Number of combat helicopters in Israel. State of Israel

Recipes 27.06.2019

Recipes

December 31st, 2017

Original taken from a colleague oleggranovsky Are there not enough pilots trained in Israel?

After decommissioning on 12/26/16 F-16A/B ("Nets"), F-16C/D ("Barak"), F-16I ("Sufa"), F-15A/B/C/D remain in service ("Baz"), F-15I ("Raam") and F-35I ("Adir"). The number of aircraft is as follows:

"Adir" - 9 (41 more ordered);

"Raam" - 25;

"Baz" - 89 received, but 8 lost in accidents and disasters, 14 decommissioned or dismantled for spare parts, 5 more will be decommissioned instead of the currently modernized F-15D, 62 remain (89 - (8 + 14 + 5));

"Sufa" - 102 received, 4 lost in accidents and disasters, 98 left;

"Barak" - 135 received, 4 (at least, rather more) lost in accidents and disasters, 131 remained. In the near future, 12 aircraft can be sold to Croatia, and even if this deal does not take place, this means that the Air Force is not interested in these aircraft .

Result: 9+25+62+98+131=325. In fact, there are slightly fewer planes, no complete information about the loss of "Barak" and the decommissioning of "Baz", and 4 of the recently received F-15Ds have not yet been put into operation.

Aircraft spend part of their lives on medium and major repairs and modernization, however, this question can be omitted: if there is evidence of the approach of a total war, the Air Force is able to curtail repairs and put into operation almost the entire fleet, as it was in 1967. So we can say that there are slightly less than 325 combat aircraft in Israel, I think the figure of 310 is quite plausible.

How many pilots are needed per aircraft? In the past, I have read statements that in Israel the practice is to have 2 crews for each aircraft, in practice this is nothing more than a myth. For example, there are exact figures for the presence of aircraft and pilots (including reservists) in a particular squadron in 1967. Here are the data on squadrons of single-seat fighter-bombers of that period (I omit Votour and Fugue-Magister):

101st ("Mirage-3") - 22 aircraft, 32 pilots, 1.4 pilots per aircraft;

117th ("Mirage-3") - 24 - 31 - 1.3;

119th ("Mirage-3") - 22 - 20 - 0.9;

105th ("Super Mister") - 35 - 26 - 0.7;

109th ("Mister-4") - 16 - 26 - 1.6;

116th ("Mister-4") - 17 - 23 - 1.3;

107th ("Hurricane") - 16 - 17 - 1.1;

113th ("Hurricane") - 35 - 28 - 0.8.

By 1973, there was no such detailed layout, but the Air Force had 391 combat aircraft (including photo reconnaissance aircraft) and 650 pilots and navigators for them. The presence of navigators makes it difficult to accurately count. The navigators were part of the crews of the Phantoms, of which there were about 120 in the Air Force. However, before the Phantoms, the profession of “combat aircraft navigator” was practically absent in the Air Force, only a few double Votours had a second crew member, so mass training of navigators began only since 1969, i.e. 4 years before the Yom Kippur War. So it is doubtful that there were more than 100 navigators. And 550 pilots for 391 aircraft means a proportion of 1.4.

Of course, changes in technology over the years may have altered these proportions. For example, in the past, aircraft operated almost exclusively during the day, night flights were rare. Now most of the Air Force fighter-bombers are able to operate effectively at night. It would seem that this increases the need for pilots, on the other hand, breakdowns and the need to eliminate them are unlikely to allow one or another aircraft to be operated around the clock, i.e. some squadrons will be more active during the day, others at night.

In general, I don’t have an exact answer to the second question, but in my opinion 1.4 pilots per plane will be enough. Those. 310 aircraft require 434 pilots.

What is the nature and duration of the pilot's service?

As part of participation in the flight course, it is necessary to commit to 7 years of service after graduating from the Flight School (since 2015, previously - 9 years). Of these 7 years, one year is operational training courses (KAAM and KAAMAM). Then service begins in one of the Air Force squadrons.

Squadron pilots can be divided into 3 categories:

those who constantly serve in this squadron ("Sadir");

reservists ("Miluim"); here it should be added that the pilots who decided not to renew the contract after the mandatory 7 years or who left the service after the 2nd, 3rd, etc. contracts, continue to fly in reserve, and unlike ordinary reservists who serve several weeks a year without a break (say 3-4 weeks without a break or 2 times 2 weeks, there are many variations), reservist pilots fly once a week - two, gaining at least 40 days of service per year; often serve much more, 60-90 and even 100 days a year;

regular positions in case of war (hatsakh, “hatsavat Khirum”) - pilots who have transferred to headquarters positions, instructor positions or gone to study, during the war they return to one of the squadrons; to maintain flight training, they continue to fly regularly in squadrons, approximately like reservists; of course, there are staff positions that must be filled during the war, but there are few of them, and sometimes there is a non-pilot reservist to fill them, or a former pilot who has already stopped flying.

Thus, the termination of the contract, going to study, staff or instructor work does not reduce the number of Air Force pilots in case of war. The average age of graduates of the Flight School is 22 years old, i.е. 23 after CAAM / CAAMAM, the approximate length of service as a pilot (including reserve) is at least 45 years, but often much more, say Yehuda Koren flew up to 58 years, Giora Epstein - up to 59, Amir Nahumi and Yisrael Baharav - 60 (usually in the last years of such a long service, pilots were only instructed).

So, from 23 to 45 years of service plus 20 pilots a year, we have 440 pilots. Catastrophicity in recent years in Israel is very low (1 catastrophe or severe accident per year for all types of aircraft), there are, of course, write-offs due to illness, accidents and other accidents not related to the Air Force, other cases of flight termination up to 45, but all of them are more than are compensated by those who continue to fly after 45. Thus, 10 fighter pilots in the graduation of each flow of the flight school are enough.

Shmuel Gordon "30 Shaot Be-Oktober" ("30 hours in October", 2008), p. 484.

Dani Shalom "Ki Raam Be-Yom Bahir" ("Like a bolt from the blue", 2002), pp. 621-622, 626.

HAIL AVIR - this is the Hebrew name for the air force of the Jewish state, which is considered the main strike weapon of the IDF. They were founded in October 1947 and by the beginning of the War of Independence were 4 squadrons of 28 light passenger aircraft. They were re-equipped with machine guns and makeshift bomb releasers. These machines were piloted by experienced pilots, participants in the 2nd World War. And although there was not a single combat aircraft among their aircraft, the actions of the first IDF squadrons terrified the Arabs.

During the war, they were joined by 25 Messerschmitts purchased from Czechoslovakia, 13 fighters purchased from the United States and 10 from South Africa, which flew another 40 volunteer pilots.

Despite such a variegated and by no means modern equipment, Israeli aviation dominated the battlefields, and when British attack aircraft came to the aid of the Egyptians surrounded in the Fallujah area, Jewish pilots defeated them utterly, shooting down 6 aircraft.

In subsequent wars, the Hail Avir was equipped mainly with French Mister and Mirage fighters. On these machines, the Israelis steadily gained air supremacy, which was one of the main prerequisites for the defeat of the Arab armies.

And only in the 70s did the re-equipment of Hail Avir with American-made aircraft begin. At the same time, Israeli firms began to implement their own projects for the manufacture of military vehicles. And today, Israel is one of the few countries producing modern fighters, which include the Kfir in service. But even before him, Israeli designers created the Lavi fighter-bomber, which in its characteristics surpasses contemporary aircraft. And the Americans literally forced them to stop fine-tuning this machine, pledging to supply their own fighters in return. Today, it is they who make up the bulk of the Israeli Air Force combat aircraft fleet.

Organizationally, they consist of aviation and air defense. Leading Heil Avir Commander (in given time Major General Dan Halutz) is subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff and is responsible for the combat readiness, development, operational training and logistics of the Air Force, whose headquarters is located in Tel Aviv.

In terms of the number of aircraft and helicopters, Israeli aviation is not inferior to the leading European countries. More than 700 combat aircraft, of which 250 are in reserve. 18 squadrons, consisting of 86 F-15 Stike Eagle interceptors, 232 F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter-bombers, 50 F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers, 100 front-line attack aircraft A-4 "Sky Hawk" and 250 fighter-bombers "Kfir". The basis of military aviation is the American F-15 and F-16 aircraft, capable of delivering over 10 tons of bombs and missiles to a distance of up to 1,500 km.

The reconnaissance unit includes 10 Avax aircraft, 6 Boeings equipped with the Falcon detection system, 33 long-range reconnaissance aircraft and electronic warfare aircraft. Military transport aviation consists of 5 squadrons - 34 transport and 8 refueling aircraft. The helicopter unit consists of 130 attack helicopters, 153 amphibious transport and 10 anti-submarine helicopters.

Air Force units and subunits are stationed at 10 air bases. In addition, there are 47 more airfields, of which only three have unpaved runways, the rest are paved. All of them are equipped with systems that ensure flights in difficult weather conditions and at night.

Personnel aviation has 21 thousand people, mostly career officers and sergeants (another 20 thousand - in air defense, for the most part - conscripts). The Heil Avir command pays the closest attention to the recruitment and training of the flight contingent. In Israel, for several decades, the selection of candidates for this, frankly speaking, the most prestigious military profession has been established.

All recruiting offices are looking for young men who are most suitable in terms of their psychophysical data to become pilots, looking for them even in secondary schools. Selected graduates go through a ten-day gathering. Those who successfully complete it are trained in flight practice on light aircraft for a year. The best become applicants for admission to the Air Force Academy, located at the Hatzerim airbase. But, despite such a severe selection, no more than 15 percent of those who entered it initially graduate from this academy.

In the future, Israeli pilots continuously improve their skills. They have the largest flight time in the world, 30 percent superior to American pilots, although an hour of flight of a modern fighter aircraft costs the Israelis $ 17,000. More than half of the combat pilots who have served are in the mobilization reserve and are systematically involved in flights in order to save skills at a level not inferior to regular pilots.

Both those and other pilots are required to live in close proximity to the air base where they serve or to which they are assigned according to the mobplan. The strictest secrecy regime is observed in their relation, it is forbidden to photograph them, their names and place of residence constitute a state secret. All activities for the training of pilots and care for them are fully justified by the highest combat skills of these air fighters, who have earned the fame of the best in the world.

Ground technical personnel are trained at the Air Force School located in Beer Sheva, flight directors, control systems specialists are trained in Bikat-Uvda.

