As a result, three experimental cars appeared: one with a Maybach HL234 engine with a power of 850 hp, the other with a Simmering Sla16 diesel engine with a power of 720 hp. With. and the third with a 700 hp MAN/Argus LD220 engine. With. At the end of 1944, MAN received an order for the construction of two Panther II tanks. The first prototype was ready in 1945, however, it had a standard turret, which was equipped with previous modifications of the Panther. In the chassis, road wheels and drive wheels were used, which were used on the "Tigers" II.

In 1943, on the basis of the standard tank PzKpfw V "Panther" Ausf.D, tanks were built with an additional radio station - control tanks. Depending on the type of radio station, they were produced in two versions. Sd.Kfz.267 machines were equipped with FuG5 and FuG7 radio stations and served for communications at the battalion and company level, while FuG5 and FuG8 radios were installed on Sd.Kfz.268 vehicles to ensure communication with the regiment and division. The crew of the control tank consisted of a commander, a driver, a "communications officer", who also performed the duties of a gunner, and two radio operators who acted as a gunner and loader. However, most often the additional radio station was served by the loader. On control tanks, the MG-34 machine gun was located in the turret, the placement of the ammunition was different, the ammunition for the gun was reduced to 64 rounds on the tanks of the D and A versions and to 70 rounds on the machines of the G version.

Another special version of the Panther was the artillery observation vehicle. She did not have a cannon, but was equipped with a wooden model of the KwK42 gun in order to mislead the enemy. The MG-34 machine gun was placed in the turret in a standard ball mount. Since 1943, on the basis of the Panther version D, MAN began the production of repair and recovery vehicles intended to replace half-track tractors and tractors based on PzKpfw III tanks that could not tow Panthers and Tigers that were too heavy for them. On March 1, 1944, at the Berke training ground near Eisenach, the new Bergepanther Sd.Kfz.179 BREM was demonstrated to the General Inspector of Tank Forces, Colonel General Heinz Guderian, and on April 7, Hitler ordered the production of 20 vehicles a month. However, only 13 vehicles were built in April, 18 in May, 20 in June, and only 10 in July. The Bergepanther was planned to be built on the basis of the Panther F version tanks. The Bergepanther ARVs were also used as ammunition transporters.

In the steppes of the Eastern Front and in the battles in France and Germany in 1944-1945. "Panther" proved to be excellent, fighting with the tank armies of the allies. Its 75-mm cannon with a barrel length of 70 calibers had a huge impact force, and the sloped armor provided reliable protection in any battle. Most tank experts agree that the Panther was best tank World War II, however, with two important reservations: firstly, she suffered from constant technical problems and breakdowns, and this affected her combat effectiveness, and secondly, as noted above, the German military industry was not able to produce " Panther" in sufficient numbers so that it could change the course of the war. Allied strategic bombing, combined with the Germans' obsessive reluctance to make the slightest sacrifice of quality in exchange for more quantity, resulted in low production. Overshadowed by constant engine breakdowns, the time period for the participation of a few Panthers in hostilities was short. They appeared at the front in July 1943 and fought until the end of the war in May 1945. The first battles with the participation of the Panthers took place on the Eastern Front, where she participated in the most fierce battles.

Tanks "Panther" and preparations for the battle of Kursk

Work on the Panther was completed at the end of 1942, and its baptism of fire took place during Operation Citadel in the summer of 1943. Under this name, the Germans' summer offensive was hidden, the purpose of which was to destroy the ledge that formed the front line in the Kursk region, an important railway junction 805 km south of Moscow. This ledge went deep into the German defense line. It was formed as a result of the fighting in the winter of 1942/43 and had a width of 190 km and a depth of 120.7 km. The idea of ​​the Germans was that as a result of converging strikes on the southern and northern faces of the ledge, Soviet troops would be cut off and destroyed, and the victory won would serve as a springboard for subsequent offensive operations. Naturally, in order to carry out such an operation, the German army needed a large number of tank formations, diligently recreated after the defeat at Stalingrad.

In February 1943, Guderian was again sent to the Eastern Front. He received the position of Inspector General of the Panzer Forces and intended to create fully equipped panzer divisions. By 1944, Guderian expected to have divisions capable of carrying out large-scale operations. Each division was to have 400 tanks and full support units. He insisted that it was better to have a few powerful divisions than many weak ones. He was also convinced that Germany should eventually get large tank armies capable of defeating the Russians, who received weapons from factories located east of the Ural Mountains.

Guderian believed that the war would last a long time. In this regard, he insisted on the need to improve the reliability of combat vehicles and increase the production of Panthers and Tigers, but not at the expense of reducing the production of PzKpfw IV - the "workhorse" of the Wehrmacht. Therefore, Guderian did not particularly support the idea of ​​the Kursk operation, preferring to postpone the offensive until 1944. However, Hitler ignored Guderian's fears about the irreparable losses of manpower and equipment that the army would suffer in the offensive, and ordered preparations for Operation Citadel to begin. Then he intervened again, insisting that the army should have more Panthers, which caused the start of the operation to be delayed. It was the worst thing Hitler could come up with. By July 1943, when the attack on Kursk was to begin, the element of surprise was lost due to transfers, and the Germans were forced to advance where the enemy wanted it, where his defenses were well prepared, and the attackers had no room to maneuver. At the same time, the delays still did not allow the Germans to prepare and deliver to the front a sufficient number of Panthers and other tanks, and the manufacturing companies did not have enough time to eliminate the shortcomings inevitable for the new machine. Those tanks that arrived at the front were often incapacitated.

The Battle of Kursk was unique. It was the largest tank battle in history, with over 6,000 tanks and self-propelled guns taking part. For comparison, in the battle of El Alamein in North Africa in 1942, 1,500 tanks participated, and in the battle for the “Chinese Farm” in the Sinai Peninsula during the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, about 2,000 tanks participated. Kursk became the "swan song" of the German tank forces. It should also be noted that the German army launched its last major offensive in the East, using tanks, most of which were outdated. Almost 900,000 soldiers and officers and 2,700 tanks and self-propelled guns were involved in Operation Citadel from the German side, of which only a small part were Panthers, and there were even fewer Tigers. The vast majority of German tanks were PzKpfw IVs, armed with long-barreled 75mm guns. Once again, we have to note that the excessive emphasis on quality at the expense of quantity led to the fact that the Germans did not have enough Panthers, which was one of the reasons for the failure of their offensive.

