Tactical and operational rear depth. Operational intelligence

1. Military intelligence- a set of measures taken by the military command of all levels to obtain and study information about an active or potential enemy. Depending on the scale and purpose of the assigned tasks, military intelligence is subdivided into strategic, operational, and tactical.

2. Strategic intelligence is organized mainly by the command. Materials mined strategic intelligence, are supplemented by data obtained as a result of the work of operational and tactical intelligence agencies carried out directly on the battlefields.

3. Operational reconnaissance is organized by the command of the fronts and armies /if they have appropriate reconnaissance assets in their combat composition/ in order to ensure decision-making and conduct of operations. The depth of operational reconnaissance is determined by the forthcoming task of the front, the army. Normally, the front organizes reconnaissance reconnaissance to a depth of 300-500 km, the army to 100-150 km.

4. Operational intelligence obtains information and studies:

Areas of concentration and deployment of enemy troops before the start of the operation; the number and composition of troops, the numbers of units and formations, their grouping and intentions, the direction of the main and auxiliary strikes, the distribution of troops according to the directions of the strike, the places of headquarters of the formations.

- areas of concentration of army and front-line reserves of the enemy, their composition, grouping, combat capability and the possibility of directing actions;

- areas of concentration of enemy tank and motorized formations, their combat strength, the enemy airfield network, the composition and belonging of aviation to it.

Defensive lines / lines / of the enemy, their preparation in engineering terms and the degree of employment by troops.

New technical means of combat and their operational-tactical use.

- the arrangement and operation of the army and front rear of the enemy, routes for the supply of troops, ammunition, fuel, the intensity of transportation, places for unloading troops and cargo, places for army and front-line ammunition depots, all types of armed, food, fuel, main and distribution railway stations, transshipment and exchange offices on dirt tracks.

The degree of staffing of the enemy’s active units and formations, the procedure for the formation of new ones, their national composition, combat capability and material support, training of personnel,

The political and moral state of the enemy troops, the population of the area of ​​upcoming hostilities.

- the theater of military operations and individual operational areas from the point of view of the possibility and convenience of the actions of enemy troops and their own.

The most important task of operational reconnaissance is to reveal the operational intentions of the enemy; how, where and with what it threatens or can threaten our zoisks, as well as determining what the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy’s plan of action are.

1. Operational reconnaissance is carried out by aviation, tanks, mechanized and cavalry formations, airborne troops, radio reconnaissance equipment, agents, and is supplemented by data obtained as a result of partisan combat operations and tactical reconnaissance data. Aviation, tank, mechanized and cavalry formations and airborne troops, as a rule, conduct operational reconnaissance simultaneously with the performance of their combat missions.

6. Tactical reconnaissance is organized by the army command, commanders of formations, units and subunits. It helps them to obtain information about the enemy for decision-making and the appropriate use of their troops in battle.

The depth of foot reconnaissance in a regiment is 5-10 km, in a division 10-20 km, in the army / corps / 15-25 km, the depth of reconnaissance carried out by mobile troops is up to 20-40 km, by aviation up to 100 km. In conditions where there are large gaps in the disposition of the enemy troops or the areas of operations are populated and sympathize with the Red Army, or it is poorly populated, reconnaissance agencies can penetrate the enemy disposition to a depth of 50-70 km.

1. Tasks of tactical intelligence;

Establish the grouping of the resisting enemy and its combat composition;

Clarify battle formations, flank and joints of enemy units, as well as the nature of his actions.

Establish an enemy defense system, all types of fire and the location of all firing points, fortifications, obstacles and barriers.

Establish the presence and number of tanks, self-propelled guns and artillery in enemy combat formations.

Establish the location, combat composition and ownership of enemy tactical reserves.

- to determine the location of the headquarters, units and formations of the enemy, his command and observation posts and communication centers.

- to clarify the advanced airfield network of the enemy and the basing of aviation on it.

- organization of the rear of regiments, divisions and corps.

- to study the tactics of actions of all branches of the enemy troops in all types of combat.

- to study the terrain and the area of ​​forthcoming actions, to determine their influence on the actions of the troops of both sides, especially tanks, self-propelled artillery and artillery.

The most important task of tactical intelligence is to determine combat strength opposing enemy, revealing his intentions and all elements of the battle formation.

Tactical reconnaissance is conducted continuously, both by special reconnaissance subunits and units, and by all active troops, and is supplemented by operational reconnaissance data.

1. Depending on the means of performing reconnaissance tasks, military reconnaissance is divided into the following types:
   - military;
   - agency.
   Reconnaissance carried out by means of troops / ground and air services to solve the problem of operational and tactical reconnaissance / is called military intelligence.

10. Troop intelligence is the main type of intelligence. It is conducted by infantry, cavalry, aviation, artillery, tank, engineering, chemical troops, signal troops, special forces, as well as political bodies, topographical, sanitary and veterinary services.

11. The tasks of military intelligence are solved:

- direct combat activities of the troops.

- Combat activities of reconnaissance units, subunits and bodies / photographing, eavesdropping, searches, ambushes, raids, combat, actions behind enemy lines /.

– Observation /commander, ground, with the help of special equipment, aerial/.

- Informing, that is, clarifying and adding all available intelligence data received from partisans / interrogation of prisoners, defectors who arrived from enemy territory, study of documents and trophies, interrogation local residents, reconnaissance of the area and the study of the area of ​​operations. Only the battle allows you to most reliably identify the opposing enemy.

12. Basic principles of military intelligence: continuity, activity, timeliness, reliability of information.

13. The success of military intelligence is achieved:

- centralization in one hands of the management of the activities of all reconnaissance means, the collection of information and control over the fulfillment of assigned tasks.

Purposeful setting of tasks for intelligence agencies and communications.

- The concentration of the greatest efforts on the direction of the main blow of our troops or on the main enemy grouping.

- The presence of a sufficient reserve of reconnaissance assets and its correct use.

– Keeping secret all preparatory and reconnaissance activities.

- Careful preparation of the personnel, combat and material support of intelligence agencies before the performance.
- Sudden, decisive and daring actions.
- Good communications with intelligence agencies and rapid transmission of intelligence data to the appropriate commanders and headquarters.
- Careful control over the timely completion of reconnaissance missions by the troops.
– Knowledge of the tactics of the enemy, the organization of his troops and the technical means of combat used by him.
- A careful study of all information about the enemy and the ability to quickly and correctly draw a conclusion about the nature of the actions and intentions of the enemy.
- Transfer of all intelligence data to the replacement units.

14. Organization of continuous reconnaissance, one of the main duties of commanders and staffs in all types of combat activities of the troops.

15. The commander, on the basis of the task set by the senior commander, assessing the situation of the available data about the enemy, indicates to the chief of staff the goals and objectives, the determination by what time should be obtained, and also gives the order to allocate the funds necessary for this.

16. The commander of a subunit, unit, formation is responsible to the highest authority for organizing the conduct of reconnaissance. He is obliged to daily manage reconnaissance in order to know the forces, means, grouping, nature of actions and intentions of the opposing enemy in any situation. Train your staff in organization and intelligence and be responsible for its ability to carry out these tasks. The company commander personally collects and processes information about the enemy in a company, and the battalion commander in a battalion.