Upon mobilization, all Air Force reservists are required to arrive at their air bases within 24-36 hours in full readiness for combat operations. At the same time, the personnel of the Air Force is increasing by 12 thousand people.

The Air Defense Forces became part of Hail Avir in 1965, when the then modern American Hawk-type anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) were put into service. According to Militri Technology magazine, as of January 1, 2003, Israeli air defense consisted of 17 Advanced HOK SAM batteries, 6 Patriot SAM batteries, and 8 Chapparel short-range SAM batteries.

Despite such a relatively abundant amount of air defense systems, the Israeli leadership believed that they did not guarantee the country from being hit by operational tactical missiles that potential adversaries have - Iraq, Iran, Syria and Egypt. Therefore, since 1988, specialists from the Israeli company "Ai-Ai-Ai" and the American corporation "Lockheed-Martin" have been developing an anti-missile system (PRK), which received the name "Arrow". It was created by 1998, tested, and in 2000 the first battery was put on combat duty in a positional area north of Tel Aviv.

The Arrow missile defense system is designed to confidently intercept warheads of operational-tactical missiles (range up to a thousand km) and enemy aircraft at distances up to 100 km and altitudes up to 50 km. The combat means of interception is the two-stage anti-missile "Arrow-2" with an inseparable warhead. It is equipped with a combined (infrared and radar) homing head, which ensures reliable target acquisition in adverse weather conditions and in the presence of active radio countermeasures.

COMBAT AVIATION OF ISRAEL

In terms of the number of aircraft and helicopters, it is not inferior to the leading countries of Europe, and pilots for it are being trained from school bench
Mark Steinberg

Heil Avir - this is the Hebrew name for the air force of the Jewish state, which is considered the main strike weapon of the IDF. They were founded in October 1947 and by the beginning of the war for independence were 4 squadrons of 28 light passenger aircraft. They were re-equipped with machine guns and makeshift bomb releasers. These machines were piloted by experienced pilots, participants in the Second World War. And although there was not a single combat aircraft among their aircraft, the actions of the first IDF squadrons terrified the Arabs.

During the war, they were joined by 25 Messerschmitts purchased from Czechoslovakia, 13 fighters purchased from the United States, and 10 from South Africa, which flew another 40 volunteer pilots.

Despite such a variegated and by no means modern equipment, Israeli aircraft dominated the battlefields, and when British attack aircraft came to the aid of the Egyptians surrounded in the Faluja area, Jewish pilots defeated them utterly, shooting down 6 aircraft.

And only in the 70s did the re-equipment of Hail Avir with American-made aircraft begin. At the same time, Israeli firms began to implement their own projects for the manufacture of military vehicles. And today, Israel is one of the few countries producing modern fighters, which include the Kfir in service. But even before him, Israeli designers created the Lavi fighter-bomber, which in its characteristics surpasses contemporary aircraft. The Americans literally forced them to stop fine-tuning this machine, pledging to supply their fighters in return. Today, it is they who make up the bulk of the Israeli Air Force combat aircraft fleet.

Organizationally, the Air Force consists of aviation and air defense. The commander in charge of Heil Avir (currently Major General Dan Halutz) is subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff and is responsible for the combat readiness, development, operational training and logistics of the Air Force, whose headquarters is located in Tel Aviv.

In terms of the number of aircraft and helicopters, Israeli aviation is not inferior to the leading European countries. It has more than 700 combat aircraft, of which 250 are in reserve. 18 squadrons, consisting of 86 F-15 Stike Eagle interceptors, 232 F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter-bombers, 50 F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers , 100 A-4 Sky Hawk attack aircraft and 250 Kfir fighter-bombers. The basis of military aviation is the American F-15 and F-16 aircraft, capable of delivering over 10 tons of bombs and missiles to a distance of up to 1,500 km.

The aviation personnel numbers 21,000 people, mostly career officers and sergeants (another 20,000 are in the air defense, mostly conscripts). The Heil Avir command pays the closest attention to the recruitment and training of the flight contingent. Israel has been selecting candidates for this prestigious military service for several decades.

All recruiting offices are looking for young men who are fit for their psychophysical data to become pilots, looking for them even in secondary schools. Selected graduates go through a ten-day training camp. Those who successfully complete them are trained in flight practice on light aircraft for a year. The best students enter the Air Force Academy at the Hatzerim airbase. But, despite such a harsh selection, no more than 15% of those who entered it initially graduate from this academy.

In the future, Israeli pilots continuously improve their skills. They have the largest flying hours in the world, 30% higher than American pilots, although an hour of flight of a modern fighter costs the Israelis $ 17,000. More than half of the retired combat pilots are in the mobilization reserve and are systematically involved in flights to maintain their skills at a level not inferior to regular pilots.

Both those and other pilots are required to live in close proximity to the air base where they serve or to which they are assigned according to the mobplan. The strictest secrecy regime is observed in their relation, it is forbidden to photograph them, their names and place of residence constitute a state secret. All measures for the training of pilots and care for them are fully justified by the highest combat skills of these air fighters.

Ground technical personnel are trained at the Air Force School located in Beer Sheva, flight directors, control systems specialists are trained in Bikat-Uvda.

The air defense forces became part of Hail Avir in 1965, when the American Hawk-type anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) were adopted. According to Militri Technology magazine, as of January 1, 2003, Israeli air defense consisted of 17 Advanced HOK SAM batteries, 6 Patriot SAM batteries, and 8 Chapparel short-range SAM batteries.

Despite such a relatively abundant amount of air defense systems, the Israeli leadership believed that they did not guarantee the country from being hit by operational-tactical missiles that potential adversaries have: Iraq, Iran, Syria and Egypt. Therefore, since 1988, specialists from the Israeli company Ai-Ai-Ai and the American corporation Lockheed Martin have been developing an anti-missile system (PRK), which received the name Arrow. It was created by 1998, tested, and in 2000 the first battery was put on combat duty in a positional area north of Tel Aviv.

The Arrow missile defense system is designed to confidently intercept warheads of operational-tactical missiles (with a range of up to 1,000 km) and enemy aircraft at distances up to 100 km and altitudes up to 50 km. The combat means of interception is the two-stage anti-missile "Arrow-2" with an inseparable warhead. It is equipped with a combined (infrared and radar) homing head, which ensures reliable target acquisition in adverse weather conditions and in the presence of active radio countermeasures.

High-explosive fragmentation warhead directed action with a proximity fuse strikes warheads of enemy missiles and aircraft within a radius of up to 75 m. The search system of the Arrow missile defense system is capable of detecting and tracking up to 12 targets simultaneously and directing at least two anti-missiles at each of them. In terms of its combat effectiveness, the Arrow anti-ship missile system is one of the most advanced in service in the armies of the planet.

The battery of the Arrow missile defense system consists of four launchers carrying six tube containers with anti-missiles. All installations, detection and guidance system, as well as command post The batteries are mounted on wheeled conveyors with high cross-country ability, which provides the complex with sufficient mobility.

By January 1st current year in position areas south of Dimon and east of Haifa, the 2nd and 3rd batteries of the Arrow missile defense system were deployed. According to Israeli experts, they provide reliable cover from strikes of operational-tactical missiles to potential enemies - including Iraq - up to 85% of the territory of the Jewish state.

From 1999 to the present, 144 anti-missiles have been purchased for the Arrow missile defense system at a price of $1.5 million each. It is planned to purchase 30 PR annually, up to 2010.

According to NATO military analysts, Israeli military aviation, air defense and missile defense systems are currently the most modern and most combat-ready in the Middle East region.

From the very beginning of its existence, Israel was involved in a long one. The refusal of the Jews to accept the UN-approved international plan for partitioning Palestine into Arab and Jewish states exacerbated the situation. In the first stage, from November 30, 1947 to May 14, 1948, Jewish and Arab paramilitaries fought for control of the territories of Palestine. After the United Kingdom's mandate to govern Palestine expired on May 15, 1948, Israel declared independence, signaling the start of all-out war. In it, Israeli armed formations and settlements were opposed by the troops of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Yemen, whose goal was the elimination of Israel as a state.

Israel needed strong aviation in combat operations, like air, but it had to be collected bit by bit, hastily buying military aircraft in Europe. On May 31, 1948, the creation of Heil Ha "Avir, the Israeli Air Force, was officially announced, which was used in combat almost immediately. Within less than six months, Heil Ha" Avir turned into a significant combat force, so that the numerical ratio for aircraft was 1 :4 in favor of Israel.

The first Arab-Israeli war (according to the Israeli version - the “War of Independence”) ended on July 18, 1949 with the victory of the Israelis. The latter managed to defend the independence of their state and expand its territory. However, this was only the beginning of many years of bloody confrontation.

SUET CRISIS (NOVEMBER, 1956)

Operation "Musketeer" - a diagram of the combat area.

In 1952, King Farouk, who ruled Egypt, was overthrown in a military coup, and Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power. Determined to put an end to the British military presence in his country, by 1956 he had achieved this goal. In the same year, he nationalized the Anglo-French Suez Canal Company, taking control of the most important waterway and thereby jeopardizing the commercial relations of France and Britain with their colonies in the Middle and Far East. As a result, these countries came to the conclusion about the need for a military solution to the problem. To this end, Operation Musketeer was planned.

Israel was given the role of "instigator". His troops were to capture the Mitla Pass in the western Sinai Peninsula, allegedly in retaliation for attacks by Palestinian guerrillas against Israel from Gaza. On October 24, 1956, Great Britain, France and Israel signed the Sevres Agreement, according to which an Israeli raid was scheduled for October 29, after which Egypt was supposed to present an Anglo-French "ultimatum" on the withdrawal of troops from the Suez Canal zone. In this operation, Israel pursued its own interest - to establish control over the Sinai Peninsula, knocking out the Egyptian troops from there.

By the beginning of hostilities, the Egyptian Air Force had about 70 units of first-line military equipment. The most combat-ready units were equipped Soviet aircraft: two squadrons - MiG-15 fighters and a squadron - Il-28 bombers. In Fayida, one squadron of Vampire and Meteor aircraft were based, which were supposed to be decommissioned, but so far they were still on alert and could use forward-based airfields in the Sinai Peninsula. These forces were provided by three transport squadrons (60 aircraft at Almaza and Deversour bases). Six other divisions (having 84 piston and jet aircraft different types) were either in the stage of rearmament or liquidation and therefore were not among the combat-ready. Having learned about the concentration of Anglo-French troops in Malta and Cyprus, the Egyptian command, in order to counter this threat, redeployed a number of units from the Sinai Peninsula to the Nile Delta, as a result of which the number of Egyptian forces in the Sinai was halved. Most of the air force was also aimed north rather than east, towards Israel.