The tanks were simply not ready to participate in the Kursk operation. The roads and lanes leading from the railway stations where they unloaded to the front line were clogged with Panthers that had failed due to transmission failures or engine fires. As already mentioned, Guderian believed that Hitler sent the Panther tanks into battle too early, not allowing them to be fully tested on the training grounds. According to him, the Panthers, on which the Chief of the General Staff had placed such hopes, still suffered from the shortcomings that are always inherent in new technology, and it seemed unlikely that they would be eliminated in time.

Guderian was right. The delays caused by Hitler's desire to direct operations gave the Soviet engineering units time to turn the Kursk salient into an impregnable fortress, and they did it quickly and in full. Six interconnected lines of defense were built, over 40 km deep, with trenches, strongholds and barbed wire. From the depths, the defense was supported by 20,000 artillery pieces, a third of which were anti-tank guns. At the same time, Soviet soldiers laid minefields with a density of 1500 anti-tank and 1375 anti-personnel mines per kilometer front. A total of 400,000 mines were laid, stream beds were blocked off and impenetrable water barriers were created, thus turning fertile agricultural land into a giant obstacle course. The Soviet High Command (Stavka) sent the local civilian population to prepare 4828 km of anti-tank ditches, in which the positions of anti-tank guns, as well as machine-gun nests, were located so that their sectors of fire overlapped and created a “screen of fire”. In addition, the Russians concentrated large forces of fighters and bombers, as well as the largest tank formations. Seven armies were concentrated on the Kursk salient. In addition, reserves were concentrated 200 km from the front line - one tank and two combined arms armies. They formed additional lines of defense. When all preparations were completed, 1,336,000 soldiers and officers, 3,444 tanks, 2,900 aircraft and 19,000 guns were ready for battle. 75 percent of all Soviet tanks were concentrated in the Kursk area in anticipation of a German hammer blow.

Debut of Panther tanks near Kursk

The Germans knew that the Russians were strengthening their defenses near Kursk, but on Hitler's orders they continued to prepare for the offensive. The postponement of the offensive played into the hands of the Red Army, giving additional time to improve the defense, while there was still not enough time to produce and deliver additional Panthers to the front. In the end, the Germans prepared only two Panther battalions for participation in the operation, which they used on the southern front of the offensive as part of the 4th Panzer Army. In addition, they reinforced several of their tank divisions with companies of Tiger tanks. Most of the tank divisions near Kursk had PzKpfw III and PzKpfw IV tanks.

On July 5, 1943, the 4th Panzer Army of Hermann Hoth and the Kempf army group, consisting of 18 divisions (including 10 tank divisions), went on the offensive south of Kursk, and the 9th Army of Walter Model (also 18 divisions, of which 7 tank ) - from the north. In total, about 200 Panther tanks of the Ausf.D model, which were part of the 51st and 52nd tank battalions, united in an improvised tank brigade, participated in Operation Citadel. Near Kursk, the Panthers Ausf.D debuted on July 5, and this debut was a failure. Tanks experienced great problems in battle due to frequent breakdowns. Many machines broke down on the way to the front - due to poor cooling and ventilation, the Panthers' engines caught fire. The reason was that the engine compartments of the tanks were hermetically sealed - they were prepared to overcome water barriers. In addition, there were mass transmission failures, transmission and suspension failures. Because of this, the Panthers failed to meet the expectations of the Germans. In addition, there were purely military problems. The minefields mentioned above could not be cleared completely, and the Panthers suffered heavy losses on them. As a result of the influence of these two factors, the 51st tank battalion lost 56 percent of its tanks on the first day of the offensive. By the end of the second day, a fifth of the Panthers remained in service, which once again testified to the too hasty dispatch of a non-combat-ready tank to the Eastern Front.

Corporal Werner Kriegel recalled his participation in the Battle of Kursk as part of the 51st tank battalion: “Our first attack bogged down in a minefield. I lost a caterpillar. While our artillery was shelling the Russians, we were able to repair both wrecked tanks ... The first day ended disastrously. By the evening of July 5, the 51st tank battalion had only 22 combat-ready Panthers. 28 tanks were either destroyed or seriously damaged. My comrades complained about weak final drives and overheating of the engines ... On July 8, we again moved to Oboyan, south of Kursk. Our "Panther" received a direct hit from a tank gun in the area of ​​​​the commander's cupola. We continued to advance with an open hatch and a split turret. My commander still keeps this shell... We lost one tank - it was hit by a shell from a SU-152 self-propelled gun, penetrating the gun mantlet. We also met with American tanks (they were supplied to the Russians under Lend-Lease), which could not compete with us ... We destroyed several T-34s at distances significantly exceeding 2500 m.

"Panther" Kriegel fought on the southern front of the Kursk salient as part of a separate unit of the 4th Panzer Army of General Hoth, which was at the forefront of the general offensive. Nine panzer divisions, including the "cream" of the SS tank formations (the Leibstandarte, Das Reich and Totenkopf divisions) were able to advance 32 km. The biggest breakthrough was made by the Germans when units of the Leibstandarte division were able to capture a small foothold on the banks of the small river Psel. Goth then bore the brunt of the offensive in the direction of the small railway station Prokhorovka. A decisive battle took place here, as a result of which Russian tanks and anti-tank artillery, together with the effective actions of the Soviet attack aircraft (IL-2), forced the Germans to stop.

"Panther" - a tank with the potential to win the war, could not decide the outcome of the Battle of Kursk in its favor. The results that the Panther showed can be considered contradictory. She hit the T-34 at long distances, but at the same time the small number of Panthers and their tendency to fail due to "childhood diseases" reduced the importance of this combat vehicle. The Panther was developed and put into service too quickly, without passing sufficient tests. As a result, transmission problems plagued tanks even into 1944. As already noted, in a cramped and hermetically sealed engine compartment, the engine quickly overheated and could catch fire. Engine fires in the midst of battle were not uncommon, causing additional problems for tank crews. One former crew member of the Panther recounted an incident that took place in September 1944, when his unit moved through a pine forest:
“From the vibration caused by passing heavy tanks, a real rain of pine needles began. After a short time, the lead tank broke down, the rest stopped. We began to find out what was the matter. It turns out that pine needles got into the air intakes and clogged them. Because of this, the engine immediately stalled. To somehow solve the problem, we welded perforated buckets to the backs of the air intakes.

