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The events of the World War turned out to be a severe test for the peoples. At its final stage, it became obvious that some of the belligerent states could not stand the difficulties that had befallen them. First of all, these were multinational empires: Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman. The burden of war they carried exacerbated social and national contradictions. A long-term exhausting war with external opponents developed into a struggle of peoples against their own rulers. We know how it happened in Russia.
Formation of new states
How did Austria-Hungary collapse?
Dates and events
- October 16, 1918. - The head of the Hungarian government announced the termination of the union with Austria by Hungary.
- 28 of October- The National Czechoslovak Committee (established in July 1918) decided to form an independent Czechoslovak state.
- 29th of October- the National Council was created in Vienna and the independence of German Austria was proclaimed; on the same day, the National Council in Zagreb proclaimed the state independence of the southern Slavs of Austria-Hungary.
- October 30- in Krakow, the Liquidation Commission was created, which took over the management of the Polish lands that were previously part of Austria-Hungary, and proclaimed that these lands belong to the resurgent Polish state; on the same day, the National Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina (which were captured by Austria-Hungary in 1908) announced the annexation of both lands to Serbia.
At the final stage of the World War, the Ottoman Empire also collapsed, from which the territories inhabited by non-Turkish peoples separated.
As a result of the fall of multinational empires, a number of new states appeared in Europe. First of all, these were the countries that restored the once lost independence - Poland, Lithuania and others. The revival took a lot of effort. At times, this was especially difficult to do. Thus, the “gathering” of Polish lands, previously divided between Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia, began during the war, in 1917, and only in November 1918 did the power pass into the hands of the unified provisional government of the Polish Republic. Some of the new states first appeared on the map of Europe in such composition and borders, for example, the Republic of Czechoslovakia, which united two kindred Slavic peoples - Czechs and Slovaks (proclaimed on October 28, 1918). The new multinational state was the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes (proclaimed on December 1, 1918), later called Yugoslavia.
The formation of a sovereign state was a turning point in the life of each of the peoples. However, it did not solve all problems. The legacy of the war was economic devastation and exacerbated social contradictions. Revolutionary unrest did not subside even after gaining independence.
Paris Peace Conference
On January 18, 1919, a peace conference opened at the Palace of Versailles near Paris. Politicians and diplomats from 32 states had to determine the results of the war, paid for with the blood and sweat of millions of people who fought at the fronts and worked in the rear. Soviet Russia did not receive an invitation to the conference.
The main role at the conference belonged to representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, but in reality the main proposals were made by three politicians - US President W. Wilson, British Prime Minister D. Lloyd George and the head of the French government J. Clemenceau. They represented the conditions of the world in different ways. Wilson, back in January 1918, proposed a program for a peaceful settlement and the post-war organization of international life - the so-called "14 points" (on its basis an armistice was concluded with Germany in November 1918).
The "14 points" provided for the following: the establishment of a just peace and the rejection of secret diplomacy; freedom of navigation; equality in economic relations between states; arms limitation; the settlement of colonial questions, taking into account the interests of all peoples; the liberation of the occupied territories and the principles for determining the borders of a number of European states; the formation of an independent Polish state, including "all the lands inhabited by Poles" and having access to the sea; creation of an international organization guaranteeing the sovereignty and integrity of all countries.
The program reflected both the aspirations of American diplomacy and the personal views of W. Wilson. Before being elected president, he was a university professor for many years, and if before he sought to accustom students to the truth and ideals of justice, now they are entire nations. The desire of the author to oppose the "positive democratic program" to the ideas of the Bolsheviks and the foreign policy of Soviet Russia also played an important role in putting forward the "14 Points". In a confidential conversation at that time, he admitted: "The ghost of Bolshevism lurks everywhere ... All over the world there is a serious concern."
A different position was taken by the French Prime Minister J. Clemenceau. His goals had a practical orientation - to achieve compensation for all losses of France in the war, maximum territorial and monetary compensation, as well as the economic and military weakening of Germany. Clemenceau adhered to the motto "Germany will pay for everything!". For his intransigence and fierce defense of his point of view, the participants of the conference called him the nickname "tiger" that had been assigned to him.
The experienced and flexible politician D. Lloyd George strove to balance the positions of the parties, to avoid extreme decisions. He wrote: “... it seems to me that we should try to draw up a peace treaty as objective arbitrators (judges), forgetting about the passion of war. This treaty should have three goals in mind. First of all - to ensure justice in taking into account the responsibility of Germany for the outbreak of war and for the ways in which it was waged. Secondly, it must be a treaty which the responsible German government can sign with confidence that it is able to fulfill the obligations assigned to it. Thirdly, it must be a treaty that will not contain any provocations of a subsequent war and will create an alternative to Bolshevism by offering all reasonable people a real settlement of the European problem ... "
The discussion of peace terms lasted almost half a year. Behind the scenes of the official work of the commissions and committees, the main decisions were made by the members of the "Big Three" - Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George. They conducted closed consultations and agreements, "forgetting" about "open diplomacy" and other principles proclaimed by W. Wilson. An important event in the course of protracted discussions was the adoption of a decision on the creation of an international organization contributing to the maintenance of peace - the League of Nations.
On June 28, 1919, a peace treaty between the Allied Powers and Germany was signed in the Hall of Mirrors at the Grand Palace of Versailles. Under the terms of the treaty, Germany transferred Alsace and Lorraine to France, the districts of Eupen, Malmedy to Belgium, the region of Poznan and parts of Pomerania and Upper Silesia to Poland, northern part Schleswig - Denmark (according to the results of the plebiscite). The left bank of the Rhine was occupied by the troops of the Entente, and a demilitarized zone was established on the right bank. The Saar region was under the control of the League of Nations for 15 years. Danzig (Gdansk) was declared a "free city", Memel (Klaipeda) moved away from Germany (later included in Lithuania). In total, 1/8 of the territory, where 1/10 of the country's population lived, was torn away from Germany. In addition, Germany was deprived of colonial possessions, its rights in the Shandong province in China were transferred to Japan. Restrictions were introduced on the number (no more than 100 thousand people) and weapons of the German army. Germany also had to pay reparations - payment to individual countries for the damage caused as a result of the German attack.
Versailles-Washington system
The Treaty of Versailles was not limited to resolving the German question. It contained provisions on the League of Nations - an organization created to resolve international disputes and conflicts (the Charter of the League of Nations was also cited here).
Later, peace treaties were signed with the former allies of Germany - Austria (September 10, 1919), Bulgaria (November 27, 1919), Hungary (June 4, 1920), Turkey (August 10, 1920). They determined the borders of these countries, established after the collapse of Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire and the rejection of part of the territories from them in favor of the victorious powers. For Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, restrictions on the number of armed forces were introduced, and reparations were paid to the winners. The terms of the treaty with Turkey were particularly harsh. She lost all her possessions in Europe, on the Arabian Peninsula, in North Africa. The armed forces of Turkey were reduced, it was forbidden to keep the fleet. The zone of the Black Sea straits came under control international commission. This treaty, humiliating for the country, was replaced in 1923, after the victory of the Turkish revolution.
The League of Nations, established in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles, took part in the redistribution of colonial possessions. The so-called mandate system was introduced, according to which the colonies taken from Germany and its allies under the mandate of the League of Nations were transferred under the tutelage of "advanced" countries, primarily Great Britain and France, which managed to occupy a dominant position in the League of Nations. At the same time, the United States of America, whose president put forward the idea and actively contributed to the creation of the League of Nations, did not join this organization and did not ratify the Treaty of Versailles. This testified that the new system, eliminating some contradictions in international relations, gave rise to new ones.
The post-war settlement could not be limited to Europe and the Middle East. Significant problems also existed in the Far East, Southeast Asia and the Pacific. There, the interests of the British, the French, who had previously penetrated into this region, and the new contenders for influence - the United States and Japan, whose rivalry turned out to be especially sharp, clashed. A conference was convened in Washington (November 1921 - February 1922) to resolve the problems. It was attended by representatives of the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Portugal and China. Soviet Russia, whose borders were in this region, did not receive an invitation to the conference this time either.
Several treaties were signed at the Washington Conference. They consolidated the rights of the United States, Great Britain, France and Japan to their territories in the region (for Japan, this meant the recognition of its rights to the captured possessions of Germany), and established the ratio of the naval forces of individual countries. Particular attention was paid to the issue of China. On the one hand, the principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China was proclaimed, and on the other, the position of "equal opportunities" for the great powers in this country. Thus, the monopoly seizure of China by one of the powers was prevented (a similar threat existed from Japan), but the hands were untied for the joint exploitation of the wealth of this vast country.
The alignment of forces and mechanisms that had developed by the beginning of the 1920s international relations in Europe and the world were called the Versailles-Washington system.
Old and new in international relations
Since 1920, the Soviet state began to improve relations with neighboring countries by signing peace treaties with Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Finland. In 1921, treaties of friendship and cooperation were concluded with Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkey. They were based on the recognition of the independence of these states, the equality of partners, and in this they differed from the semi-enslaving agreements imposed on the countries of the East by the Western powers.