17. Conducting reconnaissance by a senior commander and assigning reconnaissance tasks to a subordinate commander does not release the latter from the obligation to conduct reconnaissance in the interests of fulfilling the tasks of his subunit, part of a formation.

The purpose and operational-tactical use of one or another type of combat aviation is determined by its combat power and the tactical and technical properties of weapons.

The main feature of attack aviation is that it is capable of effectively suppressing tactical objects (troops and technical means of combat), much less vulnerable to other types of combat aviation. Therefore, attack aircraft is the main means of suppressing these objects from the air, but it can also inflict powerful strikes on various other objects, especially on small targets (railways, bridges, trains, ships, etc.), whose vulnerability when acting from a height drops sharply.

However, it must be taken into account that attack aircraft are capable of inflicting a powerful and decisive blow only on targets and objects located open and massively, and assault operations on dispersed and hidden combat formations of troops and their firing points not very effective. Ground attack aircraft also cannot conduct continuous, methodical and prolonged fire on the entire enemy troop deployment system or even on a limited section of it. Therefore, the use of ground attack aviation within the reach of firepower of ground forces (i.e., within the battlefield) and against objects that have already adopted battle order or are engaged in combat, as a rule, impractical. This essentially leads to the replacement of firepower of ground troops by attack aircraft, without achieving the necessary combat effect and with heavy losses of attack aircraft. The use of attack aircraft within the battlefield is allowed only in exceptional circumstances to assist ground troops at critical moments of the battle and when even a short-term superiority in a given sector and the suppression of individual objects can significantly affect the course or outcome of the battle.

The most powerful combat effect is achieved when ground attack aircraft are used to suppress targets that affect or may affect the course and outcome of a battle or operation, but have not yet adopted battle formations and have not been put into battle (on a campaign, in reserve, at a bivouac, on vacation, etc.). d.). Such objects are usually found outside the battlefield, when the impact on them by firepower of other branches of the armed forces is impossible in place and time. With this use of attack aircraft, a strike is achieved across the entire tactical and operational depth of the enemy. Deep air strikes, in tactical or operational connection with the actions of ground forces, deplete the enemy’s combat assets, make it difficult or even exclude the possibility of concentrating and building up forces to counter our strike groupings, and prevent the accumulation of enemy forces in sectors and areas where it is operationally disadvantageous. intention of our command. Under these conditions, attack aircraft do not replace, but supplement the firepower of ground forces. By repeated and successive assault strikes, albeit against separate targets, but according to a single, purposeful plan, it is possible to achieve a certain systematic (methodical) fire attack aviation. Under these conditions, ground attack aviation becomes more independent a combat force capable of systematically carrying out responsible combat missions in the interests of a battle or operation carried out by the joint efforts of all branches of the armed forces. The well-known systematicity of assault strikes can only be achieved by massing attack aircraft in a given sector (direction) in the hands of the commander, directing the efforts of attack aircraft to where the danger threatens, and to suppress objects that are of paramount importance in this particular situation. If attack aviation is dispersed and reassigned to numerous commanders, then it will deliver separate little coordinated and not purposeful strikes. In addition, when operating in small units, the already complex basing and combat power, communications and control of attack aircraft are even more complicated.

Depending on the availability of assault forces and means and on the combat situation, attack aircraft can also be used in conducting independent air operations within the range of attack aircraft in service.

The most powerful strikes and decisive success in modern combat are achieved by the interaction of various branches of the armed forces and fire weapons. There are two main types of interaction between aviation and ground forces, or between different branches of aviation: a) tactical interaction and b) operational interaction.

Tactical interaction between different types of troops is achieved by such an organization of their combat activities, when the troops can suppress objects that are different in nature and location, simultaneously or in different time, but within the framework of the general battle plan, in order to achieve a single ultimate goal by the efforts of the combined arms formation. It can be carried out by troops subordinate to corps commanders, and by means directly subordinate to the army command (subordination to one chief is not necessary).

In the tactical interaction of attack aviation with ground forces, as is clear from the above combat properties and the basics of the combat use of attack aircraft, the most powerful combat effect is achieved.

Operational interaction differs from tactical interaction in greater freedom in the choice of individual points of impact in time and place, greater depth of action on a scale and in the interests of the operation as a whole.

Aviation, as well as other types of troops directly subordinate to the command of the army, can be used both in operational and tactical cooperation with corps or divisions.

Assault aviation is retained, as a rule, at the direct disposal of the army command. Depending on the situation, the army command uses it in the interests of the battle or the operation as a whole.

When distributing and deploying assault forces and setting combat missions for them, the command must take into account the following basic provisions:

1. A significant or decisive influence on the course and outcome of a battle or operation can be achieved only by the massive use of attack aircraft.

2. In order to deplete the enemy's combat power and finally defeat him, in most cases it is more advantageous to strike a decisive blow against a smaller number of main objectives than a weak blow against numerous but secondary targets. In addition, the more powerful the assault strike and the stronger the degree of destruction of the object of attack, the less vulnerable the attack aircraft and the less their losses.

3. The enemy carries out his actions, creates fortifications and strongholds, disposes of reserves, concentrates strike groupings or pulls up reinforcements and fresh forces, and organizes combat support (rear) regardless of the borders and areas of operation of our military formations. Therefore, within a relatively narrow band (for example, in the band of actions rifle corps, especially when attacking a defending enemy) it is not always possible to complete and effective use attack aviation, because the enemy can build up his forces, bypass the flanks or go to the rear of our units from any direction.

4. The use of attack aircraft by small units or subunits against numerous and small targets in most cases leads to dispersal of forces and means, exhausts the flight crew, without achieving a significant combat effect. It is difficult for small assault groups to seize the initiative in battle, to suppress firepower Air defense of the enemy and at the same time inflict the desired defeat on the object of attack. In addition, an assault strike may not always be timed to coincide with the most favorable conditions in place and time, because small forces may be used up or brought to the limit of their combat work, and a significant break in time will be required between attacks of the same crews.

The concentration of attack aviation at the disposal of the army command does not exclude, but, depending on the situation, it provides for the setting of tasks and actions of attack aircraft for a certain period in the interests of one or another combined arms formation that is part of the army. In order to ensure the closest and most fruitful interaction, the commanders of military formations, who, on the orders of the army commander, are assisted by attack aircraft, and the commanders of assault units are required to coordinate their actions.

In advance or during the battle, as the situation becomes clear or changes, the commanders of military formations turn to the commander to whom the attack aircraft are subordinate, with a request to provide them with one or another support by assault actions. And if the provision of the necessary support does not go beyond the general task assigned to the troops and attack aircraft, then they turn directly to the commander of the assisting attack aircraft, and the latter takes all measures in his power to better fulfill the assigned tasks.

If there are sufficient assault forces, by order of the army command, some assault units can be assigned for tactical interaction with ground forces to temporary operational subordination to the commanders of corps operating in responsible areas of the army, or to the commanders of motorized mechanized units of cavalry formations intended to use success after a breakthrough of the front, raiding or abandoned to eliminate the enemy raiding in our rear.

