Recently, the media broadcast another message about new Russian cruise missiles Oh. If they are true, then probably we are talking about violation of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) thirty years ago. After its signing, all of Europe literally breathed a sigh of relief, but now, as it seems, this treaty is becoming a historical relic with no special prospects for the future.

Let me briefly remind you that it all started in 1976, when the Soviet Union began to deploy RSD-20 Pioneer missiles, known in the West as SS-20, with a range of almost five thousand kilometers. This was followed by OTP-23 Oka missiles with a range of 480 kilometers, and before that, Temp-S missiles with a range of 900 kilometers had already been developed. The Americans already had Pershing missiles, but they responded to Soviet weapons with a new type of Pershing II. The Americans also deployed ground-based Griffin cruise missiles, close to the famous sea-based Tomahawks.

Then, in the first half of the 80s, a very dangerous situation developed in Central Europe, because missiles were deployed on both sides of the Iron Curtain, which could destroy Europe in a few tens of minutes. The psychological pressure was greater than in the case intercontinental missiles, which were located somewhere far away in the USA and the USSR. The medium-range missiles were located directly in Central and Western Europe. And it is not surprising that people were seized with fear.

In NATO countries against American missiles a large-scale campaign was launched, which, however, completely ignored soviet weapons- in particular, due to the fact that these protests were generously sponsored by the KGB. The population of the Warsaw Pact countries, of course, could not protest, but only had the opportunity to resort to black humor, as a very popular joke once confirms: “Mom, dad, I'm afraid of the Pershings! Don't be afraid, dear child, the SS-20 will save you!"

Although since 1980 the two superpowers have been discussing the reduction of the arsenals of this type of weapon, the situation changed only with the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev. He reached an unusually quick agreement with US President Ronald Reagan, and in 1987 the INF treaty was signed. It forbade the production and deployment of missiles with a maximum range of 500-5500 kilometers and ordered the destruction of a total of 2,692 American and Soviet missiles. Until now, this treaty has been considered a great success in the disarmament process because, in fact, an entire category of nuclear warhead carriers has been abolished.

However, the reality turned out to be less rosy. The US and USSR destroyed their medium-range missiles, but they remained in service with other NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, including Czechoslovakia, which had Oka missiles. The treaty did not affect sea- and air-based missiles, so technology development continued. During several conflicts, the Americans proved that their Tomahawk missiles are in fact very accurate and destructive weapons.

Context

Is the INF Treaty dead?

The National Interest 03/11/2017

End of the INF Treaty?

Defense24 16.02.2017

AP: An "aggressive" response is being prepared for possible violations of the INF treaty

Voice of America Russian service 06/06/2015 This, naturally, forced the Russians to develop analogues, or rather, to improve their sea-based Granat missiles. Initially, they served only as carriers of nuclear warheads, while the Tomahawk turned into a fearsome traditional weapon. Therefore, the Russians have developed a "family" of cruise missiles "Caliber", also known by the export name of the Club, and includes several anti-ship missiles and missiles against ground targets, which are equipped with surface ships, submarines, aircraft and ground systems.

Range export modifications limited by the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Mode), therefore, it reaches a maximum of 300 kilometers, while the Kalibr missiles in service Russian army, have a much greater range. This was confirmed by the hostilities in Syria, where Islamist targets were hit by rockets that rose into the air from ships in the Caspian Sea and flew 2.5 thousand kilometers. However, it has been known for several years that Russia also has a ground-based version of the Kalibr, also called the R-500 Iskander-K, because it is part of the so intimidating Iskander missile system.

By the way, the latter is also in its own way a response to the INF treaty: the Russians were very sorry for the destroyed Oka missiles. It was they who developed the Iskander-M ballistic missiles to replace them, with a range of 480 kilometers. It does not exceed the limit established by the INF Treaty. However, some experts believe that the true potential of these missiles is higher, and that with better fuel, the Iskander can fly over 700 kilometers, or maybe a thousand. In addition to these ballistic missiles the system also includes the R-500 (9M728), the declared range of which also does not exceed the established limit - less than 500 kilometers.

However, many people doubt the veracity of this information. The control mechanisms of the INF treaty are actually weak, and it is impossible to check whether the range of the R-500 exceeds the allowable one. Since, from a technical point of view, this rocket is a modification of the Caliber, its potential exactly reaches 2.5 thousand kilometers. Perhaps the range of the 9M728 was deliberately limited, as in the case of the Club export missile, but recently there have been reports of a new 9M729 missile, whose range again reaches about 2.5 thousand kilometers. Thus we return to where we came from. In general, apparently, Russia is violating the INF Treaty.

But it's not just about Caliber and Iskander. raises questions and new rocket RS-26 "Rubezh", which officially belongs to the category of intercontinental. However, it seems that by design it is two stages from the three-stage Topol-M. The maximum range of this missile (allegedly) reaches more than 6 thousand kilometers, which formally removes it from the INF Treaty. But it is clear that a weapon with similar parameters can be ideally used in the same way as a "forbidden" missile.

If in the case of Kalibr and Iskander the treaty was secretly violated, the Rubezh missile is a resourceful way to bypass the upper limit of restrictions set by the INF treaty. The range of 5.5 thousand is actually not chosen by chance - this is the distance between the territory of the United States and the USSR in the Atlantic direction, so longer-range missiles are formally already classified as intercontinental. One way or another, the question arises as to what goals Moscow is pursuing by taking such steps.

After all, despite the tension between the West and Russia, there is reason to doubt that the Kremlin is primarily interested in developing missiles against NATO countries. As already mentioned, the INF treaty was not quite what it was given out for. Intermediate-range missiles have not completely disappeared and have even been flourishing for several years, but mainly in other countries. China, India, Pakistan, Iran, North Korea and Saudi Arabia have more than enough of these missiles and are seen as important weapons of regional rivalry, intimidation and intimidation.

After all, this is what Vladimir Putin was talking about when he hinted in 2007 that Russia might withdraw from the INF Treaty in order to create an arsenal to counter Asian states that have thousands of medium-range missiles (like China, for example). Therefore, it is possible that Russia really put everyone before the fact: it can withdraw from the treaty and soon after that announce that it has a new generation of medium-range missiles.

AT Russian media there are even certain statements that may be preparation for such a step. These are, in particular, accusations against the United States that they are also violating the treaty. The Russians claim, for example, that ground-based missile defense silos in Romania contain Tomahawk missiles, among other things, and that training targets for testing missile defense systems have the parameters of medium-range missiles. Claims are also made against American drones, which allegedly need to be regarded as a kind of "carriers" that fall under the INF Treaty. It is unlikely that other countries will join the treaty, but hypothetically, there may be talk of amending the treaty between Russia and the United States.

If Moscow's actions are aimed at countering China, then the West, of course, should not put obstacles in its way. The suggestion recently made by a Czech nuclear weapons expert, Petr Suchy, may also be justified. According to him, the US and Russia could agree to deploy medium-range missiles again, but only in Asia. If Russia insisted on their deployment, for example, to the west of the Urals, this would clearly indicate that the INF treaty simply lost all meaning.

The United States may already be secretly preparing for this scenario. Three senators, including former presidential candidate Marco Rubio, introduced the INF Treaty Preservation Act. In fact, it contains measures that are designed to force Moscow to return to the implementation of the treaty. Paradoxically, the project also includes financing a “response” to new Russian missiles, and in extreme cases, counteraction, that is, its own weapons of this category.

The latter option will probably mean a complete rejection of the INF Treaty, from which, apparently, both parties will withdraw in this case, and new round an arms race that could undoubtedly affect Europe as well. With Moscow's motivation still unclear, it's impossible to say exactly what to expect. One thing is clear: if they still want to keep the INF Treaty, changes will be inevitable. However, NATO members should definitely prepare for the option of terminating the treaty - more precisely, for an unfavorable scenario in which medium-range missiles return to Europe again.

The materials of InoSMI contain only assessments of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the editors of InoSMI.

USSR stamp, Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, December 1987

(Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (IRNFT)) - an agreement between the USSR and the USA, signed by M. S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan on December 8, 1987 during the Soviet-American summit in Washington .

The treaty entered into force on June 1, 1988. For the first time in history, the treaty made it possible to eliminate a whole class of weapons: the parties pledged to destroy all complexes of ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles of medium (1000-5500 km) and shorter (from 500 to 1000 km) ranges, and also not to produce, test or deploy such rockets in the future. In accordance with the Agreement, the parties within three years were to destroy all launchers and ground-based missiles with a range of 500 to 5500 kilometers, including missiles both on the European and Asian territory of the USSR. The treaty provided for verification procedures by inspectors who were to monitor the destruction of the missiles of the opposite side.