At the same time, following the signing of the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement (March 1921), the question arose of resuming Russia's economic ties with the leading European countries. In 1922, representatives of Soviet Russia were invited to an international economic conference in Genoa (it opened on April 10). The Soviet delegation was headed by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs GV Chicherin. Western powers expected to gain access to Russian natural resources and the market, as well as to find ways of economic and political influence on Russia. The Soviet state was interested in establishing economic ties with outside world and diplomatic recognition.
The means of pressure on Russia from the West was the demand for the payment of its external debts of tsarist Russia and the Provisional Government and compensation for the property of foreign citizens nationalized by the Bolsheviks. The Soviet country was ready to recognize the pre-war debts of Russia and the right of the former foreign owners to receive in concession the property that previously belonged to them, subject to the legal recognition of the Soviet state and the provision of financial benefits and loans to it. Russia proposed to annul (declare invalid) military debts. At the same time, the Soviet delegation submitted a proposal for a general reduction in armaments. The Western powers did not agree to these proposals. They insisted that Russia pay off all debts, including military debts (totaling about 19 billion gold rubles), return all nationalized property to its former owners, and abolish the monopoly of foreign trade in the country. The Soviet delegation considered these demands unacceptable and, for its part, proposed that the Western powers compensate for the losses inflicted on Russia by intervention and blockade (39 billion gold rubles). The negotiations stalled.
It was not possible to reach a general agreement at the conference. But Soviet diplomats managed to negotiate with representatives of the German delegation in Rapallo (a suburb of Genoa). On April 16, a Soviet-German treaty was concluded on the resumption of diplomatic relations. Both countries renounced claims for compensation for losses caused to each other during the war years. Germany recognized the nationalization of German property in Russia, and Russia refused to receive reparations from Germany. The treaty came as a surprise to international diplomatic and political circles both because of the very fact of its signing and in terms of its content. Contemporaries noted that he gave the impression of an exploding bomb. It was a success for the diplomats of the two countries and an example for others. It became increasingly clear that the relationship problem with Soviet Russia became one of the main problems of international politics of that time.
References:
Aleksashkina L. N. / General History. XX - the beginning of the XXI century.
Current page: 7 (total book has 16 pages) [accessible reading excerpt: 11 pages]
§ 11. International relations in the XVI-XVII centuries: war and diplomacy
Old and new in international relations
In the XVI-XVII centuries. The political map of Europe was changing. The struggle for spheres of influence in the world and the territorial disputes of that time had important consequences for future eras.
Features of the old and the new coexisted in international relations. On the one hand, centralized states arose, and modern nations developed within their borders. The rulers of such powers put the “state interest” at the forefront. They sought to secure favorable relations with those countries that served them as markets and suppliers of raw materials. If this could not be done peacefully, the struggle for colonies and trade routes began.
On the other hand, the medieval dynastic principle continued to play an important role in European politics. Through inheritance or marriages of monarchs, multinational states arose, similar to the Habsburg empire. The interests of individual countries that were part of such states often contradicted each other. The personalities of the monarchs, their sympathies or enmity, still seriously influenced foreign policy.
In the XVI century. the population of Western and Central Europe split into Catholics and Protestants. Many countries were drawn into conflicts out of solidarity with brothers in faith in order to establish the "true" religion and put an end to "heresy" (although it also happened that the principles of faith receded before political gain). Under such conditions, even minor feuds could develop into a major international conflict.
French standard-bearer (XVI century)
In the era of centralized states, the scale of military clashes increased significantly. In the XVI century. the armies of large countries already numbered several tens of thousands of people, in the 17th century. - 100 thousand or more. Enormous funds were required to maintain them, wars inevitably led to a sharp increase in taxes, and it was not by chance that people began to say that money is the nerve of war.
The victory of the combined fleet of Spain and Venice over the Turks at Lepanto
System of "political balance"
In the 16th-17th centuries, as before, several of the most powerful states stood out in Europe. If one of them grew stronger, the rest made alliances to weaken the formidable rival. Thus, no power could become excessively strong. Less significant states were also involved in the system of "political balance". From the end of the XV century. France, Spain and the Holy Roman Empire were the strongest powers in Western Europe (since 1519, Spain and the Holy Roman Empire were united under the rule of Charles V). The interests of France and Spain clashed constantly. The possessions of the Habsburgs surrounded France on all sides, and the two countries more than once fought over border lands. Both of them also claimed Italian territories, which led to the Italian Wars, which were fought from 1494 to 1559. Rich but fragmented Italy became easy prey for the conquerors. The war went on with varying success, but at the final stage, the Spaniards had the preponderance of forces, and their dominion in Italy was established for a long time. France had to give up its claims, although it partly compensated for this with other acquisitions. However, due to the Wars of Religion, France ceased to play an active role in European politics for a long time, and in the second half of the 16th century. a stronger England turned out to be a counterbalance to powerful Spain. In a collision with her, Philip II in 1588 suffered a heavy defeat.
What was the defeat of Spain from England in 1588?
The Ottoman Empire became an equal component of the system of "political balance". Having conquered the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula, the Turks in the 16th century. defeated Hungary and launched an offensive against the possessions of the Austrian Habsburgs; their fleet devastated the coasts of Italy and Spain. The presence of a powerful Muslim power in Europe constantly affected international relations. On the one hand, the Turkish threat reminded the peoples of Europe that, despite their religious differences, they were all primarily Christians. More than once negotiations were held between Orthodox Russia, Catholic and Protestant countries on joint actions against a common enemy. On the other hand, in search of a balance of power, the European powers entered into an alliance with the Turks. France was especially successful in this, seeking in this way to weaken Charles V.
The birth of modern diplomacy
The complex relations between European states required more and more active diplomatic activity. Previously, embassies were sent only on a specific occasion, now this is no longer enough. It turned out to be necessary to have permanent diplomatic missions in all major countries. The ambassadors were also engaged in collecting all kinds of information (sometimes the ambassador was called an “honorary spy”). They reported to their government important information about the military and financial capabilities of allies and opponents, about the internal political and religious struggle, which could change the foreign policy orientation of the state. It happened that thanks to the efforts of the diplomats of certain countries, the consequences of the military defeats of their sovereigns were actually eliminated.
The English delegation at the signing of a peace treaty with Spain in 1604. Fragment of a painting by an unknown artist
Diplomacy became a real art, special treatises were devoted to it. There were norms of diplomatic etiquette: the reception of ambassadors, their behavior (diplomatic ceremonial), the principles of a special attitude towards them (diplomatic immunity). The foundations of the modern international law: norms of relations between powers in peace and war time, rules for the use of the seas and straits.
Thirty Years' War
At the beginning of the XVII century. the first all-European war broke out. One way or another, most European countries participated in it. The war lasted from 1618 to 1648 and therefore was later called the Thirty Years' War.
The conflict, in which various political contradictions were combined with religious strife, has been brewing for a long time. Second half of the 16th - early 17th centuries - This is the period that passed in Germany under the sign of the Counter-Reformation. Reinforced Catholics pressed the Protestants. Both of them received help from their foreign supporters: the Catholics were supported by the Habsburgs - the German emperor and Spain, as well as the Pope; their opponents are Protestant England, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, and also (to spite the Habsburgs) Catholic France. Now any excuse could lead to the outbreak of war.
What were the causes of the Thirty Years' War?
Such an occasion was the uprising against the emperor in Prague (1618). Soon the Catholic army moved on the rebels and in 1620 defeated them near Prague. Merciless reprisals against Protestants began in the Czech Republic. At the same time, the Spaniards pressed the Dutch, taking the important fortress of Breda. The obvious successes of the Catholics alarmed the Protestant sovereigns of northern Europe. In 1625, Denmark entered the war against the Habsburgs.
Uprising in Prague. Habsburg officials thrown out of windows
Catholics began to experience financial difficulties, a way out of which was found by Albrecht Wallenstein. A fearless warrior and a talented commander, he was generous to his soldiers, who literally idolized the commander. However, his ambition and cynicism knew no bounds. He proposed to maintain troops by collecting funds from the local population. In this way, Wallenstein quickly created an army of 100,000, which inflicted a series of crushing defeats on the Danes.
In 1630, Sweden took the side of the Protestants. The morale of the Swedish army was very high, and King Gustav II Adolf, who led it, was an outstanding commander. In a victorious march, he marched throughout Germany, inflicting heavy defeats on the Catholics. In the Battle of Lützen (1632), the Swedes forced even Wallenstein to retreat. When Gustav II Adolf died in battle, the Protestants lost their best military leader.
Surrender of Breda. Artist D. Velasquez
Meanwhile, Wallenstein's position in the Catholic camp was shaken. He quarreled with both the emperor and the German princes. The mad ambition of the commander - and he dreamed of the Czech crown - led him to negotiations with the Swedes. He played a double game, and even his associates ceased to understand what he really wants. As a result, Wallenstein was accused of treason, abandoned by almost all supporters and killed.
In 1635, France entered the war, having previously waited and supported the Protestants with money. Gradually, the Protestants began to take over. All participants in the war were exhausted, its continuation threatened each of the parties with internal complications. Peace negotiations began.
The Peace of Westphalia, concluded in 1648, reflected the new alignment of forces in Europe. Spain and the Habsburg Empire lost their former power, while France and Sweden, on the contrary, strengthened. Sweden gained possession in northern Germany and became the dominant power in the Baltic. France took away Alsace from the empire and strengthened its influence on the Rhine. The Republic of the United Provinces and Switzerland received recognition of their independence. For Germany, the war turned into innumerable victims and destruction, but individual principalities - Brandenburg, Bavaria - strengthened at the expense of their neighbors.