To attack Egypt, the British and French assembled an impressive tactical air armada, which included fighter-bombers, medium bombers, as well as fighter cover and reconnaissance aircraft. They were based in Malta and Cyprus, as well as five aircraft carriers and one airborne assault ship. Allied ground forces included paratroopers and marines with tanks.

France had four fighter-bomber wings (100 aircraft), three transport aircraft wings and two aircraft carriers, Arromanches and Lafayette, with F4U-7 Corsair fighters on board. On October 23, three squadrons of French fighters arrived in Israel - their Misters, along with F-84 fighters, were supposed to defend Tel Aviv. Later, F-84s supported the Israeli army in the Sinai Peninsula. Noratlas transport planes were involved in delivering cargo to Israeli paratroopers at the Mitla Pass and in Central Sinai. On all machines intended for operations over Egyptian territory, Israeli markings were applied. Thus, Israel was able to concentrate the bulk of its Air Force in the Sinai direction. They included 69 jet and 45 piston fighters, as well as B-17 bombers and transport aircraft. Fighters "Mister" formed an air defense system, and "Meteors", "Hurricanes", R-51 and "Mosquito" stormed ground targets. B-17s flew bombing raids at night.

The British had the most modern aviation. Them Royal Air Force(Royal Air Force, RAF) allocated four squadrons of Valient heavy bombers and six squadrons of Canberra medium bombers to Operation Musketeer, which were based on the island of Malta. The main air power of the RAF was concentrated in Cyprus: 10 squadrons of Canberra bombers, four squadrons of Hunter and Meteor fighters for air defense missions, four squadrons of Venom aircraft for ground attack and six transport squadrons of Hasting and "Valetta". The British Navy Air Force had three aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean - Albion, Bulwark and Eagle. They carried 11 squadrons of Wyvern, Sea Venom and Sea Hawk aircraft on board. The Suez War began in the late afternoon of October 29, 1956, when Israeli troops invaded the Sinai Peninsula in two places. Then about 1,600 paratroopers were dropped from C-47s near the eastern part of the Mitla Pass, while Israeli Mister fighters patrolled over the central part of the Sinai Peninsula, waiting for the reaction of the Egyptian air force. By 20.00 Egyptian troops began to cross the Suez Canal towards the Mitla Pass. An hour later, six French transport aircraft dropped heavy weapons on Israeli paratroopers.

At dawn on October 30, four British Canberra bombers attempted to reconnoiter the Egyptian air defense system in the canal zone. All of them were intercepted by MiG-15 fighters, and one bomber was damaged. In the early morning of the same day, the Egyptian destroyer Ibrahim al-Awwal tried to bombard the port of Haifa, but was attacked by Israeli Hurricane fighter-bombers, was seriously damaged and was forced to surrender to Israeli destroyers. Almost at the same time, a flight of four Egyptian Vampires was reconnaissance of Israeli positions in and east of Mitla and El Thamed. Behind them, two hours later, MiG-15s appeared, which destroyed six vehicles and one Piper Cub aircraft that did not have time to take off. Even more equipment was destroyed during the following raids by the Egyptian "Vampires" escorted by "MiGs". As a result, the Israeli command decided to organize a constant patrol of the canal zone with its Mister fighters. The first air battle began at the end of the day, when six MiGs pulled back six Misters loitering over the canal, while two Egyptian Meteors launched an effective bombing attack on Israeli paratrooper positions east of Mitla. Soon reinforcements arrived on both sides, and a real battle began in the air, as a result of which two MiGs were shot down and one Mister was seriously damaged.

The Egyptian Air Force was taken by surprise by the Israeli invasion. Nevertheless, on October 30, their aircraft managed to make about fifty sorties. The Israeli Air Force carried out over 100 sorties, the greatest effect of which was achieved against the Egyptian troops that entered the western part of the Mitla Pass. The Egyptians lost almost all of their vehicles, but still managed to take advantageous defensive positions on the heights that dominate the Heitan Gorge.

On October 31 at 0600, the British and French issued an ultimatum demanding that both sides, Egypt and Israel, withdraw their troops from the Suez Canal zone, which Israeli units had not yet reached. As expected, the Egyptians rejected this ultimatum. At dawn, four Egyptian Vampires, taking advantage of the temporary absence of Israeli air patrols, attempted to strike Israeli positions in the Mitla area. When they began approaching the target, six Mister fighters arrived in time. "Vampires" still managed to bomb, but two of them were then shot down by fighters. This raid again led to serious losses of the Israeli troops ..

To the east, Israeli aircraft attacked an Egyptian armored convoy moving south towards Bir Jifgafa, but were intercepted by Egyptian Meteors, one of which was shot down. Israeli aircraft continued strafing attacks on this convoy but were unable to stop it, and at the same time the Egyptian Air Force took similar action against Israeli forces advancing towards Bir Hama.

On October 31, the Israeli army suffered its only major setback in the entire campaign, suffering heavy losses after a series of unsuccessful attacks on Abu Ajayla. The Israeli Air Force was now so overburdened that they were forced to come to the aid of French aircraft based in Israel, which attacked another Egyptian column advancing on Abu Ajeila from the canal zone.

In anticipation of an attack after the expiration of the Anglo-French ultimatum, the Egyptian air defense system in the Nile Delta and in the Suez Canal zone was put on full alert early in the morning of October 31. By this time, Soviet and Czech pilots had already flown 20 Il-28 bombers and 20 MiG-15 fighters intended for the Syrian Air Force to Syria. They were escorted by twenty unarmed Egyptian MiGs. Meanwhile, both active and reserve Il-28s of the Egyptian Air Force flew south to Luxor, where, according to the Egyptian command, they should have been safe.

Until the very last moment, the Egyptians believed that the British and French were bluffing, and therefore, when the first wave of allied bombers appeared over Almaza shortly after dark, there was no blackout in the city, and the population and military personnel did not take refuge in bomb shelters. Military equipment was not dispersed. RAF planes, given the task of destroying the Egyptian aircraft, launched a series of bombing attacks. Three waves of Canberra and Valient bombers from Cyprus and Malta attacked Almaza, Abu Suer, Kabrit and Cairo International Airport. Bombing was carried out from a height of 12 km. In this case, only 14 aircraft were destroyed or damaged. The Egyptian Air Force made two attempts to intercept the enemy, but only once was the Meteor NF.Mk 13 night fighter able to approach the Valient bomber at a firing distance.

Early on the morning of November 1, a pair of Canberra reconnaissance flights were attacked by MiGs, damaging one aircraft. Returning from reconnaissance, the pilots reported on the low effectiveness of night raids, and therefore the allied command switched to a new tactic. Anglo-French ground and carrier-based aircraft attacked all Egyptian airfields west of the Sinai Peninsula. The Egyptians urgently dispersed their MiGs throughout the delta, but it turned out that it was very dangerous to take off, since each runway was almost under constant enemy surveillance. On November 2 and 3, the air force academy at Bilbeis and the aircraft repair shops at Helwan were bombed. On November 6, Allied aircraft attacked railway communications, barracks and air defense facilities.

On November 2, the French Corsairs, taking off from the Arromanches aircraft carrier, headed for Alexandria, but the ship itself was, in turn, attacked by the Egyptian destroyers El Nasr and Tarek. When the Corsairs returned and attacked the destroyers, they put up a smoke screen and left. The raids continued on 4 and 5 November. British carrier-based aircraft attacked airfields near Alexandria, trying to divert the attention of the Egyptians from Port Said and Port Fuad, on which it was planned to drop paratroopers. In the Luxor area on November 3, one Canberra was damaged by a MiG, and in general the Egyptian air defense began to operate more effectively. On November 5, the Egyptians shot down three Allied aircraft: one Wyvern over Port Said, one Sea Hawk and one Mister over Cairo.

Since the Anglo-French air offensive tied up the Egyptian air force, the Israelis were able to throw large armored forces forward without fear of air strikes. As a result, the Egyptians were forced to leave the Sinai Peninsula, forcing the Suez Canal in the opposite direction on November 2.

The intensity of the fighting on the ground decreased, there were only a few skirmishes. In the air, however, things were different. Israeli and Egyptian Air Force, or rather. what was left of them grappled in a furious fight. The Vampires flew from El Arish to Bir Jifgafa and Bir Rod Saleem. In the late morning of November 1, they attacked Israeli paratrooper positions near Mitla, losing one vehicle shot down by an Israeli interceptor. Despite daytime attacks by Anglo-French aviation, three Egyptian Meteors NF.Mk 13 with an escort from MiGs appeared at noon over the Sinai Peninsula. In a battle with two Israeli Mister fighters, one MiG was shot down.

Starting from November 2, fierce battles were going on in the Sharm el-Sheikh area. On El Tor, on the western coast of the peninsula, paratroopers with heavy weapons were dropped, other parts of the Israelis advanced along the eastern coast. Meanwhile, the Israeli Air Force bombed the British frigate Crane, blockading Sharm, mistaking it for an Egyptian ship. On 3 November, Mustangs and B-17s destroyed two heavy guns from an Egyptian battery guarding the Strait of Tiran at Ras Nasrani. The remaining guns were blown up on the night of November 3-4 by the Egyptian artillerymen themselves, who then left for Sharm el-Sheikh. The night attack bogged down, but a second assault, supported by the Mustangs, which dropped napalm, broke into the Egyptian defense perimeter. After the approach of Israeli paratroopers from El Torah, the Egyptian garrison of Sharm el-Sheikh capitulated at 9.30 on November 5.

By this time, active operations on land of the Anglo-French troops began. At dawn on November 5, carrier-based aircraft attacked the Egyptian defensive positions, and at 0820, British paratroopers had already landed at Gamil airfield on the outskirts of Port Said. Fifteen minutes later, French paratroopers were also on Egyptian soil south of Port Said. The previously planned helicopter assault with the aim of capturing the bridges across the canal was canceled, however, reinforcements were transferred to the paratroopers who had already managed to gain a foothold. At dawn the next day, after the artillery preparation of naval artillery, the amphibious assault under the cover of fighter-bombers captured the port area. Ground fire shot down two planes, a Sea Hawk and one Venom. Nevertheless, aviation provided cover for the paratroopers, who made a swift throw along the banks of the Suez Canal and reached El Cap.

