Russian security policy in the Arctic. Vladimir Artamonov, Tamara Musienko Russia's Arctic Geopolitics: Security Issues

VILLAGE SABETTA / Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug /, August 30. /TASS/. Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, called for the continued creation of an effective security architecture in the Arctic, avoiding ultimatums and threats.

“We need to continue building an effective security architecture that will become a guarantee against any attempts to destabilize the [Arctic] region,” he said, opening the VII international meeting of representatives of the member states of the Arctic Council, observer countries in the Arctic Council and the foreign scientific community.

"The Arctic countries speak different languages, but it is in our power to make sure that the language of threats and ultimatums is never heard in the North," the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation added.

“Today, when energy security issues have acquired a global scale and often turn into a political dimension, the topic of Arctic resources is more relevant than ever,” Patrushev noted. “According to modern estimates, hydrocarbon reserves in the region amount to 90 billion barrels of oil, 47 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, as well as 44 billion barrels of gas condensate."

"At the same time, an irresponsible race for resources can cause environmental disasters and the destruction of the traditional ways of life of the peoples of the North," the Security Council Secretary warned. for all of us".

Patrushev urged, despite individual interstate disagreements, to join forces in the name of a common cause - the preservation of the Arctic as a unique natural and cultural heritage of all mankind. "This implies a number of difficult, but still solvable tasks," he said. In particular, there is a need for a comprehensive dialogue on economic issues. “The harsh conditions of the region make many undertakings so complicated that their implementation is possible only in close international cooperation,” stressed the Secretary of the Russian Security Council. “You already know, for example, that the Yamal LNG project involves Russian, Chinese and French capital, contractors and partners from dozens of countries around the world."

Patrushev also called for increasing the role of the Northern Sea Route and developing transport infrastructure in the Arctic.

“Efforts must be made to increase the accessibility of the Arctic region,” stressed the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. It's about first of all, about increasing the role of the Northern Sea Route, for the development of which the Russian side is making great efforts, including in terms of operating a nuclear icebreaker fleet that has no analogues in the world. "The accessibility of the Arctic also implies the creation of infrastructure for tourism and attracting qualified specialists to the region ", he added.

Patrushev noted the need for scientific and technological support for the development of the Arctic. “Arctic technologies are not a tribute to fashion, but a profitable area of ​​activity,” he is sure. “In our country, they have already realized that successful use in harsh Arctic conditions is a unique quality mark that instantly makes technology in demand and competitive.”

The Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation considers it necessary to work to increase the popularity of the Arctic, to draw the attention of the international community to the issues of its development and conservation. “The development of Arctic tourism is of great importance here,” Patrushev explained. “We can count on a careful attitude to this region only when all of humanity, and not just the Arctic states, realize the enduring value of the Arctic as a common heritage of mankind.”

The Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation stressed that the Arctic today is facing challenges that, it would seem, are long gone. He said that at the end of the meeting, the participants would be shown presentations on the elimination of an anthrax outbreak that occurred in Yamal in 2016. “Here I would like to note that at that time we managed not only to stop the spread of a dangerous disease in time, but also to restore the property lost by indigenous people in the shortest possible time. local residents, Patrushev said. “This proves once again that even when faced with extraordinary challenges in the Arctic, we can respond to them with the highest standards of social responsibility.”

Institute of Economic Problems. G.P. Luzin Federal Research Center "Kola Scientific Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences"

Institute of Economic Problems. G.P. Luzin is a separate division of the Federal State Budgetary Institution of Science of the Federal Research Center "Kola Science Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences" . The Institute is included in the FRC KSC RAS ​​on the basis of the order of the FASO of Russia dated July 26, 2017 No. 465.

The scientific and methodological guidance of the Institute is carried out by the Department of Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

The Institute was established on the basis of the Department of Economic Research of the Kola Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences dated December 24, 1986 No. 1478 “On the Organization of the Institute for Economic Problems of the Kola Branch named after I. CM. Kirov Academy of Sciences of the USSR. This decision of the Academy of Sciences was based on the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of December 14, 1986 No. 1226 "On the integrated use of minerals in the Kola Peninsula."

At the Institute, thanks to the efforts of its first director, Corr. RAS G.P. Luzin, a scientific school of research on the problems of the "economy of the northern dimension" of Russia was created, the principles of which are being successfully developed by the Institute's staff in modern conditions. An indicator of the recognition of the merits of this scientific school was the decision of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences to award the Institute after G.P. Luzin (Resolution of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences dated December 12, 2006 No. 359).

On the basis of the Federal Law of September 27, 2013 No. 253-FZ "On the Russian Academy of Sciences, reorganization of state academies of sciences and amendments to certain legislative acts Russian Federation”and Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation dated December 30, 2013 No. 2591-r until December 18, 2017. The Institute was a non-profit scientific organization established in the form of a federal state budgetary institution, administered by the FASO of Russia.

Currently, the Institute employs about 90 people.

In accordance with the Charter of the FRC KSC RAS ​​and the main areas of research are:
- study of the patterns of evolution of the socio-economic systems of the North and the Arctic, the theoretical foundations for the sustainable development of the Arctic territories and cities in the context of globalization;
- development of scientific foundations for the socio-economic policy of the northern and Arctic regions, mechanisms for activating its social, innovative, industrial and financial components;
- study of the problems of rational environmentally balanced use of natural resources in the regions of the Russian Arctic, including the Arctic shelf, substantiation of a strategy for the development of economic maritime activities in the Arctic, including in the area of ​​the Northern Sea Route, determination of the conditions and mechanism for harmonizing the defense and economic activity in the Russian Arctic;
- study of geo-economic processes in the world and Russian Arctic; analysis and modeling of the mechanism of functioning of the economy and social sphere of the Russian Arctic; development economic theory spatial development and management of the Arctic territories. Analysis and forecasting of challenges and threats to Russia's economic security in the Arctic and development of measures to strengthen it.

These areas correspond to the Program of Fundamental Scientific Research of State Academies of Sciences for 2013-2020, approved by the Government of the Russian Federation on December 03, 2012 No. 2237-r (as amended by the order of the Government of the Russian Federation on October 31, 2015 No. 2217-r): p. 167 "Study of the dynamics of the correlation of global and national in socio-economic development and optimization of Russia's participation in the processes of regional and global integration"; item 172 “Development of a unified system theory and tools for modeling the functioning, evolution and interaction of socio-economic objects of nano-, micro- and meso-economic levels (theories and models of socio-economic synthesis)”; item 173 "Development of a strategy for the transformation of the socio-economic space and territorial development of Russia"; item 174 “Development of proposals for the state policy of the integrated development of Siberia, the North and Far East».

The Institute carries out educational activities in the field of postgraduate professional education in higher education programs - programs for the training of scientific and pedagogical personnel in graduate school in the direction 38.00.00 "Economics and Management" in the specialty 08.00.05 "Economics and Management of the National Economy".

Since 2001, the Institute has regularly held the International Scientific and Practical Conference “North and the Arctic in the new paradigm of world development. Luzin Readings”, which is a traditional platform that brings together Russian and foreign scientists, politicians, businessmen, representatives public organizations for the exchange of scientific knowledge and best practical experience in the development of the North and the Arctic. Since 1991, with the participation of the Institute, an international traveling scientific symposium “Calotte Academy” has been organized annually. The Institute is the organizer and co-organizer of a number of other scientific conferences, symposiums, seminars, round tables held both on the basis of the Institute and on the basis of other Russian and foreign organizations.

Since 1998, the Institute has been publishing the scientific and informational journal "The North and the Market: Forming an Economic Order". Full information about the journal and the archive of issues can be found on the website:. The journal is one of the leading scientific publications on social and economic problems sustainable development of the Russian North and the Arctic. The thematic range of publications is extensive, and the most important direction of published articles is the analysis and forecasting of the dynamics of socio-economic processes in the northern and Arctic regions, taking into account the influence of global, national and regional factors that determine the development of territories with extreme conditions life and management. Since June 06, 2017, the journal has been included in the List of peer-reviewed scientific publications, in which the main scientific results of dissertations for the degree of candidate and doctor of sciences (List of the Higher Attestation Commission) in the group of scientific specialties 08.00.00 - Economic Sciences should be published.

Since 2012, the Institute, in collaboration with the Arctic Center of the University of Lapland and the Barents Institute of the University of Tromsø, has been working on publishing an international interdisciplinary scientific journal on the problems of sustainable development of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region "Barents Studies: Peoples, Economies and Politics" (Barents studies: people, economics and politics). The address of the journal's website on the Internet: http://www.barentsinfo.org/barentsstudies/English.iw3 . Information on the site is presented in English and Russian. The journal presents the results of scientific research by foreign scientists concerning development processes in the Barents region, and creates conditions for presenting to a wide international scientific and public audience the views of Russian scientists on the problems of sustainable, balanced development of the Barents Euro-Arctic region as a whole and its Russian part.

Today, the Arctic theme is becoming more and more popular and logically fits into the framework of the state course for the restoration of Russia's geopolitical positions in all azimuths. Priority attention, which since the beginning of the 21st century has been given to the development of the Arctic territories, is determined by the long-term strategic interests of the state. The Fundamentals of the National Policy in the Arctic until 2020 have been developed, which provide for the transformation of the Arctic zone into the leading strategic resource base of Russia. As a result, already now the Arctic provides about 11% of the country's national income, 22% of the total Russian exports are created here, more than 90% of nickel and cobalt, 60% of copper, 96% of platinoids are mined and produced...

About a quarter of the world's hydrocarbon resources are concentrated in the Russian part of the Arctic. Unique gas fields have been discovered on the shelves of the Barents and Kara Seas. The fishery complex produces about 15% of the country's aquatic biological resources. The key role in the development of a unified transcontinental transport system belongs to the Northern Sea Route, which serves as the shortest route between the European and Far Eastern sea and river ports of Siberia.

"QUIET" REGION

The special geopolitical position and wealth of its raw material deposits have turned the Arctic into one of the main points of attraction not only for the Arctic states, but also for the very remote countries of the Northern Hemisphere.

China, Japan, South Korea, India and Singapore, the Netherlands, Spain, Great Britain, Germany, France, Poland, and Italy received the status of an observer of the Arctic Council. In an effort to assert its institutional involvement in the Arctic affairs, the EU also claims the status of a permanent observer in the Arctic Council.

The states and their coalitions, claiming to participate in decision-making on the problems of the Arctic, without de jure questioning the jurisdiction of the coastal Arctic countries, are de facto trying to find ways to change the existing situation. The desire of many states to demonstrate their right to independent study of the Arctic, the development of the Arctic field allows us to predict an increase in confrontation, primarily between the main world geopolitical players: Russia, the United States, China, the states of the Arctic region and their coalitions. The confrontation can be carried out both within the framework of diplomatic negotiations and using a wide range of technologies of modern conflicts.

So far, the Arctic is considered a relatively calm region. Thanks to the professionalism of Russian diplomats, many important agreements for Russia have been signed and are being implemented within the framework of the Arctic Council: on cooperation in aviation and maritime search and rescue in the Arctic, on cooperation in the field of preparedness and response to marine oil pollution in the Arctic. In total, within the framework of the Arctic Council, Russia takes part in 80 projects. The UN Commission recently recognized the legitimacy of our claim for the continental shelf of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. Now it has actually become the Russian inland sea.

The opinions of a number of experts sound rather reassuringly, arguing that the only significant open issue in the Arctic remains the definition of external borders and the delimitation of the continental shelf of a number of coastal states beyond 200-mile zones. At the same time, it is believed that this issue will not give rise to disputes and conflicts regarding access to the natural resources of the Arctic, most of which are located within the boundaries of the undisputed exclusive economic zones of coastal states. At the same time, the world has more than once encountered the fact that the position of the West has changed dramatically, and this has led to a radical transformation of situations, to a cynical denial of the sovereign rights of individual states, up to the use of military force against them. The West defends its national interests resolutely and harshly, ignoring the norms international law when they conflict with his interests. So far, the situation in the Arctic, unlike problem areas, is relatively calm.

However, the world is changing, and strategies are also changing, allowing you to impose your will on the enemy not only by military force. In the context of globalization and the information revolution, the events related to the hybrid war waged against Russia can serve as a catalyst for abrupt and unpredictable changes in the Arctic region.

UNPREDICTABLE ENVIRONMENT

Given the volatility and unpredictability of the international situation, one should not lose sight of the possibility of implementing a strategy of indirect action in the course of a hybrid war that is unfolding against Russia in the Arctic.

In modern conflicts, technologies are increasingly being used to gradually prepare the conditions for an avalanche-like development of the situation. The calculation is made on the fact that everything should “go by itself”, without the noticeable participation of the main initiator of the conflict. According to one of the authors of the Anglo-Saxon strategy of indirect action, the British military theorist B.L. Garth, "you can arrange various relatively small nasty things, all the time reminiscent of the enemy, but he himself will not be visible."

The strategy of indirect action in the Arctic is only a link in the US global strategy, the goal of which is to establish world domination and achieve guaranteed access to all vital areas.

With regard to the Arctic region, for many years the United States and some other NATO countries have been coordinating their political, military, economic, and information efforts within the framework of solving a single task - to expand their economic presence in the regions of the North, achieve the internationalization of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and, ultimately, try to minimize the role of Russia in the region. At the same time, we note that the issue of control over the NSR for Russia is of critical importance, since this is so far the only transport route capable of integrating the remote regions of the Far North of the country and their resource potential into the national economy. Therefore, Russia cannot allow economic ties between individual regions of the country carried out via the NSR to be placed under international control.

