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Today, the Arctic theme is becoming more and more popular and logically fits into the framework of the state course for the restoration of Russia's geopolitical positions in all azimuths. Priority attention, which since the beginning of the 21st century has been given to the development of the Arctic territories, is determined by the long-term strategic interests of the state. The Fundamentals of the National Policy in the Arctic until 2020 have been developed, which provide for the transformation of the Arctic zone into the leading strategic resource base of Russia. As a result, already now the Arctic provides about 11% of the country's national income, 22% of the total Russian exports are created here, more than 90% of nickel and cobalt, 60% of copper, 96% of platinoids are mined and produced...
About a quarter of the world's hydrocarbon resources are concentrated in the Russian part of the Arctic. Unique gas fields have been discovered on the shelves of the Barents and Kara Seas. The fishery complex produces about 15% of the volume of water biological resources countries. The key role in the development of a unified transcontinental transport system belongs to the Northern Sea Route, which serves as the shortest route between the European and Far Eastern sea and river ports of Siberia.
"QUIET" REGION
The special geopolitical position and wealth of its raw material deposits have turned the Arctic into one of the main points of attraction not only for the Arctic states, but also for the very remote countries of the Northern Hemisphere.
China, Japan, South Korea, India and Singapore, the Netherlands, Spain, Great Britain, Germany, France, Poland, and Italy received the status of an observer of the Arctic Council. In an effort to assert its institutional involvement in the Arctic affairs, the EU also claims the status of a permanent observer in the Arctic Council.
The states and their coalitions, claiming to participate in decision-making on the problems of the Arctic, without de jure questioning the jurisdiction of the coastal Arctic countries, are de facto trying to find ways to change the existing situation. The desire of many states to demonstrate their right to independent study of the Arctic, the development of the Arctic field allows us to predict an increase in confrontation, primarily between the main world geopolitical players: Russia, the United States, China, the states of the Arctic region and their coalitions. The confrontation can be carried out both within the framework of diplomatic negotiations and using a wide range of technologies of modern conflicts.
So far, the Arctic is considered a relatively calm region. Thanks to the professionalism of Russian diplomats, many important agreements for Russia have been signed and are being implemented within the framework of the Arctic Council: on cooperation in aviation and maritime search and rescue in the Arctic, on cooperation in the field of preparedness and response to marine oil pollution in the Arctic. In total, within the framework of the Arctic Council, Russia takes part in 80 projects. The UN Commission recently recognized the legitimacy of our claim for the continental shelf of the Sea of Okhotsk. Now it has actually become the Russian inland sea.
The opinions of a number of experts sound rather reassuringly, arguing that the only significant open issue in the Arctic remains the definition of external borders and the delimitation of the continental shelf of a number of coastal states beyond 200-mile zones. At the same time, it is believed that this issue will not give rise to disputes and conflicts regarding access to the natural resources of the Arctic, most of which are located within the boundaries of the undisputed exclusive economic zones of coastal states. At the same time, the world has more than once encountered the fact that the position of the West has changed dramatically, and this has led to a radical transformation of situations, to a cynical denial of the sovereign rights of individual states, up to the use of military force. The West defends its national interests resolutely and harshly, ignoring the norms international law when they conflict with his interests. So far, the situation in the Arctic, unlike problem areas, is relatively calm.
However, the world is changing, and strategies are also changing, allowing you to impose your will on the enemy not only by military force. In the context of globalization and the information revolution, the events related to the hybrid war waged against Russia can serve as a catalyst for abrupt and unpredictable changes in the Arctic region.
UNPREDICTABLE ENVIRONMENT
Given the volatility and unpredictability of the international situation, one should not lose sight of the possibility of implementing a strategy of indirect action in the course of a hybrid war that is unfolding against Russia in the Arctic.
In modern conflicts, technologies are increasingly being used to gradually prepare the conditions for an avalanche-like development of the situation. The calculation is made on the fact that everything should “go by itself”, without the noticeable participation of the main initiator of the conflict. According to one of the authors of the Anglo-Saxon strategy of indirect action, the British military theorist B.L. Garth, "you can arrange various relatively small nasty things, all the time reminiscent of the enemy, but he himself will not be visible."
The strategy of indirect action in the Arctic is only a link in the US global strategy, the goal of which is to establish world domination and achieve guaranteed access to all vital areas.
With regard to the Arctic region, for many years the United States and some other NATO countries have been coordinating their political, military, economic, and information efforts within the framework of solving a single task - to expand their economic presence in the regions of the North, achieve the internationalization of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and, ultimately, try to minimize the role of Russia in the region. At the same time, we note that the issue of control over the NSR for Russia is of critical importance, since this is so far the only transport route capable of integrating remote areas Far North countries and their resource potential in the national economy. Therefore, Russia cannot allow economic ties between individual regions of the country carried out via the NSR to be placed under international control.
The leading role in counteracting the legitimate interests of Russia in the Arctic belongs to the United States. The report of the Chief of Staff of the US Navy, Admiral D. Greenert, "Roadmap" for the Arctic 2014-2030, defines specific goals and objectives for various services and departments of the US Navy and their allies. The military infrastructure of the United States and Canada is already being created and developed in the Arctic. In particular, the US has decided to build two new advanced coast guard bases in Alaska at Barrow and Nome. The possibilities of ensuring the permanent presence of an aircraft carrier group in the Arctic and the allocation of additional patrol ships are being considered. Efforts are being stepped up for anti-submarine defense and deep landing operations. AT last years the scale and intensity of NATO operational and combat training in the Arctic has increased. Every year, 3-4 trips of multi-purpose nuclear submarines are carried out to the Arctic, at least three sorties of base patrol aircraft are made weekly.
In the Arctic sector and on the border territory of the Russian Federation, the activities of the US intelligence services and their NATO allies have intensified. In addition to military forces and means, Norwegian research vessels are involved in reconnaissance, various non-governmental organizations are used, especially environmental ones, as was the case, for example, in 2013 during the Greenpeace campaign on the Prirazlomnaya platform. The presence of foreign researchers is noted in the areas of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago and in the throat White Sea- where Russia is testing its nuclear submarines. In Norway, they are talking about plans to change the demilitarized status of Svalbard, and the development of a concept for the use of national armed forces in the Arctic region is being completed.
NATO's position on military presence in the Arctic has not yet been determined. In this regard, the issue of the alliance's policy in the Arctic was not reflected in any of the adopted in 2010 strategic concept alliance, nor in the decisions of subsequent bloc summits. The lack of involvement of NATO in solving the problems of the Arctic is associated with different approaches and unequal interest of the allies. But supporters of a more visible NATO presence in the northern latitudes do not stop trying to change the situation, appealing to the fact that five NATO member states (USA, Canada, Norway, Denmark and Iceland) and two important partners (Sweden and Finland) are Arctic countries. Thus, it is proposed to expand the number of NATO member states participating in the Arctic confrontation with Russia.
