The years of the Japanese war beginning and end. Soviet-Japanese War (1945)

Career and finance 16.10.2019
Career and finance

A promise had to be kept

Everything in Russia more people deny the effectiveness of the Neutrality Pact between the USSR and Japan (1941) and justify military action Soviet Union against Japan after the end of World War II, which gave rise to the problem of the "northern territories" and the tragedy of the Siberian prisoners of war. Retired KGB colonel Alexei Kirichenko, who revealed the truth about the problem of Soviet arrests, in an interview with our newspaper stressed that this point of view is erroneous.

Ryosuke Endo: On April 5, 1945, the USSR informed Japan that it would not renew the Neutrality Pact. In this regard, many argue that the war against Japan is not a problem.

Alexei Kirichenko: Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov told Japanese Ambassador Naotake Sato that he did not intend to renew the pact. However, the experienced ambassador ensured that Molotov recognized that he was valid until April 25, 1946. Then Stalin "corrected" this agreement and attacked Japan, but the agreement between the foreign ministers should not be violated.
Asahi Shimbun 08/23/2016

He went through the Siberian camps

Mainichi Shimbun 08/15/2016
- Recently, a Japanese specialist quoted the words of the Japanese military, voiced in 1941, as well as the theory of the movement to the north of Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka (Yosuke Matsuoka). This specialist argues that Japan did not intend to comply with the neutrality pact.

“War thinking is the work of the military. in the Navy and ground forces Ah, there were people who opposed the war with the USSR. Matsuoka's views did not coincide with those of the government. In July of the same year it was changed. It doesn't matter who had what plans.

“Some also claim that Soviet Far Eastern forces held Japan back from attack.

- In fact, in the fall of 1941, Japan transferred part of the Kwantung Army to the south, quickly concentrating there military power. In September, the USSR understood that Japan would not be able to start a war with such a composition. At the end of October, Stalin held a meeting with the Far Eastern military leaders and the leadership of the Communist Party, during which it was decided to transfer the Far Eastern units to the west (to fight the Nazis). They were sure that Japan would not attack. On November 7, 1941, the Far Eastern forces took part in the parade on Red Square and went west to participate in the war. Thanks to this, an attack on Moscow was avoided. In the period from 1941 to 1943, the well-trained and armed 42nd division was completely transferred from the Far East to the west.

- From Manchuria, attacks on the territory of the USSR were often made. Some believe that they were a manifestation of Japanese intentions to attack the USSR.

- After the conflict on the Khalkhin Gol River (1939), Japan carefully monitored so as not to violate Soviet borders. The fact is that at the height of the Sino-Japanese war, Japan could not conduct military operations in two directions. At the same time, the Kwantung Army arrested Soviet deserters and intelligence officers, so it seems to me that the border violations were more likely from the USSR.

- How did the USSR decide to attack Japan?

- I believe that in the first half of the war the Neutrality Pact was extremely beneficial for both the USSR and Japan. Nevertheless, after the Battle of Stalingrad (1942-1943), the USSR realized own strength starting to prepare for war with Japan. The Defense Committee decided to lay railway from Komsomolsk-on-Amur to Sovetskaya Gavan to prepare an offensive against Japan. Construction was completed a few days before the planned date, which was 1 August 1945.

- Also, many argue that the Second World War ended not thanks to the atomic bombing, but precisely thanks to the actions of the USSR. Thus they justify the attack on Japan.

- If you analyze the situation in Manchuria, it becomes clear that there were only 380 aircraft with a one-way supply of fuel. By mid-August, most of them had returned to Japan. The Soviet side had more than five thousand aircraft, but there were practically no air battles. There were also very few tanks in Manchuria. The reality is that Japan was completely weakened.

Why don't you hide your point of view, which differs from the official version?

- I began to study Japan as an enemy of the USSR. Nevertheless, having become well acquainted with Japanese reality, I realized that the USSR, and then Russia, made many mistakes. These mistakes are reflected in the current Russian-Japanese relations. Of course Japan far from an angel. I think there is value in avoiding tragedy and hardship in the future.

Soviet attack on Japan: On August 9, 1945, Soviet troops attacked Japan, violating the Neutrality Pact. They invaded Manchuria and Sakhalin. The USSR continued to fight after Japan signed the Potsdam Agreement, and on August 15 the end of the war was announced. Soviet troops captured the four northern islands on September 5, although Japan signed the surrender on September 2. The USSR interned about 600,000 unarmed Japanese soldiers. More than 60 thousand people became victims of the Siberian imprisonment.

Alexei Kirichenko is a former KGB colonel. Member of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Born in Belarus in 1936. In 1964 he graduated from the Higher School of the KGB, worked in the second department in the Japanese direction. In the 1980s, he became an employee of the institute and began to study the issue of Japanese prisoners of war. I tried to get to the bottom of the Russian-Japanese problems. Among the works "Unknown Moments of 200 Years of Japanese-Russian Relations".

The materials of InoSMI contain only assessments of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the editors of InoSMI.