According to the information of the British and French, during the entire operation they destroyed or damaged 260 enemy aircraft in battle, including 207 jets. The Egyptian Air Force denied this claim, reporting the loss of only eight MiG-15 fighters, seven Il-28 bombers, nine Harvards, six C-46s, four C-47s, three civilian Dakotas and one Avro Lancaster, destroyed on earth. 62 aircraft were damaged. Il-28s were destroyed in Luxor, where they seemed to be safe. However, French F-84Fs, equipped with additional tanks, took off from bases in southern Israel and shattered this illusion. About a dozen MiG-15 and MiG-15UTI aircraft of the Syrian training squadron were also destroyed near Abu Suer.

Over the Sinai Peninsula, the Egyptian Air Force lost four MiGs, four Vampires, one Meteor and a Sokol reconnaissance aircraft. The Israeli Air Force acknowledged the loss of one Mister fighter, two Hurricanes, ten Mustangs and two Piper Kabs. Five more aircraft were hit and crashed to the ground before reaching their bases. The French lost only one F-84 aircraft, which took off from the airfield in Lydda. The loss of the British amounted to four aircraft: one Canberra, which crashed on landing, two Sea Hawks and one Wyvern. To this list should be added another Canberra PR.Mk 7 shot down over the Syrian-Lebanese border.

AT politically The Suez operation turned out to be a fruitless adventure, since both world superpowers intervened in the matter: the USSR and the USA. The latter, threatening direct military intervention, parted the belligerents and forced the "winners" to return what they had seized back. For Britain and France, this was a major political defeat. Israel also had to clear the territory of the Sinai Peninsula from its troops, but before that they removed a large number of captured weapons from there, plus they destroyed all the Egyptian structures of any value.

SIX DAY WAR (JUNE 1967)

Antagonism in the Middle East had already escalated into a full-scale war twice before: in the late 1940s and in 1956. Tensions again began to rise from the beginning of April 1967, when military clashes took place in the Golan Heights, belonging to Syria. The UN decision to withdraw its peacekeeping forces from the Egyptian-Israeli border on May 17, 1967 only added fuel to the fire. This prompted Egypt to close the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli ships.

At the end of May, the Egyptian-Jordanian-Syrian defense agreement was signed, which led to the creation of the United Arab Republic Air Force. These Air Forces were equipped with modern types of Soviet combat aircraft: front-line MiG-19 and MiG-21 fighters, Su-7 fighter-bombers and Il-28 and Tu-16 bombers. The main problems experienced by the Arab Air Force at this time were the poor operational reliability of aircraft and a chronic shortage of trained crews. Only 126 out of 500 pilots could fly the MiG-21 or MiG-19. There was no pilot reserve.

Marshal of the Egyptian Air Force Sidqi and his staff feared a preemptive Israeli attack already in early June and introduced a state of high alert in the air units. However, President Nasser was convinced that Israel would not dare to fight. He canceled Sidqi's order, and the Arab Air Force returned to its former state again. This was a big mistake.

With the first rays of the sun on June 5, 40 Israeli Mirage IIICJ and Super Mister fighters took off in a westerly direction. They were followed by two more waves of aircraft, a total of 120 aircraft. As usual, the Israeli pilots flew at low altitude, and the Egyptian radars lost them. Since they had practiced this tactic many times in exercises, this did not arouse the suspicion of the Egyptians, and the Egyptian air defense interceptor fighters of the morning shift changed from patrolling as usual. However, this time the Israeli fighters turned south to cross the Egyptian coast undetected.

At 0845 Cairo time, when the UAR air force morning patrols landed, and most of the senior officers were still on their way to duty from home, the airfields at El Arish, Bir Gifgaf, Cairo West, Jebel Libni, Bir Tamada, Abu Suer, Kabrite, Beni Suef, Inkhase and Faitde were subjected to air raids. Ten units of four aircraft each made one bombing run, and then several strafing runs, firing cannons and machine guns, as well as NURSs, at Egyptian aircraft parking lots. The first wave was followed by a second and a third at ten-minute intervals. Having used up ammunition, the Israeli pilots returned to their bases in an extremely short time. It took 80 minutes to attack with eight waves of aircraft. After a ten-minute lull, the air raids resumed and continued again for 80 minutes. During this operation, only 12 fighters were left to protect the air borders of Israel. Sixty training "Masters", converted to attack ground targets, did not take part in it, as they were supposed to support the actions of the Israeli ground forces.

Over 300 Egyptian aircraft were destroyed or damaged in this three-hour air attack, mostly on the ground. The primary targets of the Israeli pilots were Tu-16 long-range bombers, which posed a great potential danger to Israel, as they could carry air-to-ground missiles capable of reaching Israeli cities and settlements. Both Tu-16 squadrons were destroyed. Israeli losses during these air raids amounted to 19 vehicles.

In the air, the UAR Air Force lost four unarmed trainers near Imbaba - the first losses of the war - and one MiG-21 when it took off from the airfield at Abu Sueira. Another MiG-21 was wrecked as it attempted to land on a cratered runway after driving four Israeli Super Misters away from it. The three surviving MiG-21s took off from the Inkhas base between Israeli raids. It happened at 8.56. There was no control from the ground, but over the Cairo West base they managed to shoot down the Hurricane, which, falling, crashed into a Tu-16 standing on the ground. Perhaps the Israeli pilot did it on purpose. Another MiG-21, which took off from the airfield in Abu Sueira, at 10.01 shot down the Mister, which fell near the outer border of the airfield. The last two MiG-21s that could fly were destroyed when they taxied to the runway a few minutes later, and this was done by the same Mirage III.

MiG-19s and 21s based at Kherghad flew north to help their comrades, but when they tried to land at Abu Sueira at 10.30 they were attacked by sixteen Mirages. Four MiGs were immediately shot down, but in the ensuing air battle, neither side managed to shoot down a single aircraft. Nevertheless, all the MiGs were killed. They either crashed trying to land with their gear retracted next to the runways riddled with funnels, or simply crashed to the ground when they ran out of fuel. Only at El Arish did the airfield remain intact, because here the Israeli pilots relied mainly on cannon fire and guided bombs, similar in design to the American Bullpups, used only against aircraft in the parking lots. Now only one Egyptian plane remained in the air - Il-14, on board of which were Air Marshal Sidqi and other senior officers of the Egyptian armed forces. They flew over the battle zone from the very beginning of the Israeli attack and were unable to take any urgent measures to save the situation, because the Israelis did not give them the opportunity to land. Thus, Egypt's ability to launch a counterattack was eliminated.

A few hours later, in response to the Israeli attack on Egypt, other Arab neighbors of Israel also got involved in the battle. In the morning, long-range Jordanian artillery damaged at least one runway at Ramat David Air Base. However, by the time 16 Royal Jordanian Air Force Hunters struck Netanya and Kfar Sirkin, the Israelis had already moved on Jerusalem.

At 14.30 Tel Aviv time, the Israeli Air Force shifted its direction of operations from the UAR Air Force to the Jordanian Air Force and raided the air bases in Mafraq and Amman and the strategically important radar station in Ajloun. Of the 18 Jordanian Hunter fighters on the ground, 17 were destroyed. The Israelis lost only one machine. The remaining Hunter was then damaged, killing two pilots. King Hussein ordered the surviving Hunter pilots to be placed at the disposal of the Iraqi Air Force command. On that first day of the war, Israeli aircraft also attacked Iraqi and Palestinian units advancing westward from Mafraq, defensive positions around Jerusalem, the Jordanian army headquarters in Jericho, a convoy east of Mount Olives, and the royal palace in Amman.

The list of targets of Israeli aviation on June 5 also included objects of the Syrian Air Force. At 11.45 (Tel Aviv time), 12 Syrian MiG-21s bombed the oil refinery in Haifa and attacked the Mahanaim airfield at strafing flight. An hour later, a powerful response from the Israeli Air Force followed, which bombed the Syrian air bases in Damascus, Merge Real, Doumeira and Seykal. The more distant T-4 airfield was raided in the middle of the day, shortly after three Israeli planes also attacked the Iraqi H-3 airbase. Although the Syrian Air Force did not suffer such catastrophic damage as the Egyptian or Jordanian ones, they nevertheless lost two-thirds of the first-line vehicles.

During the day, the Israeli Air Force again attacked Egypt and attacked the Cairo International Airport and the airfields at Mansoura, Helwan, El Minya, Bilbeis, Kherghad, Luxor and Ras Banas, as well as 23 radar positions.

On the second day of the war, June 6, the Israeli Air Force concentrated its main efforts on supporting the actions of its ground forces in the Sinai Peninsula and on the west bank of the Jordan River. The strike on enemy artillery positions west of Rafah allowed the Israelis to break into the layered defense of the Egyptians. That night, in the rear of the Jordanian troops, east of Jerusalem, an Israeli commando helicopter landing was landed. Another helicopter assault preceded the fall of Abu Agheila, the most important fortified area of the Egyptians near the border in Sinai. On June 6, combat missions were made to the Gaza and Bir Lahfana region to support the infantry, but in the early morning all Egyptian units had already begun to withdraw from the Sinai.

Noticing this, the Israelis decided to send forward a mobile detachment to capture the Mitla and Jiddi passes. This detachment broke through the crumbling Egyptian defenses and completed the task. A significant part of the Egyptian army was trapped east of the mountains, where it was ruthlessly destroyed from the air by Israeli aircraft. Just before the Mitla Pass, the whole area was littered with the mangled wreckage of thousands of Egyptian trucks, vans and jeeps.

The command of the UAR Air Force, in turn, decided to hastily put together at least some strike air group in order to strike from the air at the Israeli units straddling the passes, knock them out and rescue the thousands of troops from the encirclement. On the night of June 5-6, the Egyptian command managed to assemble a somewhat motley formation of 50 aircraft, mostly those that received minor damage and were immediately repaired. The Egyptians suffered the most damage in the flight crew: 70 pilots were killed and 200 were injured. The first indication that they still existed was given by the UAR Air Force at 5:36 a.m. on June 6, when two MiG-21s attempted to attack an Israeli convoy at Bir Lahfan. Both aircraft were shot down. The same fate befell a pair of Su-7 fighter-bombers, which at 0600 challenged Israeli fighters in the El Arish area and were destroyed. Then the Egyptian Su-7 and MiG-21 twice tried to shoot down Israeli helicopters. All of these attacks were pinpricks compared to the beating that the Israeli Air Force inflicted on the Egyptian army.