Prior to the signing of the Treaty in the United States, ballistic missiles were classified as [ ] at intercontinental (over 5000 km), medium (from 500 to 5000 km) and short (from 150 to 500 km) ranges. In the USSR until the mid-1980s [ ] operational-tactical missiles (from 1 to 500 kilometers) also stood out. In the United States, tactical (operational-tactical) missiles had [ ] flight range from 1 to 150 kilometers. In 1987, with the signing of the Treaty, it was finally established new classification. For the period up to the mid-1980s, historical works both classifications are valid.

According to Art. 3 of the Treaty, were subject to destruction:

• intermediate range missiles
  • USSR - RSD-10 "Pioneer", "R-12", "R-14" (according to NATO classification, "SS-20", "SS-4" and "SS-5", respectively) and ground-based cruise missiles of the Republic of Kazakhstan -55 (according to NATO classification - SSC-X-4 "Slingshot");
  • USA - Pershing-2 and BGM-109G (ground-based Tomahawk cruise missile);
• short range missiles
  • USSR - "OTR-22" Temp-S "" and OTR-23 "Oka" ("SS-12" and "SS-23");
  • USA - Pershing-1A.

By June 1991, the Treaty was fulfilled: the USSR destroyed 1846 missile systems (of which about half were manufactured missiles that were not on combat duty); USA - 846 complexes.

After several mutual accusations of violating the INF Treaty, the parties announced in February 2019 that they were suspending compliance with their obligations under the Treaty.

background

In the mid-1970s, first in the United States and then in the USSR, systems for laser, infrared and television guidance of missiles on targets were created. This made it possible to achieve high accuracy of their hitting targets (according to various estimates - up to 30 meters). Experts started talking about the possibility of delivering a new type of nuclear strike - decapitation or blinding, which would make it possible to destroy the leadership of the opposite side before a decision was made to activate the retaliatory strike mechanism. This revived ideas about the possibility of winning a "limited nuclear war" due to the gain in flying time. On August 17, 1973, US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger unveiled the concept of a decapitation strike as the new basis for US nuclear policy. For its implementation, it was supposed to achieve a gain in flying time. The priority in the development of nuclear deterrence was shifted from the strategic triad to medium and short-range weapons. In 1974, this approach was enshrined in the founding documents of the US nuclear strategy.

In order to implement the doctrine, the United States began to modify the Forward Based System deployed in Western Europe. As part of this project, US-British cooperation on the modification of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and medium-range missiles has increased. In 1974, Britain and France signed the Ottawa Declaration, under which they pledged to develop common system defense, including nuclear sphere. In the USSR, these actions were perceived as France's rejection of the concept of "independent defense" and a partial revision of the policy of Gaullism.

These actions caused alarm in the USSR. In 1976, D. F. Ustinov became Minister of Defense of the USSR, who was inclined to a tough response to US actions. The basis of the modified nuclear strategy of the USSR was the build-up of the fleet of heavy ICBMs with MIRVs and, at the same time, the cover of the European strategic direction. In 1977, the USSR began deploying medium-range RSD-10 Pioneer (SS-20) missiles on the western borders. In total, about 300 missiles of this class were deployed, each of which was equipped with three warheads for individual targeting. This allowed the USSR to destroy NATO's military infrastructure in Western Europe in a matter of minutes - control centers, command posts and, especially, ports (the latter, in the event of a war, made it impossible for American troops to land in Western Europe). Against the backdrop of the total superiority of the USSR in conventional weapons, this gave the Warsaw Pact Organization complete military superiority in the European theater of operations.

On December 12, 1979, the NATO Council adopted a "double decision", providing for the deployment of 572 Pershing-2 missiles (Pershing-2) in Europe by 1983. The short flight time of Pershing-2 missiles (6-8 minutes) gave the United States the opportunity to launch a first strike on command posts and launchers of Soviet ICBMs (at the same time, deployed nuclear missiles were not taken into account in the Soviet-American agreements on the limitation of strategic arms that existed at that time). At the same time, the NATO countries agreed to start negotiations with the USSR in order to solve the problem of Soviet euro-missiles by 1983.

Negotiation

But the US refused to conduct “package negotiations”. In September 1983, the Americans began deploying their missiles in the UK, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands. On November 22, 1983, the Bundestag voted for the deployment of Pershing-2 missiles on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. These actions caused a sharply negative reaction in the USSR. On November 24, 1983, Yu. V. Andropov made a special statement, which spoke of the growing danger of a nuclear war in Europe, the withdrawal of the USSR from the Geneva talks on Euromissiles and the adoption of retaliatory measures - the deployment of the OTP-23 "Oka" ("SS-23" ) on the territory of the GDR and Czechoslovakia. With a range of up to 450 km, they could theoretically shoot through the entire territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, that is, deliver a preventive disarming strike at the locations of the Pershings. At the same time, the USSR moved its nuclear submarines closer to the US coast.

An attempt to resume contacts between the parties began immediately after the death of Yu. V. Andropov, which occurred on February 9, 1984. His funeral on 14 February was attended by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and US Vice President George W. Bush. They proposed resuming negotiations on euro-missiles on the condition that the USSR "unblock the package". In the Soviet leadership, however, there was no unity. The new General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, K. U. Chernenko, advocated negotiations with the NATO countries, but Defense Minister D. F. Ustinov (who actually became the second person in the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee) categorically refused to unblock the package. On June 29, 1984, the USSR proposed to resume negotiations on "Euromissiles" on package terms. However, the United States (as expected) did not agree with this position. Since the USSR continued the deployment of the OTR-23 Oka in Czechoslovakia and the GDR, begun under Yu. V. Andropov, the United States announced in the summer of 1984 that they intended to deploy Lance operational-tactical missiles with neutron warheads in Europe.

In December 1984, a Soviet delegation headed by M. S. Gorbachev visited Great Britain. But, despite the warm welcome, M. Thatcher categorically refused to conduct "package" negotiations. The situation changed after the death of D. F. Ustinov on December 20, 1984 - a compromise line prevailed in the Soviet leadership. On February 7, 1985, at a meeting with US Secretary of State J. Schultz in Geneva, USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko agreed to negotiate on Euro-missiles separately from negotiations on space weapons. After Gorbachev was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU on March 10, 1985, negotiations resumed.

The position of the USSR in the negotiations became softer. In the summer of 1985, Gorbachev imposed a moratorium on the deployment of the OTP-23 Oka in Czechoslovakia and the GDR. Gorbachev and Reagan made an attempt to reach an agreement on negotiations in Geneva in November 1985. It ended in failure: the US refused to withdraw medium-range missiles from Europe, and the USSR was close to blocking the package again. But in January 1986, Gorbachev announced a program for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world and made a number of serious concessions. At a meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan in Reykjavik, the USSR agreed to "unblock the package" - to negotiate on INF separately from SDI.

In the autumn of 1986, the USSR proposed the option of exporting medium-range missiles: the USSR withdraws the RSD-10 beyond the Urals, and the United States exports the Pershing-2 and ground-based cruise missiles to North America. Reagan agreed to accept this option. However, on December 24, 1986, Japan categorically opposed him: Tokyo feared that the USSR would redirect the RSD-10 to them. On January 1, 1987, China also opposed this option, where they also feared that they could become the target of the RSD-10. As a result, when in February 1987 the USSR proposed the "double zero" project, the United States, taking into account the interests of Japan, refused to accept it.

Outcome of negotiations

It was possible to reach a compromise at the talks of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR E. A. Shevardnadze in Washington in September 1987.

The USSR agreed to develop a unified classification for the INF Treaty and include it in the future OTR-23 Oka Treaty ("SS-23"), although they did not fall under the definition of the INF Treaty. The United States, in turn, promised to destroy the Tomahawk ground-based cruise missiles and refuse to deploy the Lance-2 OTR in Central Europe with neutron warheads.

On December 8, 1987, the Washington Treaty was signed, under the terms of which the parties agreed to destroy all INF as a class.

Implementation of the Treaty

By June 1991, the Treaty was fulfilled: the USSR destroyed 1846 missile systems (of which about half were manufactured missiles that were not on combat duty); USA - 846 complexes.