The leading role in counteracting the legitimate interests of Russia in the Arctic belongs to the United States. The report of the Chief of Staff of the US Navy, Admiral D. Greenert, "Roadmap" for the Arctic 2014-2030, defines specific goals and objectives for various services and departments of the US Navy and their allies. The military infrastructure of the United States and Canada is already being created and developed in the Arctic. In particular, the US has decided to build two new advanced coast guard bases in Alaska at Barrow and Nome. The possibilities of ensuring the permanent presence of an aircraft carrier group in the Arctic and the allocation of additional patrol ships are being considered. Efforts are being stepped up for anti-submarine defense and deep landing operations. In recent years, the scale and intensity of NATO operational and combat training in the Arctic has increased. Every year, 3-4 trips of multi-purpose nuclear submarines are carried out to the Arctic, at least three sorties of base patrol aircraft are made weekly.

In the Arctic sector and on the border territory of the Russian Federation, the activities of the US intelligence services and their NATO allies have intensified. In addition to military forces and means, Norwegian research vessels are involved in reconnaissance, various non-governmental organizations are used, especially environmental ones, as was the case, for example, in 2013 during the Greenpeace campaign on the Prirazlomnaya platform. The presence of foreign researchers is noted in the areas of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago and in the throat White Sea- where Russia is testing its nuclear submarines. In Norway, they are talking about plans to change the demilitarized status of Svalbard, and the development of a concept for the use of national armed forces in the Arctic region is being completed.

NATO's position on military presence in the Arctic has not yet been determined. In this regard, the issue of the alliance's policy in the Arctic was not reflected in any of the adopted in 2010 strategic concept alliance, nor in the decisions of subsequent bloc summits. The lack of involvement of NATO in solving the problems of the Arctic is associated with different approaches and unequal interest of the allies. But supporters of a more visible NATO presence in the northern latitudes do not stop trying to change the situation, appealing to the fact that five NATO member states (USA, Canada, Norway, Denmark and Iceland) and two important partners (Sweden and Finland) are Arctic countries. Thus, it is proposed to expand the number of NATO member states participating in the Arctic confrontation with Russia.

Along with military activities in the northern latitudes, Washington is increasing its efforts in the information sphere, using the means of traditional and public diplomacy to consolidate allies and undermine Russia's positions. The breeding ground for the implementation of the preparatory phase of the strategy of indirect action in the Arctic is a complex of hybrid threats that can serve as a catalyst for building confrontation between Russia and other contenders for the wealth of the region.

Main hybrid threats for the Russian Federation in the Arctic zone are due to a combination of the following military, political, economic, informational factors: the intensification of military activities of the Arctic states and their allies, the growth of its scale in the Arctic and adjacent water areas; implementation of ideas about common and equal access to the use of the Northern Sea Route and the resources of the Arctic for all subjects of the world community; the implementation by the Arctic states and their allies of informational measures to discredit the Russian Federation; Norway's actions to forcibly oust the Russian Federation from traditional fishing areas in the Barents and Norwegian Seas; the desire of the United States and its allies to establish control over the nuclear facilities of the Russian Federation in the Arctic; the desire of the leadership of the countries of the Asia-Pacific region to obtain bases for their naval forces in the Arctic zone, etc.

Given the trend towards an increase in the number of participants claiming their share in the Arctic, it is possible to predict the formation of situational coalitions in the composition of states, relations between which are by no means always examples of friendship and mutual understanding. But given the unresolved number of legal aspects in relation to the problems of the Arctic, it seems quite realistic to coordinate the activities of individual states in order to weaken the position of Russia and achieve a favorable decision for them by international authorities. The actions of such rivals of Russia are characterized by purposeful, adaptive use of both military force methods and coordinated steps to weaken the enemy economically and use subversive information technologies. The use of indirect asymmetric actions and methods of waging hybrid wars both against the whole state and in relation to its individual large regions makes it possible to deprive the opposing side of actual sovereignty without seizing territories by military force.

Thus, a hybrid war is being waged against Russia in the Arctic, which requires appropriate “hybrid” countermeasures. Some of these measures are provided for in the document adopted by the Security Council of the Russian Federation in 2008 - "Fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the period up to 2020 and beyond." The Fundamentals reflect the main goals and strategic priorities of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic, the main tasks, measures and mechanisms for its implementation. Among the tasks in the field of ensuring military security, it is required to "bring the capabilities of the border agencies in line with the nature of the threats and challenges of the Russian Federation in the Arctic."

Based on the spirit and letter of the "Osnovy", Russia plans to create an Arctic group of troops by 2020 to protect its economic and political interests in this region. The document refers to the strengthening of the border troops of the FSB of Russia and the need to create a coast guard of the Russian Arctic borders.

So far, there are no clear signs indicating the existence of a consolidated anti-Russian strategy aimed at realizing the interests of the Arctic states and countries located far from the Arctic. However, for a hybrid war in the Arctic as the largest geopolitical region, the following is important: nothing prevents each of the participants from realizing their intentions without the direct use of armed forces and even without declaring war at all. If the interests of a group of participants coincide, it may be appropriate to create their situational coalition to “push through” the desired solution.

Therefore, it is also important for Russia to use such coalitions to its advantage, using disagreements between various actors. In this context, it is also important to use the opportunities of the SCO, EAC, cooperation with Japan, South Korea. A program of long-term cooperation with neutral Sweden and Finland should be developed and cooperation in the Arctic should be included in it in order to prevent these states from being drawn into anti-Russian maneuvers.

ARC OF INSTABILITY

The strategic importance of the Arctic region determines its coverage by the so-called "system of arcs of instability", which is the main tool through which the most important systemic security problems of Eurasia in general and the Russian Federation in particular are created. According to Professor Vladimir Kolotov, "the system of arcs of instability creates a geopolitical "climate", which in every possible way contributes to the conduct of controlled regional destabilization." This system covers the territory located between four oceans: Pacific, Indian, Atlantic and Arctic. It consists of eight operating segments of varying degrees of "readiness".

The arctic segment of the arc of instability is in the process of formation. The interests of the parties are defined, attempts are being made to ensure their compatibility on the basis of an internationally recognized legal framework, which, in turn, is characterized by a high degree of underdevelopment, which creates uncertainty regarding the rights of the participants to use various parts of the Arctic field in their interests. As part of the US-proclaimed strategy of geopolitical dominance in the Arctic segment, in parallel with the build-up of forces and the creation of military infrastructure, operations are being deployed in other areas of preparation and conduct of a hybrid war.

Within the framework of the hybrid war that the West is waging against Russia, the Arctic theater occupies a special place, determined by a number of objective factors. Among them: extreme natural and climatic conditions; great length coastline and the focal nature of the deployment of border guard forces; low population density; lack of a unified industrial and economic complex and remoteness from the main industrial centers, high resource intensity and dependence of economic activity and the livelihood of the population on the supply of fuel, food and essential goods from other regions; low stability of ecological systems that determine the biological balance and climate of the Earth, and their dependence on even minor anthropogenic impacts.

An important factor of a subjective nature is the still insufficiently coordinated system of state administration in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation. The imperfection of state regulation measures in the economic and social spheres has led to a critical state of the basic transport, industrial, border, information, scientific and social infrastructures. Disproportions in regional development are growing, there is an outflow of population from the region.

The danger is recognized by the authorities, and as a result of energetic measures taken, the situation is rectified. However, the competitive potential of the Arctic zone of Russia is still far from being fully used.

NONLINEAR APPROACH

The strategy and goals of a hybrid war are formulated taking into account the vulnerability of the Arctic part of Russia to the use of hybrid technologies aimed at destabilizing the situation in vast areas.

First, as already mentioned, the most important goal is to undermine the economic potential of the state. This predetermines the place of Russian economic facilities in the Arctic, communications and control systems as the primary goals of the hybrid war. Forces and means are being created to influence the objects of this group, including special operations forces, cyber weapons, and theater reconnaissance is being organized. It is necessary to predict the expansion of the use of UAVs for reconnaissance purposes.

Secondly, the length of the coastline and the sparsely populated areas of land complicate the task of protecting the border, preventing the penetration of sabotage and reconnaissance groups of special operations forces.

Thirdly, an important feature of the theater is the high sensitivity of the environment in the Arctic to environmental factors, which makes it possible to predict the use of special operations forces in a hybrid war to disrupt the ecological balance. Here, one can fully expect the use of the nonlinearity property of a hybrid war, when the consequences of using indirect methods related to the impact on the ecology of the region lead to disproportionately high catastrophic consequences that can cause an avalanche-like change in the military-strategic and political situation. These can be, for example, acts of sabotage at oil-producing facilities, pipelines, and transport. A high degree of threat is posed by cyber operations against the control systems of the above facilities.

When developing protective measures in the Arctic region, one should resolutely abandon the traditional linear vision of war, which implies the possibility of establishing direct and proportional relationships between cause and effect, disturbing influence and results. In a hybrid war built on a non-linear strategy, small impacts can produce big results. The non-linearity factor of a hybrid war significantly changes the degree of reliability of predicting the possible consequences of a conflict both on the scale of the Arctic region and on a global scale.

In a hybrid war, the consequences of using indirect methods create an extremely dangerous situation, often beyond the control of the initiators. As a result of the disruption of the direct connection between cause and effect, vast zones of uncertainty are created associated with the actions of heterogeneous actors, and the actions of one of them can cause an avalanche-like change in the entire military-strategic and political situation. These and some other factors create serious obstacles when trying to foresee the course and outcome of a hybrid war.

Fourth, hybrid warfare is illegitimate. All existing laws of war are designed, as a rule, for conflicts between two belligerents, usually states pursuing interests that each of the participants considers legitimate. For traditional war The UN has adopted the concept of "aggression", there are laws protecting the rights of combatants, prisoners of war and the civilian population, prohibiting the use of certain types of . The existing legal and regulatory framework serves as a tool for political decision makers and military leaders. There is nothing like this for a hybrid war.

And finally, the concept of “parties to the conflict”, which act as carriers of the conflict, needs to be clarified. A hybrid war in the Arctic is not declared, the parties to the conflict are not defined, while it is traditionally believed that a conflict as a phase of contradiction is possible only when its parties are represented by subjects. Where there is no subject, there can be no conflict.

If in a hybrid war one of the obvious subjects is the state - the victim of aggression, then it is not easy to define the aggressor himself as the other side of the conflict.

At the same time, the fact of hybrid aggression does not become obvious immediately. This thesis should be primarily attributed to the important components of a hybrid war - information and cyber wars. In both cases, it is difficult to determine the subject of aggression. These and some other factors create serious obstacles in predicting the situation and strategic planning of measures to counter a hybrid war in the Arctic.

"FRICTION OF WAR"

Taking into account the uniqueness of the Arctic theater, the phenomenon of the concept of “friction of war” introduced by K. Clausewitz is of great importance for understanding hybrid warfare as a sphere of uncertainty and uncertainty. In his writings, the military theorist rightly emphasized that "friction is the only concept that, in general, distinguishes a real war from a paper war." In other words, in war there can be a huge distance from what is conceived to what is actually being implemented. The validity of this judgment is especially true for a hybrid war in the Arctic, given the unpredictability and uncertainty of the conflict, the special sensitivity of possible targets to small impacts that can lead to large-scale consequences. The peculiarities of a hybrid war as an uncertain and unreliable conflict, in which heterogeneous forces and means participate, turn friction into a source of significant perturbing influences on the course of actions, which, under the influence of the friction of war, often become an uncontrollable and even uncontrollable process.

For traditional warfare, there are seven sources of general friction: danger; physical stress; uncertainty and unreliability of information on the basis of which decisions are made; random events that cannot be predicted; physical and political restrictions on the use of force; unpredictability resulting from interaction with the enemy; gaps between the causes and effects of war.

For a hybrid war in the Arctic region, the list of friction sources can be expanded.

First, given the scale of the economic interests of the states claiming their share in the Arctic field, the geography of their location and the specific approach to existing problems, psychological tension and stress increase, which increases the likelihood of error.

It is known that many modern conflicts occur on intercivilizational faults. The influence of this factor on the possible aggravation of the situation in the Arctic increases due to the expansion of the civilizational diversity of contenders for the Arctic field.

Secondly, a powerful source of disturbing influences that provoke failures in control systems are actions in cyberspace directed against control systems at oil and gas production facilities and pipelines.

Thirdly, disinformation is already widely used in the information war to manipulate the activities of environmental groups, which contributes to the creation of an environment of chaos and confusion.

And finally, as a result of friction, seemingly insignificant phenomena and facts occurring at the tactical level receive the power and ability of a strategic catalyst capable of influencing the course of an entire military campaign. There are cascading amplification mechanisms that allow small events in the course of a war to trigger completely unexpected and unpredictable processes that cannot be quantified within the framework of any theory. In the Arctic sector, in a hybrid war against Russia, cascade mechanisms-catalysts can be man-made man-made disasters at civilian and military facilities, terrorist attacks on communications with a large number of victims, disruption of the supply of vital products and funds to hard-to-reach Arctic regions.

The sum of friction sources usually turns out to be more than their simple sum, since some types of friction interact with others, which further increases their destructive result.

Friction in zones of uncertainty in a hybrid war is associated with the manifestation of many accidents and causes phenomena that cannot be taken into account in advance. This increases the likelihood of random incidents that widen the scope of the conflict. This is especially dangerous in a hybrid war in the Arctic, in which the interests of nuclear powers are involved.

Thus, the sources of friction largely determine the structural properties of hybrid warfare, the effectiveness of operations, and the strategy and tactics of counteraction.