On the night of June 5-6, Iraq and Jordan joined forces to strengthen the defense of the H-3 airfield. At dawn on June 6, an Iraqi Tu-16 dropped bombs on an Israeli industrial complex in Natanya, but was then shot down by anti-aircraft fire.

Shortly thereafter, the Israeli Air Force launched another strike on the H-3 airbase and met with a fierce rebuff in the air from Iraqi and Jordanian fighters. The Arabs claimed to have shot down nine enemy aircraft, but the Israeli Air Force admitted the loss of only two aircraft. The Israelis, meanwhile, shot down one or two Lebanese Hunter reconnaissance aircraft over the Galilee. On June 6 and 7, the Israeli Air Force launched devastating strikes on Jordanian positions on the West Bank of the Jordan.

Israel also reported eight air battles that took place in eastern front from 6 to 7 June, mainly over the H-3 airbase. There, by the end of the war, one Jordanian pilot, Captain Ihsan Shardom, chalked up one downed Mirage, two Misters, and one Süd-Quest Votour.

During the remainder of the war, the UAR Air Force continued to deliver small-scale, but each time more and more effective strikes against Israeli troops in the Sinai Peninsula, although this could no longer affect the outcome of the war. At dawn on June 7, four MiG-19s defeated an Israeli convoy on a road along the Mediterranean coast. True, shortly after that, three MiGs were shot down by an Israeli air patrol. The subsequent three raids by the UAR Air Force and artillery fire from Egyptian ships slowed the advance of the Israelis in this sector. Near El Arish, Israeli fighters shot down one Il-18 and one MiG. Several units of the MiG-17 sent to strike at the Mitla Pass and southern Sinai suffered serious losses, but also had successes. For example, a MiG-17 shot down a Super Mister east of Ismailia.

On June 8, there were reports that volunteers from Algeria were fighting side by side with the Egyptian pilots. In addition, pilots from the UAR Air Force units stationed in Yemen arrived in Egypt. At the same time, the combat successes of the Israeli Air Force began to wane. On 8 June they shot down only nine UAR aircraft. In the late evening of the same day, the Israelis attacked from the sea and from the air the American intelligence ship "Liberty" and inflicted serious damage on it. It is still not clear how this could happen. Hostilities in the Sinai Peninsula practically ceased, and Egypt on June 9 at 4.35 accepted the UN proposal for a ceasefire.

Now the Israeli Air Force began to prepare for the next campaign, this time against Syria. But since Israeli aircraft had already delivered a series of serious strikes on the Syrian fortified area on the Golan Heights, Syria, which found itself alone after the defeat of Egypt and Jordan, on the evening of June 8 announced its agreement to accept the UN proposal for a ceasefire.

Israel, however, did not give such consent, and at 11.30 on June 9, the Israeli army launched a full-scale offensive on the Golan Heights.

At first, the Israelis met with fierce resistance, but then, after expressing a vigorous protest at the UN Security Council, the Syrian government withdrew its troops to defend the capital. In the air, both sides did not show much activity, although the Syrian Air Force and the UAR shot down one "Mister" and, possibly, one "Votur" near Damascus. Some Israeli planes were shot down by anti-aircraft fire. The Israeli Air Force claimed to have shot down 12 Syrian aircraft in aerial combat during the Six Day War. The main focus of Israeli aviation was on supporting ground troops who were fighting for the capture of the Golan Heights and the city of Quneitra. They managed to complete their task before the ceasefire scheduled by the UN Security Council for 6.30 June 10.

The so-called Six Day War was over, and Israel had won a victory that had a deafening resonance in the world.

The Israeli Air Force destroyed 286 UAR aircraft (60 of them in dogfights), 22 Jordanian Air Force aircraft, 54 Syrian aircraft, 15 to 20 Iraqi aircraft and one Lebanese aircraft. The loss of the Israeli Air Force amounted to at least 45 vehicles, or even more. 12 of them were shot down in air battles. 20 pilots were killed and 13 were taken prisoner.

However, lasting peace did not reign in the region. Reconciliation between Jews and Arabs did not follow, even for a short time. Both sides were simply building up their forces before starting the next, inevitable, round of confrontation.

WAR OF ATTRACTION (1969-1970)

The ceasefire at the end of the Six Day War brought only a brief respite in the struggle between Israel and its neighbors. Preceding the war, periodic shelling, airspace violations (which often ended in the fact that the violator was simply shot down) and raids by sabotage and airborne groups continued to take place after it. For example, on July 1, 1967, Egyptian troops ambushed an Israeli patrol on the east bank of the Suez Canal. For ten days thereafter, artillery duels took place across the canal, which soon provoked air clashes. Israel claimed that its Air Force shot down 4 Egyptian MiG-17s and 3 MiG-21s in July and 4 Syrian MiG-19s in October.

The French embargo on the supply of 50 Mirage 5J fighters, introduced even before the start of the six-day war, forced Israel to look for other aircraft suppliers to compensate for combat losses and modernize the materiel. The United States ordered 50 F-4E fighters and 6 RF-4E reconnaissance aircraft, as well as 25 A-4E attack aircraft formerly in service with the US Air Force, in addition to 48 A-4H attack aircraft (and two TA-4H) ordered even before the war. In 1968, the Israeli Air Force also received 20 Bell UH-1 multipurpose helicopters.

In September 1968, artillery exchanges across the canal resumed, and in October, Israeli commandos made several raids deep into Egyptian territory.

In March 1969, Nasser announced the start of a war of attrition. Just at this time, Israel completed the construction of the fortified Bar Lev line on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. Israel also responded to the barrage of Egyptian artillery with shelling and powerful air raids. By the end of May, 21 Egyptian planes had been shot down. Israeli losses amounted to three cars. By November, the number of Egyptian aircraft destroyed had increased to 51. Of these, 34 aircraft were shot down in air duels. In January 1970, the Israeli Air Force delivered powerful strikes against "military" targets in the Cairo area, after which the Egyptian government turned to the Soviet Union for help. This request was soon granted. The USSR sent five MiG-21 squadrons to Egypt, of course, along with volunteer pilots who turned out to be more prepared for fights with Israeli aces. By the end of that month, the Israelis had dropped 8,000 tons of bombs on Egypt. Since April, Egyptian fighter-bombers have launched short-lived air raids on Israeli fortified positions in the Sinai. In the air, Israel met with a serious rebuff. During July alone, Soviet MiGs shot down five Israeli Phantoms. In the end, on August 8, 1970, a truce was declared.

DOOMSDAY WAR (OCTOBER 1973)

In 1967, Israel's unheard-of debacle against its historically hostile Arab neighbors created dangerous complacency among the Jews. Israel was a country of 2.5 million, surrounded by a hundred million potential enemies. The leaders of Egypt and Syria have vowed to restore Arab glory by planning a campaign that will take Israel by surprise. In order to take revenge on Israel, the Arabs managed to create a powerful military coalition, the main participants of which were Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Jordan. This coalition was supported by other Arab countries, including Algeria and Libya. Even Pakistan, not being an Arab country, came out in support of it.

As a result of a brutal war of attrition, the material base of the Israeli Air Force has largely worn out. When the countdown to the start of the next conflict began, Israel had only 370 first-line aircraft against 730 aircraft in Egypt and Syria. Jordan was still too weak to take part in the next war, but could bind the Israeli troops by a simple act of mobilization and would then send only a symbolic contingent of its troops. By October 1973, everything was ready for the war, which was destined to have a profound impact on the theory and tactics of air combat.

The earlier victories reinforced the perception in Israel that the Arabs were inherently disorganized and incapable of effective warfare, despite their varied arsenal of Soviet military equipment. However, Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat adopted a plan whereby the Arabs could win the war without winning on the battlefield. Its basis was to be a surprise attack on two fronts simultaneously: Syrian troops in the north and Egyptian troops in the south. While the Syrians were supposed to liberate the Golan Heights and advance into Israeli territory, Egypt planned to launch a phased offensive through the Suez Canal.

The Arab troops advanced under the pretext of exercises went on the offensive at 14.00 on October 6, 1973. On this day, the religious holiday Yom Kippur (Judgment Day) was celebrated in Israel, and vigilance in the country, naturally, was weakened. Wave after wave of Egyptian planes swept over the Suez Canal to deliver a powerful blow to Israeli airfields, launchers anti-aircraft missiles, radars and many other military installations in the Sinai Peninsula. In addition to 222 fighter-bombers, Egypt used 25 KSR-2 air-to-ground missiles fired from Tu-16 bombers and surface-to-surface tactical missiles.

In the north, Syrian aviation supported the throw of its ground forces across the Golan plateau. MiG-17 and Su-7 attacked ground targets from extremely low altitudes. Despite its relatively short range and lack of modern avionics, the Su-7 was an excellent fast fighter-bomber capable of hitting targets with great accuracy. Algerian Su-7s were stationed in Egypt and took part in the war against a common enemy, being under the operational control of the Egyptian command. MiG-17s have proven themselves well in strafing attacks on enemy columns. At the beginning of the war, Egypt had 110 MiG-17s in 6 squadrons; the Syrian Air Force was armed with 100 vehicles of this type.

From above they were covered by the MiG-21. MiG-21 aircraft formed the basis of the Egyptian and Syrian fighter aircraft. Israeli propaganda tried to play down the danger that the MiG-21 posed to the Israeli Air Force, although it is now clear that this type of Soviet fighter was an unpleasant surprise for the Israelis. The Egyptian and Syrian air forces had about 300 MiG-21 aircraft, which were equipped with 18 squadrons.

Mi-8 helicopters landed assault units, which were tasked with capturing important facilities in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. The first Israeli planes took to the air in 30 minutes, but it took two hours to bring all parts of the Israeli Air Force to full combat readiness. In the attacking role, A-4 Skyhawk attack aircraft were used, which were escorted by more modern F-4 Phantom aircraft. Of the 40 landing helicopters, the Israelis managed to intercept only 5.

