Chemical weapons: a terrifying story, a hopeful ending. Chemical disarmament Chemical disarmament

10 years ago, on November 5, 1997, Russia ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use chemical weapons and its destruction (CWC). During this time, our country, and not only it, has come a long way in its implementation. To date, we have destroyed 9633 tons of this heritage cold war out of 40 thousand tons of its reserves. Fulfilled their interim obligations under the Convention. And there is even more difficult work ahead. And it is worth thinking about what worked and what did not.

THE CONVENTION IS ON THE MARCH

The decision to stop the production of chemical weapons (CW) was taken in our country in 1987. And in 1990, a bilateral agreement with the United States on the destruction of chemical weapons was signed. It did not take effect for a number of reasons. One of them can be considered the completion of multilateral negotiations on the key provisions of the draft CWC.

The convention was opened for signature on 13 January 1993. On the same day, Russia signed it. In 1996, the federal target program "Destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons in Russian Federation". In 1997, the Federal Law on CWD was adopted, which, for the first time in the practice of Russian legislation, regulated issues related to the national security in the field of disarmament, taking into account the interests and rights of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation.

The CWC entered into force on 29 April 1997 with 65 ratifications. Russia was not among them, but the law on the ratification of the Convention was already in the State Duma, and practically a decision was made at all levels of government, in principle. But from the point of view of the viability of the document, Moscow's consent to its ratification has become a landmark event, since not only de jure, but de facto, only from this moment can one begin the countdown to the implementation of the provisions of the CWC.

It is clear that against the background of the economic downturn, it was impossible for Russia to complete the elimination of all CW stocks in 10 years, that is, by April 29, 2007, to fulfill the main condition of the Convention. But having agreed with such a requirement, Moscow was oriented in advance to extending the terms for 5 years, which is allowed by the CWC as an exception. By the time the Convention was ratified, Russia had not erected a single facility for the destruction of chemical weapons. The social discontent of the population grew. At the regional levels, such decisions were made that completely ruled out the very possibility of building facilities. And to amend the Convention during this period of time was unrealistic and impossible for political reasons.

And yet, in Russia, they found a very non-standard way out of a seemingly completely hopeless situation. It consisted in the exceptional non-standardness of the Law on the Ratification of the Convention, which (in contrast to the accepted practice of such laws containing only one phrase “to ratify an international treaty, convention, agreement ...”) placed the responsibility for the timing of the implementation of the Convention and the possibility of amending it on the President of the country . It is he who, according to the law, “sets, based on the provisions of the Convention, the deadlines for the destruction of chemical weapons, taking into account the economic situation in the Russian Federation and the need to use the safest technologies for the destruction of chemical weapons”, “┘ensures the participation of the Russian Federation in decision-making on issues related to the Convention , including changes and amendments to it┘".

These provisions of the law, in fact, secured the possibility of extending the terms of the implementation of the Convention, even beyond the allowable extension through amendments.

And, finally, the law includes an article containing a provision that allows Russia “in the event that extraordinary events, including economic or technogenic nature concerning the subject matter of the Convention, jeopardize the supreme interests of the Russian Federation, the procedures established by Section V “Termination or Suspension of International Treaties of the Russian Federation” of the Federal Law “On international treaties Russian Federation". In fact, it stipulates the conditions under which Russia can withdraw from the Convention.

The subsequent period of development of the process of chemical disarmament in Russia was also not easy. In 2000, the Federal Law on the Social Protection of Citizens Working with Chemical Weapons was adopted, which provides for a large list of benefits (about 15 types related to working conditions, rest, treatment, etc.). In 2001, the President of Russia transferred the functions of the state customer of the Program for the destruction of chemical weapons from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense to a purely civilian department - Rosmunitions, which was later transformed into Rosprom. This decision made it possible to remove certain “concerns” of foreign states, which were worried that their gratuitous assistance, given the certain secrecy of the actions of the Russian Ministry of Defense, could be used not for the purpose of destroying chemical weapons, but for the development of new types of weapons.

But much greater value this decision had for Russia itself, since it made it possible to give the process of chemical disarmament a national significance and to single out this problem as a separate block of Russia's priorities, including financing.

In 2001, the State Commission for Chemical Disarmament was formed, designed to establish a constructive dialogue between the federal and regional authorities. This was especially important in this period of time, when the construction of the first object for the destruction of chemical weapons had already begun, but the amount of funding could not satisfy the needs of the regions for social construction. And people on the ground protested against such methods of work. In total, over 50 different normative legal documents were adopted during the period 1997-2007, regulating various areas of activity of the chemical disarmament process, including the development of the program document "Fundamentals of Chemical and Biological Safety until 2010", approved by the President of Russia.

Today, when we celebrate the anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention, nothing prevents Russia from fulfilling its requirements in full: economic recovery and financial stabilization have made it possible to rapidly build facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons, and other tasks are being solved. If there are no force majeure circumstances, then our country will be able to fulfill its obligations and complete the complete destruction of chemical weapons by April 29, 2012. Well, if they arise, Russia will take advantage of the provisions of the Law on Ratification of the Convention, which are mentioned above.

