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The front line at the beginning of the summer-autumn campaign of 1943 ran from the Barents Sea to Lake Ladoga, further along the Svir River to Leningrad and further south; at Velikie Luki, it turned to the southeast and in the Kursk region formed a huge ledge, deeply protruding into the disposition of enemy troops; further from the Belgrade region, it ran east of Kharkov and along the Seversky Donets and Mius rivers stretched to the eastern coast of the Sea of \u200b\u200bAzov; on the Taman Peninsula, it passed east of Timryuk and Novorossiysk.
The largest forces were concentrated in the southwestern direction, in the area from Novorossiysk to Taganrog. In maritime theaters, the balance of power also began to take shape in favor of Soviet Union, primarily due to the quantitative and qualitative growth of naval aviation.
The fascist German command came to the conclusion that the most convenient site for delivering a decisive blow was the ledge in the Kursk region, which received the name of the Kursk salient. From the north, the troops of the Army Group "Center" hung over it, creating a heavily fortified Oryol bridgehead here. From the south, the ledge was covered by the troops of the Army Group "South". The enemy hoped to cut off the ledge under the base and defeat the formations of the Central and Voronezh fronts operating there. The fascist German command also took into account the exceptionally large strategic importance ledge for the Red Army. Occupying it, Soviet troops could strike at the rear of the flags of both the Oryol and Belgrade-Kharkov enemy groups.
The development of the offensive operation plan was completed by the Nazi command already in the first half of April. It received the conditional name "Citadel". The general plan of the operation boiled down to the following: with two simultaneous counter strikes in the general direction to Kursk - from the Orel region to the south and from the Kharkov region to the north - to encircle and destroy the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts on the Kursk ledge. The subsequent offensive operations of the Wehrmacht were made dependent on the results of the battle on the Kursk Bulge. The success of these operations was to serve as a signal for an attack on Leningrad.
The enemy prepared carefully for the operation. Taking advantage of the absence of a second front in Europe, the fascist German command transferred 5 infantry divisions from France and Germany to the area south of Orel and north of Kharkov. It paid particular attention to the concentration of tank formations. Large aviation forces were also drawn up. As a result, the enemy managed to create strong strike groups. One of them, consisting of the 9th German Army of the Center group, was located in the area south of Orel. The other, which included the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf Task Force of the Army Group South, was located in the area north of Kharkov. The German 2nd Army, which was part of Army Group Center, was deployed against the western front of the Kursk salient.
The former chief of staff of the 48th tank corps, which participated in the operation, General F. Mellenthin, testifies that "not a single offensive was as carefully prepared as this."
Soviet troops were also actively preparing for offensive operations. The headquarters planned in the summer-autumn campaign to defeat the Army Groups "Center" and "South", liberate the Left-Bank Ukraine, Donbass, eastern regions of Belarus and reach the Smolensk line, the Sozh river, the middle and lower reaches of the Dnieper. The troops of the Bryansk, Central, Voronezh, Steppe fronts, the left wing of the Western Front and part of the forces of the Southwestern Front were to participate in this large offensive. At the same time, it was supposed to concentrate the main efforts on the southwestern direction in order to defeat the enemy armies in the areas of Orel and Kharkov, on the Kursk Bulge. The operation was prepared by the Headquarters of the General Staff, the military councils of the dandies and their headquarters with the utmost care.
On April 8, G.K. Zhukov, who was at that time on the instructions of the Headquarters in the area of the Kursk salient, outlined his thoughts on the plan for the upcoming actions of the Soviet troops to the Supreme Commander. “It will be better,” he reported, “if we exhaust the enemy on our defense, knock out his tanks, and then, introducing fresh reserves, we will finally finish off the main enemy grouping by going on a general offensive.” A. M. Vasilevsky shared this point of view.
On April 12, a meeting was held at Headquarters, at which a preliminary decision was made on a deliberate defense. The final decision on deliberate defense was made by Stalin in early June. The Soviet High Command, realizing the importance of the Kursk ledge, took appropriate measures.
The repulse of an enemy strike from the area south of Orel was assigned to the Central Front, which defended the northern and northwestern parts of the Kursk ledge, and the enemy’s offensive from the Belgorod region was supposed to disrupt the Voronezh Front, which defended the southern and southwestern parts of the arc.
The coordination of the actions of the fronts on the spot was entrusted to the representatives of the Stavka marshals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky.
Never before during the war did Soviet troops create such a powerful and grandiose defense.
By the beginning of July, the Soviet troops were fully prepared to repel the enemy offensive.
The fascist German command kept postponing the start of the operation. The reason for this was the preparation of the enemy to attack the Soviet troops with a powerful tank avalanche. On July 1, Hitler summoned the main leaders of the operation and announced the final decision to start it on July 5.
The fascist command was especially concerned about achieving surprise and devastating impact. However, the enemy's plan failed: the Soviet command promptly revealed the intentions of the Nazis and the arrival of his new troops to the front. technical means, and set the exact start date for Operation Citadel. Based on the data received, the commanders of the Central and Voronezh Fronts decided to carry out a pre-planned artillery counter-training, to launch a fire attack on the areas of concentration of the main enemy groupings in order to stop his initial onslaught, to inflict heavy damage on him even before he rushes to the attack.
Before the offensive, Hitler issued two orders to keep the morale of his soldiers: one, on July 1, for the officers, the other, on July 4, for the entire personnel troops involved in the operation.
On July 5, at dawn, the troops of the 13th Army, the 6th and 7th Guards Armies of the Voronezh and Central Fronts launched a powerful artillery strike on its battle formations, artillery firing positions, command and observation posts. One of the biggest battles of the Great Patriotic War. During the artillery counter-preparation, serious losses were inflicted on the enemy, especially in artillery. The battle formations of the Nazi units and subunits were largely disorganized. There was confusion in the camp of the enemy. The German fascist command, in order to restore the disturbed command and control of troops, was forced to postpone the start of the offensive for 2.5-3 hours.
At 0530 hours, after artillery preparation, the enemy went over to the offensive in the zone of the central front and at 0600 in the zone of Voronezh. Under cover of the fire of thousands of guns, with the support of many aircraft, a mass of fascist tanks and assault guns rushed into the attack. The infantry followed them. Fierce battles began. The Nazis delivered three blows to the troops of the Central Front in the 40 km zone.
The enemy was sure that he would be able to quickly join in battle formations Soviet troops. But his main blow fell on the strongest sector of the defense of the Soviet troops, and therefore, from the very first minutes of the battle, it began to unfold not as the Nazis had planned. The enemy was met with a flurry of fire from all types of weapons. From the air, enemy manpower and equipment were destroyed by pilots. Four times during the day, the Nazi troops tried to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops and each time they were forced to roll back.
The number of wrecked and burned enemy vehicles grew rapidly, the fields were covered with thousands of corpses of the Nazis. The Soviet troops also suffered losses. The fascist command threw more and more tank and infantry units into battle. Up to 4 infantry divisions and 250 tanks were advancing against two Soviet divisions operating in the main direction (the left flank of the 13th Army) (81st Generals Barinova A.B. and 15th Colonel V.N. Dzhandzhgov). They were supported by about 100 aircraft. Only by the end of the day did the Nazis manage to penetrate into the defense of the Soviet troops for 6-8 km in a very narrow area and reach the second defensive zone. This was achieved at the cost of huge losses.