Soviet-Japanese War 1945 was the main component of the last period of the Second World War and a special campaign of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-45.
Even at the Tehran conference in 1943, the heads of government of the USSR, the USA and
The Soviet delegation, meeting the proposals of the allies and striving to strengthen the anti-Hitler coalition, agreed in principle to join the war against militaristic Japan after the defeat of fascist Germany.
At the Crimean Conference of 1945, US President F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill, not hoping for a quick victory over Japan, again turned to the Soviet government with a request to enter the war on Far East. True to its allied duty, the Soviet government promised to oppose Japan after the end of the war with fascist Germany.
On February 11, 1945, Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill signed a secret agreement, which provided for the entry of the USSR into the war in the Far East 2-3 months after the surrender of Germany.
On April 5, 1945, the Soviet government denounced the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, signed on April 13, 1941. The statement on the reasons for the denunciation stated that the pact was signed "... before the German attack on the USSR and before the outbreak of war between Japan, on the one hand, and England and the United States of America, on the other. Since that time, the situation has changed radically. Germany attacked the USSR, and Japan, an ally of Germany, helps the latter in her war against the USSR.In addition, Japan is at war with the United States and England, which are allies of the Soviet Union.In this situation, the Neutrality Pact between Japan and the USSR lost its meaning.
Difficult relations between the USSR and Japan had a long history. They began after Japan's participation in the intervention in the Soviet Far East in 1918 and its capture until 1922, when Japan was expelled from its territory. But the danger of war with Japan existed for many years, especially since the second half of the 1930s. In 1938, there were well-known clashes on Lake Khasan, and in 1939, the Soviet-Japanese battle on the Khalkhin Gol River on the border of Mongolia and Manchukuo. In 1940, the Soviet Far Eastern Front was created, which indicated a real risk of starting a war.
The Japanese invasion of Manchuria and later North China turned the Soviet Far East into a zone of constant tension. Incessant conflicts kept the entire population and especially the troops in anticipation of war. Every day they were waiting for real battles - in the evening no one knew what would happen in the morning.
The Japanese were hated: every Far East resident, young and old, knew, as they wrote in books and newspapers then, that it was they who threw partisan Lazo and his comrades alive into the furnace of a steam locomotive. Although at that time the world did not yet know what the secret Japanese “731 detachment” was doing with the Russians in Harbin before the war.
As is known, in the initial period of the war with Germany, the Soviet Union had to keep a significant contingent of its troops in the Far East, part of which was sent to the defense of Moscow at the end of 1941. The transferred divisions played an important role in the defense of the capital and the defeat of the German troops. The redeployment of troops was facilitated by the entry of the United States into the war with Japan after its attack on the US naval base at Pearl Harbor.
It is very important to note that Japan is stuck in a war with China, in which, by the way, he lost 35 million people. This figure, which our media began to print quite recently, speaks of the unusually cruel nature of the war for China, which, in general, is typical of the Asian mentality.
It is this circumstance that explains Japan's non-entry into the war against the USSR, and not the reports of our intelligence officer Richard Sorge (who, most likely, was a double agent, which in no way detracts from his merits). I believe that this is why Sorge, of course, a great intelligence officer, did not comply with the order Moscow about returning to the Union, where he would have been shot much earlier before his execution in a Japanese dungeon.
It must be said that the Soviet Union, long before 1945, began to prepare for a fight with Japan, which was explained by the increased power of the army and the skill of its headquarters. Already from the end of 1943, part of the replenishment Soviet army entered the Far East to replace those who served here earlier and had a good military training. Throughout 1944, the troops being formed in the course of continuous exercises were preparing for future battles.
The troops of the Soviet Union throughout the war with Germany, who were in the Far East, rightly believed that their hour had come to stand up for their homeland, and honor should not be lost. The hour of retribution has come with Japan for the unsuccessful Russian-Japanese war of the beginning of the century, for the loss of its territories, Port Arthur and Russian ships of the Pacific Fleet.
From the beginning of 1945, troops released on the Western Front began to arrive in the Far East. The first echelons from the Soviet-German front in 1945 began to arrive already in March, then month after month the intensity of traffic increased and by July it reached its maximum. From the moment it became clear that our troops would advance to punish what was then called "militarist" Japan, the army lived in expectation of retribution for years of Japanese threats, provocations and attacks.
Troops being transferred from the West to the Eastern theater of operations had good technique, honed by years of fierce battles, but, most importantly, the Soviet army went through the school of the great war, the school of battles near Moscow and Kursk, the school of street fighting in Stalingrad, Budapest and Berlin, the assault on the fortifications of Koenigsberg, the crossing of large and small rivers. The troops received invaluable experience, or rather, experience paid for by the millions of lives of our soldiers and commanders. The air battles of Soviet aviation over the Kuban and in other military operations showed the increased experience of the Soviet army.
At the end of the war with Germany, this was the experience of the winners, able to solve any problems, regardless of any of their losses. The whole world knew this, and the military leadership of Japan understood this.
In March-April 1945, the Soviet Union sent an additional 400 thousand people to the troops of its Far Eastern group, bringing the group to 1.5 million people, 670 T-34 tanks (and a total of 2119 tanks and self-propelled guns), 7137 guns and mortars and many other military equipment . Together with the troops deployed in the Far East, the regrouped formations and units made up three fronts.
At the same time, in the units and formations of the Japanese Kwantung Army, opposing the Soviet troops in Manchuria, where the main hostilities were unfolding, there were absolutely no machine guns, anti-tank rifles, rocket artillery, there was little RGK and large-caliber artillery (in infantry divisions and brigades as part of artillery regiments and divisions, in most cases there were only 75-mm guns).
The idea of ​​this operation, the largest in terms of scope in World War II, provided for military operations on an area of ​​about 1.5 million square kilometers, as well as in the waters of the Sea of ​​Japan and the Sea of ​​Okhotsk.
The Soviet-Japanese War had a huge political and military value. So on August 9, 1945, at an emergency meeting of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War, Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki said: “The entry into the war of the Soviet Union this morning puts us finally in stalemate and makes it impossible to continue the war."
The Soviet Army defeated the strong Kwantung Army of Japan. The Soviet Union, having entered the war with the Empire of Japan and, having made a significant contribution to its defeat, hastened the end of World War II. American leaders and historians have repeatedly stated that without the entry of the USSR into the war, it would have continued for at least another year and would have cost an additional several million human lives.
The commander-in-chief of the American armed forces in the Pacific, General MacArthur, believed that "Victory over Japan can only be guaranteed if the Japanese ground forces are defeated." US Secretary of State E. Stettinius stated the following:
“On the eve of the Crimean Conference, the American Chiefs of Staff convinced President Roosevelt that Japan could only capitulate in 1947 or later, and defeating her could cost America a million soldiers.”
Today, the experience of the Soviet army, which carried out this military operation, is being studied in all military academies of the world.
As a result of the war, the USSR returned to its territory the territories annexed by Japan from the Russian Empire at the end of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 following the Peace of Portsmouth (southern Sakhalin and, temporarily, Kwantung with Port Arthur and Dalniy), as well as previously ceded to Japan in 1875, the main group of the Kuril Islands and assigned to Japan by the Shimoda Treaty of 1855 southern part Kuriles.
The fighting against Japan showed an example of the interaction of several countries, primarily: the USSR, the USA and China.
Today's relations between Russia, the heir state and legal successor of the USSR and Japan, are complicated by the absence of a peace treaty between our countries. Modern Japan does not want to recognize the results of the Second World War and demands the return of the entire southern group of the Kuriles received by Russia as an indisputable result of the victory, paid for by the lives of Soviet warrior heroes.
We see the rapprochement of the positions of our countries in the joint development of disputed territories.
* * *
Separately, we should dwell on our losses in this little-remembered war. According to various sources, the Soviet troops lost more than 30 thousand people, including 14 thousand dead. Against the background of the victims and destruction that the country suffered in the war with the Germans, this seems to be not much.
But I would like to remind you that as a result of the Japanese attack on Sunday morning December 7, 1941 on the central base of the Pacific Fleet naval forces The US Americans lost 2403 people killed and 1178 wounded (on this day, the Japanese sank 4 battleships, 2 destroyers of the American fleet, several ships were badly damaged).
This day is celebrated by the United States of America as the National Day of Remembrance for the victims of Pearl Harbor.
Unfortunately, the Soviet-Japanese War, the grandiose battle of World War II, despite its uniqueness and scale, still remains little known and little studied by historians in Russia. The date of signing the surrender of Japan is not usually celebrated in the country.
In our country, no one commemorates the fallen in this war, because someone decided that these numbers are small compared to the incalculable losses on the Soviet-German front.
And this is wrong, we must cherish every citizen of our country and remember everyone who gave their lives for our beloved Motherland!