SMOOTH ONLY ON PAPER

However, despite the "holiday mood", it is impossible not to say about the deep disappointment in relation to the international assistance to Russia, which she was so promised. The actual fulfillment of the "promises" leaves not only many questions, but also forces Russia to permanently make changes to the federal program for the destruction of chemical weapons.

The first version of the Program dated 1996 (worth about 16 billion rubles in current prices) provided that destruction would begin four years after the entry into force of the Convention and be completed in 2005. Within four years after the completion of the destruction of chemical weapons, work should have been carried out related to the decommissioning of destruction facilities, the degassing of process equipment, the sanitation of placement sites, and the operation of landfills solid waste. The inconsistency of the Program manifested itself immediately after its adoption, since its resource provision was a few percent of the required funds, as well as the volume of international assistance.

The second version of the Program dated 2001 (federal costs - 92.7 billion rubles) was largely designed for international support, to the extent that its provisions included, for example, the transportation of chemical weapons from the storage base in the city of Kizner, Udmurt Republic to the facility for the destruction of chemical weapons, located in the city of Shchuchye, Kurgan region, as one of the requirements of the United States, stipulating the provision of assistance. However, the failure to meet the deadlines for the construction of the Shchuchye facility and the failure to fulfill financial obligations on the part of the United States, as well as the calculation of the cost of such transportation, comparable to the volume of American assistance, revealed the impossibility of implementing the Program either according to the construction schedules of the facilities, or in terms of their commissioning.

The third edition of the Program of 2005 (federal spending - 160.4 billion rubles) was already more focused on own forces, although it also included a significant amount of expected international assistance. However, once again, expectations were not met. Aid continued to come "drip" and did not make a significant contribution to the construction of facilities. Although an exception must be made here - Germany provided us with quite effective assistance. Even not so much in terms of money, but in the responsible fulfillment of the obligations assumed.

And the biggest miscalculation of the third edition of the Program was the inclusion of a schedule for the construction of a facility for the destruction of chemical weapons in the city of Pochep Bryansk region funded by Italy. Rome promised him 360 million euros. The agreement with Italy has not entered into force to this day. And there are no special hopes that it can be implemented in the near future.

The fourth edition of the Program was adopted quite recently - in July 2007 (federal spending - 183.8 billion rubles). It once again clarified the terms for the construction of facilities for destruction and their commissioning. The reason is the same - the lack of international assistance. Appendix 7 to this Program contains information on the amounts of funds provided by 15 countries providing assistance under the agreements concluded (that is, having legal force) and their actual implementation from the moment of signing until January 1, 2007. For the USA and Germany - since 1992, for some others - since 2000, 2001 and subsequent years. And the total amount of assistance provided for by the agreements is 1955.09 million dollars, while the real contribution is only 363.64 million dollars.

These data lead to sad reflections that this fourth edition of the Program is not the last.

HALF-EMPLOYED PROMISES

Russia has repeatedly at the official level in a mild form (at the expert level - more critically and straightforwardly) drew the attention of foreign partners to problems in cooperation. Naturally, donors do not like our reproaches. And in recent times their comments on this issue began to appear more and more often, the essence of which boils down to the fact that "Russia now has a lot of money and does not need help."

One could agree with this if there were no problems of a higher political rank behind such decisions. First, if the donor country does not want to continue to provide assistance, then it must formally refuse to implement the agreements concluded. With all the ensuing consequences from the standpoint of international law.

But for political reasons, such a step is practically impossible. Therefore, we can expect the continuation of the policy of delaying investment and indirect pressure on Russia to make decisions to increase the share of its own financing, which, in fact, is happening. The data on the cost of the Program presented earlier speaks clearly of this.

Secondly, the refusal to assist will destroy the established international cooperation in the joint solution of not only the fundamental goal of the Convention - the complete and irreversible destruction of an entire class of weapons mass destruction which is without precedent in disarmament processes, but will also undermine the foundations of the G8 global partnership in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It can be confidently asserted that none of the states today will dare to take such a step.

Only one conclusion can be drawn from what has been said. Russia, of course, will have to increase the amount of its own funding for the Program if we intend to continue to strictly follow the requirements of the Convention and complete the destruction of chemical weapons by April 2012.

DOES THE CWC HAVE A FUTURE

True, outside of the anniversary events, there is some concern about the future of the Convention and, to some extent, the national program for the destruction of chemical weapons. There is a danger of the emergence of "dead" cities. This refers to the unresolved issues of further use of large industrial facilities created and being created for the destruction of chemical agents with a powerful engineering and social infrastructure in 7 regions of Russia, which may cease to exist after the completion of the CW elimination process. According to the requirements of the Convention, CW destruction facilities are subject to destruction upon completion of work.

Untimeliness or insufficient thoughtfulness of the decisions taken by the authorities on the designated problem will certainly lead to negative social consequences. Today there is only a fundamental decision (without technical and economic calculations and identification of sources of financing) that such objects should be converted and subsequently used for national economic purposes. The program provides that specific solutions on the conversion of such objects should be taken two years before the completion of work on the object for its main purpose, which is clearly not enough. In practice, the coordination of projects, their examination, the purchase and installation of equipment and other preparatory work take a much longer time.