At night, the troops of the 13th Army consolidated their positions and prepared for the next battle.
In the early morning of July 6, the 17th Guards Rifle Corps of the 13th Army, the 16th Tank Corps of the 2nd Tank Army, and the 19th Separate Tank Corps, supported by aviation, counterattacked the main enemy grouping. Both sides fought with extraordinary tenacity. Enemy aircraft, despite big losses, continuously bombed the battle formations of Soviet units. As a result of a two-hour battle, the enemy was pushed back to the north by 1.5 -2 km.
Unable to break through to the second line of defense through Olkhovatka, the enemy decided to concentrate his main efforts on another sector. At dawn on July 7, 200 tanks and 2 infantry divisions, supported by artillery and aircraft, attacked in the direction of Ponyri. The Soviet command urgently transferred large forces here anti-tank artillery and rocket launchers.
Five times during the day the Nazis made violent attacks, and they all ended unsuccessfully. Only at the end of the day, the enemy, pulling up fresh forces, broke into northern part Ponyrey. But the next day he was knocked out of there.
On July 8, after a powerful artillery and aviation preparation, the enemy resumed the attack on Olkhovatka. In a small area of 10 km, he brought into battle two more tank divisions. Now almost all the forces of the shock German fascist group advancing on Kursk from the north took part in the battle.
The fierceness of the fighting grew with every passing hour. Especially strong was the onslaught of the enemy at the junction of the 13th and 70th armies in the area locality Samodurovka. But the Soviet soldiers survived. The enemy, although he advanced at the cost of exceptional losses by another 3-4 km, to break through Soviet defense couldn't. This was his last push.
During four days of bloody fighting in the area of Ponyri and Olkhovatka, the fascist German group managed to engage in the defense of the troops of the Central Front in just a zone up to 10 km wide and up to 12 km deep. On the fifth day of the battle, she could no longer advance. The Nazis were forced to go on the defensive at the line reached.
Towards this grouping, which was trying to pass to Kursk from the north, enemy troops sought to break through from the south.
The enemy delivered the main blow from the area west of Belgorod in the general direction to Kursk. In this grouping, the enemy included the bulk of tanks and aircraft.
The battles in the Oboyan direction resulted in the largest tank battle, which had a significant impact on the entire course and outcome of events on the southern face of the Kursk salient. The Nazis intended to ram the first and second lanes of defense operating in this direction of the 6th Guards Army of General I. M. Chistyakov on the move. Ensuring the main attack from the east, the enemy's 3rd Panzer Corps advanced from the Belgorod region to Korocha. Here the defense was occupied by the troops of the 7th Guards Army of General M.S. Shumilov.
From the morning of July 5, when the enemy went on the offensive, the Soviet troops had to withstand an exceptional onslaught of the enemy. Hundreds of planes and bombs were thrown at Soviet positions. But the soldiers fought back the enemy.
Pilots and sappers inflicted great damage on the enemy. But the Nazis, despite huge losses, continued to attack. The most fierce battles broke out in the area of the settlement of Cherkesskoe. By evening, the enemy succeeded in penetrating into the division's main defense line and encircling the 196th Guards rifle regiment. Having chained significant enemy forces to themselves, they slowed down his advance. On the night of July 6, the regiment received an order to break out of encirclement and retreat to a new line. But the regiment survived, providing an organized retreat to a new defensive line.
On the second day, the battle continued with unrelenting tension. The enemy threw more and more forces into the attack. In an effort to break through the defense, he did not reckon with huge losses. Soviet soldiers fought to the death.
The pilots provided great assistance to the ground forces.
By the end of the second day of the battle, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, advancing on the right flank of the shock group, wedged itself into the second line of defense on a very narrow section of the front. On July 7 and 8, the Nazis made desperate attempts to expand the breakthrough towards the flanks and deepen in the direction of Prokhorovka.
No less fierce battles flared up in the Korochan direction. Up to 300 enemy tanks advanced from the Belgorod region to the northeast. In four days of fighting, the enemy's 3rd Panzer Corps managed to advance only 8-10 km in a very narrow area.
On July 9-10-11, in the direction of the main attack, the Nazis continued to make desperate efforts to break through to Kursk through Oboyan. They brought into battle all six tank divisions of both corps operating here. Intense fighting went on in the strip between the railway and the highway leading from Belgorod to Kursk. The Nazi command expected to make a march to Kursk in two days. The seventh day was already running out, and the enemy advanced only 35 km. Having met such stubborn opposition, he was forced to turn to Prokhorovka, bypassing Oboyan.
By July 11, the enemy, having advanced only 30-35 km, reached the Gostishchevo-Rzhavets line, but he was still far from the goal.
Having assessed the situation, Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, the representative of the Headquarters, and the command of the Voronezh Front decided to launch a powerful counterattack. The 5th Guards Tank Army of General P.A. Rotmistrov, the 5th Guards Army of General A.S. Zhadov, who arrived at the disposal of the front, was involved in its application, as well as the 1st Tank, 6th Guards Armies and part of the forces 40.69 and 7th Guards Army. On July 12, these troops launched a counteroffensive. The struggle flared up on all fronts. On both sides, a huge mass of tanks participated in it. Particularly heavy fighting was fought in the Prokhorovka area. The troops stumbled upon exceptional, stubborn resistance from units of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which continuously launched counterattacks. A large oncoming tank battle took place here. A fierce fight lasted until late in the evening. Both sides suffered heavy losses. July 12 came a turning point in the Battle of Kursk. On this day, by order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the Bryansk and Western fronts went on the offensive. On the very first day, with strong blows, they broke the defenses of the 2nd Panzer Army in a number of sectors of the Oryol grouping of the enemy and began to develop the offensive in depth. July 15 launched an offensive and the central front. As a result, the Nazi command was forced to finally abandon its plan to destroy the Soviet troops on the Kursk ledge and began to take urgent measures to organize defense. On July 16, the fascist German command began to withdraw its troops on the southern face of the ledge. The Voronezh Front and the troops of the Steppe Front, brought into battle on July 18, proceeded to pursue the enemy. By the end of July 23, they had basically restored the position they had occupied before the start of the battle.
Thus, the third summer offensive of the enemy on the eastern front completely failed. It bogged down within a week. But the Nazis claimed that the summer is their time, that in the summer they can really use their huge opportunities and achieve victory. This turned out to be far from the case.
Hitler's generals considered the Red Army incapable of broad offensive operations in the summer. Incorrectly assessing the experience of previous companies, they believed that Soviet troops could only advance in “alliance” with a fierce winter. Fascist propaganda persistently created myths about the “seasonality” of the Soviet strategy. However, reality has refuted these claims.
The Soviet command, having the strategic initiative, dictated its will to the enemy in the Battle of Kursk. The defeat of the advancing enemy groupings created a favorable situation for launching a decisive counteroffensive here, which was prepared in advance by the Headquarters. Its plan was developed and approved by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief back in May. After that, it was discussed more than once in the Headquarters and corrected. Two groups of fronts were involved in the operation. The defeat of the Oryol grouping of the enemy was entrusted to the troops of Bryansk, the left wing of the Western and the right wing of the central fronts. The troops of the Voronezh and Stepnovsky fronts were to strike at the Belgorod-Kharkov grouping. Partisan formations of the Bryansk region, the Oryol and Smolensk regions, Belarus, as well as the regions of the Left-Bank Ukraine were given the task of disabling railway communications in order to disrupt the supply and regroup the enemy forces.
