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MILITARY THOUGHT No. 1/1989, pp. 38-46
CONNECTING PRACTICE
tactical defense
(History and present)
Retired Major GeneralI. N. VOROBYOV ,
doctor of military sciences, professor
Many articles on defense topics have been published on the pages of the Military Thought magazine in recent years. IB them rise a row interesting questions. Still, it must be noted that there are quite a few problems in defense theory, especially in revealing the trends and prospects for its development. In particular, at present, in my opinion, the issues of preparing and conducting a defensive battle with the beginning of a possible enemy aggression have not been sufficiently studied, and the conditions in which troops may find themselves during this period have been poorly studied. The experience of past world and modern local wars has shown that the combat effectiveness of formations and units is determined to a decisive extent by how ready they are in an organized manner to engage in battle in the event of an enemy attack and repel his first blows.
The fighting at the beginning of the war has its own specifics. Already the transition of troops from a peaceful to a military position is associated with a huge moral shock. "Unfired" personnel, having entered the first battle, will find themselves in an extreme situation that they have not encountered before. Using the factor of surprise, the attacking side can put into action previously kept secret means of armed struggle and apply new tactics. All this will put the defenders in a difficult position.
War ruthlessly punishes armies in which miscalculations were made in the preparation of subunits, units and formations in Peaceful time. During the Second World War, the armed forces of a number of countries, after the first unsuccessful defensive battles, could not then recover from the powerful blows of the enemy. In September 1939, during the first three days, the Nazis managed to break through the defenses and crush the most powerful first echelon of Polish troops, and this predetermined the outcome of the entire Polish campaign. The French army could not withstand the first blows of the Wehrmacht in May 1940, which was the prologue of its defeat in the war. They were not ready to repel the aggression in June 1941 and the formations (parts) of the Red Army. The outcome of the first defensive operations and battles, unfavorable for our troops, had a negative impact on subsequent military operations for a long time.
The year 1941 occupies a special place in our military history. The Red Army had to repel the enemy invasion in the most difficult conditions. However, the experience of conducting these defensive battles, which we got at an exceptionally high price, has not received proper study in the military history literature. Neither textbooks nor fundamental military history works provide a detailed analysis of the lessons of the initial period of the war. This could not but have a negative effect on the development of Soviet military theory, the nature of the combat training of troops, especially in the field of organizing and conducting defense. It is no coincidence that after the war little attention was paid to this particular type of combat. It has been wrongly asserted that defense is the lot of the weak.
The thesis that existed in our theory in the 1960s and 1970s, that defense is a short-term phenomenon, a kind of "companion" of an offensive, contradicted the experience of the war. It was believed that when repelling aggression, troops should mainly use offensive forms of combat operations, and defense could only be used briefly in order to repel an enemy counterattack (counterattack) during the successful advance of our troops, to secure a threatened flank or to gain a foothold on the achieved line. Prolonged, carefully prepared positional defense was essentially ruled out. In practice, this led to the fact that during the exercises the issues of creating a fire system and organizing interaction were hastily worked out, positions in engineering terms were not fully equipped. The commanders and staffs did not learn, as was done during the war years, to prepare a defensive battle with all scrupulousness. As a result, precious combat experience was gradually lost. The concept of "mobile defense" was unjustifiably excluded from theory, which impoverished the art of war. The concept of the so-called "unified defense" inevitably gave rise to schematism and stereotypes in the training of troops.
Recurrences of underestimation of this type of battle during the exercises were manifested in the fact that the defenders usually acted as a side playing along - their actions were entirely subordinate to the actions of the attacker. It turned out that, regardless of the nature of the decisions taken by the commanders of the defending units, they always failed. As noted in our press, the exercises almost did not work out the issues of restoring the situation on the defensive by conducting decisive counterattacks, disrupting the enemy's offensive, and generally successfully conducting a defensive battle.
Ignoring the experience of the last war was also reflected in the fact that combat training underestimated the role of preparing subunits and units for conducting defense with the onset of aggression, and mastering various methods of repelling it. In the light of the strictly defensive orientation of the Soviet military doctrine, the study of methods of organizing and conducting defense in all its forms - positional and maneuvering, under the most diverse conditions, and primarily in relation to the outbreak of war, acquires exceptional relevance. The Minister of Defense of the USSR, General of the Army D.T. Yazov, also draws attention to this: “As the main type of military operations in repelling aggression,” he emphasizes, “the Soviet military doctrine considers defense. It must be reliable and stable, stubborn and active...”.
The question of advance preparation of troops to repulse an enemy attack did not arise today - it worried the minds of generals before. For miscalculations in this matter, the army paid with unjustified losses. But the problem of repulsing the enemy's aggression has acquired special significance at the present time. This is primarily due to the fact that the initial period of a war can have a decisive influence on the course of the entire armed struggle. It is also important that the importance of the factor of surprise has sharply increased. It becomes extremely difficult to negate the disastrous consequences of a surprise attack by the enemy.
A characteristic trend is the increased ability of the attacking side to build up the power of the first strike. For example, when conducting offensive operations in NATO troops in the first echelon of army groups included up to 80 percent. forces and means.
The arsenal of types of weapons used in the first strike - nuclear, chemical, and also conventional - is becoming more large-scale and diverse. The power of means of armed struggle, their speed of action, accuracy and selectivity, and the greater depth of strikes are sharply increasing. The calculation is made for the simultaneous fettering of all elements of defense with the start of hostilities. The first strike is usually of a combined land-air (land-sea) nature. Aviation plays the most important role in it. Its impact on near and far objects in the defense is carried out by a raid from different directions and heights under the cover of massive electronic interference.
The changed conditions of modern operations place higher demands on the methods of action of formations and units in repelling an enemy attack. An experience local wars* showed that operational cover troops must be able to withstand a powerful deep fire strike by an aggressor using high-precision weapons, massive tank rams, frontal attacks of many times superior forces, carried out in combination with the simultaneous landing of defending airborne assault forces, airmobile units and sabotage - reconnaissance groups, active and continuous electronic countermeasures.
The Great Patriotic War clearly demonstrated that although the defense used by the formations of the first operational echelon with the outbreak of hostilities was tactical in content, its significance went far beyond tactics. The achievement of operational-strategic goals not only in the initial period, but in the course of subsequent operations, largely depended on how successfully the border divisions could fulfill their task of repelling the first enemy strike. Therefore, the operational authority sought to keep the tactical defense zone at all costs in order to give what is called a “general battle” here, to prevent the loss of territory. The troops were tasked with conducting defense on the principle of "not one step back."
An analysis of the experience of the Great Patriotic War and local wars gives grounds to draw some conclusions regarding content and methods commanders' work and tactical level headquarters for the preparation of defense on the eve and during the conduct of the first operations. It's about on the adoption of extraordinary decisions regarding the formation of defense, the battle formations of units and subunits, the system of fire damage, the organization of interaction, the choice of positions (lanes) and their engineering equipment, and the comprehensive support of combat operations.
Decision-making and planning of a defensive battle in peacetime in the event of a possible enemy invasion is usually carried out in conditions where there is no real enemy offensive grouping, i.e., in an environment of operational uncertainty. This requires from commanders and staffs a deep foresight of the development of events, a certain risk and, at the same time, reasonable prudence and caution.
Of course, it is impossible to anticipate in advance the development of events with the outbreak of war, as well as the methods of unleashing it by the enemy, what forces and means and in what direction he will introduce in action, determine exactly where their parts will be at this moment, and much more. And yet, based on the study of a potential enemy, operational-tactical calculations, and deep forecasts, the commander and headquarters are obliged to clearly understand what and how to do in an emergency situation in order to take up defense in an organized manner and successfully repel an enemy strike. To do this, they must develop a specific plan of action with the outbreak of war, on the basis of which it would be possible to determine the combat mission for each executor, down to small units, during the threatened period.
The successful solution of this problem is facilitated by the fact that the work of commanders and staffs in making decisions and planning defensive actions usually continues for a long time. This makes it possible to carefully assess the situation, conduct reconnaissance, clarify directly on the ground the areas on whose retention the stability of the defense depends, the outline of positions, think over the system of fire and obstacles, calculate in all details possible options actions of own troops and the enemy, to outline measures to mislead him. It is appropriate to recall in this connection that during the Great Patriotic War, division commanders, when making a decision on defense, usually determined the position up to each platoon strong point, and regiment commanders - up to the detachment.
All preparatory work should be carried out in such a way that in the event of an unexpected attack by the enemy, the troops could, in the shortest possible time, in an organized way go to the designated area and take up defense. One of the reasons for the failure of the Argentine troops in repulsing the British invasion of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands (1982) was that at the most crucial moment they failed to create an organized system of fire and obstacles in areas convenient for landing amphibious assaults.
It must be remembered that at advance preparation of defense troops receive many advantages. By their skillful choice of positions, the creation of fire bags and barriers, deceptive actions, and the use of military cunning, they are able to frustrate the attacker's plan. However, in order to make full use of the advantages of the defensive method of combat operations, one must know the enemy's tactics well, carefully follow his preparations, and timely reveal the place, time, and methods of his possible strikes.
Special diligence and responsibility are required from commanders and staffs in the event of a sudden emergence of crisis situations. They must take all measures to bring the troops to combat readiness in a timely manner. It is important to avoid confusion and panic among personnel when the enemy delivers the first massive blow, in the most difficult situation, firmly hold the threads of control in your hands.
In June 1941, when a real threat of a military attack by fascist Germany arose, the Soviet military leadership showed indecision. The plans did not provide for a course of action in the event of a surprise attack by the enemy. At the same time, the initiative of individual commanders to bring the troops to full combat readiness was severely suppressed. Border formations were preparing defensive lines in the immediate vicinity of the state border. Troops caught at the beginning of the war by surprise at the points of permanent deployment, in camps, training centers and during the exercises, they could not reach the designated areas. Lacking other lines prepared in advance, or at least reconnoitred, they were forced to hastily consolidate on terrain that was not equipped in terms of engineering. So, the 124th Rifle Division of the 5th Army of the Kyiv Special Military District at the time of the attack by the Nazi troops was in points of permanent deployment 20-35 km from the state border. According to the plan of operational cover, she was supposed to, in cooperation with the troops of the Strumilovsky fortified area, take up defense 5-7 km from the border. But for this she needed at least 5-9 hours. Raised at 3:30 am on June 22 on alarm, the division, by decision of its commander, Major General F. G. Existing, tried to enter its area. However, she failed to do this, and after an unsuccessful oncoming battle under enemy fire, she was forced to hastily go over to the defensive on unequipped lines. As a result, she failed to firmly gain a foothold and stop the advance of the enemy.
It must be said that even in such an exceptionally unfavorable situation, the division could fulfill its task if the option of occupying the defense in the immediate vicinity of the points of permanent deployment had been worked out in advance. Another conclusion is also instructive - nothing harms the cause so much as the strictest regulation of the actions of troops, blind attachment to a plan worked out in advance, a template, fettering the initiative of commanders, political workers and staff officers in making bold decisions, fear of responsibility.
Defensive action planning only turns out to be vital when it is corrected in a timely manner as the situation changes, when the most typical tactical episodes are carefully played out at command exercises, exercises, and briefings with officers, calculations, tactical and technical standards are verified, measures are thought out to comprehensively support combat actions, the procedure for advancing and occupying defensive positions, the preparation of a fire system, obstacles, etc., are practically worked out with subunits.
When carrying out defensive measures carried out on the eve and during the war, great attention should be given secrecy of the actions of the troops. During the war years, as G.K. Zhukov noted, our command very often developed special plans to deceive the enemy, as a result, surprise was achieved. Under modern conditions, when reconnaissance capabilities have increased many times over, measures to mislead the enemy are even more important in achieving success in combat. Therefore, the idea of deception should become, in my opinion, an integral element of any tactical decision.
One of the primary tasks of commanders and staffs in the advance preparation of defense on the eve of the war is to carefully think through the system fire damage aggressor. There are many difficulties here. If in the course of a battle they can more or less accurately reveal the nature of the actions of the enemy grouping that actually exists in front of the front, then in peacetime the planning of a fire engagement, as well as the solution of other issues, is entirely based on the forecast. The operational uncertainty of the situation necessitates greater flexibility in the preparation of the fire system. It should be based on a wide maneuver of strikes and fire in order to create "fire barriers" and zones of destruction along the state border and in depth, to quickly transfer the efforts of forces and funds to threatened areas.
The defending troops, therefore, must be able to display high fire activity. By inflicting retaliatory fire strikes, destroying priority objects, it is important to win a fire battle, significantly reduce the enemy's strike and fire potential, and disrupt his plans. The formation will be able to achieve this goal only in close cooperation with the forces and means of the operational command.
As the experience of the war in Korea (1950-1953) showed, increasing the stability and survivability of the defense is facilitated by the covert location of fire weapons, the skillful creation of fire bags, the use of a system of spare and false positions, roaming tanks, guns, and anti-tank weapons. An enemy crossing the state border must meet with a powerful barrage of fire, increasing fire resistance as it approaches the front line of defense. In order to cover the most dangerous axes, it is important to make full use of the enemy's probable paths of advance in the form of dynamic engineering fire barriers. An important role in this is played by remote mining of the terrain, combined with attacks by combat helicopters, artillery and other long-range fire, as well as the widespread use of fire ambushes.
The preparation of troops for combat operations and the occupation of defense during local wars were carried out under various conditions. Anticipating possible aggressive actions on the part of Israel against Lebanon in 1982, the Syrian command took some retaliatory measures: it provided for the early transition of its troops to the defense, carried out the understaffing of units, and replenished stocks of materiel. Measures to increase combat readiness were consistently increased, combat plans were refined, and the command and control system was improved. In parallel with this, the engineering equipment of the positions was carried out. Things were different in the Iran-Iraq military conflict. Here, both sides were forced to take up defensive positions in a short time during the ongoing hostilities. First of all, they created defensive groups, organized a system of fire and obstacles, and only then carried out engineering work.
It is characteristic that in the past, with linear methods of conducting combat, the main efforts of the defense were concentrated mainly on repulsing the frontal attack of the enemy. Now the situation has changed. Along with the strengthening of the strike force operating from the front, the attacker seeks, immediately with the outbreak of war, to achieve simultaneous impact on deep-seated targets through long-range fire strikes and the landing of a strong air echelon in the areas of destruction in the form of tactical airborne assault forces, airmobile forces and sabotage and reconnaissance formations. Consequently, the defender is faced with the task of preventing the dismemberment of his troops not only along the front, but also in depth, which requires the adoption of effective measures to strengthen the survivability of the defense, to ensure the stability of each element of the combat order of the formation and unit.
Particular attention should be paid to antitank defense, since the basis of the strike echelon of the attacker is usually tank troops. Moreover, the power of tank strikes is now significantly increasing. If in the past the enemy grouping in the division's defense zone in the most important directions usually consisted of 150-200 tanks, now, according to the experience of NATO exercises, this figure can increase to 800-900 or more armored units, tank density in breakthrough areas will increase by 2-3 times ( up to 50-70 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles per 1 km of the front against 20-30 units in the Great Patriotic War).
In order to repel massive enemy attacks, with the outbreak of hostilities, formations and units usually create a strong first "armored echelon" saturated with tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, anti-tank, anti-aircraft and other means. Back in the Great Patriotic War, dug-in tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts proved to be very effective means of combating enemy armored targets.
Modern tanks and infantry fighting vehicles have even greater capabilities in this regard. Consequently, in the most important areas where a strike by a strong enemy grouping is expected, it is advisable to include tank as well as motorized rifle units on infantry fighting vehicles in the first echelon of the defenders. This conclusion is confirmed by the fact, in particular, that the anti-tank capabilities of motorized rifle units on infantry fighting vehicles are 3-4 times higher than those on armored personnel carriers.
Of course, the solution of the problem of increasing anti-tank capabilities defense. There are many other ways as well. For example, to combat armored targets, it is expedient to use practically the entire arsenal of weapons available in the formation, especially combat helicopters, means of remote mining of the terrain, and make extensive use of other engineering obstacles. It is important to achieve the defeat of the enemy tank grouping to the entire depth of its formation (including the second echelons and reserves). Ultimately, only in cooperation with operational means is tactical defense able to ensure its anti-tank stability.
When planning defensive actions on the eve of a war, it is important to bear in mind that an offensive strike force, according to the views of NATO command, includes a strong air echelon. The experience of the exercises shows that up to one quarter of the total strength of the strike group can be allocated to it. Based on an analysis of the tactics of NATO troops, it should be expected that with the start of the invasion in the defense zone of the division, 2-3 tactical airborne assault forces up to a battalion each, 10-15 or more sabotage and reconnaissance groups can be landed, and one or two airborne assault detachments consisting of combat helicopters and attack aircraft, one or two anti-tank attack helicopter groups. This requires the adoption of appropriate countermeasures. It seems that the system of combating airborne assaults should become an integral element in the construction of modern tactical defense.
In the past, when it came to episodic landing by the enemy of single airborne assault forces, to combat them in formations and units were allocated a special anti-amphibious reserve. Now this is clearly not enough. Since the enemy's advance can With from the very beginning of the war turn around in on a large scale, the task of fighting With its air echelon cannot be solved by local measures. In addition to allocating special reserves, it is important to prepare in antiamphibious relation to the entire defense system. It is advisable that each element of the order of battle of the formation (unit), a also units of all types of troops and special troops, including rear units, institutions, were able to fight airborne assaults. Company strong points should be prepared with particular care for solving such a problem. To do this, it is advisable to equip positions for anti-aircraft weapons, arrange ambushes from ZSU-23-4 installations, and adapt small arms for firing at air targets. The importance of combating enemy helicopters is growing ever stronger. This is due to the fact that in the combined arms formations of NATO troops there are a large number of helicopters. One of the new qualities of modern defense, therefore, is its anti-helicopter character.
Antiamphibious defense measures are based on reliable engagement of enemy airborne assault forces while they are still being prepared for landing in initial areas. And on the routes of their flight, ambushes of helicopters and air defense systems should be arranged. During the Korean War, fire ambushes were set up on commanding heights near road junctions, passes, and water crossings. Vietnamese patriots, in order to fight the airborne units of the US Army, arranged special anti-amphibious barriers in airborne areas and allocated raid detachments, which were entrusted with the task of destroying and capturing paratroopers.
When covering the state border, special requirements are imposed on the choice of lanes, positions, defense areas, strong points, and their engineering equipment. The system of their construction, as well as the battle formation of a formation (unit), is based on the principle of creating a tough defense capable of stubbornly resisting enemy attempts to cut the defensive grouping into parts, counteract its repeated envelopment on the ground and in the air, and at the same time ensure a wide maneuver of its forces and funds along the front and from the depths. The experience of the battles near Kursk showed that the strength of the defense increases significantly when positions are located at a relatively small distance from each other, so that their close tactical and fire interconnection is ensured, the second echelons and reserves can promptly increase the combat efforts of the first echelon units. In this case, the entire tactical depth of defense turns into a kind of fortified area, saturated with fire weapons, including long-term mobile firing structures in the form of nomadic tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, as well as various engineering barriers and obstacles. The creation of a continuous defense zone makes it possible for the troops to draw the enemy into exhausting battles, fetter his maneuver, make it necessary to storm every height, settlement, road junction, pass, and "gnawing through" defensive positions in the border zone with heavy fighting.
When determining the mutual distance of defensive positions, it is advisable to take into account the requirement to ensure a dispersed arrangement of combat formations of subunits, the placement of artillery firing positions, air defense systems, reserve areas, command posts, and rear subunits in the interpositional space. The criterion for providing protection against enemy high-precision weapons is taken here so that more than a motorized rifle (artillery) platoon is not hit by one Lance-2 missile or a guided projectile.
In mountainous, mountain-desert theaters of military operations and in northern regions the principles of building a defense can differ significantly from the usual conditions. More widely, maneuverable forms of defense can be used, allowing the abandonment of some part of the territory in order to gain time, wear down the enemy, inflict losses on him, lure in"fire bags".
The stability of the defense is largely ensured by the skillful fortification equipment of the terrain. The experience of the Great Patriotic War showed that in those cases when, with the outbreak of hostilities, our divisions managed to preempt the enemy in occupying a line prepared in engineering terms, they were able to hold back his superior forces for a longer time. For example, the 41st Rifle Division of the 6th Army of the Southwestern Front, concentrated on June 21, 1941 by decision of the division commander at the points of permanent deployment (14 km from the state border), managed to get out before the enemy at the start of the war and occupy the prepared defense zone. In cooperation with the Rava-Rus fortified area, she repulsed the attacks of four enemy divisions for four days.
