Modern military intelligence is divided into tactical, or operational, strategic intelligence and counterintelligence.

tactical intelligence

provides fighting troops at the tactical level, i.e. within formations, units and subunits in contact with the enemy. It reveals information about the enemy's combat capabilities (including his plans), his vulnerability and the area of ​​​​operations (including terrain and weather conditions), which facilitates the commander and his headquarters to make optimal decisions on planning and conducting combat operations. This data is either obtained by regular forces and means, or received from a superior. Usually intelligence is obtained by polling local residents, interrogation of prisoners and defectors, interception of information transmitted by electronic means, study of documents, equipment and weapons captured from the enemy, radar, ground, aerial reconnaissance and aerial photographic reconnaissance. Tactical reconnaissance is usually carried out in difficult combat conditions, the time for a thorough analysis of the information obtained by it is limited, and information of this kind quickly becomes obsolete. Therefore, inaccurate or misleading information may lead to big losses, and even to the defeat of the troops who used them.

strategic intelligence

obtains and studies information about the capabilities, vulnerabilities and plans of foreign states. It is carried out in the interests supreme bodies state power and military leadership, and the data it produces are used to develop a foreign policy course, plan and implement measures to national security in Peaceful time and for conducting strategic operations in time of war. The role of strategic intelligence and the volume of tasks performed by it increased significantly during the period of confrontation between the United States and the former USSR, when the threat of total war arose. In the information and analytical centers of strategic intelligence, a huge amount of information is continuously processed regarding factors that determine the military-economic and political power or weakness of the state, including the level of scientific and technological development, geography, climate, transport, communications, industry, finance, employment level population, military potential, sociological characteristics of society and their trends, political parties, national policies, and biographical information about current and likely leaders. Such wide range tasks does not mean, however, that strategic intelligence studies only the facts general. Events seemingly insignificant in remote corners of the globe may turn out to be the first signs of important changes in the policy of foreign powers, a manifestation of their growing power, or, conversely, evidence of weakness. For example, a detail in a photograph or a mention in a local newspaper article about the transfer of a group of engineers to a new job can serve as a signal that the development of a new weapon has begun. Various foreign books, newspapers and magazines (especially government bulletins, scientific journals and military publications) are valuable sources of such information. In peacetime, they can be easily and quite legally purchased in any country. Other sources for obtaining strategic intelligence information are reports from the diplomatic corps, information from governments friendly states, statements by defectors from unfriendly countries, and materials obtained on the job by various military and civilian intelligence agencies. As before, an important role in the intelligence system is assigned to spies sent to a hostile country, where they often rely on agents from recruited residents of this country who are opposed to the regime. (Brilliant scouts - heroes of movie serials - are extremely rare in life. Usually an agent is an inconspicuous person who collects various kinds of information.) During the war, strategic intelligence resorts to the same sources of obtaining information about the enemy as tactical intelligence, but with much more spatial coverage and with the involvement of well-armed technical forces and means. This is explained by the fact that strategic intelligence, in addition to solving problems in the interests of ongoing military operations (which is the main goal of tactical intelligence), is also engaged in identifying the probable nature of future actions of foreign states. Timely forecasting of future actions of the enemy is facilitated by the fact that they are preceded by a preparatory period that takes enough for a long time and manifested in changes in the economy, armaments and foreign policy.

counterintelligence

includes all active and passive measures carried out by state bodies in order to combat the intelligence of other states. It ensures the security of classified information, equipment, objects and persons related to state secrets. The tasks of counterintelligence include the suppression of subversive activities carried out by both foreign powers and disloyal elements within the country and in the territories controlled by it.

exploration cycle.

Intelligence is carried out continuously according to a three-stage cycle: the collection of intelligence information, its processing and bringing the data to the interested authorities. However, intelligence data, no matter how reliable, loses its value over time, and therefore it must be periodically rechecked and updated.

Collection of intelligence information.