The tasks of the Soviet troops in the counteroffensive were very complex and difficult. Both on the Oryol and on the Belgorod-Kharkov bridgehead the enemy created a strong defense. The Nazis fortified the first of them for almost two years and considered it as a starting area for striking at Moscow, and they considered the second "a bastion of German defense in the east, a gate that blocked the paths for Russian armies to Ukraine."
The enemy defense had a developed system of field fortifications. Its main strip, 5-7 km deep, and in some places up to 9 km, consisted of heavily fortified strongholds, which were connected by trenches and communications. In the depths of the defense there were intermediate and rear lines. Its main nodes were the cities of Orel, Bolkhov, Muensk, Belgorod, Kharkov, Merefa - large nodes of railways and highways, which allowed the enemy to maneuver with forces and means.
It was decided to start the counteroffensive with the defeat of the 2nd Panzer and 9th German armies defending the Oryol bridgehead. Significant forces and means were involved in the Oryol operation. Its general plan, which received the code name "Kutuzov", consisted in the simultaneous delivery by troops of three fronts of attacks from the north, east and south to the eagle in order to capture the enemy grouping here, cut it and destroy it piece by piece. The troops of the left wing of the Western Front, operating from the north, were to first, together with the troops of the Bryansk Front, defeat the enemy's Bolkhov grouping, and then, advancing on Khotynets, intercept the enemy's retreat from the Orel region to the west and, together with the troops of the Bryansk and Central Fronts, destroy it.
To the southeast of the Western Front, the troops of the Bryansk Front prepared for the offensive. They were supposed to break through the enemy defenses from the east. The troops of the right wing of the central front were preparing for an offensive in the general direction of Kromy. They were ordered to break through to Orel from the south and, together with the troops of the Bryansk and Western fronts, defeat the enemy grouping on the Oryol bridgehead.
On the morning of July 12, powerful artillery and air preparations began in the offensive zone of the shock groups of the Western and Bryansk fronts.
The Nazis, after powerful artillery and air strikes, at first could not offer any serious resistance. As a result of two days of fierce fighting, the defense of the 2nd Panzer Army was broken through to a depth of 25 km. The fascist German command, in order to strengthen the army, hastily began to transfer units and formations here from other sectors of the front. This favored the transition to the offensive of the troops of the Central Front. On July 15, they attacked the Oryol grouping of the enemy from the south. Having broken the resistance of the Nazis, these troops in three days completely restored the position that they occupied before the start of the defensive battle. Meanwhile, the 11th Army of the Western Front advanced south to 70 km. Its main forces were now 15-20 km from the village of Khotynets. Over the most important communication of the enemy - railway. Orel-Bryansk highway is under serious threat. The Nazi command hastily began to pull additional forces to the breakthrough site. This somewhat slowed down the advance of the Soviet troops. In order to break the increased resistance of the enemy, new forces were thrown into the battle. As a result, the pace of advance increased again.
The troops of the Bryansk Front were successfully advancing towards Orel. The troops of the Central Front, advancing on Kromy, interacted with them. Aviation actively interacted with the ground forces.
The position of the Nazis on the Oryol bridgehead became more and more critical every day. Divisions transferred here from other sectors of the front also suffered heavy losses. The stability of the soldiers in the defense has declined sharply. Increasingly frequent were the facts when the commanders of regiments and divisions lost command of the troops.
In the midst of the Battle of Kursk, the partisans of Belarus, Leningrad, Kalinin, Smolensk, Oryol regions, according to a single plan “Rail War”, began a massive decommissioning of the railway. enemy communications. They also attacked enemy garrisons, convoys, intercepted railways and highways.
The Nazi command, irritated by the failures at the front, demanded that the troops hold their positions to the last man.
The Nazi command failed to stabilize the front. The Nazis retreated. The Soviet troops increased the strength of their blows and did not give a break day or night. On July 29, the city of Bolkhov was liberated. On the night of August 4, Soviet troops broke into Orel. At dawn on August 5, the Eagle was completely cleared of the enemy.
Following Orel, the cities of Krom, Dmitrovsk-Orlovsky, Karachaev, as well as hundreds of villages and villages were liberated. By August 18, the Oryol bridgehead of the Nazis ceased to exist. For 37 days of the counteroffensive, Soviet troops advanced westward up to 150 km.
Another offensive operation was being prepared on the southern front - Belgorod-Kharkovskaya, which received the code name "Commander Rumyantsev".
In accordance with the concept of the operation, the Voronezh Front delivered the main blow on its left wing. The task was to break through the enemy defenses, and then develop the offensive with mobile formations in the general direction of Bogodukhov, Valki. Before the counteroffensive, intense preparations were going on in the troops day and night.
Early in the morning of August 3, artillery preparation for the attack began on both fronts. At 8 o'clock, on a general signal, the artillery moved its fire into the depths of the enemy's battle formations. Clinging to its fire shaft, the tanks and infantry of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts went on the attack.
On the Voronezh Front, the troops of the 5th Guards Army advanced up to 4 km by noon. They cut off the enemy's retreat to the west of his Belgorod grouping.
The troops of the Steppe Front, breaking the resistance of the enemy, went to Belgorod and on the morning of August 5 started fighting for the city. On the same day, August 5, two ancient Russian cities, Orel and Belgorod, were liberated.
The offensive breakthrough of the Soviet troops increased day by day. On August 7-8, the armies of the Voronezh Front captured the cities of Bogodukhov, Zolochev and the village of Cossack Lopan.
The Belgorod-Kharkov enemy grouping was cut into two parts. The gap between them was 55 km. The enemy was moving fresh forces here.
Fierce battles took place from 11 to 17 August. By August 20, the enemy grouping was drained of blood. The troops of the steppe front successfully advanced on Kharkov. From August 18 to 22, the troops of the Steppe Front had to fight heavy battles. On the night of August 23, the assault on the city began. In the morning, after stubborn fighting, Kharkov was liberated.
During the successful offensives of the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, the tasks of the counteroffensive were fully completed. The general counter-offensive after the Battle of Kursk led to the liberation of the Left-Bank Ukraine, Donbass, and southeastern regions of Belarus. Soon Italy withdrew from the war.
Fifty days lasted the Battle of Kursk - one of the greatest battles of the Second World War. It is divided into two periods. The first - a defensive battle of the Soviet troops on the southern and northern faces of the Kursk ledge - began on July 5. The second - a counteroffensive of five fronts (Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh and Steppe) - began on July 12 in the Oryol direction and on August 3 - in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction. On August 23, the Battle of Kursk ended.
After the Battle of Kursk, the power and glory of Russian weapons increased. Its result was the insolvency and fragmentation of the Wehrmacht in the satellite countries of Germany.
After the battle for the Dnieper, the war entered its final stage.
The Battle of Kursk - military operations during the Great Patriotic War in the area of the Kursk ledge in the summer of 1943. It was a key element of the summer 1943 campaign of the Red Army, during which a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War ended, which began with the victory at Stalingrad.
Chronological framework
In Russian historiography, the point of view was established that the Battle of Kursk took place from July 5 to August 23, 1943. Two periods are distinguished in it: the defensive stage and the counteroffensive of the Red Army.