The importance of fortification work in ensuring the stability of the defense is evidenced by the fact that the rate of its engineering equipment in the past war outpaced the growth in the density of weapons.
With the outbreak of war, the speed of engineering equipment for positions and areas acquires special significance. In the event of a sudden attack by the enemy, the defense will often have to be created under fire. Proceeding from this, commanders and staffs, even in peacetime, must learn to effectively use engineering equipment, equipped with built-in and attachments, use industrially manufactured collapsible structures (LK.S-3, KVS-A, KVS-U, K.FU, etc.) to organize fortification work.
It is important that during the exercises the troops carry out the prescribed engineering work in full, learn how to profitably use the protective and camouflaging properties of the terrain, settlements, natural obstacles and barriers, be able to quickly adapt local objects for defense, arrange blockages and barriers. We dwell on this because, contrary to front-line experience, the troops are often allowed to make concessions and simplifications in the implementation of engineering measures. Continuous trenches, for example, were not torn off even in company strongholds.
A few words about defense activity. The Great Patriotic War clearly showed that the defending troops cannot count on success if they show passivity and do not seek to impose on the enemy my will to inflict the maximum defeat on him. However, already in the first days of the war, there were many cases when the commanders and headquarters of formations and units, on the orders of senior commanders, in order to achieve active operations, even without knowing the exact position of the enemy, were forced to counterattack him at all costs. This led to unjustified losses and worsened the position of the troops. Counterattack is undoubtedly an effective means of manifestation of activity. With its skillful organization and all-round support, it can contribute to a change in the situation. But in the conditions of the initial period of the war, when the troops of the first operational echelon are tasked with a stubborn, tough, insurmountable defense to stop, wear down, bleed the enemy, and prevent his advance in depth, commanders and staffs must take a particularly balanced approach to organizing counterattacks. It is important to remember that if on the defensive a battalion is capable of repulsing the offensive of a brigade, then in a counterattack, at best, it can defeat only an enemy company.
In conclusion, we emphasize once again that defense is a complex form of combat. Its strength is tested in the confrontation with the superior forces of the enemy, who also has the initiative of Actions. Hence the urgent need in military practice for a well-developed theory of defense. There are still many unresolved problems here. Take, for example, such as the correlation of positional and maneuver forms of defense in various theaters of military operations in the first and subsequent defensive operations, the study of the methods and content of the work of commanders and staffs during a deliberate and forced transition to defense in an unfavorable situation, the organization and implementation of interaction, especially in case of sudden enemy attack, preparation of measures to deceive the attacker and other issues.
The development of any theory is not complete without a struggle of opinions, broad discussions. This is the only way to resolutely eradicate stereotypes and mercilessly fight dogmatism - everything that stifles creative thought and hinders innovation in military affairs.
Yazov D.T. On Guard of Socialism and Peace.- M: Military Publishing House, 1987.- P. 32.
Military Bulletin. - 1988. - No. 4. - S. 27-28.
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After the collapse of the USSR, following the historical necessity, Russia developed the Military Doctrine, which on November 2, 1993, was approved by decree of the President of the Russian Federation as the "Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation." In many ways, this document continued the military-political line Soviet Union at the last stage of its existence, fixed on May 29, 1987 in Berlin by the signatures of the heads of the socialist states as the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact countries. The doctrine of 1993 (now Russia) has changed practically nothing in the theory of the Armed Forces, new views on ways to improve the army and navy, when compared with the doctrine of 1987, are not presented.
Unfortunately, neither the doctrine of 1987 nor the doctrine of 1993 said anything about the naval component, nor was naval art (NMI) singled out, although by the end of the 80s it was far ahead of the practice of using even a powerful Soviet Navy. True, after the adoption of the doctrine in 1993, there was a positive theoretical shift in relation to the maritime component. Its essence is as follows. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 11 of January 17, 1997 approved the Federal Target Program "World Ocean". The program clearly spells out specific areas that determine the development of the Navy in the 21st century. Here, the Navy is defined as one of the most important instruments for protecting Russia's military-strategic interests in the World Ocean, and it is also noted that " military force retains its importance as a means of ensuring the national interests and goals of the state, and, if necessary, a means of curbing aggression."
The Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of March 4, 2000 approved the "Marine Policy of Russia". Attached separately to this decree are "Fundamentals of Russian Policy in the Field of Naval Activities until 2010". These documents outlined the main goals for the development of the Navy, clarify the importance of the Navy in the Military Doctrine of Russia. April 21, 2000 the new Military Doctrine is approved by presidential decree. The document emphasizes that the doctrine realistically assesses the military-political situation in the world, in the regions and reveals the nature of external and internal threats to Russia's national interests, including in the World Ocean. Moreover, on July 27, 2001, the Naval Doctrine of Russia was also approved.
It is noted that at present there is a great possibility of confrontation, various conflict situations on the seas and oceans. There are many prerequisites and geopolitical reasons for this. For example, unlike the land area, the vast water area of the World Ocean is not divided. The raw materials of the Earth on the continents are limited in reserves and will be used up within tens of years, not even centuries. A 71% the globe is the oceans. And it is in it that virtually untouched innumerable energy and food reserves are hidden. At the same time, since ancient times, the seas and oceans have been a vast field of military operations for military fleets - due to the clash of interests of various states or their alliances. That is, there has always been a military threat to this or that state, including Russia, at sea and from the sea. In addition, now the sea power of our country is significantly reduced.
Most of the oceans are the open sea, the so-called. "neutral waters". Consequently, the wealth of these waters can be used by any state. However, as in the past on land, a period will come when the division of wealth will begin, but now it is no longer land, but the World Ocean. It can be unequivocally stated that a weak naval rival will not be allowed to participate in this division. Weakness refers to both the size of the Navy and their ability to defend themselves and water areas that will be divided or seized. Even today, a number of states never for a moment leave the waters of the oceans. It is known that by the beginning of the 21st century, more than 130 warships from the navies of 16-20 states were daily in its seas. Their tasks were different, but many groups operated in areas from which strikes by carrier-based aircraft and high-precision weapons (Tomahawk missile defense systems) are possible on 80% of the territory of the Russian Federation, on which 60-65% of the Russian military-industrial potential is concentrated. That is, in addition to the struggle for the division of the World Ocean, there really exists a military threat to Russia's national interests from maritime directions. It should be taken into account that, according to some estimates, with the current dynamics of development of the Russian Federation, by 2015 it will have only 60 ships, of which 30 will be surface and 30 will be submarines. At the same time, the NATO naval grouping has more than 800 ships, and the fleets of the North Atlantic Alliance are improving their tactical and operational training every day, almost constantly performing certain tasks in the oceans.
Consequently, it is extremely important for Russia to actively build a new fleet. But an equally urgent task is to create for him a coherent system for the preparation and conduct of operations and combat operations at sea. For the ocean fleet, this system, by analogy with the recent past, should have three scales: strategic, operational and tactical. The construction of the fleet and the improvement of naval art are inseparable from the maritime policy of the state, which ensures it national interest in the oceans. Undoubtedly, in modern conditions, the priority in ensuring these interests belongs to non-military methods. But, unfortunately, mankind is still far from solving its problems only by peaceful means. War, as a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, includes an obligatory element - armed struggle. How a country prepares and conducts this armed struggle is investigated by a special area - military science. In turn, the most important component of this science is the art of war, which covers issues related to the preparation and conduct of armed struggle in general, as well as various scale operations and fighting both on land and in the air and at sea. Thus, depending on the scale of operations, military art consists of three complementary components: strategy, operational art, and tactics. The highest field of military art is strategy. It explores the large-scale problems of armed struggle, the solution of which, ultimately, determines victory in the outbreak of war. Thus, in a broad sense, military strategy should be viewed as Russia's policy in the field of defense, expressed in plans for preparing the country and the Armed Forces to repel an attack from outside, followed by the defeat of the attacking side.
In contrast to strategy, the lower levels in terms of the scale of action are considered by two other components of military art - operational art and tactics. Operational art occupies an intermediate position between strategy and tactics and plays a connecting role between them. The specificity of the composition and nature of each branch of the Armed Forces and the conditions for solving their inherent tasks necessitates the development of operational art for each branch of the Armed Forces, including the Navy.
Tactics is a field of military art that embraces the theory and practice of combat by subunits, units, and formations. It is subordinated to operational art and strategy and follows from them. Compared with them, tactics are more mobile and sensitive to all changes in the material basis of warfare, in people and military equipment. It is people and military equipment that have a direct impact on the means and methods of combat.
Each branch of the Armed Forces, including the Navy, has its own methods of action, its own tactics, and within each branch, its own tactics of the branches of forces (troops).
The strategy, as well as the operational art and tactics subordinate to it, as a system of knowledge, must correspond to the current policy and the real capabilities of the country, that is, the accepted doctrine. For the Navy, due to its specifics, this system of knowledge is called naval science (Theory of the Navy), which has its own most important part - naval art. Contemporary naval arts include: the strategic use of the Navy, the operational art of the Navy, and the tactics of the Navy. There is a close connection and interdependence between these parts. The strategic use of the Navy is the highest field of naval art, which, proceeding from the tasks of military strategy, has a decisive influence on the development of the operational art and tactics of the Navy and sets tasks for them. Operational art and tactics serve the strategic use of the Navy, ensuring that it achieves its goals and objectives in war.
The main task of the Russian Navy, as follows from the above documents, in peacetime is to carry out combat service in readiness to use weapons (in recent times the task of countering terrorism at sea has been added); in war time- active military operations to defend its coast and prevent attacks from the sea against land targets of the country by enemy missile submarines and aircraft carriers. Thus, the objects against which military operations will have to be carried out in the World Ocean and on the seas washing the coast of Russia or adjacent to them are aircraft carriers, missile submarines, anti-submarine forces, groups of surface ships cruising in the seas adjacent to the waters of Russia or located in areas of the World Ocean, from which their weapons are capable of hitting objects on our territory or affecting our ship groups.
The Russian Navy, in the event of a war in which maritime countries confront us, the following types of maritime operations can be carried out (in each, only one task is solved, in contrast to the fleet operation, which is possible in the future):
- a naval operation to destroy enemy ground facilities (it will be carried out in concert with the actions of the Strategic Missile Forces and be an integral part of their operation);
- - a naval operation to destroy enemy missile submarines;
- - a naval operation to defeat the enemy navy in closed seas and ocean areas adjacent to the coast;
- - a naval operation to disrupt (disrupt) enemy ocean and sea transportation;
- - a naval operation to destroy enemy anti-submarine forces;
- - a naval operation to defend their base areas and sea lanes (i.e. this operation consists of solving two interrelated tasks).
All of the above applies to the operational art of the Navy. And this is perhaps the main part of modern naval art. At the same time, it should be emphasized that in any operation, weapons are used by each branch of the forces (this is a set of means of destruction, delivery, control, etc.), and most importantly, people who own these weapons act. They are the most important element that determines the outcome of hostilities at sea. But this is already tactics - a stage of naval art, subordinated to operational art. It seems that the tactics that were worked out in the Soviet Navy can now be fully used in the Russian fleet. And this is not just continuity, but the most holistic way to restore the combat capability of the current Russian fleet.
Historical aspect of naval art
Elements of naval art. originated in antiquity with the advent of navies and improved in connection with the development of society, weapons, military equipment and forms of armed struggle. In the slave states Ancient Greece, Ancient Rome, etc.) the fleet consisted of rowing vessels. The military strategy of the slave-owning states assigned the fleet a supporting role in wars and limited its operations to coastal areas. The methods for achieving victory in battle were ramming and boarding, and the main tactical form of battle was a frontal collision of fleets, which ended in single combat between individual warships. The first attempt to generalize the military experience of slave-owning Rome was the work of Vegetius (beginning of the 5th century) “A Brief Summary of Military Affairs”, in which, along with other questions, he described the main methods of warfare known at that time at sea.In Europe, during the era of early feudalism (before the 10th century), fleets and naval art did not receive significant development. During the heyday of feudalism in Europe, progress was made in shipbuilding. From 10-11 centuries. sailing ships appear, then - navigation aids (compass, sextant, nautical charts), which allows you to make long voyages in the open sea. In the 15-16 centuries. there is a transition from the rowing fleet to the sailing fleet, which was completed by the middle of the 17th century. From the 14th century sailing ships are equipped with artillery. The strategy of the emerging in the 15-16 centuries. colonial empires (Spain, Portugal, later England, France, Holland) increased the role of the fleet in wars, changed the nature of its actions and entrusted the fleet with the fulfillment of independent tasks of disrupting enemy communications and defending its sea lanes. However, the tactics of the first sailing fleets of the 15th-16th centuries. still differed little from the methods of conducting a rowing fleet battle.
In the 17th century permanent, regular military fleets were created, which became an important military means of implementing the foreign policy of the state. Further development of naval artillery, its use as the main weapon in naval battles in the Anglo-Dutch wars of the 17th century. made fundamental changes in the combat composition, organizational structure of the sailing fleet and its tactics; the classification of ships was established and their tasks were determined. Battleships formed the basis of the strike power of the fleets. Frigates, artillery rowboats and fireships were assigned an auxiliary role in naval battles and blockade operations. A combat organization of the fleet was formed. The ships began to unite into squadrons under the unified command of the flagship. The conduct of hostilities by large forces of fleets of a heterogeneous composition increased the requirements for managing a squadron in a naval battle, the outcome of which, to a much greater extent than before, began to be determined by the skill of the flagship - the squadron commander. The main tactical form of conducting naval combat by squadrons of fleets was linear tactics, which provided for the maneuvering of ships in the battle line (wake column). This tactic ensured the most efficient use of artillery mounted on ships along the sides in several rows. The ram began to be used less and less. Boarding persisted throughout the existence of sailing fleets. Linear tactics dominated throughout the 17th and 18th centuries.
A significant contribution to the development of naval art in the first quarter of the 18th century. introduced Russian naval art, which manifested itself in the Northern War of 1700-21 against a strong naval enemy - Sweden. Instead of the raids on the coast that were then carried out by the fleets of the Western countries, the struggle on communications and the general battle of the fleets, Peter I used a more decisive and reliable method waging war by occupying naval bases and the coast of the enemy by joint actions of the army and navy. His tactical art is characterized by: the organization of constant interaction between the fleet and the army, the decisive actions of the fleet to destroy enemy forces using forms of maneuver unexpected for him (covering the flanks, cutting through the formation, encirclement, boarding, etc.). The generalized experience of the combat operations of the fleet under Peter I was outlined in the Naval Charter of 1720. the effectiveness of naval artillery (increasing the firing range, lethal and destructive power of the cannonball, accuracy of fire) came into conflict with the tactical form of its use - linear tactics. Russian admirals G. A. Spiridov and F. F. Ushakov for the first time in the practice of naval combat abandoned the templates of linear tactics and laid the foundations for a new form of combat use of the fleet - maneuvering tactics. Their naval art was distinguished by high activity, decisive action in achieving the set goals, good organization of the interaction of all forces and was manifested in the victories of the Russian fleet over the Turkish in the battles in the Chios Strait (1770), near about. Tendra (1790) and at Cape Kaliakria (1791).
The first attempts to theoretically substantiate the maneuverable form of naval combat were reflected in the work of the Englishman J. Clerk "The Experience of Naval Tactics" (parts 1-4, 1790-97, Russian translation "Movement of the Fleets", 1803), in which he based analysis of the reasons for the failures of the English Navy in the battles of the mid-18th century. outlined some recommendations for changing linear tactics and introducing maneuvering principles of naval combat. However, in the naval art of the major maritime powers (Great Britain, France, Spain, Holland), linear tactics continued to dominate until the end of the 18th century. The naval victories of the English admiral G. Nelson at Abukir (1798) and Trafalgar (1805) and the Russian admiral D. N. Senyavin in the battle of Athos (1807), in which the principles of maneuvering combat were used, contributed to the establishment of maneuver tactics in the naval art . In addition to maneuvering the squadron, this tactic provided for a more complete use of artillery and disruption of command and control of enemy fleet forces, greater independence in maneuvering individual ships. This introduced new content into the tactics of a single ship and made increased demands on the commander in the art of control and use of the ship's weapons in battle.
The further development of capitalist production, science, and military technology made it possible to improve the design of warships, their sailing and artillery armament. The experience of the Crimean War of 1853-56 showed the advantages of steam-powered ships over sailing ships in maneuvering sea battles. In the 2nd half of the 19th century. in the UK, USA, France, steam ships with armor protection were created. The battleships with powerful artillery weapons and strong armor became the basis of the strike power of the fleets. There were also cruisers, minelayers, destroyers. Changes in the material and technical base of the fleet required the development of tactics for using armored squadrons in naval combat. Russian scientists have made a significant contribution to this issue. Admiral G. I. Butakov in his work “New Foundations of Steamship Tactics” (1863) summarized the experience of combat operations of steam ships and proposed rules for their restructuring in a squadron for naval combat. These rules have received recognition in all fleets of the world. Admiral A. A. Popov, based on the experience of the Crimean War, was the first to correctly assess the great importance of the armored fleet in combat operations at sea. Admiral S. O. Makarov, based on the experience of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-78, for the first time outlined the tactics of using mine-torpedo weapons. In his Discourses on Naval Tactics (1897), he was the first to approach the development of armored fleet tactics as a science. In this and other works, Makarov substantiated the need for the interaction of artillery and mine-torpedo ships in a sea battle, theoretically substantiated the expediency of using a wake formation when building battle formations of armored squadrons, and formulated the principles of mine and anti-submarine defense.
In the 90s. 19th century Rear Admiral A. Mahan, one of the creators of the American naval strategy, and Vice Admiral F. Colomb, an Englishman, tried to substantiate the theory of "dominance at sea". They associated this theory with the establishment of American and British world domination by creating overwhelming naval superiority in armored ships of the line and destroying hostile war fleets in one pitched battle. Colomb promoted the "eternal and unchanging" laws of naval warfare, mechanically transferred the methods and forms of warfare at sea by sailing fleets to the steam fleet, and did not take into account the development of new combat forces and means of the fleet. He contrasted the fleet with the army, underestimated the importance of the ground forces, and did not take into account the general course and outcome of hostilities on land and at sea as a whole. The military ideologists of the USA and Great Britain after the 2nd World War of 1939-1945 again turned to the works of Mahan and Colomb to substantiate their ideas about world domination.
During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05, naval art was enriched by the experience of conducting combat operations in the defense of naval bases (the defense of Port Arthur) and conducting anti-blockade operations, in which ships of the fleet, coastal artillery, mines and torpedoes were used. The first attempts to use torpedoes and mines showed that artillery, while remaining the main weapon for striking, has ceased to be the only means of combat impact on the enemy. It became necessary to create new classes of ships (battleships, minesweepers, etc.) and new types of mine and artillery weapons. The foundations of the tactics of conducting large-scale naval battles with the participation of significant forces of armored ships were born (the Battle of Tsushima, the battle in the Yellow Sea, the actions of the Vladivostok detachment of ships, etc.). According to the experience of the Russian-Japanese war, battleships were recognized as the decisive force in the struggle at sea in many fleets of the world. The experience of mine action pointed to the need to organize the daily combat activities of the fleet in the struggle to ensure a favorable regime in the area of \u200b\u200bits bases. Light cruisers began to be used in the fleets of many countries to conduct reconnaissance, combat destroyers, and operate on sea lanes. The military doctrines of the maritime powers did not undergo significant changes after the Russo-Japanese War. As before, it was believed that the conquest of dominance at sea should be achieved through a general battle of the main forces of the fleets.
During the 1st World War of 1914-1918, destroyers were recognized as universal-purpose ships, light cruisers and especially submarines were used, which turned into an independent branch of the Navy and successfully solved not only tactical, but also operational tasks. This prompted the creation of patrol ships and submarine hunters. Other new classes of ships also appeared - aircraft carriers, torpedo boats, landing craft. The share of large surface artillery ships in combat operations has decreased. Basically, a new kind of naval forces took shape - naval aviation. Achieving strategic goals by conducting one pitched battle, as envisaged by the Anglo-American doctrine of "dominance at sea", became impossible. A new form of combat activity of the fleet was put forward by naval art - an operation that necessitated appropriate measures to ensure it: operational reconnaissance, camouflage, defense of large surface ships during the passage by sea and in battle from submarines, logistics, etc. further development of the daily combat activities of the fleet to create a favorable operational regime in the area of its bases, coast and in the area of \u200b\u200bcombat operations. Russian naval art developed methods for conducting a sea battle on a previously prepared mine and artillery position as a necessary measure in the fight against a stronger enemy. Such a position was created in the Baltic Sea on the line of about. Nargen - the Porkkala-Udd Peninsula in order to prevent the German fleet from breaking into the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland. It consisted of several lines of minefields, exposed across the Gulf of Finland, and coastal artillery batteries on the flanks of the positions. In the rear of this position, the main forces of the fleet were deployed and operated. The experience of the war confirmed the effectiveness of this form of naval combat operations in the coastal area against superior enemy forces.