Signing of the Peace of Westphalia. Fragment of the painting "Munster Peace". Artist G. Terborch
Hostilities between France and Spain continued for another 11 years. The peace concluded between them in 1659 brought new territorial acquisitions to France.
The protracted and devastating war for all participants demonstrated the futility of attempts to resolve religious conflicts by military means.
Territorial changes by the Peace of Westphalia 1648
Find on the map the states that received recognition of their independence in the Peace of Westphalia. Find the territorial acquisitions of France and Sweden following the war.
Wars and diplomatic relations in the second half of the 17th century.
The Thirty Years' War showed that no state was able to achieve complete dominance - the struggle was only for relative dominance over rivals. Catholics and Protestants, fighting or entering into alliances with each other, no longer attached such importance to religious contradictions. Former irreconcilable enemies (for example, Spain and the Netherlands) in the new conditions could turn out to be allies.
The balance of power in Europe has also changed. The Spanish empire was weakened, it was losing its power, trying to maintain huge possessions in Europe and America. The anti-Habsburg bloc, which had accomplished its task in the Thirty Years' War, disintegrated; former allies became enemies. Sweden sought to strengthen its leading position in the Baltic by weakening the Commonwealth. The influence of Holland, which had a powerful fleet and rich colonies, increased. For a long time, England was mainly occupied with internal problems, although this did not prevent her from conquering Ireland and fighting Holland three times in 20 years, which became her main competitor in trade. France, having defeated Spain, entered the period of its maximum power.
France possessed huge resources and the strongest army in Europe. Louis XIV dreamed of military glory. Disguising his plans for conquest, he claimed that his country was only striving to return to its "natural borders", which, from his point of view, passed along the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees. The fact that for this France should take possession of the lands that belonged to other countries for centuries did not bother him. This policy was primarily directed against the weakened Spain.
In 1667, Louis XIV invaded the Southern Netherlands (the so-called Spanish Netherlands) in order to ostensibly protect the hereditary rights of his wife, the Spanish princess Maria Theresa. His army did not meet serious resistance, but the Dutch did not at all want the aggressive France, having seized the possessions of Spain, to receive a common border with them. The alliance of Holland with England and Sweden against France forced Louis to moderate his appetites, although the Peace of Aachen (1668) gave France a number of cities in Flanders.
Now Louis was eager to "revenge" the Dutch. Having concluded a secret treaty with England and neutralized Sweden, in 1672 he attacked Holland, which was left without allies. However, Dutch stadtholder William III of Orange (great-grandson of the leader of the Dutch revolution William I of Orange) managed to put together a strong coalition against France. Nevertheless, according to the Nimwegen Peace (1678-1679), which ended the Dutch War, France managed to take Franche-Comte from Spain - the lands located on the border with Switzerland.
Intoxicated by the first successes, the "Sun King" stopped bothering to look for pretexts to attack opponents. He shamelessly captured the German cities along the Rhine. Ancient Strasbourg, which dared to resist, was savagely plundered.
The policy of Louis XIV, which upset the balance of power in Europe, caused increasing indignation, especially after the French king defiantly refused to help Austria defeat the Turks besieging Vienna in 1683. Gradually, the so-called Augsburg League was formed against France, consisting of England, Holland, Spain, Austria and other states; France was isolated. The war of the League with France (1688-1697) on land went with varying success, but at sea the forces of the League were clearly stronger. The exhausted France had to yield. According to the Peace of Ryswick (1697), Louis XIV lost almost all the lands captured in previous years (except Strasbourg), but retained the desire to fight.
After William III of Orange became king of England in 1689, this country turned out to be the main enemy of France in Europe for a long time. The subsequent more than 100-year period is even called by historians the "Second Hundred Years' War".
What has changed in international relations in the second half of the XVII century. compared to the previous period?
Summing up
With the formation of united states, the nature of international relations changes. In the XVI-XVII centuries. the principle of "state interest" was strengthened, and a system of "political balance" was formed. As a result of the Reformation, the rivalry between countries acquired a religious coloring for a whole century. The Thirty Years' War, the first all-European war in history, also took place under religious slogans. As a result, Spanish dominance in Europe was replaced by French.
International law - a set of laws, treaties and other rules governing relations between states, various business and public groups. In modern times, these laws and rules were often formed on the basis of unwritten agreements.
1494 -1559 - Italian wars.
1618 -1648 - Thirty Years' War.
“What does it mean to be fabulously brave these days?
Call black black and white call white
Do not compose excessively loud odes to murder,
Lie only when necessary, and do not lie without need.(Poems by a contemporary of the Thirty Years' War, the German poet Friedrich Logau)
Questions
1. What's new in the international relations of the XVI-XVII centuries. compared to the Middle Ages? Where has the old retained its strength?
2. As a religious split in Europe in the 16th century. affected international relations?
3. What role did the Ottoman Empire play in international relations in Europe?
4. What changes and why have occurred in the organization of the diplomatic service?
5. Do you think the defeat of the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs in the Thirty Years' War was accidental?
Tasks
1. Give examples of the operation of the “political balance” system in Europe in the 16th–17th centuries.
2*. The Dutch thinker G. Grotius wrote in his treatise "On the Free Sea":
“The dispute between us and the Spaniards concerns the following: can the sea, huge and boundless, belong to any one kingdom? Can one nation forbid others to trade, exchange, establish contacts? Can one nation give away what never belonged to it, or discover what already belonged to another? Can such a flagrant injustice eventually become a special right?
Explain with what point of view Grotius argued. Can it be considered an accident that the treatise was written by a Dutchman and precisely in the 17th century?
3. Based on the materials of the textbook, fill in the table "Thirty Years' War".
Conclusion to the second chapter
The Reformation, which in the 16th century almost all of Europe, led to a split in the Catholic Church and the emergence of new trends in Christianity, known under the general name "Protestantism". The most important historical role among them was played by Lutheranism and Calvinism, which won victory in a number of European countries. However, the "popular direction" in the Reformation was defeated. At the same time, the Counter-Reformation allowed the Catholic Church to stop the advance of the Reformation.
The emergence of Protestantism in Europe in the 16th-17th centuries. was closely associated with political changes, causing severe social upheavals and religious wars in a number of countries. The general direction of the political development of Europe was the formation of absolutism, which reached its peak in France in the second half of the 17th century. At the same time, the victory of the liberation movement in the Netherlands led to the emergence of a different form of government there - the republic.
Many new things appeared in the XVI-XVII centuries. and in international relations. The principle of "state interest" was strengthened, and a system of "political balance" was formed. As a result of long wars, among which the first all-European war in history, the Thirty Years' War, stood out, the balance of power between European states changed; Spanish dominance in Europe was replaced by French.
Chapter 3
Age of Revolution in England
“The legacy of this period was the public debate and the desire to justify political democracy and religious tolerance, which has become a tradition. This tradition was never forgotten again."
British historian G. Koenigsberger
Industrial landscape in England
§ 12. Causes and first stages of the English Revolution
England at the beginning of the 17th century
After the death of the Spanish "Invincible Armada" before England opened the way to dominance on the sea trade routes. British ships increasingly appeared off the coast of India and other lands that attracted European merchants. Already in the first decade of the XVII century. the British began the colonization of North America (for details, see § 23). Thus, the first steps were taken towards the creation of a powerful colonial empire.
In England, domestic and foreign trade developed rapidly. The isolated, insular position of the country helped transform its entire territory into a single market. Foreign trade was monopolized by a number of companies: East India, Levantine, African, Moscow, etc. Taking advantage of the weakness of competitors, such large companies, like magnets, attracted capital not only from all over England, but also from abroad. The lion's share of these capitals was invested in the further expansion of production.
What, besides strong monopoly companies, helped England to strengthen its position in foreign trade?
At the turn of the XVI-XVII centuries. in England, such branches of the economy as cloth-making, metallurgy, shipbuilding, etc. were actively developing. Mining continued to strengthen: in the first decades of the 17th century. England produced about 80% of all European coal.
But on the whole, England still continued to be an agrarian country. In the first half of the XVII century. its population was about 5 million people, and only a quarter of them lived in cities.
Festive festivities on the banks of the Thames
Aggravation of social contradictions
Relations in the village changed rapidly. Differences deepened between the traditional "old nobility", which was gradually losing its former influence and trying to compensate for its losses in the royal service, and the gentry, or "new nobility". Gentry sought to extract from their possessions the maximum profit. They bought up or seized neighboring lands, actively introduced improvements and innovations, set up manufactories, and invested in trade. Many gentry, in fact, turned into capitalist entrepreneurs.
At the same time, many peasants were ruined or simply driven off the land as a result of fencing and other actions of landlords who sought to take over the peasant holdings, and then rebuild their economy on a new basis so that it would bring more income. And the former peasants became hired agricultural workers or turned into beggars and vagabonds, joining the ranks of the discontented.
How difficult it is to be a peasant! Artist D. Morland
It was not easy for most peasants and representatives of the urban lower classes to understand what the changes would bring in the end - an improvement in life or a deterioration in it. In the face of uncertainty about tomorrow many commoners were attracted to the views of the Puritans - English Calvinists. By the end of the XVI century. Puritanism won many adherents.