Along with military activities in the northern latitudes, Washington is increasing its efforts in the information sphere, using the means of traditional and public diplomacy to consolidate allies and undermine Russia's positions. The breeding ground for the implementation of the preparatory phase of the strategy of indirect action in the Arctic is a complex of hybrid threats that can serve as a catalyst for building confrontation between Russia and other contenders for the wealth of the region.
Main hybrid threats for the Russian Federation in the Arctic zone are due to a combination of the following military, political, economic, informational factors: the intensification of military activities of the Arctic states and their allies, the growth of its scale in the Arctic and adjacent water areas; implementation of ideas about common and equal access to the use of the Northern Sea Route and the resources of the Arctic for all subjects of the world community; the implementation by the Arctic states and their allies of informational measures to discredit the Russian Federation; Norway's actions to forcibly oust the Russian Federation from traditional fishing areas in the Barents and Norwegian Seas; the desire of the United States and its allies to establish control over the nuclear facilities of the Russian Federation in the Arctic; the desire of the leadership of the countries of the Asia-Pacific region to receive for their naval forces base points in the Arctic zone, etc.
Given the trend towards an increase in the number of participants claiming their share in the Arctic, it is possible to predict the formation of situational coalitions in the composition of states, relations between which are by no means always examples of friendship and mutual understanding. But given the unresolved number of legal aspects in relation to the problems of the Arctic, it seems quite realistic to coordinate the activities of individual states in order to weaken the position of Russia and achieve a favorable decision for them by international authorities. The actions of such rivals of Russia are characterized by purposeful, adaptive use of both military force methods and coordinated steps to weaken the enemy economically, use subversive information technologies. The use of indirect asymmetric actions and methods of waging hybrid wars both against the whole state and in relation to its individual large regions makes it possible to deprive the opposing side of actual sovereignty without seizing territories by military force.
Thus, a hybrid war is being waged against Russia in the Arctic, which requires appropriate “hybrid” countermeasures. Some of these measures are included in adopted by the Council security of the Russian Federation in 2008 document - "Fundamentals public policy RF in the Arctic for the period up to 2020 and beyond”. The Fundamentals reflect the main goals and strategic priorities of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic, the main tasks, measures and mechanisms for its implementation. Among the tasks in the field of ensuring military security it is required to "bring the capabilities of the border authorities in line with the nature of the threats and challenges of the Russian Federation in the Arctic."
Based on the spirit and letter of the "Osnovy", Russia plans to create an Arctic group of troops by 2020 to protect its economic and political interests in this region. The document refers to the strengthening of the border troops of the FSB of Russia and the need to create a coast guard of the Russian Arctic borders.
So far, there are no clear signs indicating the existence of a consolidated anti-Russian strategy aimed at realizing the interests of the Arctic states and countries located far from the Arctic. However, for a hybrid war in the Arctic as the largest geopolitical region, the following is important: nothing prevents each of the participants from realizing their intentions without the direct use of armed forces and even without declaring war at all. If the interests of a group of participants coincide, it may be appropriate to create their situational coalition to “push through” the desired solution.
Therefore, it is also important for Russia to use such coalitions to its advantage, using disagreements between various actors. In this context, it is also important to use the opportunities of the SCO, EAC, cooperation with Japan, South Korea. A program of long-term cooperation with neutral Sweden and Finland should be developed and cooperation in the Arctic should be included in it in order to prevent these states from being drawn into anti-Russian maneuvers.
ARC OF INSTABILITY
The strategic importance of the Arctic region determines its coverage by the so-called "system of arcs of instability", which is the main tool through which the most important systemic security problems of Eurasia in general and the Russian Federation in particular are created. According to Professor Vladimir Kolotov, "the system of arcs of instability creates a geopolitical "climate", which in every possible way contributes to the conduct of controlled regional destabilization." This system covers the territory located between four oceans: Pacific, Indian, Atlantic and Arctic. It consists of eight operating segments of varying degrees of "readiness".
The arctic segment of the arc of instability is in the process of formation. The interests of the parties are defined, attempts are being made to ensure their compatibility on the basis of an internationally recognized legal framework, which, in turn, is characterized by a high degree of underdevelopment, which creates uncertainty regarding the rights of the participants to use various parts of the Arctic field in their interests. As part of the US-proclaimed strategy of geopolitical dominance in the Arctic segment, in parallel with the build-up of forces and the creation of military infrastructure, operations are being deployed in other areas of preparation and conduct of a hybrid war.
Within the framework of the hybrid war that the West is waging against Russia, the Arctic theater occupies a special place, determined by a number of objective factors. Among them: extreme natural and climatic conditions; great length coastline and the focal nature of the deployment of border guard forces; low population density; lack of a single industrial and economic complex and remoteness from the main industrial centers, high resource intensity and dependence economic activity and life support of the population from the supply of fuel, food and essential goods from other regions; low stability ecological systems that determine the biological balance and climate of the Earth, and their dependence on even minor anthropogenic impacts.
An important factor of a subjective nature is the still insufficiently coordinated system government controlled in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation. The imperfection of state regulation measures in the economic and social spheres has led to a critical state of the basic transport, industrial, border, information, scientific and social infrastructures. Disproportions in regional development are growing, there is an outflow of population from the region.
The danger is recognized by the authorities, and as a result of energetic measures taken, the situation is rectified. However, the competitive potential of the Arctic zone of Russia is still far from being fully used.
NONLINEAR APPROACH
The strategy and goals of a hybrid war are formulated taking into account the vulnerability of the Arctic part of Russia to the use of hybrid technologies aimed at destabilizing the situation in vast areas.
First, as already mentioned, the most important goal is to undermine the economic potential of the state. This predetermines the place of Russian economic facilities in the Arctic, communications and control systems as the primary goals of the hybrid war. Forces and means are being created to influence the objects of this group, including special operations forces, cyber weapons, and theater reconnaissance is being organized. It is necessary to predict the expansion of the use of UAVs for reconnaissance purposes.
Secondly, the length of the coastline and the sparsely populated areas of land complicate the task of protecting the border, preventing the penetration of sabotage and reconnaissance groups of special operations forces.
Thirdly, an important feature of the theater is the high sensitivity of the environment in the Arctic to environmental factors, which makes it possible to predict the use of special operations forces in a hybrid war to disrupt the ecological balance. Here, one can fully expect the use of the nonlinearity property of a hybrid war, when the consequences of using indirect methods related to the impact on the ecology of the region lead to disproportionately high catastrophic consequences that can cause an avalanche-like change in the military-strategic and political situation. These can be, for example, acts of sabotage at oil-producing facilities, pipelines, and transport. High degree threats are posed by cyber operations against the control systems of the above facilities.