The elements of the information collected vary considerably in accuracy and completeness, from rumors transmitted by a petty informant to intelligence reports with corresponding conclusions received from another headquarters. For the purposeful acquisition of intelligence information, each headquarters develops an intelligence plan that specifies the main tasks for collecting information, intelligence signs for each task, and the reconnaissance forces and means (regular or requested from higher command) to carry out these tasks. The main tasks direct the performers to obtain the information that the commander needs to make an informed decision when planning military operations. Usually they are formulated as questions, for example: "Is the enemy going to attack?"

Intelligence signs are such manifestations of enemy activity that can be used to judge the nature of his preparations. In our example, there may be: increased movement of troops, especially tank units, to the front line; the emergence of new artillery and mortar batteries; clearance by the enemy of minefields; activation of the activities of its reconnaissance groups, etc. Tactical reconnaissance forces and means include line regular units, reconnaissance units equipped with ground and air reconnaissance equipment, neighboring units, higher headquarters and attached reconnaissance units.

Strategic intelligence has a much more diverse arsenal of forces and means. The collection of information can be carried out openly or covertly (usually through agents and traitors). Both methods are associated with significant difficulties. A credible informant may suddenly die, make a mistake, or even turn out to be an agent of someone else's intelligence. Air and ground reconnaissance during hostilities can be difficult due to complex weather conditions or opposition from the enemy. Unfriendly locals may give false information or refuse to give information. To prevent radio interception, the enemy can use complex codes or even prohibit the operation of his radio stations for transmission (radio silence). To hide his forces and true intentions, the enemy may resort to such methods of disguise as misinformation and demonstrative actions (for example, an enemy about to retreat may launch an attack with small forces, hoping that in the confusion that has arisen, the withdrawal of his main forces will go unnoticed). It may also happen that the captured documents and samples of weapons will not be handed over to intelligence agencies.

Strategic intelligence encounters difficulties in obtaining information even in peacetime. Dictatorial regimes rarely allow reliable and complete statistics about their countries to appear in the open press. All published materials are subject to censorship and often contain deliberately distorted information. Entire areas in such countries are closed to the public.

Counterintelligence often acts harshly and openly, penetrating into all spheres of society. Any issue related to the armed forces is considered a state secret in non-democratic countries. Elsewhere in the world, the main challenges may be the language barrier and the lack of reliable maps. As a result, especially during military operations, information about the enemy is often scarce, fragmentary, unreliable and contradictory. Careful planning of reconnaissance activities and their active implementation can help here. This should involve as many independent sources of information as possible.

Processing of intelligence information.

In processing the collected disparate information, the intelligence officer uses an analytical method, much like that used by a scientist in solving a scientific problem. The information processing process includes a number of operations that can be classified as accounting, selection, evaluation, interpretation and generalization. When tactical intelligence information is processed, the number and volume of these operations can be reduced.

Accounting (systematization) is essentially a mechanical operation, but important: information is grouped according to the generality of the issues covered, the sources and time of its receipt are recorded. After such a systematization, it is more convenient to select the information required to solve the problem. The selected materials are then evaluated in relation to, for example, the reliability of their source, the time elapsed since they were mined, their accuracy compared to the information already available on the subject, etc.

The interpretation is to determine the significance of the evaluated information. For example, it has been reliably established that an unfriendly state suddenly launched the construction of an automobile and railway in the remote border region. Analysis of available information about the area, surrounding areas and changes in the economic, external and military policy the state itself should uncover the reasons for such unusual activity. The analyzed and evaluated information is then summarized in order to establish the relationship of data and determine their overall significance, a process that sometimes resembles guessing a crossword puzzle. At the conclusion of this operation, the intelligence officer draws conclusions. Unfortunately, he is often unable to fully argue his conclusions due to the nature of the information received, especially when these conclusions concern the likely actions of the enemy or his future combat capabilities. The head of intelligence has to deal more with information of a rather probabilistic nature, and to fill in the gaps in it, he is forced to resort to his imagination, intuition and logical reasoning.

The final conclusions are communicated in a clear and concise manner to the authorities concerned, usually the immediate superior, the higher headquarters, the headquarters of the main subordinate units (divisions) and, when appropriate, the headquarters of neighboring units (divisions).