Performance of the Agreement

Termination of the Agreement

Russian claims against the United States for violations of the Treaty

On February 15, 2007, the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, General of the Army Yuri Baluyevsky, announced that Russia could begin to review the entire legal system of nuclear deterrence in response to the deployment of elements of the American missile defense system in Eastern Europe. In particular, according to him, Russia can unilaterally withdraw from the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles: “The Treaty ... is of an indefinite nature, but there is a possibility of withdrawing from it if one of the parties provides convincing evidence of the need to withdraw. Today they are: many countries are developing and improving medium-range missiles, and Russia, having fulfilled the INF Treaty, has lost many systems of these weapons.

A similar statement about Russia's possible withdrawal from the INF Treaty was made earlier (in June 2000) by Russian President Vladimir Putin in response to the US announcement of its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

In February 2007, the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces of the Russian Armed Forces, Colonel-General Nikolai Solovtsov, said at a press conference that Russia was ready to restore the production of medium-range ballistic missiles: “As a class of IRBMs, they were destroyed, but all the documentation remained, the technology remained. AT shortest time, if necessary, the production of these complexes will be restored. But already with new technologies, on a new element base, with new system management, with new opportunities". This statement was made in response to reports that Poland and the Czech Republic intend to accept the US offer to deploy missile defense elements (surveillance radar and interceptor missiles) on their territory.

This approach was also reflected in official documents - for example, in the Foreign Policy Review of Russia (2007) it was noted: “The situation around the Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF) causes concern. Missiles of these two classes were destroyed in accordance with the Treaty back in 1991, but since then this international legal act has not been given a universal character. Moreover, an increasing number of states, including those located near our borders, are developing and adopting such missiles. Under these conditions, it is necessary to think about ensuring our own security.”

From the Russian perspective, the US violated the INF Treaty by deploying anti-missile launchers in Europe that could hypothetically be used to deploy cruise missiles, using target missiles similar in performance to ground-based intermediate and shorter-range missiles, and increasing production and use strike unmanned aerial vehicles.

Modules launchers vertical launch mk.41, already deployed in the missile defense system in Poland and Romania, allow you to launch not only Standard 2 and Standard 3 anti-missiles, but also Tomahawk missiles (Tomahawk is a medium-range cruise missile (1000- 2200 km), capable of carrying nuclear warheads).

In 2013, the United States began test launches from the ground of the AGM-158B aircraft cruise missile with a range of 1,000 kilometers. And in December 2017, President Trump signed a defense bill that, among other things, provided $25 million for the development of a new cruise missile of this type. From the Russian point of view, this is a violation of the INF Treaty.

In June 2013, Vladimir Putin, at a meeting with representatives of the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation, called the decision of the USSR to abandon medium-range missiles "at least controversial", and the head of the presidential administration, Sergei Ivanov, announced the possibility of withdrawing Russian Federation from the Treaty.

Withdrawal from the Treaty

In July 2014, U.S. President Barack Obama, in a letter to Vladimir Putin, for the first time at the level of heads of state, accused Russia of testing medium-range cruise missiles that violated the Treaty. The US claims that in 2008-2011. Russia, in violation of the Treaty, tested a ground-based cruise missile at a range of more than 500 km (we are talking about the 9M729 missile, developed by the Yekaterinburg Novator Design Bureau named after Lyulyev); according to Russian officials, the range of this missile is known to be less than 500 km).

In November 2016, for the first time since 2003, a meeting of a special control commission under the INF Treaty was convened in Geneva at the initiative of the United States, but the concerns of the parties could not be removed.

On October 31, in an article in Foreign Policy magazine, John Wolfsthal (director of the Nuclear Crisis Group, former special assistant to President Barack Obama and senior director of arms control and nonproliferation at the National Security Council) criticized Trump's decision. In particular, John Wolfsthal argues the following: “The annulment of this treaty will make the US and its allies (which Trump obviously does not care about at all) less secure and undermine the global foundations for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.”

On November 26, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Sergei Ryabkov said that Moscow considers the US deployment of launchers for MK41 guided missiles as part of complexes "a direct and egregious violation of the INF Treaty" Aegis Ashore in Europe which, contrary to the Treaty, "allow the exercise combat use from the ground medium-range cruise missiles "Tomahawk" and other strike weapons» .

On December 5, Vladimir Putin commented on Pompeo’s statement, recalling that the United States first announced its intention to withdraw from the Treaty and only after that began to justify its decision, shifting responsibility to Russia: “No evidence of violations on our part is provided,” the President of the Russian Federation noted.

On December 17, in an interview with the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, the commander Rocket troops Colonel-General Sergey Karakaev, of strategic appointment, stated that "the impact of the consequences of the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty, the subsequent deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe and the new threats to our security associated with this are undoubtedly taken into account." Karakayev said that by the end of the year, it is planned to supply about 100 new types of weapons to the troops, including stationary and mobile-based Yars missile systems. This will be one of the responses of the Russian Federation to the deployment of the US missile defense system in countries of Eastern Europe. According to Karakaev, a number of military-technical measures will sufficiently reduce the effectiveness of the prospective US missile defense system in Europe.

On January 15, 2019, Russian-American negotiations on the treaty in Geneva ended in failure, primarily due to disagreements between the parties regarding claims to the Russian 9M729 missile.

On January 23, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation invited foreign military attaches and journalists to a briefing, where for the first time certain performance characteristics ground-based cruise missile 9M729, a launcher and a transport-launch container were demonstrated. Representatives of the United States and the military of a number of other countries - members of NATO, as well as the EU, including the UK, Germany and France, ignored the invitation. The demonstration of the Russian 9M729 missile, however, did not dissuade the US that Russia was violating the INF Treaty. Andrea Kalan, a spokesman for the US Embassy in Russia, told Interfax: "The United States and most of our NATO allies refused to attend this briefing, in which we all saw only another attempt to cover up a violation and create an appearance of transparency."

On February 1, 2019, US President Donald Trump announced the start of the procedure for withdrawing from the Treaty. “Russia has been violating the INF Treaty with impunity for far too long, covertly developing and deploying banned missile system, which poses a direct threat to our allies and troops abroad. Tomorrow, the United States will terminate its obligations under the INF Treaty and begin the process of withdrawing from the INF Treaty, which will end in 6 months, unless Russia returns to compliance by destroying all of its missiles, launchers, and related equipment that violate the treaty,” Trump said.

On February 2, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia, in response to US actions, was also suspending participation in the Treaty: "American partners ... have announced that they are engaged in research, R & D and development work, and we will do the same." At the same time, Putin demanded that we no longer initiate disarmament negotiations with the United States: “Let's wait until our partners mature in order to conduct an equal, meaningful dialogue with us on this most important topic - both for us and for our partners, and for the whole world.” » .

On February 2, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that the United States began preparations for the production of missiles prohibited by the Treaty two years before it announced its withdrawal from the INF Treaty: “According to the irrefutable data available to the Russian Ministry of Defense, since June Raytheon Corporation in Tucson, Arizona, has launched a program to expand and modernize production facilities in order to create intermediate and shorter-range missiles prohibited by the INF Treaty. Over the past two years, the area of ​​this largest US manufacturing facility missile weapons increased by 44%, and the number of employees increased by 2 thousand people.

On February 5, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, at a conference call at the ministry, said that in 2019-2020, in response to the US decision to suspend the implementation of the INF Treaty, a land-based version of the Kalibr sea-based complex with a long-range cruise missile will have to be developed. At the same time, a ground-based missile system with a long-range hypersonic missile is to be created.

On February 7, the Russian Defense Ministry, having read the contents of the US State Department note on the suspension of the participation of the American side in the INF Treaty and the beginning of the procedure for withdrawing from it, rejected "unfounded allegations that Russia violated its obligations under this treaty" and, in turn, accused the United States of that they did not take the necessary actions to eliminate their violation of their own obligations under the Treaty. In this regard, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation suggested that the American side, in the period before the termination of the Treaty, return to its implementation and "accept necessary measures on returning to strict observance of the Treaty by destroying” several types of missiles and military equipment:

The corresponding note was handed over to the military attache at the US Embassy in Moscow.

On February 8, the US mission to NATO said that the Aegis Ashore missile defense system "fully complies with US obligations under the INF Treaty" and is capable of launching "only defensive interceptor missiles", which, in turn, are not subject to the Treaty. According to the American side, American strike UAVs do not violate the Treaty either: “The INF Treaty does not place any restrictions on the development, testing and use of reusable armed drones. In the opinion of the United States, the term "missile", which is used in the Treaty, applies only to disposable products.