When developing protective measures in the Arctic region, one should resolutely abandon the traditional linear vision of war, which implies the possibility of establishing direct and proportional relationships between cause and effect, disturbing influence and results. In a hybrid war built on a non-linear strategy, small impacts can produce big results. The non-linearity factor of a hybrid war significantly changes the degree of reliability of predicting the possible consequences of a conflict both on the scale of the Arctic region and on a global scale.
In a hybrid war, the consequences of using indirect methods create an extremely dangerous situation, often beyond the control of the initiators. As a result of the disruption of the direct connection between cause and effect, vast zones of uncertainty are created associated with the actions of heterogeneous actors, and the actions of one of them can cause an avalanche-like change in the entire military-strategic and political situation. These and some other factors create serious obstacles when trying to foresee the course and outcome of a hybrid war.
Fourth, hybrid warfare is illegitimate. All existing laws of war are designed, as a rule, for conflicts between two belligerents, usually states pursuing interests that each of the participants considers legitimate. For traditional war The UN has adopted the concept of "aggression", there are laws protecting the rights of combatants, prisoners of war and the civilian population, prohibiting the use of certain types of . The existing legal and regulatory framework serves as a tool for political decision makers and military leaders. There is nothing like this for a hybrid war.
And finally, the concept of “parties to the conflict”, which act as carriers of the conflict, needs to be clarified. A hybrid war in the Arctic is not declared, the parties to the conflict are not defined, while it is traditionally believed that a conflict as a phase of contradiction is possible only when its parties are represented by subjects. Where there is no subject, there can be no conflict.
If in a hybrid war one of the obvious subjects is the state - the victim of aggression, then it is not easy to define the aggressor himself as the other side of the conflict.
At the same time, the fact of hybrid aggression does not become obvious immediately. This thesis should be primarily attributed to the important components of a hybrid war - information and cyber wars. In both cases, it is difficult to determine the subject of aggression. These and some other factors create serious obstacles in predicting the situation and strategic planning of measures to counter a hybrid war in the Arctic.
"FRICTION OF WAR"
Taking into account the uniqueness of the Arctic theater great value to understand hybrid warfare as a sphere of uncertainty and uncertainty, the phenomenon of the concept of “friction of war” introduced by K. Clausewitz has. In his writings, the military theorist rightly emphasized that "friction is the only concept that, in general, distinguishes a real war from a paper war." In other words, in war there can be a huge distance from what is conceived to what is actually being implemented. The validity of this judgment is especially true for a hybrid war in the Arctic, given the unpredictability and uncertainty of the conflict, the special sensitivity of possible targets to small impacts that can lead to large-scale consequences. The peculiarities of a hybrid war as an uncertain and unreliable conflict, in which heterogeneous forces and means participate, turn friction into a source of significant perturbing influences on the course of actions, which, under the influence of the friction of war, often become an uncontrollable and even uncontrollable process.
For traditional warfare, there are seven sources of general friction: danger; physical stress; uncertainty and unreliability of information on the basis of which decisions are made; random events that cannot be predicted; physical and political restrictions on the use of force; unpredictability resulting from interaction with the enemy; gaps between the causes and effects of war.
For a hybrid war in the Arctic region, the list of friction sources can be expanded.
First, given the scale of the economic interests of the states claiming their share in the Arctic field, the geography of their location and the specific approach to existing problems, psychological tension and stress increase, which increases the likelihood of error.
It is known that many modern conflicts occur on intercivilizational faults. The influence of this factor on the possible aggravation of the situation in the Arctic increases due to the expansion of the civilizational diversity of contenders for the Arctic field.
Secondly, a powerful source of disturbing influences that provoke failures in control systems are actions in cyberspace directed against control systems at oil and gas production facilities and pipelines.
Thirdly, disinformation is already widely used in the information war to manipulate the activities of environmental groups, which contributes to the creation of an environment of chaos and confusion.
And finally, as a result of friction, seemingly insignificant phenomena and facts occurring at the tactical level receive the power and ability of a strategic catalyst capable of influencing the course of an entire military campaign. There are cascading amplification mechanisms that allow small events in the course of a war to trigger completely unexpected and unpredictable processes that cannot be quantified within the framework of any theory. In the Arctic sector, in a hybrid war against Russia, cascade mechanisms-catalysts can be man-made man-made disasters at civilian and military facilities, terrorist attacks on communications with a large number of victims, disruption of the supply of vital products and funds to hard-to-reach Arctic regions.
The sum of friction sources usually turns out to be more than their simple sum, since some types of friction interact with others, which further increases their destructive result.
Friction in zones of uncertainty in a hybrid war is associated with the manifestation of many accidents and causes phenomena that cannot be taken into account in advance. This increases the likelihood of random incidents that widen the scope of the conflict. This is especially dangerous in a hybrid war in the Arctic, in which the interests of nuclear powers are involved.
Thus, the sources of friction largely determine the structural properties of hybrid warfare, the effectiveness of operations, and the strategy and tactics of counteraction.
As in any other war, in the hybrid war in the Arctic there are some kind of “lubricants” that can reduce friction in any military machine, including in a hybrid war. This is the use of flexible adaptive political strategies in diplomacy. Availability is important combat experience and military training participants, special equipment, military equipment and weapons, the rational deployment of forces and means, strict discipline, a well-thought-out information strategy, the early creation of effective channels for obtaining, transmitting, processing and analyzing situational data, etc.
For a hybrid war, a unique “grease” is its complete lack of legitimacy and subordination to international norms and rules, which makes it permissible on this basis to carry out the dirtiest provocations with the involvement of special operations forces, the use of manipulated terrorist groups and organized crime. The use of bacterial agents against animals, such as pathogens, cannot be excluded. anthrax, foot and mouth disease, plague, glanders, false rabies, etc.
LEGAL CONCLUSIONS
The Arctic is an extremely tasty region for Russia's geopolitical adversaries, who have repeatedly demonstrated the ability to violate any international agreements, if this is in line with them. national interest. Historical experience does not allow counting on unconditional respect for the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of Russia enshrined in treaties in the Arctic waters and on the shelf. Such factors, along with well-known problems with the justification of the outer boundaries of the Russian continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean outside the exclusive economic zone, create conditions for attempts by the Arctic, some non-Arctic states and their coalitions to use a sophisticated strategy of indirect actions to put pressure on Russia, built on the formation and implementation of the spectrum hybrid threats.
The effectiveness of countering a hybrid war in the Arctic will depend on how fully it will be possible to foresee and take into account its features in order to adequately and promptly adapt to a rapidly changing environment, which will allow you to get ahead of rivals and prevent the transformation of challenges and risks into real dangers and threats to the national interests of the state in vital region.