The possibility of involving the international community in solving this problem is also not considered. Although the interest in the joint development of such projects could be quite high. One could declare, for example, international competition for the development of conversion projects for CWD facilities or to form an international consortium for the production of civilian products at converted facilities in the interests of all participating States or to develop other investment projects beneficial to all. A cause for concern is the unresolved issue regarding non-lethal types of chemical weapons that are not prohibited from being used for police purposes. Since there are no clear and unambiguous interpretations of the definitions of "military or police operation".

And against the background of the fact that today we are witnesses and participants (willing or unwitting) of the process of disintegration of many agreements in the field of disarmament, reduction and limitation of arms and military equipment Apparently, the time has come to take all possible measures to preserve the CWC and strengthen its provisions. For example, even problems with rendering assistance to Russia can be considered from positions of the importance for the purposes of the Convention.

In particular, the actions of a donor country, for various reasons, reducing the volume of investment and at the same time violating the terms of payments, from the standpoint of complying with the terms of the agreements as a party to the Convention, can be regarded as creating conditions for Russia to fail to comply with the Convention. And, as actions leading to the destruction of this unique and the only multilateral treaty in the history of mankind on the destruction of an entire class of weapons of mass destruction.

But there is another danger of destroying the Convention, which the participating States prefer to pass over in silence. It is increasingly emerging information (not at the official level yet) that the US will not complete the destruction of its CW stockpiles by 2012. At the expert level, the terms from 2013 to 2023 are called. And, if events continue to develop in this way, it is worth asking the question: what should Russia do in such a situation? Destroy all of its CW stockpiles within a set timeframe, or see if the US keeps up to 25% of its total stockpile? Maybe it's worth slowing down the implementation of your program and combining your destruction deadlines with the American ones?

This question is far from idle for our country and its security.

- one of the weapons mass destruction, whose action is based on the use of combat toxic chemical substances(BTHV). HTS includes poisonous substances (OS) and toxins that have a damaging effect on the human and animal body, as well as phytotoxicants that can be used for military purposes to destroy various kinds vegetation.

According to military terminology, chemical weapons include single-use (artillery shells, air bombs, sabers, etc.) and reusable chemical munitions or so-called chemical warfare devices (pouring and spraying aviation devices, thermomechanical and mechanical generators).

According to the legal definition used in international treaty processes, chemical weapons include: toxic chemicals and chemicals involved at any stage of their production; ammunition and devices designed to be destroyed by toxic chemicals; any equipment specially designed for the use of chemical munitions and other similar devices.

The use of chemical weapons can result in severe environmental and genetic consequences, the elimination of which will take a long time.

In 1993, in Paris, the UN member states opened for signing the Chemical Weapons Convention, which prohibits the production and stockpiling of many chemicals. The "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction" (CWC) entered into force on 29 April 1997 for 87 States Parties (another 22 countries ratified the Convention within 180 days of its entry into force).

The most important obligation under the Convention is the destruction of chemical weapons. It is also the most costly element in the implementation of the Convention.

Much of the cost of destruction relates to investment in state-of-the-art technology that minimizes the risk to the public and the environment at every stage of transport and destruction of ammunition, as well as in the process of removal and destruction of poisonous substances, and therefore, destruction must be carried out on highly specialized objects.
There are two main technological approaches to the destruction of toxic substances - direct combustion of toxic agents and neutralization through various chemical reactions. Participating States must submit to the Technical Secretariat detailed plans, specifying the process to be used in the destruction activity and the deadlines to be met.

One of the main requirements - ensuring the safety of people and the environment, is achieved by using a modern progressive method of destruction of chemical weapons, which was developed by Russian scientists - a two-stage technology for the destruction of chemical weapons, by hydrolysis, when at the first stage the agents are destroyed by exposure to a chemical reagent and at the second stage, the resulting reaction mass is calcined in a thermal furnace (up to 1000 degrees Celsius).

In September 2013, the US announced that it was moving to a two-stage technology for the destruction of chemical weapons. Today it is the only technology in the world that has successfully passed a joint international expert assessment in laboratory conditions on both American and Russian agents and has received a positive assessment from the International Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

According to the data of the group for work and public relations of the facility for the storage and destruction of chemical weapons in the village of Kizner of the Republic of Udmurtia, developed as part of information support for the implementation of the Convention, the process of destruction of chemical munitions begins with their delivery from the storage facility to the production building. Delivery is carried out in sealed transport and technological containers, on specially equipped vehicles.

Ammunition is subjected to 100% final control before shipment.

At the first stage, in the production premises, the ammunition is once again checked and prepared for destruction.

Further, the ammunition is moved to the demilitarization unit, in which the ammunition body is reamed and the OM is removed. From this moment on, all operations with ammunition are carried out automatically.

Control technological process produced from a remote control panel, using automatic control microprocessors, signaling, blocking and emergency protection systems.

The extracted OM is reloaded into the reactor, in which the detoxification process is carried out to obtain reaction masses. The resulting reaction masses are subject to further processing, which consists in their thermal decomposition with a multi-stage system for cleaning gaseous emissions.