As in any other war, in the hybrid war in the Arctic there are some kind of “lubricants” that can reduce friction in any military machine, including in a hybrid war. This is the use of flexible adaptive political strategies in diplomacy. Availability is important combat experience and military training for participants, special equipment, military equipment and weapons, the rational deployment of forces and means, strict discipline, a well-thought-out information strategy, the early creation of effective channels for obtaining, transmitting, processing and analyzing situational data, etc.

For a hybrid war, a unique “grease” is its complete lack of legitimacy and subordination to international norms and rules, which makes it permissible on this basis to carry out the dirtiest provocations with the involvement of special operations forces, the use of manipulated terrorist groups and organized crime. The use of bacterial agents against animals, for example, pathogens of anthrax, foot-and-mouth disease, plague, glanders, false rabies, etc., cannot be ruled out.

LEGAL CONCLUSIONS

The Arctic is an extremely tasty region for Russia's geopolitical adversaries, who have repeatedly demonstrated the ability to violate any international agreements, if this is in their national interests. Historical experience does not allow counting on unconditional respect for the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of Russia enshrined in treaties in the Arctic waters and on the shelf. Such factors, along with well-known problems with the justification of the outer boundaries of the Russian continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean outside the exclusive economic zone, create conditions for attempts by the Arctic, some non-Arctic states and their coalitions to use a sophisticated strategy of indirect actions to put pressure on Russia, built on the formation and implementation of the spectrum hybrid threats.

The effectiveness of countering a hybrid war in the Arctic will depend on how fully it will be possible to foresee and take into account its features in order to adequately and promptly adapt to a rapidly changing environment, which will allow you to get ahead of rivals and prevent the transformation of challenges and risks into real dangers and threats to the national interests of the state in vital region.

480 rub. | 150 UAH | $7.5 ", MOUSEOFF, FGCOLOR, "#FFFFCC",BGCOLOR, "#393939");" onMouseOut="return nd();"> Thesis - 480 rubles, shipping 10 minutes 24 hours a day, seven days a week and holidays

Kravchuk Alexey Andreevich. The main threats to the security of the Russian Federation in the Arctic and the formation of state policy for their neutralization: dissertation ... Candidate of Political Sciences: 23.00.04 / Kravchuk Aleksey Andreevich; [Place of protection: Far Eastern Federal University], 2017.- 225 p.

Introduction

Chapter 1. Theoretical approaches to the development of the main categories of national security 21

1.1 The essence and content of the main categories of the theory of national security within the framework of the axiological approach 21

Chapter 2. Comprehensive assessment of the Arctic heritage of Russia, national interests and military potential of the Arctic states 49

2.1 The Arctic heritage of the Russian Federation as the most important object of national security 49

2.2 Analysis of national interests key players Arctic region 64

2.3 Comparative analysis of the military power and potential of key players in the Arctic region 89

Chapter 3 State policy of the Russian Federation in the field of ensuring national security in the Arctic 113

3.1 Classification of phenomena that threaten the national security of the Russian Federation in the Arctic 113

3.2 The mechanism for ensuring the national security of Russia in the Arctic 134

3.3 Main directions Arctic policy Russia to neutralize threats to national security 150

Conclusion 179

List of sources and literature

Introduction to work

Relevance Topics research. In the system of modern

international relations, the role of the Arctic region is steadily increasing. Here the interests of the Arctic (Denmark, Canada, Norway, Russia, USA) and subarctic (Iceland, Finland, Sweden) states, a number of international organizations (EU and NATO), as well as states that are not geographically assigned to the Arctic region (China, India, Republic of Korea, Japan, Singapore, Germany, Great Britain, etc.). The heightened interest shown in this region by all the above-mentioned actors in the system of international relations is not accidental. The presence of significant reserves of mineral raw materials, hydrocarbons and biological resources, the possibility of increasing the volume of cargo transportation along promising water routes connecting the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, the prospect of establishing transpolar flights from North America to Asia and back - these are just some of the opportunities that attract international actors in the Arctic region.

During the March 2017 meeting on the integrated development of the Arctic, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin stressed that the Arctic is an extremely important region not only for our country, but also for the world community as a whole. In the Russian part of the Arctic, whose area is 19.9% ​​of the total area of ​​the country, 22% of the total volume of Russian exports is produced, the region also provides about 11% of the national income and about 20% of Russia's gross domestic product. According to the President of the Russian Federation, in the near future these figures may increase significantly, since today "the degree of exploration of the mineral resource base of the Arctic region is low, as well as the level of its development, which does not correspond to the promising opportunities of the macro-region." one

In recent years, the Russian leadership has begun to pay priority attention to the development of the Arctic region. Fundamental strategic documents were adopted, defining basic principles Arctic policy of Russia, which is aimed at ensuring the sovereignty of the country and the realization of its national interests in the region. According to Moscow's plans, the Arctic is assigned the role of Russia's strategic resource base, which should satisfy the country's growing needs for mineral, hydrocarbon, biological and other strategically important resources, thereby contributing to the fulfillment of the task of its integrated socio-economic development. 2

In addition, at the present stage, the geopolitical significance of the Arctic has also increased significantly, through which two of the shortest sea routes pass connecting Europe and Asia (the Northern Sea Route and the North-Western

1 Meeting on the integrated development of the Arctic. Official site of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation.
03/29/2017. URL: .

2 Fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the period up to 2020 and beyond
perspective. Approved by the President of the Russian Federation on September 18, 2008 No. Pr-1969. URL:
.

passage), and one of them is under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. Active development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) will enhance the geopolitical status of Russia itself, which has traditionally been viewed as a predominantly continental power that does not have control over the world's maritime communications. If the NSR becomes a route of world importance, Russia's role as a maritime power that controls one of the key maritime transport corridors for world trade will increase.

In general, considerable attention is paid to the Arctic topic, both in Russian and foreign scientific literature, but, as a rule, regional processes are considered in the context of a policy of comprehensive cooperation between actors (especially in domestic sources), and the possible conflict potential of the Arctic, in our opinion, remains practically unexplored. At the same time, the difficult foreign policy situation, the differences in the views of international actors on the main processes in the Arctic, the colossal economic and strategic potential of the region, which promises huge benefits for all players involved in projects to implement Arctic initiatives in one way or another, in combination with the current trend towards active militarization of the Arctic, can lead to destabilization of the situation in the region and cause international conflicts, including with the use of military force, which carries a direct threat to the national security of the Russian Federation. In this regard, the study of the problems of ensuring national security in the Arctic, undertaken in this work, is of particular relevance.

As object of study advocates the process of ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation in the Arctic. The classification of phenomena that threaten the national security of the Russian Federation in the Arctic, and the formation of a policy to neutralize them are subject of study.

Timeline of the study cover the end of the 20th - the beginning of the 21st centuries, which is due to the need to study the ongoing process of strengthening the role of the Arctic in the system of international relations and the activation of the Arctic policy of key regional actors.

Geographic limits. In this study, the Arctic is understood as the northern polar region of the Earth, including the margins of the continents of Eurasia and North America, almost the entire Arctic Ocean with islands (except for the coastal islands of Norway), as well as the adjacent parts of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Geographically, the territories of eight states, which are also known as the countries of the Arctic eight, adjoin the Arctic region: Denmark, Canada, Norway, Russia, USA, Iceland, Finland and Sweden.

From a geopolitical point of view, the Arctic region and its maritime communications are of particular interest to a number of non-regional players. That is why today in the system of international relations in the Arctic

included a number of European and Asian countries. This fact predetermines the need to conduct a study of their national interests and state policy in the region. In this study, the European Union will be singled out as the main non-regional players in the Arctic (as a supranational international organization or a union of sovereign European states leading a coordinated international politics) and the key states of Northeast Asia (China, Japan and the Republic of Kazakhstan).

The purpose of the research work advocates a comprehensive study of the problems of ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation in the Arctic, which makes it possible to identify the main challenges, dangers and threats in the region, as well as to consider state policy to counter the main threats to the country's national security in the region and the integrated socio-economic development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF).

To achieve the goal of the study, the following were set and solved. research tasks:

- to study and clarify the categorical apparatus of the theory of national security using the axiological approach;

– conduct a comprehensive assessment of Russia's national heritage in the Arctic;

- to compare the national interests of the key Arctic players in order to identify their possible intentions to harm the national security of the Russian Federation (in case of a conflict of interest) and promising areas for the development of cooperation (in case of a coincidence of interests);

– perform a comparative analysis of the military power and potential of key Arctic players in order to determine the objective possibility for them to damage the national security of the Russian Federation in the Arctic;

– explore the implementation mechanism Russian politics in the field of ensuring national security in the Arctic;

- identify the main challenges, dangers and threats to the national security of the Russian Federation in the Arctic and evaluate the key areas and effectiveness of the country's state policy to neutralize them;

– assess the prospects for the implementation of major economic projects in the Russian Arctic in the context of the general weakening of Russia’s economic ties with Western countries, as well as develop proposals for optimizing the operation of the Russian Arctic transport system (based on the NSR) and strengthening cooperation with the countries of Northeast Asia (NEA) in the development Arctic.

The degree of scientific development of the problem. In the domestic and
foreign science presented a significant number of works devoted to
study of international relations in the Arctic region, many of
which affect various aspects of national security

regional states. The complexity of the subject under study predetermined the diversity of scientific ideas used in this study, the problem field of which is located at the junction of several branches of science:

political science, philosophical, legal, economic, military, technical and other sciences.

The theoretical foundations of national security were studied in the studies of prominent Western scientists W. Lippman, G. Morgenthau, A. Wolfers, K. Waltz, N. Gröbner, J. Romm, B. Buzan, J. Mearsheimer, G. Kissinger 3 and others. Together At the same time, one cannot fail to note a significant contribution to the development modern theory national security, which was introduced by Russian political scientists, including: Kosolapov N.A., Khrustalev M.A., Bogaturov A.D., Kolobov O.A., Torkunov A.V., Tsygankov P.A., Zelenkov M.Yu., Konyshev V.N., Sergunin A.A., Prokhozhev A.A., Vozzhenikov A.V. 4 and others. Nevertheless, despite the large number of works on this issue, there are many definitions of national security in political science, none of which is universally recognized.

The works of A.I. Pozdnyakov had the greatest influence on the formation of theoretical and methodological ideas for this study. 5 and Gatsko M.F. 6 In particular, proposed by Pozdnyakov A.I. the axiological approach to the theory of national security, allows you to identify and make a full assessment of the object of security, which includes the national treasure (national values) and national interests. Within the framework of axiology 7, such important categories as

3 Lippman W.U.S. Foreign Policy: shield of the republic. - Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1943. xvii + 177 p.;
Morgenthau H. Politics among nations: the struggle for peace and power. – New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993. 419 p.;
Wolfers A. "National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol // Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 67, no. 4. Dec., 1952, P. 481-
502; Waltz K.N. Theory of international politics. - IL: Waveland Press, 2010. 251 p.; Graebner N.A. The National
security. Its Theory and Practice, 1945-1960. - New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986. 316 p.; Romm J.J.
Defining national security: the nonmilitary aspects. - Pew Project on America's Task in a Changed World (Pew Project
series). Council on Foreign Relations, 1993. 122 p.; Buzan B. People, States & Fear. The National Security Problem in
international relations. - Brighton: Harvester Books, 1983. 262 p.; Mearsheimer J.J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
- New York: Norton, 2001. 540 rubles; Kissinger H. World order: reflections on the character of nations and the course of
history. – London: Penguin UK, 2014. 432 p.

4 Bogaturov A.D. Essays on the theory and political analysis of international relations. – A.D. Bogaturov, N.A.
Kosolapov, M.A. Khrustalev. – M.: NOFMO, 2002. 390 p.; Kolobov O.A. Theory of international relations:
Textbook in 2 volumes. Number of authors; Under the general editorship. O.A. Kolobov. T.1. Evolution of conceptual approaches. -
Nizhny Novgorod: FMO UNN. 2004. 393 p.; Torkunov A.V. Modern International Relations: Textbook.
Ed. A.V. Torkunova, A.V. Malgin. – M.: Aspect Press. 2012. 688 p.; Tsygankov P.A. Theory of international
Relationships: Textbook. – M.: Gardariki. 2004. 590 p.; Zelenkov M.Yu. Theoretical and methodological
Problems of the theory of national security of the Russian Federation: monograph. - M .: Law Institute
MIIT, 2013. 196 p.; Konyshev V.N. American Neorealism on the Nature of War: The Evolution of Political Theory.
- St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2004. 372 p.; Sergunin A.A. Russian foreign policy thought: problems of national and
international security: Monograph. – Nizhny Novgorod: Nizhny Novgorod State
Linguistic University named after N.A. Dobrolyubova, 2003. 94 p.; Prokhozhev A.A. General theory of national
Security: Textbook. Under total ed. A.A. Prokhozhev. Ed. 2. - M.: Publishing House of the RAGS, 2005. 344 p.; Vozzhenikov A.V.
The National Security Paradigm of Reforming Russia: Monograph. 2nd ed., rev. and add. - M., 2000.
358 p.

5 Pozdnyakov A.I. The system of basic concepts of the theory of national security from the standpoint of value
(axiological) approach. Security of Russia in the XXI century. – M.: RIC ISPI RAN, 2006. 582 p.; Pozdnyakov A.I.
Comparative analysis of modern approaches to the definition of the concepts of national and military security //
Military-philosophical bulletin. 2008. No. 2 (02). pp. 17-29; Pozdnyakov A.I. Criteria for evaluating effectiveness
ensuring national security // Analytical Bulletin of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly
RF. 2010. No. 17. S. 57-64.

6 Gatsko M.F. Fundamentals of national security. Tutorial. Publication of the Noginsk branch of the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration. -
Noginsk: 2014. 130 p.