Elements of Soviet naval art originated during the years of the Civil War and the military intervention of 1918-20, when the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Fleet, created by the young Soviet Republic, defended the approaches to Petrograd from the sea, supported the Red Army units on the coast with artillery fire, and ensured the suppression of the White Guard rebellion on the forts "Krasnaya Gorka" and "Gray Horse", landed troops and fought against the lake and river forces of the enemy. The construction of the Navy, which was widely developed due to the successes of socialist industrialization, in the years of the pre-war five-year plans went in the direction of creating surface ships, submarines, naval aviation and coastal artillery modern for that time.
In the period between the 1st and 2nd World Wars, Soviet naval art created the foundations for the operational use of the fleet in various types of combat operations and in joint operations with ground forces in coastal areas, the tactics of the actions of the heterogeneous forces of the Navy, the foundations for interaction between them in naval combat, which are reflected in the Manual on the conduct of naval operations, the Combat Charter of the Navy and other documents published on the eve of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.
Naval art in other states after the 1st World War was characterized by the presence of different, often opposing views on the use of the Navy in war. The “omnipotence” of the battle fleet, undermined in the 1st World War, led to the fact that many military theorists began to oppose one type of naval forces to another, trying to find one that could ensure dominance at sea, defended the principles of a general battle, refuted by the course of the war . At the same time, the development of existing and the emergence of new forces and means of struggle necessitated a revision of outdated views. Before the start of World War II, fleets were replenished with aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, torpedo boats, and naval aviation. Radar and hydrolocation have been developed. In military doctrines, the developing forces of combat at sea (aviation, submarines, etc.) and new methods of combat operations initially did not find a proper reflection.
In World War II of 1939-1945, despite the fact that its outcome was decided on land, the scope of armed struggle at sea increased significantly compared to previous wars.
The main content of military operations in the Pacific in 1941-45 consisted of amphibious and antiamphibious operations, strikes against enemy fleet forces at sea, in bases, and combating communications. In the Pacific Ocean, landings were made on about. Leyte (1944), Marshall and Mariana Islands (1944), Fr. Okinawa (1945), in the Mediterranean theater of operations - in Algeria and Morocco (1942), on about. Sicily, in Southern Italy (1943), etc. In total, more than 600 large landings were landed, 6 of them were of a strategic scale. The largest was the Normandy landing operation of 1944. By the beginning of the war, a qualitatively new force appeared in the fleets - aircraft carriers, and the proportion of coastal-based aviation increased in the struggle in closed naval theaters. Carrier aviation moved into the ranks of the main forces of the fleets. Collisions between aircraft carrier formations grew into the largest naval battles of the 2nd World War, during which aircraft carriers were the main striking force and objects of strikes. The use of carrier-based aviation made it possible to conduct naval battles in conditions when the groups of ships of the belligerents were hundreds of miles apart. Groupings of surface forces, covered by carrier-based fighters, were able to operate off the coast of the enemy. Features of the military-geographical conditions of the Pacific theater of operations (the presence of large island archipelagos) revealed the need for long-term combat operations in island areas, where by disrupting enemy communications, suppressing aviation at airfields and in the air, one of the parties could achieve complete exhaustion island garrisons and the subsequent landing of troops with weak opposition from the enemy.
The peculiarity of the situation that developed during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 on the Soviet-German front required the use of the fleet primarily for joint operations with the ground forces. The fleet also carried out independent operations and conducted combat operations on enemy sea lanes and in defense of its lanes. The combat operations of the fleet were characterized by the extensive use of diverse forces, and especially by fleet aviation, which was greatly developed during the war. Naval art was enriched by the experience of landing operations (the Novorossiysk and Kerch-Eltigen operations of 1943, the Moonsund operation of 1944, the Kuril landing operation of 1945, etc.), the use of submarines and combating enemy submarines.
In the course of World War II, the naval operation established itself as the main form of employment of the diverse forces of the fleet in armed struggle at sea. Conducting operations over vast areas of the seas and oceans according to a single plan and under a single command increased the requirements for organizing interaction between groupings of forces (operational interaction), between forces in naval battles (tactical interaction) and for command and control of forces in operations and battles. Of particular importance was the secrecy of the preparation of the operation, thorough reconnaissance, swiftness of maneuver, the conquest of air supremacy in the area of the operation, as well as the organization of combat, special and logistic support. Submarines and naval aviation were recognized as the main striking force of the fleet. Naval art developed new tactics for using submarines (group actions) and aviation (massive raids from several directions). With the equipment of the fleets with radar surveillance and more advanced hydroacoustics, the methods of firing and tactics of artillery combat of surface ships improved, and the tactical methods of submarines for searching for and attacking targets at sea and evading aircraft and anti-submarine ships were developed. Large artillery ships (battleships, cruisers), due to their great vulnerability to submarines and especially aviation, have lost the role of the main striking force in military operations at sea. Their actions were reduced mainly to assisting the ground forces (fire support for the landing force, artillery shelling of the coast, etc.). In landing operations, the forms of interaction between the forces of the fleet and the ground forces were improved, new methods of landing, forms and methods of conducting a landing battle were developed. The results of the war allowed naval art to conclude that in certain maritime and oceanic theaters of operations, navies can have a significant impact on the course of the war. The post-war development of the navies of the most economically and militarily-technically developed states led to the emergence of qualitatively new ocean-going fleets equipped with nuclear missile weapons.
The strike power of the Soviet Navy began to be made up of nuclear submarines and naval aviation, equipped with missile and torpedo weapons. The development of modern means of combat, and especially missile nuclear weapons made fundamental changes in naval art and affected all its areas, the fleet gained the ability to deliver nuclear missile strikes on enemy territory, the Navy and their bases from vast distances, reaching several thousand kilometers, and to have a decisive influence on the achievement of strategic goals in armed struggle on the sea. Naval art was enriched with a new component - the strategic use of the fleet in modern war. The following have been developed: new forms and methods for the strategic use of the forces of the Navy, as well as for the operational and combat use of the fleet; tactical methods and methods of using submarines with missile and torpedo weapons, naval aviation, surface ships of various classes, marine units and other forces in combat operations: measures to maintain fleet forces in high combat readiness to repel a surprise enemy attack and solve assigned tasks.
The naval art of the fleets of the USA, Great Britain, France and other countries focused on the development of methods for conducting combat operations by submarines and aircraft carrier strike forces of fleets in a general nuclear war; at the same time, methods were being developed for using the Navy in local wars. It is believed that the success of solving the main tasks of the Navy will largely depend on the effectiveness of the fight against enemy submarines. In this regard, the US Navy, Great Britain and other NATO countries are conducting intensive research work aimed at finding ways to combat submarines, especially armed ballistic missiles. equipped on the deployment routes of submarines, as well as directly in the areas of their combat operations. Particular importance is attached to nuclear missile strikes against submarine bases immediately at the start of the war. Methods are being developed for anti-submarine defense of aircraft carrier strike forces at sea crossings and in areas where they use aviation. To combat submarines, the US Navy has created special large operational formations of anti-submarine forces.
operational art
Operational art is component military art, covering the issues of theory and practice in the preparation and conduct of joint and independent operations and combat operations by operational formations of branches of the armed forces in various theaters of military operations; military-theoretical discipline. The main tasks of operational art are the study of the nature and content of operations (combat operations), the development of methods for their preparation and conduct on land, in aerospace and at sea, the determination of the most effective methods for the combat use of types of armed forces and combat arms in them, as well as methods of organizing interaction between them; development of recommendations on command and control of troops (forces), their operational support and practical guidance of the combat activities of troops (forces) in the course of operations. Operational art covers the study and development of all types of military operations: offensive, defense, organization and implementation of operational regroupings, etc. Operational art occupies an intermediate position between strategy and tactics and plays a connecting role between them. It follows directly from strategy and is subordinate to it; the requirements and provisions of strategy are fundamental to operational art. In relation to tactics, operational art occupies a dominant position: it determines its tasks and directions of development. There are also inverse relationships and interdependencies. For example, when determining the strategic goals of a war and methods of conducting it in a particular theater of operations, the real possibilities of operational formations are taken into account, as well as the level of development of the theory and practice of operational art. In the same way, when planning operations (combat operations), the tactical capabilities of formations and units, the nature and characteristics of their actions in a specific situation, are taken into account, because Ultimately, tactical successes determine the achievement of operational results, and the latter directly affect the achievement of intermediate and final goals of the strategy. Under the influence of the development of armaments and military equipment, the improvement of the organizational structure of troops, and changes in the methods of conducting military operations, the interconnections and interdependence between strategy, operational art and tactics are becoming more multifaceted and dynamic. Since operational art addresses the issues of theory and practice of preparing and conducting both joint and independent operations by operational formations of the ground forces, air force, and navy, then, within its general theory and practice, one can single out the operational art of the ground forces, air force, and navy. The operational art of each branch of the armed forces in its development proceeds from the general methodological foundations and requirements of military theory and practice, taking into account at the same time the specifics of the organization, technical equipment, scopes, and combat capabilities operational associations of the corresponding branch of the armed forces. Basic provisions of O. and. stem from the general principles of military art. The most important of them are: the constant maintenance of troops, forces and means in high combat readiness; the continuous and bold conduct of hostilities in order to seize and hold the initiative; readiness to conduct combat operations by conventional means and with the use of nuclear weapons; achievement of the goals set by the joint efforts of formations and associations of all branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms on the basis of their close interaction; concentration of the main efforts of the troops in the chosen direction at the decisive moment. The application of general principles in an operation depends on the specific conditions in which the troops will operate.
In the military theory of Western states, the term "operational art" is not used. Instead, the concepts of "big tactics" or "small strategy" are used.
The historical aspect of operational art
The objective prerequisites for the emergence of operational art were a natural consequence of the changes that took place in the development of the productive forces of society, its social and political structure , as well as in the state of armament, organization of troops, forms and methods of conducting military operations. With the advent of the late 18th - early 19th centuries. in the countries of Western Europe, mass armies began to unfold combat operations over large areas in the form of a series of successive and interconnected battles and be waged for a long time. Headquarters are being established as command and control bodies. A new form of military operations is emerging in terms of scale, methods of organization and conduct - an operation, the first signs of which appeared in the wars of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. In the wars of the 2nd half of the 19th century. further development of the nascent operation is underway. The development of railways and other modes of transport made it possible to speed up the transfer, concentration and deployment of troops, to improve their supply, and the introduction of the telegraph, telephone, and radio facilitated the control of large groups over large areas. As a result of the latest scientific technical discoveries in the late 19th - early 20th centuries. magazine rifles, machine guns, rapid-firing and long-range artillery appear, new classes of warships - battleships, destroyers, submarines, the production of combat aircraft begins, and then tanks. All this affected the change in the forms and methods of conducting military operations, the characteristic features of which, in particular, the tendency to a sharp increase in the front of military operations, their division into a number of battles and an increase in the duration of battles and battles, manifested themselves during the very first imperialist wars and especially in Russian- Japanese war 1904-1905. For example, the battle near Mukden unfolded on a front of up to 150 km and lasted 3 weeks; on the river Shahe - at the front of 90 km and was carried out for 13 days. During the 1st World War of 1914-1918, the battle in Galicia took place on a front of about 400 km and lasted 33 days. Combat operations began to cover not only land and sea, but gradually also airspace. To lead the troops in the Russian army, front-line departments were created even before the war. At the beginning of the war, operational formations also appeared in Germany, France and Great Britain - army groups or army groups with appropriate departments. As a result, at the beginning of the 20 the concept of an operation is emerging as a set of military operations of military formations and formations taking place over a large area, united by a common plan and aimed at achieving a common goal. The main forms of operational maneuver were also determined - a maneuver to encircle and a frontal attack with the aim of breaking through the formed positional front. Breakthrough methods have also been outlined, although this problem has not been completely solved. All this created objective conditions for separating operational art into an independent section of military art. However, at that time this was not yet done in any army.Soviet operational art began to take shape during the Civil War. The operations of the Red Army were characterized and carried out with a wide maneuver of troops, on a large scale, and with decisive goals. The main provisions for planning and conducting front-line and army operations were also determined: the choice of the direction of the main attack, the concentration of forces and means in decisive directions, the creation of strike groups, the flexible use of reserves, the organization of operational interaction between armies, etc. An important achievement was the use of mobile formations in offensive operations and associations - cavalry corps and cavalry armies, which made it possible to significantly increase the depth of strikes, increase the pace of the offensive, and develop tactical success into an operational one. After the Civil War, operational art was improved on the basis of the experience gained in World War I, and mainly on the basis of generalizations of the practice of operations of the Civil War that were new in nature. An important role in the formation of the theory of operational art was played by the developments that began in the 1920s. creative discussion, works and articles of Soviet military leaders, especially M. V. Frunze, as well as A. I. Egorov, S. S. Kamenev, I. P. Uborevich, B. M. Shaposhnikov. The main provisions for the preparation and conduct of operations by armies and fronts were set out in the manual "High Command. Official Guide for Commanders and Field Directorates of Armies and Fronts" (1924) and developed in the work of V. K. Triandafillov "The nature of the operations of modern armies" (1929) . From the 2nd half of the 20s. the division of Soviet military art into three parts - strategy, operational art and tactics - is practically fixed. This division manifests itself primarily in defining the foundations of operational art. Its further development took place under the influence of the growing economic power of the country and the successful development of the aviation, tank, chemical, and automotive industries, which made it possible to equip the armed forces with the latest military equipment; at the same time, there was a process of improving their organizational structure. In the 1st half of the 30s. in the Soviet Armed Forces, the theory of a deep offensive operation was developed. The essence of this theory lies in the simultaneous suppression of the entire depth of the enemy defense by massive artillery fire, air strikes and the use of airborne assault forces, in creating a gap in the defense through which mobile troops rushed in order to develop an offensive to the entire operational depth. It was believed that the scope of a front-line offensive operation can be characterized by the following indicators: the width of the offensive zone is 150-300 km, the depth is up to 250 km, the rate of advance is 10-15 km or more per day, and the duration is 15-20 days. The army advancing in the main direction received a strip 50-80 km wide, the depth of the operation could reach 70-100 km, the duration of 7-10 days. The army operation was considered as an integral part of the front-line one. In special conditions, armies could conduct independent operations. Achieving the goals of the operation was conceived through the implementation of the immediate and subsequent tasks. Defense was considered in close connection with the offensive. Certain successes have been achieved in developing the principles of operations for the Navy, Air Force, and airborne operations.
In the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, experience was gained in carrying out a front-line operation to break through a fortified area, massive use of rifle troops, artillery and aviation in the main direction.
During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, operational art took a new step in its development. The war confirmed the correctness of the previously developed views on the preparation and conduct of front-line and army operations. In 1941-1942, when the Soviet Armed Forces were conducting mainly strategic defense, experience was gained in organizing and carrying out front-line and army defensive operations. The most important problems that were solved by operational art were the correct determination of the directions of the main enemy attacks and the timely concentration of forces and means to repel these attacks, the development of methods for building a defense in depth and ensuring its stability. Special attention The focus was on creating an operational defense capable of withstanding massive strikes by tank groupings and aviation, as well as massive enemy artillery fire, separating forces and fire weapons, and increasing the activity and resilience of troops. Front defensive operations were, as a rule, an integral part of a strategic defensive operation and were carried out with the aim of repelling the offensive of large enemy groupings, holding important areas and creating conditions for going on the offensive. With the accumulation of combat experience gained in the winter counter-offensive of 1941-1942 near Rostov, Tikhvin and especially near Moscow, the gradual increase in the rate of technical equipment of the branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms, the practice of preparing and conducting offensive operations was continuously improved. So, new methods were developed for creating strike groups for an offensive in the directions of the main strikes, effective use tanks, artillery and aviation. In the Battle of Stalingrad in 1942-1943 and in the Battle of Kursk in 1943, the methods of organizing a defense in depth, persistent defense and counteroffensive were further developed, right choice directing the main strike, achieving operational-tactical surprise, pinpointing weaknesses in the enemy’s defenses, substantiated calculation of forces and means for a successful breakthrough of tactical defenses and developing success in operational depth, organizing clear interaction between troops, quickly encircling and defeating large enemy forces. The basic theoretical principles and practical recommendations worked out by operational art were used throughout the war and constantly developed in subsequent operations, especially in the Belorussian operation of 1944, the Jassy-Kishinev operation of 1944, the Vistula-Oder operation of 1945, the Berlin operation of 1945. During the war, a front-line operation, as a rule, was part of a strategic operation (an operation of a group of fronts), while an army operation was part of a front-line operation. In some cases, combined-arms armies carried out operations independently. The problem of breaking through the enemy defenses to the full depth and developing tactical success into operational success was successfully solved. Strong second echelons were created in the armies and fronts. Methods were developed for organizing and carrying out an artillery offensive and an air offensive as an effective form of combat use of artillery and aviation to defeat the enemy throughout the entire depth of his defense. Maneuvering reserves, forcing rivers on the move, conducting operational pursuit, night operations, etc., were successfully carried out. All this contributed to an increase in the depth of offensive operations and an increase in the pace of the offensive of troops. So, if in 1942 the depth of front-line offensive operations was 100-140 km, and the rate of advance was 6-10 km per day, then at the final stage of the war, front-line offensive operations were carried out to a depth of 300-500 km with an advance rate of 15-20 km, and tank armies 40-50 km per day or more. The encirclement of the enemy became a typical form of combat operations of the Soviet troops: the methods of combat operations to eliminate encircled enemy groups were improved. The methods of organizing and conducting reconnaissance, engineering support, camouflage, and rear services were further developed. The most important operations during the war years were carried out, as a rule, with the participation of operational formations of all branches of the Armed Forces. Along with this, methods were developed for the preparation and conduct of independent operations by associations of branches of the Armed Forces - air, airborne, sea, sea landing. The operational art of the Air Force determined the basic principles of the combat use of aviation formations and formations - surprise, massing of efforts, continuity of interaction, wide maneuver, the presence of a reserve, and centralization of control. Techniques have been developed for gaining air supremacy, defeating large enemy air groupings, aviation support for bringing tank armies into battle and their operations in operational depth, assisting troops in eliminating encircled enemy groupings, repelling counterattacks by enemy reserves, combating its operational and strategic reserves, strikes against large political and industrial centers, communication centers, naval bases, etc. The operational art of the Navy was aimed at developing and improving methods of conducting operations in order to disrupt the enemy’s sea lanes and protect their own sea lanes, securing the flanks of fronts operating in coastal areas . Significant development has been made in the art of preparing and conducting amphibious landing operations and combat operations aimed at disrupting enemy amphibious landing operations and delivering strikes from the sea against enemy naval bases and other targets.
The practice of preparing and conducting operations during the war was theoretically generalized in the orders, directives and instructions of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff, in regulations, manuals and military-theoretical works.
During the war years, Anglo-American troops gained experience in carrying out operations by forces of field armies or army groups in cooperation with large aviation forces. However, the combat operations of the allies in North Africa and Western Europe were carried out in conditions of overwhelming superiority over the enemy in forces and means. Much more experience was gained in a number of major air operations against Germany and Japan, as well as sea and landing operations in Europe and the Pacific Ocean with the participation of ground forces, navies, aviation and airborne assault forces.
Tactics
Military tactics (Greek taktiká - the art of building troops, from tásso - building troops), an integral part of military art, including the theory and practice of preparing and conducting combat by formations, units (ships) and subunits of various types of armed forces, military branches (forces) and special forces on land, in the air and at sea; military-theoretical discipline. Tactics covers the study, development, preparation and conduct of all types of combat operations: offensive, defense, meeting engagement, tactical regroupings, etc.In the Russian Armed Forces, tactics are subordinate to operational art and strategy. Operational art determines the tasks and direction of development of tactics. taking into account the tactical capabilities of formations and units, the nature and characteristics of their actions. Under the influence of changes in the methods of warfare caused by the adoption of nuclear weapons and improved conventional weapons by the troops (naval forces), the interconnection and interdependence between strategy, operational art and tactics are becoming more multifaceted and dynamic. Tactical nuclear weapons allow tactical command to exercise a certain independence in choosing methods of combat operations and achieve faster successes that determine the achievement of operational results. At the same time, the strategic and operational command of the application of powerful nuclear strikes on important targets and large groupings of enemy troops (forces) it can solve major strategic (operational) tasks and create favorable conditions for the performance of tactical tasks.