Institute of Economic Problems. G.P. Luzin Federal Research Center "Kola Scientific Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences"
Institute of Economic Problems. G.P. Luzin is a separate subdivision of the Federal State Budgetary Institution of Science of the Federal research center"Kola Science Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences". The Institute is included in the FRC KSC RAS on the basis of the order of the FASO of Russia dated July 26, 2017 No. 465.
The scientific and methodological guidance of the Institute is carried out by the Department of Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
The Institute was established on the basis of the Department of Economic Research of the Kola Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences dated December 24, 1986 No. 1478 “On the Organization of the Institute for Economic Problems of the Kola Branch named after I. CM. Kirov Academy of Sciences of the USSR. This decision of the Academy of Sciences was based on the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of December 14, 1986 No. 1226 "On the integrated use of minerals in the Kola Peninsula."
At the Institute, thanks to the efforts of its first director, Corr. RAS G.P. Luzin, a scientific school of research on the problems of the "economy of the northern dimension" of Russia was created, the principles of which are being successfully developed by the Institute's staff in modern conditions. An indicator of the recognition of the merits of this scientific school was the decision of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences to award the Institute after G.P. Luzin (Resolution of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences dated December 12, 2006 No. 359).
Based on the Federal Law of September 27, 2013 No. 253-FZ “On Russian Academy sciences, reorganization of state academies of sciences and amendments to certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation” and Order of the Government of the Russian Federation dated December 30, 2013 No. 2591-r until December 18, 2017. The Institute was a non-profit scientific organization established in the form of a federal state budgetary institution administered by the FASO of Russia.
Currently, the Institute employs about 90 people.
In accordance with the Charter of the FRC KSC RAS and the main areas of research are:
- study of the patterns of evolution of the socio-economic systems of the North and the Arctic, the theoretical foundations for the sustainable development of the Arctic territories and cities in the context of globalization;
- development of scientific foundations for the socio-economic policy of the northern and Arctic regions, mechanisms for activating its social, innovative, industrial and financial components;
- study of the problems of rational environmentally balanced use natural resources in the areas of the Russian Arctic, including the Arctic shelf, substantiation of a strategy for the development of economic maritime activities in the Arctic, including in the area of the Northern Sea Route, determination of the conditions and mechanism for coordinating defense and economic activities in Russian Arctic;
- study of geo-economic processes in the world and Russian Arctic; analysis and modeling of the mechanism of functioning of the economy and social sphere of the Russian Arctic; development of an economic theory of spatial development and management of the Arctic territories. Analysis and forecasting of challenges and threats economic security Russia in the Arctic and the development of measures to strengthen it.
These areas correspond to the Program of Fundamental Scientific Research of State Academies of Sciences for 2013-2020, approved by the Government of the Russian Federation on December 03, 2012 No. 2237-r (as amended by the order of the Government of the Russian Federation on October 31, 2015 No. 2217-r): p. 167 "Study of the dynamics of the correlation of global and national in socio-economic development and optimization of Russia's participation in the processes of regional and global integration"; item 172 “Development of a unified system theory and tools for modeling the functioning, evolution and interaction of socio-economic objects of nano-, micro- and meso-economic levels (theories and models of socio-economic synthesis)”; item 173 "Development of a strategy for the transformation of the socio-economic space and territorial development of Russia"; item 174 "Development of proposals for the state policy of the integrated development of Siberia, the North and the Far East."
The Institute carries out educational activities in the field of postgraduate vocational education in higher education programs - programs for the training of scientific and pedagogical personnel in graduate school in the direction 38.00.00 "Economics and Management" in the specialty 08.00.05 "Economics and Management of the National Economy".
Since 2001, the Institute has regularly held the International Scientific and Practical Conference “North and the Arctic in the new paradigm of world development. Luzin Readings”, which is a traditional platform that brings together Russian and foreign scientists, politicians, businessmen, representatives of public organizations to exchange scientific knowledge and best practical experience in the development of the North and the Arctic. Since 1991, with the participation of the Institute, an international traveling scientific symposium “Calotte Academy” has been organized annually. The Institute is the organizer and co-organizer of a number of other scientific conferences, symposiums, seminars, round tables held both on the basis of the Institute and on the basis of other Russian and foreign organizations.
Since 1998, the Institute has been publishing the scientific and informational journal "The North and the Market: Forming an Economic Order". FROM complete information the magazine and the archive of issues can be found on the website:. The journal is one of the leading scientific publications on social and economic issues of sustainable development of the Russian North and the Arctic. The thematic range of publications is extensive, and the most important direction of published articles is the analysis and forecasting of the dynamics of socio-economic processes in the northern and Arctic regions, taking into account the influence of global, national and regional factors that determine the development of territories with extreme living and economic conditions. Since June 06, 2017, the journal has been included in the List of peer-reviewed scientific publications, in which the main scientific results of dissertations for the degree of candidate and doctor of sciences (List of the Higher Attestation Commission) in the group of scientific specialties 08.00.00 - Economic Sciences should be published.
Since 2012, the Institute, in collaboration with the Arctic Center of the University of Lapland and the Barents Institute of the University of Tromsø, has been working on publishing an international interdisciplinary scientific journal on the problems of sustainable development of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region "Barents Studies: Peoples, Economies and Politics" (Barents studies: people, economics and politics). The address of the journal's website on the Internet: http://www.barentsinfo.org/barentsstudies/English.iw3 . Information on the site is presented in English and Russian. The journal presents the results of scientific research by foreign scientists concerning development processes in the Barents region, and creates conditions for presenting to a wide international scientific and public audience the views of Russian scientists on the problems of sustainable, balanced development of the Barents Euro-Arctic region as a whole and its Russian part.
VILLAGE SABETTA / Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug /, August 30. /TASS/. Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, called for the continued creation of an effective security architecture in the Arctic, avoiding ultimatums and threats.
“We need to continue building an effective security architecture that will become a guarantee against any attempts to destabilize the [Arctic] region,” he said, opening the VII international meeting of representatives of the member states of the Arctic Council, observer countries in the Arctic Council and the foreign scientific community.
"The Arctic countries speak different languages, but it is in our power to make sure that the language of threats and ultimatums is never heard in the North," the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation added.
“Today, when energy security issues have acquired a global scale and often turn into a political dimension, the topic of Arctic resources is more relevant than ever,” Patrushev noted. “According to modern estimates, hydrocarbon reserves in the region amount to 90 billion barrels of oil, 47 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, as well as 44 billion barrels of gas condensate."
"At the same time, an irresponsible race for resources can lead to environmental disasters and the destruction of the traditional ways of life of the peoples of the North, the Secretary of the Security Council warned. - The unique features of the Arctic can instantly turn any negative incident into a real disaster. That's why careful attitude to the riches of the region should be a top priority for all of us."