Operational analytical intelligence is carried out in the interests of the near future. It includes analysis of ongoing events, short-term forecasting, preparation of recommendations for current activities.

A. Dulles writes about how operational analytical intelligence can be carried out:

"For important intelligence information entering the State Department, the War Department and the CIA, round-the-clock control is established (...) Specially assigned officers consider the incoming information in search of any facts of a particularly acute nature. The possibility of immediate notification of immediate superiors is provided. The latter decide which of the highest political leaders - from the president to senior officials of the State Department, the Department of Defense and the CIA - should be immediately informed. Analysts also monitor print materials and radio broadcasts ... "("The Art of Intelligence", p. 153)

Doing operational intelligence hampered by strict restrictions on the execution time of tasks. Tasks cannot wait for the refinement of theories and technologies, the arrival of inspiration. The operational reconnaissance mechanism must be fine-tuned for the future.

In fact, operational intelligence is a component of the activities of anyone involved in operational management. The peculiarity of the operational intelligence service itself is that this service 1) uses, among other things, confidential sources of information; 2) works in conditions of conflict, opposition.

The formation of short-term forecasts is facilitated by the fact that the near future is determined mainly by parameters and trends current moment, because in the time before its occurrence, the interests, ideas, methods of activity, and the capabilities of various subjects cannot change significantly.

Components of the operational intelligence system:

means of obtaining operational data;

data visualization tools;

· means of access to reference and theoretical data, to descriptions of precedents;

means of formal search, analysis, forecasting;

· means of registration of results of work;

means of delivering results.

Approximate structure of the Directorate of Operational Intelligence:

· center of operational tracking: operational duty officers working in the common room and using common visualization tools;

monitoring department: specialists who monitor less important events and parameters in order to inform operational duty officers when significant circumstances are discovered;

· operational-analytical department: analysts working on individual problems on the instructions of operational duty officers;

Contact department: specialists involved in obtaining and disseminating information on the instructions of operational duty officers;

technical department: specialists who ensure the performance, reliability and development technical means Directorate of Operational Intelligence;

· development department: analysts who determine the quality of operational intelligence, analyze errors, and prepare proposals for improving work.

The operational tracking center should work in close cooperation with the operational response center (they can be located in the same room and combined into a "special operational control center").

Operational intelligence must detect, evaluate, predict in time ...

· military conflict;

· economic crisis;

· financial crisis;

· political crisis;

natural disaster;

· mass riots;

a propaganda attack

an epidemic

The team of operational duty officers of the operational tracking center may include, for example, three people who share duties as follows:

economics, finance, movement of resources;

· politics, mass information, mass movements, conflicts;

· military preparations, hostilities, natural and technical disasters, epidemics.

Or (second option):

your own country

main partners and opponents;

· the rest of the world.

As for special operational response, it can be divided into informational and non-informational, external (abroad) and internal (within the country), aimed at leaders, at the masses, at objects.

Information response within the country, aimed at leaders, has four levels of severity:

The level of providing information for decision-making;

level of issuing orders, delegation of commissioners;

the level of substitution officials with their people.

The non-informational operational response includes the following types of actions: sabotage (disabling people, objects, etc.), seizure (kidnapping of people, objects), occupation (capture of certain territories, objects), substitution (covert replacement of people, objects by other people , objects). These actions can be typical, or prepared in advance, or improvised using debugged elements.

Introduction

Reconnaissance is the most important type of combat support for troop operations. It is a set of measures for organizing, obtaining and studying information about the enemy, the terrain and the area of ​​upcoming actions necessary for the successful fulfillment of the tasks assigned to subunits and units.

Requirements for reconnaissance: purposefulness, continuity, activity, timeliness and efficiency, secrecy, reliability, accuracy of determining coordinates.

In accordance with the scope of its activities and the nature of the tasks to be solved, military intelligence is divided into strategic, operational and tactical.

Strategic intelligence - conducted in the interests of preparing and conducting strategic operations and war in general. Operational intelligence - solves its tasks in the interests of army and front-line operations and battles.