The Puritans advocated "cleansing" Anglican Church from excessively lavish ceremonies. They insisted on the abolition of the subordination of the Church to the king and the transfer of its management to elected colleges. The Puritans encouraged their co-religionists to be diligent and extremely thrifty. Their clothes differed sharply from the expensive outfits of the court aristocracy: a strict black suit or a black dress. Puritans cut their hair "under the pot." It is because of this haircut that they were nicknamed "round-headed". Theater, dancing, music and other entertainments were considered sinful by the Puritans. Already by the beginning of the XVII century. The Puritans divided into two camps. The former were called Presbyterians: they advocated the replacement of bishops by presbyters (i.e., elected elders). Another wing of Puritanism was represented by the Independents (i.e., independents), who aspired to complete self-government of church communities. Their teaching attracted active, energetic people.
The ranks of the Independents were joined by the common people of the city and the countryside, medium and small entrepreneurs, and the less wealthy part of the gentry.
What were the main differences between the "old nobility" and the "new nobility"?
Causes and the beginning of the conflict between the king and parliament
The first kings of the Stuart dynasty - James I (reigned 1603-1625) and Charles I (reigned 1625-1649) - sought to consolidate their power even more actively than their predecessors. They wanted to weaken the role of parliament, to make it a secondary authority, completely dependent on the monarch. However, under the Tudor kings, as we remember, the relationship between the sovereign and parliament was built differently, and the actions of the Stuarts were perceived as a violation of English traditions.
House of Lords building in London
The Stewarts were in a difficult position. Traditional taxes, the collection of which did not require the consent of parliament, were constantly lacking in the conditions of the “price revolution”, and in order for the increase in previous taxes or the introduction of new ones to be perceived by the country's population as necessary and justified, it was necessary to negotiate with parliament. However, neither James I nor Charles I wanted to compromise, while in the lower house of parliament - the House of Commons - the voices of the opposition sounded louder and louder. The most resolute deputies already sought to control the expenses of the monarchy, to influence the appointment officials and religious politics. The reform attempts that the Stuarts made from time to time were perceived as a violation of the rights of subjects and met with resistance. In fact, all the main contradictions in English society were concentrated in the conflict between the king and parliament.
In June 1628, Parliament strongly demanded that the king respect the privileges of legislators. In words, the king promised to respect the rights of parliament, but already in March 1629 he dissolved it.
Charles I. Artist A. van Dyck
Having eliminated Parliament, Charles I Stuart introduced new taxes. The harsh measures of the monarch infringed on the interests of almost all groups of the population. AT different parts countries broke out peasant unrest. It was also unsettled in the cities. Increasingly, demands were made to restore parliament in all its rights.
War with Scotland and the beginning of the revolution
From 1603, Scotland was in a personal union with England: the Stuart dynasty simultaneously ruled in both countries. But most of the Scots wanted to break the union. In 1637 the Scots revolted. The reason was an attempt to forcibly introduce in Scotland, where the Scottish Presbyterian Church had already established itself, Anglican rites and the Anglican prayer book. The rebellion quickly escalated into an Anglo-Scottish war. The local nobility who led the uprising demanded the complete independence of Scotland.
Charles I did not have large forces to fight the rebels. And the Scots, having gathered an army of 22,000, crossed the border in February 1639 and occupied almost the entire north of England. In June 1639, England had to sign a peace treaty. The union was maintained, but Charles I promised the Scots complete freedom in ecclesiastical and secular affairs.
Soon the king decided to raise a new army, but this needed funds. And then he had to remember the parliament: after all, without his consent, Charles I would not have been able to introduce new taxes and replenish the empty treasury. On April 13, 1640, after an 11-year break, the king again convened parliament, apparently hoping that for the sake of war with Scotland, parliament, despite all the contradictions, would rally around the monarch. But the parliamentarians refused to approve taxes for a new war with the Scots and put forward the old demands for the observance of their rights and privileges. The enraged king already on May 5 again dissolved the parliament, which was called the Short. Across the country, speeches began in defense of parliament.
The Scots, having learned that the king was preparing to violate the peace treaty, decided to get ahead of him and in August launched a new powerful offensive. They crushed English army at Newburn. Charles I had to call Parliament again (November 1640). This decision turned out to be a fatal mistake.
The new parliament was called Long, as it lasted more than 12 years. The House of Commons repeated all its demands and achieved the arrest for "high treason" of the closest assistants to the king, Strafford and Laud. At the same time, the king yielded not only to parliament, but also to the people, whose crowds, armed with swords, clubs and stones, came to support the House of Commons. On May 12, 1641, with a huge confluence of Londoners, the royal favorite Strafford was beheaded. Later, Lod was also executed.
In the autumn, on November 22, Parliament adopted the Great Remonstrance (i.e. protest, objection) - a set of accusations and complaints about the abuses and miscalculations of royal power. Charles I rejected the Remonstrance and on 4 January 1642 tried to arrest the leaders opposition. But they managed to escape, and ordinary people rose to defend the parliament.
The king fled from the capital to the north, where the counties that remained loyal to him were located. There he began to gather detachments of his supporters, who were increasingly called cavaliers. In the rest of the country, power actually passed into the hands of parliament. Thus ended the first, peaceful (parliamentary) stage (1640-1642) of the English Revolution, the beginning of which is considered to be the conflict between the king and the Long Parliament.
The initial period of the war
The second stage of the English Revolution was Civil War, more precisely, two civil wars with a short break between them. In 1642, Charles I raised the royal flag in Nottingham, which English traditions meant a declaration of war. The country split into supporters of the king and supporters of parliament. Moreover, both were present in all social groups and in all regions of the country; it even happened that father and son ended up in different camps. Nevertheless, the Puritans were much more likely to support parliament than the king, and Catholics (by this time few in number) usually took the side of the monarch. The southeastern and central counties, the most economically developed, stood for parliament, while the supporters of the king were more in the comparatively backward northern and western counties.
In the hands of Parliament were the fleet and the main harbors of the country. The king therefore found himself, as it were, locked up in the north. But on the other hand, the army of Charles I was better trained and more experienced than the hastily assembled parliamentary militia. And therefore the beginning of the war was unsuccessful for the parliament.
The reason for these failures was primarily that the parliamentary troops were weaker than the royal ones, worse equipped. The generals who commanded them avoided decisive action. In addition, the leadership of the army of Parliament split into Independents and Presbyterians. The first called for the most decisive action, and the second - for reconciliation with the king. The contradictions between them grew.
Among the gentlemen, on the contrary, no one doubted the rightness of their cause, they had a clear and precise goal - to pacify the "rebels".
Were there other (besides those named in the textbook) reasons for the failure of the army of parliament at the beginning of the war?
Fracture entry of the war
Suffering defeats, the parliamentary army gained experience, learned to act more decisively and in an organized manner. Parliament was helped by their conclusion of a union treaty with Scotland on September 25, 1643, after which the powerful Scottish army actually moved into the camp of the rebels. In 1644, the Scottish army entered the northern regions of England. As early as 1643, Oliver Cromwell (1599–1658), a prominent figure in the parliamentary opposition, began to form combat detachments in the east of England. Growing up in a Puritan environment, Cromwell was as ambitious and practical as most Puritans.
Oliver Cromwell
In 1640, when the Long Parliament was convened, Cromwell's decisiveness made him one of the leaders of the parliamentary opposition. During the years of the civil war, his talent as a commander and organizer was clearly manifested.
Strict discipline reigned in Cromwell's army, he himself monitored the combat training and equipment of the soldiers (they were nicknamed "iron-sided" for their modest but reliable metal armor). Peasants and people from the urban lower classes willingly went to Cromwell's army, many of whom he appointed to officer positions for military merit. Cromwell's soldiers were distinguished by a fanatical faith in God.
On July 2, 1644, in an important battle on Marston Moor, the troops of Parliament defeated the Cavaliers for the first time. Particularly distinguished "iron-sided" Cromwell. Soon he managed to achieve a parliamentary decision on the creation of a unified army of the "new model". Its core was made up of commoners. This is the first in the history of England regular army in terms of its combat effectiveness, it was not inferior to the best armies in Europe. It was headed by a young Presbyterian, Thomas Fairfax, who soon became an Independent. Cromwell himself led the cavalry.
The army of the "new model" in the most stubborn battle at Naseby on June 14, 1645 destroyed the backbone of the royal troops. Charles I fled to Scotland. But the Scots in February 1647 actually sold the king to Parliament for 400,000 pounds. Military operations stopped for a while. Thus ended the First Civil War.
Article by A.V. Yakovenko
in the journal "International Affairs"
(autumn 2013)
WORLD AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS TODAY:
NEW AND WELL FORGOTTEN OLD
Now that the fifth year of the global financial and economic crisis is coming to an end, no one doubts that the world has entered a period of radical transformation. The crisis of Soviet society, and the socialist system of social order, which led to the end of " cold war” at the turn of the 80s and 90s, has now been supplemented by the crisis of Western society, including the liberal economy and broadly representative democracy. Thus, systemic failures in the Euro-Atlantic, and these two models exhausted the collective experience of social development in the space of European civilization and ensured - within the framework of bipolarity - its dominance in the global economy, politics and finance, became key elements of the global crisis. In fact, a line has been drawn under a long cycle historical development, which was initiated by the catastrophe of the First World War. And just as the 20th century began in 1914, it can be assumed that the 21st century should also begin in 2008, when the crisis broke out.