"The Diplomat, Japan

From May to September 1939, the USSR and Japan waged an undeclared war against each other, in which more than 100,000 military personnel took part. Perhaps it was she who changed the course of world history.

In September 1939, Soviet and Japanese armies clashed on the Manchu-Mongolian border in a little-known but far-reaching conflict. It was not just a border conflict - the undeclared war lasted from May to September 1939, and more than 100,000 soldiers took part in it, as well as 1,000 tanks and aircraft. Between 30,000 and 50,000 people were killed or injured. In the decisive battle, which took place on August 20-31, 1939, the Japanese were defeated.

These events coincided with the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact (August 23, 1939), which gave the green light to Hitler's aggression against Poland, undertaken a week later and served as the beginning of World War II. These events are related to each other. The border conflict also influenced the key decisions taken in Tokyo and Moscow that determined the course of the war and ultimately its outcome.

The conflict itself (the Japanese call it the Nomongan Incident, and the Russians the Battle of Halkin Gol) was provoked by the notorious Japanese officer Tsuji Masanobu, head of the group in the Japanese Kwantung Army that occupied Manchuria. On the opposite side, the Soviet troops were commanded by Georgy Zhukov, who would later lead the Red Army to victory over Nazi Germany. In the first major battle in May 1939, the Japanese punitive operation failed, and the Soviet-Mongolian forces pushed back the Japanese detachment, which consisted of 200 people. The frustrated Kwantung Army intensified military operations in June-July and began to deliver forced bombing strikes deep into Mongolian territory. The Japanese also carried out operations along the entire border with the participation of entire divisions. Successive Japanese attacks were repelled by the Red Army, but the Japanese kept up the stakes in this game, hoping that they could force Moscow to retreat. However, Stalin tactically outplayed the Japanese and, unexpectedly for them, launched a military and diplomatic counteroffensive at the same time.

In August, when Stalin was secretly seeking an alliance with Hitler, Zhukov formed a powerful group near the front line. At the moment when German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop flew to Moscow to sign the Nazi-Soviet pact, Stalin threw Zhukov into battle. The future marshal demonstrated the tactics that he would later use with such a stunning result near Stalingrad, in the Battle of Kursk, and also in other places: a combined arms offensive, during which infantry units, with the active support of artillery, tied up enemy forces in the central sector of the front, in while powerful armored formations attacked the flanks, surrounded and eventually defeated the enemy in a battle of annihilation. Over 75% of the Japanese ground forces on this front died in action. At the same time, Stalin made a pact with Hitler, a nominal ally of Tokyo, and thus left Japan diplomatically isolated and militarily humiliated.

The coincidence in time of the Nomongan Incident and the signing of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact was by no means accidental. While Stalin was openly negotiating with Britain and France for an anti-fascist alliance and secretly trying to negotiate with Hitler for a possible alliance, he was attacked by Japan, Germany's ally and partner in the Anti-Comintern Pact. By the summer of 1939, it became clear that Hitler intended to move east against Poland. Stalin's nightmare, which should have been prevented at all costs, was a war on two fronts against Germany and Japan. His ideal outcome would be one in which the fascist-militarist capitalists (Germany, Italy, and Japan) fought the bourgeois-democratic capitalists (Britain, France, and possibly the United States). In this scenario, the Soviet Union would have remained on the sidelines and would have become the arbiter of the fate of Europe, after the capitalists had exhausted their forces. The Nazi-Soviet pact was Stalin's attempt to achieve the optimum result. This treaty not only pitted Germany against Britain and France, but also left the Soviet Union out of the fray. He gave Stalin the opportunity to decisively deal with isolated Japan, which was done in the Nomongan area. And this is not just a hypothesis. The connection between the Nomongan Incident and the Nazi-Soviet Pact is even reflected in German diplomatic documents published in Washington and London in 1948. Recently released documents from the Soviet era contain supporting details.

Zhukov rose to prominence at Nomongan/Khalkin Gol, thus earning the trust of Stalin, who in late 1941 placed him in command of the troops, just at the right time to avert catastrophe. Zhukov managed to stop the German offensive and turn the tide on the outskirts of Moscow in early December 1941 (probably the most important week of World War II). This was partly facilitated by the transfer of troops from the Far East. Many of these soldiers already had combat experience - it was they who defeated the Japanese in the Nomongan area. The Soviet Far Eastern Reserve - 15 infantry divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, 1,700 tanks and 1,500 aircraft were redeployed to the west in the autumn of 1941, when Moscow learned that Japan would not attack the Soviet Far East, since it had made the final decision regarding expansion in the southern direction, which eventually led her to war with the United States.

The story regarding Japan's route to Pearl Harbor is well known. But some of these events are not so well covered, and Japan's decision to go to war with the United States is connected with the Japanese memories of the defeat at the village of Nomongan. And the same Tsuji who played a central role in the Nomongan Incident became a powerful proponent of southern expansion and war with the United States.

In June 1941, Germany attacked Russia and inflicted crushing defeats on the Red Army in the first months of the war. Many at that moment believed that the Soviet Union was on the verge of defeat. Germany demanded that Japan invade the Soviet Far East, avenge the defeat at the village of Nomongan, and seize as much Soviet territory as it could swallow. However, in July 1941, the United States and Britain imposed an oil embargo on Japan that threatened to leave the Japanese war machine on a starvation diet. In order to avoid such a situation, imperial fleet Japan intended to seize the oil-rich Dutch East Indies. Holland itself had been occupied a year earlier. Britain also struggled to survive. Only the American Pacific Fleet blocked the way for the Japanese. However, many in the Japanese army wanted to attack the USSR, as Germany demanded. They expected to avenge Nomongan at the moment when the Red Army suffered heavy losses as a result of the German blitzkrieg. The leaders of the Japanese army and naval forces discussed this issue during a series of military conferences with the participation of the emperor.