On the Eastern Front, the Panthers had to fight against a much more dangerous enemy than the one who opposed the Germans during the attack on Moscow in 1941. The Red Army at Kursk and during the subsequent offensive on Berlin was fundamentally different from the brave, but poorly trained and led troops that the Germans had fought before. Near Kursk, she demonstrated a completely different level of training during both defensive and offensive operations. Defensively, the Russians used the so-called "anti-tank areas", which were a system of strong points, the basis of which were groups of tanks and anti-tank guns, covered by minefields. These strongholds were located in the depths of the defense at a distance of about 20 km from the front line. For the Germans, this Russian tactic was new. Often the situation developed in such a way that for each German tank there were up to 10 Soviet guns.

Tactics of Panther tanks: "Tank Wedge" and "Tank Bell"

"Panthers" near Kursk and after acted in battle order, which was called - "tank wedge" ("Ranzerkeil"). It was a wedge, on the edge of which heavy tanks moved, which were supposed to break through the Russian defenses. On the flanks of the wedge, medium and light tanks marched in ledges. Often, along with the "Panthers" were "Tigers". The more vulnerable PzKpfw III and PzKpfw IV moved under the cover of these heavy tanks. Behind the wedge, infantry armed with machine guns, artillery and control vehicles moved.

The "tank wedge" system in 1944 evolved into a battle formation, called the "tank bell" ("Panzerglocke"). Here, along with heavy tanks, sapper units of tank troops followed at the tip of the wedge. As before, the flanks were covered by medium and light tanks. The command version of the Panther was also in combat formations, from which the attack was directed and coordinated with the Ju-87 Stukka dive bombers, which provided air support. The use of new tactics depended on specific factors: good reconnaissance, good communications between the ground and air components of the operation, good artillery, good timing of the operation, the correct location of forward observers, the availability of sufficient reserves of fuel and ammunition located close to the attacking units, and the correct the use of white and colored smoke screens for cover and marking on the battlefield.

Assessment of Major General F.V. von Mellenthin.

German commander-tanker Major General F.V. von Mellenthin left interesting memories of the actions of the Panthers in the Battle of Kursk in his book Tank Battles. It talks a lot about the problems experienced by the Panthers: “During Operation Citadel, the German tank units moved and fought in the battle formation “tank wedge” (“Panzerkeil”), which turned out to be very effective. On the edge of the wedge were the heaviest tanks. The "Tigers" proved to be effective against the Soviet "anti-tank areas" organized in the depths of the defense. The 88-mm guns of the Tigers were superior to anything the Russians had, but, as I said, the Panthers were still in their "infancy" and were constantly breaking down.

Battle for Kharkov. August 1943

After the Battle of Kursk, the Germans proved they could make tactical gains as the Russians continued their offensive, seeking to capture the strategically important city of Kharkov. Stalin entrusted this task to the elite 5th Guards Tank Army. The situation in mirror order reflected the situation near Kursk: the Germans knew that the Russians were going to attack, and prepared a deep defense. The defense system included 96 Panthers, which inflicted very serious damage on the attacking Soviet troops and taught the Russians who were in euphoria after the Battle of Kursk a lesson - do not underestimate the Germans. In this battle, the Russians lost almost 420 tanks. But, despite the fact that the Germans demonstrated their tactical superiority near Kharkov, they could not change the situation strategically. The Russians were constantly rushing to the West, and only tactical successes remained for the Germans.

Tank "Panther" near Narva

In defense (and after Kursk, the Germans increasingly had to switch to this type of hostilities), the Panthers were very useful. During the second half of 1943, the 11th SS Volunteer Panzergrenadier Division "Nordland" received several Panthers instead of StuG III assault guns (the usual armament for this type of SS divisions). By the beginning of 1944, the Nordland division became part of the 3rd "German" SS Panzer Corps under the command of Gruppenführer Felix Steiner, taking up defenses in the northern sector of the Eastern Front near the Gulf of Finland in the Narva region. The position of the front line in the north had not changed much since October 1941, although in 1943 the Russians managed to break the blockade of Leningrad. In early February 1944, the Russians launched an offensive against the line of defense of the Nordland division, crossing the frozen Narva River. They managed to capture a bridgehead south of the positions held by the division. They began to move north, attacking the division's defenses from the south. The division commander sent his reserve, Panthers Aufs.A, from the 11th SS Panzer Battalion Hermann von Salz, named after the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, who stopped the Russians, to meet the advancing enemy. A similar situation arose at the end of March, when a Soviet tank column broke through the German defenses and reached the bridge across the Narva near Ivan-gorod, the division command sent Panthers from the 1st tank company to repel an attack by vastly superior enemy forces. For the courage shown in this battle, SS Oberscharführer Phillip Wild received the Knight's Cross. The 3rd SS Panzer Corps managed to hold out at Narva for six months - until the summer, when a massive Russian offensive in July along the entire front forced it to retreat.

On June 22, 1944, the third anniversary of the start of Operation Barbarossa, Soviet T-34s spearheaded an offensive that drove German troops back more than 700 kilometers. 25 German divisions were defeated. This offensive demonstrated how much better the Soviet tank forces had become, both in terms of tactics and the quality of weapons. The Russians had so many tanks that they could form huge tank armies, suppressing everything that the Germans could oppose them. The number of Russian tanks exceeded the number of German three times. The balance of power was fundamentally different from the "heady" days of 1941, when the Wehrmacht invaded Russia and almost reached the gates of Moscow. Soviet troops rushed forward along the entire front, undertaking a series of attacks and using their unlimited superiority in manpower and large masses of tanks. Usually, after a powerful bombardment, heavy tanks began the attack, punching holes in the German defenses, into which T-34s and infantry broke into. The problems for the Germans were that they had too few Panther tanks capable of stopping the Russian tanks. The Russians had enough resources to attack again and again in the same area, simply exhausting the defenders.

To repel enemy attacks, the Germans combined the Panthers into mobile counterattack groups. They were supposed to strike at the flank of the attacking Soviet units. Since most Soviet tanks were not equipped with walkie-talkies, it was assumed that during the attack, all crews would adhere to pre-selected tactics, with tactics determined for each crew. As a result, German counterattacks rarely met organized resistance, and the Panthers and PzKpfw IVs could inflict heavier losses on the Russians than usual. And of course, against the better trained Allied crews in Normandy and Italy, the Germans could not use such tactics. The main problem of the Germans was the huge superiority of the Russians in material and technical resources, combined with Hitler's orders “Not one step back!” that did not correspond to the real situation. Because of this, in 1944, huge masses of German troops, along with military equipment, including Panthers, were surrounded. The encircled troops either capitulated or tried to break out of the "boiler". In such battles, the losses were especially great, and the Panthers were especially valued. Of these, special units were formed, the task of which was to break through the encirclement and rescue the encircled troops. One of these units was the Becke heavy tank regiment, named after its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Franz Becke. The regiment included a battalion of "Tigers" (34 tanks) and a battalion of "Panthers" (46 tanks), as well as support units, including an infantry battalion, self-propelled artillery units and sappers.