However, you cannot enter the same stream twice. If world politics and experiments with models economic development and social structure in the 20th century were limited to the framework of European civilization, now the Euro-Atlantic community for the first time in the last two or three centuries has faced real global competition from other regions of the world, their cultures and civilizations. This is the most important difference between the present stage of world development. It is characterized by pluralism that goes beyond the historical experience of Europe, a wider competition of development models and value systems. In their article “The Post-Washington Consensus” (Foreign Affairs magazine, March-April 2011), N. Birdsall and F. Fukuyama write that “intellectual power” is more and more evenly distributed in the world when the crisis “puts on trial any development model" and "Western democracies have highlighted the risks of over-reliance on market-led globalization."
At the same time, the history of Europe, its modus operandi, continue to exist at the level of established categories of thinking used in the analysis of what is happening in the world and the development of forecasts for the future. Moreover, we are talking not only about the narrow ideological debate along the lines of capitalism-communism during the Cold War, but also about the conceptual apparatus and methods of social transformation of an earlier period, including the Reformation, Enlightenment, Revolution, Industrial Revolution, such categories as "social contract ”, progress and violence, including as a means of resolving interstate contradictions.
And if we take this historical heritage of Europe, it is difficult to say which of its parts outweighs - negative or positive. In the negative - two world wars, imperialism, colonialism, the "cold war" and its military conflicts on the periphery, environmental problems, the militarization of economic and scientific and technological development, as well as international relations. On the positive side, what can be called the civil application of scientific and technological progress, the expansion of the space of freedom by ensuring the "compatibility of democracy and capitalism", as well as the emergence of a sustainable model of social development in the form of a socially oriented economy and broadly representative democracy based on a significant average class and a stable level of social inequality.
Of course, the fact that nuclear deterrence, for all its danger, ensured peace, stability and predictability among the world's leading states should also be considered positive. The "Third World War" was a virtual reality and did not go beyond the strategic developments of the military. With the end of the Cold War, the reasons for the threat of a global war have practically disappeared. It is possible that this can be attributed to the inwardly directed slow transformation explosion (implosion) of European civilization, the final stage of which, apparently, is the current crisis.
It is noteworthy that in terms of time the formation of its prerequisites coincided on both sides of the Iron Curtain. On the one hand, these were the failed reforms of A.N. Kosygin, on the other hand, they strained the Vietnam War, which led to the abandonment of the "gold standard" in the United States and a radical restructuring of the Bretton Woods system. The common cause could well be the exhaustion of the previous technological basis of the next "big cycle" of economic development and the inability, but rather the lack of political will to a sober analysis of the situation. In the Soviet Union, this manifested itself in stagnation, in the West - in the creation of artificial sources of growth in the financial sector, the so-called "financial alchemy" (J. Stiglitz), which became possible due to its deregulation in the early 80s. It is not surprising that the beginning of the erosion of the middle class in Western society (one of the signs is the lack of guarantees of work in their specialty for university graduates) refers precisely to this period. This was probably a form of stagnation and “sweeping under the carpet” of phenomena that were given a second wind by the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the associated “end of history” euphoria.
We can say that militarization has exhausted its resource, including as a source of economic growth and scientific and technological progress, a trend that goes back to the need to get out of the Great Depression in the 30s. last century in the US and Europe, and in Japan a decade earlier. This is one of the characteristics of the modern world. I am not sure that the security sector as a whole, the creation of the so-called “national security state” or, as they say in connection with the E. Snowden case, “intelligence state”, can serve to solve the problem of overcoming the current crisis. Probably, we can also say that first in the Soviet Union, and then in the West, the consumer socio-cultural way of life has exhausted itself, which existed for a long time despite the Gospel truth that “man does not live by bread alone”. Actually, such an outcome for the entire European civilization, including the Soviet Union, was predicted by Pitirim Sorokin in the 60s. When prophecies come true, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that we are witnessing a fundamental transformation that excludes a return to the previous state of affairs.
There was a geopolitical "compression" of Russia, the USA, the West, all of historical Europe. Therefore, it is difficult not to agree with the Honorary Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP) S.A. Karaganov that we are going through a period of “policy of a balanced state”. All processes in world development have received a powerful acceleration - thought and politics simply do not keep up with them. It must be assumed that this general characteristics for any endgame, which is fixed in the analysis of the current stage of world development, which is contained in the Foreign Policy Concept Russian Federation(approved by President Vladimir Putin in February 2013).
Development issues come to the fore for all the states of the world and, perhaps, for the Euro-Atlantic region to a greater extent than for others, bearing in mind the fact that the sources of economic growth in the current conditions are, as a rule, outside the boundaries of historical Europe. Understanding of this is growing as the consequences of the protracted crisis accumulate. A bold attempt to "break into the future" was the draft "national strategy concept", proposed in April 2011 by two American military men, W. Porter and M. Michaelby. It was posted on the Internet with a foreword by A.-M. Slaughter, who previously headed the Political Planning Staff of the US State Department. The meaning of the proposed concept is to renew the sources of America's international influence, bearing in mind the priority of ensuring the sustainability of the country's internal development in all its components. Judging by some evidence, this demarche of the US military had a chance of success in terms of revising the US national security strategy, rooted in the realities of the Cold War and its outdated ideology. Lately Blessed Augustine is often quoted as asking God for "chastity, but not now." It seems that for the time being this can also be attributed to the desire to formulate the goals and objectives of the US national strategy in non-ideologized categories of developmentalism. Perhaps the book Foreign Policy Begins at Home by President of the New York Council on Foreign Relations R. Haas will have a better chance of success.
It was, of course, easier for Russia, which circumstances had lowered to the sinful earth much earlier. As soon as it became possible to comprehend the ways of further development of the country, and this happened around 2000, when the first solid doctrinal documents began to appear, a fundamental conclusion was made about the main task of foreign policy work - the creation of favorable external conditions for internal development. The whole philosophy of Russian diplomacy boils down to this, if we try to formulate it in one phrase. The movement of our partners in the same direction allows us to judge the underlying convergence at the level of attitude.
If you look more broadly, then in general there is a search for a solution to the problems of social development in the Euro-Atlantic along the lines of convergence and synthesis. Objectively, this creates the conditions for overcoming the intellectual narrow-mindedness of the Cold War era and the formation of an appropriate dimension of the restored unity of European civilization, represented along with Europe, North America and the expanse of the former Soviet Union.
In the 20th century, within the framework of European civilization, there were already convergence moments between West and East. So it was in the 30s. due to the Great Depression. So it was in the post-war period, when the "socialization" of the economy of Western European countries was a direct response to the "challenge of the Soviet Union." Later came détente and the deepening of trade and economic cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic region associated with it. General principles of European policy were also formulated, which were reflected in the Helsinki final act. In general, a sustainable socially oriented model of economic development has been formed. This model is enshrined in the Constitution. modern Russia. This explains the entire socio-economic policy of the Russian government.
Over the past 20 years, Russia has pursued a consistent course towards integration into the world economy. We have become a member of the WTO, we are striving to join the OECD. As a member of the G20, we and our partners are looking for ways to overcome the crisis and restore the stability of the global and national economies. It can be assumed that much in world politics will become clear only when the current crisis is overcome. It will be a kind of post-crisis settlement in the world.
Probably, we will have to learn the lessons of what happened in the financial sector in the last 30 years, where artificial sources of growth were created that distorted the overall picture in the economy, including statistics. And the hypertrophied financial sector itself began to work for itself, ceasing to serve the real economy and contribute to the creation of jobs in the countries of capital export. This activity has led to a widening gap between income from capital and income from employment, with devastating consequences for the middle class, which played the role of the social pillar of the political system of a broadly representative democracy. We could talk about changing the paradigm of economic development with an emphasis on its qualitative characteristics in accordance with the requirements of the current state of society, including the demographic factor. Is it possible, as in disarmament, to qualitatively strengthen the economy while simultaneously reducing it quantitatively?
This will require a solution to what the Financial Times' leading economics columnist Martin Wolfe called the "innate propensity to rent," which, it should be noted, is also extracted in the form of payments on the public debt. Rent is being written about more and more often, including in connection with such problems as the reduction of social mobility and elevators, intergenerational antagonism, and a general loss of historical perspective. Belle Epoque France provides an example of a rentier state. Is it possible that this experience of forgetting the interests of one's own development (since one can "cut coupons"!) Is already being reproduced collectively by the entire historical West? On these paths, then it was not possible to isolate oneself from real life - it reminded of itself of the First World War. That is why it is important to understand the state of European society and the vices of European politics of that time - in order to continue to think further on the problems of today.
A curious element of commonality between Russia and Great Britain is the frequent use of the word "anniversary". With regard to the British, apparently, the traditions of the long reign of Queen Victoria are affecting. More interesting is that in the context of the current crisis, materials are appearing where it is used in its original, Old Testament meaning. Parallels are drawn with the fact that a high level of debt, although not like slavery, significantly limits a person's freedom. Judging by the countries of the Mediterranean periphery of the Eurozone, the unbearable burden of debt, primarily public debt, imposes far from trivial restrictions on the sovereignty of independent states. And if we take 1971 as the starting point, when life on credit began, then we are already close to the 50-year anniversary.