The main tasks of tactics are: the study of the patterns, nature and content of combat, the development of methods for its preparation and conduct; determination of the most effective methods of using means of destruction and protection in combat; study of the combat properties and capabilities of subunits, units, formations, determination of their tasks and battle formations in the conduct of hostilities and methods of organizing interaction between them; study of the role of fire, strikes and maneuver in combat; development of recommendations on command and control of troops (forces), their combat, special and logistic support; study of the forces and means of the enemy and his methods of conducting combat. Each type of armed forces (Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy), branch of service (forces, aviation) and type of special troops, as well as military rear and parts of the railway troops, have their own tactics., Which studies the combat properties and capabilities formations, units (ships), and subunits of a given type of armed forces, type of troops (forces, aviation), type of special troops, methods of their use and actions in combat independently and in cooperation with other types and types of troops. General laws and regulations for the preparation and conduct of combat by formations, units and subunits of all types of armed forces, combat arms (forces) and special troops form the basis of the general theory of tactics. Exploring the diverse conditions of combat, tactics do not provide ready-made recipes. It produces only the main, most important points and rules, following which the commander makes an independent decision, corresponding to the specific conditions of the combat situation, showing creative initiative.
Changes in tactics and their development are connected with the achieved level of production, the invention of new types of weapons and military equipment, the degree of general development and the state of the morale of the troops, their training, the development of strategy and operational art, and the organization of troops. The tactics and methods of combat operations are directly influenced by people and military equipment. It is tactics that are the most changing part of the art of war. It is also influenced by the condition and training of the enemy's armed forces, their methods of action, and other factors. New tactical methods, based on the capabilities of more advanced military equipment, are in constant struggle with the old methods of warfare, which have ceased or no longer meet the prevailing conditions, but have become stronger in theory and practice.
Historical aspect of tactics
The development of tactics went from the simplest methods of troop action on the battlefield to more complex ones. Even the commanders of antiquity, in the course of preparing and waging wars, developed and improved the methods of waging combat. At an early stage in the development of a slave-owning society, combat was reduced to a rectilinear movement and hand-to-hand combat of warriors armed with edged weapons. Qualitative improvement in weapons, organization of troops and training of soldiers led to the emergence of more advanced battle formations and a corresponding change in tactics. In the ancient Greek army, a phalanx arose - a dense and deep (8-12 or more ranks) formation of heavy infantry, which dealt a strong initial blow, but was clumsy and incapable of maneuvering on the battlefield. The Greek commander Epaminondas in the battle of Leuctra (371 BC) initiated the application of the tactical principle of uneven distribution of troops along the front in order to concentrate forces for delivering the main blow in a decisive direction. This principle was further developed in the army of Alexander the Great (4th century BC), who skillfully created superiority in forces for delivering the main blow, using combined heavy and light cavalry and infantry. The commander Hannibal in the battle of Cannae (216 BC) for the first time struck the main blow not on one flank, like Epaminondas and Alexander the Great, but on two, achieving encirclement and almost complete destruction of the larger Roman army. Under the slave system, tactics reached their highest development in the army of ancient Rome. Already at the end of the 4th c. BC e. The Roman army moved from the stagnant phalanx to a more maneuverable manipulative tactic. The legion in battle was divided along the front and in depth into 30 tactical units - maniples (not counting lightly armed warriors), which could maneuver and interact with each other. At the end of the 2nd - beginning of the 1st centuries. BC e. manipulative tactics were replaced by cohort ones. The 3 maniple cohort became a stronger tactical unit, although somewhat less maneuverable than the maniple. Lightweight throwing machines (ballistas and catapults) began to play a significant role in field battles. Cohort tactics were further improved under Gaius Julius Caesar, who skillfully applied various types of maneuver and battle formations. The Roman military theorist Vegetius (late 4th century) summarized the experience of the Roman army and developed various battle formations and various ways conducting combat.In the era of feudalism, until the completion of the revolution in military affairs (16th century), caused by the development of firearms, the theory and practice of tactics developed slowly. During the period of formation and victory of capitalist relations, linear tactics were developed related to equipping armies. firearms, including artillery, and an increase in the role of fire in battle, as well as with the recruitment of armies by hired soldiers who are not capable of independent initiative actions. According to this tactical scheme, the troops were deployed to conduct battle in a line; the outcome of the battle was decided by a frontal collision and the power of rifle and artillery fire. Linear tactics were characterized by the stereotyped and slowness of the actions of the troops.
Russian commanders of the 18th century - Peter I the Great, P.S. Saltykov, P.L. Rumyantsev-Zadunaisky, adhering mainly to linear tactics, sought out new ways of fighting. Peter I, in a linear order of battle, created a reserve and introduced a deeper formation, which contributed to the victory of the Russian troops over the troops of Charles XII near Poltava (1709). Rumyantsev began to use loose formation and square. A. V. Suvorov, along with linear battle formations, used columns, squares, loose formations and combinations of various formations. The tactics of Suvorov's troops were offensive; its main features are decisiveness and suddenness of action, delivering the main blow to the weakest place (rear, flank), concentrating forces to strike in the chosen direction, speed, bold maneuvering and defeating the enemy in parts.
Profound changes in tactics occurred during the French Revolution and the national liberation wars of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, which led to the creation of mass armies in the countries of Western Europe on the basis of universal conscription and the improvement of weapons. By the end of the 18th century linear tactics have exhausted their possibilities; French, Russian and other armies switched to a new tactic based on a combination of columns and loose formation. This tactic was characterized by the activity, decisiveness of actions and maneuverability of the troops, the initiative of the commanders, the interaction of the military branches, the dismemberment of battle formations along the front and in depth. The troops in loose formation prepared the battle with fire, and the troops, built in battalion columns, dealt the decisive blow. In the improvement of new methods of warfare in the late 18th - early 19th centuries. a great contribution was made by Napoleon I, who massively used artillery and cavalry, and M.I. Kutuzov, whose tactics of troops were characterized by a decisive offensive and stubborn defense, the use of wide troop maneuver, simultaneous and successive strikes, and relentless pursuit of the enemy.
The further development of tactics is associated with the introduction into the troops in the second half of the 19th century. rifled weapons, which, compared with smooth-bore weapons, had greater range, rate of fire and accuracy. The experience of hostilities showed that the use of columns on the battlefield became impossible, since they carried big losses from aimed artillery and small arms fire even during the period of rapprochement with the enemy. Therefore, during the Crimean (1853-56), Franco-Prussian (1870-71), Russian-Turkish (1877-1878) wars, the transition to rifle chains was basically completed. In the offensive, the infantry began to use dashes, crawls and self-digging, to combine fire, maneuver and strike. In defense, in order to increase its stability, the engineering equipment of the terrain began to be widely used, field and long-term defense received significant development, especially during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.
In the First World War of 1914-1918, the increased saturation of armies with rapid-fire artillery and automatic weapons, the emergence of new means of combat (tanks, aircraft, etc.) and a sharp increase in the size of armies created the preconditions for the further development of tactics. The creation of defensive positions echeloned in depth, the widespread use of trenches, communication passages, engineering obstacles, and the use of various types of weapons made the defense more and more powerful compared to the forces and means of the attacking side, which led to the transition to positional forms of struggle. Beginning in 1915, the main problem of tactics was to break through the positional front. To this end, they began to create several echelons of rifle chains - “waves” that followed one after another at a distance of 50-75 m with intervals between fighters of 1 m, but at the same time, the troops, suffering heavy losses, still could not break through the enemy defenses. The advancing side tried to destroy the enemy defenses and pave the way for the infantry with massive artillery fire. For this purpose, multi-day artillery preparation was used, but even it did not ensure the suppression of firing points throughout the entire depth of defense. In 1918, the warring parties finally abandoned the use of "waves" and chains and switched to group tactics, which was the division of rifle chains into small infantry groups (squads, platoons), reinforced with light machine guns, rifle grenade launchers and flamethrowers, which made it possible to better use the opportunities infantry. The appearance in 1916 of escort tanks and artillery increased the firepower and strike power of the advancing troops and made it possible to achieve significant success in carrying out a tactical breakthrough in the enemy's echeloned defense. The offensive was carried out methodically according to the principles: artillery destroys, infantry occupies. The infantry advanced in narrow lanes: a division - about 2 km, a regiment - 1000-1200 m, a battalion - 400-600 m. By the end of the war, the battle became combined arms, since tactical tasks in it were solved by the joint efforts of the infantry, artillery, tanks, engineering troops ; formed
ground forces tactics.
The tactics of the Soviet ground forces began to take shape during the Civil War of 1918-1920. It absorbed all the best of what was accumulated by the Russian army. The large length of the fronts and the relatively low saturation density of their troops necessitated the use of extensive maneuver by forces and means. The main arms of the army were infantry and cavalry. Artillery was used, as a rule, in a decentralized manner, armored trains were widely used. Aviation mainly conducted reconnaissance. The basis of offensive combat tactics was strikes at the weakest points - the flanks and rear of the enemy, bypassing and enveloping his groupings. The offensive was carried out in separate directions at relatively low tactical densities. The combat formations of units and formations were usually built in one echelon, with the allocation of a reserve; rifle companies attacked the enemy in a chain. The cavalry, using the attack in cavalry formation and widely using machine-gun carts, waged highly maneuverable battles and was the main means of developing the offensive. The defense was created in pockets in threatened directions, great importance was attached to counterattacks.
In the period between the 1st (1914-1918) and 2nd (1939-1945) world wars, the development of tactics in all the armies of the world proceeded on the basis of motorization and the widespread introduction of military equipment into the troops - new artillery systems, new types of tanks, automatic weapons and other means of struggle. In the mid 30s. in the Red Army, a theory of deep offensive combat was developed, which was an integral part of the theory of deep operations. The essence of the theory of deep combat was to defeat the enemy with artillery fire and air strikes to the entire tactical depth, to break through his defenses with a powerful breakthrough echelon, consisting of rifle troops, direct support tanks, to develop success by cavalry, long-range tanks, rifle formations in cooperation with airborne troops. The battle was considered as a combined arms battle with the decisive role of infantry and tanks. The theory of deep combat gained recognition in most armies and was successfully used by the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic war 1941-1945. Methods of conducting combined arms combat were reflected in the charters of the Red Army and foreign armies. These included: deep separation of battle formations, massive fire suppression of enemy defenses, a joint attack of infantry with tanks, artillery escort of their attack, the development of a breakthrough by tank and motorized formations, the use of airborne assault forces, the creation of deep anti-tank defense, the use of minefields in defense, the organization air defense and etc.
Comprehensive development of the tactics of the Soviet troops received during the Great Patriotic War. The war confirmed the correctness of the previously developed basic principles of tactics and required their further improvement. At the beginning of the war, when the initiative in combat operations and superiority in forces were on the side of the enemy, the Soviet troops were forced to defend themselves against superior enemy forces in order to inflict maximum losses on him and create conditions for a counteroffensive. In connection with the insufficient equipping of the Soviet troops with weapons and military equipment, the stretching of the front of hostilities, rifle units and formations were initially assigned wide sectors and strips for defense; the defense was built shallow, with low tactical densities and poor engineering equipment. As the troops received weapons and military equipment, the combat capabilities of the troops increased. The development of defense proceeded along the line of increasing its depth, concentrating forces and means in the main directions. The stamina of the troops increased. Already in July 1941, they began to create anti-tank strongholds, from the autumn of 1942 - anti-tank areas, to use trenches in some sectors of the front in company and battalion areas. The tactics of the defense of the Soviet troops were especially developed in the Battle of Leningrad, in the battles near Odessa, Sevastopol, in the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk. Soviet troops began to create two lines of defense using a system of trenches. The tactical depth of defense increased from 4-6 km to 15-20 km. The width of the defense zone of rifle formations has decreased: for a corps from 40-60 km to 10-35 km, for a division from 15-18 km to 6-14 km. Tactical densities have increased: for rifle battalions up to 0.8-1.2, for artillery up to 30-40 guns and mortars, for tanks up to 2-5 units per 1 km of the front.
With the accumulation of combat experience gained in the winter counter-offensive of 1941-1942 near Rostov, Tikhvin and especially near Moscow, and the increase in the pace of technical equipment of the troops, offensive tactics were also improved. In the autumn of 1942, in all units and formations, up to and including rifle divisions, a one-echelon battle formation was introduced for the offensive. A rifle chain was introduced in rifle platoons and companies. The combat practice of the troops was reflected in the Combat Manual of the Infantry (1942). Beginning in 1943, Soviet troops had to break through the enemy's solid defense in depth. In this regard, the combat formations of rifle units and formations again began to be built in 2-3 echelons (the combat formation of rifle companies - in one echelon - remained unchanged). Given the continuous strengthening of the enemy's defenses, the offensive zones of the Soviet troops narrowed during the war. For example, rifle divisions advanced in the zone: in the winter of 1941-1942 - 7-14 km, in the autumn of 1942 - 4-5 km, in the summer of 1943 - 2-2.5 km, in 1944-45 - 1.5-2 km. A further increase in the number of weapons and military equipment made it possible to increase tactical densities, which in the third period of the war amounted to 1 km of the breakthrough area: 6-8 rifle battalions for infantry, 150-250 guns and mortars for artillery, 20-30 units for tanks. All this made it possible to achieve a decisive superiority in forces and means in the main directions. An artillery attack began. The advance of the advancing infantry and tanks was provided by the actions of the engineering troops. The developed basic theoretical provisions and practical recommendations of tactics were successfully used by the Soviet troops in breaking through the enemy defenses and developing the offensive at a high pace, especially in the Belorussian operation of 1944, the Iasi-Kishinev operation of 1944, the Vistula-Oder operation of 1945, the Berlin operation of 1945 The practice of tactical training of troops and their conduct of combat operations during the war found a theoretical generalization in the orders, directives and instructions of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff, in the charters, instructions and military-theoretical works.
The tactics of the fascist German ground forces on the eve and in the first years of World War II 1939-1945 developed taking into account the massive influx of tanks, aviation, artillery and other means of combat into the troops, the emergence of new types and types of troops and major changes in the organizational structure of troops (forces). Many provisions of the tactics of the Nazi troops before the start of the war were borrowed from the Soviet theory of deep combat. During the war against the USSR, the tactics of the land forces of fascist Germany proved to be untenable in the confrontation with the tactics of the troops of the Soviet Army.
The tactics of the Anglo-American ground forces in World War II developed along the path of developing the most expedient methods of joint use in combat of the combat arms of the ground forces and aviation. Great experience was gained in conducting sea and landing operations with the participation of ground forces and the widespread use of amphibious tanks as a means of supporting infantry during battles for bridgeheads.
In the post-war period, the introduction of nuclear missile weapons with enormous destructive capabilities into the troops, electronics, various types of the latest conventional weapons and military equipment, the full motorization and mechanization of the ground forces immeasurably increased their combat capabilities, changed the nature and methods of conducting combined arms combat.
The basic principles of tactics follow from the general principles of the art of war. The most important of them are: the constant maintenance of troops, forces and means in high combat readiness for conducting combat operations with and without the use of nuclear weapons; high activity and decisiveness of the troops in the conduct of hostilities; close interaction of all military branches; surprise and secrecy of actions, concentration of forces and means in the most important areas and at a decisive moment, the continuity of hostilities; flexibility of maneuver by troops, forces and means, creation, timely restoration and skillful use of reserves of all types; comprehensive provision of troops in the conduct of hostilities.
Modern means of combat have had a decisive influence on changing the content of combined arms combat. It is believed that in the case of the use of nuclear weapons, the main content of combined arms combat will be nuclear and fire strikes in combination with maneuvers and attacks by troops. There will be a need to use maneuver by troops in order to use the results of their own nuclear and fire strikes to complete the defeat of the enemy or withdraw troops from under his strikes.
The high destructive power of nuclear weapons, long range and accuracy of hitting the target make it necessary to disperse troops along the front and in depth, increase the width of the action zones of formations and units, and concentrate forces and means in the main direction, primarily by massing nuclear and conventional weapons.
The massive introduction of infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery, and other military equipment into the arsenal of motorized rifle troops makes it possible to sharply increase the pace of the offensive. Motorized rifle units were able to attack without dismounting together with tanks. As a result of the saturation of troops with helicopters, the widespread use of tactical airborne assault forces, aviation, as well as the implementation of maneuver by troops in the air, combined arms combat acquired a ground-air character.
The tactics of the Air Force is an integral part of the military art of the Air Force, including the theory and practice of preparing and conducting combat by an aviation formation, unit, subunit, and a single aircraft (helicopter). Air Force tactics originated in the early 20th century. with the advent of military aviation. During the 1st World War, reconnaissance, fighter, bomber aviation stood out, their combat missions and received the development of tactics for each type of aviation.
The tactics of the Soviet Air Force originated during the Civil War. The basic principles of the combat use of aviation were set forth in the Field Manual of 1919 and other documents. With the advent of assault (1926) and heavy bomber (1933) aviation in the USSR, the development of tactics for their combat use began. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, methods and techniques were developed for conducting single and group air combat, organizing and implementing tactical and fire interaction between the Air Force and the ground forces and the Navy, as well as between branches of aviation. The main provisions on the tactics of aviation branches were enshrined in the combat regulations of fighter (BUIA-1940) and bomber (BUBA-1940) aviation.
During the 2nd World War and the Great Patriotic War, Air Force tactics received comprehensive development. A system for guiding fighters to air targets was developed. Radio facilities were widely used to control aviation, airfields and command posts were close to the combat areas.
Group air combat became the basis of fighter aviation tactics. The smallest firing unit was a pair of combat aircraft, which, as a rule, operated as part of an aviation unit. The battle of a single aircraft (fighter) was an exception. The use of radar made it possible in many cases to abandon barrage (patrolling) of fighters in the air, replacing it with the method of duty at airfields. The fight against single aircraft and small groups of enemy aircraft over its territory was carried out by the method of "free hunting". Assault aviation carried out an attack on ground (sea) targets from a gentle dive (at an angle of 25-30 °) and from a strafing flight. The basis of the battle formation was a pair of aircraft. To increase the duration of the impact on the enemy, groups of attack aircraft on the battlefield used multiple attacks of given targets. The tactics of bomber aviation were characterized by the use of concentrated strikes by regimental and divisional groups of bombers against large targets, and in difficult meteorological conditions and at night - echeloned strikes by squadrons, units and single aircraft. Dive-bombing at an angle of 50-60° from a height of 2-3 thousand meters was new. The importance of aerial photography increased in reconnaissance aviation tactics. Reconnaissance aircraft were covered by fighters.
In the post-war period, the re-equipment of aviation with jet aircraft, a sharp increase in speeds, flight altitudes, the emergence of more powerful modern aviation weapons and equipment caused a change in the tactics of all branches of aviation and the tactics of the Air Force. Missile-carrying aircraft gained the ability to strike at ground and sea targets without entering the air defense zone of the covered object. Reconnaissance aircraft, thanks to high speeds and flight altitudes, and the presence of highly efficient radar photographic equipment, were able to penetrate deep behind enemy lines and detect any, including small-sized, objects. Interception of air targets on the distant approaches to covered objects and their destruction before the moment of dropping nuclear weapons becomes the most important method of tactical actions of fighters.
Naval tactics is an integral part of naval art, including the theory and practice of preparing and conducting combat and other types of combat operations at sea by formations, units, and subunits of various fleet forces. The tactics of the Navy originated in antiquity with the advent of the rowing fleet, the characteristic features of the tactics of which were: the desire to fight in calm weather and not far from the coast, the use of close formation and frontal collision of ships, ramming, later (5-4 centuries BC. e. ) and abortion.