Patrushev urged, despite individual interstate disagreements, to join forces in the name of a common cause - the preservation of the Arctic as a unique natural and cultural heritage of all mankind. "This implies a number of difficult, but still solvable tasks," he said. In particular, there is a need for a comprehensive dialogue on economic issues. "The harsh conditions of the region make many undertakings so difficult that their implementation is possible only in close international cooperation, - stressed the Secretary of the Security Council of Russia. “You already know, for example, that the Yamal LNG project involves Russian, Chinese and French capital, contractors and partners from dozens of countries around the world.”
Patrushev also called for increasing the role of the Northern Sea Route and developing transport infrastructure in the Arctic.
“Efforts must be made to increase the accessibility of the Arctic region,” stressed the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. It's about first of all, about increasing the role of the Northern Sea Route, for the development of which the Russian side is making great efforts, including in terms of operating a nuclear icebreaker fleet that has no analogues in the world. "The accessibility of the Arctic also implies the creation of infrastructure for tourism and attracting qualified specialists to the region ", he added.
Patrushev noted the need for scientific and technological support for the development of the Arctic. “Arctic technologies are not a tribute to fashion, but a profitable area of activity,” he is sure. “In our country, they have already realized that successful use in harsh Arctic conditions is a unique quality mark that instantly makes technology in demand and competitive.”
The Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation considers it necessary to work to increase the popularity of the Arctic, to draw the attention of the international community to the issues of its development and conservation. “The development of Arctic tourism is of great importance here,” Patrushev explained. “We can count on a careful attitude to this region only when all of humanity, and not just the Arctic states, realize the enduring value of the Arctic as a common heritage of mankind.”
The Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation stressed that the Arctic today is facing challenges that, it would seem, are long gone. He said that at the end of the meeting, the participants would be shown presentations on the elimination of an anthrax outbreak that occurred in Yamal in 2016. “Here I would like to note that at that time we managed not only to stop the spread of a dangerous disease in time, but also to restore the property lost by indigenous people in the shortest possible time. local residents, Patrushev said. “This proves once again that even when faced with extraordinary challenges in the Arctic, we can respond to them with the highest standards of social responsibility.”
Every year, 3-4 trips of US and UK nuclear submarines are carried out to the Arctic. Photo from www.navy.mil
Today, the Arctic theme is becoming more and more popular and logically fits into the framework of the state course for the restoration of Russia's geopolitical positions in all azimuths. Priority attention, which since the beginning of the 21st century has been given to the development of the Arctic territories, is determined by the long-term strategic interests of the state. The Fundamentals of the National Policy in the Arctic until 2020 have been developed, which provide for the transformation of the Arctic zone into the leading strategic resource base of Russia. As a result, already now the Arctic provides about 11% of the country's national income, 22% of the total Russian exports are created here, more than 90% of nickel and cobalt, 60% of copper, 96% of platinoids are mined and produced...
About a quarter of the world's hydrocarbon resources are concentrated in the Russian part of the Arctic. Unique gas fields have been discovered on the shelves of the Barents and Kara Seas. The fishery complex produces about 15% of the country's aquatic biological resources. The key role in the development of a unified transcontinental transport system belongs to the Northern Sea Route, which serves as the shortest route between the European and Far Eastern sea and river ports of Siberia.
"QUIET" REGION
The special geopolitical position and wealth of its raw material deposits have turned the Arctic into one of the main points of attraction not only for the Arctic states, but also for the very remote countries of the Northern Hemisphere.
China, Japan, South Korea, India and Singapore, the Netherlands, Spain, Great Britain, Germany, France, Poland, and Italy received the status of an observer of the Arctic Council. In an effort to assert its institutional involvement in the Arctic affairs, the EU also claims the status of a permanent observer in the Arctic Council.
The states and their coalitions, claiming to participate in decision-making on the problems of the Arctic, without de jure questioning the jurisdiction of the coastal Arctic countries, are de facto trying to find ways to change the existing situation. The desire of many states to demonstrate their right to independent study of the Arctic, the development of the Arctic field allows us to predict an increase in confrontation, primarily between the main world geopolitical players: Russia, the United States, China, the states of the Arctic region and their coalitions. The confrontation can be carried out both within the framework of diplomatic negotiations and using a wide range of technologies of modern conflicts.
So far, the Arctic is considered a relatively calm region. Thanks to the professionalism of Russian diplomats, many important agreements for Russia have been signed and are being implemented within the framework of the Arctic Council: on cooperation in aviation and maritime search and rescue in the Arctic, on cooperation in the field of preparedness and response to marine oil pollution in the Arctic. In total, within the framework of the Arctic Council, Russia takes part in 80 projects. The UN Commission recently recognized the legitimacy of our claim for the continental shelf of the Sea of Okhotsk. Now it has actually become the Russian inland sea.
The opinions of a number of experts sound rather reassuringly, arguing that the only significant open issue in the Arctic remains the definition of external borders and the delimitation of the continental shelf of a number of coastal states beyond 200-mile zones. At the same time, it is believed that this issue will not give rise to disputes and conflicts regarding access to the natural resources of the Arctic, most of which are located within the boundaries of the undisputed exclusive economic zones of coastal states. At the same time, the world has more than once encountered the fact that the position of the West has changed dramatically, and this has led to a radical transformation of situations, to a cynical denial of the sovereign rights of individual states, up to the use of military force against them. The West defends its national interests resolutely and harshly, paying no attention to the norms of international law when they contradict its interests. So far, the situation in the Arctic, unlike problem areas, is relatively calm.
However, the world is changing, and strategies are also changing, allowing you to impose your will on the enemy not only by military force. In the context of globalization and the information revolution, the events related to the hybrid war waged against Russia can serve as a catalyst for abrupt and unpredictable changes in the Arctic region.
UNPREDICTABLE ENVIRONMENT
Given the volatility and unpredictability of the international situation, one should not lose sight of the possibility of implementing a strategy of indirect action in the course of a hybrid war that is unfolding against Russia in the Arctic.
In modern conflicts, technologies are increasingly being used to gradually prepare the conditions for an avalanche-like development of the situation. The calculation is made on the fact that everything should “go by itself”, without the noticeable participation of the main initiator of the conflict. According to one of the authors of the Anglo-Saxon strategy of indirect action, the British military theorist B.L. Garth, "you can arrange various relatively small nasty things, all the time reminiscent of the enemy, but he himself will not be visible."
The strategy of indirect action in the Arctic is only a link in the US global strategy, the goal of which is to establish world domination and achieve guaranteed access to all vital areas.