In the summer of 1941, Colonel Tsuji was the senior officer of the headquarters for planning operations at the Imperial Headquarters. Tsuji was a charismatic man as well as a flamboyant speaker, and he was one of the army officers who supported the navy's position, which eventually led to Pearl Harbor. Headed the Bureau in 1941 military service Army Ministry Tanaka Ryukichi reported after the war that "the strongest supporter of the war with the United States was Tsuji Masanobu." Tsuji later wrote that the Soviet firepower in Nomongan forced him to abandon the attack on the Russians in 1941.

But what would have happened if there had been no Nomongan Incident? And what would have happened if it had ended differently, for example, if it hadn't revealed a winner or if it had ended with Japan's victory? In this case, Tokyo's decision to push south might look very different. Less impressed by the military capabilities of the Soviet armed forces and forced to choose between fighting against the Anglo-American forces and participating with Germany in the defeat of the USSR, the Japanese might have considered the northern direction the best choice.

If Japan had decided to move north in 1941, the course of the war and history itself might have been different. Many believe that the Soviet Union would not have survived a two-front war in 1941-1942. The victory in the battle near Moscow and a year later - near Stalingrad - were won with exceptionally great difficulty. A determined enemy in the east in the form of Japan at that moment could tip the scales in favor of Hitler. Moreover, if Japan had moved its troops against the Soviet Union, it would not have been able to attack the United States in the same year. The United States would have entered the war a year later, and would have done so under much less favorable circumstances than the grim reality of the winter of 1941. And how, then, could the domination of the Nazis in Europe be ended?

The shadow from Nomongan was very long.

Stuart Goldman is a Russia Specialist and Fellow at the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research. This article is based on his book Nomonhan, 1939. The Red Army's Victory That Shaped World War II.



On August 8, 1945, the USSR declared war on Japan. Perceived by many as part of the Great Patriotic War, this confrontation is often undeservedly underestimated, although the results of this war have not yet been summed up.

Tough decision

The decision that the USSR would go to war with Japan was made at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. In exchange for participation in hostilities, the USSR was to receive South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, which after 1905 belonged to Japan. In order to the best organization the transfer of troops to the areas of concentration and further to the areas of deployment, the headquarters of the Trans-Baikal Front sent special groups of officers to Irkutsk and to the Karymskaya station in advance. On the night of August 9, advanced battalions and reconnaissance detachments of three fronts in extremely adverse weather conditions - the summer monsoon, which brings frequent and heavy rains, - moved into enemy territory.

Our advantages

The grouping of Red Army troops at the time of the start of the offensive had a serious numerical superiority over the enemy: in terms of the number of fighters alone, it reached 1.6 times. In terms of the number of tanks, the Soviet troops outnumbered the Japanese by about 5 times, in artillery and mortars - 10 times, in aircraft - more than three times. The superiority of the Soviet Union was not only quantitative. The equipment that was in service with the Red Army was much more modern and powerful than that of its Japan. The experience gained by our troops during the war with fascist Germany also gave an advantage.

heroic operation

An outstanding and unique operation can be called Soviet troops to overcome the Gobi Desert and the Khingan Range. The 350-kilometer throw of the 6th Guards Tank Army is still a demonstration operation. High mountain passes with slopes up to 50 degrees seriously complicated the movement. The technique moved in a traverse, that is, in zigzags. Weather also left much to be desired: heavy rains made the soil impassable mud, and mountain rivers overflowed their banks. Nonetheless, soviet tanks stubbornly moved forward. By August 11, they had crossed the mountains and found themselves in the rear of the Kwantung Army, on the Central Manchurian Plain. The army experienced a shortage of fuel and ammunition, so the Soviet command had to establish supplies by air. Transport aviation delivered to our troops more than 900 tons of tank fuel alone. As a result of this outstanding offensive, the Red Army managed to capture only about 200,000 Japanese prisoners. In addition, a lot of equipment and weapons were captured.

No negotiations!

The 1st Far Eastern Front of the Red Army faced fierce resistance from the Japanese, who fortified on the heights of "Acute" and "Camel", which were part of the Khotous fortified area. The approaches to these heights were swampy, indented by a large number of small rivers. Scarps were excavated on the slopes and wire fences were installed. The Japanese cut down firing points in a granite rock massif. Concrete caps of pillboxes had a thickness of about one and a half meters. The defenders of the height "Acute" rejected all calls for surrender, the Japanese were famous for the fact that they did not go to any negotiations. A peasant who wished to become a truce was publicly cut off his head. When the Soviet troops nevertheless took the height, they found all its defenders dead: men and women.

Kamikaze

In the battles for the city of Mudanjiang, the Japanese actively used kamikaze saboteurs. Strapped with grenades, these people rushed at Soviet tanks and soldiers. On one of the sectors of the front, about 200 "live mines" lay on the ground in front of the advancing equipment. However, the suicide attacks were only initially successful. In the future, the Red Army increased their vigilance and, as a rule, managed to shoot the saboteur before he had time to approach and explode, causing damage to equipment or manpower.

Surrender

On August 15, Emperor Hirohito made a radio address announcing that Japan accepted the terms of the Potsdam Conference and capitulated. The emperor called on the nation to courage, patience and to unite all forces to build a new future. Three days later - on August 18, 1945 - at 13 o'clock local time, an appeal was made by the Kwantung Army command to the troops, which said that due to the senselessness of further resistance decided to surrender. Over the next few days, the Japanese units that did not have direct contact with the headquarters were notified and the terms of surrender were agreed.

Results

As a result of the war, the USSR actually returned to its composition the territories lost Russian Empire in 1905 following the Peace of Portsmouth.
Japan's loss of the South Kuriles has not yet been recognized by Japan. According to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan renounced the rights to Sakhalin (Karafuto) and the main group of the Kuriles, but did not recognize them as having passed to the USSR. Surprisingly, this treaty was not yet signed by the USSR, which, thus, was legally at war with Japan until the end of its existence. At present, these territorial problems prevent the conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and Russia as the successor to the USSR.