In general, F-4s in this war did most of the combat work in the air. So, out of 28 Egyptian MiG-17 and MiG-21 fighters that participated in the first raid on the Ophir airbase on October 6, 1973, a pair of Israeli Phantoms on combat duty were able to shoot down seven cars. Other F-4s were busy intercepting Egyptian Mi-8 helicopters that were trying to land special forces at key points in the Sinai Peninsula. Of the 40 helicopters, 5 were shot down.

"Mirages" IIICJ, together with "Nashers", made in Israel analogues of the French attack aircraft "Mirage" 5 (there were, however, a few more), were used against ground targets. It should, however, be said that both the Mirages and the F-4 brought considerable benefits, also performing air defense tasks. Even the obsolete "Super Misters" B2 were thrown into battle. There were about a dozen of them. Helicopter support was provided by Super Frelon and UH-I Iroquois vehicles.

If on the southern front such a factor as the Sinai desert acted in favor of Israel, which served as a buffer zone, then in the north such a factor was absent. Thus, military operations against Egypt have so far receded into the background. The Israeli troops operating on the southern front were given the task of containing the Egyptians, exhausting their forces in defensive battles. Priority was given to the northern front, where Syrian troops were only a few kilometers from Israeli towns and villages. The Israeli army still managed to hold out and buy time to mobilize reserves. Heavy fighting, during which a fierce tank battle took place with heavy losses on both sides, lasted three days. In the end, the Syrian troops ran out of steam, unable to take advantage of the advantage gained in the first hours of the war, which they got at a high price. As a result, the Syrians were forced to start a retreat. At the same time (October 9), the Israeli Air Force responded to the rocket attack on Israeli territory by bombing the headquarters of the Syrian army in Damascus and the oil refinery in Homs.

On October 7, Iraq sent a Hunter squadron to help the Syrian Air Force, and some time later, a MiG-21 unit. Jordan's contribution to the air war was limited to launching missiles at Israeli aircraft flying into the zone of operation of Jordanian air defense systems. Since the Syrian units were now retreating, the air defense system acquired a vital importance, after all, Israeli aircraft, carrying out a strategic bombing operation, flew almost to the very Syrian-Turkish border. By October 12, the Syrian air defense system was in a deplorable state. Many MiG-21s were either destroyed or permanently disabled as a result of severe damage. And the role of interceptors had to be assigned to obsolete MiG-17s.

Meanwhile, on the Egyptian front, things were not going well for the Israelis. Two days after the start of the offensive, Egyptian troops captured the eastern bank of the Suez Canal and firmly held it, despite 23 Israeli counterattacks. True, the Israeli Air Force managed to prevent further Egyptian commando operations by shooting down 10 Egyptian Mi-8 helicopters on October 10, but the shield from the Egyptian air defense systems proved to be extremely effective, as well as anti-tank guided missiles, with which the Egyptians defended the bridgehead they had captured. On October 7, Israeli aircraft made attempts to act directly against the air defense system, but this led to serious losses.

Six Phantoms were shot down, two pilots were killed and nine were captured. Another F-4E was shot down, but was able to return and engulfed in flames landed at the Ramat David airbase. The raids on Egyptian airfields did not result in heavy losses for the Arabs. On October 8, Phantoms raided Syrian airfields and Egyptian pontoon crossings across the canal, and also patrolled the airspace. Four MiG-17s were shot down while trying to attack Om-Khasiba. One F-4E was included in the list of losses. Apparently, he was shot down by a Syrian MiG-21.

To understand how serious the situation was for the Israelis, it is best to turn to the numbers of Israeli casualties.

During the first four days, the Israeli Air Force lost 81 aircraft, which amounted to two-thirds of the total number of losses that Israeli aviation was to suffer during the 19 days of the conflict. This was mainly due to the self-confidence of the Israelis, who, based on the experience of the 1967 war, treated Egyptian S-75 air defense systems with contempt. But the Israelis paid the price for their frivolity - this time the Arabs had much more advanced air defense systems. Along the entire length of the canal on its western bank, new air defense systems are located: S-125, Kub, Strela-1 and portable hand-held anti-aircraft systems Strela-2.

SAM 2K12 "Cube" was an unknown quantity for the West, and no one knew how to deal with its combined radar and electro-optical guidance system or target search radar. The SAM batteries were placed according to the classical Soviet scheme of a multi-level air defense system. Trying to avoid hitting any one known type of missile defense system, Israeli fighters inevitably fell into the coverage areas of other air defense systems. At the same time, the guided missile of the Kub air defense system turned out to be an unexpected gift for the Israelis, since it often could not distinguish its own aircraft from someone else's and hit the wrong target. According to some reports, 40 Egyptian and 4 Iraqi planes were mistakenly shot down by missiles of this type. Even before the end of the war, 6 9K12 Kub launchers fell into the hands of the Israelis, which were sent by plane to the United States, where specialists carefully studied them and developed the necessary countermeasures.

On October 8, when both sides continued to bomb each other's airfields, a squadron of Algerian Su-7 fighter-bombers arrived to help the Egyptians. In contrast to the 1967 war, when the Arab Air Force was destroyed on the ground, now not a single Egyptian aircraft has been lost in this way, and the Israeli attempts to achieve this cost them dearly. Syria is less fortunate in this respect. On October 8, for example, it lost a dozen planes during Israeli raids on three Syrian airfields. Since October 14, the Libyan squadron of "Mirages" Sh / 5 also took part in air battles, which, according to some reports, made about 400 sorties. These Mirages were piloted by mercenary pilots, mostly Pakistanis.

Despite heavy opposition from Arab air defenses, the Israelis continued to attempt to attack. October 9, 16 "Phantoms" went to Damascus, having received the task to strike at the headquarters of the Syrian army, but due to bad weather conditions, only eight aircraft reached the target. Several hits were noted at the cost of losing one car. Her pilot was killed, and the navigator was taken prisoner. Another "Phantom" barely made it home. During Israeli air raids on power plants and Egyptian airfields, another Phantom was shot down.

The next day, the Phantoms attacked various Egyptian and Syrian air bases and suffered no losses, but in similar operations on October 11, two F-4s were shot down by Egyptian MiG-21s over the Banbach airfield. The day of October 12 passed without loss, but the next day one F-4 was seriously damaged by anti-aircraft artillery fire during a raid on the El Mazza airfield near Damascus. The campaign against Syrian airfields ended on October 14, but raids on targets in Egypt continued. During the bombing of Mansur, according to unconfirmed reports, two MiG-21s were shot down. In turn, the MiGs put up a decent resistance, as a result of which two F-4Es ran out of fuel on the way back and they were forced to land on unprepared airfields in Baluey and Refidim.

On October 15, 12 Phantoms attacked the Tanta airfield and shot down one MiG-21, but they themselves suffered losses - one F-4 was destroyed, the navigator of the car was killed, and the pilot was captured. Another "Phantom" was seriously damaged, but somehow flew back. On October 16, anti-aircraft missile systems were attacked in the Port Said area. On October 17 and 18, these raids were repeated. During these attacks, three Israeli "Phantoms" were shot down, and the fourth was heavily damaged. On October 18, four Syrian MiG-17s were intercepted and, according to the Israeli side, destroyed. At least one of them was shot down by a new Israeli-made Rafael Shafrir missile. On October 20, Egyptian missiles destroyed another two Phantoms.

For both sides, the moment came when they had to replenish their units, pretty battered in battles, with supplies new technology from the arsenals of the superpowers. As early as October 9, two air bridges with different senders of military cargoes, but with one geographical address (USA / USSR - Middle East), were in full swing. Some American transport planes landed directly on airfields located in the Sinai Peninsula. The Soviet BTA made 934 flights to Syria alone, delivering 15,000 tons of military equipment there. US military transport aircraft C-141 Starlifter and C-5 Galaxy carried out 566 sorties until November 15, transferring 22,395 tons of cargo to Israel, including disassembled CH-53D helicopters. In addition, Israeli Boeing 707s and 747s delivered another 5,500 tons of equipment. A lot of goods arrived by sea.

Egypt and Syria quickly made up their losses in aircraft. From October 14 to October 20, their Air Force received 100 Soviet fighters each. Israel, pretending to be a Kazan orphan, issued a desperate cry for help, saying that by October 13 it allegedly had military supplies for only 4 days of the war, and this led to an acceleration in the pace of American supplies. Phantoms and Skyhawks were urgently withdrawn from US Air Force and Navy squadrons and sent to the Middle East. The first 28 vehicles were there in combat readiness by October 17, and another 50 by October 22. US markings were painted over. These aircraft were taken from the 4th and 401st TIAK and made 200 sorties in the war in the Middle East. During the fighting, four squadrons of "Phantoms" (69, 107, 119 and 201st) destroyed 115 enemy aircraft, and also attacked enemy ground targets.

However, the victory for Israel was brought not by additional deliveries of fighters, but by US Air Force transport aircraft, which delivered new electronics and weapons: electronic countermeasures devices to combat S-75 and S-125 air defense systems, smart bombs such as Waley and HOBOS, AGM anti-radar missiles -45 Shrike, AGM-65 Maverick teleguided missiles, Rockey cluster bombs and Toy anti-tank guided missiles for the ground forces. Stockpiles of Hawk anti-aircraft missiles and AIM-9 and AIM-7 air-to-air missiles were also replenished.

Having received a new weapon, Israel was now ready to take advantage of the tactical mistake made by the Egyptian command on October 14th. Egyptian troops violated the original plan and got out from under the wide and reliable shield of the air defense system. The fighting has now acquired a maneuverable nature with a rapidly changing situation, which was very beneficial for Israel. The result was quite predictable. On the night of October 15-16, with the support of helicopters, units of the Israeli Navy attacked the Egyptian coast far to the west of the front line. At the same time, Israeli units, taking advantage of the gap in the Egyptian defense line, penetrated through it to the opposite bank of the Suez Canal.

In the same time fighting intensified in the sky to such an extent that the northern front was left with almost no air cover, which provided the Syrians with a rare opportunity to use MiG-17 and Su-7 aircraft to strike Israeli bases and an oil refinery. The Egyptian command threw even Aero L-29 jet trainers into battle as attack aircraft, which, however, did not achieve much success.