With regard to the Arctic region, for many years the United States and some other NATO countries have been coordinating their political, military, economic, and information efforts within the framework of solving a single task - to expand their economic presence in the regions of the North, achieve the internationalization of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and, ultimately, try to minimize the role of Russia in the region. At the same time, we note that the issue of control over the NSR for Russia is of critical importance, since this is so far the only transport route capable of integrating the remote regions of the Far North of the country and their resource potential into the national economy. Therefore, Russia cannot allow economic ties between individual regions of the country carried out via the NSR to be placed under international control.
The leading role in counteracting the legitimate interests of Russia in the Arctic belongs to the United States. The report of the Chief of Staff of the US Navy, Admiral D. Greenert, "Roadmap" for the Arctic 2014-2030, defines specific goals and objectives for various services and departments of the US Navy and their allies. The military infrastructure of the United States and Canada is already being created and developed in the Arctic. In particular, the US has decided to build two new advanced coast guard bases in Alaska at Barrow and Nome. The possibilities of ensuring the permanent presence of an aircraft carrier group in the Arctic and the allocation of additional patrol ships are being considered. Efforts are being stepped up for anti-submarine defense and deep landing operations. In recent years, the scale and intensity of NATO operational and combat training in the Arctic has increased. Every year, 3-4 trips of multi-purpose nuclear submarines are carried out to the Arctic, at least three sorties of base patrol aircraft are made weekly.
In the Arctic sector and on the border territory of the Russian Federation, the activities of the US intelligence services and their NATO allies have intensified. In addition to military forces and means, Norwegian research vessels are involved in reconnaissance, various non-governmental organizations are used, especially environmental ones, as was the case, for example, in 2013 during the Greenpeace campaign on the Prirazlomnaya platform. The presence of foreign researchers is noted in areas of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago and in the throat of the White Sea - where Russia is testing its nuclear submarines. In Norway, they are talking about plans to change the demilitarized status of Svalbard, and the development of a concept for the use of national armed forces in the Arctic region is being completed.
NATO's position on military presence in the Arctic has not yet been determined. In this regard, the issue of the alliance's policy in the Arctic was not reflected either in the strategic concept of the alliance adopted in 2010, or in the decisions of subsequent summits of the bloc. The lack of involvement of NATO in solving the problems of the Arctic is associated with different approaches and unequal interest of the allies. But supporters of a more visible NATO presence in the northern latitudes do not stop trying to change the situation, appealing to the fact that five NATO member states (USA, Canada, Norway, Denmark and Iceland) and two important partners (Sweden and Finland) are Arctic countries. Thus, it is proposed to expand the number of NATO member states participating in the Arctic confrontation with Russia.
Along with military activities in the northern latitudes, Washington is increasing its efforts in the information sphere, using the means of traditional and public diplomacy to consolidate allies and undermine Russia's positions. The breeding ground for the implementation of the preparatory phase of the strategy of indirect action in the Arctic is a complex of hybrid threats that can serve as a catalyst for building confrontation between Russia and other contenders for the wealth of the region.
The main hybrid threats to the Russian Federation in the Arctic zone are caused by a combination of the following military, political, economic, informational factors: the intensification of military activities of the Arctic states and their allies, the growth of its scale in the Arctic and adjacent water areas; implementation of ideas about common and equal access to the use of the Northern Sea Route and the resources of the Arctic for all subjects of the world community; the implementation by the Arctic states and their allies of informational measures to discredit the Russian Federation; Norway's actions to forcibly oust the Russian Federation from traditional fishing areas in the Barents and Norwegian Seas; the desire of the United States and its allies to establish control over the nuclear facilities of the Russian Federation in the Arctic; the desire of the leadership of the countries of the Asia-Pacific region to obtain bases for their naval forces in the Arctic zone, etc.
Given the trend towards an increase in the number of participants claiming their share in the Arctic, it is possible to predict the formation of situational coalitions in the composition of states, relations between which are by no means always examples of friendship and mutual understanding. But given the unresolved number of legal aspects in relation to the problems of the Arctic, it seems quite realistic to coordinate the activities of individual states in order to weaken the position of Russia and achieve a favorable decision for them by international authorities. The actions of such rivals of Russia are characterized by purposeful, adaptive use of both military force methods and coordinated steps to weaken the enemy economically and use subversive information technologies. The use of indirect asymmetric actions and methods of waging hybrid wars both against the whole state and in relation to its individual large regions makes it possible to deprive the opposing side of actual sovereignty without seizing territories by military force.
Thus, a hybrid war is being waged against Russia in the Arctic, which requires appropriate “hybrid” countermeasures. Some of these measures are provided for in the document adopted by the Security Council of the Russian Federation in 2008 - "Fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the period up to 2020 and beyond." The Fundamentals reflect the main goals and strategic priorities of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic, the main tasks, measures and mechanisms for its implementation. Among the tasks in the field of ensuring military security, it is required to "bring the capabilities of the border agencies in line with the nature of the threats and challenges of the Russian Federation in the Arctic."
Based on the spirit and letter of the "Osnovy", Russia plans to create an Arctic group of troops by 2020 to protect its economic and political interests in this region. The document refers to the strengthening of the border troops of the FSB of Russia and the need to create a coast guard of the Russian Arctic borders.
So far, there are no clear signs indicating the existence of a consolidated anti-Russian strategy aimed at realizing the interests of the Arctic states and countries located far from the Arctic. However, for a hybrid war in the Arctic as the largest geopolitical region, the following is important: nothing prevents each of the participants from realizing their intentions without the direct use of armed forces and even without declaring war at all. If the interests of a group of participants coincide, it may be appropriate to create their situational coalition to “push through” the desired solution.
Therefore, it is also important for Russia to use such coalitions to its advantage, using disagreements between various actors. In this context, it is also important to use the opportunities of the SCO, EAC, cooperation with Japan and South Korea. A program of long-term cooperation with neutral Sweden and Finland should be developed and cooperation in the Arctic should be included in it in order to prevent these states from being drawn into anti-Russian maneuvers.
ARC OF INSTABILITY
The strategic importance of the Arctic region determines its coverage by the so-called "system of arcs of instability", which is the main tool through which the most important systemic security problems of Eurasia in general and the Russian Federation in particular are created. According to Professor Vladimir Kolotov, "the system of arcs of instability creates a geopolitical "climate", which in every possible way contributes to the conduct of controlled regional destabilization." This system covers the territory located between four oceans: Pacific, Indian, Atlantic and Arctic. It consists of eight operating segments of varying degrees of "readiness".
The arctic segment of the arc of instability is in the process of formation. The interests of the parties are defined, attempts are being made to ensure their compatibility on the basis of an internationally recognized legal framework, which, in turn, is characterized by a high degree of underdevelopment, which creates uncertainty regarding the rights of the participants to use various parts of the Arctic field in their interests. As part of the US-proclaimed strategy of geopolitical dominance in the Arctic segment, in parallel with the build-up of forces and the creation of military infrastructure, operations are being deployed in other areas of preparation and conduct of a hybrid war.