From the point of view of the technique of performing assault operations, studying the objects of attack and the terrain of the area of ​​operations, the distribution of tasks between air formations and individual units is more profitable, since the objects of attack in the near and deeper rear will usually be different in nature, which will require different means of destruction and methods of attack . Therefore, for actions in the interests of a battle or operation, it is advisable to allocate separate assault units, at least for a certain period, in the near and deeper rear.

Given the tension and complexity of assault operations, the command provides for the use of attack aircraft, based on the following standards for the combat work of attack aircraft:

- one attack per day. The total duration of ground attack aircraft in the air should not exceed 3 hours, including no more than 2 hours over enemy territory.

b) Intense combat work- 2-3 attacks per day; the total duration of flights can be increased to 5-6 hours, of which over enemy territory - up to 4 hours.

c) In special conditions of the situation and mainly during operations over our territory, when enemy units (motorized mechanized units, cavalry, air and naval assault forces) broke into our rear, the rate of combat work of attack aircraft can be increased to 4-5 attacks per day. However, stay in the air should not exceed 6-7 hours.

G) Average rate combat work of attack aircraft per decade - 8-10 sorties, per month - up to 20 sorties.

e) The time interval on the ground between the first and second flights (of the same crews in one day) must be at least 1-2 hours for the technical inspection of the material part, combat charging of aircraft, as well as setting and studying a new task by the flight crew . The interval between the second and third sorties on the ground should be at least 4-6 hours, since the flight crew should be given rest.

Notes. 1. Additional reconnaissance of the target is carried out in excess of the standards of combat work established in paragraphs. "a" and "b".

2. In the cases provided for in paragraph "c", the norms for preparing for the next flight and rest of the flight crew established in paragraph "e" may be brought to a practicable minimum.

3. Reducing the time spent on the ground between the first and second sorties (p. "d") is allowed only when preparing individual aircraft or small units (for example, flying for additional reconnaissance), but on condition that a reinforced technical squad is allocated for inspection and charging composition and not at the expense of the quality of training.

The power of assault strikes should be achieved through the rational use of assault forces, but not through overloading the flight crew or weakening the technical preparation of the materiel.

It should be taken into account that an exhausted aircrew on a strafing flight can become a victim without causing any or almost no damage to the enemy, and the failure of the material part on a strafing flight and a forced landing over one's own territory, as a rule, means a breakdown or accident of the aircraft, not excluding the possibility of a catastrophe , and over enemy territory this leads to the loss of the aircraft and crew.

The vivacity of air fighters in the performance of combat missions is very important. The material part before each flight must be carefully and in the prescribed manner reviewed. The weakening of the technical inspection and preparation of the material part is not allowed under any circumstances, especially since in combat vehicles can receive holes and damage, sometimes difficult to detect during a superficial examination.

The element of time in general and the timing of the combat readiness of attack aircraft, in particular, are very important for the timely suppression of mobile tactical objects by attack aircraft. The term of combat readiness of attack aircraft, i.e., the time from the moment of receiving a specific task for an attack to departure, should be minimal and is set by special instructions or orders, based on technical properties and design features the material part in service and from options combat mission, taking into account the training and degree of training of the personnel.

In order to reduce the terms of combat readiness of attack aircraft, the aircraft after each flight must be immediately prepared for the next flight, regardless of whether the next flight is scheduled or not yet scheduled. Then, upon receipt of the next task for the attack, it remains only to perform combat charge, assimilate new task and prepare to carry it out.

Operational intelligence- a set of measures to obtain and study information about the current or potential enemy and the area of ​​alleged military operations in order to prepare for the successful conduct of the operation by the troops (forces) of the formation.

In the Soviet and Russian military school is integral part military intelligence and is interconnected with its other parts - strategic and tactical intelligence.

The ultimate goal of operational intelligence in peaceful and war time is to obtain the following information:

Operational intelligence about the combat area provides the following information:

The depth of operational reconnaissance is determined by the nature and scope of hostilities, the combat missions assigned to the formation, the depth of the operational formation of enemy troops, the nature of the theater of operations and other conditions.

Full-fledged operational reconnaissance consists in the timely receipt of all the necessary data in the entire zone and in the entire depth of hostilities conducted by the association. Analysis of the data provided by operational intelligence allows the commander and headquarters of the formation to calculate possible changes in the situation and rationally manage troops and weapons during combat operations.

The main difference between operational reconnaissance and tactical reconnaissance is the investigated depth of the enemy's rear.

In operational reconnaissance, the rear of the enemy is investigated at a distance from the line of contact of troops to a depth of defense of the formation up to 1,000 kilometers. All operational intelligence actions take place behind the front line (with the exception of radio and electronic intelligence).

Another main difference between operational intelligence and tactical intelligence is the use of illegal agents. If tactical reconnaissance is carried out exclusively by the forces of reconnaissance units of the troops (due to which tactical intelligence otherwise called military intelligence), then in operational intelligence the need for a much greater depth of penetration behind enemy lines, as well as secret infiltration into state and military authorities, requires the use of illegal agents of special services. Also, for conducting operational intelligence, the recruitment of military personnel and civilians of the enemy is used.

The main methods of collecting information in operational intelligence are:

The very term "operational intelligence" officially came into use in the USSR Armed Forces from the 40s.

Documentary references to the fact that operational reconnaissance was to be carried out in the formations date back to the beginning of hostilities in the Great Patriotic War. For example, in the report of the commander of the 12th mechanized corps dated July 29, 1941, it is noted that during the initial period of hostilities, the unit was not provided with operational intelligence data from the headquarters of the 8th Army.

In various sources, different definitions are given to designate an integral part of operational reconnaissance carried out by ground reconnaissance formations deep behind enemy lines, which, on the basis of this moment are synonyms.

The first full-time reconnaissance formations, designed to work deep behind enemy lines, were created by directive of the Chief of Staff of the Red Army No. 137 / ss of January 25, 1934. At that historical period, it was assumed that these formations were supposed to organize sabotage and create partisan detachments from among local residents. In this regard, the term "special intelligence" came into use, denoting the organization of reconnaissance and sabotage operations.

The functions of conducting operational intelligence as a whole did not apply to them in that historical period.

In the Soviet military school, since the 50s, the following terms have been used as synonyms for special intelligence and the formations that perform it: “deep intelligence”, “special intelligence” (abbreviated as “special forces intelligence”) and “army special forces”. For special intelligence formations of the USSR Navy, the synonym "sea special forces" was used.

Also, in Soviet / Russian military terminology, the term “special forces” was not and is not applied to the GRU special intelligence formations. A similar term is used exclusively for formations performing similar functions as part of the armed forces of a number of NATO countries, consonant with the Russian concept and literally translated as "reconnaissance units to a greater depth" (eng. long range surveillance unit) .

The need for operational intelligence appeared in the 20th century due to the fact that fighting began to take on the character of an operation. The planning of the operation, as the schedule of military operations for the unification, required the calculation of possible scenarios for the development of events.