As a result of the successful actions of the Israeli units, the situation for the Egyptians became close to critical, and then, in a futile attempt to disrupt the Israeli forcing of the Suez Canal, the Egyptian command used Mi-8 helicopters as bombers on October 19. They dropped napalm from the cargo bays from a low altitude. When the Israeli troops crushed the enemy defenses with a flank strike and walked through the positions of the air defense system along the canal, capturing 12 out of 40 anti-aircraft systems, the powerful defensive umbrella of the Arabs fell apart, giving Egyptian aircraft to the mercy of the enemy.

When Israeli troops firmly established themselves in the bridgehead on the western bank of the Suez Canal, it became clear that Egypt, not Israel, would lose the territory. The time has come for the Arabs to use their last weapon: on October 20, Saudi Arabia cut off oil supplies to the West. At the same time, Egypt requested a ceasefire. Through mediation and under pressure from the superpowers, it was decided that the truce would come into effect at 6:52 p.m. on 22 October. However, Israel had its own opinion on this matter, and he continued to advance south towards Suez, trying to surround the Egyptian 3rd Army, and only on October 24 the US forced him to stop his troops.

In the north, too, there was a scramble to secure better positions before the truce began. Under the cover of fighter jets, Syrian troops and Israeli helicopters delivered reinforcements to posts located on the tops of the mountains. In the last hours of the war, Israel managed to capture an important observation post on Mount Hermon. Helicopters and parachute troops played the main role in this operation.

Up to the present day, each of the parties refutes the enemy's data on the number of air losses. What is certain is that they were stunning. Egypt and Syria lost 220 vehicles each. To this should be added 21 Iraqi Hunters and MiG-21s and 30 Algerian and Libyan fighters.

Israel lost 120 aircraft. Almost half of the losses were A-4 Skyhawk attack aircraft - 53 units. These machines had to bear the brunt of the fight against the powerful air defense systems of the Arab countries and enemy ground forces.

37 Phantoms were lost. Another six of these machines were so badly damaged that they had to be written off. Thus, in terms of the number of losses, the Phantoms were second only to the A-4 Skyhawk attack aircraft. This was due to the specifics of the combat missions assigned to the "Phantoms", performing which they had to overcome the dense fire of anti-aircraft artillery and enter the zones of operation of the air defense system. At the same time, the Israeli pilots who fought on the F-4E had 115 victories in air battles.

Also, the Arabs shot down 11 "Mirages" or "Nashers" - unlicensed copies of the "Mirage" of Israeli production.

About 40 Israeli planes were shot down by anti-aircraft missiles, 31 - by anti-aircraft artillery fire, and most of these losses occurred in the first days of the war.

The total Arab losses from the air defense system and ZA amounted to only 17 and 19 vehicles, respectively. About 400 air battles took place in the air. Israel acknowledges the loss of only 21 aircraft in them and claims that its pilots shot down 335 Arab aircraft, two-thirds of this number by cannon fire, and the rest with AJM-9 Sidewinder missiles or their Israeli-made IAI Shafrir counterparts fired at close range . Israel's own missiles destroyed two planes, while the Arabs - 58.

Helicopters make up a separate loss item. The Egyptians lost 42 rotorcraft, the Syrians 13, and the Israelis 6.

Yom Kippur ushered in a new era of air warfare, and the Egyptian complex, multi-layered air defense system nearly overpowered the Israeli air force.

This war and its results became the subject of a comprehensive analysis by experts from different countries, who drew the appropriate conclusions. Due attention was paid to the Soviet air defense systems. The role of radar countermeasures in increasing the probability of successfully completing a combat mission has become more obvious. Laser-guided or TV-guided missiles, which were successfully tested in Vietnam, gained much wider acceptance due to the apparent effectiveness they showed in pinpoint strikes by the Israeli Air Force in the second phase of the war. , used by Israel to collect information, have become an integral part of any modern army.

ISRAEL'S LONG-TERM AIR RADIES (1976-1985)

In four major Middle East wars, Israel has shown that it has a fairly effective air force. However, in 1976 it turned out that he also had the means to transfer his troops over long distances.

On June 27, 1976, an Air France plane took off from Athens for Paris. On board the Airbus A300 were the crew and 258 passengers, including four tourists who transferred from the plane that arrived in Athens from Bahrain. 8 minutes after takeoff, the “tourists”, threatening with pistols and grenades, hijacked the airliner. First, they forced the pilots to head for Benghazi, and then the plane flew to Uganda, where President Idi Amin provided the terrorists with asylum.

The kidnappers - members of the Baader-Meinhof and PLO organizations - demanded the release of 53 prisoners who were in prisons in several countries. The terrorists released a few passengers, but all the Jews, who made up the majority, were left as hostages. The French crew of the plane decided to share the fate of the latter and stayed with them.

Israel, which has long been a target for terrorists, immediately launched a rescue operation. However, having flown to Entebbe, the terrorists found themselves outside the range of most types of Israeli aircraft. Nevertheless, the preparations for the operation were in full swing. She was given the code name Operation Thunderbolt (translated from English - "lightning strike").

On Saturday, June 3, three C-130 Hercules transport planes took off from the Afir air base, located in the very south of the Sinai Peninsula, occupied by Israel. A Boeing 707 flew with them, providing control and communications during the operation. In this composition, the system of Israeli aircraft flew over Ethiopia and Kenya. Having passed Nairobi, where the second Boeing 707 (medical) aircraft had already landed, this link approached the Ugandan airport in Entebbe. Israeli intelligence officers who entered the airport in advance had already managed to report that the hijacked plane was parked at the old terminal where the hostages were kept.

The key to the success of the Israeli rescue operation in Entebbe, according to the plans of the Israeli command, was the element of surprise. In order to freely get close to the place where the hostages are being held, the Israeli paratroopers dressed in the form of PLO fighters.

Three Boeing C-130s landed just after midnight. The first plane taxied openly to the terminal building, and a black Mercedes rolled out of it through the hatch-ramp, the same, up to the number, as President Amin's. He was followed by Land Rovers with men in PLO uniforms armed with AK-47s. The Ugandan guards saluted a man in a black Mercedes, whom they mistook for their president, and immediately fell down, mowed down by AK-47 bursts. Disguised Israeli special forces fired. From another plane, a second wave of Israeli special forces rushed out. The fighters burst into the terminal building shouting: “Lie down! We are Israelis! A shootout with the terrorists ensued, right over the heads of the hostages.

The second unit captured the control tower and destroyed the radio transmitting equipment, but in the process, the commander of the special forces, Colonel Yehonatan Netanyahu, was killed by a sniper's bullet. To completely eliminate any possibility of an air chase, Israeli paratroopers destroyed eleven MiG fighters - almost all military equipment Ugandan Air Force.

Within a few minutes, the terrorists were finished, and the hostages were quickly put into the fourth, empty, C-130, which had just landed. Unfortunately, three hostages died in the shootout.

The C-130s took off, leaving the bodies of the hijackers on the ground, as well as 20 killed and over 100 wounded Ugandan soldiers. After landing in Kenya, the Israeli planes refueled while the wounded were transferred to a waiting air ambulance and then continued their flight. A triumphant meeting awaited them at Tel Aviv's Ben Gurion Airport.

As a result of the successful operation, the lives of more than 100 hostages, as well as members of the Air France Airbus crew, were saved. This was achieved at the cost of the lives of three hostages and the commander of the special forces, Lieutenant Colonel Netanyahu, whose younger brother was destined to later become Prime Minister of Israel.

Five years later, Israel conducted another long-range raid, but of a different nature.

Iraq has long been suspected of having a clandestine program to build its own nuclear weapons, in which the nuclear center at Osirak played a major role. This plant was built with the help of French and Italian specialists in the desert, 19 km southeast of Baghdad.

Israeli intelligence reported that the power plant would be operational by September 1981, and production of enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium would begin shortly thereafter.

All of Iraq's neighbors were deeply concerned about this. But the greatest danger threatened Israel, and therefore in this country it was decided to strike at a nuclear reactor from the air. It was not easy to do this, since Baghdad is more than 1100 km away from Israel. However, shortly before this, Israel acquired American-made F-15 and F-16 fighters, which were up to such a task.

After careful preparation, which included the construction of a life-size model of the reactor for training attacks, the command gave the go-ahead for the operation.

On Sunday, June 6, 1981, six F-15 Eagles, which were supposed to provide fighter cover, and eight F-16 Fighting Falcons, each carrying two 1000 kg bombs, took off from the air force base Etzion.

Flying at low altitude over the desert regions of Jordan and Saudi Arabia, the Falcons reached their target in 80 minutes. After climbing steeply, the F-16 pilots saw the reactor dome clearly visible against the background of the desert and immediately began approaching the target. There is reason to believe that all 16 bombs hit the object, although one of them did not explode. The Iraqi air defense system was alerted to full alert, but it was too late. When the Iraqi anti-aircraft guns opened fire, Israeli planes were already flying home.

This air raid caused great anger in the Arab world, but at the same time it demonstrated that the Israelis have both the ability and the will to launch powerful strikes against distant targets if it serves their interests. This became clear again in 1985.

On September 2, 1985, three Israelis were brutally murdered aboard a yacht in Larnaca, Cyprus. The investigation determined that the perpetrators belonged to Unit 17, a terrorist organization associated with the PLO. Israel decided to respond to this with a strike on the PLO headquarters in Tunisia.

The distance for the flight was considerable - almost 2000 km there and back. This raid was to be the longest in Israeli history. For this operation, F-15 Eagle fighter-bombers were allocated, which were supposed to be refueled in the air from a Boeing 707 tanker aircraft.

The target of the flight was the PLO building complex in Hamam al-Shatt, where the offices of Yasser Arafat and his closest advisers were located, as well as the operational and propaganda departments and the communications center. This complex of buildings also housed Unit-17.

The raid was carried out on 1 October. Aerial refueling went off without a hitch, according to schedule. The only concern was the weather: the Gulf of Tunis was all covered with thick clouds. However, as the aircraft approached the coast, the weather improved and the F-15 pilots were able to recognize their targets on the ground. The raid was unexpected and very destructive. All targets were either destroyed or severely damaged. There were direct bomb hits on Arafat's headquarters and the Unit 17 barracks. Israel has shown once again that it can act if it wants to, regardless of any political consequences and world public opinion.