In one of the battles in January 1944, the Backe regiment fought for five days, destroying at least 267 enemy tanks and losing only one Tiger and four Panthers. Then the regiment formed the vanguard of the 3rd Panzer Corps, which was supposed to come to the aid of the German units trying to break out of the encirclement. In all these battles, the Panthers showed their best side, but there were too few of them to delay the advance of the enemy to the West. The Soviet tank lieutenant Degan (originally Degan) described the problems he encountered during the fights with the Panthers:

“Against such German tanks as the Tiger or Panther, I could not do anything if I faced them head-on. If I wanted to win, I had to find their weak point, that is, I needed to go in from the flank. So our usual tactic when we were advancing and knew there might be an ambush ahead of us was to attack unexpectedly, stop and fire as if we knew there was something ahead, and then turn around. and leave as quickly as possible. We hoped that they would open fire and we would be able to determine where they were shooting from in order to attack again.”

The Russian summer offensive of 1944 stalled due to supply problems rather than actual resistance. The Russians were already in Poland and East Prussia - and were preparing to enter directly into German territory. The crews of the remaining "Panthers" fought stubbornly and courageously, but the numerical superiority of the enemy affected more and more. When the Russians stopped at the Vistula River, the Germans tried to reinforce their front to meet the next enemy advance. But things were getting worse for Germany - her ally Romania withdrew from the war. The troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front of Rodion Malinovsky with the 6th Panzer Army in the forefront took Bucharest in September 1944. More importantly, the Russians had seized the oil fields at Ploiesti, one of the last sources of crude oil that Germany could use. Soon the Panthers stopped due to lack of fuel. The Panthers' problem was that after the Battle of Kursk, the front rolled to the West. Therefore, more and more often they had to be used in defense, and not in offensive battle formations, which were mentioned above. Although the Panthers greatly outperformed the Pz.4, the main tank of the German Panzerwaffe of World War II, the Wehrmacht continued to rely on this more reliable and widespread tank, resisting attempts to stop its production in favor of the more modern but capricious Panthers.

"Panther" against the tank "Sherman"

When on May 24, 1944, the Allies outflanked the "Hitler Line", the Germans moved real Panthers against them. This was the first time the Panthers were used in the Western theater in their usual role, and not in the form of towers mounted on concrete platforms. In a short skirmish, the Shermans knocked out three Panthers and several self-propelled artillery mounts. This was a remarkable event, given the problems that Allied tanks (Shermans, for example) usually experienced when facing Panthers.

There were Sherman models armed with a powerful cannon. However, the Shermans were mostly armed with a 75-mm cannon, which showed simply depressing results in the confrontation with the Tigers and Panthers. She, in principle, did not penetrate the frontal armor of the Panthers when fired from any distance. At the same time, the Panther's 75-mm cannon with a high initial projectile velocity blew the Sherman to pieces when firing from a distance exceeding 2700 m. To hit the Panther, the Sherman had to shoot it on board from a distance of no more than 3600 m In fairness, it should be noted that the Panther could destroy the Sherman from the flank from a distance of almost 4500 m. "now pierced the frontal armor of the Panther tower from 550 m, and the Panther frontal armor of the improved Sherman from 2700 m. Heavy battles, in which large forces of the Shermans and Panthers met, took place in Normandy. In Italy, "Panthers" in the usual role were used little. There, Panther towers mounted on platforms were effectively used. As a result, the Allies broke through the "Hitler Line" for a very long time, and their advance towards Rome was seriously delayed.

Battle for Poland

When the Soviet troops deepened into the territory of Poland, their commander, Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, began to plan the final offensive against Germany and the operation to take Berlin. By October 1944, the offensive plan was almost ready. For the last blow against the Reich, 13 tank and mechanized corps were deployed. They were based on T-34 tanks, and heavy IS-2 tanks were also part of the hulls. Elite guards tank armies were also trained. In January 1945, after a powerful artillery barrage, the Russians began crossing the Vistula. Having broken through the German defenses, the Soviet tanks rushed into the gap, trying to expand it and go to their rear. Some of them were equipped with elementary devices for diesel operation under water (snorkels), which made it possible to force water barriers along the bottom. This made it possible to avoid problems during the crossing of the Vistula, similar to those that occurred during the summer offensive of 1944.

The Germans retreated. Soon, Soviet tanks, which were advancing at a speed of 80 km per day, entered the capital of Poland, Warsaw. However, during this offensive, the Russians failed to capture Berlin, and the decisive offensive began only in April 1945. The question of why the Russians stopped in front of Berlin became the subject of heated discussions. Some explained this by the need to pull up the lagging behind. The attackers ran out of fuel and ammunition. The usually reliable Russian tanks began to fail due to breakdowns in the tracks, engine and suspension, like the Panthers. The second reason was the growing resistance of the Germans. The motley remnants of the German army, as well as parts of the Volkssturm, consisting of elderly people and teenagers, fought desperately, trying to keep the Russians out of Berlin. German troops in Pomerania (north of Berlin) threatened to hit the Russian flank. Thus, an early capture of Berlin was impossible.

Operation Spring Awakening

The Germans continued to wage fierce rearguard battles. At the end of 1944, on the Western Front, they launched a counteroffensive in the Ardennes. The failure of this operation did not bring any respite to the exhausted German troops. In 1945, Hitler ordered the 6th SS Panzer Army to organize a new counteroffensive in the East. Having received several days to rest and organize the reception of new Panthers, on February 10, 1945, the 6th Army launched Operation Spring Awakening in Hungary. The SS division "Hitler Youth", for example, received 16 new "Panther" Ausf.G. The total number of "Panthers" in it was now 44 cars. After four weeks of fierce fighting, the division lost 35 tanks and had only 9 operational Panthers.

Battle for Seelow Heights, 1945

The few remaining combat-ready Panthers were in the thick of the battle that the Germans were fighting, trying with their last strength to prevent the fall of Berlin. In mid-April, they took their last stand. It was a battle on the Seelow Heights, where Soviet tanks broke through the German defenses and rushed to Berlin. Here the Panther battalion and several Tigers dealt a powerful blow to the Soviet tanks for the last time.