The further development of operational intelligence took place under the influence of such factors as a change in the means and methods of armed struggle, the arrival at the disposal of the operational command of the OTRK and MLRS with a long range. Such changes in weapons required the improvement and creation of new means of operational reconnaissance, capable of detecting with high accuracy in a short time important enemy targets for delivering a primary strike, on maximum range the actions of the means of destruction available to the association.

The practice of armed conflicts in recent history has shown that over 85% of intelligence information is obtained using technical means. radio-electronic complexes installed on ground, air and space carriers. Therefore, the main emphasis in the development of operational intelligence is on the technical equipment of the troops.

16.1. General characteristics of the rear of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus.

Logistic support is organized and carried out in all types of combat and in the daily activities of military units and subunits in order to maintain them in a combat-ready state and create favorable conditions for the fulfillment of assigned tasks.

Types of logistics are material, medical, veterinary, commercial and household, apartment and operational, and in air force and troops air defense besides this, engineering and aerodrome, aerodrome and technical support for rear services.

Organizationally, the forces and means of the rear are part of the operational commands and units of the branches of the Armed Forces, and are also directly subordinate to central authorities management.

The logistic support system inherited by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus as a legacy of the Red Banner Belarusian Military District has undergone significant changes over the years of reform related to clarifying the tasks of logistic support, improving the organizational structure of the troops and rear, changing the responsibility of officials of the Ministry of Defense for organizing one or another type of security. As a result, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus have developed a system of logistical support for troops, which has its own national characteristics, unlike similar support systems for the armies of foreign states.

The development of tactics and operational art shows that comprehensive and uninterrupted logistical support for troops is one of the decisive conditions for the successful conduct of combat and the most important duty of commanders. When organizing combat operations, the commander must take into account the state and capabilities of the rear, set tasks for him in a timely manner, and continuously manage them during the battle.

By the scale and nature of the tasks performed the rear of the Armed Forces is subdivided on the strategic, operational-strategic, operational and tactical(military).

Strategic rear- the highest echelon of the rear of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus. It includes the rear of the center, the forces and means of logistics directly subordinate to the commanders of the branches of the Armed Forces (the rear command post of the Armed Forces, the command posts of rear formations and military units, the command posts of organizations and institutions of the rear of central subordination). Particularly responsible tasks to ensure combat activities in Everyday life troops performs rear center. It receives logistics equipment, rocket fuel, fuel and other materiel from the national economy, maintains the bulk of their stocks and provides them to the combat arms of all branches of the Armed Forces; ensures the delivery of all types of materiel to operational commands, and also performs operational and evacuation transportation; carries out the most complex types of repairs of equipment and property of the rear services, manufactures some samples of military products; treats the wounded and sick.

Operational-strategic rear- is a link between the strategic and operational rear. It is designed to provide rear services for the branches of the Armed Forces.

The operational rear is a link between the operational-strategic and operational rear, and in a number of cases it has ties with enterprises and organizations of the national economy. It directly provides for operational and operational-tactical formations and their formations and separate units in the rear.

Tactical (military rear)- the final link in the rear of the Armed Forces, designed to directly support units, subunits in combat and everyday activities.

16.2. Tasks and composition of the military rear.

The military rear consists of rear units and subunits with stocks of material resources that are part of formations, units, and subunits. The composition of the military rear is determined by the states of the corresponding military units. Depending on the purpose, its main formations are divided into military units and subunits: material support, medical, airfield technical.

Rear tasks:

Preparation of rear units (subdivisions) for logistic support;

Replenishment in subdivisions and warehouses of material and technical means to the established norms;

Maintenance and repair of rear equipment;

Evacuation of the wounded and sick;

Inspection on the battlefield and evacuation of captured and domestic weapons;

Commercial and consumer services;

Organization of security, defense, rear protection;

Management organization.

Military units and logistics units- are intended: for receiving, maintaining and delivering (release) stocks of weapons, ammunition, fuel, food, water, clothing, engineering and medical property and other materiel; refueling equipment with fuel; providing personnel with hot food and hygienic washing; repair, disinfection and disinsection of clothing property; evacuation from units (subdivisions) of defective, domestic and captured weapons and military equipment, property unnecessary for combat and preparing them for shipment to their destination. Separate battalions (companies) of material support for mechanized brigades, in addition, solve the problem of providing military units with bread.

Military medical units and divisions- designed to evacuate the wounded and sick from medical units or directly from areas of mass sanitary losses, provide them with the appropriate type of medical care and prepare for further evacuation, strengthen the medical service of units with personnel, means of evacuating the wounded and sick, and conduct sanitary-hygienic and anti-epidemic measures , measures of the medical service to protect personnel from weapons mass destruction and providing military units (subdivisions) with medical equipment.

Aerodrome technical support units- designed to maintain operational readiness of airfields, landing sites for basing aircraft, refueling aircraft, providing power to the flight crew during flights (combat operations).

The main task of the military rear is full timely material, technical and medical support for the troops.

Successful completion of this task is achieved by:

Continuous, firm and flexible control of the rear units and subunits;

Active, purposeful and continuous educational work in the rear units and subunits;

High training, timely movement and deployment of the military rear, its reliable protection against weapons of mass destruction, defense and security;

The uninterrupted supply of necessary materiel to the troops, the rational use of transport and its rapid maneuver;

Maintenance in technical serviceability and readiness for the use of weapons, armored, automotive and other equipment, their timely repair and evacuation;

Implementation of medical-evacuation, sanitary-hygienic and anti-epidemic measures in the troops;

Timely organization and conduct of rear reconnaissance.

16.3. Requirements for the military rear.

Logistic support is organized and carried out in close cooperation with combat and technical support on the basis of a coordinated solution of all issues of material support, the implementation of all types of military transportation. The success of logistic support in combat operations is achieved by fulfilling a number of requirements for the military rear. In general, these requirements can be described as:

Permanent high combat readiness of the rear- means its ability in any situation to turn around in an organized and timely manner, begin to provide military units (subunits) that have begun hostilities, and create conditions for the successful completion of their tasks.

Ideological work in the military rear- aims to mobilize all personnel for the timely and high-quality performance of logistic support tasks in any situation.

Clear planning and compliance of the organization of providing units (subdivisions) with their tasks- is achieved by the knowledge of the deputy rear commanders and the heads of the services of the formations of the plan of the planned military operations, the tasks of the military units (subdivisions) provided and the specific situation, the state of the rear, the availability of material resources and the capabilities of subordinate military units (divisions), as well as the high training of the deputy rear commanders and chiefs of rear services.

Concentration of the main efforts of the rear on providing military units (subunits) performing the main task - the creation of conditions for the autonomy of their actions in the rear relation is achieved by distributing the forces and means of the rear depending on the tasks of the military units performing the main task; the priority delivery of material resources to them and the evacuation of the wounded and sick from them; the creation in these military units of increased stocks of funds, their reinforcement, if necessary, by the forces and means of a higher rear link; timely maneuver by rear subunits and stocks of materiel along the lines and frontiers of operations of military units (subunits).