Questions:
1. The situation in the Far East. The general course of hostilities.
2. Results, lessons and significance of the war.

The Soviet-Japanese War of 1945 is one of the most important milestones on the way to victory in World War II. In terms of its scale, scope, attracted forces and means, tension, results, military-political and strategic consequences, it belongs to the most important stages of the Second World War.

The surrender of Nazi Germany in May 1945 marked the end of the war in Europe. But in the Far East and the Pacific Ocean, militaristic Japan continued to fight against the USA, Great Britain and other allies of the USSR in the Asia-Pacific region.
The entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan was conditioned by the allied obligations assumed by the USSR at the Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam conferences, as well as by the policy pursued by Japan towards the USSR. Throughout the Great Patriotic War, Japan provided all possible assistance to fascist Germany. She continuously reinforced her armed forces on the Soviet-Japanese border, thereby forcing the Soviet Union to keep there a large number of troops, much needed for use on the Soviet-German front; Japanese ships interfered in every possible way with normal Soviet shipping, attacking ships and detaining them. All this nullified the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact, concluded in April 1941. In this regard, the Soviet government in April 1945 denounced the said pact. On August 8, 1945, it made a statement that from August 9, the Soviet Union would consider itself at war with Japan.
The political goals of the military campaign of the Soviet Union in the Far East were to eliminate the last hotbed of World War II as quickly as possible, to eliminate the threat of a Japanese attack on the USSR, to liberate the countries occupied by Japan together with the allies, and to restore world peace. The government of the USSR also pursued its geopolitical goals (to return to the Soviet Union South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, which had been torn away by the Japanese during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), to open a free exit for Soviet ships and vessels to the Pacific Ocean, etc., previously formulated For the Japanese government, the entry of the USSR into the war meant the loss of their last hope and their defeat both by military and diplomatic means.
The main military-strategic chain of the war was the defeat of the Kwantung Army, the liberation of Northeast China (Manchuria) and North Korea from the Japanese invaders. The solution of this problem was supposed to have an impact on the acceleration of the surrender of Japan and ensure success in the defeat of Japanese troops in South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands.
The general plan of the war was to defeat the Kwantung Army and capture the most important military-political and economic centers of Manchuria with the forces of the Trans-Baikal, 1st and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts and the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, in cooperation with the Pacific Fleet and the Amur Flotilla. The main blows were supposed to be delivered from the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) by the forces of the Trans-Baikal Front to the east and from the territory of the Soviet Primorye by the forces of the 1st Far Eastern Front to the west. In addition, it was planned to deliver two auxiliary strikes by the forces of the Trans-Baikal and the 1st Far Eastern fronts. The troops of the 2nd Far Eastern Front, in cooperation with the Amur military flotilla, striking in the Sungarian and Zhaohei directions, were supposed to pin down the enemy forces opposing him and thereby ensure the success of the Transbaikal and 1st Far Eastern fronts.
The Pacific Fleet was supposed to disrupt enemy communications at sea, support the coastal flanks of troops and prevent enemy landings. Later, he was entrusted with the task, together with the 1st Far Eastern Front, to seize the ports of North Korea. Air Force The fleets were to strike at ships and transports of the enemy to prevent the supply of materiel for the Kwantung Army, to ensure the combat operations of landing forces to seize the ports of North Korea.
The theater of the upcoming military operations covered the territory of Northeast China, part of Inner Mongolia, North Korea, the Sea of ​​Japan and the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, Sakhalin Island and the Kuril Islands. The great honor of the territory of the Manchurian-Korean region is occupied by mountains (Great and Lesser Khingan, East Manchurian, North Korean, etc.) with a height of 1000-1900 m. The mountains of Northern and Western Manchuria are largely covered with forest, most of Inner Mongolia is occupied by semi-deserts and waterless steppes.
The grouping of Japanese troops in Manchuria, Korea, South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands included the 1st, 3rd, 5th and 17th fronts, the 4th and 34th separate armies. The strongest was the Kwantung Army, located in Manchuria. It included the 1st and 3rd fronts, the 4th and 34th separate and 2nd air armies, the Sungari river flotilla (24 infantry divisions, 9 separate infantry and mixed brigades, a special forces brigade - suicide bombers, 2 tank brigades and air force). With the outbreak of hostilities, the 34th Separate Army was reassigned to the commander of the 17th (Korean) Front, which became part of the Kwantung Army on August 10, and the 5th Air Army was also included in it on August 10. In total, the grouping of Japanese troops concentrated near the Soviet borders consisted of four fronts and two individual armies, a military river flotilla and two air armies. It consisted of 817 thousand soldiers and officers (including puppet troops - more than 1 million people), over 1200 tanks, 6600 guns and mortars, 1900 combat aircraft and 26 ships.
Japanese troops were located in advance prepared positions. The most important areas were covered by 17 fortified areas. The coastal direction was most strongly fortified, and especially between the lake. Khanka and Posyet Bay. To reach the central regions of Manchuria and Korea, Soviet troops had to overcome mountainous-wooded, semi-desert and wooded-marshy terrain to a depth of 300 to 600 km.
The preparation of hostilities included a number of activities carried out in advance and immediately before their start. The main ones were the transfer of troops from the western regions and the creation of offensive groupings, the study and equipment of the theater of upcoming actions, the training of troops and the creation of stocks of materiel necessary for a strategic operation. great attention it was given to carrying out measures aimed at ensuring the surprise of the offensive (observance of the secrecy of the preparation of the operation, concentration, regrouping and deployment of troops in the initial position, involving a limited circle of people in planning, etc.).
The Trans-Baikal (commander Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya Malinovsky), the 1st Far East (commander Marshal of the Soviet Union K.A. Meretskov) and the 2nd Far East (commander General of the Army M.L. Purkaea) fronts were involved in the Far Eastern campaign, as well as the Pacific Fleet (commander Admiral I.S. Yumashev), the Amur Military Flotilla (commander Rear Admiral N.V. Antonov) and parts of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army (commander-in-chief Marshal X. Choibalsan). This grouping consisted of more than 1.7 million people, about 30 thousand guns and mortars (without anti-aircraft artillery), 5.25 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 5.2 thousand aircraft. 93 warships of the main classes. The general command of the troops was carried out by the High Command of the Soviet Forces in the Far East, specially created by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky).
On the eve of the USSR's entry into the war with Japan, on August 6 and 9, the United States, for the first time in the history of mankind, used nuclear weapon, dropping two atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, although there was no military need for these bombings. The exact number of victims of the atomic bombings is still unknown, but it has been established that in total at least 500 thousand people suffered from them, including those killed, wounded, affected by radiation and subsequently died from radiation sickness. This barbaric act was intended to demonstrate the power of the United States, and not so much to achieve a military victory over Japan, but to put pressure on the USSR in order to obtain concessions from it in matters of the post-war world order.