At the first stage, the Kursk strategic defensive operation was carried out by the forces of two fronts of the Central (July 5-12, 1943) and Voronezh (July 5-23, 1943) with the involvement of the strategic reserves of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (Steppe Front), the purpose of which was to disrupt the Citadel plan ".
Background and plans of the parties
After the defeat at Stalingrad, the leadership of Germany faced two key problems: how to hold the eastern front under the increasing blows of the growing power of the Red Army, and how to keep the allies in their orbit, who had already begun to look for ways out of the war. Hitler believed that an offensive without such a deep breakthrough, as it was in 1942, should not only help solve these problems, but also raise the morale of the troops.
In April, a plan for Operation Citadel was developed, according to which two groups would strike in converging directions and encircle the Central and Voronezh fronts in the Kursk salient. According to Berlin's calculations, their defeat made it possible to inflict huge losses on the Soviet side, and to reduce the front line to 245 km, and to form reserves from the released forces. Two armies and one army group were allocated for the operation. South of Orel, Army Group (GA) "Center" deployed the 9th Army (A) of Colonel General V. Model. After several revisions of the plan, she received the task of breaking through the defenses of the Central Front and, having traveled about 75 km, to unite in the Kursk region with the troops of the GA "Yu" - the 4th Panzer Army (TA) Colonel General G. Goth. The latter was concentrated north of Belgorod and was considered the main force of the offensive. After breaking through the line of the Voronezh Front, she had to go to the meeting point for more than 140 km. The outer front of the encirclement was to be created by 23 ak 9A and the army group (AG) "Kempf" from the GA "South". It was planned to deploy active hostilities in a section of about 150 km.
For the "Citadel" GA "Center" allocated V. Model, whom Berlin appointed in charge of the operation, 3 tank (41.46 and 47) and one army (23) corps, a total of 14 divisions, of which 6 tank, and GA "South" - 4 TA and AG "Kempf" 5 corps - three tank (3, 48 and 2 shopping malls SS) and two army (52 ak and ak "Raus"), consisting of 17 divisions, including 9 tank and motorized.
The headquarters of the Supreme High Command (VGK) received the first information about Berlin's planning for a major offensive operation near Kursk in mid-March 1943. And on April 12, 1943, at a meeting with I.V. Stalin, a preliminary decision was already made on the transition to strategic defense. The Central Front of Army General K.K. Rokossovsky received the task of defending the northern part of the Kursk salient, repelling a possible strike, and then, together with the Western and Bryansk fronts, going on the counteroffensive and defeating the German group in the Orel region.
The Voronezh Front of Army General N.F. Vatutin had to defend southern part the Kursk ledge, to bleed the enemy in the upcoming defensive battles, then go on the counteroffensive and, in cooperation with the Southwestern Front and the Steppe Fronts, complete his defeat in the area of Belgorod and Kharkov.
The Kursk defensive operation was considered as essential element throughout the summer campaign of 1943. It was planned that after the expected enemy offensive in the zone of the Central and Voronezh fronts would be stopped, conditions would arise for completing its defeat and moving on to a general offensive from Smolensk to Taganrog. The Bryansk and Western fronts will immediately begin the Oryol offensive operation, which will help the Central Front finally thwart the plans of the enemy. In parallel with it, the Steppe Front should approach the south of the Kursk ledge, and after its concentration it was planned to launch the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation, which was to be carried out in parallel with the Donbass offensive operation of the Southern Fronts and the South-Western Front.
On July 1, 1943, the Central Front had 711,575 people, including 467,179 combat personnel, 10,725 guns and mortars, 1,607 tanks and self-propelled guns, and the Voronezh Front had 625,590 military personnel, of which 417,451 combat personnel, 8,583 guns and mortars, 1,700 units armored vehicles.
Kursk defensive operation. Combat operations in the north of the Kursk Bulge, July 5-12, 1943
During April - June, the start of the "Citadel" was postponed several times. The last date was the dawn of July 5, 1943. On the Central Front, fierce battles unfolded over a 40 km section. 9 And with a small interval attacked in three directions. The main blow was inflicted on 13A by Lieutenant General N.P. Pukhov with the forces of 47 tk - on Olkhovatka, the second, auxiliary, 41 tk and 23 ak - on Malo-Arkhangelsk, on the right wing 13 A and the left 48A of Lieutenant General P.L .Romanenko and the third - 46 shopping mall - to Gnilets on the right flank 70A of Lieutenant General I.V. Galanin. Heavy and bloody battles ensued.
On the Olkhovatsko-Ponyrovsky direction, Model threw more than 500 armored units into the attack at once, and groups of bombers marched in the air in waves, but a powerful defense system did not allow the enemy to break the lines of the Soviet troops on the move.
In the second half of July 5, N.P. Pukhov moved part of the mobile reserves to the main strip, and K.K. Rokossovsky sent a howitzer and mortar brigades to the Olkhovatka area. Counterattacks by tanks and infantry, supported by artillery, halted the enemy advance. By the end of the day, a small “dent” had formed in the center of 13A, but the defense had not been broken through anywhere. The troops of 48A and the left flank of 13A completely held their positions. At the cost of heavy losses, 47th and 46th TCs managed to advance 6-8 km in the Olkhovat direction, while 70A troops retreated only 5 km.
To restore the lost position at the junction of 13 and 70A, K.K. Rokossovsky in the second half of July 5 decided to conduct a counterattack on the morning of July 6 by 2 TA Lieutenant General A.G. Rodin and 19 TC in cooperation with the second echelon 13 A - 17 Guards . rifle corps (sk). He was unable to complete the task. After two days of fruitless attempts to implement the Citadel plan, 9A got bogged down in the defense of the Central Front. From July 7 to 11, the Ponyri station and the area of the villages of Olkhovatka - Samodurovka - Gnilets, where two powerful centers of resistance were created, blocking the path to Kursk, became the epicenter of the battles in the strip 13 and 70A. By the end of July 9, the offensive of the main forces of 9A was stopped, and on July 11, she undertook the last failed attempt break through the defenses of the Central Front.
On July 12, 1943, a turning point occurred in the fighting in this area. The Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. V. Model, who was appointed responsible for the defense of the entire Oryol arc, began hastily transferring troops to Kursk near Orel. And on July 13, Hitler officially ended the Citadel. The depth of advance of 9A was 12-15 km at the front up to 40 km. No operational, let alone strategic, results have been achieved. Moreover, she did not hold on to the already occupied positions. On July 15, the Central Front went over to the counteroffensive and two days later basically restored its position until July 5, 1943.
At dawn on July 5, 1943, the troops of the GA "South" went on the offensive. The main blow was inflicted in the zone of the 6th Guards. And Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov in the direction of Oboyan by forces of 4TA. More than 1168 armored units were involved here by the German side. In the auxiliary, Korochansky direction (east and northeast of Belgorod), the positions of the 7th Guards. And Lieutenant General M.S. Shumilov was attacked by 3 TK and "Raus" AG "Kempf", which had 419 tanks and assault guns. However, thanks to the resilience of the fighters and commanders of the 6th Guards. And, already in the first two days, the offensive schedule of the GA "South" was disrupted, and its divisions suffered great damage. And most importantly, the shock group GA "South" was split. 4TA and AG "Kempf" failed to create a continuous breakthrough front, because. AG "Kempf" was unable to cover the right wing of the 4TA and their troops began to move in divergent directions. Therefore, 4TA was forced to weaken the shock wedge and direct large forces to strengthen the right wing. However, a wider offensive front (up to 130 km) than in the north of the Kursk Bulge and more significant forces allowed the enemy to break through the line of the Voronezh Front in a zone up to 100 km by the end of the fifth day and enter the defense in the main direction up to 28 km, while in its hulls, 66% of armored vehicles failed.