Coordinated use of all forces and means of the rear- is achieved by clear planning, organization and maintenance of continuous interaction in terms of goals, time and place between various services, rear military units and subunits. The interaction of the rear is organized and carried out, first of all, in the interests of those military units (subdivisions) that perform the main tasks.

Sustainability of logistic support of military units (subdivisions)- is achieved by: echeloned deployment and timely movement of rear military units and subunits; their constant approach to the provided military units (subdivisions); uninterrupted replenishment of stocks of material resources and equipment of the rear; timely building up and restoration of supply and evacuation routes; advance preparation of military units (subunits) of the rear for the performance of their subsequent tasks; skillful organization of the transition of all links of the military rear to providing military units (subunits) in various types of hostilities, conducted using not only conventional, but also precision weapons and others modern means defeat; the rapid restoration of the combat capability of military units (subdivisions) of the rear; maintaining the high morale of their personnel.

The main forms of maneuver by forces and means of the rear are:

Moving them to new directions and frontiers;

Attraction of vehicles of military units to perform tasks according to the plans of higher commanders;

Switching the evacuation of the wounded and sick to military medical units (subdivisions) of neighboring military units (subdivisions) or military units (subdivisions) located in the second echelons (reserves);

Intended use of vehicles general purpose for the evacuation of the wounded and sick.

Rear reconnaissance- is carried out constantly during preparation and during combat operations in order to timely provide deputy rear commanders and heads of services with reliable information necessary for the proper organization of logistic support for military units (subdivisions).

Rear reconnaissance is organized by deputy commanders of formations (military units) in the rear. It is conducted by specially designated groups. Senior reconnaissance groups report on the results of reconnaissance to the deputy commanders of formations (military units) in the rear; intelligence data is summarized and (as far as it is concerned) put on the work cards of the relevant officials of formations (military units).

High survivability of the logistics system– achieved: rational structure, high technical training and the equipment of military units (subdivisions), their organized transfer from peacetime to wartime; the presence of established stocks of material resources; expedient placement and timely movement of military units and subunits of the rear; ensuring the secrecy of these events; the continuity of the supply of materiel and evacuation; reliable protection, security and defense of rear facilities; the rapid restoration of the combat capability of military units and rear units that suffered heavy losses from enemy strikes; the organization of stable, continuous, operational and covert control of the rear and the conduct of other activities.

If the rear of a formation (military unit) loses its combat capability as a result of enemy strikes, the deputy commander for rear and the heads of services immediately organize the restoration of military units (subunits) of the rear. It includes: restoration of disturbed control; collection of situation data; identification of the degree of combat readiness of rear military units and subunits; decision-making and clarification of tasks for the rear units that retained their combat capability for further actions; the withdrawal of military units (subdivisions) of the rear from areas of fires, destruction, flooding (contamination zones); replenishment of their personnel, stocks of material resources and property; raising the morale of the staff. At the same time, the consequences of the enemy's impact are being eliminated at the rear facilities. The restoration of combat readiness is carried out without stopping the rear of the assigned tasks.

The combat effectiveness of military units (subunits) of the rear is restored, as a rule, in their former organizational structure; the creation of consolidated formations is not excluded. For this, first of all, the surviving forces and means of the restored military units (subunits) of the rear are used. If necessary, other forces and means of their unit (military unit) are also involved, as well as those allocated by the senior commander.

16.4. Material support of formations and military units.

Material support is carried out for the timely and complete satisfaction of the needs of subunits and units in material resources. It includes:

Receipt and storage of material resources;

Their dispatch or extradition to combined arms subdivisions and units, subdivisions and units of military branches, special troops and rear;

Bringing the established norms directly to consumers;

Creation of necessary stocks.

Material support is carried out centrally, according to the plans and orders of senior commanders who are responsible for the uninterrupted provision of subordinate units and subunits with material resources, their rational use and economical spending.

To tangible assets include all types of weapons, military and other equipment, ammunition, fuel, food, protective equipment, engineering, clothing, medical and other types of property, materials and liquids for various purposes, as well as water.

The needs of the troops for materiel are constantly increasing due to the constant growth and qualitative improvement technical equipment subunits and units, an increase in the scope of the battle. The number of items, or nomenclature, of consumed material resources is growing, their volume and mass indicators are increasing. According to the foreign press, during the Second World War, about 20 kg of materiel per day was spent on average per soldier, and in present-day local wars this expenditure has increased to 100 kg or more.

In order to timely and fully meet the needs of subunits and units in the conditions of the use by the enemy of weapons of mass destruction, high-precision and incendiary weapons, it is necessary to create in advance sufficient stocks of the required material resources, properly separate them and uninterruptedly replenish their consumption and losses. Stocks of materiel of a fairly extensive range and in sizes that make it possible to meet the needs of military formations for materiel with the necessary efficiency are kept at the bases and warehouses of the higher rear echelons. These bases and warehouses serve as the main sources of material resources for the warehouses of the senior link of the military rear, and from there, on the orders of the relevant chiefs, as necessary, they go to the lower link of the rear. Sometimes materiel is delivered to formations and units without reloading, bypassing intermediate bases and warehouses.

Units and subunits receive the necessary material resources within the limits of the resources allocated to them, in accordance with their real needs and taking into account the need to have certain stocks of material resources. These reserves, called military supplies, are created in the established sizes and are intended for the timely and uninterrupted provision of the needs of subunits and units. The size of military reserves is determined by the senior commander at the beginning of each battle, depending on its nature and expected scope, the role of the subunit or unit in solving the overall combat mission, the expected consumption of materiel, the possibilities of their transportation and the use of local resources.

Depending on the situation, by order of the senior commander, additional stocks of materiel may be created. In the course of a battle, means can be maneuvered to provide subunits and units performing the main task, when shifting efforts to a new direction, restoring the combat capability of troops after nuclear or chemical attacks by the enemy, massive use of high-precision weapons by him, and in other cases.

Troop stocks of materiel are kept and transported in vehicles of subunits and units, in combat and other vehicles, with weapons and personnel. They are stored and transported, as a rule, in a reliable container, capped or covered in order to ensure their safety, protect them from contamination with radioactive, poisonous substances or bacterial agents.

Military stocks of materiel are divided into expenditure part and emergency ration ( and for fuel - an irreducible reserve). The material needs of units and subunits are met at the expense of the expenditure part of military reserves. The inviolable (irreducible) stock is spent in special cases, as a rule, with the permission of the brigade commander, and in an urgent case, with the permission of the battalion commander.

The basis for the timely and complete satisfaction of the material needs of the troops is the uninterrupted supply of the necessary material resources. It is carried out to replenish the consumption and losses of material resources in subdivisions and units and to create the necessary stocks of these funds. Delivery includes preparation of materiel for transportation, loading onto vehicles, transportation from storage or repair sites to destinations and unloading. Its continuity is ensured by precise planning, centralized use of means of transportation, timely approach of rear units with supplies of materiel to the troops fighting, mechanization of loading and unloading operations, maintenance of supply routes in a passable condition, and reliable protection of motorcades along the way.