Tactical reconnaissance - conducted by the forces and means of subunits, units and formations in the interests of successful combat. It is subdivided into military, artillery, radar, radio and radio engineering, engineering, chemical and air. Since motorized rifle and tank subunits conduct mainly military reconnaissance, in the future in the textbook the issues of conducting and organizing reconnaissance will be disclosed in relation to military reconnaissance.

Military intelligence includes the organization of intelligence, its conduct and information work.

Purpose, tasks and organization of intelligence, its types and content

Intelligence -- the practice and theory of gathering information about an adversary or competitor for security and advantage in the field armed forces, politics or economics. This is usually understood as part of an organized effort (ie, at a governmental or corporate level). Intelligence can use both legal methods of information gathering (for example, collecting and analyzing data from public sources, listening to radio channels from abroad, surveillance using reconnaissance satellites) and illegal operations that fall under the concept of "espionage" or "theft of information."

All questions that the intelligence agencies have to resolve ultimately boil down to the following: to obtain timely information about the enemy, the terrain, the population and local means; study them and systematize, and then report to their command, higher headquarters and bring them to the troops. Intelligence can successfully fulfill these tasks only if the work of all its organs and means is clearly organized and coordinated.

All reconnaissance efforts should be aimed at contributing to the resolution of the main combat mission of the unit (combination).

The need for a clear setting of tasks for intelligence agencies and the use of precisely those methods of conducting intelligence that correspond to a given specific situation.

There are several classifications of intelligence, depending on the basis.

By appointment, the following types are distinguished:

military intelligence

political intelligence

economic intelligence

Industrial espionage

By means used

Illegal intelligence

Analytical Intelligence

Undercover intelligence (English HUMINT)

Species reconnaissance (English IMINT)

Electronic intelligence (eng. SIGINT)

Electronic Intelligence

Aerial reconnaissance

Military intelligence is the practice and theory of gathering information about an enemy or competitor for security and military advantage.

Military intelligence, depending on the goals, scale of activity and the nature of the tasks performed, is divided into:

strategic;

operational-tactical;

counterintelligence;

frontline;

tactical.

Depending on the scope, the involved forces and means, military intelligence is divided into five types:

ground;

air;

space;

special.

In particular, tactical intelligence ground forces divided into ground and air. In turn, ground reconnaissance includes: military, radio and radio engineering, radar, chemical and bacteriological.

Tactical reconnaissance of the ground forces is divided into ground and air. Ground reconnaissance includes: military, radio and radio engineering, radar, chemical and bacteriological.

Military reconnaissance is conducted by reconnaissance, motorized rifle, regimental, parachute and air assault units.

The methods of conducting military reconnaissance are: observation, eavesdropping, search, raid, ambush, reconnaissance in force.

In combined-arms formations, units and their subdivisions, the following are appointed to conduct military intelligence:

from the division - reconnaissance detachments, reconnaissance patrols, reconnaissance groups, officer reconnaissance patrols, subunits for conducting searches, setting up ambushes, subunits for conducting reconnaissance in force, observation posts;

from the regiment - reconnaissance detachments, reconnaissance patrols, officer reconnaissance patrols, search units, ambushes, observation posts;

from the battalion - combat reconnaissance patrols, ambushes, patrol squads, observation posts;

from the company - patrol squads, observers, and sometimes combat reconnaissance patrols;

from a platoon, squad - observers, sentinels.

An important way of conducting military intelligence is the capture of languages.

Analytical intelligence - obtaining the necessary information through the analysis of data available in freely available sources or obtained by covert means.

Analytical intelligence should be considered as constituent part intelligence as a whole -- as an element of the intelligence cycle. In the chain of “problem setting - information collection - information processing - presentation of results”, analytical intelligence occupies an important place, but, nevertheless, without a mining link, without a clearly defined goal, without a correct presentation of the results, analytical intelligence will not be able to cope with those tasks set by customers.