Nazi Germany entered the war with the Soviet Union without tanks weighing more than 25 tons, with more powerful weapons than the short-barreled 75 mm KwK 37 L / 24 guns. There was no place for heavy vehicles in the blitzkrieg concept: it was believed that the 37-50-mm guns of the PzKpfw III medium tanks were suitable for combating any armored vehicles that were in service with the enemy armies (although already during the French campaign, the Panzerwaffe forces encountered vehicles that had anti-ballistic armor), and PzKpfw IV (heavy, according to the early classification) and assault guns with 75-mm cannons will find successful use as means of fire support and destruction of fortifications. In parallel, design work was carried out on the first heavy tanks - Durchbruchwagen, VK 3001 (H) and VK 3001 (P).

Indeed, the PzKpfw III and IV showed themselves quite effectively against the outdated Polish, to a lesser extent - against the British and French armored vehicles, as well as the Soviet T-26, BT-5 and BT-7. But soon after the start of aggression against the USSR, the German tank units faced an unexpected enemy - medium T-34s, heavy KV-1s and assault KV-2s. The first of them, which was to become the most massive tank of the Second World War, surpassed its rivals in terms of the power of weapons, manufacturability and protection; as for the KV, despite their significant shortcomings in terms of reliability, the advantage of these vehicles in relation to the Pz III and IV was so overwhelming that in a number of cases single Soviet tanks held back the advance of entire German divisions.

In addition, in the first year of the war in the USSR, large-scale production of new generation equipment continued, the share of which in the troops by the beginning of World War II was relatively small. In such unfavorable conditions, an urgent re-equipment of the German army was required. It became obvious that it was necessary to modernize the models already in service (primarily the Pz IV, whose anti-tank capabilities were at a low level, while its design allowed the installation of more powerful weapons) and the transition to a new model of the main medium tank.

One of the first proposed solutions was the release of a technological copy of the T-34, but the German military leadership refused this option. The reason for this was not the unpreparedness of the German military-industrial complex for the development of a simple and cheap Soviet machine, but a number of other reasons. Firstly, industrial standards varied (for example, the caliber of the gun), and modifying the T-34 to German standards required time and the creation of some new units. Secondly, the Germans were not entirely satisfied with the design of the early production T-34, which was characterized by major defects: imperfection of observation and aiming devices, uncomfortable working conditions for the crew, and shortcomings in individual elements of the power plant. Finally, the Soviet V-2 engine ran on diesel fuel, while it was constantly in short supply.

Therefore, the Ordnance Department chose to announce the start of designing a fundamentally new medium tank. Work on the prototypes VK 2401 (Krupp) and VK 2001 (MAN) was curtailed due to futility, and on November 25, 1941, the MAN and Daimler-Benz concerns were given an order for the preparation of technical projects and the construction of prototypes of the main medium tank, formulating the following mandatory meeting the requirements: weight - about 30 tons, armament - a long-barreled 75-mm gun, armor - 40 mm, engine power - up to 700 hp. s., speed on the highway - 55 km / h. It also implied the introduction of successful solutions tested on the T-34, such as rational angles of armor plates and a wide caterpillar chain. The tank developed by Daimler-Benz received the designation VK 3002 (DB), and the production of MAN - VK 3002 (MAN) (the number 30 meant the estimated mass, 02 - a series of experimental vehicles).

Already in February 1942, Daimler-Benz presented its working model of the tank to A. Hitler. VK 3002 (DB) externally and in layout very much resembled the T-34. The shape of the hull turned out to be almost identical (with the exception of the placement of the engine, the exhaust valves of which were brought on board), the rear location of the transmission and drive wheel, the location and appearance of the tower, shifted forward. A 75-mm cannon with a single-chamber muzzle brake was mounted in a complex-shaped gun mantlet, again reminiscent of the T-34 mod. 1940. The undercarriage on one side consisted of four double rubber-coated rollers of large diameter on a spring suspension and three support rollers. The combat vehicle made a favorable impression on the head of the Third Reich, and soon he ordered the production of the first batch of 200 VK 3002 (DB).

However, the Armaments Directorate expressed disagreement with Hitler, considering the MAN variant, which had not yet been completed even in prototype, to be more suitable. The VK 3002 (MAN) went beyond the specifications in terms of mass (gross weight was 35 tons), was distinguished by the complexity of the design, but, on the other hand, its advantages (expressed primarily in a larger reserve for modernization and power reserve) balanced the disadvantages. To agree on opinions on the choice of one of the two VK 3002, a commission was established, which on May 13, 1942 issued its decision, according to which preference was given to the MAN prototype. One of the conditions that influenced the choice is the similarity of the VK 3002 (DB) with its Soviet counterpart, although it is somewhat far-fetched - in military reality, fire could be erroneously fired at one's own vehicles, regardless of their similarity to the enemy's BTT.

Daimler-Benz engineers tried to bring their experienced tank to the level of a competitor. The diesel engine was replaced with a gasoline engine, fundamental changes were made to the chassis: a torsion bar suspension with a staggered arrangement of road wheels corresponded to the MAN version. However, it took time to correct all the shortcomings, and the booking characteristics would still be inferior to VK 3002 (MAN). As a result, the only copy of the Daimler went for recycling, and the VK 3002 (MAN) tank went into production.

Prior to the start of production, the basic model underwent improvements: security increased by an order of magnitude, and at the request of A. Hitler, it was even supposed to install the KwK 42 L / 100 gun, which at that time was still in development. As a result, instead of the originally planned 30-ton medium tank, the Panzerwaffe adopted a vehicle weighing 43 tons, adequate not for the T-34, but rather for the KV-1. According to the German classification, tanks were divided into light, medium and heavy, not depending on the combat weight, but on the caliber of the main weapon, and the Panther was assigned to the class of medium vehicles. In the domestic tradition, nevertheless, with sufficient grounds, it was assessed as heavy tank, and the author sees no reason to abandon this opinion.

In the summer of 1942, the Ministry of Armaments approved the release plan - according to it, by May of the next year, 250 Panthers were to be delivered to the line units. But only in January 1943 did the first finished cars leave the factory floor. 20 tanks of the installation series, designated as Sd. Kfz. 171 Ausf. A, differed from full-fledged combat "Panthers" in thinner hull armor - up to 60 mm (according to some reports, from non-armored steel) and a KwK 42 gun with a single-chamber muzzle brake from KwK 40 L / 43. It is assumed that PzKpfw V Ausf A did not take part in hostilities and were used only for crew training. According to other sources, one tank of this variety was captured by the Soviet army on the Kursk Bulge, which makes one assume that there were separate cases of their presence at the front.