On July 10, the second stage of the Kursk defensive operation of the Voronezh Front began, the epicenter of the fighting shifted to Prokhorovka station. The battle for this center of resistance lasted from July 10 to July 16, 1943. On July 12, a frontal counterattack was carried out. For 10-12 hours, about 1,100 armored units of the opposing sides acted at different times in the station area on a 40 km section. However, it did not bring the expected results. Although the troops of the GA "South" managed to be kept in the army defense system, all formations of the 4th TA and AG "Kempf" retain their combat capability. In the next four days, the most intense fighting took place south of the station in the interfluve of the Seversky and Lipovoy Donets, which was convenient for striking both the deep right flank of the 4TA and the left wing of the Kempf AG. However, the area was not protected. On the night of July 15, 1943, 2nd SS TC and 3rd TC surrounded four 69A divisions south of the station, but they managed to break out of the "ring", albeit with heavy losses
On the night of July 16-17, the troops of the GA "South" began to withdraw in the direction of Belgorod, and by the end of July 23, 1943, the Voronezh Front pushed the GA "South" back approximately to the positions from which it launched the offensive. The goal set for the Soviet troops during the Kursk defensive operation was fully achieved.
Oryol offensive operation
After two weeks of bloody battles, the last strategic offensive of the Wehrmacht was stopped, but this was only part of the plan of the Soviet command for the summer campaign of 1943. Now, it was important to finally take the initiative into our own hands and turn the tide of the war.
The plan for the destruction of German troops in the Orel region, which received the code name Operation Kutuzov, was developed even before the Battle of Kursk. The troops of the Western, Bryansk and Central fronts, bordering the Oryol arc, were supposed to strike in the general direction on Orel, cut 2 TA and 9A GA "Center" into three separate groups, surround them in the areas of Bolkhov, Mtsensk, Orel and destroy.
Part of the forces of the Western (commanded by Colonel General V.D. Sokolovsky), the entire Bryansk (Colonel General M.M. Popov) and the Central Fronts were involved in the operation. A breakthrough of the enemy defense was envisaged in five sectors. The Western Front was to strike the main blow with the troops of the left wing - 11 Guards A, Lieutenant General I.Kh. Bagramyan - on Khotynets and auxiliary - on Zhizdra, and the Bryansk Front - on Oryol (main attack) and Bolkhov (auxiliary). The Central Front, after completely stopping the 9A offensive, was to concentrate the main efforts of 70,13, 48A and 2 TA on the Kromsky direction. The start of the offensive was tightly linked to the moment when it became clear that the 9A strike force was exhausted and tied up in battles on the lines of the Central Front. According to the Headquarters, such a moment came on July 12, 1943.
A day before the offensive, Lieutenant General I.Kh. Bagramyan conducted reconnaissance in combat on the left flank of 2 TA. As a result, not only was the outline of the front edge of the enemy and his system of fire clarified, but in some areas the German infantry was knocked out of the first trench. THEM. Baghramyan gave the order for the immediate start of a general offensive. Introduced on July 13, 1 mk completed the breakthrough of the second band. After that, the 5th shopping mall began to develop an offensive around Bolkhov, and the 1st shopping mall began to attack Khotynets.
The first day of the offensive on the Bryansk Front did not bring tangible results. Operating in the main, Oryol direction, 3A Lieutenant General A.V. Gorbatov and 63A Lieutenant General V.Ya. Kolpakchi by the end of July 13 broke through 14 km, and 61A of Lieutenant General P.A. Belova in the Bolkhov direction wedged into the enemy defenses only 7 km. The offensive of the Central Front, which began on July 15, did not change the situation either. His troops, by the end of July 17, threw back 9A only to the positions that she occupied by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk.
Nevertheless, already on July 19, the threat of encirclement loomed over the Bolkhov group, because. 11 Guards A broke through to the south for 70 km, stubbornly moved towards Bolkhov and 61A. This city was the "key" to Orel, so the warring parties began to build up their forces here. On the direction of the main attack of the Bryansk Front on July 19, the 3rd Guards TA, Lieutenant General P.S. Rybalko, is advanced. Having repulsed the enemy counterattacks, by the end of the day she broke through the second line of defense on the Oleshnya River. The grouping of the Western Front also hastily increased. A significant preponderance of forces, although not quickly, but gave its fruits. On August 5, 1943, one of the largest regional centers of the European part of the USSR, the city of Orel was liberated by the troops of the Bryansk Front.
After the destruction of the grouping in the area of Bolkhov and Orel, the most intense hostilities unfolded on the Hotynets-Kromy front, and at the final stage of the Kutuzov operation, the most difficult battles flared up for the city of Karachev, which covered the approaches to Bryansk, which was liberated on August 15, 1943.
On August 18, 1943, Soviet troops reached the German defensive line "Hagen", east of Bryansk. This operation "Kutuzov" ended. In 37 days, the Red Army advanced 150 km, a fortified bridgehead and a large enemy grouping were eliminated in a strategically important direction, favorable conditions were created for an attack on Bryansk and further to Belarus.
Belgorod - Kharkov offensive operation
It received the code name "Commander Rumyantsev", was carried out from August 3 to August 23, 1943 by the Voronezh (Army General N.F. Vatutin) and Steppe (Colonel General I.S. Konev) fronts and was the final stage of the Battle of Kursk. The operation was supposed to be carried out in two stages: at the first, to defeat the troops of the left wing of the GA "South" in the area of Belgorod and Tomarovka, and then to liberate Kharkov. The steppe front was supposed to liberate Belgorod and Kharkov, and the Voronezh front was to bypass them from the north-west, to develop success on Poltava. It was planned to deliver the main blow by the armies of the adjacent flanks of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts from the area northwest of Belgorod in the direction of Bogodukhov and Valki, at the junction of 4 TA and AG Kempf, crush them and cut off their path to retreat to the west and southwest. Apply an auxiliary blow to Akhtyrka, with forces 27 and 40A, in order to block the pulling up of reserves to Kharkov. At the same time, the city was to be bypassed from the south by 57A of the South-Western Front. The operation was planned on a front of 200 km and a depth of up to 120 km.
On August 3, 1943, after a powerful artillery preparation, the first echelon of the Voronezh Front - 6 Guards A, Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov and 5 Guards A, Lieutenant General A.S. Zhadov crossed the Vorskla River, punched a 5 km gap on the front between Belgorod and Tomarovka, through which the main forces entered - 1TA Lieutenant General M.E. Katukov and 5th Guards TA Lieutenant General P.A. Rotmistrov. Having passed the "corridor" of the breakthrough and deployed in battle formation, their troops dealt a strong blow to Zolochev. By the end of the day, the 5th Guards TA, having penetrated 26 km into the enemy’s defenses, cut off the Belgorod grouping from the Tomarovsky one, and reached the line with. Good Will, and in the morning of the next day broke through to Bessonovka and Orlovka. And the 6th Guards. On the evening of August 3, they broke through to Tomarovka. 4TA put up stubborn resistance. From August 4, 5 Guards. TA for two days was pinned down by enemy counterattacks, although according to the calculations of the Soviet side, already on August 5, its brigades were supposed to go west of Kharkov and capture the city of Lyubotin. This delay changed the plan of the entire operation to quickly split the enemy grouping.