Until the 16th century The tactics of the Navy, despite the appearance of sailing ships and their arming with artillery, differed little from the tactics of the rowing fleet. In the 17th century the transition from the rowing fleet to the sailing fleet, which had a greater speed and cruising range, was completed. Profound changes in tactics were caused by the development of naval artillery and its use in naval battles during the Anglo-Dutch wars of the second half of the 17th century. as the main weapon. At this time, the classification of ships was established (see Military ship), which began to unite into squadrons. Battleships formed the basis of the strike power of the fleets. The desire to make the most of artillery fire in naval battles led to the development of linear tactics, which in the 17-18 centuries. dominated all fleets. Its main content was the conduct of artillery combat by squadrons of ships that maneuvered in the battle line (wake column) on counter courses or on parallel courses. By the middle of the 18th century. in connection with the increase in the firing range, lethal and destructive power of the core, a contradiction arose between the capabilities of naval artillery and the tactical form of its use - template linear tactics. Russian admirals G.A. Spiridov, F.F. battle abandoned its patterns and laid the foundations for new ways of combat use of the sailing fleet - maneuvering tactics. Its characteristic features were to bring the sides closer to the distance of effective artillery fire, create superiority in forces or firepower against part of the enemy’s forces, which was achieved by covering the head of the column of his battleships or dismembering their formation, encircling and defeating part of the enemy fleet’s forces, including the flagship. The principles of maneuver tactics were later used by Admiral G. Nelson in the battles of Abukir (1798) and Trafalgar (1805) and by the Russian admiral D. N. Senyavin in the battle of Athos (1807) and contributed to its establishment.
With the transition from sailing to steam fleet in the 2nd half of the 19th century. the main forces of the fleets began to be large artillery battleships and armored cruisers. A significant contribution to the development of steam fleet tactics was made by the Russian admirals G. I. Butakov, A. A. Popov, S. O. Makarov. The basis of the tactics of the Navy was the sea battle of squadrons, which included surface ships of various classes. As a rule, a battle at sea consisted of three stages: reconnaissance of the enemy (by cruisers) and deployment of their own armored forces in battle formation; artillery battle of the main forces; development of success by destroyers or their provision of withdrawal (in case of failure). To cover the head of the enemy squadron, a detachment of high-speed armored cruisers was usually allocated. The tactics of destroyers and minelayers also took shape.
The development of tactics in World War I was associated with profound changes in the nature of naval combat, caused by the use of various new means of combat in it, a sharp increase in the number of ships, and the appearance of the main form of combat activity of the Navy - operations (see Naval operation). Along with the battles of large groupings of the surface forces of the fleet, single actions of submarines and anti-submarine forces became widespread, and the foundations of the tactics of the diverse forces of the fleets were formed. Linear forces, which formed the basis of the strike power of the fleets, could only operate under the cover of light forces from attacks by submarines, destroyers, and from the impact of mine weapons.
During the years of the Civil War, the tactics of the Soviet Navy were born, tactical principles were developed for the combat use of river and lake fleets, joint operations of the fleet forces with ground forces, landing amphibious assaults and conducting naval battles in their coastal zone. With the development of the forces and means of the fleet in the 20-30s. the tactics of the actions of the diverse forces of the Navy and the methods of interaction between them in a sea battle were improved. The foundations of the military aviation of the Navy were enshrined in the Combat Manual of the Naval Forces of the Red Army and other documents.
Big influence The development of naval tactics was influenced by the growing importance of submarines and naval aviation during World War II, which became the main striking force of the fleets. In some foreign fleets (Japan, the United States), an important role in combat was assigned to aircraft carriers and tactics were developed for their combat use. Carrier aviation conducted naval battles when the ships of the belligerents were hundreds of miles apart. This led to an increase in the spatial scope of the battle, allowing the forces of the fleet to strike at the enemy from several directions from under water and from the air.
The main content of the tactics of the Navy in the 2nd World War was air-sea and underwater-sea battles, conducted by interacting heterogeneous forces. The tactics of the Soviet Navy in the Great Patriotic War developed in the independent operations of the fleets and their joint combat operations with the ground forces. The tactics of applying combined strikes by naval aviation, submarines and light surface forces with the aim of disrupting enemy sea lanes were further developed. Methods were developed for the group use of submarines and their interaction with other forces of the fleet. The development of forces and means of combat in the postwar period predetermined profound changes in the nature of combat at sea and the tactics of the Navy, new directions for its development appeared: the tactics of missile submarines, missile ships, missile-carrying aircraft, etc. Nuclear missile submarines were able to maneuver for a long time and covertly outside the zones anti-submarine defense of the enemy with the aim of suddenly delivering powerful strikes from under the water on its important objects. Naval missile-carrying aviation is now capable of delivering missile strikes against enemy ships from distances beyond the reach of its anti-aircraft missiles and artillery and the cover zone of fighters. Cruise missiles, which are in service with submarines and surface ships, allow them to use these weapons from distances that sharply reduce the effectiveness of the enemy's anti-submarine defense and exclude the use of artillery and torpedoes. The most important principle of modern tactics of the Navy is the conduct of combat operations by the combined efforts of diverse forces and various types of weapons with their close interaction.
"What should be done to revive the country's sea power?"
In the short term, at least by 2020, as the Naval Doctrine, approved by decree of the President of the Russian Federation on July 27, 2001, defines:Firstly, the authorities in the country are obliged, at a minimum, to strictly, accurately and persistently implement all the provisions of existing doctrinal documents. They must be implemented, and not remain just a declaration.
Secondly, the content of the naval art of modern Russia, subject to study by every naval officer, must be formalized into a coherent system.
The fulfillment of these provisions is dictated by the preamble of the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation: "Historically, Russia is a leading maritime power, based on its spatial and geophysical features, place and role in global and regional relations." In addition, the content of the Naval Doctrine states: "The solution of the tasks of parrying threats to the security of the Russian Federation in the World Ocean is based on maintaining a sufficient naval potential of the Russian Federation."
In the conditions of the current development of the situation in the world, as noted by V.V. Putin, "we are forced to think about ensuring our own security." That is, the question of the revival of the Russian Navy is now acute: after all, the United States and most of the major NATO states are maritime powers with powerful fleets.
V.Valkov, Ph.D., Associate Professor
Literature: Klado N. L. Introduction to the course of the history of naval art, St. Petersburg. 1910; Mahan A. T.. The influence of sea power on history 1660-1783, trans. from English, St. Petersburg. 1895; Colomb F. G., Naval warfare, its basic principles and experience, [transl. from English]. St. Petersburg, 1894; Military strategy, 2nd ed., M., 1963, ch. 1-3; History of naval art, vol. 1-3, M., 1963; Gorshkov S. G., The development of Soviet naval art, "Naval Collection", 1967, No. 2: Fleet in the First World War, vol. 2, M., 1964; Campaigns of the Pacific War, [transl. from English], M., 1956: Belli V.A., Penzin K.V., Fighting in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea, 1939-1945, M., 1967, “Great Soviet Encyclopedia”, M, 1975, G. Kostev "Who owns naval art now?", M, 2007
AIR SUPERIORITY decisive air superiority of one of the parties in the airspace in a theater of operations, an important operational direction or in a certain area. Allows the Air Force, as well as the Ground Forces and the Navy to carry out tasks without significant opposition from enemy aircraft. It is achieved (won) by defeating the main grouping of its aviation by strikes on airfields and destroying aircraft in air battles, weakening air defense, disrupting aviation and air defense control, as well as destroying stocks of aviation fuel and ammunition, disabling important parts of the aviation industry.
The main role in gaining air supremacy belongs to the Air Force. At the same time, rocket troops, naval forces and special troops are involved in achieving this goal. In terms of scale, air supremacy can be strategic (won in a theater of operations for a long period of time), operational (won in the air-operational direction for the period of a specific operation) and tactical (won in a certain area for the duration of a combat mission).
In the United States and NATO member states, this concept corresponds to the category of air superiority.
DOMINATION ON THE AIR is a state in which one of the parties has the ability to more effectively use its electronic means in combat, operations and war without significant opposition from the enemy, while the other side is deprived of such an opportunity due to a lower energy potential and artificial interference created by the enemy.
Achieved by: detection, destruction and suppression of enemy radio-electronic components and systems by air strikes, missile troops and fire of all types of the Ground Forces, the use of electronic warfare and ensuring the stable operation of their electronic means by reliably protecting them from the blows of the enemy, his electronic warfare and homing weapons.
DOMINATION AT THE SEA decisive superiority of one of the parties in the sea (ocean) theater of operations or in a certain part of it, which provides the naval forces with favorable conditions for the fulfillment of the assigned strategic, operational and combat missions.
It is achieved (won) by destroying the main groupings of the enemy's Navy (Navy) in the theater of operations or in the zone of operations, destroying their bases and control centers, preventing the introduction of additional forces into the maritime theater through straits and narrownesses, destroying anti-submarine lines and creating their own anti-submarine lines. An important condition for gaining dominance at sea is also the preliminary (or simultaneous) gain of dominance in the air.
In terms of scale, dominance at sea can be strategic (over the entire sea or the main part of the ocean theater), operational (in the operational zone of the fleet) or tactical (in the limited zone of the sea or ocean theater).
SYSTEMATIC BATTLE ACTIONS one of the forms of operational use of aviation, air defense and naval forces .. They consist in the implementation of individual operational tasks a limited composition of forces and means for a long time with limited goals: continuous impact on the enemy, fettering his actions, inflicting damage on him, creating favorable conditions for the situation before the main forces are put into action. They are usually conducted in the intervals between operations, battles and massive strikes.
COUNTERSTRIKING is a strike inflicted by the troops of an operational formation (front, army, army corps) in a defensive operation to defeat an enemy grouping of troops that has broken through into the depths of the defense, restore the lost position and create favorable conditions for launching a counteroffensive.
It can be carried out in one or several directions by forces of the second echelons, operational reserves, part of the forces of the 1st echelon, as well as troops withdrawn from secondary sectors of the front. It is supported by the main aviation forces and a specially created artillery group. On the direction of the counterattack, airborne assault forces can be landed and raid detachments can be used. As a rule, it is applied along the flanks of the wedged enemy grouping.
It can be carried out directly on the main forces of the advancing enemy in order to cut them and force them out of the occupied area. Under any conditions, the counterattack should, as far as possible, rely on those sectors of the front where the enemy was stopped or detained. If this is not possible, the beginning of the counterattack takes the form of an oncoming battle.
AIR DEFENSE (Air Defense) is a set of nation-wide, operational-strategic, tactical and organizational-technical measures and combat operations of troops (naval forces) to protect the groupings of the Armed Forces (troops, fleet forces), military and economic facilities, the population, transport communications from air strikes .
It relies on a defense system, including: groupings of forces and means of the Air Force (Air Force and Air Defense), an air enemy reconnaissance system and warning about it, an anti-aircraft missile and artillery cover system, an air cover system, an electronic warfare system, a camouflage system and a control system. It can be created according to the principles of zonal-territorial, zonal-objective and object air defense.
When organizing zonal-territorial air defense, forces and means form a single grouping to protect operationally important areas of the territory with troops and objects located on it.
In the zonal-object construction of air defense, the cover of certain important areas of the territory is combined with the direct cover of important objects located outside the created zones.
When creating an object air defense forces and means are distributed and used for the direct protection of individual important objects.
Air defense is carried out by the Air Force and Air Defense Forces (armies, corps, divisions, brigades, regiments) in cooperation with the military air defense of the Ground Forces and the air defense forces of the Navy. Its constituent elements are anti-missile (non-strategic missile defense - the destruction ballistic missiles tactical and operational-tactical purposes) and anti-aircraft defense, as well as the fight against cruise missiles various types basing.
In peacetime and wartime, air defense is organized and performs its tasks in coordination with the air defense of troops and fleet forces in the theater of operations: before the start of the war - by duty forces and means, and in a threatened period and with the outbreak of war - by the entire composition of the troops, forces and means.
At the beginning of the 21st century, in the strategy of the Air Force and Air Defense, interception and destruction of ballistic and cruise missiles all types of basing, "low visibility" aircraft, aviation complexes Electronic warfare, long-range patrol aircraft and aviation guidance. In ensuring the high efficiency of performing the tasks of the Air Force and Air Defense, the creation of a continuous automated radar field, universal anti-aircraft missile systems high performance, multifunctional short and long-range interception fighters.
ANTI-SPACE DEFENSE (ASD) is a set of measures and combat operations in space aimed at detecting and destroying (disabling, blocking) enemy spacecraft in order to gain dominance in outer space, disrupt an enemy attack from space, ensure the survivability of one's own grouping of military space systems and their reliable operation.
It includes the creation of a grouping of land-based and sea-based anti-space assets, the organization of control of outer space, the interception and destruction (disabling, blocking) of enemy combat and supporting military space assets. Organized as a global system.
It is carried out by special systems for detecting and intercepting space targets, interceptor satellites and ground-based and space-based fire complexes of the Space Forces. At the beginning of the 21st century, the IS-M system (Russia) and the ASAT aviation missile systems (USA) can be used for these purposes.
ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSE (ABM) is a set of measures and combat actions to repel an enemy missile attack, protect the country and the armed forces from nuclear missile and missile and fire strikes.
It is carried out by detecting, intercepting and destroying ballistic missiles (BR), their warheads (MC) or warheads (BB) on flight paths. Can be organized and conducted on a global scale to destroy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) strategic purpose or on a theater scale to combat operational-tactical missiles.
Accordingly, it is built according to the object (to protect certain important objects), zonal (to protect certain areas) or territorial (to protect the entire territory of the country) principle. Underway Space Forces using long-range detection systems of ballistic missiles, anti-missile fire systems of various ranges and control complexes (computing tools and means of transmitting information) in cooperation with the forces of objects, areas, air force and air defense zones.
In accordance with the 1972 ABM Treaty, the USSR and the USA had missile defense systems, respectively, to cover the city of Moscow and one group of ICBMs (mothballed). At the same time, a number of states are developing promising territorial strategic and zonal-object systems of anti-missile defense, including the use of combat weapons based on new ground and space-based physical principles.
AIR DEFENSE (PSD) is an integral part of air defense (according to the American terminology of aerospace defense), designed to detect, intercept and destroy air attack weapons (strategic, operational and tactical aircraft, air, ground and sea-based cruise missiles, airborne assault forces in flight).
It is carried out by formations and formations of the Air Force and Air Defense, as well as by means of air defense of the fronts (army groups), fleets, formations of the Ground Forces and ships of the Navy. It provides for the organization of monitoring the air situation, the conduct of constant reconnaissance of an air enemy, the destruction of aircraft, cruise and ballistic missiles for operational-tactical purposes by anti-aircraft missile and artillery fire and fighter aircraft using air-to-air missiles and cannon aviation systems, as well as the suppression of aviation aiming and guidance systems for the enemy by means of electronic warfare.
When organizing anti-aircraft defense, a grouping of radio engineering troops (RTV) is created, which forms a continuous radar zone, a grouping of anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) with corresponding fire zones, a grouping of fighter aircraft (IA), as well as a grouping of anti-aircraft electronic warfare (EW).
ANTI-TANK DEFENSE (ATD) is a complex of operational, organizational and technical measures, as well as combat operations of troops to combat tanks and other armored forces of the enemy, and repel their attacks.
It relies on a defense system that includes prepared strikes by aviation, missile forces and artillery of the Ground Forces, a grouping of anti-tank weapons, equipped anti-tank strongholds and defense units, an anti-tank fire system in front of the front edge and in depth, a system of anti-tank barriers, designated anti-tank firing lines, the use of anti-tank reserves, mobile and helicopter detachments of barriers. It forms the basis of combined arms defense.
DEFENSIVE LINE An engineered, fortified strip of terrain, relying on which the defending troops (naval forces) must repel an enemy attack and hold certain important objects in depth.
In terms of their significance, defensive lines can be strategic or operational; by affiliation - rear, front, corps and military; by position - first and subsequent, main and intermediate. The operational defensive line (frontline, army), as a rule, is equipped at a depth of 50-250 km and includes 1-2 lanes 15-30 km deep each, occupied by troops of the army (army corps).
The strategic defensive line is being prepared to a depth of 150-550 km, includes 3-4 defensive lines and is engaged in the main forces of the troops of the front, the front of the 2nd echelon and reserves. Each of the defensive lines can serve as a starting area for launching counterattacks and going over to the counteroffensive.
DEFENSE ZONE An engineered area of terrain in which operational formations (combinations) are deployed in battle formation (create an operational formation) and conduct a defensive battle (defensive battle). In NATO armies, a defense zone is understood as a part of the combat zone in a theater of operations, consisting of a forward, several intermediate and strategic defensive lines, an operational and tactical defense zone.
According to the modern views of the Russian military leadership, the operational defense zone is part of the defense zone of an operational formation, extending from the rear border of the tactical defense zone to the entire depth of the operational formation of front troops (army group). Engaged in the second echelon of the reserve of the army (corps) and the front. It has a depth of up to 300 km.
It plays a decisive role in the fight against the advancing enemy groupings that have broken through, their defeat and stabilization of the strategic front.
DEFENSE ZONE A TACTICAL strip of terrain in which formations of the 1st and 2nd echelons of the army (army corps) are defending. It usually includes two defensive lines and is created to a depth of 50 km. The main efforts of the defending troops are concentrated in the tactical zone. In the struggle for this zone, the advancing enemy must be inflicted a decisive defeat, his strike groupings must be drained of blood and stopped, and the possibility of their breakthrough into the operational depth (into the operational space) must be ruled out. Combat operations in this zone are usually of the most intense and stubborn nature, and sometimes turn into positional forms.
FIRE COUNTER-PREPARATION is an integral part of enemy fire engagement in a defensive operation, a relatively short-term massed preemptive strike by rocket troops, artillery, and aviation against the main grouping of enemy troops prepared for an offensive, in order to disrupt or weaken its strike. It is organized, as a rule, by decision of the commander of the troops of the front (army group), sometimes the commander of the army (army corps).
Usually planned according to several options, depending on the expected actions of the enemy. It is carried out according to one of the options in one or several sectors to the depth of the operational-tactical formation of the enemy strike force. The main targets of destruction in the course of counter-preparation may be troops in the initial areas, artillery, reserves, and command posts. It should begin suddenly, before the start of enemy fire preparation.
Usually includes artillery and aviation counter-training. Artillery counter-preparation, in turn, consists of several powerful fire raids; aviation counter-training - from one or two massive (concentrated) air strikes and layered aviation actions. In the future, it can develop into a massive retaliatory missile and fire strike.
A classic example is the fire counter-training conducted by the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts in the Battle of Kursk in July 1943.
FIRE PREPARATION FOR ATTACKS (LANDING LANDINGS), FORCING OBSTACLES The period of fire engagement of the enemy immediately preceding the start of the operation (transition of troops to the offensive, breaking through fortified lines and positions, landing naval and airborne assault forces, forcing water lines).
It consists in conducting pre-planned powerful artillery and mortar fire, delivering strikes by missile forces and aircraft to destroy and suppress enemy nuclear weapons, artillery, manpower and fire weapons, destroy and destroy its strongholds, firing structures, command posts, communication centers and others important objects in the tactical and immediate operational depth, gaining fire superiority and creating favorable conditions for subsequent actions of troops (naval forces).
It usually includes one or more fire raids, a number of missile and air strikes, direct fire to destroy and hit important targets, a number of transfers of fire (including false ones).
Components of fire training are artillery and aviation training. In time, it can last from several tens of minutes to 2-3 hours, and sometimes even several days. Goes into fire support of the attack (landing, forcing).
FIRE SUPPORT OF ATTACKS (LANDINGS OF LANDINGS), FORCING OBSTACLES A period of fire engagement, which consists in pre-planned destruction and suppression by fire of artillery and mortars (fleet ships), strikes and echeloned actions of aircraft of enemy troops and ground facilities for the non-stop advancement of their troops, overcoming and capturing them fortified positions, maintaining fire superiority, eliminating enemy fire opposition, maneuvering forces and means.
It is usually carried out before the troops have captured the defense areas to the depth of the brigades (regiments) of the first echelon, and sometimes more, during the time necessary for their capture. It can be carried out by the method of single, double and triple fire shaft, consistent concentration of fire. Artillery and air support for an attack are integral parts of attack fire support. Goes into fire support.
Suppression and destruction of the enemy by fire from all types of weapons, strikes by missile troops and aircraft using ammunition in conventional equipment is the most important component of the actions of troops (naval forces) in operations, battles and in battle. It is carried out continuously, as a rule, to the entire depth of the enemy operational formation.
The basis of fire damage in modern conditions is the infliction of massive, group and single missile and fire strikes on the troops (navy forces) and enemy targets. In addition, the enemy is destroyed by air strikes, fire from anti-aircraft missile forces, artillery, tank, anti-tank and small arms, the use of mines and flamethrowers. Reconnaissance and strike systems, high-precision conventional weapons with guided and homing munitions, high-powered munitions, and volume explosion munitions take an important place in the system of fire destruction.