Within the framework of the hybrid war that the West is waging against Russia, the Arctic theater occupies a special place, determined by a number of objective factors. Among them: extreme natural and climatic conditions; the large length of the coastline and the focal nature of the deployment of border guard forces; low population density; lack of a unified industrial and economic complex and remoteness from the main industrial centers, high resource intensity and dependence of economic activity and the livelihood of the population on the supply of fuel, food and essential goods from other regions; low stability of ecological systems that determine the biological balance and climate of the Earth, and their dependence on even minor anthropogenic impacts.
An important factor of a subjective nature is the still insufficiently coordinated system of state administration in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation. The imperfection of state regulation measures in the economic and social spheres has led to a critical state of the basic transport, industrial, border, information, scientific and social infrastructures. Disproportions in regional development are growing, there is an outflow of population from the region.
The danger is recognized by the authorities, and as a result of energetic measures taken, the situation is rectified. However, the competitive potential of the Arctic zone of Russia is still far from being fully used.
NONLINEAR APPROACH
The strategy and goals of a hybrid war are formulated taking into account the vulnerability of the Arctic part of Russia to the use of hybrid technologies aimed at destabilizing the situation in vast areas.
First, as already mentioned, the most important goal is to undermine the economic potential of the state. This predetermines the place of Russian economic facilities in the Arctic, communications and control systems as the primary goals of the hybrid war. Forces and means are being created to influence the objects of this group, including special operations forces, cyber weapons, and theater reconnaissance is being organized. It is necessary to predict the expansion of the use of UAVs for reconnaissance purposes.
Secondly, the length of the coastline and the sparsely populated areas of land complicate the task of protecting the border, preventing the penetration of sabotage and reconnaissance groups of special operations forces.
Thirdly, an important feature of the theater is the high sensitivity of the environment in the Arctic to environmental factors, which makes it possible to predict the use of special operations forces in a hybrid war to disrupt the ecological balance. Here, one can fully expect the use of the nonlinearity property of a hybrid war, when the consequences of using indirect methods related to the impact on the ecology of the region lead to disproportionately high catastrophic consequences that can cause an avalanche-like change in the military-strategic and political situation. These can be, for example, acts of sabotage at oil-producing facilities, pipelines, and transport. A high degree of threat is posed by cyber operations against the control systems of the above facilities.
When developing protective measures in the Arctic region, one should resolutely abandon the traditional linear vision of war, which implies the possibility of establishing direct and proportional relationships between cause and effect, disturbing influence and results. In a hybrid war built on a non-linear strategy, small impacts can produce big results. The non-linearity factor of a hybrid war significantly changes the degree of reliability of predicting the possible consequences of a conflict both on the scale of the Arctic region and on a global scale.
In a hybrid war, the consequences of using indirect methods create an extremely dangerous situation, often beyond the control of the initiators. As a result of the disruption of the direct connection between cause and effect, vast zones of uncertainty are created associated with the actions of heterogeneous actors, and the actions of one of them can cause an avalanche-like change in the entire military-strategic and political situation. These and some other factors create serious obstacles when trying to foresee the course and outcome of a hybrid war.
Fourth, hybrid warfare is illegitimate. All existing laws of war are designed, as a rule, for conflicts between two belligerents, usually states pursuing interests that each of the participants considers legitimate. For traditional war, the UN adopted the concept of "aggression", there are laws that protect the rights of combatants, prisoners of war and the civilian population, prohibiting the use of certain types of weapons. The existing legal and regulatory framework serves as a tool for political decision makers and military leaders. There is nothing like this for a hybrid war.
And finally, the concept of “parties to the conflict”, which act as carriers of the conflict, needs to be clarified. A hybrid war in the Arctic is not declared, the parties to the conflict are not defined, while it is traditionally believed that a conflict as a phase of contradiction is possible only when its parties are represented by subjects. Where there is no subject, there can be no conflict.
If in a hybrid war one of the obvious subjects is the state - the victim of aggression, then it is not easy to define the aggressor himself as the other side of the conflict.
At the same time, the fact of hybrid aggression does not become obvious immediately. This thesis should be primarily attributed to the important components of a hybrid war - information and cyber wars. In both cases, it is difficult to determine the subject of aggression. These and some other factors create serious obstacles in predicting the situation and strategic planning of measures to counter a hybrid war in the Arctic.
"FRICTION OF WAR"
Taking into account the uniqueness of the Arctic theater, the phenomenon of the concept of “friction of war” introduced by K. Clausewitz is of great importance for understanding hybrid warfare as a sphere of uncertainty and uncertainty. In his writings, the military theorist rightly emphasized that "friction is the only concept that, in general, distinguishes a real war from a paper war." In other words, in war there can be a huge distance from what is conceived to what is actually being implemented. The validity of this judgment is especially true for a hybrid war in the Arctic, given the unpredictability and uncertainty of the conflict, the special sensitivity of possible targets to small impacts that can lead to large-scale consequences. The peculiarities of a hybrid war as an uncertain and unreliable conflict, in which heterogeneous forces and means participate, turn friction into a source of significant perturbing influences on the course of actions, which, under the influence of the friction of war, often become an uncontrollable and even uncontrollable process.
For traditional warfare, there are seven sources of general friction: danger; physical stress; uncertainty and unreliability of information on the basis of which decisions are made; random events that cannot be predicted; physical and political restrictions on the use of force; unpredictability resulting from interaction with the enemy; gaps between the causes and effects of war.
For a hybrid war in the Arctic region, the list of friction sources can be expanded.
First, given the scale of the economic interests of the states claiming their share in the Arctic field, the geography of their location and the specific approach to existing problems, psychological tension and stress increase, which increases the likelihood of error.
It is known that many modern conflicts occur on intercivilizational faults. The influence of this factor on the possible aggravation of the situation in the Arctic increases due to the expansion of the civilizational diversity of contenders for the Arctic field.
Secondly, a powerful source of disturbing influences that provoke failures in control systems are actions in cyberspace directed against control systems at oil and gas production facilities and pipelines.
Thirdly, disinformation is already widely used in the information war to manipulate the activities of environmental groups, which contributes to the creation of an environment of chaos and confusion.
And finally, as a result of friction, seemingly insignificant phenomena and facts occurring at the tactical level receive the power and ability of a strategic catalyst capable of influencing the course of an entire military campaign. There are cascading amplification mechanisms that allow small events in the course of a war to trigger completely unexpected and unpredictable processes that cannot be quantified within the framework of any theory. In the Arctic sector, in a hybrid war against Russia, cascade mechanisms-catalysts can be man-made man-made disasters at civilian and military facilities, terrorist attacks on communications with a large number of victims, disruption of the supply of vital products and funds to hard-to-reach Arctic regions.