The delivery of material resources is usually carried out by transport of a higher level, however, if necessary, vehicles of subunits and units can also be involved. If the situation requires it and conditions allow, materiel can be delivered down through the chain of command, while fuel and ammunition can be delivered directly to combat vehicles and artillery firing positions. When returning, the delivery vehicle is used to evacuate the wounded and sick, damaged weapons, equipment and property.

Provision of personnel hot food, food and water is carried out through the food points of the subunits deployed on terrain with good protective and camouflage properties, convenient access roads and favorable in sanitary terms. If possible, personnel are provided with three meals a day with the delivery of hot food. If this is not possible, meals can be two meals a day with the issuance of a part of the daily norm of products in dry form.

16.5. Management of the military rear.

Rear management is an integral part of command and control. It is carried out by the commander personally, as well as through the headquarters, deputies for rear and technical (weapons), chiefs of military branches, special troops and services. These officials organize the work of the rear on the basis of the decision and instructions of the commander, as well as the orders of the relevant superiors of the higher level on logistics. When preparing a battle or other actions of the troops, logistics tasks, depending on the situation, are brought to the attention of the performers. orders or rear orders, during the battle - short orders given to subordinates mainly through technical means of communication or in personal communication.

The control of subunits and units of the rear is carried out from the rear command post, headed by the deputy commander for rear and having the necessary means of communication and movement. From the rear command post of a formation (unit), reliable communication should be provided with the commander and headquarters, with the rear command posts of the units and the higher formation (compound), as well as with subordinate rear units and subunits.

The deputy commander of the formation of the rear unit is responsible for communications in the rear management. The direct responsibility for ensuring reliable and uninterrupted communication lies with the head of communication of the connection.

Rear management includes:

Timely decision-making, setting and bringing tasks to subordinates;

Preparation of rear units and subunits for upcoming actions and their comprehensive support;

Organization and maintenance of interaction in the work of the rear;

Constant monitoring of the implementation of tasks and assistance to subordinates;

Continuity, hardness and management flexibility military rear is provided with:

Maintaining reliable communications for rear management;

Constant knowledge, correct understanding of the situation, quick response to its changes and timely clarification of the tasks set;

Proper placement of the rear control point and its timely movement during the battle;

The coordinated work of the deputy commanders for logistics, armaments and the chief of staff of the formation (unit), as well as the chiefs of military branches, special troops and rear services;

Persistent implementation of instructions on logistic support of troops;

Timely receipt and provision of reports on the security of the troops and the state of the rear.

In preparing for a battle, the main effort is directed to: creating in units (subdivisions) established stocks of materiel, carrying out all types of maintenance and repair of equipment, evacuating faulty equipment and property, evacuating the wounded and sick from units and medical centers, conducting sanitary-hygienic and anti-epidemic measures , preparation for the work of the rear units and subunits with the provision of their reliable protection from weapons of mass destruction, careful camouflage and cover from air strikes.

Special attention appeals to timely provision missile parts, forward detachments, airborne assault forces, as well as units (subunits) operating in the main direction.

The commander of a subunit (unit) bears full responsibility for the material, technical and medical support of subunits subordinate to him.

He manages the rear through the deputy for rear, and manages the technical support through the deputy for armaments.

The chief of staff of a formation (unit) ensures the coordinated work of the deputy commanders for logistics and armaments, heads of military branches, special troops and services, and also exercises control over the work of the rear. He must promptly inform the deputy commanders for logistics and armaments, and the chiefs of logistics services about upcoming hostilities, planned events and all changes in the situation, and provide reliable communications for rear management.

In clarifying the task, it is necessary to correctly understand the nature of the upcoming battle, the tasks of the troops and the rear.

After the task is clarified, measures are determined that must be immediately carried out for the fastest preparation of the rear for providing troops in battle, and the necessary preliminary orders are given.

When assessing the situation, the following are studied: condition of transportation routes; security of material resources; the availability and condition of the delivery vehicle; probable sanitary losses in battle and the possibility of providing medical care to the wounded and sick; the probable failure of equipment and the possibility of its restoration; economic condition of the area of ​​operations; the degree of the enemy's likely impact on the rear facilities; radiation, chemical and bacteriological conditions; the influence of the nature of the terrain, weather and seasons on the organization and work of the rear.

As a result of studying the situation, the deputy commanders for logistics and armaments, the chiefs of services must determine what the rear has to provide troops in preparation for and during the battle, in what conditions it will have to work, and what measures must be taken to eliminate the causes that impede the performance of tasks.

brigade commander(separate battalion), when deciding on combat operations, determines the main issues of organizing the rear in battle and the tasks of material, technical and medical support for the troops and usually indicates:

The location of the rear of the brigade (separate battalion) and the direction of its movement;

Ways of delivery and evacuation;

The size and timing of the creation of stocks of material resources in subdivisions and units;

Main activities for technical and medical support;

Forces and means allocated, if necessary, to help the rear.

The deputy commander of the brigade (division) for logistics, in accordance with the instructions of the commander, makes a decision on the organization of the rear and the supply of materiel.

In your decision deputy commander for logistics determines:

Separation of the rear of the brigade and the order of its movement during the battle;

Ways of delivery and evacuation;

The sequence and timing of the supply of materiel to units (subdivisions);

Measures to protect the rear from weapons of mass destruction, its defense and protection;

Rear management organization.

Tasks for the rear are communicated to the performers by order, and in some cases - by order for the rear of the brigade.

The deputy commander of the unit for armaments, the chiefs of the military branches, special troops and services give orders to the subordinate chiefs of the services and commanders of subunits on matters of material and technical support.

The logistics plan is developed by the deputy commander for logistics for the period of the assigned task, displayed on the map, agreed with the headquarters and approved by the brigade (separate battalion) commander.

The logistic plan usually specifies:

Location areas and the procedure for moving rear units and subunits, routes of supply and evacuation before and during hostilities;

Calculation of material support, volume and organization of delivery, procedure for refueling military equipment;

The procedure for using medical units and units, organizing the evacuation of the wounded and sick;

Organization of protection, defense and protection of the rear;

Place, time of deployment of the rear command post, organization of communications.

Connection Services Managers(parts) draw up appropriate plans (calculations) for the material, technical and medical support of the troops, approved accordingly by the commander or his deputy for logistics.

The deputy commander of a formation (unit) in the rear, within the established time limits, provides the superior head with a summary (report) on the rear, and the heads of services - the corresponding reports (reports) on their services.

The summary (report) on the rear usually indicates:

Placement of rear units (subdivisions), transport and evacuation routes;

Provision with ammunition, fuel, food and clothing in settlement and supply units;

Availability and condition of delivery vehicles;

The presence of the wounded and sick;

General conclusions about the state of the rear and security of the troops, indicating what the troops especially need.

Depending on the situation, the summary (report) on the rear indicates the degree of training of the rear personnel, the presence of contaminated materiel, areas and sections of supply and evacuation routes with a high level of radiation, and other specific data.

In accordance with the governing documents of the North Atlantic Alliance, the term "special operation" means organized and coordinated in terms of purpose, place and time of action of specially formed, trained and equipped units and subunits of the armed forces to perform special tasks in the interests of achieving political, military and economic goals.