On February 20, Russian President Vladimir Putin, in his message to the Federal Assembly, said that in the event of the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe, Russia would be forced to deploy assets that would have within their reach both the territories where these missiles would be deployed and the territories where the centers making decisions about their application (i.e. the US). At the same time, the flight time of Russian missiles will be adequate to the flight time of American missiles, which Putin estimated at 10-12 minutes. Russian President stressed that Russia is not going to be the first to deploy intermediate and shorter-range missiles in Europe.

On March 4, 2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on the suspension by Russia of the implementation of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF Treaty), at the same time, in a commentary to this decree, Vladimir Putin noted that Russia does not plan to place missiles subject to the INF Treaty on border areas.

see also

	Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles at Wikimedia Commons
	Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles at Wikinews

Notes

1. History of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles // Kommersant, 07.12.2017
2. The US targeted the Russian missile with sanctions. Negotiations in Geneva on the INF Treaty are in danger of disruption // Kommersant, 12/11/2017
3. Putin announced the suspension of Russia's participation in the missile treaty (indefinite) . Lenta.ru (February 2, 2019). Retrieved February 2, 2019.
4. Russia 'may withdraw' from US missile treaty (indefinite) . BBC(February 15, 2007). Archived from the original on February 20, 2012.
5. Vladimir Solovyov. Intelligence in a word // The United States asked Russia to hold back missiles (indefinite) . Kommersant(February 17, 2007). Archived from the original on February 20, 2012.
6. Denis Zhukov; Olga Sokolik. Russia gave an "asymmetric" response (indefinite) . RBC daily(February 20, 2007). Archived from the original on February 20, 2012.
7. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia | 03/27/2007 | Foreign Policy Review of the Russian Federation
8. Obituary on the arms control regime. Issue price // Kommersant, 08.12.17
9. "Saving the treaty requires a more responsible approach on the part of the United States." Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Sergey Ryabkov on threats to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty // Kommersant, 12/8/2017
10. INF Treaty: On Russian Claims Against the United States (indefinite) . Journalistic Truth (December 7, 2018). Retrieved December 10, 2018.
11. The United States violated the INF Treaty on four counts (Russian). Russian newspaper. Retrieved 6 December 2018.
12. Obama fails to convince Putin to make new nuclear cuts (Russian). RIA Novosti (June 19, 2013). Retrieved 4 February 2019.
13. The INF Treaty cannot operate indefinitely, Ivanov said (Russian). RIA Novosti (June 21, 2013). Retrieved 4 February 2019.

Intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple reentry vehicles are a terrible danger to life on Earth. If they are set in motion, most likely, human civilization will not survive. But ICBMs still have one plus: tens of minutes will pass from the moment of launch to hitting the target, and during this time you can still try to prevent the irreparable.

Oleg Makarov

Short and medium-range missiles are a completely different matter. There will be no time for reflection if they are applied. Almost won't. And recent history already knew two serious crises associated with this type of weapon. The most acute was the Caribbean crisis, which almost led to a nuclear missile clash between the USSR and the USA in 1962, when, in response to America's deployment of ground-based ballistic systems in Turkey, the USSR decided to bring its missiles to Cuba. The Americans delivered PGM-19 Jupiter missiles in Turkey, fearing a Soviet breakthrough to the Black Sea straits. This single-stage oxygen-kerosene rocket was designed under the leadership of Wernher von Braun, flew up to 2400 km and had a circular probable deviation of 1.4 km. The power of the nuclear warhead was just under one and a half megatons.

Comparative sizes of Soviet operational-tactical missiles different years and generations. Far right is the modern R-500 cruise missile used as part of the Iskander OTRK. The 9M714 missile of various modifications, which is part of the OTR-23 Oka complex, was to be destroyed under the INF Treaty.

Dispersed world

The Soviet Union managed to deliver only R-12 missiles to Cuba (it was also planned to deploy R-14s with a longer range). The rocket on high-boiling fuel components was designed by Mikhail Yangel, its range was 2080 km, the warhead had a capacity of 2.3 Mt, and the maximum deviation was 5 km.

As you know, the events of 1961 ended with a peaceful zero decision: R-12s were taken from Cuba, Jupiters were removed from positions in Turkey. Less than two decades passed, and in the late 1970s there was a new serious crisis around the so-called euro-missiles. Since 1977, the USSR began to deploy RSD-10 Pioneer - SS-20 missile systems in the European part of the USSR, according to the NATO index. This solid-propellant rocket had a range of up to 5,000 km, carried three thermonuclear warheads with a capacity of 15 Mt each. With such parameters, she was able to hit the entire European infrastructure of NATO up to the Atlantic.

Ground launch of the American long-range cruise missile BGM-109G Gryphon, a land modification of the Tomahawk missile. Its deployment in Europe became one of the cornerstones of the Euromissile crisis that erupted in Soviet-American relations in the 1970s and 1980s.

The Americans responded by deploying ballistic Pershing-2s in 1983 with a range of 1770 km. They were supplemented by the land version of the BGM-109 Gryphon winged Tomahawks. The Griffin did not, of course, have the deadly speed of ballistic missiles, but it flew over a distance of 2500 km and posed a serious problem for Soviet air defense, moving in the air at low altitude and avoiding obstacles. And most importantly, the accuracy of these weapons has increased significantly. The danger of an instant nuclear conflict with an unpredictable outcome hung over Europe. It took years of difficult negotiations, the search for compromises, before the USSR and the United States agreed to conclude the Treaty on the Elimination of Shorter and Intermediate-Range Missiles (INF Treaty). Exactly 30 years ago, in 1988, it came into force. According to the agreement, the USSR and the USA refused to produce and possess intermediate and shorter-range missiles (range 500-5500 km). Separately, it is worth emphasizing that it was specifically about ground-based missiles. Similar weapons for sea and air basing were not banned.

Under the INF Treaty, the USSR destroyed 1,846 missile systems, including Pioneer mobile launchers with missiles equipped with multiple reentry vehicles, R-12 and R-14 stationary missiles, RK-55 cruise missiles, operational-tactical systems " Temp-S" and "Oka". The United States destroyed 846 missile systems with Pershing-2 missiles, Tomahawk-type cruise missiles and Pershing-1A tactical missiles.

Medium-range ballistic missiles, MGM-31 Pershing-2, destroyed by the Americans as part of the implementation of the INF Treaty. Currently, the United States is considering the revival of this sea-based missile, which is not prohibited by the treaty.

Burrowing "Pershing"

It would seem that the indefinite agreement concluded by Gorbachev and Reagan is a thing of the past, but in last years discussions around this topic have been actively renewed. The point of view was repeatedly expressed according to which the agreement with the Americans was not very beneficial for the USSR and its successor, the Russian Federation. One of the arguments is that according to the INF Treaty, our country has lost much more warheads and missile weapons. Another is that there are several nuclear states near the Russian borders that have INF and are not bound by any restrictions. Chief Researcher of the Center international security IMEMO RAS, professor, retired major general Vladimir Dvorkin is deeply convinced that the INF Treaty was timely and should not be revised.

“The means that the Americans began to deploy in Europe in the first half of the 1980s threatened us with a lightning strike at command posts, bunkers where the military and political leadership of the country could be located, ICBM launchers,” says Vladimir Dvorkin, “Pershing-2 missiles with their flight time of 6-8 minutes was an innovative weapon. They were equipped with high-precision warheads capable of deepening into the earth's surface. Tomahawks, with their high accuracy and stealth, were also dangerous for our air defense. At the same time, the Pioneer RSD-10 allowed strikes on the territory of the European NATO states, but for the United States they were absolutely safe. It was the right exchange."

The problem today is not even that the INF Treaty is being criticized. For several years now, Russia and the United States have been bringing mutual accusations against each other of violating the treaty. Russian representatives have said that the United States is looking for a reason to withdraw from the INF Treaty. What is it about?

"Tomahawk" under the "Aegis"?