After two days of heavy fighting on the outskirts of Belgorod, on August 5, 1943, the 69th and 7th Guards A of the Steppe Front pushed the troops of the Kempf AG to the outskirts and began its assault, which ended in the evening with the clearing of its main part from the invaders. On the evening of August 5, 1943, in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod, for the first time during the war years, a salute was given in Moscow.
On this day, a turning point occurred and in the strip of the Voronezh Front, in the auxiliary direction, the 40A of Lieutenant General K.S. went on the offensive. Moskalenko, in the direction of Boroml and 27A Lieutenant General S.G. Trofimenko, who by the end of August 7 released Grayvoron and advanced to Akhtyrka.
After the liberation of Belgorod, the onslaught of the Steppe Front also intensified. On August 8, 57A of Lieutenant General N.A. was transferred to him. Hagen. Trying to prevent the encirclement of his troops, on August 11, E. von Manstein launched counterattacks on 1TA and 6 Guards A south of Bogodukhov with the forces of 3 TC Kempf AG, which slowed down the pace of the offensive not only of the Voronezh, but also of the Steppe Front. Despite the stubborn resistance of the Kempf AG, Konev's troops continued to persistently move towards Kharkov. On August 17, they started fighting on its outskirts.
On August 18, GA "South" made a second attempt to stop the advance of two fronts with a counterattack, now on the stretched right flank of 27A. To repel it, N.F. Vatutin brought into battle the 4th Guards A, Lieutenant General G.I. Kulik. But the situation was not quickly reversed. The destruction of the Akhtyrskaya group dragged on until August 25th.
On August 18, the 57A offensive resumed, which, bypassing Kharkov from the southeast, was moving towards Merefa. In this setting importance On August 20, units of 53A of Lieutenant General I.M. Managarov captured a resistance center in the forest northeast of Kharkov. Using this success, Lieutenant-General VD Kryuchenkona's 69th Army began to bypass the city from the northwest and west. During August 21, the corps of the 5th Guards TA concentrated in the strip 53A, which significantly strengthened the right wing of the Steppe Front. A day later, the Kharkov-Zolochev, Kharkov-Lyubotin-Poltava and Kharkov-Lyubotin highways were cut, and on August 22, 57A went south of Kharkov to the area of the villages of Bezlyudovka and Konstantinovka. Thus, most of the enemy's retreat routes were cut off, so the German command was forced to begin a hasty withdrawal of all troops from the city.
On August 23, 1943, Moscow saluted the liberators of Kharkov. This event marked the victorious completion of the Battle of Kursk by the Red Army.
Results, meaning
About 4,000,000 people, over 69,000 guns and mortars, more than 13,000 tanks and self-propelled (assault) guns, up to 12,000 aircraft took part in the Battle of Kursk, which lasted 49 days. It became one of the most large-scale events of the Great Patriotic War, its significance goes far beyond the Soviet-German front. “A major defeat on the Kursk Bulge was the beginning of a deadly crisis for the German army,” wrote the outstanding commander Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky. - Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk became three important stages in the fight against the enemy, three historical milestones on the way to victory over Nazi Germany. The initiative for action on the Soviet-German front - the main and decisive front of the entire Second World War - was firmly entrenched in the hands of the Red Army.
The Battle of Kursk, which lasted from 07/05/1943 to 08/23/1943, is a turning point in the Great Patriotic War and a giant historical tank battle. The Battle of Kursk lasted 49 days.
Hitler had high hopes for this major offensive battle called the Citadel, he needed a victory to raise the spirit of the army after a series of failures. August 1943 was fatal for Hitler, as the countdown to the war began, the Soviet army confidently marched to victory.
Intelligence service
Intelligence played an important role in the outcome of the battle. In the winter of 1943, the intercepted encrypted information constantly mentioned the "Citadel". Anastas Mikoyan (a member of the Politburo of the CPSU) claims that on April 12, Stalin received information about the Citadel project.
Back in 1942, British intelligence managed to crack the Lorenz code, which encrypted the messages of the 3rd Reich. As a result, the project of the summer offensive was intercepted, and information about the general plan "Citadel", the location and structure of forces. This information was immediately transferred to the leadership of the USSR.
Thanks to the work of the Dora reconnaissance group, the deployment of German troops along Eastern Front, and the work of other intelligence agencies provided information in other directions of the fronts.
Confrontation
The Soviet command was aware of the exact time of the start of the German operation. Therefore, the necessary counter-preparation was carried out. The Nazis began the assault on the Kursk Bulge on July 5 - this is the date the battle began. The main offensive attack of the Germans was in the direction of Olkhovatka, Maloarkhangelsk and Gnilets.
The command of the German troops sought to get to Kursk along the shortest path. However, the Russian commanders: N. Vatutin - the Voronezh direction, K. Rokossovsky - the Central direction, I. Konev - the Steppe direction of the front, adequately responded to the German offensive.
The Kursk Bulge was supervised by the enemy by talented generals - these are General Erich von Manstein and Field Marshal von Kluge. Having been rebuffed at Olkhovatka, the Nazis tried to break through at Ponyri, using the Ferdinand self-propelled guns. But here, too, they failed to break through the defensive might of the Red Army.
Since July 11, a fierce battle has been going on near Prokhorovka. The Germans suffered significant losses of equipment and people. It was near Prokhorovka that the turning point in the war took place, and July 12 became a turning point in this battle for the 3rd Reich. The Germans struck immediately from the southern and western fronts.
One of the global tank battles took place. The Nazi army advanced 300 tanks into the battle from the south, and 4 tank and 1 infantry divisions from the west. According to other data, tank battle numbered from 2 sides about 1200 tanks. The defeat of the Germans overtook by the end of the day, the movement of the SS corps was suspended, and their tactics turned into a defensive one.
During the Battle of Prokhorovka, according to Soviet data, on July 11-12, the German army lost more than 3,500 men and 400 tanks. The Germans themselves estimated the losses of the Soviet army at 244 tanks. Only 6 days lasted the operation "Citadel", in which the Germans tried to attack.
Used technique
Soviet medium tanks T-34 (about 70%), heavy - KV-1S, KV-1, light - T-70, self-propelled artillery mounts, nicknamed "St. SU-122, met in confrontation with German tanks Panther, Tiger, Pz.I, Pz.II, Pz.III, Pz.IV, which were supported by Elefant self-propelled guns (we have Ferdinand).
The Soviet guns were practically incapable of penetrating the frontal armor of the Ferdinands in 200 mm, they were destroyed with the help of mines and aircraft.
Also, the German assault guns were tank destroyers StuG III and JagdPz IV. Hitler strongly counted on new equipment in the battle, so the Germans postponed the offensive for 2 months in order to release 240 Panthers to the Citadel.
During the battle, Soviet troops received captured German "Panthers" and "Tigers", abandoned by the crew or broken. After the elimination of breakdowns, the tanks fought on the side of the Soviet troops.
List of forces of the USSR Army (according to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation):
- 3444 tanks;
- 2172 aircraft;
- 1.3 million people;
- 19100 mortars and guns.