The main advantage of MTRs is their special training and constant readiness for use already in Peaceful time when the involvement of conventional armed forces is considered politically inappropriate or premature, as well as the specific methods and tactics of their actions in carrying out their tasks.

Depending on the current situation and the assigned tasks, special operations forces of the Armed Forces of foreign states can carry out:

reconnaissance and sabotage actions;

subversion;

special actions;

actions to ensure internal security on the territory of another state;

psychological impact;

information operations;

enabling actions.

For reconnaissance and sabotage operations include: obtaining information about the enemy, carrying out sabotage, determining the coordinates of various objects, guiding aircraft, adjusting artillery fire and missile strikes, destroying enemy high-precision weapons, conducting electronic intelligence and electronic warfare. Under conditions of approximate equality of arms in conventional arms, the command of the armies of the NATO countries by such actions expects to achieve superiority over the enemy, depriving him of a significant part of his military potential, as well as violating command and control of troops and weapons.

Subversion based on the use of guerrilla tactics, consist in organizing an insurrectionary and guerrilla movement on enemy territory.

Special actions involve the seizure of samples of weapons, military equipment, important documents, as well as prominent political, state and military figures, the release of prisoners of war and prisoners, and the conduct of an anti-terrorist struggle. At the same time, the anti-terrorist struggle involves both preventive measures and the direct destruction of terrorists and the release of hostages.

Actions to ensure internal security in the territory of another state They presuppose, first of all, the fight against partisan and insurgent movements, that is, counter-partisan and counter-insurgent struggle. They are an integral part of programs to provide military assistance to foreign states with which the NATO bloc is bound by contractual obligations.

Psychological impact is one of the main tasks of the MTR, since the results of its implementation significantly affect the success of the operation as a whole. Measures of psychological impact, carried out by units and subunits of the special operations forces, involve: the creation of a "favorable" political environment; formation of an international public opinion; decomposition of the fighting spirit of the enemy and undermining his authority; work with prisoners and the population.

Special Operations Forces conduct psychological operations on their own or as part of a theater operation. The personnel of the MTR units, who have knowledge of the language, culture and characteristics of the region, in the course of psychological operations, develop and implement psychological impact programs (the content of such programs usually includes general information, a warning about the presence of any danger, calls for surrender with appropriate explanations and promises, statements about readiness to provide assistance to the population during and after the completion of a military operation, etc.).

Information operations are carried out with the aim of disinformation and misleading the enemy, suppressing its information flows and systems, including by delivering pinpoint strikes against key information carriers. For this purpose, reconnaissance and sabotage groups equipped with special equipment can be used to connect to information channels and quickly disseminate information via satellites, the Internet, television, radio and other media.

Enabling actions can be carried out in peacetime and wartime.

These actions include:

conducting reconnaissance in the interests of the actions of special operations forces;

organizing the withdrawal or deployment to the rear of operational detachments and their evacuation from enemy territory;

combat and logistic support, evacuation of the wounded and sick, deployment of hospitals for partisans and insurgents, training of combat formations of resistance forces;

psychological impact on the population and enemy troops.

According to military experts of NATO member countries, at the stage of escalation of the military-political situation, the main efforts are focused on supporting actions in order to create favorable conditions for the subsequent transition to active subversive and special actions. A few days before the outbreak of war, the MTR grouping deployed on enemy territory proceeds to reconnaissance and sabotage operations in the interests of creating favorable conditions for strike groupings of troops.

The combat use of special operations forces is envisaged to be carried out, first of all, in the interests of the first battles of the initial period of the war. In the course of hostilities, special operations forces perform strategic and operational tasks.

When organizing the training of special operations forces for the fulfillment of tasks for their intended purpose, serious attention is paid to the tactics of operations in the front-line and front-line zones. Based on the experience of modern conflicts, the leadership of the armed forces of the United States and other NATO member countries have worked out the use of reconnaissance and sabotage groups (DRGs) of special operations forces in the interests of providing first-echelon troops, including brigades to a depth of 40 km, divisions to a depth of 100 km , corps - within 300 km and joint operational formations - 700 - 800 km.

The withdrawal of the DRG behind enemy lines can be carried out:

by land - by crossing the border or front line;

by air - by planes, helicopters, hang gliders, other means;

by water - using cutters, boats, light diving equipment, etc.

The movement of the DRG behind enemy lines is carried out covertly, mainly at night or in conditions of limited visibility, with the obligatory observance of security and camouflage measures, including on combat and other equipment captured from the enemy. At the same time, the walking daily transition can be
30 - 50 km. Subversive and reconnaissance groups are capable of staying behind enemy lines for 30 days or more. In areas of destination, it is planned to operate singly, in pairs or in small groups, while widely used various ways disguise (from cover documents to military uniform enemy or civilian clothes).

Command posts and communications centers are usually assigned to sabotage and reconnaissance groups for destruction (destruction), launchers missiles, important elements of airfields, rear and air defense facilities, communication centers and other facilities, the failure of which ensures the disruption of the enemy's control systems. They can create zones of flooding, destruction and contamination, and provide isolation of certain areas.

Destruction (incapacitation) of enemy objects is carried out: by inflicting damage with fire weapons; undermining with the use of mine-explosive means; arson with the help of incendiary and combustible substances; mechanical, electromagnetic destruction and damage; electronic suppression; flooding, poisoning or pollution of reservoirs and water sources.

The DRG is capable of opening (detecting and determining the coordinates) up to two objects in a day, hitting one large stationary object and destroying up to three moving targets. The probability of completing the task of the DRG to destroy a typical object is 0.5-0.7, which puts the special operations agencies on a par with high-precision weapons in terms of strike capabilities.

In the period preceding the hostilities, and with their beginning, up to 75 percent of the enemy's from the existing composition of the grouping of special operations forces. At the same time, up to 25 percent can be used in the interests of preparing for hostilities, up to 60 percent in the implementation of the immediate task, and up to 15 percent in the interests of completing the final task. created by DRGs.

The optimal depth of reconnaissance and sabotage actions is 50-150 km, and special and subversive actions are carried out, as a rule, in operational and strategic depth.

The basis of the tactical actions of the DRG are: plaque; ambush actions; sabotage; object search; aiming high-precision missile and aircraft weapons at targets using radio beacons and laser illumination devices; observation.

The characteristic features of these tactical actions are sudden short-term strikes using maneuver and a quick exit from the battle, as a rule, at night or in conditions of limited visibility.

Plaque (schemes 1,2) is the most common way of tactical actions of the DRG. It provides for a sudden attack on an object with the aim of destroying it and incapacitating it, destroying personnel and equipment. The raid includes a hidden exit to the designated area, the rapid infliction of fire damage, a quick exit from the battle and retreat.

The raid is preceded by thorough reconnaissance, as a result of which the following are established: the location of the object; the composition, armament and nature of the enemy's actions on it; secret approaches to the object and the direction (place) that provides the greatest surprise of the attack; the presence of obstacles and barriers on the approaches to the object; the direction (area) from where the enemy can provide assistance to the object, by what forces and means; escape routes.