Species reconnaissance is the discipline of collecting intelligence information based on images (views) obtained by photographic, optoelectronic or radar equipment. Species reconnaissance uses photo images taken both in the visible range of the electromagnetic spectrum - panchromatic, infrared, and multispectral photographs. Radar images for specific reconnaissance are formed by synthetic aperture radar equipment in various electromagnetic ranges. The main methods of species reconnaissance are aerial photography and space photography. According to its features, specific intelligence refers to the technical types of intelligence. Species reconnaissance should be distinguished from electronic reconnaissance, which uses optical-electronic and radar equipment that does not form images.

Electronic intelligence is a set of methods and organizational structures for reconnaissance activities electronic means(RES) and other electronic equipment.

Industrial espionage is one of the forms of unfair competition used at all levels of the economy, from small enterprises to states.

The main purpose of industrial espionage is to save money and time that is required to catch up with a competitor that occupies a leading position, or to prevent falling behind a competitor in the future if he has developed or is developing a new promising technology, as well as to enter new markets for the enterprise .

This is also true for interstate competition, where issues of national security are added to issues of economic competitiveness.

The main difference between industrial espionage and competitive intelligence is that industrial espionage violates the norms of the law, primarily criminal, while competitive intelligence cannot do this.

Industrial espionage remains and will remain a powerful tool of state intelligence, the purpose of which is a direct violation of the laws of foreign states in the interests and on behalf of their country.

At the enterprise level in recent times Increasingly, the choice is made in favor of competitive intelligence, since the company does not have the authority of state intelligence, therefore, in the event of a failure of an industrial espionage operation, it risks being held criminally liable, as well as incurring reputational risks.

Tools:

bribery (persons are bribed who are able to transfer documentation or product samples on topics of interest);

blackmail (against the same persons);

theft (of documents or products);

sabotage (temporary or permanent incapacitation of product samples, people or enterprises of a competitor);

covert physical penetration of a competitor's facility, associated with the deliberate overcoming of protection lines created by a competitor to ensure the safety of information or products.

the introduction of an agent into an enterprise or country of a competitor with the task of gaining access to information or products that are the subject of a commercial or state secret competitor.

theft of information through the illegal use of technical means of removing information (interception of other people's telephone lines, illegal penetration into other people's computer networks, etc.).

GRU DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR. HEROES OF THE INVISIBLE FRONT Nikolsky Vitaly

CHAPTER 2. Operational undercover intelligence in the prewar years

From the beginning of 1939, I happened to work in the central apparatus of military intelligence in the western direction as a senior assistant to the head of the department. Until 1940, the department was part of the military-technical intelligence department, which was led by engineer 2nd rank A.A. Konovalov. The department had the task of selecting, training, sending Soviet intelligence agents abroad to the official foreign apparatus and to illegal work, and to carry out the entire range of measures related to obtaining information about the plans and intentions of our potential adversaries in the field of development of military equipment. In 1940, in connection with the reorganization of the technical department, I was transferred to the department of border intelligence in the department in charge of the activities of the intelligence agencies of the border western, special, as they were then called, military districts. The department was engaged in staffing, equipment, material resources, development of mobilization measures in case of war in the border intelligence agencies. His duties also included the inspection of the combat readiness of these bodies and the analysis of information received from the mining apparatus abroad. The department was headed by Colonel I.V. Vinogradov, the department was headed by Major N.V. Sherstnev.

Despite the fact that, under the terms of the conspiracy, each of the employees of one direction or another was supposed to know only what he was supposed to do in his service, the general picture of the impending military danger for all intelligence workers was still clear. Terrible events were brewing. Germany irresistibly rushed to dominate the world and after seizing almost all of Western Europe, having a powerful military-industrial potential, mobilized by a well-armed army, directed its aggressive aspirations against the world's first socialist state. Information about the preparation of the Nazis for an attack on the USSR began to come through various channels from illegal intelligence residencies, the official foreign apparatus, and border districts.

It should be noted that with a fairly well-organized work to obtain information that our government needs about the plans and intentions of the capitalist countries and, first of all, Germany in relation to our country, intelligence, even its senior officials, was very poorly informed about the 6 planned actions of its own government.