Russia's claims relate to the creation by the Americans in Romania and Poland of missile defense position areas to fight ballistic missiles. The Aegis missile defense system (“Aegis”), which includes AN / SPY-1 three-coordinate phased array radars and Standard Missile-3 missiles with Mk 41 launchers, has existed for a long time, but until 2016 it was based only on naval ships USA. Two years ago, the Americans announced the commissioning of the land position Aegis Ashore ("Land Aegis") in the Deveselu region (Romania). Next in line, according to the plan adopted by the Obama administration, is the deployment of a similar facility in Poland. Russian representatives have repeatedly pointed out that the Mk 41 launcher can be used not only to launch anti-missiles, but also to launch cruise missiles of the Tomahawk type. And if such installations are already placed on land, then we can talk about a violation of the INF Treaty. “Theoretically, these fears are justified,” says Vladimir Dvorkin, “however, with military point this does not make much sense, since the Americans today have about 6,000 high-precision sea-based Tomahawks and ships armed with them often cruise near our borders. If we add another 20 or 40 ground-based missiles to these thousands, this will not be a significant change in the available potential.

An SM-3 missile is launched from a US Navy ship equipped with an anti-ballistic missile defense system. At the moment, similar systems are being deployed on land (Romania, Poland). Russia believes that the Mk 41 launchers for the SM-3 missile could also be used to launch Tomahawk cruise missiles.

Trapped in suspicion

The Americans, on the other hand, look with alarm at our new cruise missiles, which are equipped with the Iskander family of operational-tactical missile systems. The Iskander-K variant uses the R-500 (9M728) cruise missile, which, according to Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov, is capable of overcoming any promising missile defense systems. At the same time, the official position of Russia is that the range of the missile is established under the INF Treaty and does not exceed 500 km. However, American representatives express doubts about the veracity of this parameter, although they do not present any specific evidence. But more often from across the ocean they point to another cruise missile developed by the Novator Design Bureau, which was tested in Russia and has the index 9M729, and in NATO it is called SSC-8. According to the Americans, it is an analogue of the Kalibr sea-based missile, which the Russian Navy effectively fired from the Caspian and mediterranean seas on IS facilities (an organization banned in Russia) in Syria, and has a range of up to 5,500 km. The Pentagon believes that the missile not only passed the tests, but, having been put into service, was deployed as part of two divisions of the Iskander complexes. Russia denies these data.

Operational-tactical missile system "Iskander" with two single-stage solid-propellant missiles 9M723, flying along a quasi-ballistic trajectory. However, American claims against Russia are related to cruise missiles used as part of the complex.

We need to negotiate

“Probably, the Americans base their point of view on the fact that a long-range cruise missile was actually tested in 2014, but the fact of testing in itself is not a violation of the INF Treaty,” says Vladimir Dvorkin. True, there is a clause in the contract according to which longer-range missiles can be tested on land, but the launcher must be different from mass-produced ones. It is possible that in the United States they believe that the installation was not sufficiently converted for testing and is close to the equipment of the Iskander complex. What can be offered here? Within the framework of the contract, there is a control commission, at the meeting of which it is necessary to discuss and clearly define the criteria for distinguishing a test installation from a serial one. Unfortunately, this has not been done yet. But the main thing is that mutual claims are mainly of a technical nature and do not affect the potentials that exist today.”

The 1987 INF Treaty was the result of serious compromises and applied only to the USSR and the USA. Missiles of this class remained with NATO members France and Great Britain, they were developed and are being developed by Israel, India, Pakistan, China, North Korea. However, according to Vladimir Dvorkin, it is practically unrealistic to include all these countries in a single treaty banning the INF Treaty. It is much more important to maintain the status quo.

Vladimir Dvorkin believes that an alternative to harmonizing positions and withdrawing mutual claims is the collapse of the INF Treaty, and this will become big problem for all interested parties. This year, the United States allocated funds for the development of a new ground-based medium-range cruise missile. R&D in this area is not prohibited by the treaty, but if the arms race resumes there, it will seriously complicate military-political situation in Europe and will require the Russian budget to spend more on the production of medium-range and shorter-range missiles.

The US Congress approved the allocation of $58 million for the development of medium-range missiles. In fact, this means a decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty.

The amount is small even by Russian standards, let alone American ones, when appropriations for the development of simpler weapons systems began with several hundred million, or even billions of dollars. This suggests that the new American RSD already has a solid scientific and technical backlog. In fact, we are talking about the transition immediately to the development stage. The cost of the first prototypes of a promising missile can reach a dozen or more million dollars according to the most conservative estimates (for example, a serial Tomahawk, a simple product compared to a high-precision IRBM, costs the customer one and a half to two million dollars). So, with the allocated funds, the Americans will be able to build three to five models or perform a relatively modest amount of other R&D. This gives reason to assume that the new rocket has already been developed and that we are talking about the final stage before launching in mass production. That is, they have been working on it on the sly for a long time - probably from the moment when the United States suddenly discovered "Russia's violation" of the INF Treaty.

“Such ammunition initiates catastrophic geophysical processes in the United States”

Washington will try to achieve superiority by deploying RSD groups near the borders of Russia. Our country will not be able to quickly give an adequate response, and the Americans will gain an indisputable advantage for a sufficiently long period in the military-political sense. The idea is obvious - to make Europe (more precisely - its eastern part) a springboard for a nuclear attack. There is an opportunity to significantly increase the potential for defeating Russian territory relative to a retaliatory strike without withdrawing from the treaties on the reduction of strategic offensive arms. And on the other hand, to force us to redirect part of the strategic nuclear forces from the United States to Europe. Moscow is deprived of the opportunity to place RSD near the American borders so that the firing area includes all the key elements of the US military infrastructure and economy: there are no territories where such a grouping can be formed. The second operation "Anadyr" ("At the zenith of the Cold War") is not feasible today.

Pershing vs Pioneer

How serious is the reason that once prompted the Soviet leadership to sign the INF Treaty? Let's go back to the past and see what the situation was at our borders then. In 1982, the United States adopted the Pershing-2 IRBM. The plans provided for the deployment of a group of more than a hundred such missiles and about 380 nuclear-armed Tomahawk GLCMs near the borders of the ATS. To eliminate this threat, the Soviet leadership decided (with the full support of the military) to sign the INF Treaty. What is the point? Indeed, in exchange for 490 American missiles, we had to reduce about 680 Pioneer systems, which significantly exceeded the American Pershing-2 in terms of firing range and warhead power. As for the Tomahawks, in the USSR they could easily create an equivalent grouping of the ground version of the Grenade.

Let us turn to the performance characteristics of Pershing-2, today this is not a secret: a 7.5-ton rocket had a firing range of about 1,800 kilometers. Its nuclear warhead is 8-80 kilotons of TNT equivalent. The missile system is mobile: the launcher is mounted on a self-propelled chassis - it is problematic to ensure its preemptive destruction, since it is necessary to constantly monitor the location in real time with the appropriate correction of target designation for weapons of destruction, which is enough to do difficult. But this does not surprise us. After all, the Pioneer, put into service in 1977, is also mounted on a self-propelled chassis of a six-axle MAZ-547V cross-country transporter. But unlike Pershing-2, Pioneer fired at 5500 kilometers, and its warhead weighing about 1500 kilograms made it possible to place on it a thermonuclear charge with a TNT equivalent of about a megaton. That is, the Soviet missile system is much more powerful than the American one. Yes, and they were in service, we emphasize, about 680 units. So what made our leaders make such disproportionate cuts? It's all about shooting accuracy and flying time. The American missile hit the target with a standard deviation of about 30 meters! The high-precision munitions currently used in Syria by the Russian and US Aerospace Forces have approximately the same performance. According to the experience of the war, this is enough to guarantee the destruction of even a well-protected object with one hit.

At that time (and even today), the main way to ensure the combat stability of the command and control system of the armed forces of all developed countries was the creation of specially protected underground (rocky) command posts that could withstand explosions of nuclear weapons at a distance of several hundred meters. But not like the Pershing-2 warhead. With a firing accuracy of 30 meters standard deviation, the probability of a warhead hitting an object 100-150 by 100-150 meters (typical size of an underground protected control center) is more than 0.95.

Another important indicator was the flight time of the Pershings to the assigned targets, which, due to the flat trajectory and high speed ranged from five to six to eight to ten minutes, depending on the distance of the target. That is, the Americans were able to deliver a preemptive decapitation strike and destroy all the main points strategic management our strategic nuclear forces. With the system for preventing the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons introduced in accordance with the START-1 Treaty, which excludes the possibility of launches without receiving carriers of a special cipher code that unlocks missiles, the aggressor could count on the fact that there would be no response. After all, then the "Perimeter" system, the notorious " dead hand”, did not yet exist - it was created precisely as a counteraction to a decapitating blow.