The combat operations of the Soviet troops in the Far East include the Manchurian, South Sakhalin offensive operations and the Kuril landing operation. As part of the Manchurian offensive operation, the Khingan-Mukden (Trans-Baikal Front), Harbino-Girinskaya (1st Far Eastern Front) and Sungaria (2nd Far Eastern Front) front-line offensive operations were carried out.
The Manchurian strategic offensive operation (August 9 - September 2, 1945), according to the nature of the tasks to be solved and the methods of action of the troops, was divided into two stages:
- the first stage - August 9-14 - the defeat of the Japanese cover troops and the exit of Soviet troops to the Central Manchurian Plain;
- the second stage - August 15 - September 2 - the development of the offensive and the surrender of the Kwantung Army.
The idea of ​​the Manchurian strategic offensive operation provided for delivering powerful blows to the flanks of the Kwantung Army from the west and east and several auxiliary blows to the directions converging in the center of Manchuria, which ensured a deep coverage of the main forces of the Japanese, dissecting them and quickly defeating them in parts. Operations to liberate South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands were made dependent on the fulfillment of this main task.
On August 9, strike groups of the Soviet fronts attacked the enemy from land, air and sea. The fighting unfolded on the front with a length of more than 5 thousand km. The Pacific Fleet went out into the open, cut off the sea communications used by the troops of the Kwantung Army to communicate with Japan, and the forces of aviation and torpedo boats inflicted powerful blows on Japanese naval bases in North Korea. the Gobi Desert and the mountain ranges of the Greater Khingan, defeat the Kalgan, Solunskhui and Hailar enemy groups and rushed to the central regions of Northeast China. On August 20, the main forces of the 6th Guards Tank Army would enter the cities of Shenyang (Mukden) and Changchun and began to move south to the cities of Dalian (Far) and Luishun (Port Arthur). The cavalry-mechanized group of Soviet-Mongolian troops, leaving on August 18 to the cities of Zhangjiakou (Kalgan) and Chengde, cut off the Japanese grouping in Manchuria from the Japanese expeditionary forces in China.
The troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front, advancing towards the Trans-Baikal Front, broke through the enemy's border fortifications, repulsed his strong counterattacks in the Mudanjiang region, entered the city of Jilin on August 20 and, together with formations of the 2nd Far Eastern Front, into Harbin. The 25th Army, in cooperation with the amphibious assault forces of the Pacific Fleet, liberated the territory of North Korea, cutting off Japanese troops from the mother country.
The 2nd Far Eastern Front, in cooperation with the Amur Flotilla, successfully crossed the Amur and Ussuri Rivers, broke through the long-term enemy defenses in the Heihe, Sunyu, Hegai, Dunan and Fujin regions, overcame the Lesser Khingan mountain range covered with taiga and launched an offensive not in the Harbin and Qiqihar directions. On August 20, together with the troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front, he captured Harbin.
Thus, by August 20, Soviet troops advanced into the depths of Manchuria from the west by 400-800 km, from the east and north by 200-300 km. They reached the Manchurian Plain, dismembered the Japanese troops into a number of isolated groupings and completed their encirclement. On August 19, the commander of the Kwantung Army gave the troops an order to stop resistance. On August 19, a ceasefire agreement was signed. Only then did the organized surrender of Japanese troops in Manchuria begin. It continued until the end of the month. However, even this did not mean that the hostilities were completely stopped. Only on August 22, after powerful artillery and aviation preparation, was it possible to storm the Khutous resistance center by storm. In order to prevent the enemy from evacuating or destroying material assets, airborne assaults were landed in Harbin, Shenyang (Mukden), Changchun, Girin, Luishun (Port Arthur), Pyongyang and other cities from August 18 to 27. The rapid offensive of the Soviet and Mongolian troops put Japan in a hopeless situation, the calculations of its command for a stubborn defense and the subsequent offensive were thwarted. The million-strong Kwantung Army was defeated.
The major success of the Soviet troops in Manchuria, achieved in the first days of the war, allowed the Soviet command on August 11 to launch an offensive in South Sakhalin. The South Sakhalin Offensive Operation (August 11-25, 1945) was entrusted to the troops of the 16th Army of the 2nd Far Eastern Front (commanded by Lieutenant General L.G. Cheremisov) and the Northern Pacific Flotilla (commanded by Admiral V.A. Andreev ).
The defense of Sakhalin Island was carried out by the Japanese 88th Infantry Division, the Border Guard and reservist units. The strongest grouping (yes, 5400 people) was concentrated in the valley of the Poronai River, not far from the state border, covering the only road from the Soviet part of Sakhalin to the south. The Kotonsky (Kharamitogsky) fortified area was located in this direction - up to 12 km along the front and up to 16 km in depth, which included the foredfield strip, the main and second defense lines (17 pillboxes, 139 pillboxes and other structures).
The fighting on Sakhalin began with a breakthrough in this fortified area. The offensive was carried out in extremely difficult terrain with fierce resistance from the enemy. On August 16, an amphibious assault was landed behind enemy lines in the port of Toro (Shakhtersk). Counter strikes from the front and rear on August 18 broke through the enemy defenses. Soviet troops launched a swift offensive towards the southern coast of the island. On August 20, an amphibious assault was landed in the port of Maoka (Kholmsk), and in the morning of August 25 - in the port of Otomari (Korsakov). On the same day, Soviet troops entered the administrative center of South Sakhalin, the city of Toyohara (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk), having completely completed the liquidation of the Japanese group on the island.
The successful course of hostilities in Manchuria, Korea and South Sakhalin allowed the Soviet troops to begin the Kuril landing operation (August 18 - September 1, 1945). Its goal was the liberation of the northern group of the Kuril Islands - Shumshu, Paramushir, Onekotan. The troops of the Kamchatka defensive region, ships and units of the Petropavlovsk naval base were assigned to carry out the operation. The landing force included the 101st Infantry Division (without one regiment), units of sailors and border guards. He was supported from the air by the 128th Aviation Division and the regiment naval aviation. On the Kuril Islands, the 5th Japanese Front had over 50 thousand soldiers and officers. The most fortified in antiamphibious relation was the island of Shumshu - the closest to Kamchatka. On August 18, under cover of ship fire, the landing of troops on this island began. The fog made it possible to achieve the surprise of the beginning of the landing. Having discovered it, the enemy made a desperate attempt to push the landing units into the sea, but his attacks were not successful. During August 18-20, Japanese troops suffered heavy losses and began to withdraw deep into the island. On August 21-23, the enemy laid down their arms. More than 12 thousand. man was taken prisoner. Landing on August 22-23 on other islands, Soviet troops captured the entire northern part of the ridge up to Urup Island. More than 30 thousand Japanese soldiers and officers were taken prisoner. The Kuril operation was completed by the landing, landed on the morning of September 1 on the island of Kunashir.
The operation on the Kuril Islands is characterized primarily by the skillful organization of a sea crossing over a long distance (up to 800 km) and the landing of troops on an unequipped coast. The personnel were unloaded from the transports in the roadstead and delivered to the shore on various landing craft. Landing operations are characterized by covert movement by sea, sudden decisive actions by forward detachments that ensured the landing of the main forces.
On the evening of August 23, 1945, a salute was fired in Moscow in honor of the victory of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East. On September 2, on the battleship Missouri, anchored in Tokyo Bay, the signing of the Act of Unconditional Surrender of Japan took place. This historic day marked the end of World War II.