7 “Axiology is a special branch of philosophy, the subject of which are values ​​(from the Greek axios - values,
logos - knowledge: the science of values). For more details see Buchilo N.F., Chumakov A.N. Philosophy: Textbook. -
M.: PER SE, 2001. 447 p.

"national value" and "damage". In turn, Gatsko M.F. 8 most fully revealed the essence of the categories "danger" and "threat" through the prism of two main components - the subjective intentions and objective possibilities of one subject to harm another. This approach formed the basis for the development of a universal mechanism for determining the phenomena that threaten the national security of the country, and, together with the axiological approach, made it possible to clarify the existing categorical apparatus of the theory of national security.

The specifics of this research work also necessitated the use of certain provisions of geopolitics set forth in the works of F. Ratzel, A. Mahan, H. Mackinder, K. Haushofer, N. Speakman, S. Huntington 9 and others.

The geographical reference of the research being conducted implies the widespread use of scientific papers reflecting regional themes. In this regard, one cannot fail to note the personal contribution of many Russian and foreign scientists to the study of a wide range of Arctic problems. So, when writing this work, the dissertator actively turned to the scientific works of Konyshev V.N., Sergunin A.A., Zagorsky A.V., Apanasenko V.M., Oznobishchev S.K., Kudinova N.N., Khramchikhin A. .A., Kramarenko V.G., Ivanova G.V. 10 , S. Romanyuk, A. McDonald, B. Bury, H. Mikkola, I. Kapuly 11 and others, devoted to a comprehensive study of security problems in the Arctic.

8 Gatsko M.F. On the relationship between the concepts of "threat" and "danger" // "OBSERVER - OBSERVER", No. 7 (90), 1997.
URL: .

9 Ratzel F. Ethnology. Edition in 2 volumes. - St. Petersburg: "Enlightenment", 1904. 812 p.; Mahan A.T. Influence
sea ​​power on the history of 1660-1783. - St. Petersburg: Terra Fantastica, 2002. 632 p.; Mackinder H.J. Geographic axis
stories. Classics of geopolitics. - M .: "Publishing house Ast", 2003. S. 7-32; Haushofer K. Borders in their
geographic and political significance. About geopolitics: Works of different years - M.: Thought, 2001. C. 7-250;
Spykman N. America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power. - New York: Transaction
Publishers, 2007. 525 p.; Huntington S.P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Simon & Schuster,
2011. 368 p.

10 Konyshev V.N., Sergunin A.A. Remilitarization of the Arctic and the security of Russia // National security.
NOTA BENE. 2011, no. 3-4. pp. 55-67; Zagorsky A.V. Military security in the Arctic. Arctic region:
Problems of international cooperation: reader in 3 volumes. Ros. council for international affairs [under the general. ed. I.S.
Ivanova]. - M .: Aspect Press, T. 1. 2013. S. 256-269; Apanasenko V.M., Oznobishchev S.K. Conventional
security issues in the Arctic. The Arctic: a zone of peace and cooperation. - M.: IMEMO RAN, 2011. S. 87-102;
Kudinov N.N. The Coast Guard of the FSB is the subject of ensuring the protection and security of national interests
Russia in the Arctic. The strategy of maritime activities of Russia and the economics of environmental management in the Arctic // IV
All-Russian Maritime Scientific and Practical Conference: materials of the conference. Murmansk, June 07-08, 2012
- Murmansk: Publishing House of MSTU, 2012. 198 p. URL: ;
Khramchikhin A.A. Military-political situation in the Arctic and scenarios of possible conflicts // Arctic and North.
2011. No. 2. URL: ; Kramarenko V.G. military activity
NATO in the Arctic // Proceedings of the research department of the Institute military history. T. 9. Book. 1. Security
Russia's national interests in the Arctic. Zap. military district, military acad. Gene. Headquarters Armed. Force Ros.
Federation, Inst. history, Mrs. polar. acad. - St. Petersburg: Politekhnika-service, 2014. P. 50-59; Ivanov
G.V. National security of Russia in the Arctic: problems and solutions // Bulletin of MSTU, volume 18, no. 3, 2015. P.
401-406.

11 Romaniuk S. Militarizing the Arctic: Is Canada Ready for a Literal Cold War with Russia? // Geopolitical Monitor.
11/10/2015. URL: ; MacDonald A. The Militarization of the Arctic: Emerging Reality, Exaggeration, and Distraction // Canadian
Military Journal, Vol. 15, no. 3, Summer 2015. URL:
; Beary B. Race for the Arctic // CQ Global
Researcher, No. 2, 2008. P. 213-242; Kpyl J., Mikkola H. The Global Arctic: The Growing Arctic Interests of Russia,
China, the United States and the European Union. FIIA Briefing Paper 133, 2013. 9 p.

In the light of considering the issues of socio-economic development of the Arctic region, the works of Yu.F. Lukin, S.N. Grinyaev, M.N. Dudin, N.P. Ivashchenko, A.V. Zagorsky turned out to be interesting. Fadeeva A.M., Nikolaeva A.B., Skufina T.P. 12, C. Cale, O. Young, T. Tolanda, H. Conley 13 et al.

Regional policy and national interests of the Arctic actors were studied in the scientific works of Konyshev V.N., Sergunin A.A., Pavlenko V.I., Aleksandrova O.B., Ovlashchenko A.V., Zhuravlya V.P., Pestsov S. TO. 14 , P. Baev, M. Enker, K. Pulkkinen 15 and others.

Problems of conservation of Arctic ecosystems and ensuring environmental safety during the economic development of the region are disclosed in detail in the works of Yu.I. Sokolov, S.N. Chistyukhina, A.O. Podoplekin, K.A. Borodin, V.N. Ilyukhin, V.I. 16 , T. Fengja, B. Funston, L. Nowlan,

12 Lukin Yu.F. Russian Arctic in a changing world: monograph. Sev. (Arctic) feder. un-t im.
Lomonosov. - Arkhangelsk: IPTs NArFU, 2013. 281 p.: ill.; Grinyaev S.N. Economic, technological and
maritime cooperation in the Arctic // Law and Investments. 2015. No. 1-2. pp. 76-77; Dudin M.N., Ivashchenko N.P.
World experience and trends in innovative development of the Arctic territories // MIR (Modernization.
Innovation. Development). 2015. V. 6. No. 4. S. 107-117; Zagorsky A.V. International political conditions for development
Arctic zone of the Russian Federation. ed. A.V. Zagorsky; IMEMO RAN. – M.: Master, 2015. 304 p.;
Fadeev A.M. Improving economic approaches to managing the development of offshore hydrocarbon
deposits in the Arctic. Ros. acad. Sciences, Kol. scientific center, Institute of economy. problems for them. G.P. Luzin. - Apatity,

2012. 269 p.; Nikolaeva A.B., Selin V.S. Problems and prospects for the formation of special economic zones in
Russian Arctic: [monograph]. RAS, KSC, Inst. problems. - Apatity: Publishing House of the Kola Scientific
Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2009. 147 p.; Skufina T.P. The development of the Russian Arctic in the face of increased struggle for possession
mineral resources // Federalism. 2014. No. 2 (74). pp. 95-108.

13 Keil K. Economic Potential. Arctic security matters. EU Institute for Security Studies, 2015. ISS Report No. 24. P. 21-
31; Young O.R. Arctic Politics in an Era of Global Change // The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Fall/Winter 2012.
Volume XIX, Issue 1. P. 165-178; Conley H.A., Pumphrey D.L., Toland T.M., David M. Arctic Economics in the 21st
Century: The Benefits and Costs of Cold. A Report of the CSIS Europe Program, July 2013. 67 p.

14 Konyshev V.N., Sergunin A.A. National interests of Russia in the Arctic: myths and reality // National
interests: priorities and security. 2011, No. 29. S. 2-11.; Pavlenko V.I. Arctic zone of the Russian
Federations in the system of ensuring the national interests of the country // Arctic: Ecology and Economics No. 4 (12),

2013. S. 16-25; Aleksandrov O.B. Interests and priorities of the EU Arctic strategy // MGIMO Bulletin
university. 2013. No. 3 (30). pp. 12-17; Ovlashchenko A.V. Formation of the Arctic policy of the EU // World
economy and international relations. 2009. No. 7. S. 28-36; Zhuravel V.P. China, Republic of Korea, Japan in
Arctic: politics, economics, security // Arctic and North. 2016. No. 24. P. 112-144; Pestsov S.K. Strategy and
Russian policy in the Arctic // Information and analytical bulletin "At the map of the Pacific Ocean", 2016. No. 45
(243). pp. 6-19.

15 Baev P.K. Russia's Arctic aspirations. Arctic security matters. EU Institute for Security Studies, 2015. ISS Report No.
24. P. 51-56; Anker M., The High North and Russo-Norwegian bilateral economic relations. Russia, Finland and Norway:
Economic Essays // BOFIT Online, 2009. No. 15. P. 32-41; Pulkkinen K. The Arctic Council and the Northeast Asian
observers. Swedish Institute of International Affairs. URL: .

16 Sokolov Yu.I. Arctic: to the problem of accumulated environmental damage // Arctic: Ecology and Economics No. 2
(10), 2013, pp. 18-27; Chistyukhina S.N. Environmental protection of the Arctic (international legal aspect) //
Bulletin of RUDN University, Juridical Sciences series, 2008, No. 2, pp. 94-100; Podoplekin A.O. The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue and
environmental protection // Bulletin of the Northern (Arctic) Federal University. Series:
Humanities and social sciences. 2013. No. 6. P. 159-160; Borodin K.A., Skripnichenko V.A. Formation
rational environmental management in the development of offshore oil fields in the Arctic // Bulletin
Northern (Arctic) Federal University. Series: Humanities and social sciences. 2014. No. 5. S.
116-124; Ilyukhin V.N. Regulatory and legal aspects maritime search and rescue
activities of Russia in the Arctic // Arctic: ecology and economy. 2015. No. 1 (17). pp. 76-81; Bogoyavlensky V.I.
Arctic shelf: natural and technogenic threats to the ecosystem during the development of oil and gas resources // Bulletin
Ministry of Emergency Situations. 2013. No. 6-7. pp. 35-41; Nemchenko S.B. On the implementation of the function of the state for the prevention and elimination
consequences of emergencies in the Arctic. Legal policy in the field of security in the Arctic:
round table materials. Murmansk, November 26, 2014. Under total ed. E.N. Chizhikova, A.V. Malko, S.B.
Nemchenko; comp. A.A. Smirnova, N.I. Utkin. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg University of the State Fire Service of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Russia. 2015. 252
With.

O. Gildzha 17 and others.

The study of the prospects for the development of transport communications in the Arctic is presented in the publications of Ruksha V.V., Nikolaeva A.B., Selin V.S., Danilov A.I., Chenskikh N.A., Agarkov S.A., Smirnov S.M. , Zolotukhina I.N. 18 , B. Gunnarsson, J. Mackenzie, L. Jacobson 19 et al.

Studying what is happening in the Arctic political processes Vylegzhanin A.N., Moiseev E.G., Panichkin I.V., Shinkaretskaya G.G., Kovalev A.A., Savaskov P.V., Mikhina I.N., Gavrilov V. V., Ovlashchenko A.V., Pokrovsky I.F. 20 , S. Groves, J. Hawke, K. Allen 21 et al.

The works of V.N. Konyshev, A.A. Sergunin,

17 Fenge T., Funston B. The practice and promise of the Arctic Council. Greenpeace independent report, 2015. 33 p. URL:
;
Nowlan L. Arctic Legal Regime for Environmental Protection. IUCN, Gland, Switzerland and Cambridge, UK and ICEL,
Bonn, Germany. 2001. xii + 70 p. URL: ; Gilg O.
Climate change and the ecology and evolution of Arctic vertebrates // Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences,
Issue: The Year in Ecology and Conservation Biology, 2013. P. 166-190.

18 Ruksha V.V., Golovinsky S.A., Smirnov A.A. Russian nuclear icebreaker fleet and development prospects
Northern Sea Route // Arctic: ecology and economy. 2013, No. 1 (9). pp. 78-83; Nikolaeva A.B. Northern
sea ​​route: problems and prospects // Bulletin of the Kola Scientific Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences. 2011. No. 4. S. 108-112; Celine
V.S. Evaluation of opportunities for the development of marine communications in the Russian Arctic // Bulletin of the Kola Scientific
center of the Russian Academy of Sciences. 2011. No. 4. S. 22-28; Danilov A.I., Alekseev G.V., Klepikov A.V. Impacts of climate change on
maritime activities in the Arctic // Ice and snow. 2014. No. 3 (127). pp. 91-99; Chenskikh N.A. Transport routes
Arctic: approaches of Russia and the USA // Azimut of scientific research: economics and management. 2015. No. 4 (13). FROM.
116-120; Agarkov S.A., Selin V.S. Arctic communications in the global economy and the development of the Northern
sea ​​route // Vestnik MSTU, vol. 18, no. 3, 2015, pp. 369-372; Smirnov S.M., Zhuravel Yu.G. The Northern Sea
Route and its impact on Asia-Pacific // Asia-Pacific Journal of Marine Science & Education, 2015. Vol. 5. No. 2. P. 98-
103; Zolotukhin I.N. The Northern Sea Route as a transoceanic highway. Development problems in the aspect
interests of the powers of the North Pacific: a view from Russia // Oikumena. Regional studies. 2013. No. 2
(25). pp. 16-29.