Transportation of liquid agents, obtained reaction masses through pipelines is carried out with the help of vacuum created by vacuum pumps.

After extracting the OM, the ammunition is repeatedly washed with a degassing solution. At the next stage, the ammunition is subjected to heat treatment, during which the thermal destruction of the residual agents in micropores and in paintwork body, which guarantees the safe conduct of further operations. At the final stage, the hulls of ammunition are sent to irreversible deformation, where they are brought into a state unsuitable for further use.

In case of exceeding the threshold concentrations of OM in the air of industrial premises, emergency ventilation is automatically switched on, and measures are taken to eliminate gas contamination. Gas pollution is constantly monitored by automatic gas control devices.

To provide environmental safety during destruction, several independent environmental monitoring services operate at each facility for the destruction of OM. This is the service of the facility where the destruction takes place, the state centers for environmental control and monitoring, the supervisory authorities of local environmental services, as well as foreign observers.

By 2013, Russia had destroyed more than 76% of its stockpiles of chemical weapons - about 30,000 tons.

The material was prepared on the basis of information from RIA Novosti

The open electronic journal "CHEMICAL DISARMAMENT" is a joint project Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation and the Federal Directorate for the Safe Storage and Destruction of Chemical Weapons (Federal Directorate).

From 2012 to the present, the information and technical support of the journal is provided by the Federal Office.

An electronic journal is a mass media created and implemented in electronic form, distributed via the Internet. It is a collection of informational, analytical, photo and video materials, constantly updated in the information part. The electronic form of the journal gives it the widest possible character both in terms of special thematic sections (scientific, technical, environmental, socio-political, international), and in terms of genre diversity ( analytical publications, interviews and reports). Its goal is to make more open and accessible information about the process of destruction of chemical weapons in Russia and in the world. The electronic journal provides answers to almost all questions in the field of chemical disarmament, from terminology to the completion of the destruction of chemical weapons and the conversion of facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons (Objects).

The "News" section publishes the latest and verified information on the progress in the destruction of chemical weapons, political, economic, social and international aspects this process. In the "Publications" section, you can get acquainted with the materials of the Russian, including the regional press. The "Documents" section contains materials from the Russian and international legal framework. There are also sections "Terms", "Chemical weapons", "Objects", "Interviews and press conferences", "Competitions", "Media galleries", etc.

Placement of materials in the journal is carried out by specialists of the public relations group of the Federal Office. The motto of the electronic journal is “Openness. Publicity. Efficiency". The electronic address of the journal: www.khimrazoruzhenie.rf.

On the website of the open electronic journal " Chemical disarmament» From 2012 to the present, more than 90 materials prepared by employees of the group for work and public relations (Group) of the Kambarka facility have been posted. Among them: information about the activities of the Facility, environmental and medical monitoring, built on the territory of the Kambarsky district as part of the implementation of the federal target program "Destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons in the Russian Federation", social facilities, and field events held by the Group. In addition, information is provided on ongoing "round tables", telephone "hot" lines, environmental camps and children's drawing competitions "A world without chemical weapons!". Here you can find articles by the Group's employees published in regional and local media, brochures and information sheets issued by the Group.

As already mentioned, Russia signed the Convention in January 1993. and ratified in November 1997. However, as always, "it was smooth on paper, but the ravines were forgotten."

A bit of history. Even in the process of developing the Convention, the former leadership of the USSR made a decision (independent and individual) to reduce chemical weapons. In 1985 (8 years before the appearance of the Convention) the construction of the first facility for the destruction of chemical weapons began (Chapaev, Samara region). The plant was built in a record short time - in 2 years, but was never put into operation, which was caused by political, economic and social changes in Russia at the turn of the late 80s and early 90s, plus aggression from the so-called fighters for the environment pursuing exclusively their own interests and therefore playing on the issues of safety and environmental friendliness of the object. (Tell about German OV in the Baltic). As a result, the object was first frozen, and then redesigned into a training center for training specialists of the appropriate profile.

CW stocks in Russia include ammunition and aviation instruments, missile troops and artillery ( Ground troops) in the equipment of RH, as well as stocks of RH in containers. The total amount of OM in Russia (standard) is about 40 thousand tons, of which about 80% is in equipped ammunition (CW of the 1st category).

The ratification process was complex, it took more than 4 years since the signing of the CWC.

Main arguments against:

– unrealistic implementation of the Convention within the specified timeframe (10 years) due to the unavailability of the material and technical base and the impossibility of full financial support for the destruction of chemical weapons;

– unacceptability of the requirements of the CWC on physical destruction CW producing facilities;

- "high cost" for Russia of the cost of international inspections (several tens of millions of dollars a year);

– lack of confidence in the measures of control over the fulfillment of the requirements of the Convention, especially over the covert continuation of research in the field of chemical weapons.