Yes, release. western regions Ukraine and Belarus, the conclusion of a friendship and border treaty with Germany was a surprise for intelligence, which could not even give instructions on the redeployment of the most valuable agents from the former eastern regions of Poland to the west, and with the rapid advance of the Red Army to the Bug, it soon found itself in our deep rear.

After the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Germany, the sharpness of anti-fascist propaganda among the Soviet people, which had previously been actively carried out through all available channels, decreased sharply: print, radio, cinema, oral presentations and lectures. In libraries, even in the intelligence department, anti-fascist books, magazines and other printed materials were confiscated, in textbooks German language adapted articles from the stories of German anti-fascist writers who castigated Nazism were cut out, anti-fascist films such as "Professor Mamlock" and others disappeared from the screens.

In the press and public reports, more attention was paid to exposing the policy of the Western imperialists, who tried to set Germany against the USSR, but "thanks to the far-sighted policy" of the Soviet government, they failed. In newspapers and official publications, notes of gloating towards the British and French slipped through, allegedly trying in vain to drag Germany and the USSR into the war with Germany.

Despite the sharp turn in relations with Germany, the vast majority of Soviet people blindly believed in the wisdom of Stalin's plans, the power of their army, and the government's desire to maintain peace at any cost.

The firm conviction that the German proletariat would not go to war with the first socialist state in the world and that the first day of the war with the USSR would be the last day of fascism was the dominant one in all sections of Soviet society, and it had to be gradually got rid of with heavy sacrifices already in the course of the war.

Thanks to easy victories over pan-Poland and the liberation of Ukrainians and Belarusians in September 1939, the annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina almost without loss in June 1940 (with the formation of the Moldavian SSR in August of the same year), the victory of our troops over the Japanese invaders in the Khalkhin- Gola in August 1940, many were dizzy from success. The accession to the country of socialism within a few months without loss of the republics and large territories of Western Ukraine and Belarus was substantive proof of the correctness of Stalin's foreign and domestic policy.

There were speeches, marches, songs: “If tomorrow there is war, / If tomorrow we go on a campaign ...”, “Beloved city can sleep peacefully ...”, “When Comrade Stalin sends us into battle, / And the first marshal will lead us into battle ...” and others similar works.

Soviet power was established in the liberated regions. At the same time, they did not always take into account their own mistakes in domestic policy, which was considered by everyone, including those directly implementing it, to be absolutely infallible.

The general upsurge was somewhat overshadowed by events on Karelian Isthmus, where from November 30, 1939 to March 13, 1940, the "troops of the Leningrad Military District", supported by formations from a number of internal districts, waged war with the Finns. The hopes that the government created from among the Finnish communists would lead the entire people of Finland along with it did not materialize. Supported primarily by Nazi Germany, which showed amazing unity with its enemies England and France in the so-called Finnish question, the Finns stubbornly resisted and were broken only at the cost of big sacrifices and three months of bloody battles.

The state leadership of the country seemed to be trying at all costs to avoid big war. These aspirations met the aspirations of the people, who believed in their government, party, and leader.

In the meantime, disturbing information continued to flow into the Intelligence Directorate from all over the world. Nazi Germany in the General Government (as the occupiers called Poland), Czechoslovakia (divided into the protectorate of the Czech Republic and Moravia and Slovakia), Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria concentrated its troops openly and under the guise of numerous missions and advisers. RO headquarters of the border military districts reported on the concentration German troops in the border strip, exceeding all norms allowed in peacetime between neighboring countries. The fact that the attack of the Nazis is inevitable, it became clearer. There were reports about the start of the war. As it later turned out, they were real and differed from each other for several weeks and even days.

All this mass of information was processed, systematized, and reported to the leadership of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the General Staff, which, knowing Stalin’s negative opinion about the possibility of a German attack on the USSR, excelled in an effort to curse the sources of this truthful information that our wonderful patriots and foreign internationalists obtained in different points the globe at risk to life. Intelligence reluctantly advertises its heroes, but the names of Richard Sorge, Lev Manevich, Vladimir Zaimov, Ivan Vinarov, Alexei Korobitsyn are already known, who obtained valuable information in the prewar period and during the war in Japan, Italy, Belgium, Germany, Romania and other countries. The merits of scout heroes, like the talents of geniuses, often become known only after their death.