19 Gunnarsson B. The future of Arctic Marine operations and Shipping Logistics. The Arctic in World Affairs: A North
Pacific Dialog on the Future of the Arctic. Edited by O.R. Young, J.D. Kim, Y.H. Kim. North Pacific Arctic Conference
Proceedings. – Publisher: Seoul: Korea Maritime Institute; Honolulu: East-West Center. 2013. P. 37-62; McKenzie J.,
Klarich S., Ardrey C., Lagor K. The Bering Strait: Reducing Risk Through International Cooperation and Capability
improvements. – Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, United States Coast Guard
Academy Center for Arctic Study and Policy, World Wildlife Fund Arctic Program. 103 p.; Jakobson L. China prepares for
an ice-free arctic. SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security. 2010. No. 2. 16 p.

20 Vylegzhanin A.N. Issues of interpretation and execution of the Spitsbergen Treaty of 1920 // Moscow Journal
international law. – M.: Intern. relations, 2010, No. 1, pp. 4-30; Moiseev E.G. Arctic and International
right. Law and state: theory and practice. - M .: Law and State, 2008, No. 9 (45). pp. 101-104; Panichkin
I.V. International legal framework for the prevention of marine oil pollution in the Arctic //
International public and private law. - M.: Lawyer, 2014, No. 5 (80). pp. 16-20; Shinkaretskaya G.G. Russia,
Arctic, continental shelf // Moscow Journal of International Law. – M.: Intern. relations,
2009, No. 1. S. 119-131; Kovalev A.A. The international legal regime of the Arctic and the interests of Russia // Index
security. 2009. No. 3-4 (90-91), T. 15. S. 115-124; Savaskov P.V. Legal regime of the Arctic. Arctic: zone of peace
and cooperation. - M.: IMEMO RAN, 2011. S. 27-39; Mikhina I.N. International legal regime of maritime
areas of the Arctic. Dis. … cand. legal Sciences: 12.00.10 - M., 2003. 252 p.; Gavrilov V.V. The LOSC and the
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Arctic Ocean // The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, No. 31
(2), March 2016. P. 315-338; Ovlashchenko A.V., Pokrovsky I.F. Prospects for the legal regime of the maritime
transport environment of the Russian Arctic: dualism of approaches or their eclecticism? // Transport law. – M.:
Lawyer, 2012, No. 1. S. 12-20.

21 Groves S., Accession to Convention on the Law of the Sea Unnecessary to Advance Arctic Interests. Heritage
Foundation Backgrounder No. 2912, June 26, 2014. URL: ; Houck J.W. The Opportunity Costs of Ignoring
the Law of the Sea Convention in the Arctic. Hoover Institution: Arctic Security Initiative, 2013. URL:
; Allen C.H. "Lead in the Far North" by
acceding to the Law of the sea convention // Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy. URL:
.

Zagorsky A.V., Morgunova B.A., Gudeva P.A., Lukina Yu.F., Troyakova T.G. 22 , G. Corella, I. Oldberg, A. Bales 23 et al.

Despite the fact that in the domestic and foreign science of international relations there is a significant number of works devoted to the issues of national security of the Russian Federation in the Arctic, a serious omission of most of them, in our opinion, is the lack of a clearly defined object of security. Without a complete understanding of the object, the security of which must be ensured, it is difficult to identify phenomena that threaten national security. This is mainly due to the fact that the scientific community is still far from consensus on a single conceptual apparatus of the theory of national security. At the same time, the effective functioning of the system for ensuring the national security of the state is impossible without a clear understanding of the essence and content of the basic categories of this theory.

In this paper, the categorical apparatus of the theory of national security has been investigated and refined using the axiological approach. The theoretical results obtained by the author allowed him to apply a new approach to study the whole range of problems of ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation in the Arctic in the interests of revealing and classifying the main threatening phenomena in the region and considering the state policy of the Russian Federation to neutralize them.

Empirical base The research is represented by several groups of documents:

- international treaties to which the Russian Federation is a party; 24

– regulatory legal acts of the Russian Federation in the field of ensuring national

security; 25

– regulatory legal acts of the Russian Federation, defining the main directions

22 Konyshev V.N., Sergunin A.A. International organizations and cooperation in the Arctic // Bulletin
international organizations. 2011, No. 3. S. 27-36; Zagorsky A.V. Problems of Arctic cooperation and
mechanisms for their solution. The Arctic: a zone of peace and cooperation. - M.: IMEMO RAN, 2011. S. 170-193; Morgunov
B.A. International cooperation is the key to solving environmental problems in the Arctic // Arctic
statements. 2012. No. 3. S. 44-53; Gudev P.A. Prospects for the formation of an international regime in the Arctic //
International life. 2014. No. 2. S. 88-101; Lukin Yu.F. Arctic projects of interregional integration //
Arctic and North, 2013, no. 13, pp. 14-33; Troyakova T.G. The cooperation of Russia and Northeast Asian Countries in the
Arctic // East Asia-Arctic Relations: Boundary, Security and International Politics. Ed. by Kimie Hara and Ken Coates.
CIGI Waterloo, Canada. P.117-126.

23 Corell H. The Arctic. An Opportunity to Cooperate and to Demonstrate Statesmanship // Vanderbilt Journal of
Transnational Law. 2009 Vol. 42. Issue 4. P. 1065-1079; Oldberg I. Soft security in the Arctic. The role of Russia in the
Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Arctic Council. UI Occasional Paper, 2011. No. 4. 55 p.; Bailes A. Understanding the
Arctic Council: A "sub-regional" perspective. Center for Arctic Policy Studies, Institute of International Affairs University
of Iceland. occasional paper. 17 p.m.

24 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982; international convention for the protection of human life
sea ​​dated November 01, 1974; International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships of 02 November
1973; Agreement on Cooperation in Aviation and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic dated May 12, 2011
of the year; Agreement on cooperation in the field of preparedness and response to marine oil pollution in the Arctic from
May 15, 2013; etc.

25 Constitution of the Russian Federation of December 12, 1993; Federal Law of December 28, 2010 No. 390-FZ “On
security"; Federal Law No. 35-FZ of March 6, 2006 “On Combating Terrorism”;
Federal Law No. 40-FZ of April 3, 1995 "On the Federal Security Service"; the federal law
dated July 31, 1998 No. 155-FZ "On internal sea waters, the territorial sea and the adjacent zone of the Russian Federation";
Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of December 31, 2015 No. 683 "On the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation"; etc.

state policy in the Arctic; 26

– regulatory legal acts of foreign countries in the field of implementation of the Arctic policy; 27

– electronic resources – official websites of Russian 28 and foreign 29 public authorities.

Theoretical and methodological foundations of the study. When writing this research work, the author mainly relied on theoretical ideas developed within the framework of the neorealist paradigm in the science of international relations.

In the course of the study, a wide range of empirical and theoretical methods, characteristic of political science, were applied. When choosing the leading methodological approaches, the author took into account the fact that in the practice of modern political research, the main ones are systemic and comparative methods, and the second of them becomes fundamental. thirty Practical use The comparative method made it possible to compare the military power and potential of key Arctic players, as well as to compare their national interests in order to identify possible intentions to harm the national security of the Russian Federation (in case of a conflict of interest) and promising areas for the development of cooperation (in case of a coincidence of interests). Through the application of the systematic method, the author managed to achieve a comprehensive study of the mechanism for ensuring Russia's national security in the Arctic region.

In addition, the complexity of the subject under study predetermined

variety of scientific approaches used in this work. Thanks to the use of an axiological approach to the theory of national security, the author managed to systematize the categorical apparatus of this theory and make a comprehensive assessment of Russia's national heritage in

26 Merchant Shipping Code of the Russian Federation of April 30, 1999 No. 81-FZ; Fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation in
Arctic for the period up to 2020 and beyond (approved by the President of the Russian Federation on September 18, 2008
No. Pr-1969); Strategy for the development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and ensuring national security for the period up to
2020 (approved by the President of the Russian Federation on February 08, 2013); Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of May 02, 2014 No. 296 "On
land territories of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation”; Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation dated 14
March 2015 No. 228 "On approval of the Regulations on the State Commission for Development
the Arctic"; etc.

27 Norwegian Government Strategy for the High North 2006; "Canada's Northern Strategy: Our North,
our heritage, our future” 2009; "Strategy of the Kingdom of Denmark in relation to the Arctic for 2011-2020
years" 2011; US Arctic Policy Directive 2009; "US National Strategy for
the Arctic Region" in 2013; “Strategy of Finland in the Arctic Region” 2010; "Strategy Sweden
for the Arctic region" 2011; "Parliamentary Resolution on the Arctic Policy of Iceland" 2011;
etc.

28 Official website of the President of the Russian Federation. URL: ; Official site of the Government of the Russian Federation. URL:
; Official website of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. URL: ;
Official site of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. URL: ;
Official site of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. URL: ; etc.

29 Official website of the Administration of the President of the United States. URL: ; Official
Norwegian government website. URL: ; Official site
Governments of Canada. URL: ; Official website of Denmark. URL:
; Official website of the Government of Sweden. URL:
; etc.

30 Voskresensky A.D. Political systems and models of democracy in the East. M.: Aspect Press, 2007. S.13-14.

Arctic. In order to consider the dynamics of the formation and development of the state policy of key regional actors, a historical approach was applied.

Scientific novelty this study is as follows:

Firstly, the application of the postulates of the axiological approach made it possible for the first time to make a comprehensive assessment of the object of ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation in the Arctic, which is considered the national heritage and national interests of the country.

Secondly, on the basis of axiological postulates, the author developed his own theoretical approach to the systematization of the categorical apparatus of the theory of national security, as well as to the disclosure and classification of phenomena that threaten the country's security, on the basis of which the main challenges, dangers and threats of the Russian Federation in the Arctic were identified.

Thirdly, the author presented a mechanism for ensuring Russia's national security in the Arctic, and also explored the main directions of Russian policy to neutralize threats to the country's national security in the region, which made it possible to develop a number of proposals for the further development of the Russian Arctic and strengthening international cooperation in the Arctic.

Theoretical and practical significance of the work. The main theoretical value of the work is the theoretical approach formed by the author on the basis of axiological postulates to systematize the basic categories of the theory of national security, as well as to identify and classify challenges, dangers and threats to national security. These theoretical calculations, according to the author, are of a universal nature and can be used in conducting scientific research on a broad topic of national security of any state.

From a practical point of view, the use of the results of this study by government departments can increase the effectiveness of Russian policy in the field of ensuring national security in the Arctic. The main conclusions and results of the study can be used by representatives of the Russian and foreign scientific community involved in the study of the political and economic processes taking place in the Arctic. Also, the materials of research work can be used in the educational process in the development of educational and methodological and lecture materials, in the preparation of university students studying in such areas as: "International Relations", "Political Science", "Regional Studies", etc.

The main provisions for defense:

1. The Arctic heritage of Russia in many respects surpasses the heritage of other countries in the region. In particular, more than half of the total population of the Arctic lives on the territory of the Russian Federation (2391.652 thousand people); it owns the largest area of ​​the earth's surface beyond the Arctic Circle (28% of the total area); the world's largest hydrocarbon deposits have been discovered in the Russian Arctic; under the jurisdiction of the country is the shortest sea route connecting Asia and Europe (NSR); most of the Arctic seaports (18 units) are located on the coast of Russia; and she also has

the world's largest icebreaker fleet (40 operating vessels), which allows active exploration of the Arctic territories. In this regard, the author believes that in the near future Russia will continue to hold a leading position in the system of international relations in the Arctic region.

2. The results of the study point to the failure of the proposed
many Western experts of the thesis that Russia is conducting an expansionist
policy in the Arctic, the extreme manifestation of which is considered a possible
military aggression against other countries in the region. Russia is interested in
maintaining the status quo in the Arctic, since its national
the wealth in the region surpasses that of any other country, and, in the case of
revision of the international order existing in the region, Moscow risks
much more to lose than to gain. In this regard, the author
argues that comprehensive measures to strengthen the military power of Russia in
Arctic have been undertaken solely to protect
national treasure of the country in the region.

3. Based on the theoretical approach developed within the
of the study, the author identified 12 main phenomena,
threatening the national security of the Russian Federation in the Arctic, which were divided
to challenges, dangers and threats based on the degree of risk they contain
causing significant damage to a security object, including:

– six threats: (1) a full-scale military clash between the Russian Federation and NATO countries in the Arctic; (2) carrying out terrorist attacks on civilian facilities, transport and industrial infrastructure, maritime economic activities, etc.; (3) intensification of the activities of cross-border criminal groups engaged in illegal trafficking in natural resources, weapons, ammunition, explosives and poisonous substances, narcotic drugs and psychotropic drugs; (4) industrial espionage (including cyber espionage) against military installations, nuclear power facilities and enterprises of the domestic military-industrial complex (MIC) located in the Russian Arctic; (5) undermining the biodiversity of Arctic flora and fauna due to the activities of poachers; (6) the possibility of establishing international control over the NSR route;

- two dangers: (1) environmental pollution due to the growth of economic activity in the Arctic or the occurrence of accidents at the objects of marine economic activity and nuclear industry facilities; (2) occurrence of emergency situations of natural and technogenic nature related to climate change in the Arctic;

- four challenges: (1) the tendency to politicize environmental problems in the Russian part of the Arctic in order to undermine the image of Russia on the world stage; (2) Norway's actions to oust Russian fishing vessels from traditional fishing areas in the Barents and Norwegian Seas, as well as an attempt to establish exclusive national jurisdiction over the 200-mile zone around Svalbard and its bottom and subsoil; (3) the impact of various NGOs and NPOs on the population living in the Russian Arctic in order to destabilize the internal political situation by creating separatist

sentiments; (4) the presence of territorial disputes in the Arctic as a prerequisite for the emergence of an international conflict.