In an offensive, fire defeat is organized by periods, including: delivering the first and subsequent massive missile and fire strikes, fire support for the advancement and deployment of troops (naval forces), fire preparation for an attack (landing), fire support for an attack (landing), fire support for an offensive troops in the depths of enemy defenses.
In defense, it is planned and organized according to the stages of a defensive battle and consists of delivering the first and subsequent massive missile and fire strikes in response, conducting fire counter-preparation, fire engagement of the enemy during the advancement and deployment of his troops, fire support for repelling an enemy attack, fire support of the defending troops during battle in depth, fire damage when delivering counterattacks and counterattacks.
For the successful conduct of modern operations (combat actions), it is important to gain fire superiority over the enemy, forestall him in opening fire and delivering rocket-fire and air strikes, creating an expedient system of fire and fire strikes, and organizing fire interaction between various fire weapons.
The main indicators characterizing the fire engagement of the enemy were traditionally considered the density of fire weapons (their number per 1 km of the front), the density of fire (the amount of ammunition consumed per unit area), as well as the percentage ratio of the number of destroyed and suppressed targets and objects to their total number.
With the advent of high-precision, and then highly intelligent weapons capable of performing a number of intellectual functions (detection, target recognition, selection of the most effective way its defeat, control of the impact results) the main indicators should be the characteristics corresponding to these functions. The resulting indicator can be considered the number of enemy targets hit, calculated taking into account their importance (significance), for the time required to implement the plan of the operation.
FIRE SUPERIORITY A situation in which one of the parties has a significant advantage in the use of fire weapons. It consists in the ability of the troops (naval forces) to effectively use their fire weapons, successfully, with high reliability and in the shortest possible time, solve fire missions to destroy and suppress the enemy, limit his ability to counter fire damage and use his fire weapons.
It is achieved by seizing the fire initiative, making full use of the firepower of one’s own troops (naval forces), the capabilities of fire weapons, creating a quantitative and qualitative superiority in these weapons over the enemy in the most important directions (in selected areas), skillful planning of fire (strike), surprise of its opening, camouflage, as well as the effective conduct of the fight against enemy fire weapons. It is one of the important conditions for achieving success in all types of modern operations.
FIRE SUPPORT OF THE OFFENSIVE OF THE TROOPS IN THE DEPTH OF THE ENEMY'S DEFENSE A period of fire damage organized for fire clearing the way for the advancing troops (naval forces), landings. It begins after the fire support of the attack and continues during the offensive to the entire depth of the assigned tasks.
It consists in the continuous destruction and suppression of manpower and firepower of the opposing enemy, his reserves and objects in depth by conducting planned and unplanned artillery, mortar fire, strikes by missile troops and aircraft. Consists of artillery and air support.
It can be carried out with varying intensity, while the main role in its implementation can periodically shift from missile forces and artillery to attack aircraft, or vice versa.
FIRE STRIKE simultaneous powerful fire (missile-fire) attack on the enemy to destroy in a short time a significant number of his targets and objects in the most important areas to a specified depth.
It can be massive and focused, proactive and reactive. It includes a number of coordinated strikes carried out by missile troops and aircraft in combination with massive firing at enemy troops and targets in tactical depth.
It is carried out, as a rule, when repelling a surprise enemy attack (as an immediate response), as well as at decisive moments in a defensive battle, before the start of and during offensive (counter-offensive), airborne and antiamphibious, and sometimes air operations.
In operations carried out with the use of conventional weapons, the delivery of the first massive missile and fire strike and the reflection of an enemy missile and fire strike are of particular importance in modern conditions. All subsequent actions of troops (naval forces) can depend to a decisive extent on this.
OPERATIONAL GROUPING OF TROOPS (FLEET FORCES) disposition of troops (navy forces) and means according to operational-strategic and operational formations and tasks performed with their appropriate formation and location on the ground. Usually includes main, auxiliary and demonstrative groupings, landings, general groupings of formations and units of types of the Armed Forces, special troops, rear and technical support groups acting in the interests of the entire association.
According to their purpose, groupings are distinguished between shock and defensive; by type - groups of ground forces, air force, air force and air defense, navy, special forces.
The main elements of the groupings of the Ground Forces are formations and formations operating in the main and auxiliary sectors, combined arms anti-tank reserves.
The main elements of aviation groupings are strike and support aviation groups.
The main elements of the Air Force and Air Defense groupings are anti-aircraft missile, aviation fighter and radio engineering units.
The main elements of the Navy are strike and support groups designed to perform a variety of tasks.
Initial groupings of troops (naval forces) and means are created well in advance of the start of operations. In the course of operations, they, as a rule, change and reorganize depending on the development of the situation, and also, as certain tasks are completed and new tasks appear, the need to organize combat operations on newly opened directions.
OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE A task assigned to an operational unit to achieve a specific goal in an operation by a set date. The performance of an operational task contributes to the successful completion of an operation or a certain stage of it. The content of operational tasks can be: inflicting defeat on the first or one of the subsequent echelons of the enemy, defeating individual groupings of his troops (navy forces) or reserves, capturing part of the territory (a certain area) to a specified depth, holding certain important areas, repelling enemy strikes, creating favorable conditions for further action.
In offensive (counter-offensive) operations, the operational task is usually divided into immediate (sometimes subsequent) and further tasks. In terms of the depth of combat operations, the further task, as a rule, coincides with the goal of the entire operation of the Armed Forces.
In defensive and joint operations, immediate and further tasks are not set. Instead, as a rule, stages of the operation are established, each of which covers a certain set of actions.
OPERATIONAL INITIATIVE is a set of created conditions, circumstances and objective circumstances that make it possible to impose one's will on the enemy in the course of an ongoing operation for a certain time in the corresponding direction. The side that has seized the initiative has the freedom to choose methods of action, directions and timing of strikes, and can solve assigned tasks under favorable conditions, while the other side is limited in its actions.
Capturing and maintaining the operational initiative is one of the most important factors in achieving success in operations.
It is achieved by inflicting preemptive strikes, surprise actions, more resolute, daring and active use of one's troops (naval forces) and means, gaining fire superiority, air and sea supremacy, and pinning down enemy actions.
OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE is the end result to be achieved by troops (navy forces) in front-line (navy), army and corps-scale operations, as well as in joint operations and operations of formations of types of the Armed Forces.
Usually it involves the defeat of certain operational groupings of enemy troops (naval forces), the capture or retention of areas and objects of operational significance. Frustrating the enemy's intentions is achieved by sequential and simultaneous execution of a number of operational tasks.
OPERATIONAL (COMbat) SUPPORT is a system of operational and organizational measures taken during preparation and during operations, as well as in all types of combat and daily activities of operational-strategic and operational formations of all types of the Armed Forces in order to create favorable conditions for the fulfillment of assigned tasks, maintaining the combat capability of their troops (naval forces), increasing the effectiveness of their actions, as well as preventing a surprise attack by the enemy, dangerous actions and strikes by his troops (navy forces).
main, general views operational support are: operational intelligence, operational camouflage, psychological warfare, electronic warfare, radiation, chemical and biological protection, protection against high-precision weapons, engineering, topogeodesic, navigational, hydrometeorological (meteorological) support. They are inherent in all types of aircraft.
In addition, special types of operational support are organized that are specific to one or another type of aircraft. In particular, the Air Force (Air Force and Air Defense) and the Navy additionally organize and carry out navigational, search and rescue, radar and radio engineering support, and the Navy also provides anti-submarine, anti-mine, anti-boat, anti-submarine and sabotage, navigation, hydrographic support.
As operations become more complex, the composition of the armed forces (naval forces) participating in them, and the types and systems of weapons, interaction increases, and the range of issues resolved during its organization expands. The main organizers of operational cooperation are the headquarters of the formations, primarily the combined arms headquarters of the fronts, armies, and army corps.
OPERATIONAL INTERACTION coordinating the efforts of troops (naval forces) in terms of goals, tasks, place and time for the successful conduct of operations of all types. It is organized and carried out between elements of the operational formation of fronts, fleets, armies, formations of other types of the Armed Forces, between groupings of troops (naval forces) operating in different directions, between adjacent formations and formations, as well as between formations and formations of various types of the Armed Forces, military branches and special forces involved in operations.
As a rule, operational cooperation is planned and organized in the interests of the main groupings of troops (naval forces) and formations of those branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms that play the leading role in the operation.
Working out interaction issues on an operational scale is usually carried out on maps, in the course of special exercises using models of the operation area and / or modern computerized systems for visualizing the situation, and in the most important directions, in addition, it is specified on the ground.
It is documented in plans of operations and plans for interaction, as well as in acts to ensure flanks and joints. At the same time, the order of joint actions of troops (naval forces) and the provision of mutual assistance, including with the maneuver of part of the forces and means of the neighbors' zone, is determined in particular detail.
To ensure operational interaction, interaction networks are created and corresponding signal tables are developed. In the course of operations, the organization of operational interaction is systematically refined, and disrupted interaction is restored. In offensive operations, operational cooperation is organized according to tasks and lines; in defensive operations - in directions, depending on the possible actions of the enemy; in joint operations - by stages.
OPERATIONAL ART is an integral part of military art, covering the theory and practice of preparing and conducting operations and combat operations by combined arms (common fleet) formations (fronts, armies, army corps, fleets, flotillas, heterogeneous forces), joint and independent operations (combat operations) of various types of formations Sun.
Operational art occupies an intermediate position between military strategy and tactics, is subordinate to strategy, ensures the fulfillment of its goals and tasks, at the same time determines the nature and general direction of tactics, sets certain requirements and tasks for it. It is subdivided into combined arms operational art, operational art of the Armed Forces, operational art of the rear.
As an independent part of military art, operational art was first singled out in the USSR. In the 21st century, its legitimacy is also recognized in the United States and other NATO member states. Operational art continues to develop rapidly due to the increase in the scale of hostilities, the improvement of weapons, and the technical development of possible methods of their application. Of particular importance is the development of new forms and methods of conducting operations using increased-power ammunition, high-precision and "intelligent" weapons, reconnaissance and strike systems, robotic "intelligent" and automated means.
In connection with the development of the concept of deterrence (especially non-nuclear deterrence), a special type of operational art is the demonstration of force and convincing communication to the potential aggressor of the effectiveness of the means that will be used to strike back at him. This task is solved by the armed forces in peacetime, before the outbreak of hostilities, and is aimed at preventing them.
OPERATIONAL ART OF THE SERVICES OF THE AF - based on the provisions of the combined arms operational art, determines the tasks, organization of training, methods of conducting operations and combat operations by formations of other types of the Armed Forces (Air Force, Navy), taking into account their specifics, properties, organizational structure, technical equipment, scope.
The basis of the content of the operational art of formations is: for the Air Force - the preparation and conduct of air operations, layered operations of the Air Force and air support for other types of Armed Forces, as well as the preparation and conduct of anti-aircraft operations and systematic combat operations; for the Navy - preparation and conduct of operations of the fleet, flotillas, maritime operations of consolidated groups of the Navy, systematic combat operations of the naval forces, participation of the fleet in amphibious and antiamphibious operations.
In peacetime, the branches of the Armed Forces involved in solving the problem of deterrence must possess the art of carrying out combat duty and demonstrating their readiness to strike back at the aggressor.
OPERATIONAL ART OF COMMON ARMS forms the basis of operational art. It occupies a dominant place and gives general guidelines for the operational use of all types of armed forces and rear, establishes uniform principles for their use, considers the theory and practice of using formations of the Ground Forces in operations, the tasks and methods of training and conducting front-line, army and corps, airborne, anti-airborne and other joint operations.
THE OPERATIONAL ART OF THE AF LOGO deals with the issues of organizing the rear and rear support of front-line, army, corps operations, as well as joint operations of the branches of the Armed Forces.
OPERATIONAL PLANNING - a set of measures for the production of calculations and the development of operational documents for the preparation and conduct of operations of all types, the rational distribution of forces and means at the disposal of the command of operational formations, and determining the procedure for their use to perform the assigned tasks.
It is carried out by the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the main headquarters of the types and headquarters of the branches of the Armed Forces, the commander and headquarters of military districts, fleets and armies (army corps), the commanders and headquarters of operational formations of types of the Armed Forces. Includes: assessment of the situation, determination of the goals of the operation, their types, the concept of the operation, its content and the sequence of solving the tasks involved in each operation of the troops, forces and means, their distribution according to directions and tasks, stages of the operation, forms and methods of preparing and conducting operations, organization of interaction, provision and management.
Operational planning includes:
Plans for bringing troops (naval forces) to the highest levels of combat readiness and their deployment, conducting operations of fronts, armies (army corps), fleets (flotillas), formations of types of the Armed Forces, joint operations of all types, preparation of operations, interaction of troops and forces participating in operations and means, nuclear and fire destruction of the enemy, the use of combat arms (naval forces);
Plans for all types of operational, technical and logistic support;
Plans for the organization of management, as well as relevant policy documents (operational directives, orders, instructions).
The necessary technical calculations are carried out, the expected results of operations are determined. If necessary, their modeling is carried out.
In peacetime, operational planning is a continuous process carried out in a closed cycle: setting tasks, analyzing them, assessing the situation, making a decision, planning an operation on the spot, checking the plan for conducting an operation in higher command instances, practicing exercises and games, setting refined tasks etc. In wartime, planning is carried out in a short time. The developed plans are approved, after which the commanders and staffs proceed to the direct preparation of operations on time, to their implementation.
OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF TROOPS (FLEET FORCES) distribution of troops (navy forces) and means of operational-strategic and operational formations according to the place in the grouping of troops (navy forces), the order of tasks and the nature of actions with their relative location on the ground (sea waters, in the air) . It usually includes one or more operational-tactical echelons, a mobile echelon (operational maneuver group, mobile group) of groupings, formations of types of the Armed Forces, military branches (naval forces) and special forces, reserves for various purposes.
Special elements of the operational formation may be operational cover troops, air and sea landings, and support groups. Groupings are created in accordance with the concept of the operation, the emerging operational situation and conditions in the area of the operation.
Operational formation should ensure the possibility of successfully achieving the goals of the operation, performing immediate and subsequent tasks, timely building up the efforts of troops (naval forces) in the most important areas at decisive moments of the operation, developing and consolidating the success achieved, disrupting enemy counteractions, high stability and protection of troops (naval forces ) from enemy strikes, the possibility of flexible maneuver by forces and means.
The course of the operation changes as troops (fleet forces) are brought into battle from the depths, formations and formations (that have lost their combat capability or completed their tasks) are withdrawn to the reserve, changes in the general situation, and also for other reasons. At the same time, instead of the second echelons and reserves brought into battle, new ones are created at the first opportunity.
OPERATIONAL COVER FOR THE TROOPS (FLEET FORCES) - a system of measures carried out by a special element of the operational formation of troops (naval forces) in the theater of operations, strategic or operational direction to repel a surprise enemy attack, cover the main forces when they are brought to full combat readiness, deployed and put into battle, retention of the most important areas and facilities in the border zone. It is created at the expense of specially allocated combat-ready formations and units of the ground forces, reinforced by units of the armed forces together with the border troops, and at sea - by combat duty forces.
In some areas, it can rely on equipped fortified areas and positions, a system of barriers and destruction. Usually, operational cover troops are deployed along the state border in a cover zone, which may include a security zone and specially equipped defensive lines. Barriers and units of obstacles are being created within the boundaries of the zone, a fire system is being organized, and temporary firing positions are being prepared for artillery, as well as for air defense systems and forward radar posts. Forward command posts are being prepared and an extensive communications system is being organized.
OPERATIONAL MANEUVER A maneuver carried out by troops, forces, combat assets, strikes, fire, stocks of material and technical assets on the scale of operational formations, in order to occupy a more advantageous position in relation to the enemy, concentrate efforts on the most important areas, strengthen or restore the combat capability of certain groupings of troops ( forces of the fleet), withdrawing them from attack, shifting efforts from one direction to another, repulsing unexpected enemy actions and other tasks in preparation for and during operations of all types.
Organized by the command and headquarters of operational-strategic, operational and operational-tactical formations in accordance with the evolving situation
As a rule, it should be carried out covertly, in a short time, behind a system of measures of operational camouflage and disinformation, protection against enemy attacks from the air and sea.
OPERATIONAL BRIDGEHEAD An area captured by advancing troops when forcing a water barrier or landing on an enemy coast and used to build up the main forces and deploy subsequent actions. In defense, an area held on the banks of a river or in the foothills to pin down the enemy and cover the withdrawal of the main forces from the battle.
AT broad sense- the territory used by any state for the concentration and deployment of armed forces for the purpose of invading the borders of another state. Capturing and holding bridgeheads requires decisive action. The struggle for bridgeheads, as a rule, acquires a very tense and stubborn character.
A good example of this is the struggle of the Soviet troops in the Great Patriotic War for the bridgeheads captured on the Dnieper River in 1943 and on the Vistula River in 1944.
OPERATIONAL DEFENSE BREAKTHROUGH Creation of a gap in the enemy's operational-tactical defense system for the subsequent development of an offensive in depth and towards the flanks.
It is used in conditions of continuous defense, when the defending enemy has no open flanks. It is achieved by defeating the main grouping of enemy troops (naval forces) in the chosen direction (section) with strikes of all types of weapons, followed by a decisive offensive by tank and motorized rifle formations and units, capturing defensive positions and lines in the designated zone and entering the operational space.
An operational breakthrough must be preceded by a breakthrough of the tactical defense zone. As a result, conditions are created for conducting maneuver operations of troops in the operational depth.
In operations using only conventional weapons, a breakthrough, as a rule, is carried out after powerful fire training in one or several sections of the front, each 15-30 km long or more, with the creation of high operational densities and overwhelming superiority in forces and means over the enemy. When using nuclear weapons, it can be carried out immediately on a wide front following the delivery of nuclear strikes on the defense.
The problem of a breakthrough arose in the First World War, but was solved only in the Second World War with the advent of powerful artillery, tank and aviation forces and means. At the beginning of the 21st century, for a successful breakthrough using only conventional weapons essential can acquire a massive use of high-precision weapons and ammunition of increased power.
OPERATIONAL RESERVE An element of the operational formation of troops (naval forces), designed to perform suddenly arising tasks. It includes specially dedicated formations with reinforcements and can be used to build up efforts in one of the directions, repel sudden enemy attacks, cover the flanks, strengthen the main groupings of troops, and transfer efforts to new directions. It is at the direct disposal of the commanders of fronts, fleets, associations of types of aircraft.
Along with the operational combined-arms reserve, reserves for various purposes can be created in the formation of operational formations:
Nuclear reserve - in the associations of the Strategic Missile Forces;
Anti-tank, anti-amphibious, artillery reserves, reserves of special troops (in particular, engineering, chemical), reserves of reconnaissance forces and means - in combined arms formations;
Aviation reserve - in the associations of the Air Force;
The reserve of air defense systems and RTV - in the associations of the Air Force and Air Defense;
The reserve of ships is in the formations of the Navy;
The reserve of material and technical means is in associations of all types of aircraft.
Used reserves should be restored as quickly as possible and included in the overall operational formation of troops (naval forces) in case of repulsing unforeseen enemy strikes and solving newly arisen tasks.
OPERATIONAL ECHELON is part of the operational formation of troops (naval forces), designed to perform priority or subsequent tasks in various directions or in various areas.
Usually, a distinction is made between the first operational echelon, designed to perform immediate tasks (repelling an invasion), the second echelon, to build up efforts from the depths and perform subsequent (further) tasks, and the mobile echelon, to conduct maneuvering operations in depth.
The composition of the first operational echelon of the front, as a rule, includes most of the combined arms (tank) armies and army corps; armies (army corps) - most of the combined arms formations (divisions and brigades) with reinforcements; fleet - most of the combat-ready forces of the fleet.
The composition of the second operational echelon includes 1-2 combined arms armies, army corps; as part of the mobile echelon - mobile groups, operational maneuver groups, separate tank formations and air assault (airmobile) units (combinations).
Ground and air echelons can be formed to conduct air-ground operations. The ground echelon consists of combined arms formations (formations). It is designed to strike at the enemy and his fire damage from the ground. The air echelon consists of the Air Force grouping, airborne troops and airborne assault forces. It is designed to cover the enemy and inflict deep air strikes on him.
Groupings of the Air Force, when delivering massive strikes, are usually divided into support and several strike flight echelons. The supporting echelon is designed to break through the enemy's air defense and suppress its main links. The first strike echelon - to deliver the most powerful air strike on the intended group of targets, the second and third attack flight echelons - to build up efforts, strike at some of the objects affected by the first echelon, and destroy an additional number of objects and targets.