To carry out a raid, as a rule, three subgroups are formed from the DRG: assault, fire support and combat support (prohibiting the approach of reinforcements), as well as observers (two scouts - saboteurs). During a raid, the DRG can carry out: remote detonation of mine-explosive and nuclear devices through fireproof, electrically conductive, radio and laser control channels; conducting aimed fire from various types of weapons; guidance of strike aircraft by target designation.

Ambush actions (schemes 3,4) consist in the advance and covert location of the DRG on the expected or probable enemy movement routes for a surprise attack on him with the aim of capturing prisoners, documents, weapons, military equipment and equipment, disorganizing and delaying their advance, causing panic and destruction (capture) of manpower and military equipment. Ambushes are arranged on any terrain, at any time of the year, day and night and in various meteorological conditions.

To carry out an ambush, the following subgroups are usually formed from the DRG:

fire subgroup - to destroy the enemy with fire from small arms, grenade launchers and hand grenades;

one - two subgroups of mining - for the installation of mine-explosive obstacles in selected areas of the terrain (road) and their detonation at the appointed time;

capture subgroup - for a direct attack on the enemy in order to capture prisoners, documents, weapons and military equipment;

support subgroup - to cover with fire the actions of other subgroups during the raid and when they withdraw after completing the task;

observers (two reconnaissance saboteurs) - for the timely warning of subgroups of the DRG about the approach of the enemy to the ambush site.

Diversion (Scheme 5) provides for covert, carefully prepared actions by the DRG or individual reconnaissance saboteurs to disable the most important objects or their elements using mechanical, chemical and other destruction methods not related to firefighting to achieve the set goal. Sabotage can be carried out with legal or illegal penetration of the object. The sabotage, as a rule, is preceded by a thorough additional reconnaissance of the object, during which the order of protection and defense is determined, the most vulnerabilities(elements) of the object, hidden approaches and escape routes.

In the course of sabotage actions, it is envisaged:

putting out of action especially important objects of the enemy or their destruction;

disruption or failure of communication lines;

seizure of individuals or samples of weapons and military equipment, their transfer to designated areas;

destruction or incapacitation of elements of military infrastructure;

damage to enemy information infrastructure facilities.

Search for an object (schemes 6,7) consists in a sequential inspection of terrain in a given area in order to detect an object, identify its elements, state and nature of activity, followed by determining the exact coordinates of its location. When organizing and conducting a search for enemy radio-electronic means, special small-sized direction-finding equipment is used.

The search is carried out by several reconnaissance groups (RGs) assigned from the DRGs, the composition and number of which depend on the area of ​​the reconnaissance area, information about the enemy, the availability of radio communications, terrain conditions and other factors. As part of the WG, two or more reconnaissance saboteurs with communications equipment can operate.

The reconnaissance group is assigned a lane or the direction of reconnaissance is indicated. The commander of the DRG should be with the RG operating in the direction of the most probable location of the search object, or as part of the main forces of the DRG, maintaining constant communication with the RG. Having discovered an object to be destroyed, the RGs go to the assembly area, carry out appropriate preparations, and then the RG directs aircraft or calls in the fire of artillery and missile troops.

The use of radio beacons or the implementation of laser illumination of identified objects (targets) for targeting strike weapons (diagrams 8.9). This method of tactical actions of the DRG is carried out in the following order: after detecting an object, its coordinates are determined, guidance and laser target designation means are secretly installed in the immediate vicinity of the object, and observation is organized. After the strike is completed, additional reconnaissance of the results of the defeat is carried out, and, if necessary, the coordinates of the surviving (non-damaged) elements of the object (target) are specified.

Observation (Scheme 10) provides for a visual inspection of the area in order to obtain the most reliable information about the enemy. Observation is organized and conducted continuously at any time of the year and day. At night and in conditions of limited visibility, surveillance is supplemented by eavesdropping. When organizing observation, observation sectors, landmarks and conditional names of local objects are established. At night and in conditions of limited visibility, surveillance is carried out using night vision devices and other technical means. The depth of conducting reconnaissance by observation depends on the nature of the terrain, meteorological conditions, optical and other reconnaissance technical means. When observing the movements of the enemy, the areas where their aircraft are based ( army aviation) uses reconnaissance and signaling equipment.

Observers or observation posts (OPs) consisting of at least two people, one of which is a senior, are appointed to conduct observation. The place for observation is chosen in such a way that it provides good review long range, camouflage and covert approaches. The task for an observer (OP) is set, as a rule, on the ground, but in some cases it can also be set at a base (day camp) with a subsequent exit to the place of observation. The observation sector is divided by depth into zones: near - up to
400 m; medium - up to 1 km; distant - to the limits of visibility. The boundaries of the zones are outlined conditionally according to landmarks and local objects.

For reconnaissance eavesdropping scouts-saboteurs with good hearing are appointed, those who know the language enemy and able to navigate well at night. Eavesdropping is carried out at any time of the day, especially at night and in other conditions of limited visibility, without the use (with the use) of technical means and supplements the observation. Eavesdropping without the use of technical means of reconnaissance makes it possible to detect the enemy by sound signs (by ear), determine his location and nature of activity. The depth of reconnaissance by eavesdropping depends on the nature of the terrain, meteorological conditions and the activities carried out by the enemy and can range from 100 m to several kilometers. Eavesdropping with the use of technical means is carried out by reconnaissance saboteurs operating directly at the location of the enemy.

The experience of military conflicts of recent decades, especially their post-conflict phase, has necessitated the development of conceptual provisions for a new type of operation - stabilization. For the first time, the principles of conducting stabilization operations were set out in the field charter of the US Army FM 3-0 "Operations" in 2002, and in the new edition of the charter in 2008, the theoretical foundations of this type of operation were revised. Actions to stabilize the situation are currently placed on a par with such types of military actions as defense and offensive. According to the provisions of the new charters, along with the ability to achieve military victory over the enemy, the army must be able to conduct stabilization operations in order to consolidate the results of military operations and create conditions for development in the post-conflict period.

Stabilization operations are a combination of both traditional offensive and defensive actions, and various non-military measures to establish contacts with the local population, assist them in establishing and maintaining stability in the country, restoring infrastructure, and providing humanitarian assistance, carried out in close cooperation with other law enforcement agencies , international non-governmental organizations and institutions.

The stabilization process is divided into several stages, characterized by a different ratio and scale of the use of power and non-power tools. As we advance along the path of stabilizing the situation, the intensity of the use of military force must steadily decrease.

The most active force "stabilization instruments" are used in the period immediately following the cessation of the armed conflict.

According to the charters of the US Army, during stabilization operations, tactical groups are created to perform combat missions based on the typical structure of a brigade, battalion, company and platoon, reinforced by units of military branches and special forces. Often the structure of such tactical groups differs significantly from the composition of ground forces participating in hostilities.

All units that are part of the combat brigade group participating in the stabilization operation operate within the zone of responsibility of the formation, the boundaries of which usually coincide with the boundaries of local administrative units.

In the course of stabilization operations, the units apply the following main tactical methods:

search and destruction of the enemy;

blocking and searching;

raid actions;

ambush actions;

patrolling;

defensive actions.