The situation with Tomahawks was a little better. The main type available at that time Soviet aircraft AWACS Tu-126 carried the Liana radar, focused on detecting high-altitude targets - B-52 bombers going through North Pole to strike at the USSR (almost all early warning aircraft were based in the northern regions of our country). And to identify small-sized low-flying targets such as "Tomahawk" against the background of the underlying earth's surface, "Liana" did not know how: the lower boundary of the detection zone was in the region of three thousand meters. Aircraft A-50 only entered service. Therefore, in the western directions, the control system airspace It was built exclusively on ground-based radars and had a lower boundary of the observation zone up to several hundred meters. It was into these holes between posts at extremely low altitudes that Tomahawks launched from mobile ground-based launchers could penetrate. Their range is about 2500 kilometers. And although the flight time for this distance would have been about three hours, the extremely low altitude of movement outside the zone of radar observation made the blow sudden. The accuracy of the hit, both now and then, is quite high - the standard deviation is no more than 20–30 meters, which, with a warhead power of 200 kilotons of TNT equivalent, also guaranteed the destruction of any protected control center.

So the Americans, having deployed the Pershing-2 and Tomahawks grouping in Europe, got the opportunity to launch a sudden preemptive strike on the strategic command posts of the armed forces, getting a chance to win in a nuclear war. In response, we could only go for the decentralization of the use of strategic nuclear forces as the only way to guarantee retribution. It is for this reason that our leaders spoke of a sharp rise in the nuclear threat.

As for the "Pioneers", they did not "reach out" to the control posts of the American strategic nuclear forces located on American territory. And the use of the Strategic Nuclear Forces with a flight time of 25-35 minutes and a developed US anti-missile surveillance system would not have been sudden for the Yankees, they always had the possibility of a retaliatory strike even under the most adverse conditions. And the Pioneer firing accuracy, which was 500 meters standard deviation, did not provide, despite the powerful warhead, guaranteed destruction of point highly protected targets such as an underground command post.

The destruction of Europe as compensation for the defeat of their own country was a bad consolation for the leadership of the USSR. Therefore, they went to sign the INF Treaty.

Most importantly, American ground-based medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles made it possible to inflict a sudden, guaranteed decapitation strike on our country and, of course, increase the nuclear potential capable of reaching the territory of the USSR. Today, judging by the general direction of the US military-technical policy in the field of nuclear weapons, a course has been taken towards the same goals. It cannot be ruled out that in order to neutralize the Russian “Dead Hand”, effective electronic warfare means are being created or already exist to ensure the disruption of signal transmission combat control Russian strategic nuclear forces.

Give vulcanization

It is obvious that a symmetrical response, consisting in the creation and deployment of our IRMs, is unacceptable, since this means going along with the enemy: if we deploy our systems, as some experts suggest, in the Arctic, the potential for a nuclear threat to American territory will increase minimally. Circumpolar IRMs will not reach the main control points of the US military and political leadership. And Russia will be forced to divert a significant part of its already modest financial, industrial, and intellectual resources in comparison with the United States.

It is also impossible to increase the number of strategic-range ballistic missiles, this will mean withdrawing from the START treaties and we, having a significantly lower economic potential and having destroyed nuclear warheads, while the Americans have stockpiled theirs, will not be able to participate in the race on an equal footing. According to experts, the Yankees can increase the number of strategic nuclear forces due to the "return potential" by 2-2.5 times within a year and a half.

However, in the system of legal regulation of relations between our countries in the field of nuclear weapons, there are several aspects that make it possible to create an adequate threat to the United States in the event of their withdrawal from the INF Treaty. If it is terminated, restrictions on land-based strategic cruise missiles will also be lifted. Meanwhile, Russia has a first-class aviation KR X-101. With a launch weight of more than two tons, it delivers warheads weighing about 500 kilograms at a distance of up to 5500 kilometers. At the same time, the accuracy of hitting the target is within 15–20 meters of the standard deviation. And X-101 has a nuclear twin - X-102. It can be assumed, by analogy with the American Tomahawk, that our missile is capable of hitting targets 8,000–9,000 kilometers away or more. And this is already an intercontinental range. A ground version based on the X-101 is created in a relatively short time. It is quite realistic to establish the production of launchers.

Two - four missiles weigh 15-18 tons together with the container. It can be placed on a reinforced semi-trailer truck chassis along with a control system. That is, we have a fully autonomous mobile missile system. The grouping is growing in proportion to the increase in the batteries of American IRMs in Europe, thereby creating an adequate threat to US territory. It is important to note that the control system of these RCs may also provide for a decentralized regime in the event of the destruction of elements of the strategic link. After all, cruise missiles, as well as operational-tactical and tactical-range nuclear weapons, are not subject to the requirements for centralized blocking of launches. In order for a strike to be unacceptable to the enemy under any conditions, the size of the group must be at least 500-700 units (taking into account the expected losses on the territory of Russia and anti-aircraft defense).

Another nuance of the START treaties is the absence of restrictions on the total "tonnage" of nuclear weapons. Only the number of warheads is limited. This allows us to follow the path of creating a megaweapon - warheads with a TNT equivalent of more than a hundred megatons and missiles for them. Such ammunition, if used, is capable of initiating catastrophic geophysical processes in the United States, in particular, the eruption of the Yellowstone supervolcano. Today we are developing a heavy ICBM "Sarmat". It is known that it has a global range, that is, it flies along non-optimal trajectories with the possibility of hitting any point on the planet. At the same time, its warhead can reach 10 tons. The dimensions are sufficient to fit a multi-megaton class warhead into them.

The appearance of such weapons will force the overseas "partners" to sit down at the negotiating table and agree to the destruction of both their IRMs and the missile defense system. The precedent was set by the USSR when, with R-36 missiles, it prompted the previously extremely belligerent Americans to start a dialogue.

#INF Treaty #START #ALCM X-101#X-102 #ICBM "Sarmat"

Recently, on the pages of NVO and in a number of other media, a discussion has unfolded about medium-range and shorter-range missiles. I would like to tell you more about some aspects of this issue that were not reflected in the publications.

NUCLEAR PROVOCATION

In the confrontation with the United States, we were not the first to place medium-range ballistic missiles near the borders of the other side. In 1958-1961, the United States deployed its Thor and Jupiter IRBMs with nuclear warheads on the territory of Turkey, Italy and Great Britain, reducing the flight time to objects on the territory of our country from 30 to 8-10 minutes. In 1962, the USSR symmetrically responded by deploying its R-12 medium-range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba. The flight time of Soviet missiles to US military installations and cities became exactly the same as that of American missiles to military installations and cities of the USSR.

This parity did not suit the United States, and they initiated the Caribbean crisis. The crisis situation was resolved by the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba, followed by the withdrawal of American missiles from Europe. Thus, the threat that arose after the first deployment of American medium-range ballistic missiles in Europe was eliminated.

After the Caribbean crisis, the United States for many years received a kind of "inoculation" from the deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles (IRBMs) in Europe that threatened the USSR. However, in 1979, the so-called "double decision" of NATO was adopted, providing for the deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe from 1983 and for negotiations with the USSR on arms limitation. In making this decision, the Americans counted on the fact that the Soviet leadership, remembering the crisis of 1962, would no longer deploy their medium-range missiles in Cuba as a response, and if they tried, the United States would now not allow this.

One of the representatives of a large family of modern operational-tactical missile systems "Iskander-M"

It was planned to deploy 108 Pershing-2 ballistic missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) BGM-109G. Officially, the deployment of new missiles in Europe was justified by the need to eliminate the imbalance that arises in connection with the deployment of the new Pioneer IRBM by the USSR. These missiles replaced the obsolete Soviet R-12 and R-14 medium-range missiles. At the same time, the number of deployed medium-range missiles decreased, although the number of deployed warheads increased, since the Pioneers were equipped with a multiple reentry vehicle (MIRV) with three warheads.

In terms of the number of delivery vehicles for medium-range nuclear weapons (RSD, aviation, including carrier-based), NATO in 1979 surpassed the USSR by almost two times (1800:1000). The USA had superiority over the USSR in the number of warheads on strategic carriers (ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers) - 11000:7000. At the same time, the USSR had more medium-range missiles. Great Britain and France had 178, and the USSR - about 600, of which about 100 were located in the Asian part of the country.

If the Soviet Pioneer RSD did not threaten US territory in any way, then the American Pershing-2 missiles, having high firing accuracy (KVO - 35 ... combat command and control of strategic nuclear forces and government bodies.