Troops of the first throw, first and second echelons, artillery groups and reserves are created as part of amphibious assault forces. In airborne assaults - providing paratrooper and airborne landing echelons.
OPERATIONS DURATION is one of the main characteristics of an operation. It is measured by the length of time from the beginning of the operation to its completion (achieving the set goals, reaching the established line, forced refusal to perform the assigned tasks, the actual cessation of active hostilities due to exhaustion of forces, expenditure of material resources, or for other reasons).
The duration of the operation depends on its scale, the conditions of the situation and the art of command and control. With this in mind, the operation can be long or fleeting. It is necessary to strive to complete it as soon as possible, and to plan its conduct taking into account the real capabilities of one's own troops (naval forces) and troops (navy forces) of the enemy, the nature of the terrain and weather conditions.
OPERATIONS RANGE An indicator that characterizes the main content of the operation. Includes data on the composition of the troops (naval forces) and assets involved in the operation, on the width of the zone and depth of hostilities, and their pace. It depends on the goals and scale of the operation, the correlation of forces and means, the combat capabilities of friendly troops (naval forces) and enemy troops (naval forces), the availability of material reserves and terrain features. Distinguish between the planned and actually achieved scope of the operation. Their ratio characterizes the success achieved as a result of the operation.
OPERATIONS DEVELOPMENT RATES are one of the main indicators of offensive operations. It is determined by the average daily depth of advance of troops in the main directions. In planning, the rates of advance are calculated separately for the period of accomplishment of the immediate, further task and for the entire operation. Actual rates may differ significantly from the calculated ones (in one direction or another) depending on the specific conditions of the situation, the actions of the troops (naval forces) of the parties, the quality of control and other factors. The ratio of the calculated and actually achieved rates of development of the operation characterizes the effectiveness of the actions of the command and troops (naval forces).
OPERATION is a set of simultaneous and consecutive battles, battles, strikes and maneuver of troops (naval forces) coordinated and interconnected in terms of goals, tasks, place and time, carried out according to a single plan and plan to solve strategic, operational or operational-tactical tasks in the theater (theaters) military operations, strategic (operational) direction or in a certain vast area (zone) in a specified period of time.
Operations are carried out by associations of one or more types of aircraft and differ in scale, types and types. The scale of the operation is determined by the spatial scope, duration and composition of the troops (naval forces) involved.
Based on these criteria, they distinguish: global strategic operations, strategic operations in a theater of operations, strategic operations in one or more strategic directions, operations of fronts and formations of types of aircraft (navies, flotillas, army corps, air force armies, air force and air defense armies) on one or multiple operating areas.
The types of operations include combined arms (common naval), independent and joint operations of types of aircraft. Combined-arms operations are: operations of fronts, combined-arms armies, army corps.
General naval operations include operations of fleets, flotillas, or various forces of the Navy. The independent operations of the Armed Forces include the operations of the Air Force armies, the Air Force and Air Defense armies, and naval operations. Joint operations include amphibious, antiamphibious, air, anti-aircraft, air assault operations and operations of mobile forces.
The types of operations that differ in purpose and nature of actions include defensive, counter-offensive and offensive. By the time of carrying out, the first, subsequent and final operations are distinguished.
Each operation is characterized by indicators of the spatial scope, duration and intensity (tempo) of hostilities. The nature of operations depends on the general nature of the war, the goals and objectives set, the troops, forces and means used, the morale and psychological state and training of personnel, the level of command and control, the characteristics of the theater of operations (the area of operations), and other conditions of the situation.
For the successful conduct of operations, it is important to eliminate the template in their construction, forms and methods of conducting, provide for their comprehensive training, organization of interaction between the troops, forces and means participating in them, the implementation of operational, technical and logistic support measures, continuous flexible and stable command and control of troops (forces fleet).
As military affairs develop, the structure and methods of conducting operations are constantly becoming more complex and more intense. Their mobility and dynamism increase.
OPERATION (BATTLE) AIR AND GROUND concept of the operational (combat) use of heterogeneous formations, formations and units of ground forces, tactical aviation, and sometimes fleet forces (air-land-sea operation), adopted in the USA and NATO in the mid-80s years of the twentieth century, taking into account the re-equipment of the armed forces with qualitatively new systems of weapons and military equipment, including high-precision combat systems.
The basis of the concept is the conduct of operations (battles) in decisive, active and maneuverable forms with the delivery of powerful strikes from land, air and sea, clearly coordinated in terms of targets, time and place, with the widespread use of guided and homing precision weapons, reconnaissance and strike systems, air and amphibious landings, ground and air mobile groups (detachments), organizing continuous fire engagement of the enemy simultaneously throughout the entire depth of his formation, isolating reserves and destroying them piecemeal even before they are put into battle.
It involves the gaining of fire superiority and air supremacy, the creation and coordinated use of ground and air echelons, continuous fire engagement of the enemy throughout the entire depth of his formation, coverage of the main groupings of troops (naval forces) on land, from air and sea, active conduct of electronic warfare.
It was first used during the fighting in Lebanon in 1982, in full-scale form it was practically used during the war in the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Storm in 1991
OPERATION ARMY (CORPS) is a set of formations and units of a combined arms army (corps) coordinated in terms of purpose, place and time of combat operations and means of its reinforcement in the zone assigned to it in order to achieve a specific operational goal.
Usually carried out in one operational direction. Maybe: by the nature of the actions of the troops - defensive, counter-offensive and offensive; in order of conduct - first or subsequent; by duration - short-term or long-term; according to the results achieved - successful or incomplete.
As a rule, it is part of a front-line operation, but in some cases it can be carried out independently (in an isolated operational direction). Includes the infliction of the first and subsequent massive missile and fire strikes, combat operations of combined arms divisions (brigades) of the first echelon, combat operations of divisions (brigades) of the second echelon, combat operations of mobile army groups, Air Force aviation and Air Force and Air Defense assets, airborne units, in some cases - air, sea landing (counter-landing).
A defensive operation of a combined-arms army is usually carried out in a strip 100-150 km wide, an army corps - up to 100 km. When conducting a counter-offensive (offensive) operation, an army can be assigned an offensive zone 50-100 km wide, an army corps - 30-50 km wide. The depth of an army (corps) offensive (counter-offensive) operation can be up to 150 km, with an average duration of 5-10 days.
Characteristic features of modern army (corps) operations are high dynamism, the decisive importance of a powerful fire impact on the enemy, a coordinated combination of strikes on land with strikes and air coverage, and the deployment of combat operations in separate isolated areas.
In the armed forces of the United States and NATO, modern army (corps) operations are guided and conducted according to the principles of air-ground combat. A typical example of such an operation is the operation of ground forces in common system Expeditionary Force Operation "Desert Storm" in 1991
OPERATION AIRMOBILE is one of the main forms of combat operations in the armies of the United States and other NATO member states. It consists in the covert and rapid transfer of airmobile formations by air behind enemy lines with the capture of designated areas, the infliction of powerful air and ground strikes against the enemy, the conduct of a series of interrelated battles and battles in a certain area, followed by a swift maneuver to new areas to solve certain operational or operational - tactical tasks.
The purpose of an airmobile operation is usually to capture and hold important areas on enemy territory, bridgeheads, passes, crossings, destroy objects of operational importance, prevent the organized withdrawal of enemy troops, and fight second echelons and reserves.
It is carried out, as a rule, by the forces of one or more air assault or light infantry divisions interacting with units of other branches of the armed forces (combined into a number of brigade or battalion tactical airmobile groups) with their constant fire support from combat helicopters and tactical aircraft.
Usually, an airmobile operation is divided into several stages: preparatory (concentration and deployment of troops); the first (flight of airmobile units by air); the second (landing in the area of operation); the third (conducting hostilities in the operational area); the fourth and subsequent (exit from the battle and transfer to a new area) for delivering the next blows.
It first began to be used in the US Army in the early 60s of the twentieth century in South Vietnam to destroy individual garrisons, military installations, as well as for punitive purposes against partisan formations. In modern conditions, it can be used as an integral element of the air-ground operation.
AIR OPERATION an integral part of a strategic operation in a theater of operations or a front operation, a set of coordinated air strikes, air battles and battles interconnected in terms of goals, tasks, place and time, carried out by one or more Air Force formations (Air Force and Air Defense), formations of other types of aircraft according to a single plan and a plan for solving one or more operational-strategic or operational tasks.
Such tasks may include defeating (weakening) the enemy's aviation and nuclear missile groupings and gaining air supremacy, defeating enemy reserves, disorganizing the rear and state administration, and weakening the enemy's military and economic potential. Accordingly, one or another type of air operation is distinguished.
Depending on the scale, the nature of the intended goals, the composition of the forces and assets involved, and the spatial scope, air operations can be strategic and operational, cover several theaters of operations, be carried out on one or part of the theater of operations or within the front (fleet), as well as actions on a certain strategic or air-operational direction. As a rule, it is organized in the conditions of a conventional war and is carried out using ammunition in conventional equipment. But it can also be carried out with the use of nuclear weapons.
Each air operation usually includes: conducting reconnaissance of an air enemy; infliction of the first and subsequent (5-8) massive aviation and missile strikes on airfields, bases for storing aviation fuel and ammunition, command posts, air defense systems, and other objects, depending on the goals of the operation; group strikes and layered aviation actions between massive strikes; air battles to repulse enemy air force retaliatory actions; demonstrative and distracting blows; support system.
As a rule, the operation is divided into a number of successive stages, each of which may include 1-2 massive air and missile strikes. The duration of a modern air operation varies widely: from 2-3 days. up to 1 month and more, as was the case with the Allied Powers' Operation Desert Storm against Iraq.
As a special form of military operations, the air operation became widely used by both belligerents in World War II. At the beginning of the 21st century, it acquired a qualitatively new content. Its role is constantly growing, and the methods of implementation are rapidly improving.
The characteristic features of the operation are: decisiveness of goals, large spatial scope, participation in the operation of diverse forces and means, widespread use of cruise missiles and other systems of high-precision weapons, high intensity and activity of actions, a variety of techniques and methods for performing combat missions, flexible transfer of efforts from one direction (district) to another, depending on the prevailing situation. In the future, in the case of the deployment of combat space systems, it can take the form of a large-scale aerospace operation.
AIRBOARDING OPERATION is one of the types of joint operations united by a single concept in terms of goals, place, time and tasks of the action of airborne troops and military transport aviation in cooperation with other branches of the Armed Forces and military branches to drop (land) airborne assault forces in the rear the enemy and their solution of operational tasks in the landing area.
It is carried out to seize operational bridgeheads, assist troops advancing from the front in defeating the opposing enemy and his reserves, seizing important areas and facilities in depth, disorganizing the work of the rear, transport operations and disrupting the enemy’s state and military command and control systems. It is carried out in several stages: the occupation of the initial areas, the landing of troops, fire suppression of the enemy in the landing area, the flight of the troops along the route, the landing, the performance by the troops of the tasks after the landing, the connection with the troops advancing from the front and the withdrawal from the battle. Usually it is part of a strategic or front-line offensive operation.
To participate in the operation, 1-2 airborne divisions or brigades, an airborne assault unit (combination), one or more airborne regiments with reinforcements can be used as landing forces. Suppression of enemy air defenses in the flight path of military transport aviation and in the landing area is carried out by the Air Force and the missile forces and artillery of the Ground Forces (in some cases, units of the Strategic Missile Forces).
Landing can be carried out in one or more areas. After landing, the landing troops can hold the captured areas, conduct an offensive or carry out raids behind enemy lines to capture and destroy the objects assigned to them. The landing depth depends on the composition of the landing force and can be 150-300 km or more.
It is one of the most complex types of modern surgery. It requires skillful planning, flexible organization, surprise actions, and most importantly, reliable suppression of the enemy’s air defense system on the flight route and in the landing area, its active support by air strikes, missile forces and artillery of the Ground Forces, uninterrupted air supply of the landing force.
The most characteristic airborne operations of the Second World War were: the operation of the Nazi troops to capture the island of Cyprus in 1940, the army airborne operation of 1944, the airborne operations of the American troops in the Pacific theater of war in 1944-1945.
OPERATION AIR-SEA amphibious is a major combined joint operation. It is a complex of operational actions coordinated and interconnected in terms of goals, tasks, place and time, carried out according to a single plan and concept, related to the landing of amphibious and airborne assault forces on the coast defended by the enemy and their performance of tasks on the coast.
It is usually carried out to invade the continent, capture the strait zones, important sections of the coast, naval bases, islands, and assist troops advancing in the coastal direction. It is planned and organized in stages: gaining supremacy at sea and in the air in the area of operation, concentration of forces, landing and formation of an amphibious assault, landing of an airborne assault, passage of an amphibious assault by sea and flight of an airborne assault, landing of an airborne assault, battle for an amphibious landing, combat landing operations on the coast.
Usually it is part of a strategic or front-line offensive operation. It may also have an independent strategic value. A classic example of such an operation is the Allied Normandy operation to invade Europe in 1944 by Anglo-American-Canadian troops.
OPERATION DEEP operational concept, which provides for conducting operations in the form of simultaneous fire suppression of the enemy to the entire depth of his formation, delivering powerful frontal strikes in combination with the rapid advance of mobile (mobile) groupings of troops behind enemy lines, with deep coverage of it by air and sea landings. The basis of its success is a powerful impact on all components of the operational formation of the enemy for his defeat and defeat in a short time in parts.
A deep operation involves the creation and consistent use of several shock echelons (attack, development, breakthrough), a cover echelon, mobile groups and the delivery of increasing strikes by artillery and aircraft to the full range of their actions. Developed by Soviet military theorists in the middle of 3
1. Military intelligence- a set of measures taken by the military command of all levels to obtain and study information about an active or potential enemy. Depending on the scale and purpose of the tasks military intelligence subdivided into strategic, operational and tactical.
2. Strategic intelligence is organized mainly by the command. Materials mined strategic intelligence, are supplemented by data obtained as a result of the work of operational and tactical intelligence agencies carried out directly on the battlefields.
3. Operational reconnaissance is organized by the command of the fronts and armies /if they have appropriate reconnaissance assets in their combat composition/ in order to ensure decision-making and conduct of operations. The depth of operational reconnaissance is determined by the forthcoming task of the front, the army. Normally, the front organizes reconnaissance reconnaissance to a depth of 300-500 km, the army to 100-150 km.
4. Operational intelligence obtains information and studies:
Areas of concentration and deployment of enemy troops before the start of the operation; the number and composition of troops, the numbers of units and formations, their grouping and intentions, the direction of the main and auxiliary strikes, the distribution of troops according to the directions of the strike, the places of headquarters of the formations.
- areas of concentration of army and front-line reserves of the enemy, their composition, grouping, combat capability and the possibility of directing actions;
- areas of concentration of enemy tank and motorized formations, their combat strength, the enemy airfield network, the composition and belonging of aviation to it.
Defensive lines / lines / of the enemy, their preparation in engineering terms and the degree of employment by troops.
New technical means of combat and their operational-tactical use.
- the arrangement and operation of the army and front rear of the enemy, routes for the supply of troops, ammunition, fuel, the intensity of transportation, places for unloading troops and cargo, places for army and front-line ammunition depots, all types of armed, food, fuel, main and distribution railway stations, transshipment and exchange offices on dirt tracks.
The degree of staffing of the enemy’s active units and formations, the procedure for the formation of new ones, their national composition, combat capability and material support, training of personnel,
The political and moral state of the enemy troops, the population of the area of upcoming hostilities.
- the theater of military operations and individual operational areas from the point of view of the possibility and convenience of the actions of enemy troops and their own.
The most important task of operational reconnaissance is to reveal the operational intentions of the enemy; how, where and with what it threatens or can threaten our zoisks, as well as determining what the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy’s plan of action are.
- Operational reconnaissance is carried out by aviation, tanks, mechanized and cavalry formations, airborne troops, radio reconnaissance equipment, agents, and is supplemented by data obtained as a result of partisan combat operations and tactical reconnaissance data. Aviation, tank, mechanized and cavalry formations and airborne troops, as a rule, conduct operational reconnaissance simultaneously with the performance of their combat missions.
6. Tactical reconnaissance is organized by the army command, commanders of formations, units and subunits. It helps them to obtain information about the enemy for decision-making and the appropriate use of their troops in battle.
The depth of foot reconnaissance in a regiment is 5-10 km, in a division 10-20 km, in the army / corps / 15-25 km, the depth of reconnaissance carried out by mobile troops is up to 20-40 km, by aviation up to 100 km. In conditions where there are large gaps in the disposition of the enemy troops or the areas of operations are populated and sympathize with the Red Army, or it is poorly populated, reconnaissance agencies can penetrate the enemy disposition to a depth of 50-70 km.
- Tasks of tactical intelligence;
Establish the grouping of the resisting enemy and its combat composition;
Clarify the battle formations, flanks and joints of enemy units, as well as the nature of his actions.
Establish an enemy defense system, all types of fire and the location of all firing points, fortifications, obstacles and barriers.
Establish the presence and number of tanks, self-propelled guns and artillery in enemy combat formations.
Establish the location, combat composition and ownership of enemy tactical reserves.
- to determine the location of the headquarters, units and formations of the enemy, his command and observation posts and communication centers.
- to clarify the advanced airfield network of the enemy and the basing of aviation on it.
- organization of the rear of regiments, divisions and corps.
- to study the tactics of actions of all branches of the enemy troops in all types of combat.
- to study the terrain and the area of forthcoming actions, to determine their influence on the actions of the troops of both sides, especially tanks, self-propelled artillery and artillery.
The most important task of tactical reconnaissance is to determine the combat composition of the opposing enemy, to reveal his intentions and all elements of the battle order.
Tactical reconnaissance is conducted continuously, both by special reconnaissance subunits and units, and by all active troops, and is supplemented by operational reconnaissance data.
- Depending on the means of performing reconnaissance tasks, military reconnaissance is divided into the following types:
- military;
- agency.
Reconnaissance conducted by means of troops / ground and air services to solve the problem of operational and tactical intelligence / is called military intelligence.
10. Troop intelligence is the main type of intelligence. It is conducted by infantry, cavalry, aviation, artillery, tank, engineering, chemical troops, signal troops, special forces, as well as political bodies, topographical, sanitary and veterinary services.
11. The tasks of military intelligence are solved:
- direct combat activities of the troops.
- Combat activities of reconnaissance units, subunits and bodies / photographing, eavesdropping, searches, ambushes, raids, combat, actions behind enemy lines /.
– Observation /commander, ground, with the help of special equipment, aerial/.
- Informing, that is, clarifying and adding all available intelligence information received from partisans / interrogating prisoners, defectors who arrived from enemy territory, studying documents and trophies, interviewing local residents, reconnaissance of the area and studying the area of \u200b\u200boperations. Only the battle allows you to most reliably identify the opposing enemy.
12. Basic principles of military intelligence: continuity, activity, timeliness, reliability of information.
13. The success of military intelligence is achieved:
- centralization in one hands of the management of the activities of all reconnaissance means, the collection of information and control over the fulfillment of assigned tasks.
Purposeful setting of tasks for intelligence agencies and communications.
- The concentration of the greatest efforts on the direction of the main blow of our troops or on the main enemy grouping.
- The presence of a sufficient reserve of reconnaissance assets and its correct use.
– Keeping secret all preparatory and reconnaissance activities.
- Careful preparation of the personnel, combat and material support of intelligence agencies before the performance.
- Sudden, decisive and daring actions.
- Good communications with intelligence agencies and rapid transmission of intelligence data to the appropriate commanders and headquarters.
- Careful control over the timely completion of reconnaissance missions by the troops.
– Knowledge of the tactics of the enemy, the organization of his troops and the technical means of combat used by him.
- A careful study of all information about the enemy and the ability to quickly and correctly draw a conclusion about the nature of the actions and intentions of the enemy.
- Transfer of all intelligence data to the replacement units.
14. Organization of continuous reconnaissance, one of the main duties of commanders and staffs in all types of combat activities of the troops.
15. The commander, on the basis of the task set by the senior commander, assessing the situation of the available data about the enemy, indicates to the chief of staff the goals and objectives, the determination by what time should be obtained, and also gives the order to allocate the funds necessary for this.