As a reserve force was the Steppe Front, numbering: 1.5 thousand tanks, 580 thousand people, 700 aircraft, 7.4 thousand mortars and guns.
List of enemy forces:
- 2733 tanks;
- 2500 aircraft;
- 900 thousand people;
- 10,000 mortars and guns.
The Red Army had a numerical superiority at the beginning Battle of Kursk. However, the military potential was on the side of the Nazis, not in terms of quantity, but in terms of the technical level of military equipment.
Offensive
On July 13, the German army went on the defensive. The Red Army attacked, pushing the Germans further and further, and by July 14 the front line had moved up to 25 km. Having battered the German defensive capabilities, on July 18 the Soviet army launched a counterattack in order to defeat the Kharkov-Belgorod group of Germans. The Soviet front of offensive operations exceeded 600 km. On July 23, they reached the line of the German positions that they occupied before the offensive.
By August 3, the Soviet army numbered: 50 rifle divisions, 2.4 thousand tanks, more than 12 thousand guns. On August 5 at 18 o'clock Belgorod was liberated from the Germans. From the beginning of August, a battle was fought for the city of Orel, on August 6 it was liberated. On August 10, the soldiers of the Soviet army cut the Kharkiv-Poltava railway line during the offensive Belgorod-Kharkov operation. On August 11, the Germans attacked in the vicinity of Bogodukhov, slowing down the pace of fighting on both fronts.
Heavy fighting lasted until 14 August. On August 17, Soviet troops approached Kharkov, starting a battle on its outskirts. The German troops carried out the final offensive in Akhtyrka, but this breakthrough did not affect the outcome of the battle. On August 23, an intensive assault on Kharkov began.
This day itself is considered the day of the liberation of Kharkov and the end of the Battle of Kursk. Despite the actual fights with the remnants of the German resistance, which lasted until 30 August.
Losses
According to various historical reports, the losses in the Battle of Kursk vary. Academician Samsonov A.M. claims that the losses in the Battle of Kursk: more than 500 thousand wounded, killed and captured, 3.7 thousand aircraft and 1.5 thousand tanks.
Losses in the heavy battle on the Kursk Bulge, according to information from the research of G.F. Krivosheev, in the Red Army amounted to:
- Killed, disappeared, were captured - 254,470 people,
- Wounded - 608833 people.
Those. in total, human losses amounted to 863303 people, with average daily losses - 32843 people.
Losses of military equipment:
- Tanks - 6064 units;
- Aircraft - 1626 pieces,
- Mortars and guns - 5244 pcs.
The German historian Overmans Rüdiger claims that the losses of the German army were killed - 130429 people. The losses of military equipment amounted to: tanks - 1500 units; aircraft - 1696 pcs. According to Soviet information, from July 5 to September 5, 1943, more than 420 thousand Germans were destroyed, as well as 38.6 thousand prisoners.
Outcome
Irritated Hitler put the blame for the failure in the Battle of Kursk on the generals and field marshals, whom he demoted, replacing them with more capable ones. However, in the future, the major offensives "Watch on the Rhine" in 1944 and the operation at Balaton in 1945 also failed. After the defeat in the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the Nazis did not achieve a single victory in the war.
The Battle of Kursk, which lasted from July 5 to August 23, 1943, became one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Soviet and Russian historiography divides the battle into Kursk defensive (July 5–23), Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3–23) offensive operations.
Front on the eve of the battle
During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a ledge up to 150 km deep and up to 200 km wide was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front, facing the west - the so-called Kursk Bulge (or ledge). The German command decided to conduct a strategic operation on the Kursk salient.
For this, a military operation was developed and approved in April 1943 under the code name Zitadelle ("Citadel").
For its implementation, the most combat-ready formations were involved - a total of 50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized, as well as big number separate units included in the 9th and 2nd field armies of the Army Group "Center", in the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf task force of the Army Group "South".
The grouping of German troops numbered over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, 2 thousand 245 tanks and assault guns, 1 thousand 781 aircraft.
Since March 1943, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (VGK) has been working on a strategic offensive plan, the task of which was to defeat the main forces of Army Group South and Center, to crush the enemy defenses on the front from Smolensk to the Black Sea. It was assumed that the Soviet troops would be the first to go on the offensive. However, in mid-April, based on information that the Wehrmacht command was planning to launch an offensive near Kursk, it was decided to bleed the German troops with a powerful defense, and then go on the counteroffensive. Possessing a strategic initiative, the Soviet side deliberately began hostilities not on the offensive, but on the defensive. The development of events showed that this plan was correct.
By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Soviet Central, Voronezh and Steppe fronts included more than 1.9 million people, more than 26 thousand guns and mortars, over 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, about 2.9 thousand aircraft.
Troops of the Central Front under the command of General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky defended the northern front (facing the enemy area) of the Kursk salient, and the troops of the Voronezh Front under the command of Army General Nikolai Vatutin- southern. The troops occupying the ledge relied on the Steppe Front as part of a rifle, three tank, three motorized and three cavalry corps. (commander - Colonel General Ivan Konev).
The actions of the fronts were coordinated by representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.
The course of the battle
On July 5, 1943, German strike groups launched an attack on Kursk from the Orel and Belgorod regions. During the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk On July 12, the largest tank battle in the history of the war took place on the Prokhorovsky field.
Up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns simultaneously participated in it from both sides.
The battle near the Prokhorovka station in the Belgorod region was the largest battle of the Kursk defensive operation, which went down in history as the Kursk Bulge.
Staff documents contain evidence of the first battle, which took place on July 10 near Prokhorovka. This battle was carried out not by tanks, but by the rifle units of the 69th Army, which, having exhausted the enemy, themselves suffered heavy losses and were replaced by the 9th Airborne Division. Thanks to the paratroopers, on July 11, the Nazis were stopped at the outskirts of the station.
On July 12, a huge number of German and Soviet tanks collided on a narrow section of the front, only 11-12 kilometers wide.
Tank units "Adolf Hitler", "Dead Head", division "Reich" and others were able to regroup their forces on the eve of the decisive battle. The Soviet command did not know about this.
The Soviet units of the 5th Guards Tank Army were in a deliberately difficult situation: the strike group of tanks was located between the beams southwest of Prokhorovka and was deprived of the opportunity to deploy the tank group to its full extent. Soviet tanks were forced to advance in a small area, limited on one side by the railway, and on the other by the floodplain of the Psyol River.
The Soviet T-34 tank under the command of Pyotr Skrypnik was hit. The crew, having pulled out their commander, took refuge in the funnel. The tank was on fire. The Germans noticed him. One of the tanks moved towards the Soviet tankers to crush them with caterpillars. Then the mechanic, in order to save his comrades, rushed out of the saving trench. He ran to his burning car, and sent it to the German "Tiger". Both tanks exploded.
For the first time, Ivan Markin wrote about a tank duel in the late 50s in his book. He called the battle of Prokhorovka the largest tank battle of the 20th century.
In fierce battles, the Wehrmacht troops lost up to 400 tanks and assault guns, went on the defensive, and on July 16 began to withdraw their forces.
July, 12 the next stage of the Battle of Kursk began - the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops.
5th of August as a result of operations "Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev" Orel and Belgorod were liberated, in the evening of the same day in Moscow, in honor of this event, for the first time during the war years, an artillery salute was fired.