The Soviet-Japanese War, representing an independent part of the Second World War, was a logical continuation of the Patriotic War of the Soviet people for the independence, security and sovereignty of their country.
What is the military-political, strategic and world-historical significance of the war?
First, the main military-political outcome of the war is the complete defeat of the Japanese troops in Manchuria, North Korea, Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. Enemy losses amounted to over 677 thousand people, of which about 84 thousand were killed. Soviet troops captured a lot of weapons and equipment. By the end of August 1945, the entire territory of Northeast China, part of Inner Mongolia and North Korea were liberated from the Japanese invaders. This hastened the defeat of Japan and its unconditional surrender. The main center of aggression in the Far East was liquidated and favorable conditions were created for the development of the national liberation struggle of the Chinese, Korean and Vietnamese peoples.
Secondly, the Soviet-Japanese war of 1945 occupies a special place in the history of Soviet military art.
The peculiarity of the Soviet-Japanese war was that it was carried out at a rapid pace, in a short time and was indicative of the achievement of strategic goals at its very beginning. The Soviet Armed Forces in this war were enriched by the practice of conducting military operations designed to seize the strategic initiative, the experience of maneuvering part of the country's Armed Forces into a new theater of war, and methods of organizing interaction between ground forces and the Navy. Combat operations with the participation of three fronts, aviation, fleet and Air Defense Forces of the country represent the first example of the implementation of a strategic offensive operation in the conditions of a desert-steppe and mountainous-wooded area.
The organizational composition of the fronts was characteristic. He proceeded from the characteristics of each strategic direction and the task that the front had to solve (a large number of tank troops in the Trans-Baikal, a significant amount of RVGK artillery in the 1st Far Eastern Front).
The desert-steppe nature of the terrain allowed the troops of the Trans-Baikal Front to organize an offensive in directions with deep detours of fortified areas. The mountainous taiga terrain in the zone of the 1st Far Eastern Front led to the organization of an offensive with a breakthrough in fortified areas. Hence the sharp difference in the conduct of operations by these fronts. However, their common characteristic was a wide maneuver with the use of coverage, detours and encirclement of enemy groupings. Offensive operations were carried out at a great depth and at a high pace. At the same time, in the Trans-Baikal Front, the depth of army operations ranged from 400 to 800 km, and the pace of advancement of both tank and combined arms armies turned out to be much greater than in the conditions of the Western theater of operations. In the 6th Guards Tank Army, they reached an average of 82 km per day.
The Manchurian operation was the largest strategic offensive operation carried out in the desert-steppe and mountain-taiga areas by the forces of three fronts, the Pacific Fleet and the Amur military flotilla. The operation is characterized by such features of military art as a large spatial scope, secrecy in the concentration and deployment of groupings of troops, well-organized interaction between the Fronts, the fleet and the river flotilla, the suddenness of the transition to the offensive at night by all fronts simultaneously, the delivery of a strong blow by the troops of the first echelons, the seizure of the strategic initiative, maneuver by forces and means, high rates of advance to great depths.
The idea of ​​the Headquarters for the operation took into account the configuration of the Soviet-Manchurian border. The enveloping position of the Soviet troops in relation to the enemy at the beginning of the offensive made it possible to direct attacks on the flanks of the Kwantung Army, quickly carry out a deep envelopment of its main forces, cut them up and defeat them in parts. The directions of the main attacks of the fronts were directed to the flanks and to the rear of the main enemy grouping, which deprived it of communication with the mother countries and strategic reserves located in North China. The main forces of the fronts were advancing on a sector of 2720 km. Auxiliary strikes were delivered in such a way as to deprive the enemy of the opportunity to transfer troops to the main directions. By massing up to 70-90% of the forces and means in the directions of the main attacks, superiority over the enemy was ensured: in people - by 1.5-1.7 times, in guns - by 4-4.5, in tanks and self-propelled guns - by 5 -8, in airplanes - 2.6 times.
The most characteristic features of front-line and army operations were: great depth (from 200 to 800 km); wide offensive zones, reaching 700-2300 km in fronts, and 200-250 km in most armies; the use of maneuver for the purpose of enveloping, bypassing and encircling enemy groupings; high advance rates (up to 40-50 km per day, and on some days more than 100 km). Combined-arms and tank armies in most cases advanced before the end of the front-line operation to its entire depth.
In the tactics of rifle troops, the most instructive are going over to the offensive at night under unfavorable meteorological conditions and in difficult terrain, and breaking through fortified areas. When breaking through the fortified areas, divisions and corps had deep battle formations and created large densities of forces and means - up to 200-240 guns and mortars, 30-40 tanks and self-propelled guns per 1 km of the front.
The breakthrough of fortified areas at night, without artillery and aviation preparation, deserves attention. In the development of the offensive in depth, an important role was played by forward detachments detached from divisions and corps of the first echelon of the armies, consisting of a battalion-regiment of infantry in vehicles, reinforced with tanks (up to a brigade), artillery (up to a regiment), sappers, chemists and signalmen. The separation of forward detachments from the main forces was 10-50 km. These detachments destroyed pockets of resistance, captured road junctions and passes. The detachments bypassed the strongest hearth and resistance without getting involved in protracted battles. Their sudden inflows, decisive advance into the depths of the enemy's location did not give the enemy the opportunity to organize defense by covering detachments.