As for new technologies that could form the basis of the next big cycle of global economic development, one has to state absolute unpredictability here. As the Anglo-American expert W. Janeway writes in his book “Dealing with Capitalism in an Innovative Economy”, it is impossible to predict when technologies will appear that could become the subject of mass commercialization with the creation of appropriate industries and jobs. For example, Information Technology and computerization, including mobile telephony, have significantly changed everyday life. As far as the economy is concerned, yes, they introduced fundamental changes in the nature of work, but they did not create enough jobs to compensate for their loss due to the outsourcing of traditional sectors of the economy to other regions of the world.
Thus, one can judge a kind of regression or a pause in development. The question arises of how to fill it, since life goes on. Probably, by investing in human capital, which, ultimately, will solve the problem of human development in the future. This means that those states that can create the best conditions for the self-realization of the individual, primarily investments in healthcare, education and culture, as well as in life support infrastructure, including transport, energy and, probably, agriculture, will have an advantage. The growing role of the latter in the economy may serve as an indication of the return - after the financial "fornication" - to the origins of human existence.
In this regard, of undoubted interest is the analytical material of the founder and president of Stratfor, J. Friedman (January 2013), which examines the problem of the rise and fall of the middle class in America. In particular, the author notes that the creation of a large middle class was a by-product of post-war decisions, including the provision of benefits to those demobilized from the ranks of the armed forces. It was not about a well-thought-out strategy for ensuring the sustainability of the socio-economic and political development of the country. Here is something to think about, bearing in mind that now, in a crisis, it would be the height of carelessness to rely on chance. The experience of the last three centuries should provide sufficient material for a sober analysis of problems and the development of ways to solve them in the interests of the whole society.
It has become common wisdom to talk about fundamental shifts in the geopolitical landscape of the modern world. This is the “dispersal” of power, influence and prosperity, including the rise of a number of countries, primarily the BRICS, but also regional powers such as Indonesia, Turkey and Mexico, classified as “new dynamically developing economies”. Thanks to the crisis, a new breath and quality (meetings of political leaders) was given to the G20. This is the circle of leading states of the world, without which it is no longer possible to solve the problems of global politics, economics and finance. This is felt in the work of smaller formats, say, the G8, which remains important as a platform for coordinating and coordinating the approaches of the participating countries, but a wider range of partners is already required to solve specific problems.
And, of course, we cannot talk about replacing the statutory prerogatives of the UN Security Council, which at one time was conceived, if we take the composition of its permanent members and the principle of their unanimity, as a regulatory body for a polycentric world order. Unfortunately, against the background of all the gloomy predictions about the state of affairs in the world, few people are addressing this positive reality. The UN has gained relevance in the context of the eradication of sentiments in the spirit of the "end of history". First of all, we are talking about the fundamental legal foundations of global governance. Attempts to deny this reality are being made under the pretext of some kind of "settlement" following the end of the Cold War. But as we know, there was no such written settlement, and a set of verbal obligations towards Russia, including the non-expansion of NATO to the East, was violated by our Western partners. In any case, this settlement cannot be compared with the enlightened approach to France after the defeat of Napoleon. Then, as Talleyrand put it, France was "liberated" from the emperor's "personal" territorial acquisitions. As for the rest, France entered the pan-European directory on an equal footing. Russia itself has freed itself from the ideological legacy of the Cold War, and with it, dominance in Eastern Europe. What did not follow was the creation of a Euro-Atlantic "concert" with the participation of Russia on the basis of equality. Neither the OSCE, due to its institutional underdevelopment, nor other pan-European structures solve this problem. Actually, this is where the idea of the European Security Treaty comes from, which is designed to at least start solving the problem of restoring the political unity of the region and thus reducing the financial burden on the budget by reducing defense spending.
In fact, we are returning to the “concert of powers” already tested in history on the example of Europe, which ensured peace in Europe in the period between the Congress of Vienna and the Crimean War. When this political order in Europe collapsed under the slogan of the Eastern Question, few thought about the consequences. The prejudices and instincts of the political elites, which opposed any rational analysis, took over. According to the British historian Orlando Figes, the "unnecessary" war in the Crimea became in retrospect the first all-out war - a concept that we first came to associate with the Boer Wars and the First World War. It also launched a vicious circle of humiliation and annexation against the vanquished, fundamentally changing the atmosphere of European politics, from which the notion of civility had gone. Even the two Hague peace conferences convened on Russia's initiative did not help to reverse this trend. 200 years after the Congress of Vienna, Europe and the world, taught by bitter historical experience, come to understand that there is no alternative to seeking agreement and negotiated solutions to problems based on international law and collective global governance.
It should be noted that the elimination of the "brakes" on nuclear confrontation in connection with the end of the Cold War led to a lowering of the threshold for the application of military force in various ways, whether unilaterally, as was the case in Iraq and then in Libya, or on the basis of a UN Security Council mandate, in Afghanistan. This experience of the last 20 years has led to a deadlock in the example of Syria, when the mandate of the UN Security Council is excluded, and unilateral military intervention is associated with an exorbitant price, including purely military costs, consequences for its own economy and finances, image losses and much more. The truth is confirmed in practice that no situations, including conflicts, can be reproduced, and, as in a store, nothing worthwhile is given for nothing. There are always specific circumstances. The resources necessary for this, including political ones, are also wearing out.
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate the counterproductiveness of any attempt at a unilateral, let alone forceful solution of contemporary international problems. These wars, like the Vietnam War, outwardly reproduced the logic of collective allied efforts in World War II, including the reconstruction of Germany and Japan under long-term occupation. The specific circumstances of other regions were not taken into account, the complete lack of readiness to take on long-term complex obligations, similar, among other things, to those taken in the United States in relation to South Korea and Taiwan and the Soviet Union in relation to Mongolia. Therefore, one of the key factors of modern world politics, which everyone has to reckon with, is, on the one hand, the impossibility of solving problems "on the cheap", and, on the other hand, the lack of political will and sufficient resources necessary to ensure the real success of military intervention.
A vivid illustration is provided by the ongoing crisis: what kind of "state building" can we talk about abroad when this issue is acute at home. New examples of the problem are also provided by the transformational processes within the framework of the so-called "Arab Spring". The "cheap" operation in Libya turned into "cheap" results, not to mention the undermining of confidence among the permanent members of the UN Security Council.
Unfortunately, old habits die hard. Therefore, the inertia of dominance continues to make itself felt in world affairs. In particular, this is manifested at the level of culture, to which practically the behavior of the subjects of international relations is basically reduced. A vivid example of such a political culture, reflecting the desire to turn back the clock, is provided by the already mentioned Stratfor in its analysis over the summer of this year. It constructs a geopolitical "quadrangle" consisting of the USA, Europe, China and Russia. It is probably not bad that Europe is perceived as an independent center of the modern world. It is difficult to agree with another, namely with the inevitable decline of Europe and China. As a result, America and Russia again remain, moreover, as two poles of the global confrontational policy within the framework of the "Little Cold War". One could welcome the recognition of Russia's geopolitical future. But why in a format that should justify inertia in American strategic culture? Why should Russia be instinctively suspected of being - almost objectively - the beneficiary of all America's geopolitical defeats?
Therefore, manifestations of another America are especially satisfying. Like, for example, an article by Thomas Graham in the International Herald Tribune (August 22, 2013), which reasonably analyzes the tendency to blame Russia for all America's troubles, including as a means of diverting attention from the problems of its own development. Noteworthy is his thesis that at the subconscious level for certain circles in the United States, the “problem of Russia” is that “victory” over it in the “cold war” can be considered “complete” only when the enemy takes the winner as a model, whether either in its internal development or in its behavior in the international arena. Obviously, Russia (and here we are not alone) is not a country that can give such satisfaction. It is a pity that such sentiments exist, just as there are those who cannot forgive us for the decisive role in the victory over Nazi Germany.
These same elements of political culture also explain the continuing gap in development between industrialized and developing countries, whether in terms of trade or finance. Sometimes the already forgotten term “neo-colonialism” is introduced into circulation, reflecting the transition from physical control to more veiled inequality in the common system. international relations, including the status of developing countries as raw materials appendages, albeit at a higher level of development than it was 50 years ago. Moreover, this colonialism takes on the dimension of information technology dependence, which essentially deprives these countries of the prospects for independent development, including the creation of a competitive intellectual resource.
It is the multipolarity and regionalization of global politics that are the most important material condition for combating inequality in interstate relations. Polycentrism, by creating an appropriate competitive environment, which during the Cold War was limited to the "bipolar choice", provides a real space for freedom in choosing international partners in the interests of one's own development. Now one of the key areas where the struggle for influence is being waged is the digital and media space. The notorious control over information, as shown by the recent revelations of E. Snowden, continues to be the most important element of modern geopolitics. Another thing is that the total nature of such control, which essentially denies the right to privacy, is unacceptable for new generations even in Western countries. Germany provides the most striking example. The projection of George Orwell's dystopia onto the space of the historical West does not withstand a collision with the perception of those who, even because of their age, have not developed the skills to think in terms of the "old" geopolitics, including the "Faustian exchanges" between the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms and security interests.