The sum of friction sources usually turns out to be more than their simple sum, since some types of friction interact with others, which further increases their destructive result.
Friction in zones of uncertainty in a hybrid war is associated with the manifestation of many accidents and causes phenomena that cannot be taken into account in advance. This increases the likelihood of random incidents that widen the scope of the conflict. This is especially dangerous in a hybrid war in the Arctic, in which the interests of nuclear powers are involved.
Thus, the sources of friction largely determine the structural properties of hybrid warfare, the effectiveness of operations, and the strategy and tactics of counteraction.
As in any other war, in the hybrid war in the Arctic there are some kind of “lubricants” that can reduce friction in any military machine, including in a hybrid war. This is the use of flexible adaptive political strategies in diplomacy. It is important that the participants have combat experience and military training, special equipment, military equipment and weapons, rational deployment of forces and means, strict discipline, a well-thought-out information strategy, the early creation of effective channels for obtaining, transmitting, processing and analyzing situational data, etc.
For a hybrid war, a unique “grease” is its complete lack of legitimacy and subordination to international norms and rules, which makes it permissible on this basis to carry out the dirtiest provocations with the involvement of special operations forces, the use of manipulated terrorist groups and organized crime. The use of bacterial agents against animals, for example, pathogens of anthrax, foot-and-mouth disease, plague, glanders, false rabies, etc., cannot be ruled out.
LEGAL CONCLUSIONS
The Arctic is an extremely tasty region for Russia's geopolitical adversaries, who have repeatedly demonstrated the ability to violate any international agreements, if this is in their national interests. Historical experience does not allow counting on unconditional respect for the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of Russia enshrined in treaties in the Arctic waters and on the shelf. Such factors, along with well-known problems with the justification of the outer boundaries of the Russian continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean outside the exclusive economic zone, create conditions for attempts by the Arctic, some non-Arctic states and their coalitions to use a sophisticated strategy of indirect actions to put pressure on Russia, built on the formation and implementation of the spectrum hybrid threats.
The effectiveness of countering a hybrid war in the Arctic will depend on how fully it will be possible to foresee and take into account its features in order to adequately and promptly adapt to a rapidly changing environment, which will allow you to get ahead of rivals and prevent the transformation of challenges and risks into real dangers and threats to the national interests of the state in vital region.
Vladimir Artamonov, Tamara MusienkoArctic geopolitics of Russia: security issues
Artamonov Vladimir Sergeevich
Secretary of State - Deputy Minister of the Russian Federation
for civil defense, emergency situations
and disaster relief
doctor of military sciences, doctor of technical sciences, professor
Musienko Tamara Viktorovna
St. Petersburg State Fire Service EMERCOM of Russia
doctor of political sciences,
Deputy Head of the University for Research
Professor of the Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences
Artamonov Vladimir Sergeevich
EMERCOM of Russia
State Secretary - 1st class State Counselor of the Russian Federation,
Doctor of Engineering Science,
Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor
Email: [email protected]
Musienko Tamara Viktorovna
St. Petersburg University of the State Fire Service of EMERCOM of Russia
Doctor of Political Sciences, Deputy Chief for Research
Professor of the Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences
Email: [email protected]
UDC - 3.30.32.303.01
ARCTIC GEOPOLITICS OF RUSSIA: SECURITY PROBLEMS
annotation. The article actualizes the problem of developing an effective geopolitical strategy for ensuring Russia's security in the Arctic. The essence of modern Russian geopolitics in the Arctic, its focus on minimizing threats to the sustainable development of the region is revealed. The role of an effective system for protecting the population and territories, critical and potentially dangerous objects in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation from emergencies natural and man-made nature in the implementation Arctic geopolitics countries.
Keywords: regional security complex, integrated security, geopolitics, geoeconomics, transport infrastructure, Arctic, Northern Sea Route, monitoring and forecasting system
GEOPOLITICS OF RUSSIA IN THE ARCTIC: SECURITY PROBLEMS
Summary. The article actualized the problem of developing an effective geopolitical strategy for the security of Russia in the Arctic. The essence of modern Russian geopolitics in the Arctic, its orientation to minimize threats to sustainable development in the region is defined . The role of an effective system of protection of population and territory, critical and potentially dangerous objects in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation from emergency situations of natural and man-made in the implementation of the country’s Arctic geopolitics is reflected.
keywords: regional security complex, integrated security, geopolitics, geo-economics, transport infrastructure, the Arctic, the Northern Sea Route, monitoring and forecasting system
with calls and XXI century, creating risks national security, the problem of ensuring security in the Arctic region is connected.
In the "Strategy for the development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and ensuring national security for the period up to 2020", developed in pursuance of Fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the period up to 2020 and beyond, approved by the President of Russia on September 18, 2008 and approved by the President of the Russian Federation in 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the Strategy 2020), a list of the main risks and threats is presented, among which we will primarily highlight the following:
— extreme natural and climatic conditions, including low temperatures air, strong winds and the presence of ice cover in the waters of the Arctic seas;
- focal nature of industrial and economic development of territories and low population density;
- remoteness from the main industrial centers, high resource intensity and dependence of economic activity and life support of the population on supplies of fuel, food and essential goods from other regions of Russia;
- low stability of ecological systems that determine the biological balance and climate of the Earth, and their dependence on even minor anthropogenic impacts.
— negative demographic processes in the majority of the Arctic regions of the Russian Federation, the outflow of labor resources (especially highly qualified) in southern regions Russia and abroad;
- the critical state of housing and communal services, insufficient provision of the population with clean drinking water;
— depreciation of fixed assets, especially transport, industrial and energy infrastructure;
the underdevelopment of the basic transport infrastructure, its marine and continental components, the aging of the icebreaker fleet, the lack of small aircraft;
- insufficient development of navigation, hydrographic and hydrometeorological support for navigation;
- lack of means of permanent integrated space monitoring of the Arctic territories and water areas, dependence on foreign funds and sources information support all types of activities in the Arctic (including interaction with aircraft and ships);
- the lack of a modern information and telecommunications infrastructure that allows the provision of communication services to the population and business entities throughout the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation;
- underdevelopment energy system, as well as the irrational structure
generating capacities, high cost of generation and transportation of electricity;
— in the field of science and technology, there is a shortage technical means and technological opportunities for the study, development and use of the Arctic spaces and resources, insufficient readiness to switch to an innovative path of development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation;
- in the field of nature management and environmental protection, an increase in the technogenic and anthropogenic load on environment with an increase in the probability of reaching its limit values in some waters of the Arctic Ocean adjacent to the Russian Federation, as well as in certain territories of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, characterized by the presence of particularly unfavorable zones, potential sources of radioactive contamination, and a high level of accumulated environmental damage.