In 1980, at the negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe, the Soviet side proposed a moratorium on the deployment in Europe of new medium-range missile and nuclear weapons of NATO and the USSR, that is, to "freeze" in quantitative and qualitative terms the existing level of such weapons, including advanced nuclear weapons. US base in the area.

In 1981, the USSR put forward a proposal to cut Europe-based medium-range nuclear weapons, including nuclear-weapon-carrying aircraft, by about a factor of three, to a level of 300 units for each side.
In December 1982, the Soviet side proposed to establish equality both in the number of RSDs in Europe and in the number of medium-range carrier aircraft. At the same time, the USSR should have had as many missiles as England and France had.

In October 1983, the USSR expressed its readiness to have no more than 140 Pioneer missiles in Europe, that is, less than France and Great Britain had IRMs. At the same time, the United States had to refuse to deploy its RSD in Europe. The proposal provided for equal ceilings for the sides for medium-range carrier aircraft. The US did not accept any of these proposals.

ZERO OPTION

In 1981, Reagan proposed the so-called zero option, which involved the US refusing to deploy Pershing-2 missiles and cruise missiles in Western Europe in exchange for the elimination of all Soviet medium-range missiles in both the European and Asian parts of the country. Thus, it was proposed to eliminate the actually deployed group of more than 600 missiles in exchange for the US abandoning the plan to deploy missiles that were still under development.

In March 1983, Reagan announced his readiness to go for an intermediate option, which provided for an equal number of RSD for the USSR and the USA. At the same time, French and British missiles, as well as aviation, were not covered by the proposed agreement. In November 1983, the United States proposed to establish equal ceilings for the number of IRBM warheads of the parties in the amount of 420 units. None of the American options, except for the zero one, envisaged the US refusing to deploy new missiles in Europe. In late 1983, the US began deploying new medium-range missiles in Europe..

It was necessary to force the US to withdraw its IRMs from Europe. As a response, on November 24, 1983, the USSR announced the lifting of the moratorium on the deployment of its medium-range missiles in the European part of the country, the deployment of long-range operational-tactical missiles (Temp-S) in Czechoslovakia and the GDR, and the deployment of means , which, in terms of their characteristics, will be adequate to the threat posed to the USSR and its allies by American missiles in Europe.

The following action plan was developed. We decided to create a new mobile ground missile system "Speed". The "Speed" missiles were planned to be placed on the territory of the GDR and Czechoslovakia and aimed at the locations of the Pershing-2 missiles, cruise missiles and other NATO facilities, creating a threat of their lightning destruction. In addition, it was planned to deploy the Pioneer IRBM in Chukotka. Their area of ​​operation would cover the whole of Alaska and the northwestern part of Canada.

When the head part of the rocket was redesigned and one light warhead was placed on it instead of three, a significant part of the US territory turned out to be in the zone of action of the Pioneer missiles. Under the threat of lightning destruction were the Clear radar post of the Beamus missile warning system (SPRN) in Alaska, the Cobra Dane early warning radar station on Shemiya Island and Parks in North Dakota.

Naturally, such steps should have led to an international crisis. It was assumed that the way out of it could be the removal of American medium-range missiles from Europe in exchange for the withdrawal of Soviet "Speed" missiles from Czechoslovakia and the GDR and Pioneer missiles from Chukotka. At the same time, a grouping of more than 400 Pioneer missiles was completely preserved, which would be based in their former places. However, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Yuri Andropov, and Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov, who actively supported this plan, died in 1984. Under Chernenko, work on the Speed ​​rocket continued.

In the spring of 1985, Gorbachev came to power, and the approach to how to solve the problem of American forward-based missiles changed dramatically. In April 1985, the USSR unilaterally suspended the deployment of its missiles and other retaliatory measures in Europe, which it had begun after the deployment of American forward-based IRBMs began.

The plan developed under Andropov and Ustinov was "buried". The development of the "Speed" rocket, the flight tests of which had already been started, was stopped. At the negotiations concerning medium-range missiles, Gorbachev made more and more unjustified concessions, and also put forward proposals that led to the unilateral disarmament of the USSR.

In October 1986, at a meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan in Reykjavik, the Soviet side refused to link the issue of reducing IRMs with British and French missiles of this class and withdrew the earlier demand that Western IRMs be included in the category of strategic offensive weapons. At the same time, it was proposed to start negotiations on IRMs based in the Asian part of the USSR and to “freeze” missiles with a flight range of less than 1000 km.

In November 1986, at the talks in Geneva, the Soviet delegation put forward a proposal to eliminate Soviet and American IRMs in Europe, while maintaining 100 warheads on such missiles in the Asian part of the USSR and in the United States. At the same time, the USSR would have 33 Pioneer missiles with MIRVs in the Asian part of the country, and the United States would have 100 Pershing-2 single-block missiles in their country.

The Soviet side proposed to establish equal levels for operational-tactical missiles of the USSR and the USA, provided that there would be neither Soviet nor American such missiles in Europe. At the same time, the USSR refused to take into account the missiles of Great Britain and France, the decision on aircraft delivery of medium-range missiles.

At a meeting with Gorbachev in Moscow in April 1987, US Secretary of State Schultz stated that they were ready to stick to the option discussed at the Geneva talks, to leave 100 warheads each on IRS based in the US and in the European part of the USSR, eliminating missiles of this class on both sides in Europe. However, Gorbachev proposed the “double global zero” option, which provided for the elimination not only of all American and Soviet medium-range missiles (over 1,000 to 5,500 km), but also of all shorter-range missiles (from 500 to 1,000 km). This option was legally fixed by the indefinite Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles concluded in 1987.

WHO IS IT FAVORABLE

If the first deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe was eliminated on a parity basis - the USSR and the USA removed their forward-based missiles located near the borders of the other side, then the second elimination of missiles can hardly be called parity.

The United States has eliminated missiles provocatively deployed outside its territory, close to our borders. And the USSR eliminated missiles located on its own territory, including missiles based in the Asian part of the country. At the same time, the USSR, in the process of implementing the INF Treaty, had to eliminate twice as many missiles as the United States (1846:846), and almost three times as many launchers (825:289). Our destroyed missiles could carry almost four times as many nuclear warheads as the American ones (3154:846).

The only type of missile that the US destroyed more under the INF Treaty than the USSR was GLCM (443:80). However, this exchange was of no fundamental importance either for us or for the United States. The United States had a large group of sea-based (Tomahawk) and air-based (ALCM-B) cruise missiles with similar performance characteristics. By 1994, it was planned to increase the total number of sea and air-based cruise missiles to 7,000 units. So the deployment of ground-based missiles, unlike the Pershing-2 missiles, did not create any fundamentally new threat to the USSR.

A mobile ground-based missile system with a solid-propellant two-stage medium-range ballistic missile RSD-10 "Pioneer" (known in the West as "Saber") can now only be seen in the museum.

In other classes, the USSR destroyed significantly more missiles than the United States. In the class of medium-range missiles, if we do not take into account our outdated R-12 and R-14 missiles, for one single-block rocket "Pershing-2" we gave 2.8 three-block rockets "Pioneer". The Temp-S short-range missile grouping (718 missiles, 135 launchers) was completely eliminated, receiving practically nothing in return! The United States no longer had missiles of this class in combat strength. The obsolete Pershing-1A missiles (170 units) were withdrawn from combat strength, stockpiled, and only one non-deployed launcher remained for them.

In addition, having received nothing in return from the United States, a group of 239 of the latest Oka ballistic missiles was eliminated. The maximum range of the Oka missile (400 km) did not fall within the range of missile ranges (500–5500 km) covered by the Treaty. However, Gorbachev agreed to include this missile in the composition of those to be eliminated under the INF Treaty. At the same time, the United States rejected the Soviet proposal to reduce the lower limit of the range of liquidated missiles in the Treaty to 400 km.

Thus, the United States not only achieved the elimination of the Oka missiles, but also retained the ability to manufacture, flight test and deploy the Lance-2 ballistic missile of the same class, which had a range of 450-470 km.

As a result, after the liquidation of the Oka missiles in accordance with the INF Treaty, the USSR could receive deployed Lance-2 missiles of the same class near its borders. It would be a double loss. However, the need for the Lance-2 rocket disappeared due to the fundamental changes in the military-strategic situation in the world after the collapse of the USSR and the abolition of the Warsaw Pact organization. Schultz called the decision regarding the Oka a "divine gift" from Gorbachev. He also said that " this move was so unilaterally beneficial to the West that he is not sure whether the Soviet leaders could have done it if there had been democratic legislatures in Moscow».