AT last years Convergence at the level of not only fundamental assessments of the current international situation, but also the choice of a diplomatic method that meets the requirements of the time, is also taking place between Russia and Great Britain. This is evidenced by Minister of Foreign Affairs W. Haig's June speech in California, where he spoke about the networked world, the importance of strong bilateral relations and "partially overlapping alliances" in the interests of achieving common goals. All these ideas are consonant with the conclusions reached in Russia several years ago and which were reflected in the 2008 edition of the Foreign Policy Concept. I want to emphasize that we did not need a global financial and economic crisis for this - the Concept was approved by the President back in July.
It talks about network diplomacy as the main diplomatic method in a polycentric international system. It is gratifying that the word "multipolarity" does not cause allergies among our British partners. We are no longer talking about the cumbersome military-political alliances of the past against each other. As you know, it was the formation of such alliances that became the most important element in preparing for the catastrophe of the First World War. The main thing is that there are simply no grounds for such alliances in the conditions of interdependence of all states. Therefore, diverse alliances of interests are formed: they are open, their geometry is changeable, and they unite partners to ensure very specific common interests. Such, for example, are broad antiterrorist coalitions, alliances to combat organized crime and drug trafficking, and many others. They are created not against someone, but for something. They reflect the nature of modern challenges and threats, which are transboundary phenomena. They can be effectively counteracted only on the basis of the broadest international cooperation.
Of course, both diplomacy and the diplomatic service must be at the level of modern tasks. There is also much in common between Russia and Great Britain, especially with the coming to power of the Coalition government of D. Cameron. I was deeply impressed by W. Haig's speech at the Foreign Office two years ago. Then he spoke about the need to strengthen the language training of diplomats, deepen their regional knowledge, and the importance of history. In California, they were told that under him "historians were again at the center of the work of the Foreign Office." This is really important, because it is impossible to draw lessons from recent experience without having an idea of what history teaches us. This can be called a return to classical diplomacy. I remember that Hillary Clinton also spoke about this when she was Secretary of State. I would like to understand by this the overcoming of ideologized approaches and schemes inherited from the times of the Cold War.
One of the Cold War stereotypes was the notion of diplomacy as a "zero-sum game". This also extended to official information and the information sphere as a whole, which was seen as one of the "fronts" of ideological confrontation. It looks like a lot of things are going along the knurled path here as well. And this is understandable, because in modern conditions, when the former ideological antagonisms have disappeared, the key element of politics is its "sale" to international public opinion, the impact on partners through control over the information space. What E. Snowden said speaks in favor of the fact that the sphere information security, like any other area of international relations, should be subject to strict legal regulation. No coalition of like-minded people can replace clear legally binding documents of a universal nature. Their absence will only undermine trust in world politics and hinder interstate cooperation in all other areas. That is why it is necessary international management Internet. It turns out that international national borders retain their significance here as well - as, among other things, the ultimate means of ensuring the right to the inviolability of private information.
But the question is much broader. That state of ideological confusion, which S.A. Karaganov speaks of, requires the intensification of international discourse on the entire range of development issues. Information control directly contradicts the purpose of such an exchange of ideas. Without creating equal conditions for participation in these debates for all, it is simply impossible to solve the problems of the modern globalizing world. Otherwise, do not generate new ideas, and someone's ideas that no longer work, and perhaps a camouflaged lack of ideas, will be "more equal" than any others. By and large, we are talking about freedom of speech and the right to dissent in international relations as essential element political-intellectual environment necessary to get out of the current deadlock, in which the majority is far from always right.
And yet now the situation is changing, and these changes, as it is already obvious, are connected with the change of generations in the USA, in Europe and in the world as a whole. We see a huge demand for an alternative point of view, rejection of conformism that suffocates freedom of thought. The reason, probably, is that in the West and, possibly, in the world as a whole, for some time the mood in the spirit of the “end of history” prevailed. In other words, that there is only one truth, that it is known, and we just need to all go together to a “bright future”. Of course, in fact, everything turned out to be far from the case. And the global financial crisis that erupted in the fall of 2008 "awakened" everyone to this reality.
Truth is diverse, and the search for it must never stop. In this regard, I would like to refer to the conclusion made by the former Archbishop of Canterbury R. Williams in his study of F. M. Dostoevsky, namely, the permanent incompleteness - in line with the Christian understanding of freedom - the path of life. It also denies any "end of history" options, be it communism or liberal capitalism, that place a limit on historical creativity. The pursuit of truth is one of the key characteristics of human nature and the life of society. This is what I would attribute the growing popularity of the Russia Today channel to in the US and now in the UK. People are interested in pluralism of opinions as a necessary condition for forming their own view on certain problems. It is gratifying that Russia and its media are part of such a polyphony.
In conclusion, I would like to dwell on the human rights, humanitarian dimension of the post-war settlement in Europe and the world. Reflected in relevant international instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Covenants, it has formulated a common denominator of the relevant standards acceptable to all. The attempts of the last decades to spread their interpretation of certain fundamental rights and freedoms, which is being formed within a particular country or region, as a universal one, introduces additional complications into the general climate of international relations. In fact, this serves as an obstacle to a concerted collective effort to achieve exactly what is really agreed within the international community as a whole. Clarity on this issue is also important because what was formulated in the first decades after the Second World War reflects a common understanding of the traditional values of society, including the balance between rights/freedoms and the responsibility for using them. The absolutization of the former and the complete disregard of the latter damages the complex of intercivilizational relations, which are largely based on the commonality of the moral preaching of the main world religions. Overcoming this contradiction, and in fact the negative trend of self-destruction, will be one of the challenges for humanity in the 21st century.
The history of international relations is a science that studies the totality of economic, political, cultural relations between countries and peoples of the world in historical dynamics. How diverse, complex, and ambiguous in the assessments of scientists and politicians are international relations, how complex, interesting and informative this science is. Just as politics, economics, and culture are interdependent within a single state, these components are inseparable at the level of international relations.
In the history of international relations of the twentieth century. can be divided into five main periods.
1 - from the beginning of the century to the First World War inclusive \;
2 - the formation and development of a new European equilibrium within the framework of the Versailles system of international relations\; it ends with the collapse of the Versailles world order and the establishment of German hegemony in Europe;
3 – history of international relations during the Second World War\; ends with the design of the bipolar structure of the world;
4 - the period of the "cold war" East - West and the split of Europe\;
5 - the time of global changes in the world associated with the crisis and the decay of socialism, the collapse of the Soviet
Union, the formation of a new world order.
20th century became the century of globalization of world processes, strengthening of the interdependence of states and peoples of the world. The foreign policy of the leading states was more and more clearly aligned with the interests of not only neighboring, but also geographically distant countries. Simultaneously with the global systems of international relations in Europe, their peripheral subsystems were formed and functioned in the Middle and Far East, Central and South America, etc.
The development of world civilization as a whole and of individual countries is largely determined by the relationships of the peoples inhabiting the Earth.
20th century was marked by the rapid development of international relations, the complication of combinations of interaction between countries in politics, economics, ideology, culture, and religion. Interstate relations have reached a new level, turning into
relatively stable system of international relations. One of the most important factors that determined the role of the state in the international arena of the 20th century was the population of the country, its ethno-demographic composition.
One of the main trends of recent centuries has been a sharp increase in population. If in the first 15
centuries AD population the globe increased only 2.5 times, then during the XVI - XIX centuries. The number of people has increased almost 10 times. In 1900 there were 1630 million people in the world. Currently, the inhabitants of planet Earth are already more than 6 billion. The most populated countries are China (a little less than 1.5 billion) and India (more than 1 billion people).
Researchers count in the modern world from 3.5 to 4 thousand different peoples - from the largest nations to the smallest tribes with a population of tens of people. In general, determining the national composition in different countries is an extremely difficult task. In international relations, one of the determining factors is the awareness of the people as a single nation, consolidated around the national idea (which is sometimes not easy to find). In Europe, where mainly large nations live, about 60 large nations stand out.
The most widely spoken languages in the world are:
- Chinese (about 1.5 billion, including residents of the diaspora, i.e. living outside of China)\;
- English (about 500 million) \;
- Hindi (about 300 million) \;
- Spanish (about 280 million) \;
- Russian (about 220 million) \;
- Arabic (about 160 million) \;
- Portuguese (about 160 million) \;
- Japanese (about 120 million) \;
- German (about 100 million) \;
- French (almost 94 million).
These languages are spoken by almost two-thirds of humanity. The official and working languages of the UN are English,
French, Russian, Spanish, Arabic, Chinese.
RELIGION. With the development of society, the strengthening of contacts between peoples, there are more religious communities than before; The same religion can be practiced by different nations. By the twentieth century. most of the major modern peoples belonged to one of the world religions - Christianity, Buddhism or Islam.
Among the forerunners of these religions are:
Judaism - the first monotheistic religion, appeared among the ancient Jews \;
Zoroastrianism is based on its dualism - the idea of the confrontation between good and evil principles \;
Confucianism and Taoism (religious, ethical and philosophical doctrines that arose in ancient China)\;
Hinduism, which is characterized by belief in the transmigration of souls;
Shinto (Japan).