Arguments in favor of ratification:

- "growth" of Russia's foreign economic influence;

- a significant increase in international financial and technical assistance for the destruction of chemical weapons;

– increasing the volume of information through the Organization for the Prohibition of CW (OPCW) about weapons and technologies of other countries; assessment of real and potential threats in this area; creation of new jobs and development of high technologies;

- an increase in the volume of foreign trade in chemical products, the exclusion of economic losses due to the imposition of sanctions against Russia in the event of non-ratification of the CWC;

– reduction of the danger of chemical terrorism, incl. in connection with the non-prohibition of the development of means of protection against chemical weapons.

The theoretical and legal readiness of Russia to start fulfilling its obligations is reflected in the approved in March 1996. (as amended in 2001) by the Government of the Russian Federation of the target federal programs"On the destruction of CW stocks in the Russian Federation".

The main goal of the Program is the destruction of CW stocks in Russia in accordance with the CWC and the removal of the socio-psychological tension of the population in the areas of storage due to the emerging risks of long-term storage of stocks. The program was to be completed within the period from 1995 to 2009, with a total cost of about 20 billion rubles and 500 million dollars for purposes related to ensuring international control. However, for economic reasons, the timing was unrealistic.

The new edition of the Program (2001) contains a number of new fundamental provisions:

- clarification of the timing of the destruction of chemical weapons of the 1st category, which is planned to be completed before April 29, 2012. by stages.

Completion of the conversion or destruction of CW production facilities within the time limits established by the CWC, i.e. April 29, 2003 and until April 29, 2007.

– reduction in the number and scale of facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons (construction of 6 facilities instead of 7, of which only two are full-scale);

– destruction or utilization of OM detoxification products at existing industrial facilities, which makes it possible to exclude the construction of special landfills for waste disposal;

- organization of a rotational method of operation of objects for the destruction of chemical weapons, which reduces the need for human resources and the cost of building special infrastructure facilities for the personnel of the facilities;

– carrying out a set of foreign policy measures to provide donor assistance for the destruction of chemical weapons.

The total cost of the Program was already estimated at 93 billion rubles in 2001 prices. However, the financial support of the Program began to fail from the very beginning, and in such a situation, Russia even until 2012 unable to fulfill its obligations. The real cost of the Program, taking into account inflation until 2012. will already amount to about 175 billion rubles and, therefore, annually it is necessary to allocate from 12 to 15 billion rubles for it. It was the enormous cost of chemical disarmament (more expensive than arms) that made Russia, when signing the CWC, turn to the international community for help. The United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy issued verbal assurances of financial and logistical support for Russia's efforts.

Yet, despite financial difficulties, Russia has by now done a lot in the field of its chemical disarmament.

Firstly, a regulatory and legal framework has been created to ensure the destruction of chemical weapons. These include:

– Federal Law “On the Destruction of Chemical Weapons”, 1997;

– Federal Law “On Ratification of the CWC” of 1997;

- Federal Law "On the social protection of citizens employed in work with chemical weapons" 2000.

There are more than 40 different normative acts of the Government of the Russian Federation on the implementation of these laws. In particular, full responsibility for the implementation of the CWC is assigned to the established Russian Ammunition Agency (Rosammunition), i.e. the main functions of chemical disarmament were transferred from the Ministry of Defense to a civilian agency, which is Rosboepripasy.

Taking into account that about 20 federal executive authorities and authorities of the constituent entities of the Federation are involved in chemical disarmament, in order to coordinate their activities, by decree of the President of the Russian Federation in 2001. The State Commission for Chemical Disarmament was created, chaired by Kiriyenko (then - authorized representative President in the Primorsky Federal District, where the main chemical weapons production and storage bases are located).

Secondly, the destruction of chemical weapons of category II (mainly phosgene) and category III was completed within the time limits established by the CWC.

Thirdly, work is underway to destroy or convert CW production facilities. Completion of these works by April 29, 2007. a very real challenge.

Fourth, construction was completed (2002) of the first Russian facility for the destruction of chemical weapons (settlement Gorny Saratov region, 1% XO). In December 2002 it was put into operation.

Fifth, in all CW storage areas, work has almost been completed on the creation of social and engineering infrastructure facilities necessary for the start of construction of CW destruction facilities. Some of these facilities have already been put into operation (the town of Shchuchye, Kurgan Region, the first stage was built with gratuitous assistance from the United States in accordance with the agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States in 1999).

In general, it can be said that only one provision of the CWC - on the timing of the destruction of CW of the 1st category, is not implemented by Russia. At the same time, Russia, which has the world's largest stocks of chemical weapons, both when signing the CWC and when ratifying it, drew attention to the difficulties that it would have to face in the practical implementation of the Convention.

Possible international consequences of Russia's lack of its own funds for the destruction of chemical weapons can be:

- decrease in the effectiveness of the CWC and, as a result, failure to fulfill its main goal - universality, or its collapse (until Russia destroys CW, other countries will also keep it);

- Deterioration of the socio-political situation in the regions where CW storage bases are located and where facilities for its destruction are being built. This deterioration may develop due to the fact that Russia cannot fully meet the high-cost demands of the population in these regions. An example is the experience of a CW destruction facility built but not put into operation in the city of Chapaevsk (mass protests, strikes, blockade of facilities, etc.). Such actions may lead to a delay in the fulfillment of obligations under the CWC.