All these phenomena were divided into two groups - threats of a military (five) and non-military (seven) nature, which was due to the need to study the mechanism for their neutralization.

4. From a military-political point of view, all Arctic and subarctic
countries consider the Arctic, first of all, in the context of ensuring
regional security, while for Russia and the United States it is
one of the key regions that is built into the global architecture
security. The results of the study indicate that the
NATO military power in the region is enough to defeat
Russian Arctic grouping of forces, after which NATO forces will be able to
practically unhindered strikes on most of the territory of the Russian Federation
With Arctic destinations using cruise missiles Tomahawk, including
number and by objects of strategic nuclear forces. So the US and NATO
have an objective opportunity to harm the national
property of Russia in the Arctic. Although such intentions are not openly
declared, analysis of US and NATO policy indicates that the military
preparations of Western countries in the Arctic are largely anti-Russian
orientation. It is carried out as a general tightening of the anti-Russian
the rhetoric of Western countries, and the physical approach of NATO to the borders of the Russian Federation
(including increased efforts to involve Sweden and Finland in the Alliance,
deployment of the regional segment of the missile defense system, etc.).

In this regard, the author believes that the highest threat to the national security of the Russian Federation in the Arctic is the possibility of its military clash with NATO countries, which could escalate into a full-scale war. If this threat is realized, the maximum possible direct damage may be caused to the national heritage of Russia.

5. Due to the lack of mutual trust at the present stage, the Arctic
and the subarctic countries have become hostages of the so-called “dilemma
security" when measures taken by one player to strengthen
national security, lead to a weakening of the security of another and
vice versa. That is why among the regional trends in the Arctic, a special
place is occupied by the active militarization of the region, during which each of
players trying to guarantee their national security,
that is, to protect their national treasure from possible encroachments from
sides of neighbors. In this regard, we believe that in the next decade
"militarization" will remain one of the main development trends
international relations in the Arctic.

Russia, like other Arctic countries, is taking active steps to build up military power in the region. In our opinion, in the short and medium term, this task should be achieved primarily through the deployment of mobile anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile systems, which serve exclusively defensive purposes. Thus, the Russian Federation will be able to strengthen its defense capability without

undermining the security of other Arctic states, thereby seeking to make a positive contribution to resolving the regional “security dilemma”.

6. From the point of view of the implementation of national interests in the Arctic, in recent years the Russian Federation has faced a number of internal and external problems in the promotion of major economic projects, the key of which are Yamal LNG and the NSR. The greatest negative effect had the introduced Western countries economic sanctions and a significant drop in energy prices. At the same time, the sanctions policy of the West contributed to the strengthening of cooperation between Russia and the countries of the Asia-Pacific region (including China, Japan and the Republic of Korea) in the Arctic.

These countries show a steady interest in increasing the supply of Russian hydrocarbons to meet growing domestic demand, as well as in using the NSR to transport their goods to European markets. Thus, the Arctic acts as a unique platform for establishing mutually beneficial cooperation Russia, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, the development of which will contribute to the successful implementation of economic projects in the Russian Arctic.

The same goal, according to the author, can be the use of the concept of sea shuttle transportation in the Arctic, which creates the most optimal conditions for organizing trans-Arctic navigation along the NSR on a year-round basis. To do this, when entering the NSR in the eastern and western parts of the Arctic, it is necessary to create two large logistics centers based on “non-freezing” ports with year-round navigation (for example, the ports of Murmansk and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky).

The degree of reliability and approbation of the results of the study.

The main provisions and conclusions of the dissertation are reflected in the monograph written in co-authorship (author's contribution 1.2 pp) and six scientific publications of the author (three of them are published in publications from the list of HAC, one - in the publication included in the international database Scopus data), as well as in reports at Russian and foreign scientific and practical conferences, including: VIII All-Russian scientific and practical conference with international participation "Russia - XXI century: Fighting new challenges" (May 22-24, 2015 - Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok, Russian Federation); XII International Symposium "Humanities and Social Sciences in Europe: Achievements and Prospects" (January 26, 2017 - East-West Association for Advanced Studies and Higher Education, Vienna, Austria).

Correlation between the categories "risk", "challenge", "danger", "threat" and "damage" in the theory of national security

The problem of ensuring security is one of the key ones in the science of international relations, in connection with which it has been and remains under the close attention of both professionals (scientists and statesmen) and ordinary citizens. In order to understand the content and essence of the “security” phenomenon, it is necessary to analyze the definitions of this category used in various information sources.

It is appropriate to start the analysis with a search for the etymological roots of the word "security". AT explanatory dictionary Russian language Ozhegova S.I. “security” is defined as “a state in which there is no danger, there is protection from danger”40, that is, in fact, “security” is opposed to “danger”. In turn, "danger" is interpreted as "the possibility, the threat of something very bad, some kind of misfortune"41. In the Macmillan Publishers English Dictionary, "security" is defined as "protection from attack, damage, destruction", as well as "a feeling of confidence and security"42. Thus, in the most general sense, "security" is understood as the state of the absence of the possibility or threat of the occurrence of any negative event (danger). The variability in the definitions of "security", reflected by the authors of various dictionaries, indicates the complex nature of this category. However, simplified, purely linguistic interpretations of "security" do not properly reveal the essence of this scientific phenomenon. In this regard, it should be noted that the category of "security" was subjected to deep reflection in the framework of various humanities, primarily philosophical, sociological, political, economic and military.

In the scientific literature, there are many methodological approaches to revealing the essence and content of the category "security": for example, philosophers interpret it as "the state, development trends and conditions for the life of society, its structures, institutions and institutions, which ensure the preservation of their qualitative certainty, optimal ratio of freedom and necessity”; psychologists - as "the feeling, perception and experience of the need to protect the vital needs and interests of people"; and political scientists consider this phenomenon as “a property of a certain system and the result of the activity of a number of systems and state bodies, as well as the very process of activity aimed at achieving the goals set to ensure the security of the individual, society and the state.”43

In the most general sense, traditional for political sciences, "security" is understood as "the physical survival of the state, the protection and preservation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, the ability to adequately respond to any real and potential threats"44. At the same time, “security” is an exclusively social phenomenon, as it reflects the subjective attitude of a person (society) to the world around him. As Prokhozhev A.A. rightly noted, “security” cannot exist on its own, outside the life of a person and society. “It is closely connected with all aspects of human life and society, the fundamental task of which is to ensure their own existence and development.”45 Professor Litvinov E.P. also considers "security" as a complex social phenomenon, however, he notes that the latter is only an "element of no less complex social systems" such as the individual, society, state, as well as various spheres of society (political, economic, spiritual, etc.). At the same time, the scientific solution to the problems of “security” is mainly intended to “determine the essence and content of this phenomenon”, and “consideration and analysis of security as a structural element of complex social systems will make it possible to identify the conditions for their functioning, since security in this case acts as the most important factor in their life, existence and functioning.”46 Thus, the social nature of “security” leads to the understanding of this phenomenon as a necessary condition for the continuous development of the individual, society and the state, which is associated with the constant overcoming of the contradictions and dangers of daily practical activities carried out "in conditions of uncertainty and risk, real external and internal threats"

Analysis of national interests of key players in the Arctic region

The Arctic has extremely harsh climatic conditions, which complicates the conduct of any activity and comfortable living there. In this regard, the Arctic expanses remain the least populated region of the Earth. Thus, as of 2015, 2,391,652 people lived in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF), which is 1.6% of the total Russian population of 146,267.3 thousand people134 (see Table A.1). The combined population of the remaining seven A8 Member States was 2,083,370 in 2015 (see Table A.2).

Thus, the total number of people permanently residing in the Arctic is 4,475,022 people (0.06% of the total population of the planet), while more than half of them (53.4%) live in the Russian Arctic. The largest Russian cities in the Arctic are Arkhangelsk (350982 people), Murmansk (305236 people), Severodvinsk (186172 people), Norilsk (176251 people), Vorkuta (60368 people).135 For comparison, the population of Icelandic Reykjavik is more than 100 thousand people, and the Norwegian Tromso - 71 thousand people.136

Considering the ethnic composition of the population of the Arctic, it is worth noting that most of it is made up of representatives of the Caucasian race, mainly living in large cities. The rest of the population is represented by dozens of groups of indigenous peoples of the Far North, who have lived on these lands for centuries. Thus, 40 indigenous peoples live in the Russian Arctic. small peoples North, Siberia and the Far East (with a total number of about 244 thousand people), which include: Dolgans, Aleuts, Koryaks, Khanty, Mansi, Nenets, Nanais, Saami, Evenki, Eskimos, Selkups, Chukchi and others. In addition, in the North of the country live indigenous peoples who are not small in number - these are the Yakuts and Komi (numbering more than 400 thousand people).137

Today, the Russian Federation owns the largest section of the Arctic. The length of the Russian coast in the Arctic is 22,600 kilometers, which is 58% of the total length of the Arctic coast.

In accordance with the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the period up to 2020 and beyond, the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation is referred to as “a part of the Arctic, which includes, in whole or in part, the territories of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions, Krasnoyarsk Territory, Nenets, Yamal-Nenets and Chukotka Autonomous Okrugs, determined by the decision of the State Commission under the Council of Ministers of the USSR for Arctic Affairs of April 22, 1989, as well as the lands and islands indicated in the Resolution of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of April 15, 1926 "On the announcement the territory of the USSR of lands and islands located in the Arctic Ocean”, and the internal sea waters, territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the Russian Federation adjacent to these territories, lands and islands, within which Russia has sovereign rights and jurisdiction in accordance with international law.”1 located in the Arctic Ocean” and other acts of the USSR.139

The boundaries of the maritime spaces of the Russian Federation, including those in the Arctic Ocean, are determined in accordance with international law, in particular the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. It is worth noting that until 1982, a sectoral approach prevailed in the division of the Arctic expanses, within which North Pole regarded as a "starting point". Conditional lines (meridians) were drawn from it to the outskirts of the mainland of the five Arctic countries, which delimited the entire space of the Arctic into five sectors. In accordance with this approach, the largest Arctic sector was assigned to the USSR (later the Russian Federation) - 9.3 million square meters. km., which is 44% of the total area of ​​the Arctic (see Table A.3). However, in 1982, with the adoption of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Arctic countries had to reconsider their borders. In accordance with this convention, the maritime space of a coastal state includes inland waters, territorial sea (TM), exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf (CS). The coastal state has full sovereignty over the inland waters140 and HM141 adjacent to its land territory, which are actually part of the country's territory. At the same time, the breadth of the territorial sea may not exceed 12 nautical miles measured from the baselines. In EEZ142 (200 nautical miles from the coast) and KSh143 (200 nautical miles by default, but extendable to 350 nautical miles by convention), a coastal state has a number of sovereign rights in the exploration, exploitation, conservation of natural resources and managing them. At the same time, the shelf and waters located outside the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of coastal countries are declared a global property.

Comparative analysis of the military power and potential of key players in the Arctic region

Before proceeding to a direct assessment of the military potential of the key Arctic players, it is necessary to understand the essence and content of the “military potential” category, as well as to clarify how it relates to the “military power” category.

In the domestic scientific literature, a significant number of works devoted to the study of the above categories are presented. In our opinion, special attention should be scientific work Pyzha V.V. 181 and Kirillov V.V.182, in which the authors examine in detail the essence and content of the categories "military power" and "military potential". As part of their research, both scientists justifiably resorted to a philosophical understanding of the dialectical relationship and interdependence of the categories "potential" and "power", which correlate as the categories "possibility" and "reality". At the same time, in its content, “potential” is a broader concept that characterizes the totality of the state’s existing (but not yet realized) capabilities in various spheres of society. In the process of its life activity, the state turns into reality (realizes) a number of opportunities it has, producing various material and spiritual benefits, the accumulation of which contributes to the strengthening of power. Thus, the category "power" determines the realized part of the potential.

The above analysis methodologically extends to the categories of "military power" and "military potential". The category "military power" defines "the totality of forces and means allocated by the state for a given period of time" 183, intended to ensure national security (physical protection of the state). At the same time, the state is also obliged to allocate resources for the development of other spheres of public life (social, economic, spiritual, etc.), and therefore, only a part of the total potential and resources of the state is transferred into military power. In turn, the category “military potential” reflects “the maximum amount of forces and means that can be allocated from the total potential of the state in order to build up military power.”184 It should be noted that states resort to the full realization of their military potential only in case of emergency ( for example, during a full-scale war), as this has an extremely negative impact on all other spheres of society.

As Professor Pyzh V.V. notes, “in peacetime conditions, most states try to develop the most optimal, minimally necessary amount of military power to ensure reliable defense.”185 In this case, the military potential of a state is characterized by a combination of two indicators: (1) the size of forces and funds already allocated by the state for military purposes from its total potential (that is, actual military power); (2) the amount of forces and means that the state can additionally allocate for military purposes with the maximum exertion of all its capabilities (the so-called reserve).