If you try to present the population of the Earth through the prism of confessional affiliation, you get:
Christians - more than 1 billion, of which\:
- Catholics - about 600 million;
- Protestants - about 350 million;
- Orthodox - about 80 million.
Interestingly, the majority of Catholics and Protestants currently live in the New World.
Islam is practiced by more than 800 million people, of which
- Sunnis - 730 million;
- Shiites - 70 million.
Hinduism - the ancient religion of India - is revered by 520 million people. Despite so many adherents
(adherents), this religion is not among the world, as it is purely national in nature.
Buddhism - the oldest of the world's religions - is practiced by about 250 million people.
It should be noted that all world religions are the fruits of NON-WESTERN civilizations, and the most important political ideologies - liberalism, socialism, conservatism, social democracy, fascism, nationalism, Christian democracy - are products of the WEST.
Religion unites peoples, but it can also cause enmity, conflicts and wars, when people of the same ethnic group who speak the same language are capable of fratricidal wars. At present, the religious factor is one of the key factors in international relations.
The global scale and radical nature of the changes taking place today in the political, economic, spiritual areas of the life of the world community, in the sphere of military security, allow us to put forward assumptions about the formation new system international relations, different from those that functioned throughout the twentieth century, and in many ways,
– and starting from the classical Westphalian system.
In the world and domestic literature, a more or less stable approach to the systematization of international relations has developed, depending on their content, composition of participants, driving forces and patterns. It is believed that the actual international (interstate) relations originated in the period of formation nation states on the relatively amorphous space of the Roman Empire. The end of the “Thirty Years’ War” in Europe and the conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 is taken as a starting point. Since then, the entire 350-year period of international interaction has been considered by many, especially Western, researchers as the history of a single Westphalian system. The dominant subjects of this system are sovereign states. There is no supreme arbiter in the system, therefore states are independent in conducting domestic policy within their national borders and are in principle equal in rights.
Most scholars agree that the main driving force behind the Westphalian system of international relations was rivalry between states \: some sought to increase their influence, while others - to prevent this. The outcome of the rivalry, as a rule, was determined by the balance of power between the states or unions in which they
joined in the pursuit of their foreign policy goals. Establishing an equilibrium, or balance, meant a period
stable peaceful relations; the disruption of the balance of power ultimately led to war and its restoration in a new configuration, reflecting the growing influence of some states at the expense of others. For clarity and simplification, this system is compared with the movement of billiard balls. States collide with each other in changing configurations and then move again in an endless struggle for influence or security. The main principle in this case is self-interest. The main criterion is strength.
The Westphalian system of international relations is divided into several stages (subsystems), united by common patterns, but differing from each other in features characteristic of a particular period of relations between states. In this case, they usually distinguish \:
- a system of predominantly Anglo-French rivalry in Europe and the struggle for colonies in the 17th-18th centuries;
- the system of the "European concert of nations" or the "Congress of Vienna" of the 19th century;
- Versailles-Washington system between the two world wars \;
- the Cold War system, or Yalta-Potsdam.
Obviously, in the second half of the 80s - early 90s. 20th century cardinal changes have taken place in international relations, which allow us to speak of the end of the Cold War and the formation of new system-forming patterns.
Most foreign and domestic international experts take the wave of political changes in the countries of Central Europe in the autumn of 1989 as a watershed between the Cold War and the current stage of international relations, and consider the fall of the Berlin Wall as a clear example. The obvious highlights birth new system compared to the previous one is the removal of the political and ideological confrontation between
"anti-communism" and "communism" due to the rapid and almost complete disappearance
the latter, as well as curtailing the military confrontation of the blocs that were grouped during the Cold War years around two poles - Washington and Moscow.
Recently, pessimistic lamentations have been heard more and more often about the fact that the new international situation is less
stable, less predictable and even more dangerous than in previous decades. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the change of systems does not occur instantly, but gradually, in the struggle between the new and the old, and the feeling of increased instability and danger is caused by the variability of the new and incomprehensible world.
The current stage of international relations is characterized by the rapidity of change, new forms of distribution of power. The old system of international relations, which was called bipolar - bipolar, collapsed. In the twentieth century this system was personified by the USSR and the USA - two superpowers, in the hands of which, after 1945, nuclear weapons appeared. The opposing systems entered the period of the Cold War and held back the development of each other by building up their military power. The whole world was divided into spheres of "vital interests" of the two superpowers.
In 1991, the period of the Cold War ended, and with it the bipolar model of international relations became a thing of the past. The process of building a new system of international relations is underway. At the same time, both new trends in their development appear, and the previously existing ones are more clearly visible.
The main trends in the development of modern international relations include:
1. The dispersal of power. There is a process of formation of a multipolar (multipolar) world. Today, new centers are acquiring an ever greater role in international life. There are integration processes in Europe. In Southeast Asia, new post-industrial states emerged - the so-called "Asian Tigers".
There is still no consensus among political scientists about the future of the system of international relations. Some are inclined to believe that a system of collective leadership of the United States, Western Europe and Japan is currently being formed. Other researchers believe that the United States should be recognized as the only world leader. Still others do not exclude the revival of the bipolar system, in which either Russia or China will take the place of the USSR in the ideological and military-political confrontation with the United States.
2. Globalization of international relations. It consists in the internationalization of the economy, the development of a unified system of world communications, the change and weakening of the functions of national states, the revitalization of the activities of transnational non-state entities. On this basis, an increasingly interdependent and integral world is being formed, interactions in it have become systemic, when more or less serious shifts in one part of the world inevitably reverberate in other parts of it, regardless of the will, intentions of the participants in such processes.
Globalization has affected all regions of the world to varying degrees, placing some in the center and pushing others to the periphery. Due to the permeability of interstate borders, the old ideas about security, about conflicts and their settlement, about the relationship between foreign and domestic policies, about diplomacy and about other basic problems of the political development of countries, regions and the world as a whole turned out to be “inverted”.
3. The growth of global problems and the desire of the states of the world to jointly solve them.
The very concept of “global problems of our time” appeared in the last third of the 20th century, when, after space flights, tests of atomic weapons, a number of natural disasters, numerous conflicts, the vulnerability of life itself on Earth became obvious.
All global problems facing humanity can be conditionally divided into three large groups: socio-economic, natural-economic and social (see diagram 15.2).
Social-Natural-Social and
economic economic political
Prevention Environmental Demographic
nuclear war
Normal functioning Energy International
the world economy of relations
Overcoming backwardness Food crisis of culture and
underdeveloped countries morality
International Commodity Urbanization
terrorism
Regional Military Ocean Health
conflicts
Ending the race Sustainable development Elimination of hunger,
epidemics space weapons
Figure 15.2. Global problems of our time
The most important global problem is the accumulation and improvement of weapons of mass destruction. The nature of nuclear weapons makes it impossible for any state to ensure the reliability of its defense by military means. Security in the world can only be achieved through joint efforts. It can either be common to all countries, or it cannot exist at all.
An important problem that worries all mankind is international terrorism, among the various forms of which state terrorism is the most dangerous.
In the group of natural and economic problems, environmental issues deserve special attention. Excessive human exploitation of nature has led to massive deforestation, deterioration of the quality of resources fresh water, pollution of the seas, lakes, rivers, violation of the ozone layer, which poses a danger to human life. These and other facts oblige all countries and peoples to join efforts aimed at protecting and improving the environment.
Diverse and social problems. This is, first of all, an increase in the number of dangerous diseases and harmful addictions. Cardiovascular and oncological diseases, AIDS, alcoholism, drug addiction have acquired an international character and become one of the global problems.
Global problems arose at the intersection of the relationship between man, society and nature. All of them are organically interconnected, and therefore their solution requires an integrated approach.
4.Strengthening the division of the world into two poles - the poles of peace, prosperity and democracy and the poles of unrest, poverty, tyranny.
About two and a half dozen states are at the pole of peace, prosperity and democracy - these are the countries of Western Europe, the USA, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. They are home to 15% of the world's population, the so-called "golden billion". In these countries, the standard of living of an ordinary citizen by historical standards is very high (from 10 to 30 thousand dollars of annual income), life expectancy is at least 74 years. The country can achieve such well-being only due to the presence of a highly developed knowledge-intensive economy.
At the other extreme are many states of Africa, Asia, Latin America, countries formed as a result of the collapse of the USSR. In these countries, tens of millions of people live in absolute poverty.
5. Democratization of both international relations and domestic political processes. It is observed in all countries, regardless of the type of political regime prevailing in them. Such a phenomenon as the progressive politicization of the masses, who everywhere demand access to information, improve their material well-being and quality of life, is gaining worldwide distribution.
The achievements of the post-industrial revolution - satellite communications and cable television, telefaxes and e-mail, the global Internet, which makes it possible to almost instantly disseminate and obtain the necessary information on almost all issues of interest to a person - have become signs of everyday life of people not only in the most economically developed countries, but are becoming more and more widespread throughout the world. The composition and variety of political actors is expanding sharply. As a result, the development and implementation of foreign policy guidelines cease to be the lot of a narrow group of people of a special state department. Foreign policy problems become the property of a combination of a wide variety of institutions, both governmental and non-political.