Thus, summing up the analysis of the problem of chemical disarmament in Russia, it must be stated that at present the effectiveness of the CWC as a whole is determined by Russia's success or failure in fulfilling its convention obligations. With a favorable outcome since 2012. the world will exist without CW. This is where all the prospects of modern CW lie.

In a month, in September 2017, the Russian Federation will complete the process of destroying stockpiles of one of the types of weapons of mass destruction - chemical weapons. Our country will fully fulfill its obligations on international convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Convention). The Federal Target Program "Destruction of Chemical Weapons Stockpiles in the Russian Federation" (the Program) is being completed safely, efficiently and a year ahead of schedule, saving more than 2 billion rubles of budgetary funds.

FROM CURARE TO VX

The idea of ​​inflicting defeat on the enemy with toxic substances people spied on nature. Spiders, insects, snakes, even poisonous plants used this "weapon" from prehistoric times, which was not slow to use and a reasonable person. The natives of the Amazon and the pygmies of Africa still impregnate their arrows with the poison of frogs or plants.

Mentions that suffocating smoke from the burnt dried hot pepper or wells and other water sources were poisoned, there are many ancient written documents. The "stinking gases" obtained chemically were first used by the British during the Crimean War in 1853-56, filling them with cannonballs. However, this was not yet a full-fledged chemical weapon, the soldiers protected themselves from the fetid smoke by simply wrapping themselves in wet scarves. But by the beginning of the 20th century, real chemical warfare agents (CW) were being put into service by the European powers, which were massively used in the First World War of 1914-1918. The first chemical attack with chlorine gas was undertaken by the German army on the position of the Anglo-French troops near the Belgian town of Ypres on April 22, 1915. Up to 5 thousand soldiers died on the spot, and even more were injured. And besides, according to various estimates, up to a million people were struck by lewisite and other OM in that war. Someone died immediately, someone died slowly and painfully.

CONVENTION

Seeing and realizing the catastrophic consequences of the use of chemical weapons, the countries of the world immediately began negotiations to ban them. Several international agreements restricting the use of asphyxiating gases (the Versailles Treaty of 1919, the Washington Conference of 1921, the Geneva Protocol of 1925), but in some cases chemical warfare agents were still used very for a long time, and even today continue to be used in the military conflict in Syria. However, in fairness, it should be noted that after the First World War, chemical weapons were not used en masse. Even the Nazis were careful not to use OM on the battlefields (although in concentration camps they poisoned people with the infamous cyclone B gas). Chemical weapons continued to be improved and stockpiled until the 1980s. During the years of the Cold War, the United States of America and the Soviet Union produced the most combat weapons. The agreement reached in the early 1990s between these countries on chemical disarmament formed the basis for the signing of an international convention in 1993. The world unanimously welcomed this agreement, the Convention has become one of the largest in terms of the number of participating countries. To date, only 4 states - North Korea, Israel (signed but not ratified the Convention), Egypt and South Sudan - have not acceded to it. Three of these countries, according to experts - Israel, Egypt and North Korea - may have stockpiles of chemical weapons. Initially, the United States, Russia, South Korea, India, Albania and Libya, it was also in Syria, which acceded to the Convention in 2013.

TIME FOR A CHANGE

The Chinese, who have maintained their statehood for several millennia and have noticed many patterns in the life of society, have such a wish to their enemies: "May you live in a time of change." The implementation of the federal target program "Destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons in the Russian Federation", adopted in 1996, began precisely at that time.

In the context of the collapse of a single state, the general crisis accompanied by a military conflict in the North Caucasus, and active foreign influence on Russian policy, seemingly insurmountable difficulties arose to fulfill the convention obligations. There were no industrial enterprises for the safe destruction of chemical weapons (CW), no appropriate technologies, no specialists, no finances ... But there was active resistance from regional authorities and the local population to the creation of CW facilities. Here and there whole arsenals flew into the air conventional ammunition, there were other terrible man-made disasters. The destruction of chemical weapons was opposed by some parties that at that time had their representatives in the State Duma and many regional representative bodies of power. They believed that this would weaken the defenses. Russia's enemies also put a spoke in the wheel, striving in every possible way to present our country as incapable of fulfilling its obligations under the international Convention. There were serious talks in the central media, in parliament, and at other venues that Russia should not ratify the Convention (which it initiated itself!) and that its implementation should be postponed until better times or that chemical weapons stockpiles should be transferred under international control altogether. There were a clear minority of people who believed that the country would be able to cope with the convention obligations, and there were only a few specialists who could safely and on time solve this combat mission.