In total, during the war, regular SS units and troops received a little less than 6000 PzKpfw V of all modifications made by MAN, Daimler-Benz, Henschel and MNH.

The layout of the "Panther" is typical for German tanks: unlike the T-34, the transmission is moved to the front of the hull. Behind the inclined frontal sheet were the jobs of the gunner-radio operator (on the right) and the driver-mechanic (on the left), who served, respectively, the radio station and the course machine gun, and control mechanisms. In the roof of the hull above them were oval hatches that opened when they were turned on the pivots. Behind the driver's and radio operator's seats, a part of the ammunition load for the gun was placed on racks in a vertical position.

The fighting compartment in the middle of the vehicle included the seats of the rest of the crew: on the left side - the commander, on the right - the gunner, in the rear of the tower - the loader. The engine compartment - in the building behind the combat one - containing the engine and fuel tanks, was separated from the combat by an insulating partition.

The main armament of the Pz V was the 75 mm KwK 42 L/70 gun (barrel length - 70 calibers) with a traditional two-chamber four-window muzzle brake. The elevation angle varied from -8 to +18/+20 (at Ausf D) degrees. In terms of armor destruction, the KwK 42 was significantly ahead of both the medium Pz IV Ausf G-J - KwK 40 L / 43-48 guns and the Soviet F-34 76.2 mm caliber, which were armed with the Soviet T-34s. The advantage is explained by the greater muzzle velocity of the projectile and the high quality of ammunition. At a distance of 1 km, an armor-piercing tracer projectile pierced more than 110 mm of rolled steel, a sub-caliber - 140 mm. The high-explosive fragmentation projectile, however, did not differ much from its counterparts. The full ammunition included 79 shots (on Ausf G - 82). Auxiliary armament for combating infantry and lightly armored targets - two 7.92 mm MG 34 machine guns. later, when combat experience showed low efficiency and inconvenience of aiming - in a ball mount. Ammunition for machine guns consisted of 5100 rounds (on the Ausf G, due to its reduction to 4800 rounds, space was freed up for additional 75-mm shots).

The body of the "Panther" was formed by inclined rolled alloy steel armor plates, which were hermetically connected by welding. The upper front plate, inclined at an angle of 55 degrees, had a thickness of 80 mm (adjusted thickness - 143 mm), and on the Ausf G model it was increased to 85 mm (155 mm of reduced thickness), which provided a very decent level of protection for that time, although it was somewhat reduced due to weakened zones - cutouts for the installation of a machine gun and a rectangular observation hatch for the driver. The lower frontal sheet was somewhat thinner - about 60 mm. The side plates of 40 mm thickness (later - 50 mm) and the rear wall of the hull with a reverse angle of inclination, on the contrary, were distinguished by a relatively high vulnerability. Early versions of the Pz V also had such a drawback as a large gap between the undercarriage and the upper side plate. From the middle of 1943, tanks received additional protection against cumulative ammunition - removable metal screens from 5 sections. Thin 16-mm roof armor was often deformed as a result of hits by massive shells, which could lead to breakdowns of a number of mechanisms (including the turret traverse drive) or jamming of the landing hatches.

The Panther's welded hexagonal turret had small dimensions, sloping walls and an almost sheer frontal plate. The gun was fixed in a cylindrical mantlet with 100 mm armor, which formed a lure at the junction with the turret box, which led to a change in its shape to the Ausf G modification. The frontal armor plate itself, depending on the series, had 100 or 110 mm thickness. The sides and rear of the turret were protected by 45 mm armor, and on the Ausf D model they had round holes for firing personal weapons (one per side) and a hatch for ejection of shells on the left side. During the battles, a dangerous weakening of the armor was manifested due to a violation of its integrity, and on all other versions the sides of the towers were made in one piece. The loading hatch in the rear wall, however, was left. The roof of the tower, made up of two planes, had 16-mm armor. The commander's turret, shifted to the port side, on the Pz V Ausf D copied that of the "Tiger"; later it was replaced by a new dome-shaped turret with 7 prismatic observation devices instead of 6 slit ones.

The survivability of the tank in battle was increased by 6 grenade launchers for placing smoke screens, but the imperfection of the smoke shells of that time had an effect - the duration of these optical interferences was short. Many tanks were almost completely covered (with the exception of the upper parts of the hull and turret) with anti-magnetic paste "zimmerit" to protect against mines.

On the Panther, the Knipkamp undercarriage scheme continued its evolution: in relation to one side, it consisted of 16 road wheels of a cross arrangement on a torsion bar suspension. Cast rollers were made with external rubber coating and had a simple concave shape. A small batch of cars with all-metal road wheels with steel tires and internal shock absorption was produced on a trial basis. The suspension provided high cross-country ability and speed when driving over rough terrain, but the complexity of its manufacture and maintenance called into question these positive features: for example, when a mine exploded, one or two wheels needed to be replaced, and if the main impact force of the explosion fell on the inner row suspension, it was obligatory to dismantle from a third to a half of the rollers. The 86-link caterpillar chain was driven by front-mounted drive wheels with lantern gearing. Wide tracks with powerful lugs contributed to better off-road patency than the tanks of the old Pz III and IV models.

As a power plant on the Pz V, a Maybach 12-cylinder V-engine HL 230P30 with a capacity of 700 hp was used. With. at 3000 rpm. The specific power of the machine, therefore, was 15.5 liters. s./t. The cooling system included 4 radiators and 2 fans brought to the roof of the MTO. Exhaust pipes in the amount of two on the stern sheet during the improvement of the "Panther" underwent some changes, including equipment with flame arresters. The AK 7-200 gearbox in the control compartment made it possible to adjust the stroke in 7 steps. The main complaints were caused by the transmission, which was notable for its low reliability, and attempts were made to find a replacement for the driveline, but work did not progress further than experiments with hydrostatic and hydropneumatic transmissions for financial and technical reasons.