16. The commander of a subunit, unit, formation is responsible to the highest authority for organizing the conduct of reconnaissance. He is obliged to daily manage reconnaissance in order to know the forces, means, grouping, nature of actions and intentions of the opposing enemy in any situation. Train your staff in organization and intelligence and be responsible for its ability to carry out these tasks. The company commander personally collects and processes information about the enemy in a company, and the battalion commander in a battalion.
17. Conducting reconnaissance by a senior commander and assigning reconnaissance tasks to a subordinate commander does not release the latter from the obligation to conduct reconnaissance in the interests of fulfilling the tasks of his subunit, part of a formation.
16.1. general characteristics rear of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus.
Logistic support is organized and carried out in all types of combat and in the daily activities of military units and subunits in order to maintain them in a combat-ready state and create favorable conditions for the fulfillment of assigned tasks.
Types of logistics are material, medical, veterinary, commercial, residential, operational, and in the air force and air defense forces, in addition, engineering, airfield, airfield and technical support for rear services.
Organizationally, the forces and means of the rear are part of the operational commands and units of the branches of the Armed Forces, and are also directly subordinate to the central authorities.
The logistic support system inherited by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus as a legacy of the Red Banner Belarusian Military District has undergone significant changes over the years of reform related to clarifying the tasks of logistic support, improving the organizational structure of the troops and rear, changing the responsibility of officials of the Ministry of Defense for organizing one or another type of security. As a result, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus have developed a system of logistical support for troops, which has its own national characteristics, unlike similar support systems for the armies of foreign states.
The development of tactics and operational art shows that comprehensive and uninterrupted logistical support for troops is one of the decisive conditions for the successful conduct of combat and the most important duty of commanders. When organizing combat operations, the commander must take into account the state and capabilities of the rear, set tasks for him in a timely manner, and continuously manage them during the battle.
By the scale and nature of the tasks performed the rear of the Armed Forces is subdivided on the strategic, operational-strategic, operational and tactical(military).
Strategic rear- the highest echelon of the rear of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus. It includes the rear of the center, the forces and means of logistic support, which are directly subordinate to the commanders of the branches of the Armed Forces (the rear command post of the Armed Forces, command posts logistic formations and military units, control points of organizations and institutions of the rear of central subordination). Particularly responsible tasks to ensure combat activities in Everyday life troops performs rear center. He takes from National economy logistics equipment, rocket fuel, fuel and other materiel, contains the main part of their stocks and supplies them to the branches of all branches of the Armed Forces; ensures the delivery of all types of materiel to operational commands, and also performs operational and evacuation transportation; carries out the most complex types of repairs of equipment and property of the rear services, manufactures some samples of military products; treats the wounded and sick.
Operational-strategic rear- is a link between the strategic and operational rear. It is designed to provide rear services for the branches of the Armed Forces.
The operational rear is a link between the operational-strategic and operational rear, and in a number of cases it has ties with enterprises and organizations of the national economy. It directly provides for operational and operational-tactical formations and their formations and separate units in the rear.
Tactical (military rear)- the final link in the rear of the Armed Forces, designed to directly support units, subunits in combat and everyday activities.
16.2. Tasks and composition of the military rear.
The military rear consists of rear units and subunits with stocks of material resources that are part of formations, units, and subunits. The composition of the military rear is determined by the states of the corresponding military units. Depending on the purpose, its main formations are divided into military units and subunits: material support, medical, airfield technical.
Rear tasks:
Preparation of rear units (subdivisions) for logistic support;
Replenishment in subdivisions and warehouses of material and technical means to the established norms;
Maintenance and repair of rear equipment;
Evacuation of the wounded and sick;
Inspection on the battlefield and evacuation of captured and domestic weapons;
Commercial and consumer services;
Organization of security, defense, rear protection;
Management organization.
Military units and logistics units- are intended: for receiving, maintaining and delivering (release) stocks of weapons, ammunition, fuel, food, water, clothing, engineering and medical property and other materiel; refueling equipment with fuel; providing personnel with hot food and hygienic washing; repair, disinfection and disinsection of clothing property; evacuation from units (subdivisions) of defective, domestic and captured weapons and military equipment, property unnecessary for combat and preparing them for shipment to their destination. Separate battalions (companies) of material support for mechanized brigades, in addition, solve the problem of providing military units with bread.
Military medical units and divisions- designed to evacuate the wounded and sick from medical units or directly from areas of mass sanitary losses, provide them with the appropriate type of medical care and prepare for further evacuation, strengthen the medical service of units with personnel, means of evacuating the wounded and sick, and conduct sanitary-hygienic and anti-epidemic measures , measures of the medical service to protect personnel from weapons of mass destruction and to provide military units (subdivisions) with medical equipment.
Aerodrome technical support units- designed to maintain operational readiness of airfields, landing sites for basing aircraft, refueling aircraft, providing power to the flight crew during flights (combat operations).
The main task of the military rear is full timely material, technical and medical support for the troops.
Successful completion of this task is achieved by:
Continuous, firm and flexible control of the rear units and subunits;
Active, purposeful and continuous educational work in the rear units and subunits;
High training, timely movement and deployment of the military rear, its reliable protection against weapons of mass destruction, defense and security;
The uninterrupted supply of necessary materiel to the troops, the rational use of transport and its rapid maneuver;
Maintenance in technical serviceability and readiness for the use of weapons, armored, automotive and other equipment, their timely repair and evacuation;
Implementation of medical-evacuation, sanitary-hygienic and anti-epidemic measures in the troops;
Timely organization and conduct of rear reconnaissance.
16.3. Requirements for the military rear.
Logistic support is organized and carried out in close cooperation with combat and technical support on the basis of a coordinated solution of all issues of material support, the implementation of all types of military transportation. The success of logistic support in combat operations is achieved by fulfilling a number of requirements for the military rear. In general, these requirements can be described as:
Permanent high combat readiness of the rear- means its ability in any situation to turn around in an organized and timely manner, begin to provide military units (subunits) that have begun hostilities, and create conditions for the successful completion of their tasks.
Ideological work in the military rear- aims to mobilize all personnel for the timely and high-quality performance of logistic support tasks in any situation.
Clear planning and compliance of the organization of providing units (subdivisions) with their tasks- is achieved by the knowledge of the deputy rear commanders and the heads of the services of the formations of the plan of the planned military operations, the tasks of the military units (subdivisions) provided and the specific situation, the state of the rear, the availability of material resources and the capabilities of subordinate military units (divisions), as well as the high training of the deputy rear commanders and chiefs of rear services.
Concentration of the main efforts of the rear on providing military units (subunits) performing the main task - the creation of conditions for the autonomy of their actions in the rear relation is achieved by distributing the forces and means of the rear depending on the tasks of the military units performing the main task; the priority delivery of material resources to them and the evacuation of the wounded and sick from them; the creation in these military units of increased stocks of funds, their reinforcement, if necessary, by the forces and means of a higher rear link; timely maneuver by rear subunits and stocks of materiel along the lines and frontiers of operations of military units (subunits).
Coordinated use of all forces and means of the rear- is achieved by clear planning, organization and maintenance of continuous interaction in terms of goals, time and place between various services, rear military units and subunits. The interaction of the rear is organized and carried out, first of all, in the interests of those military units (subdivisions) that perform the main tasks.
Sustainability of logistic support of military units (subdivisions)- is achieved by: echeloned deployment and timely movement of rear military units and subunits; their constant approach to the provided military units (subdivisions); uninterrupted replenishment of stocks of material resources and equipment of the rear; timely building up and restoration of supply and evacuation routes; advance preparation of military units (subunits) of the rear for the performance of their subsequent tasks; skillful organization of the transition of all links of the military rear to providing military units (subunits) in various types of combat operations, conducted with the use of not only conventional, but also high-precision weapons and other modern weapons; the rapid restoration of the combat capability of military units (subdivisions) of the rear; maintaining the high morale of their personnel.
The main forms of maneuver by forces and means of the rear are:
Moving them to new directions and frontiers;
Attraction of vehicles of military units to perform tasks according to the plans of higher commanders;
Switching the evacuation of the wounded and sick to military medical units (subdivisions) of neighboring military units (subdivisions) or military units (subdivisions) located in the second echelons (reserves);
Target use of general purpose vehicles for the evacuation of the wounded and sick.
Rear reconnaissance- is carried out constantly during preparation and during combat operations in order to timely provide deputy rear commanders and heads of services with reliable information necessary for the proper organization of logistic support for military units (subdivisions).
Rear reconnaissance is organized by deputy commanders of formations (military units) in the rear. It is conducted by specially designated groups. Senior reconnaissance groups report on the results of reconnaissance to the deputy commanders of formations (military units) in the rear; intelligence data is summarized and (as far as it is concerned) put on the work cards of the relevant officials of formations (military units).
High survivability of the logistics system– achieved: rational structure, high technical training and the equipment of military units (subdivisions), their organized transfer from peacetime to wartime; the presence of established stocks of material resources; expedient placement and timely movement of military units and subunits of the rear; ensuring the secrecy of these events; the continuity of the supply of materiel and evacuation; reliable protection, security and defense of rear facilities; the rapid restoration of the combat capability of military units and rear units that suffered heavy losses from enemy strikes; the organization of stable, continuous, operational and covert control of the rear and the conduct of other activities.
If the rear of a formation (military unit) loses its combat capability as a result of enemy strikes, the deputy commander for rear and the heads of services immediately organize the restoration of military units (subunits) of the rear. It includes: restoration of disturbed control; collection of situation data; identification of the degree of combat readiness of rear military units and subunits; decision-making and clarification of tasks for the rear units that retained their combat capability for further actions; the withdrawal of military units (subdivisions) of the rear from areas of fires, destruction, flooding (contamination zones); replenishment of their personnel, stocks of material resources and property; raising the morale of the staff. At the same time, the consequences of the enemy's impact are being eliminated at the rear facilities. The restoration of combat readiness is carried out without stopping the rear of the assigned tasks.
The combat effectiveness of military units (subunits) of the rear is restored, as a rule, in their previous organizational structure; the creation of consolidated formations is not excluded. For this, first of all, the surviving forces and means of the restored military units (subunits) of the rear are used. If necessary, other forces and means of their unit (military unit) are also involved, as well as those allocated by the senior commander.
16.4. Material support of formations and military units.
Material support is carried out for the timely and complete satisfaction of the needs of subunits and units in material resources. It includes:
Receipt and storage of material resources;
Their dispatch or extradition to combined arms subdivisions and units, subdivisions and units of military branches, special troops and rear;
Bringing the established norms directly to consumers;
Creation of necessary stocks.
Material support is carried out centrally, according to the plans and orders of senior commanders, who are responsible for the uninterrupted provision of subordinate units and subunits with material resources, their rational use and economical spending.
To tangible assets include all types of weapons, military and other equipment, ammunition, fuel, food, protective equipment, engineering, clothing, medical and other types of property, materials and liquids for various purposes, as well as water.
The needs of the troops for materiel are constantly growing due to the constant growth and qualitative improvement of the technical equipment of subunits and units, and the increase in the scope of combat. The number of items, or nomenclature, of consumed material resources is growing, their volume and mass indicators are increasing. According to the foreign press, during the Second World War, about 20 kg of materiel per day was spent on average per soldier, and in present-day local wars this expenditure has increased to 100 kg or more.
In order to timely and fully meet the needs of subunits and units in the conditions of the use by the enemy of weapons of mass destruction, high-precision and incendiary weapons, it is necessary to create in advance sufficient stocks of the required material resources, properly separate them and uninterruptedly replenish their consumption and losses. Stocks of materiel of a fairly extensive range and in sizes that make it possible to meet the needs of military formations for materiel with the necessary efficiency are kept at the bases and warehouses of the higher rear echelons. These bases and warehouses serve as the main sources of material resources for the warehouses of the senior link of the military rear, and from there, on the orders of the relevant chiefs, as necessary, they go to the lower link of the rear. Sometimes materiel is delivered to formations and units without reloading, bypassing intermediate bases and warehouses.
Units and subunits receive the necessary material resources within the limits of the resources allocated to them, in accordance with their real needs and taking into account the need to have certain stocks of material resources. These reserves, called military supplies, are created in the established sizes and are intended for the timely and uninterrupted provision of the needs of subunits and units. The size of military reserves is determined by the senior commander at the beginning of each battle, depending on its nature and expected scope, the role of the subunit or unit in solving the overall combat mission, the expected consumption of materiel, the possibilities of their transportation and the use of local resources.
Depending on the situation, by order of the senior commander, additional stocks of materiel may be created. In the course of a battle, means can be maneuvered to provide subunits and units performing the main task, when shifting efforts to a new direction, restoring the combat capability of troops after nuclear or chemical attacks by the enemy, massive use of high-precision weapons by him, and in other cases.
Troop stocks of materiel are kept and transported in vehicles of subunits and units, in combat and other vehicles, with weapons and personnel. They are stored and transported, as a rule, in a reliable container, capped or covered in order to ensure their safety, protect them from contamination with radioactive, poisonous substances or bacterial agents.
Military stocks of materiel are divided into expenditure part and emergency ration ( and for fuel - an irreducible reserve). The material needs of units and subunits are met at the expense of the expenditure part of military reserves. The inviolable (irreducible) stock is spent in special cases, as a rule, with the permission of the brigade commander, and in an urgent case, with the permission of the battalion commander.
The basis for the timely and complete satisfaction of the material needs of the troops is the uninterrupted supply of the necessary material resources. It is carried out to replenish the consumption and losses of material resources in subdivisions and units and to create the necessary stocks of these funds. Delivery includes preparation of materiel for transportation, loading onto vehicles, transportation from storage or repair sites to destinations and unloading. Its continuity is ensured by precise planning, centralized use of means of transportation, timely approach of rear units with supplies of materiel to the troops fighting, mechanization of loading and unloading operations, maintenance of supply routes in a passable condition, and reliable protection of motorcades along the way.
The delivery of material resources is usually carried out by transport of a higher level, however, if necessary, vehicles of subunits and units can also be involved. If the situation requires it and conditions allow, materiel can be delivered down through the chain of command, while fuel and ammunition can be delivered directly to combat vehicles and artillery firing positions. When returning, the delivery vehicle is used to evacuate the wounded and sick, damaged weapons, equipment and property.
Provision of personnel hot food, food and water is carried out through the food points of the subunits deployed on terrain with good protective and camouflage properties, convenient access roads and favorable in sanitary terms. If possible, personnel are provided with three meals a day with the delivery of hot food. If this is not possible, meals can be two meals a day with the issuance of a part of the daily norm of products in dry form.
16.5. Management of the military rear.
Rear management is an integral part of command and control. It is carried out by the commander personally, as well as through the headquarters, deputies for rear and technical (weapons), chiefs of military branches, special troops and services. These officials organize the work of the rear on the basis of the decision and instructions of the commander, as well as the orders of the relevant superiors of the higher level on logistics. When preparing a battle or other actions of the troops, logistics tasks, depending on the situation, are brought to the attention of the performers. orders or rear orders, during the battle - short orders given to subordinates mainly through technical means of communication or in personal communication.
The control of subunits and units of the rear is carried out from the rear command post, headed by the deputy commander for rear and having the necessary means of communication and movement. From the rear command post of a formation (unit), reliable communication should be provided with the commander and headquarters, with the rear command posts of the units and the higher formation (compound), as well as with subordinate rear units and subunits.
The deputy commander of the formation of the rear unit is responsible for communications in the rear management. The direct responsibility for ensuring reliable and uninterrupted communication lies with the head of communication of the connection.
Rear management includes:
Timely decision-making, setting and bringing tasks to subordinates;
Preparation of rear units and subunits for upcoming actions and their comprehensive support;
Organization and maintenance of interaction in the work of the rear;
Constant monitoring of the implementation of tasks and assistance to subordinates;
Continuity, hardness and management flexibility military rear is provided with:
Maintaining reliable communications for rear management;
Constant knowledge, correct understanding of the situation, quick response to its changes and timely clarification of the tasks set;
Proper placement of the rear control point and its timely movement during the battle;
The coordinated work of the deputy commanders for logistics, armaments and the chief of staff of the formation (unit), as well as the chiefs of military branches, special troops and rear services;
Persistent implementation of instructions on logistic support of troops;
Timely receipt and provision of reports on the security of the troops and the state of the rear.
In preparing for a battle, the main effort is directed to: creating in units (subdivisions) established stocks of materiel, carrying out all types of maintenance and repair of equipment, evacuating faulty equipment and property, evacuating the wounded and sick from units and medical centers, conducting sanitary-hygienic and anti-epidemic measures , preparation for the work of the rear units and subunits with the provision of their reliable protection against weapons of mass destruction, thorough camouflage and cover from air strikes.
Particular attention is drawn to the timely provision of missile units, forward detachments, airborne assault forces, as well as units (subunits) operating in the main direction.
The commander of a subunit (unit) bears full responsibility for the material, technical and medical support of subunits subordinate to him.
He manages the rear through the deputy for rear, and manages the technical support through the deputy for armaments.
The chief of staff of a formation (unit) ensures the coordinated work of the deputy commanders for logistics and armaments, heads of military branches, special troops and services, and also exercises control over the work of the rear. He must promptly inform the deputy commanders for logistics and armaments, and the chiefs of logistics services about upcoming hostilities, planned events and all changes in the situation, and provide reliable communications for rear management.
In clarifying the task, it is necessary to correctly understand the nature of the upcoming battle, the tasks of the troops and the rear.
After the task is clarified, measures are determined that must be immediately carried out for the fastest preparation of the rear for providing troops in battle, and the necessary preliminary orders are given.
When assessing the situation, the following are studied: condition of transportation routes; security of material resources; the availability and condition of the delivery vehicle; probable sanitary losses in battle and the possibility of providing medical care to the wounded and sick; the probable failure of equipment and the possibility of its restoration; economic condition of the area of operations; the degree of the enemy's likely impact on the rear facilities; radiation, chemical and bacteriological conditions; the influence of the nature of the terrain, weather and seasons on the organization and work of the rear.
As a result of studying the situation, the deputy commanders for logistics and armaments, the chiefs of services must determine what the rear has to provide troops in preparation for and during the battle, in what conditions it will have to work, and what measures must be taken to eliminate the causes that impede the performance of tasks.
brigade commander(separate battalion), when deciding on combat operations, determines the main issues of organizing the rear in battle and the tasks of material, technical and medical support for the troops and usually indicates:
The location of the rear of the brigade (separate battalion) and the direction of its movement;
Ways of delivery and evacuation;
The size and timing of the creation of stocks of material resources in subdivisions and units;
Main activities for technical and medical support;
Forces and means allocated, if necessary, to help the rear.
The deputy commander of the brigade (division) for logistics, in accordance with the instructions of the commander, makes a decision on the organization of the rear and the supply of materiel.
In your decision deputy commander for logistics determines:
Separation of the rear of the brigade and the order of its movement during the battle;
Ways of delivery and evacuation;
The sequence and timing of the supply of materiel to units (subdivisions);
Measures to protect the rear from weapons of mass destruction, its defense and protection;
Rear management organization.
Tasks for the rear are communicated to the performers by order, and in some cases - by order for the rear of the brigade.
The deputy commander of the unit for armaments, the chiefs of the military branches, special troops and services give orders to the subordinate chiefs of the services and commanders of subunits on matters of material and technical support.
The logistics plan is developed by the deputy commander for logistics for the period of the assigned task, displayed on the map, agreed with the headquarters and approved by the brigade (separate battalion) commander.
The logistic plan usually specifies:
Location areas and the procedure for moving rear units and subunits, routes of supply and evacuation before and during hostilities;
Calculation of material support, volume and organization of delivery, procedure for refueling military equipment;
The procedure for using medical units and units, organizing the evacuation of the wounded and sick;
Organization of protection, defense and protection of the rear;
Place, time of deployment of the rear command post, organization of communications.
Connection Services Managers(parts) draw up appropriate plans (calculations) for the material, technical and medical support of the troops, approved accordingly by the commander or his deputy for logistics.
The deputy commander of a formation (unit) in the rear, within the established time limits, provides the superior head with a summary (report) on the rear, and the heads of services - the corresponding reports (reports) on their services.
The summary (report) on the rear usually indicates:
Placement of rear units (subdivisions), transport and evacuation routes;
Provision with ammunition, fuel, food and clothing in settlement and supply units;
Availability and condition of delivery vehicles;
The presence of the wounded and sick;
General conclusions about the state of the rear and security of the troops, indicating what the troops especially need.
Depending on the situation, the summary (report) on the rear indicates the degree of training of the rear personnel, the presence of contaminated materiel, areas and sections of supply and evacuation routes with a high level of radiation, and other specific data.