Fortunately for Russia, there are always heroes in difficult times. In the 90s, it could only be the military, who guarded and maintained chemical weapons. In many military collectives, discipline and order were observed. The corresponding decision was made in 1992, when the Directorate for the Elimination of Chemical Weapons was formed under the Office of the Chief of the Radiation, Chemical and Biological Protection Troops (RCBZ). This structure subsequently grew into an independent federal budgetary institution - the Federal Directorate for the Safe Storage and Destruction of Chemical Weapons under the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation (Federal Directorate), which turns 25 on August 22, 2017. And already in September current year Colonel-General Valery Kapashin, the founder and permanent head of the Federal Directorate, Doctor of Technical Sciences, professor, twice laureate of the Government of the Russian Federation Prize in the field of science and technology, is ready to report to the President of the Russian Federation, to the citizens of our country and the people of the entire planet on the complete completion of the destruction of existing stocks of chemical weapons. Having overcome all objective and subjective difficulties, the staff of the Federal Administration completed the Program safely a year ahead of schedule, saving more than 2 billion rubles of budgetary funds. In due time, 7 modern large facilities for the industrial destruction of chemical weapons were created in Russia (near each CW arsenal). In 4 stages, starting from 2002, all the 40 thousand tons of chemical warfare agents in storage, which were equipped with 4.4 million chemical munitions, were destroyed (if they were placed along the equator around the earth, they would be less than than every 10 meters!). Part of the chemical munitions contained not only poisonous, but also explosives which could not be extracted. And these sophisticated munitions were also destroyed using domestic technology. Russian specialists at Russian enterprises. Our country has once again demonstrated to the world an amazing ability to effectively respond to the most acute challenges of our time.

STAGES OF THE HEROIC JOURNEY

Much has already been said and written about how CWD facilities were created, how relations with the local population were built, how security was ensured, how the process of detoxification of military agents was carried out, how other issues were resolved during the destruction of chemical weapons. Of course, the implementation of the Program will be analyzed and discussed for a long time. uneasy combat mission, historical in its significance, the implementation of which began in the conditions of an acute crisis, ends in an exemplary manner, with a demonstration of the highest professionalism, a manifestation of courage and heroism. She became one of the first "stones" that the resurgent country "collects" today. This victory can and should serve as an example of the fulfillment of military and civic duty.

The first facility for the destruction of chemical warfare agents was built under the leadership of the Federal Administration and put into operation in the village. Mountain Saratov region in December 2002. There, 1,100 tons of poisonous substances with a blistering effect, mustard gas and lewisite, were stored in special large-capacity containers. They were completely and safely destroyed in 2005.

In the same 2005, the Kambarka facility in the Udmurt Republic was put into operation, where 6.4 thousand tons of blister agents (lewisite) were stored in special large-capacity tanks. The team of the Kambarka object coped with the task in 2009.

In 2006, the third Russian object"Maradykovsky" in the village. Mirny, Kirov region, where aviation chemical munitions were stored, equipped with the latest generation of organophosphorus agents (sarin, soman, VX-type agents), as well as lewisite, with a total mass of 6.9 thousand tons. In October 2015, it was destroyed at this facility last chemical munition.

In 2008, the Leonidovka facility in the Penza region began to destroy chemical weapons. All 6.9 thousand tons of organophosphorus poisonous substances stored on it, equipped with aviation chemical munitions, were completely destroyed in September 2015.

The Shchuchye facility in the Kurgan region was put into operation in 2009. In November 2015, the facility team successfully completed the main work, destroying 5.5 thousand tons of organophosphorus agents loaded into chemical munitions for cannon and rocket artillery.

In 2010, work began on the destruction of chemical weapons at the Pochep facility, the largest in terms of stocks of chemical agents, in the Bryansk region. All 7.5 thousand tons of organophosphorus poisonous substances stored on it, equipped with aviation chemical munitions, were successfully destroyed in October 2015.

The seventh Kizner facility in the Udmurt Republic was commissioned in December 2013. There were stored 5.7 thousand tons of organophosphorus poisonous substances and lewisite in artillery chemical munitions. At this facility and, accordingly, in the Russian Federation as a whole, the last chemical munition will be destroyed at the end of September 2017.

The process of destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons in the Russian Federation took place in four stages.

According to the requirements of the Convention and the Program, by April 2003, 400 tons of poisonous substances were destroyed, which accounted for 1% of the available stocks. It was stage I.

In April 2007, stage II was completed, destroying 8,000 tons of organic matter, which accounted for more than 20% of the reserves.

In November 2009, stage III was completed: 18 thousand tons of chemical agents, or more than 45% of all stocks of chemical weapons, were destroyed.

A number of states (Germany, USA, Switzerland, Holland, Canada, etc.) provided technical assistance to our country in the implementation of the Program. This assistance in total amounted to about 10% of the funds spent. The main load in the amount of more than 288.9 billion rubles was borne by the Russian budget.

COMPENSATION TO THE LOCAL POPULATION

At the expense of the Program, as was provided for by its provisions, many social infrastructure facilities have been built in the regions where chemical weapons are stored and destroyed. Among them are more than 400 multi-apartment residential buildings, 14 hospitals, 22 children's educational institutions, 3 Houses of Culture, 3 buildings of the District Department of Internal Affairs, 3 baths, 1 Water Sports Palace, 3 sports complexes, 7 electrical substations, 11 boiler houses, 2 solid waste landfills, a water intake facility, a pond… 10.5 km of power supply networks, 201.0 km of water supply networks, 29.9 km of heat supply, 516.0 km of gas supply have been laid. 52.9 km of streets have been landscaped, 155.0 km of roads have been repaired. This is the infrastructure of a small Russian city.