The experience of using tank formations and formations in the conditions of the Far East showed that these areas (including the Greater Khingan Range) are accessible to large masses of troops equipped with modern military equipment. The increased capabilities of armored vehicles ensured the massive use of tank troops in hard-to-reach areas. At the same time, the wide operational use of tank formations and formations was skillfully combined with the use of tanks for direct support of the infantry. Particularly instructive were the actions of the 6th Guards Tank Army, which, advancing in the first echelon of the front in a strip of about 200 km, advanced to a depth of more than 800 km in 10 days. This created favorable conditions for the actions of combined arms armies.
Characteristic of the actions of our aviation was its air supremacy. In total, more than 14 thousand combat sorties were made. Aviation bombed objects in the rear, destroyed strongholds and centers of resistance, supported ground forces in pursuing the enemy, carried out landing operations, as well as supplying troops with fuel and ammunition.
Thirdly, for the Soviet people, the war against Japan was fair, and for the victims of Japanese aggression and the Japanese themselves, it was humane, which ensured a sufficient level of patriotic enthusiasm for the Soviet people who sought to restore historical justice, gave rise to mass heroism of the soldiers of the Red Army and the Naval fleet in the fight against the Japanese aggressors and provided moral support for the entry of the USSR into the war from world public opinion.
One of the decisive factors that ensured the victory was the high moral and political state of the personnel our troops. In a fierce battle, such powerful sources of victories for the Soviet people and their army as patriotism and friendship of peoples were manifested with all their might. Soviet fighters and commanders showed miracles of mass heroism, exceptional courage, steadfastness and military skill.
In a few days, but hot battles in the Far East, the immortal feats of the heroes of the war against the Nazi invaders were repeated, stubbornness and courage, skill and valor, readiness to sacrifice life for the sake of victory were shown. A vivid example of heroism is the exploits of Soviet soldiers who covered the embrasures and loopholes of Japanese pillboxes and bunkers, enemy firing points. Such feats were accomplished by the border guard of the 3rd outpost of the Red Banner Khasan border detachment, sergeant P.I. Ovchinnikov, shooter of the 1034th Infantry Regiment of the 29th rifle division Trans-Baikal Front corporal V. G. Bulba, party organizer of the battalion 205th tank brigade 2nd Far Eastern Front I.V. Batorov, machine gunner of the 254th Infantry Regiment of the 39th Infantry Division of the same front, Corporal M.Ya. Patrashkov.
A number of feats of self-sacrifice were associated with the protection of the fighters of their commanders. So, corporal Samarin of the 97th artillery battalion 109th fortified area, at the moment when the battery commander was in danger, covered it with his body.
The heroic feat was accomplished by the Komsomol organizer of the 390th battalion of the 13th Marine Brigade, Sergeant A. Mishatkin. A mine crushed his hand, but after bandaging he again joined the battle. Once surrounded, the sergeant waited for the enemy soldiers to come closer, and blew himself up with an anti-tank grenade, destroying 6 Japanese in the process.
The pilot of the 22nd Fighter Aviation Regiment, Lieutenant V.G., proved to be fearless and skillful. Tcherepnin, who shot down a Japanese plane with a ramming blow. In the sky of Korea, a fire ram was made by the commander of the 37th Assault Aviation Regiment, Junior Lieutenant Mikhail Yanko, who sent his burning aircraft into the port facilities of the enemy.
Soviet soldiers fought heroically for the liberation of the largest and fortified island of the Kuril ridge - Shumshu, where a strong defense was created, a developed system of pillboxes and bunkers, trenches and anti-tank ditches, enemy infantry units were supported by a significant amount of artillery and tanks. Group feat in combat with 25 Japanese tanks, which were accompanied by the infantry, were made by senior sergeant I.I. Kobzar, foreman of the 2nd article P.V. Babich, Sergeant N.M. Rynda, sailor N.K. Vlasenko, led by the commander of the demolition platoon, Lieutenant A.M. Vodynin. In an effort not to let tanks through combat positions, to save their comrades, the Soviet soldiers, having exhausted all means of fighting and not being able to stop the enemy in any other way, with bundles of grenades rushed under enemy vehicles and, sacrificing themselves, destroyed seven of them, which delayed the advance of the enemy armored column before the approach of the main forces of our landing. Of the entire group, only Pyotr Babich survived, who told the details about the feat of the heroes.
In the same battle, junior sergeant Georgy Balandin set fire to 2 enemy tanks, and when the anti-tank gun failed, he rushed under the third with a grenade.
Over 308,000 people were awarded orders and medals for military exploits and distinctions. The title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to 86 soldiers, the second medal "Gold Star" was awarded to 6 people. The formations and units that distinguished themselves most in battles in the Far East were given the names Khingan, Amur, Ussuri, Harbin, Mukden, Sakhalin, Kuril, Port Arthur. On September 30, 1945, the medal "For the Victory over Japan" was established by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

Guidelines.
In preparation for the lesson, it is necessary to familiarize yourself with the recommended literature, prepare for the demonstration of the scheme of operations.
It is advisable to conduct the lesson in the museum of a formation or unit, during which it is advisable to organize a viewing of documentary and feature films about the Soviet-Japanese war of 1945.
When covering the first issue, using the schemes of operations, it is necessary to show the location and balance of forces of the opposing sides at different stages of the war, while emphasizing that it is an outstanding example of Soviet military art. In addition, it is necessary to tell in detail about the exploits, give examples of the courage and heroism of Soviet soldiers.
In the course of considering the second question, it is necessary to objectively show the significance, role and place of the Soviet-Japanese war of 1945 in Russian historiography, to consider in more detail the contribution of the type of troops in which students serve to the course and outcome of the war.
At the end of the lesson, it is necessary to draw brief conclusions and answer questions from the audience.

Recommended literature:
1. Great Patriotic War Soviet Union 1941-1945 In 12 volumes. T.1. Major events of the war. - M.: Military Publishing House, 2011.
2. Military-historical atlas of Russia. - M.. 2006.
3. The World History wars. - Minsk: Harvest, 2004.
4. History of the Second World War 1939 -1945. - M., 1976.

Dmitry SAMOSVAT

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