August 23 Kharkov was liberated. Soviet troops advanced 140 km to the south and south-west and took up an advantageous position for launching a general offensive to liberate Left-Bank Ukraine and reach the Dnieper. Soviet army finally consolidated its strategic initiative, the German command was forced to go on the defensive on the entire front.
More than 4 million people from both sides took part in one of the largest battles in the history of the Great Patriotic War, about 70 thousand guns and mortars, over 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, about 12 thousand combat aircraft were involved.
Results of the battle
After a powerful tank battle, the Soviet Army reversed the events of the war, took the initiative in its own hands and continued to advance to the West.
After the Nazis failed to pull off their operation "Citadel", on the world level it looked like a complete defeat of the German campaign in front of the Soviet Army;
the fascists were morally suppressed, their confidence in their superiority was gone.
The significance of the victory of the Soviet troops on the Kursk salient goes far beyond the limits of the Soviet-German front. It had a huge impact on the further course of the Second World War. The Battle of Kursk forced the fascist German command to withdraw large formations of troops and aviation from the Mediterranean theater of operations.
As a result of the defeat of significant Wehrmacht forces and the transfer of new formations to the Soviet-German front, favorable conditions were created for the landing of Anglo-American troops in Italy, their advance to its central regions, which ultimately predetermined the exit of this country from the war. As a result of the victory at Kursk and the withdrawal of Soviet troops to the Dnieper, a radical change ended not only in the Great Patriotic War, but throughout the Second World War in favor of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.
For exploits in the Battle of Kursk, more than 180 soldiers and officers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, more than 100 thousand people were awarded orders and medals.
About 130 formations and units received the title of guards, more than 20 received the honorary titles of Oryol, Belgorod, Kharkov.
For the contribution to the victory in the Great Patriotic War, the Kursk region was awarded the Order of Lenin, and the city of Kursk was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st degree.
On April 27, 2007, by decree of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, Kursk was awarded the honorary title Russian Federation- City of Military Glory.
In 1983, the feat of Soviet soldiers on the Kursk Bulge was immortalized in Kursk - On May 9, a memorial to those who died during the Great Patriotic War was opened.
On May 9, 2000, in honor of the 55th anniversary of the victory in the battle, the memorial complex "Kursk Bulge" was opened.
Material prepared according to "TASS-Dossier"
Wounded memory
Dedicated to Alexander Nikolaev,
the driver of the T-34 tank, who made the first tank ram in the battle of Prokhorovka.
The memory will not heal like a wound,
Let's not forget the soldiers of all the simple ones,
That entered this battle, dying,
And they survived forever.
No, not a step back, we look straight ahead,
Only the blood drained from the face,
Only clenched teeth stubbornly -
Here we will stand to the end!
Let any price be the life of a soldier,
We will all become armor today!
Your mother, your city, the honor of a soldier
Behind a boyish thin back.
Two steel avalanches - two forces
Merged among the rye fields.
No you, no me - we are one,
We met like a steel wall.
No maneuvers, no formation - there is strength,
The power of rage, the power of fire.
And the fierce battle mowed down
Both armor and soldier names.
The tank was hit, the battalion commander was wounded,
But again - I'm in battle - let the metal burn!
A shout on the radio to a feat is equal to:
- All! Farewell! I'm going to ram!
Enemies stumble, the choice is hard -
You won't believe your eyes right away.
A burning tank flies without a miss -
He gave his life for his country.
Only the black square of the funeral
Explain to mothers and relatives ...
His heart is in the ground, like fragments...
He remained always young.
... Not a blade of grass on the burnt land,
Tank on tank, armor on armor...
And on the forehead of the commanders wrinkles -
There is nothing to compare the battle with in the war ...
The earthly wound will not heal -
His feat is always with him.
Because he knew when he was dying
How easy it is to die young...
In the memorial temple it is quiet and holy,
Your name is a scar on the wall...
You stayed to live here - yes, it is necessary,
So that the earth does not burn in fire.
On this land, once black,
The burning trail does not let you forget.
Your torn soldier's heart
In spring, cornflowers bloom ...
Elena Mukhamedshina
The Battle of Kursk (Battle of the Kursk Bulge), which lasted from July 5 to August 23, 1943, is one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into three parts: the Kursk defensive operation (July 5-23); Orel (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive.
During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a ledge up to 150 km deep and up to 200 km wide was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front, facing the west (the so-called "Kursk Bulge"). The German command decided to conduct a strategic operation on the Kursk salient. For this, a military operation was developed and approved in April 1943 under the code name "Citadel". Having information about the preparation of the Nazi troops for the offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to temporarily go on the defensive on the Kursk Bulge and, during the defensive battle, bleed the enemy’s strike groups and thereby create favorable conditions for the transition of Soviet troops to a counteroffensive, and then to a general strategic offensive. .
To carry out Operation Citadel, the German command concentrated 50 divisions in the area, including 18 tank and motorized divisions. The enemy grouping consisted, according to the data Soviet sources, about 900 thousand people, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars, about 2.7 thousand tanks and more than 2 thousand aircraft. Air support for the German troops was provided by the forces of the 4th and 6th air fleets.
By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command had created a grouping (Central and Voronezh fronts), which had more than 1.3 million people, up to 20 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2650 aircraft. The troops of the Central Front (commander - General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky) defended the northern front of the Kursk ledge, and the troops of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin) - the southern front. The troops that occupied the ledge relied on the Steppe Front as part of the rifle, 3 tank, 3 motorized and 3 cavalry corps (commanded by Colonel General Ivan Konev). The fronts were coordinated by representatives of the Headquarters Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.
On July 5, 1943, according to the plan of Operation Citadel, German strike groups launched an attack on Kursk from the Orel and Belgorod regions. From the side of Orel, a grouping under the command of Field Marshal Günther Hans von Kluge (Army Group Center) was advancing, from Belgorod, a grouping under the command of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (operational group Kempf of the Army Group South).
The task of repelling the offensive from the side of Orel was entrusted to the troops of the Central Front, from the side of Belgorod - the Voronezh Front.
On July 12, in the area of the Prokhorovka railway station, 56 kilometers north of Belgorod, the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place - a battle between the advancing enemy tank group (Task Force Kempf) and the counterattacking Soviet troops. On both sides, up to 1200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in the battle. The fierce battle lasted all day, by the evening the tank crews, together with the infantry, fought hand to hand. In one day, the enemy lost about 10 thousand people and 400 tanks and was forced to go on the defensive.
On the same day, the troops of the Bryansk, Central and left wing of the Western Fronts launched Operation Kutuzov, which had the goal of crushing the Oryol grouping of the enemy. On July 13, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts broke through the enemy defenses in the Bolkhov, Khotynets and Oryol directions and advanced to a depth of 8 to 25 km. On July 16, the troops of the Bryansk Front reached the line of the Oleshnya River, after which the German command began to withdraw its main forces to their original positions. By July 18, the troops of the right wing of the Central Front completely eliminated the enemy's wedge in the Kursk direction. On the same day, the troops of the Steppe Front were introduced into the battle, which began to pursue the retreating enemy.
Developing the offensive, the Soviet ground troops, supported from the air by the strikes of the forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies, as well as aviation long range, by August 23, 1943, they pushed the enemy back to the west by 140-150 km, liberated Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov. According to Soviet sources, the Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. The losses of the Soviet troops surpassed the German ones; they amounted to 863 thousand people. Near Kursk, the Red Army lost about 6,000 tanks.