In the Pochepsky district of the Bryansk region, in the Shchuchansky district of the Kurgan region, in the Penza district of the Penza region, in the Krasnopartizansky district of the Saratov region, in the Orichevsky and Kotelnichsky districts of the Kirov region, in the Kambarsky and Kiznersky districts of the Udmurt Republic, thousands of families were able to get new apartments, the old problems of capital repair or construction of new buildings of central district hospitals, clinics, schools, kindergartens, etc. Up to 10% of the cost of each of the seven facilities for the storage and destruction of chemical weapons has been allocated for these purposes.

In gratitude for getting rid of the dangerous neighborhood with the arsenals of military agents and for significant assistance in solving pressing social problems, residents of the regions of storage and destruction of chemical weapons awarded Colonel-General Valery Kapashin the title of "Honorary Citizen of the Udmurt Republic", "Honorary Citizen of the Pochepsky District of the Bryansk Region", "Honorary Citizen of the Krasnopartizansky District of the Saratov Region", "Honorary Citizen of the Kambarsky District of the Udmurt Republic", "Honorary Citizen of the Kiznersky District of the Udmurt Republic". He was awarded the medal of the Order "For Merit to the Penza Region", the badge of honor "For Merit to Kirov region" and etc.

PARTNERS LOST

As soon as Russia ratified the Convention in 1997, the United States immediately, in the same year, began to destroy its stockpiles of chemical weapons. Now it is no longer a secret that their chemical ammunition was made of duralumin to facilitate the design. This made it possible to increase the ammunition load of the bomber, however, such products turned out to be completely unsuitable for long-term storage and, in the language of the military, actively “flowed” in the 80s.

The Americans used the technology of simple combustion of OM in special chambers. She turned out to be unreliable. Per a short time At least 5 emissions of toxic substances into the atmosphere were recorded, which broke through numerous filters. Upon learning of this, the public and the local population actively opposed the use of such technology. The process of chemical disarmament in the United States has slowed down sharply. The US government asked the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to extend the deadline for completing its program by 5 years from 2007 to 2012, and then the Americans even announced that they would destroy the last chemical munition no earlier than 2023.

Against this background, our country, which since the Cold War has received 25% more chemical weapons than the Americans had (they had 30 thousand tons), and which began its industrial destruction 5 years later, turned out to be technologically more advanced in this matter . Despite the fact that we, following the Americans, also asked the OPCW to extend the implementation of our Program, we did not delay until 2023. Firstly, this would require additional budget funds in the amount of at least several tens of billions of rubles. Secondly, it is safer to destroy chemical munitions more quickly, and to re-profil the created chemical enterprises in a shorter time for the production of peaceful products. The effective destruction of chemical warfare agents in the Russian Federation has demonstrated the highest professional qualifications of our military, scientists, engineers and other specialists.

WAS IT NEEDED TO DESTROY THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS?

For the vast majority of analysts, military, political figures and ordinary citizens, the answer is clear and unambiguous: it was necessary to destroy the stockpiles of existing chemical weapons.

Because all chemical munitions have served more than once extended shelf life. All without exception. Every year they represented more and more great danger for the local population. Already in the late 80s of the last century, the command Soviet army was forced to urgently develop, manufacture and put into practice mobile complexes for the destruction of emergency special products (KUASI), which destroyed chemical munitions that failed. Of course, it was possible to renew the arsenals of chemical warfare, but it is not by chance that even before the Convention, our country unilaterally stopped the production of chemical warfare agents and repurposed part of the production capacity for peaceful purposes. By that time, it became obvious to all sensible people that the planet Earth was already rapidly “overloaded” with chemistry due to the development and spread of industrial production. Fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides, detergents and cleaning agents, petrochemicals, perfumes, household chemicals, the production of synthetic materials and other artificially obtained compounds are released into the atmosphere after their use, enter the water, and litter the soil in landfills in the form of waste. This causes problems on a planetary scale. Hundreds of species of plants and animals disappear from the face of the earth every year, the climate is changing, the quality of food, drinking water and air is declining. The large-scale use of chemical weapons would sharply push the whole of humanity into the abyss, and by getting rid of it, people will receive hope for solving the problem of environmental pollution. The chemical apocalypse has been pushed back, and there is more time to get serious about ecology.

In any case, this debatable issue in no way concerned and does not concern the Federal Office. The specialists of this organization are honorably completing the most difficult combat mission, which was set by the country's top political leadership. By the way, the staff of the Federal Administration worked under the motto "Let's leave to posterity clean planet! During the destruction of chemical weapons in the Russian Federation, not a single case of a breakthrough in environment toxic substances or products of their destruction, not a single person was injured.

Behind all this is the hard work of many thousands of employees. Russian organizations and enterprises and, first of all, the staff of the Federal Administration. His boss, Colonel-General Valery Kapashin, has been on continuous business trips for the past two decades, constantly on the road, crossing half the country from Bryansk to the Urals, from Saratov to Izhevsk, held thousands of meetings, planning meetings, commissions, meetings, events for the launch and closing of objects ... And this work of the Federal Office should be appreciated.