NEW REALITY

For more than two decades, our country has managed without ground-based medium-range and shorter-range ballistic missiles. Since then, the situation has changed significantly, and six countries already have land-based medium-range missiles. Among them are China, Iran, North Korea, India, Israel, Pakistan.

In the face of increasing threats at medium range, strategic stability can be ensured different ways. One of them is the improvement of the strategic nuclear forces so that they provide nuclear deterrence in all operational areas without medium-range missiles. The advantage of this path is the reduction in the range of missiles in production and in service.

However, the diversion of part of the ICBMs to solve medium-range combat missions reduces the potential for a retaliatory strike by strategic nuclear forces against enemy targets located at intercontinental ranges. It cannot be ruled out that in the context of the US deployment of a global missile defense system and the growth of medium-range threats, the potential of strategic nuclear forces will be insufficient for nuclear deterrence in all strategic areas.

Another way is to withdraw from the INF Treaty and deploy ground-based intermediate and shorter-range missiles. Academician Aleksey Arbatov's article "Measure Seven Times" presents convincing arguments showing the inexpediency of such a step for Russia. Russia's withdrawal from the INF Treaty will become an "indulgence" for the US to deploy new medium-range missiles in Europe in addition to the missile defense missiles already deployed there. Of course, they can deploy such missiles by being the first to withdraw from this treaty, just as they withdrew from the indefinite ABM Treaty in 2002.

THE THIRD WAY

In addition to the two options outlined for solving the problem of nuclear deterrence, there is another one - to deploy sea-based or air-based medium-range missiles that are not covered by the INF Treaty. However, under the current START Treaty, sea-launched medium-range ballistic missiles deployed on submarines will be counted on a par with intercontinental-range SLBMs. The deployment of medium-range SLBMs by reducing the number of intercontinental-range SLBMs will reduce the potential for a retaliatory strike by strategic nuclear forces in the North American direction, which is unacceptable.

The air-based variant of medium-range ballistic missiles until December 5, 2009 fell under the prohibition of the START-1 Treaty. This treaty prohibited the production, flight testing and deployment of air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs) with a range in excess of 600 km. The current START Treaty does not prohibit the testing and deployment of air-to-surface ballistic missiles. It defines nuclear-armed missiles of this class as one of the types of nuclear weapons for heavy bombers.

It is expedient to consider as possible carriers of medium-range ballistic missiles aircraft that are not classified as heavy bombers by the current START Treaty. One of these aircraft is the Tu-22M3 bomber. In the 1990s, Tupolev OJSC and the Raduga State Design Bureau worked out the use of the modernized Tu-22M3 bomber as a launch platform for the Skif launch vehicle, designed to launch spacecraft into orbit. The three-stage liquid-propellant launch vehicle "Skif" was supposed to be suspended under the fuselage of the bomber. The launch weight of the rocket was 17 tons. The launch was planned at an altitude of 12 km at an aircraft flight speed of 1800 km/h.

The studies carried out in the 1970s and 1980s showed the possibility of creating small-sized monoblock ground-based ICBMs with a launch weight of 11-15 tons. In the mid-70s, as part of the Verenitsa research project, design bureau"Arsenal" them. M.V. Frunze developed a mobile combat missile system of intercontinental range. The launch weight of a monoblock solid-propellant ICBM was 13.5 tons, length -11.4 m, hull diameter -1.28 m. monoblock ICBM. This rocket had a launch weight of about 15 tons, a length of -11.2 m, and a body diameter of -1.36 m.

Ground testing of the missile was fully completed, however, in accordance with an agreement between the leaders of the USSR and the United States, the development of the Courier ICBM and the American small-sized Midgetman ICBM was terminated in October 1991. An even smaller launch weight and dimensions were developed by Yuzhnoye Design Bureau for the Spear-R liquid-propellant ICBM of a mobile ground-based missile system. In 1985, a draft design of this complex was released. The launch weight of the Spear-R rocket was 10.9 tons, the length was 12.9 m, and the body diameter was 1.15 m.

Air-launched medium-range ballistic missiles (up to 5,500 km) due to the use of carrier altitude and flight speed at launch, as well as due to the shorter flight range compared to ICBMs, will have a launch mass of about 7-8 tons. Taking into account the results of studies on the Skif complex in as a carrier of such missiles, it is possible to use the modernized Tu-22M3 bomber. In accordance with the provisions of the 2010 START Treaty, the Tu-22M3 is not a heavy bomber.

According to the Protocol to the START Treaty, "the term "heavy bomber" means a bomber of one type or another, any of the bombers of which meets any of the following criteria: a) it has a range of more than 8,000 km, or b) it is equipped for nuclear air-to-air cruise missiles." long-range basing".

The Tu-22M3 bomber does not meet any of the above criteria. Of the aircraft in service with Russia, only the Tu-95MS and Tu-160 are classified as heavy bombers by the current START Treaty. According to the START Protocol, "the term "heavy bomber equipped for nuclear weapons" means a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, nuclear air-to-surface missiles or nuclear bombs."

Since the Tu-22M3 aircraft is not a heavy bomber, when armed with air-to-surface ballistic missiles, it will not be considered a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear weapons. At the same time, the START Treaty does not impose restrictions on the number of deployed and non-deployed bombers that are not heavy bombers. The treaty provides for the offset of warheads only for deployed heavy bombers. Thus, Tu-22M3 bombers and the warheads of the BR deployed on them will not be counted in the total number of warheads, as well as deployed and non-deployed launch vehicles, limited by the START Treaty.

Another possible medium-range ballistic missile carrier could be the MiG-31 aircraft. In the 80s, on the basis of this fighter, the Kontakt anti-satellite aviation missile system was developed. The complex included the MiG-31D carrier aircraft (designed by the Mikoyan Design Bureau) and the 79M6 Kontakt missile (designed by the Fakel Design Bureau). By the beginning of the 90s, flight and design tests of the carrier aircraft were completed. Due to the termination of funding, work on the complex was discontinued.

In the 1990s, the Mikoyan Design Bureau and the Vympel Design Bureau, based on the MiG-31 fighter, developed a system for launching spacecraft with the RN-S rocket. At the same time, a group of scientists from the Moscow Aviation Institute, with the support of specialists from the Mikoyan Design Bureau, considered the option of using the MiG-31 carrier aircraft for the air launch of the Mikron rocket. The rocket, which had a launch weight of 7 tons, a length of 7.25 m, a width with rudders of 3.7 m, was supposed to launch payloads weighing 150–200 kg into orbits with a height of 250–300 km.

From 2005 to 2007, on the basis of the MiG-31D fighter, the Ishim aviation and missile system was developed, designed to launch payloads into space. The lead developer of the carrier aircraft was the RAC MiG, and the missiles were the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering. The MiG-31I carrier aircraft was supposed to carry a three-stage rocket with a launch weight of 10.3 tons, a length of 10.76 m and a body diameter of 1.34 m. -2230 km/h.

Taking into account the studies on the Ishim complex, it is possible to use the upgraded MiG-31 aircraft as a carrier of medium-range ballistic missiles with a launch weight of up to 10 tons. about the missile attack. The MiG-31 fighter equipped with medium-range ballistic missiles will not meet any of the criteria heavy bomber, and accordingly, this aircraft and the ballistic missiles and their warheads deployed on it will not be subject to the quantitative restrictions of the current START Treaty.

The missile system with air-based medium-range ballistic missiles can be used to solve the problem of nuclear deterrence in the European, eastern and southern strategic directions without the aircraft carrier leaving the country's airspace. Due to the flight range of an aircraft carrier, such a complex can carry out nuclear deterrence simultaneously in several strategic directions. Missile systems with ground-based medium-range ballistic missiles do not have such capabilities.

Medium-range aviation BR can be unified with missiles designed for the operational launch of spacecraft and the interception of satellites. One of the options to reduce costs and reduce the development time for a medium-range missile system is the creation of a ballistic missile using elements of an existing operational-tactical ballistic missile.

Thus, at present there is a technical possibility of creating and deploying air-launched medium-range ballistic missiles outside the prohibitions and quantitative restrictions of the current INF and START treaties. The expediency of implementing this new direction in the improvement of nuclear forces should be determined as a result of a comparative military-economic assessment with other options for maintaining a strategic balance.