One of the most interesting technical innovations, first introduced on a German heavy tank, is rightfully considered a night vision device. Work on this device has been carried out since the second half of the 1930s. and led to the creation of an active night vision device with acceptable characteristics. At the end of 1944, after successfully passed tests, the installation of devices on tanks began, and it was the Panther Ausf G that was chosen as the carrier. About 50 vehicles were equipped with night vision devices. The system itself consisted of an outdoor infrared spotlight and an image converter that displays the view viewed in IR rays on the screen. In its main version, under the index FG 1250, only the tank commander used the device; in another configuration, similar devices were received by the gunner with the driver. "Panthers" with NVG first took the fight in the Ardennes counteroffensive and, according to some sources, in the battle near the lake. Balaton and proved to be very effective.

As for the combat path of the tank as a whole, it began in 1943, when a large-scale German offensive unfolded in the Kursk-Oryol direction. Here, in preparation for the last attempt to seize the initiative in the war, units equipped with the latest tanks and self-propelled guns were concentrated: in addition to the Panther, the Ferdinands, Nashorns, Hummels and Bryummbers received their baptism of fire on the Kursk Bulge. PzKpfw V among 200 vehicles, of which 4 were command vehicles, became the basis of the materiel of the 39th tank regiment of the 48th tank corps and were involved in the southern sector of the battle.

It was assumed that Pz V will go on the offensive after more powerful equipment in the most dangerous areas. However, in reality, due to the losses suffered by the forward units, they were thrown into battle shortly after the start of Operation Citadel on July 5, and by the beginning of August only about 10% of the staff remained in working condition, and 127 (according to other sources - 156) vehicles turned out to be irretrievably lost: they included those burned out and beyond repair, as well as abandoned or blown up during the retreat Pz V.

The frontal armor of the hull was not penetrated by Soviet artillery fire, represented mainly by the 76.2-mm ZIS-3 divisional gun. Even the 122-mm M-30 howitzer shells and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns only caused armor deformation. The lower frontal sheet, however, could not withstand their shelling, but it accounted for only a small part of the hits. The sides were hit by the above field guns from a distance of about 1000 m, and at a distance of 300 m or less - and a 45-mm cannon mod. 1942. Insufficient protection of the turret was revealed: even in its frontal part there were weakened zones, and shells that ricocheted from a cylindrical mask could hit the roof of the hull in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe control compartment. There was even a case of penetrating the gun mantlet with a 45-mm sub-caliber projectile. Soviet anti-tank rifles against the Panther were practically useless, with the exception of a few cases of particularly accurate hits at distances of less than 100 m.

In a relationship tank battles the dominance of the Pz V over the Soviet T-34-76 mod. 1942, KV-1 and KV-1s. Medium T-34s could be knocked out by the Panther at a distance of 1-1.5 km, so only a small part of the destroyed Pz Vs accounted for tank duels. At the same time, field artillery was used quite successfully - despite good observation devices, the detection of camouflaged gun positions was difficult, which allowed Soviet artillerymen to let enemy tanks at the proper distance and fire into vulnerable zones. For the most part, the defeat of the "Panther" on board in the MTO sector led to a fire, unlike the "Tiger" with 80-mm side protection. A significant part of the losses is due to explosions on anti-tank mines; in this case, as a rule, only the undercarriage was damaged, while the bottom remained intact. Finally, a frequent occurrence was failure due to technical reasons related to defects in the power plant: under the kinetic influence, the integrity of the fuel pumps and oil pipelines was violated with the appearance of a leak, the engine was jammed, etc. and their trials. At the same time, the acquisition of the first Soviet units equipped with captured Pz Vs began. They were trusted only by experienced crews and were used mainly for anti-tank purposes.

The not very effective debut of the new weapon forced the Germans to take measures to improve the design, and to make up for combat losses, it was planned to release 250 Panthers per month. There was a proposal to discontinue production of the medium Pz IV in favor of the Pz V, but in the end, due to the obvious irrationality of the idea and the high cost of the Panthers, it was abandoned. Since the autumn of 1943, the modernized Panther Ausf A went into production.

In the future, battles with the participation of Pz V on the Eastern Front were fought with varying success. The dominance of the "Panther" in defensive battles against armored vehicles was replaced by serious losses in the offensive. Accurate data on their use are extremely biased and require source criticism. It is clear that before the beginning of 1944 Soviet army did not have adequate equipment to deal with this heavy tank. The situation somewhat improved with the introduction of the T-34-85: although its 85-mm ZIS-S-53 gun was inferior to the KwK 42 in terms of armor-piercing effect, and the armor was thinner, the mass production of the Soviet machine equalized the opponents. The same applies to the few heavy tanks IS-1. But the IS-2, on the contrary, could destroy the Panther with a 1.5-2 km hit on the forehead of the tower, while the German tank hit the opponent without due probability (due to the uneven protection of the IS) at a distance of about 1 km ( while, in principle, not being able to penetrate more than half of the projection of the tower and the entire VLD of a Soviet heavy tank). It should be noted that the larger ammunition load of the Pz V and its better sights made their own adjustments, but, on the other hand, when attacking at high heading angles, the advantage of "Joseph Stalin" increased by an order of magnitude.

By the middle of 1944, Soviet troops also received a number of new self-propelled guns, designed, among other things, to counter heavy tanks: SU-100, ISU-122 and ISU-152, of which the second was considered the most effective tank destroyer. The use of ground attack aircraft against the Pz V generally did not bring much success.

Allied troops found themselves in a different position. Here the first experience of using "Panthers" refers to the offensive in Italy. The short-barreled guns of the Shermans and Cromwells gave a chance to destroy the Pz V only at close range when hit from the flank or rear, and a victory over one Panther could cost five M4s. The situation repeated itself during the landing in Normandy, when the only tanks relatively suitable for combating it could be considered only the Sherman-Firefly with 17-pound English guns, and later the A34 Komet and the M36 Slugger self-propelled guns. The allies (in particular, the British) were rescued only by a high level of crew training, as well as aviation. A full-fledged battle tank of the West, equal in capabilities to the Panther, the M26, practically did not participate in hostilities; cases of its collisions with the German counterpart are unknown.

Until the end of the fighting on May 11, 1945 in Czechoslovakia, the Panthers actively fought on all fronts: it was on them that the German military leadership made its last bet, and in the spring of 1945, at the cost of incredible efforts, the army received more than 500 new tanks. None of the satellites of Nazi Germany got the Pz V. After the war, quite a few tanks of this type passed to the victorious states, and for some time they were in service with France, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

The last episode featuring Sd. Kfz. 171 almost took place in the 50s. During the Indochina War, the PRC provided the Vietnamese guerrillas with several IS-2 tanks, which the French had to face. The possibility was considered to remove the remaining Panthers from conservation and send them to protect colonial interests, but the measure was considered not entirely adequate. The war soon came to an end with the independence of the former French possessions, and the two old enemies did not get to meet again on the battlefield.