Thus, the military potential of the state is the product of the addition of its actual military power and the available reserve (personnel, economic, intellectual, industrial, scientific and technical, etc.). At the same time, a comprehensive assessment of the military potential (power) of the state is an extremely difficult task, for which it is necessary to select a number of the most representative indicators that determine the complexity and versatility of the object under study in the context of the task being solved. In the scientific community, there is still no common understanding of how many indicators will be sufficient to effectively assess the military potential (power) of the state. In military sciences, “the quantitative ratio of forces and means is still considered an objective indicator of the combat power of the opposing sides, which makes it possible to determine the degree of superiority of one of them over the other.”186 However, not all

Prokhozhev A.A. General Theory of National Security… S. 167-168. indicators are quantifiable. In particular, it is not clear how a full and reliable assessment of the spiritual forces of society (intellectual level, diligence, courage, etc.) can be made using quantitative methods. In addition, any data obtained by comparing individual indicators, regardless of their importance and quantity, will “suffer from a certain incompleteness and one-sidedness, which will not allow comprehensive coverage of all aspects of such complex systems as the country's economy and its armed forces.”187

Let's move on to the consideration of some indicators that, in our opinion, are directly related to determining the military potential of the states under study (according to open sources). Recall that within the framework of this work, military potential is considered as a combination of two main elements - military power (resources already allocated) and reserve (resources that can be mobilized). In this regard, it is expedient to begin the analysis with consideration of the military power of states. To do this, let's turn to the materials of the Internet portal GlobalFirepower.com (GFP), which over the past few years has presented a detailed rating of the countries of the world, ranked by the level of military power.

When comparing the military power of states, GFP experts use an integrated assessment methodology that takes into account more than 50 different factors, including: human resources; the quantitative composition of the ground, air and naval forces; availability of natural resources; financial and logistical capabilities of the state; as well as a number of geographic indicators. At the same time, the factor of a country's possession of nuclear weapons is taken out of the brackets. According to the results of the assessment, each state is assigned a numerical index of military power, which, under ideal conditions, should tend to zero.

The main directions of the Arctic policy of Russia to neutralize threats to national security

As noted earlier, one of the fundamental documents that define the main goals, objectives, strategic priorities and mechanisms for implementing the state policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic, including in the field of military security, is Fundamentals-2008.328 According to the document, the main goal of the Russian Federation in the field of military security is favorable operational regime in the Russian Arctic, including maintaining the necessary combat potential of the groupings of general-purpose troops (forces) of the Armed Forces, other troops, military formations and bodies in this region. countries in the region, provided by the Strategy-2013.329 In particular, the document states that the Russian Federation will carry out in the region "comprehensive support for combat and mobilization readiness at a level necessary and sufficient to solve the problems of preventing forceful pressure and aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies, ensuring sovereign the rights of the Russian Federation in the Arctic and the possibilities for the unhindered implementation of all types of its activities, the neutralization of external and internal military dangers and military threats in Peaceful time, ensuring strategic deterrence, and in the event of an armed conflict, repulsing aggression and cessation of hostilities on terms that meet the interests of the Russian Federation.” Plans were also announced to improve the structure and composition of the country's Armed Forces in the region, develop the infrastructure for their deployment in the Russian Arctic, and modernize control systems airspace and surface conditions.

In the previous chapter, we noted that today, in terms of the level of military power of the forces available in the Arctic, Russia is significantly inferior to the combined forces of NATO (see Table B.2). A special advantage in favor of the Alliance forces is observed when comparing the number of large surface ships (five times superiority) and the number of combat aircraft (six times superiority). Given this lag, in recent years Moscow has begun to pay more attention to strengthening the country's defense capability in the northern direction. Below are the main directions of Russia's military activities in the Arctic.

The increased attention of the Russian leadership to the problems of ensuring the country's security in the Arctic was demonstrated in 2014, when the Joint Strategic Command "North" (USC "Sever") was created on the basis of the Northern Fleet of the Russian Navy. For the first time in history, the task of defending the entire Russian Arctic is entrusted to a single military structure, and not to several military districts and fleets. The main task of the USC "Sever" in the coming years will be the construction of an extensive system of bases and airfields that ensure daily activities in the region, control over the territory and communications, as well as the defense of the northern borders of the country in the event of an armed conflict. So, a number of military facilities have already been deployed in the island territories of the Russian Arctic. At the beginning of 2016, the process of building or reconstructing the necessary infrastructure (airfields, military camps,

Strategy for the development of the Russian Arctic and ensuring national security for the period up to 2020. administrative and housing complexes, etc.) six military bases - on the islands of Sredny (Severnaya Zemlya archipelago), Alexandra Land (Franz Josef Land archipelago), Kotelny (Novosibirsk Islands archipelago), as well as in the village of Rogachevo (Novaya Zemlya archipelago) , on Wrangel Island and Cape Schmidt.330

The task of conducting ground operations is entrusted to the Arctic brigades - special formations equipped and trained for the conditions of the Arctic. The first of them, the 80th separate motorized rifle brigade, stationed in the village of Alakurtti, Murmansk region, received its battle flag on January 17, 2015. The second brigade will be deployed in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug in 2017. As part of the USC "Sever" was created new army Air Force and Air Defense, which will be responsible for the restoration of the system air defense in the region. In January 2015, the Arctic group of troops received new S-400 Triumf anti-aircraft missile systems, which, in addition to the S-300 air defense systems deployed in the Kola North, will ensure security in the skies over the Arctic.331 The USC Sever also includes included tactical groups equipped with modern anti-ship systems. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation is building special modular polar military camps that provide normal service and life conditions for military personnel in the Arctic.332

Great attention is paid to the creation of weapons designed for operations in the difficult climatic conditions of the Arctic. In 2015, the state holding Russian Helicopters handed over to the Russian military the first multi-purpose Mi-8AMTSh-VA helicopter, designed specifically for flights in the Arctic. This machine is equipped with a fundamentally new avionics, which, among other things, includes a weather radar, several navigation systems (satellite, digital with a built-in map generator, as well as a strapdown inertial system that allows you to determine the current location of the rotorcraft in the event of a loss of satellite signal), infrared equipment and night vision goggles for pilots. The flight range of the Mi-8AMTSh-VA exceeds 1,300 km, which makes it possible to use the vehicle far from base points when performing airborne operations of the Arctic group of troops, monitoring assigned areas of responsibility, search and rescue operations in the Russian Arctic, etc.333

At the moment, United Shipbuilding Corporation JSC is developing and building warships, auxiliary and patrol vessels for the needs of USC Sever in the Arctic. In particular, the violent reaction in Western media caused the news about the introduction into the fleet of the first multi-purpose nuclear submarine (NPS) of the fourth generation of project 885 Yasen, called Severodvinsk. According to Western experts, the unique technical characteristics of this project make the nuclear submarine "practically invulnerable in the face of the latest anti-submarine weapons systems." The new boats are designed specifically for operations in the Arctic latitudes, and in fact the Severodvinsk has become "the first submarine in the world that sees almost everything in the Arctic underwater porridge." The latest weapons systems of nuclear submarines make it possible to perform a wide range of combat missions - "from destroying ground targets to fighting submarines and destroying all types of surface ships with torpedoes and supersonic anti-ship missiles." the American equivalent of Seawolf, previously considered the best nuclear submarines of the 21st century. To date, the Russian Federation is building five more submarines of the Yasen project, in total it is planned to build seven submarines of this project by 2020.335

The development of special snow and swamp-going and wheeled vehicles for ground units OSK Sever. The absence of such equipment in the units predetermines their attachment to public roads, significantly reduces maneuverability and autonomy. Already in January 2015, specialists from defense enterprises and the Ministry of Defense on the Rybachy Peninsula (Murmansk Region) tested more than 25 pieces of equipment specially designed for the Arctic.336

Every year, 3-4 trips of US and UK nuclear submarines are carried out to the Arctic. Photo from www.navy.mil

Today, the Arctic theme is becoming more and more popular and logically fits into the framework of the state course for the restoration of Russia's geopolitical positions in all azimuths. Priority attention, which since the beginning of the 21st century has been given to the development of the Arctic territories, is determined by the long-term strategic interests of the state. The Fundamentals of the National Policy in the Arctic until 2020 have been developed, which provide for the transformation of the Arctic zone into the leading strategic resource base of Russia. As a result, already now the Arctic provides about 11% of the country's national income, 22% of the total Russian exports are created here, more than 90% of nickel and cobalt, 60% of copper, 96% of platinoids are mined and produced...

About a quarter of the world's hydrocarbon resources are concentrated in the Russian part of the Arctic. Unique gas fields have been discovered on the shelves of the Barents and Kara Seas. The fishery complex produces about 15% of the country's aquatic biological resources. The key role in the development of a unified transcontinental transport system belongs to the Northern Sea Route, which serves as the shortest route between the European and Far Eastern sea and river ports of Siberia.

"QUIET" REGION

The special geopolitical position and wealth of its raw material deposits have turned the Arctic into one of the main points of attraction not only for the Arctic states, but also for the very remote countries of the Northern Hemisphere.

China, Japan, South Korea, India and Singapore, the Netherlands, Spain, Great Britain, Germany, France, Poland, and Italy received the status of an observer of the Arctic Council. In an effort to assert its institutional involvement in the Arctic affairs, the EU also claims the status of a permanent observer in the Arctic Council.

The states and their coalitions, claiming to participate in decision-making on the problems of the Arctic, without de jure questioning the jurisdiction of the coastal Arctic countries, are de facto trying to find ways to change the existing situation. The desire of many states to demonstrate their right to independent study of the Arctic, the development of the Arctic field allows us to predict an increase in confrontation, primarily between the main world geopolitical players: Russia, the United States, China, the states of the Arctic region and their coalitions. The confrontation can be carried out both within the framework of diplomatic negotiations and using a wide range of technologies of modern conflicts.

So far, the Arctic is considered a relatively calm region. Thanks to the professionalism of Russian diplomats, many important agreements for Russia have been signed and are being implemented within the framework of the Arctic Council: on cooperation in aviation and maritime search and rescue in the Arctic, on cooperation in the field of preparedness and response to marine oil pollution in the Arctic. In total, within the framework of the Arctic Council, Russia takes part in 80 projects. The UN Commission recently recognized the legitimacy of our claim for the continental shelf of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. Now it has actually become the Russian inland sea.

The opinions of a number of experts sound rather reassuringly, arguing that the only significant open issue in the Arctic remains the definition of external borders and the delimitation of the continental shelf of a number of coastal states beyond 200-mile zones. At the same time, it is believed that this issue will not give rise to disputes and conflicts regarding access to the natural resources of the Arctic, most of which are located within the boundaries of the undisputed exclusive economic zones of coastal states. At the same time, the world has more than once encountered the fact that the position of the West has changed dramatically, and this has led to a radical transformation of situations, to a cynical denial of the sovereign rights of individual states, up to the use of military force against them. The West defends its national interests resolutely and harshly, paying no attention to the norms of international law when they contradict its interests. So far, the situation in the Arctic, unlike problem areas, is relatively calm.

However, the world is changing, and strategies are also changing, allowing you to impose your will on the enemy not only by military force. In the context of globalization and the information revolution, the events related to the hybrid war waged against Russia can serve as a catalyst for abrupt and unpredictable changes in the Arctic region.

UNPREDICTABLE ENVIRONMENT

Given the volatility and unpredictability of the international situation, one should not lose sight of the possibility of implementing a strategy of indirect action in the course of a hybrid war that is unfolding against Russia in the Arctic.

In modern conflicts, technologies are increasingly being used to gradually prepare the conditions for an avalanche-like development of the situation. The calculation is made on the fact that everything should “go by itself”, without the noticeable participation of the main initiator of the conflict. According to one of the authors of the Anglo-Saxon strategy of indirect action, the British military theorist B.L. Garth, "you can arrange various relatively small nasty things, all the time reminiscent of the enemy, but he himself will not be visible."

The strategy of indirect action in the Arctic is only a link in the US global strategy, the goal of which is to establish world domination and achieve guaranteed access to all vital areas.

With regard to the Arctic region, for many years the United States and some other NATO countries have been coordinating their political, military, economic, and information efforts within the framework of solving a single task - to expand their economic presence in the regions of the North, achieve the internationalization of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and, ultimately, try to minimize the role of Russia in the region. At the same time, we note that the issue of control over the NSR for Russia is of critical importance, since this is so far the only transport route capable of integrating the remote regions of the Far North of the country and their resource potential into the national economy. Therefore, Russia cannot allow economic ties between individual regions of the country carried out via the NSR to be placed under international control.

The leading role in counteracting the legitimate interests of Russia in the Arctic belongs to the United States. The report of the Chief of Staff of the US Navy, Admiral D. Greenert, "Roadmap" for the Arctic 2014-2030, defines specific goals and objectives for various services and departments of the US Navy and their allies. The military infrastructure of the United States and Canada is already being created and developed in the Arctic. In particular, the US has decided to build two new advanced coast guard bases in Alaska at Barrow and Nome. The possibilities of ensuring the permanent presence of an aircraft carrier group in the Arctic and the allocation of additional patrol ships are being considered. Efforts are being stepped up for anti-submarine defense and deep landing operations. In recent years, the scale and intensity of NATO operational and combat training in the Arctic has increased. Every year, 3-4 trips of multi-purpose nuclear submarines are carried out to the Arctic, at least three sorties of base patrol aircraft are made weekly.

In the Arctic sector and on the border territory of the Russian Federation, the activities of the US intelligence services and their NATO allies have intensified. In addition to military forces and means, Norwegian research vessels are involved in reconnaissance, various non-governmental organizations are used, especially environmental ones, as was the case, for example, in 2013 during the Greenpeace campaign on the Prirazlomnaya platform. The presence of foreign researchers is noted in areas of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago and in the throat of the White Sea - where Russia is testing its nuclear submarines. In Norway, they are talking about plans to change the demilitarized status of Svalbard, and the development of a concept for the use of national armed forces in the Arctic region is being completed.