The information kept coming. It was impossible to keep silent about her. She was reported to the leadership, but the heads of the department, Lieutenant General Golikov F.I., and later Major General A.P. Panfilov supplied her with comments and resolutions nullifying the essence of the reports.

So, on one solid report containing the calculations and dates of the alleged attack, the head of the RU Panfilov drew a resolution: "British insinuations aimed at pushing our foreheads against Germany."

It is clear that the reports processed in this way corresponded to Stalin's inner conviction, they had a calming effect, could not cause an undesirable reaction, and everyone knew how decisive and sharp it could be. What sources such true information began to be attributed to the number of doubles, traitors, enemies of the people, careerists were not interested.

In September 1939, the former military attache (BAT) of the USSR in Poland, Major General P.S., arrived in Uzbekistan from Warsaw. Rybalko, who strongly recommended strengthening intelligence against the Germans. In response, Panfilov tactlessly told him that there is no place for fools in intelligence, and seconded him to the troops. They say that in 1943 Major General Panfilov was appointed commander tank brigade in the corps of Lieutenant General Rybalko, and the latter, not without irony, reminded Panfilov that it would obviously not be easy to serve him with a fool. But he left it in the hull.

It is clear that it was difficult to expect objectivity, party adherence to principles and statesmanship from such leaders.

Events were accelerating at a catastrophic pace. Hundreds of reports continued to arrive from the ROs of the border military districts, from numerous intelligence officers and agents in various parts of the globe, one more disturbing than the other. They were reported with appropriate comments to the management, conscientiously taken into account and filed to the case. The completeness and credibility of the information reported to the government about Germany's intentions to attack the USSR was detrimentally affected by the decentralization of the mining intelligence apparatus abroad and two independent bodies - the RU of the Red Army and the NKVD. The foreign apparatus subordinated to Beria also received information about Germany's preparations for aggression, but the all-powerful Lavrenty Pavlovich, knowing Stalin's incredulity and every possible desire to delay the clash with the Germans at any cost, reassured him and convinced him of the unreality of war with them. The less influential leadership of the Republic of Uzbekistan did not so much monitor the objectivity of the information received and the timeliness of their motivated report, but rather ensure that this information did not anger Beria, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and not cause, at best, strict organizational, or maybe be, and extrajudicial sanctions. And how strict they were, it was known enough.

In the spring of 1941, a meeting of the chiefs of the RO of headquarters of the border military districts was convened in the RU of the Red Army, at which blatant carelessness in the preparation of intelligence agencies for war was revealed. The meeting participants came up with practical concrete proposals to increase the combat readiness of intelligence in a future battle with the Germans, in the occurrence of which none of those present had any doubts. It was proposed to deploy the RO in wartime states, provide equipment, equipment, prepare appropriate bases on its territory to a depth of 400 km in case of a forced withdrawal, and a number of others. The leadership of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the General Staff treated this gathering as a regular planned event. At such an important meeting, no one from the leadership of the NPO and the General Staff was present, and the head of the RU, Lieutenant General F.I. Golikov arrived only at the final meeting, at which he read the usual speech about increased vigilance in general terms, far from the pre-war situation. Moreover, some particularly zealous supporters of urgent training in a special regard for their rear were delicately warned about the need to overcome the panic, bordering on defeatism, since, in accordance with our doctrine, we were supposed to fight only on enemy territory.

It was a monstrous misinformation of the people, including military workers responsible for the country's defense capability, the combat readiness of its army. What were the reasons and grounds for such a statement, fraught with a national catastrophe for the country, historians have been trying to explain inconsistently and unsuccessfully to this day.

A paradoxical situation arose when all the operational officers in the Intelligence Directorate expected war and were afraid even to openly tell each other about it.

The officially declared thaw in relations with Germany actually led to such a tense situation on the borders with her that the military leadership was forced to give the well-known contradictory instructions to increase combat readiness with the meaningless clause "do not succumb to provocations."