Numerous improvements during the development of the model could not fully meet all the requirements and eliminate all design flaws. A fundamentally new modification was to be the PzKpfw V Ausf F, specifically for which a new "narrow" tower "Schmalturm 605" of the Daimler-Benz concern was developed. It was distinguished by smaller dimensions, a flat roof, a different arrangement of the commander's turret, a frontal part 120 mm thick and a new gun mount - a "pot" cuff. The new 75 mm Skoda KwK 44 cannon, 70 calibers long, without a muzzle brake, was used as armament. The gunner's sight was moved to the center of the turret, the coaxial machine gun was moved to the frontal plate. The hull protection was also reinforced (120 mm - forehead, 60 mm - side, 30 mm - roof). It was also planned to replace the power plant and the type of road wheels. But until the end of the war, the corps was never prepared, and the turrets were tested on the Ausf G version. The improved Panther could no longer go into series due to lack of time and the state of industry, and information about its participation in recent battles, apparently, does not correspond to the truth.

German designers first thought about replacing their tank already in 1943, although there was no talk of a complete renovation. The new tank, named "Panther II", was unified in a number of critical units (undercarriage, main armament, internal equipment) with the "Tiger-II" being developed at that time. In a turret similar to the Schmalturm, but with 150 mm frontal armor and bent side plates, a long-barreled 88 mm KwK 43 gun was installed. The hull differed from its predecessor only in size and protection; the undercarriage included 14 stamped rollers with steel rims. Serial tanks (their release was initially scheduled for the spring of 1944, later - at the end of the year) were supposed to have a 900-horsepower engine. But in 1944, only one building was completed, and the project was soon suspended. The only prototype was tested with the PzKpfw V Ausf G turret, and a lot of shortcomings were revealed in terms of reliability and mobility, inherent in the Tiger-II. It was captured by US troops at the test site and is now on display at the Patton Museum at Fort Knox.

In the long run (autumn 1945), one of the objects of the standardized Entwicklung ("E") series was created to replace the "Panther-II" - the heavy tank E-50 with an estimated weight of 50-60 tons, in its design very reminiscent of the "Panther -II". The suspension has changed, which was supposed to consist of 6 dual rollers. New 75-mm or 88-mm guns were considered as weapons. The E-50 did not even reach the stage of a full-size layout.

The chassis of the "Panther" was a very suitable basis for the construction of numerous military and special vehicles. Of these, only four were produced in large or limited series, a little more were embodied in prototypes. The number of projects that remained only in the drawings or preliminary sketches, as well as their diversity and originality, on the contrary, is very impressive.

The command tank Panzerbefehlswagen V (Sd.Kfz 267) differed from the base model in additional communications equipment and reduced to 64 or 70 (depending on modification) ammunition load. The crew included three radio operators, part-time serving weapons. ARV Panzerbergerwagen V (often referred to as Bergepanther) was born in 1943. At that time, the Wehrmacht did not have vehicles suitable for evacuating damaged Panthers and Tigers, with the exception of Sd.Kfz.9 tractors with a pulling force of 18 tons (for towing one heavy tank required at least three of these half-tracked vehicles). Bergepanthers developed a 40-ton traction force, and late production vehicles were also equipped with a crane for dismantling the engine or turret. Defensive armament consisted of a MG 34 machine gun behind a small armored shield.

The Beobachtungspanther observation vehicle was designed to survey the battlefield from closed positions and adjust artillery fire. KwK 42 was replaced by a wooden dummy, leaving only auxiliary weapons. This model received very advanced periscope observation devices. The issue was 41 units.

The heavy tank destroyer Panzerjager V Jagdpanther was designed in 1942-1943. firm "Daimler-Benz" and produced until the beginning of 1945 (numbering 384 units). Instead of a turret, a fully armored cabin with a beveled frontal plate 80 mm thick was installed, its side plates were made integral with the hull. The Jagdpanther was armed with an 88-mm PaK 43/3 L/71 cannon and as such became one of the best anti-tank self-propelled guns of the Second World War (only the SU-100 is comparable to it, inferior in terms of armor, but with a more powerful gun, which, however, was , to self-propelled guns of the middle class). We also note that in 1944 the Jagdpanthers-II project was proposed with a front-mounted MTO and a narrow superstructure shifted to the stern, armed with a 128-mm PaK 44 cannon.

This completes the list of serial developments. Among the prototypes and projects, the most numerous are self-propelled guns: howitzers, mortars, assault self-propelled guns, tank destroyers.

One of the most interesting variants of self-propelled guns based on the Panther is the Krupp artillery duplex, which consisted of an anti-tank 128-mm gun K43 / 44 L / 61 with a cylindrical perforated muzzle brake and a 150-mm sFH 18M howitzer, which were to be replaced and placed in lightly armored wheelhouse without roof and stern protection. The project was not approved due to poor booking.

Later, the Rheinmetall company provided performance characteristics and drawings of its Scorpion tank destroyer, also with a 128-mm gun, which favorably differed from the Krupp product by the presence of circular armor. The latter company, in turn, completed the design of the Sturmpanther heavy self-propelled guns with a short-barreled 150-mm StuH 43/1 assault howitzer (like the Bryummber assault tank) in a slightly redesigned standard turret. None of these developments were implemented.

Unlike the listed models, the Grille 10 anti-aircraft self-propelled guns existed in the form of several prototypes (none of which, unfortunately, has survived to this day). Its 88 mm anti-aircraft gun in a fixed cabin was well suited for protecting stationary objects from heavy bombers, but not for troops on the march, exposed to ground attack aircraft. At the end of 1943, Krupp and Rheinmetall were involved in the development of an anti-aircraft self-propelled gun with small-caliber machine guns. Already in the spring of 1944, their work resulted in the Koelian self-propelled guns project with two 37-mm FlaK 44 guns, and its reinforced version with 55-mm machine guns was also developed in parallel. The end of the war found both options never left the drawing boards.

The Czech enterprise "Skoda" also took part in the creation of combat vehicles on the "Panther" chassis, designing an armored MLRS. In place of the tower was placed a full-rotation installation with 105- or 150-mm rockets in guide frames.

Today, in the historical and technical museums of the world there are many Panthers of all modifications, several Bergepanthers and Jagdpanthers. In Russia, the only PzKpfw V Ausf G is on display at the BTVT Museum in Kubinka near Moscow.