NATO's position on military presence in the Arctic has not yet been determined. In this regard, the issue of the alliance's policy in the Arctic was not reflected either in the strategic concept of the alliance adopted in 2010, or in the decisions of subsequent summits of the bloc. The lack of involvement of NATO in solving the problems of the Arctic is associated with different approaches and unequal interest of the allies. But supporters of a more visible NATO presence in the northern latitudes do not stop trying to change the situation, appealing to the fact that five NATO member states (USA, Canada, Norway, Denmark and Iceland) and two important partners (Sweden and Finland) are Arctic countries. Thus, it is proposed to expand the number of NATO member states participating in the Arctic confrontation with Russia.

Along with military activities in the northern latitudes, Washington is increasing its efforts in the information sphere, using the means of traditional and public diplomacy to consolidate allies and undermine Russia's positions. The breeding ground for the implementation of the preparatory phase of the strategy of indirect action in the Arctic is a complex of hybrid threats that can serve as a catalyst for building confrontation between Russia and other contenders for the wealth of the region.

The main hybrid threats to the Russian Federation in the Arctic zone are caused by a combination of the following military, political, economic, informational factors: the intensification of military activities of the Arctic states and their allies, the growth of its scale in the Arctic and adjacent water areas; implementation of ideas about common and equal access to the use of the Northern Sea Route and the resources of the Arctic for all subjects of the world community; the implementation by the Arctic states and their allies of informational measures to discredit the Russian Federation; Norway's actions to forcibly oust the Russian Federation from traditional fishing areas in the Barents and Norwegian Seas; the desire of the United States and its allies to establish control over the nuclear facilities of the Russian Federation in the Arctic; the desire of the leadership of the countries of the Asia-Pacific region to obtain bases for their naval forces in the Arctic zone, etc.

Given the trend towards an increase in the number of participants claiming their share in the Arctic, it is possible to predict the formation of situational coalitions in the composition of states, relations between which are by no means always examples of friendship and mutual understanding. But given the unresolved number of legal aspects in relation to the problems of the Arctic, it seems quite realistic to coordinate the activities of individual states in order to weaken the position of Russia and achieve a favorable decision for them by international authorities. The actions of such rivals of Russia are characterized by purposeful, adaptive use of both military force methods and coordinated steps to weaken the enemy economically and use subversive information technologies. The use of indirect asymmetric actions and methods of waging hybrid wars both against the whole state and in relation to its individual large regions makes it possible to deprive the opposing side of actual sovereignty without seizing territories by military force.

Thus, a hybrid war is being waged against Russia in the Arctic, which requires appropriate “hybrid” countermeasures. Some of these measures are provided for in the document adopted by the Security Council of the Russian Federation in 2008 - "Fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the period up to 2020 and beyond." The Fundamentals reflect the main goals and strategic priorities of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic, the main tasks, measures and mechanisms for its implementation. Among the tasks in the field of ensuring military security, it is required to "bring the capabilities of the border agencies in line with the nature of the threats and challenges of the Russian Federation in the Arctic."

Based on the spirit and letter of the "Osnovy", Russia plans to create an Arctic group of troops by 2020 to protect its economic and political interests in this region. The document refers to the strengthening of the border troops of the FSB of Russia and the need to create a coast guard of the Russian Arctic borders.

So far, there are no clear signs indicating the existence of a consolidated anti-Russian strategy aimed at realizing the interests of the Arctic states and countries located far from the Arctic. However, for a hybrid war in the Arctic as the largest geopolitical region, the following is important: nothing prevents each of the participants from realizing their intentions without the direct use of armed forces and even without declaring war at all. If the interests of a group of participants coincide, it may be appropriate to create their situational coalition to “push through” the desired solution.

Therefore, it is also important for Russia to use such coalitions to its advantage, using disagreements between various actors. In this context, it is also important to use the opportunities of the SCO, EAC, cooperation with Japan and South Korea. A program of long-term cooperation with neutral Sweden and Finland should be developed and cooperation in the Arctic should be included in it in order to prevent these states from being drawn into anti-Russian maneuvers.

ARC OF INSTABILITY

The strategic importance of the Arctic region determines its coverage by the so-called "system of arcs of instability", which is the main tool through which the most important systemic security problems of Eurasia in general and the Russian Federation in particular are created. According to Professor Vladimir Kolotov, "the system of arcs of instability creates a geopolitical "climate", which in every possible way contributes to the conduct of controlled regional destabilization." This system covers the territory located between four oceans: Pacific, Indian, Atlantic and Arctic. It consists of eight operating segments of varying degrees of "readiness".

The arctic segment of the arc of instability is in the process of formation. The interests of the parties are defined, attempts are being made to ensure their compatibility on the basis of an internationally recognized legal framework, which, in turn, is characterized by a high degree of underdevelopment, which creates uncertainty regarding the rights of the participants to use various parts of the Arctic field in their interests. As part of the US-proclaimed strategy of geopolitical dominance in the Arctic segment, in parallel with the build-up of forces and the creation of military infrastructure, operations are being deployed in other areas of preparation and conduct of a hybrid war.

Within the framework of the hybrid war that the West is waging against Russia, the Arctic theater occupies a special place, determined by a number of objective factors. Among them: extreme natural and climatic conditions; the large length of the coastline and the focal nature of the deployment of border guard forces; low population density; lack of a unified industrial and economic complex and remoteness from the main industrial centers, high resource intensity and dependence of economic activity and the livelihood of the population on the supply of fuel, food and essential goods from other regions; low stability of ecological systems that determine the biological balance and climate of the Earth, and their dependence on even minor anthropogenic impacts.

An important factor of a subjective nature is the still insufficiently coordinated system of state administration in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation. The imperfection of state regulation measures in the economic and social spheres has led to a critical state of the basic transport, industrial, border, information, scientific and social infrastructures. Disproportions in regional development are growing, there is an outflow of population from the region.

The danger is recognized by the authorities, and as a result of energetic measures taken, the situation is rectified. However, the competitive potential of the Arctic zone of Russia is still far from being fully used.

NONLINEAR APPROACH

The strategy and goals of a hybrid war are formulated taking into account the vulnerability of the Arctic part of Russia to the use of hybrid technologies aimed at destabilizing the situation in vast areas.

First, as already mentioned, the most important goal is to undermine the economic potential of the state. This predetermines the place of Russian economic facilities in the Arctic, communications and control systems as the primary goals of the hybrid war. Forces and means are being created to influence the objects of this group, including special operations forces, cyber weapons, and theater reconnaissance is being organized. It is necessary to predict the expansion of the use of UAVs for reconnaissance purposes.

Secondly, the length of the coastline and the sparsely populated areas of land complicate the task of protecting the border, preventing the penetration of sabotage and reconnaissance groups of special operations forces.

Thirdly, an important feature of the theater is the high sensitivity of the environment in the Arctic to environmental factors, which makes it possible to predict the use of special operations forces in a hybrid war to disrupt the ecological balance. Here, one can fully expect the use of the nonlinearity property of a hybrid war, when the consequences of using indirect methods related to the impact on the ecology of the region lead to disproportionately high catastrophic consequences that can cause an avalanche-like change in the military-strategic and political situation. These can be, for example, acts of sabotage at oil-producing facilities, pipelines, and transport. A high degree of threat is posed by cyber operations against the control systems of the above facilities.

When developing protective measures in the Arctic region, one should resolutely abandon the traditional linear vision of war, which implies the possibility of establishing direct and proportional relationships between cause and effect, disturbing influence and results. In a hybrid war built on a non-linear strategy, small impacts can produce big results. The non-linearity factor of a hybrid war significantly changes the degree of reliability of predicting the possible consequences of a conflict both on the scale of the Arctic region and on a global scale.

In a hybrid war, the consequences of using indirect methods create an extremely dangerous situation, often beyond the control of the initiators. As a result of the disruption of the direct connection between cause and effect, vast zones of uncertainty are created associated with the actions of heterogeneous actors, and the actions of one of them can cause an avalanche-like change in the entire military-strategic and political situation. These and some other factors create serious obstacles when trying to foresee the course and outcome of a hybrid war.

Fourth, hybrid warfare is illegitimate. All existing laws of war are designed, as a rule, for conflicts between two belligerents, usually states pursuing interests that each of the participants considers legitimate. For traditional war, the UN adopted the concept of "aggression", there are laws that protect the rights of combatants, prisoners of war and the civilian population, prohibiting the use of certain types of weapons. The existing legal and regulatory framework serves as a tool for political decision makers and military leaders. There is nothing like this for a hybrid war.

And finally, the concept of “parties to the conflict”, which act as carriers of the conflict, needs to be clarified. A hybrid war in the Arctic is not declared, the parties to the conflict are not defined, while it is traditionally believed that a conflict as a phase of contradiction is possible only when its parties are represented by subjects. Where there is no subject, there can be no conflict.

If in a hybrid war one of the obvious subjects is the state - the victim of aggression, then it is not easy to define the aggressor himself as the other side of the conflict.

At the same time, the fact of hybrid aggression does not become obvious immediately. This thesis should be primarily attributed to the important components of a hybrid war - information and cyber wars. In both cases, it is difficult to determine the subject of aggression. These and some other factors create serious obstacles in predicting the situation and strategic planning of measures to counter a hybrid war in the Arctic.

"FRICTION OF WAR"

Taking into account the uniqueness of the Arctic theater, the phenomenon of the concept of “friction of war” introduced by K. Clausewitz is of great importance for understanding hybrid warfare as a sphere of uncertainty and uncertainty. In his writings, the military theorist rightly emphasized that "friction is the only concept that, in general, distinguishes a real war from a paper war." In other words, in war there can be a huge distance from what is conceived to what is actually being implemented. The validity of this judgment is especially true for a hybrid war in the Arctic, given the unpredictability and uncertainty of the conflict, the special sensitivity of possible targets to small impacts that can lead to large-scale consequences. The peculiarities of a hybrid war as an uncertain and unreliable conflict, in which heterogeneous forces and means participate, turn friction into a source of significant perturbing influences on the course of actions, which, under the influence of the friction of war, often become an uncontrollable and even uncontrollable process.

For traditional warfare, there are seven sources of general friction: danger; physical stress; uncertainty and unreliability of information on the basis of which decisions are made; random events that cannot be predicted; physical and political restrictions on the use of force; unpredictability resulting from interaction with the enemy; gaps between the causes and effects of war.

For a hybrid war in the Arctic region, the list of friction sources can be expanded.

First, given the scale of the economic interests of the states claiming their share in the Arctic field, the geography of their location and the specific approach to existing problems, psychological tension and stress increase, which increases the likelihood of error.

It is known that many modern conflicts occur on intercivilizational faults. The influence of this factor on the possible aggravation of the situation in the Arctic increases due to the expansion of the civilizational diversity of contenders for the Arctic field.

Secondly, a powerful source of disturbing influences that provoke failures in control systems are actions in cyberspace directed against control systems at oil and gas production facilities and pipelines.

Thirdly, disinformation is already widely used in the information war to manipulate the activities of environmental groups, which contributes to the creation of an environment of chaos and confusion.

And finally, as a result of friction, seemingly insignificant phenomena and facts occurring at the tactical level receive the power and ability of a strategic catalyst capable of influencing the course of an entire military campaign. There are cascading amplification mechanisms that allow small events in the course of a war to trigger completely unexpected and unpredictable processes that cannot be quantified within the framework of any theory. In the Arctic sector, in a hybrid war against Russia, cascade mechanisms-catalysts can be man-made man-made disasters at civilian and military facilities, terrorist attacks on communications with a large number of victims, disruption of the supply of vital products and funds to hard-to-reach Arctic regions.

The sum of friction sources usually turns out to be more than their simple sum, since some types of friction interact with others, which further increases their destructive result.

Friction in zones of uncertainty in a hybrid war is associated with the manifestation of many accidents and causes phenomena that cannot be taken into account in advance. This increases the likelihood of random incidents that widen the scope of the conflict. This is especially dangerous in a hybrid war in the Arctic, in which the interests of nuclear powers are involved.

Thus, the sources of friction largely determine the structural properties of hybrid warfare, the effectiveness of operations, and the strategy and tactics of counteraction.

As in any other war, in the hybrid war in the Arctic there are some kind of “lubricants” that can reduce friction in any military machine, including in a hybrid war. This is the use of flexible adaptive political strategies in diplomacy. It is important that the participants have combat experience and military training, special equipment, military equipment and weapons, rational deployment of forces and means, strict discipline, a well-thought-out information strategy, the early creation of effective channels for obtaining, transmitting, processing and analyzing situational data, etc.

For a hybrid war, a unique “grease” is its complete lack of legitimacy and subordination to international norms and rules, which makes it permissible on this basis to carry out the dirtiest provocations with the involvement of special operations forces, the use of manipulated terrorist groups and organized crime. The use of bacterial agents against animals, for example, pathogens of anthrax, foot-and-mouth disease, plague, glanders, false rabies, etc., cannot be ruled out.

LEGAL CONCLUSIONS

The Arctic is an extremely tasty region for Russia's geopolitical adversaries, who have repeatedly demonstrated the ability to violate any international agreements, if this is in their national interests. Historical experience does not allow counting on unconditional respect for the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of Russia enshrined in treaties in the Arctic waters and on the shelf. Such factors, along with well-known problems with the justification of the outer boundaries of the Russian continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean outside the exclusive economic zone, create conditions for attempts by the Arctic, some non-Arctic states and their coalitions to use a sophisticated strategy of indirect actions to put pressure on Russia, built on the formation and implementation of the spectrum hybrid threats.

The effectiveness of countering a hybrid war in the Arctic will depend on how fully it will be possible to foresee and take into account its features in order to adequately and promptly adapt to a rapidly changing environment, which will allow you to get ahead of rivals and prevent the transformation of challenges and risks into real dangers and threats to the national interests of the state in vital region.