OPERATION "PEACE FOR GALILEE" - BATTLE OVER THE BEKAAA VALLEY ("FIRST LEBANE WAR", JUNE 1982)

After Egypt's rapprochement with the West, which followed the signing of the historic Camp David Accord, Syria automatically became Israel's main Arab adversary. This Arab country for many years defended the cause of the Palestinians, who did not stop fighting for the creation of their own, officially recognized state. The rejection of the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt was expressed in attacks by PLO fighters on the Israeli border area, which were carried out from bases in southern Lebanon. In response, Israeli attack aircraft launched missile and bomb attacks on these bases.

With the obvious goal of stopping the civil war in Lebanon, Syria sent its troops to this neighboring country on May 31, 1976. They were not to be considered as occupying forces, and therefore air cover units and anti-aircraft missiles remained in Syria. Syrian air defense systems were located in the border area, from where they could resist any attempt by Israeli aircraft to strike at Damascus. In March and April 1978, part of southern Lebanon, up to the Litani River, was occupied by Israeli troops. The Israeli Air Force periodically attacked targets in Lebanese territory, which caused opposition from Syrian aircraft.

Parallel to the border, from Rai-aka to the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, the Bekaa Valley stretches southward. Israel has made significant efforts to collect information on Syrian positions in the area and has lost several Firebee-type RPV reconnaissance drones to Syrian anti-aircraft fire.

During air battles with Israeli aircraft, the Syrian Air Force lost at least 12 MiGs from 1979 to June 1982, including two MiG-25s shot down while trying to attack the RF-4E Phantom reconnaissance aircraft.

In the late 70s - early 1980s. The Israeli Air Force received a serious trump card - more modern than their opponents, aircraft - especially the exceptionally maneuverable F-16 "Fighting Falcon" and F-15A "Eagle". Israel was among the first buyers of these types of aircraft, adopting them almost at the same time as the United States.

Israeli F-16 fighter-bombers began to make sorties immediately after entering Israel in 1980. From the very beginning, F-16s were used as fighter-bombers to escort bomb-laden F-4E Phantoms and destroy enemy ground targets and aircraft.

The F-15A has become the main Israeli air defense fighter. Although this aircraft has good speed and maneuverability, its main advantage is its excellent avionics equipment, which also consists of the APG-63 pulse Doppler radar. Israeli F-15As can carry the same range of missiles as their American counterparts: the AIM-9 Sidewinder and AIM-7 Sparrow, as well as Israeli Shafrir or Python missiles with infrared seeker.

To eliminate the threat from the PLO, Israel planned the invasion of Lebanon with its armored formations. This operation was scheduled for mid-1982. In order to reduce unwanted international outcry, this attack should have been filed as revenge for the "atrocious" crimes of the PLO. The desired casus belli soon presented itself. They were the assassination attempt on the Israeli ambassador in London on June 3. The attempt on the life of the Israeli ambassador in London was used as a pretext to justify the Israeli invasion of neighboring Lebanon in 1982. The Israeli command pursued the goal of depriving the PLO of its bases in Lebanon, from which PLO saboteurs raided Israeli territory and from where artillery and mortar attacks were carried out Israeli settlements. Lebanon was already in spasms civil war between Christian forces supported by Israel and an alliance of various Muslim organizations and the PLO backed by Syria.

The next day at 15.15, seven waves of A-4, F-4, F-16 aircraft of the Israeli Air Force rushed to Beirut, the capital of Lebanon. They attacked Palestinian refugee camps. The following morning, Beirut, the coastal highway, and PLO bases were hit. At the same time, one Skyhawk was shot down by the Strela missile, which was the first loss of the Israeli Air Force.

Israel's plans became apparent to the world only on June 6th. His ground forces, supported by helicopters, began a rapid advance north along the coast, which was supposed to lead the troops almost to the gates of Beirut. Israel has stated that the purpose of this full-scale invasion is to create a demilitarized zone in front of its northern borders. The PLO detachments that tried to resist were driven back, and this forced Syria, as an ally, to help Lebanon. On June 7, the Syrian Air Force tried to intercept F-16 aircraft over Beirut and Damour, but in the end two MiGs were lost. To protect its flanks, Israel deployed large forces in CH-53 heavy transport helicopters to the Shuf Mountains, southeast of Beirut. This operation, carried out the next day, threatened the Syrian positions in the Bekaa Valley from the flank. In addition, now Israeli forces could cut off communication between Beirut and Damascus, and so Syria responded by attacking its Gazelle fire support helicopters. Syrian attack aircraft penetrated deep into Lebanese airspace and attacked Israeli tanks near the port of Sidon.

As a result, it became clear to the Israeli command that the Syrians could interfere with operations against the PLO, which were carried out on the coastal plain. The adoption of countermeasures became an urgent need. In addition, the Israeli Air Force was constrained in their actions by the Syrian air defense system in the Bekaa Valley. The situation was further complicated by the fact that, according to intelligence, additional air defense systems arrived there. It was necessary to act urgently. At that moment, there were 19 SAM positions in the Bekaa Valley.

On June 9, after preliminary reconnaissance of the location of their positions with the help of UAVs, the Israelis carried out a false attack with a special group of aircraft. She provoked the inclusion of the radar of the Syrian air defense systems, which was what the Israelis wanted. Israeli attack aircraft armed with anti-radar missiles and cluster bombs immediately rushed to attack in waves.

90 vehicles took part in these raids. First, shortly after 1400, a unit of 26 F-4s fired AGM-65 Maverick air-to-ground missiles and AGM-45 and AGM-78 Standard air-to-ground missiles against air defense systems and control radars. In addition, Israeli ground troops fired their Zeev ground-to-ground tactical missiles at the same targets. As a result, 10 SAM positions were put out of action within 10 minutes. The almost completely paralyzed Syrian air defense was then dealt another heavy blow. 40 F-4s, A-4s and Kfir planes hit the launch sites of the anti-aircraft missiles themselves, using TV-guided Maverick missiles, cluster bombs and laser-guided bombs. This second phase of the raid ended at 1435 hours. After a short break, the third phase of the operation began. Another wave of Israeli aircraft attacked other Syrian targets along the front, as well as the surviving air defense sites.

The cover group included F-16s and F-15 Eagles that engaged the Syrian fighters. The battle soon split into dozens of separate air duels. MiG-21 units were badly battered. The Israeli Air Force, according to them, shot down 22 enemy fighters and inflicted heavy damage on seven aircraft, without losing a single aircraft. Syria acknowledged the loss of 16 vehicles, but announced 26 Israeli aircraft shot down, most of which were probably reconnaissance drones.

However, the most important result of the battle on June 9 was that in four raids, Israeli aircraft disabled at least 17 rocket launchers, leaving Syrian troops with virtually no ground-based air defense systems.

On June 10, the last two missile launch sites were destroyed, and now Syria could rely only on its Air Force in the fight against Israeli aircraft. Fierce battles broke out in the sky, as a result of which the Syrians reported 10 air victories. Israel claimed that its pilots shot down 25 Syrian planes and three helicopters. The latter tried to stop the advance of the Israeli column into the Bekaa Valley, to which the Israeli command responded by introducing AN-I Cobra and Hughes 500MD Defender fire support helicopters into battle.

The next day, June 11, similar air battles took place when Syrian troops attacked Israeli units, which, as it seemed to the Syrian command, intended to cut the road leading from the Bekaa Valley to Beirut. According to Israeli data, this cost the Syrian air force another 18 downed aircraft, lost just before the temporary ceasefire came into effect. In fact, the air war was over, although Israeli aircraft continued to occasionally strike. The work of the Israeli helicopter pilots did not decrease, since over the next months they had to support their troops from the air, occupying southern part Lebanon.

The superiority of Israeli aviation over the Syrian Air Force was overwhelming, and this was largely due to ground support elements, the main of which was the Israeli multi-level air combat control system. One of its main components was the recently acquired E-2C Hawkeye AWACS aircraft. During the fighting, two of the four E-2Cs in operational readiness were patrolling in the air near the coast. Later, the Syrian command admitted that all of its aircraft were detected by the enemy almost immediately after takeoff, which deprived them of any chance of a surprise attack. In addition to the E-2C, Israel had Westinghouse low-altitude surveillance radar systems (this system was an AN / TPS-63 tactical radar suspended under a balloon). Close reconnaissance was carried out by reconnaissance RF-4E "Phantom". One RF-4E was shot down by anti-aircraft artillery fire, and in view of the exceptional value of its avionics and electronic reconnaissance equipment (some of which were Israeli-made), the Israeli command sent a special search party behind enemy lines with the task of finding and destroying the wreckage of the aircraft. The search engines found not only the crashed plane, but also a group of eleven Soviet specialists who were removing "black boxes" from the plane. The Israelis forced them to retreat. During the fighting over the Bekaa Valley, RPV drones were widely used for both reconnaissance and deception purposes. These were the Firebee and IA1 Scouts, the latter of which were equipped with a piston engine and, having television cameras and panoramic cameras, transmitted information about the results of air raids in hot pursuit.

All operations to destroy the positions of the air defense systems were carefully planned. Aircraft of the first wave launched missiles from a distance of 35 km - outside the zone of action of the air defense system. These missiles were supposed to hit the “nerve” centers of the air defense system with pinpoint strikes and therefore were Maverick-type weapons with a television seeker and AGM-45 Shrike and AGM-78 Standard anti-radar missiles. After the air defense control centers were disabled, Israeli aircraft were able to attack the launch positions of the air defense system from a closer distance and using cluster and high-explosive bombs. Most of this work was done by Phantoms.

Boeing 707s converted from ordinary civilian airliners also took part in the battles. Equipped with side-looking radars and electronic warfare equipment, they interfered with the enemy’s radars and their guidance systems for interceptor fighters.

In the battles over the Beka Valley, Syria admitted the loss of 60 aircraft and "less than 30" air defense systems. Israel claimed that its Air Force shot down 92 Syrian planes and helicopters, including 85 fighter jets and 5 Gazelle helicopters. 40 downed Syrian aircraft (20 MiG-21 and 20 MiG-23) fall on 37 F-15 Eagle fighters. In total, the Needles shot down 58 enemy vehicles. Another victory won by the F-4E should be attributed to McDonnell Douglas. The remaining 44 downed aircraft of the Syrian Air Force fall to the share of 72 F-16s, and again these machines are almost equally distributed between the MiG-21 and MiG-23.

Syria, after initially inflating data on the number of air victories, then settled on 19 Israeli planes and helicopters shot down. Israel acknowledged the loss of only one Skyhawk and two helicopters. This data is underestimated. In reality, Israel lost 13 fighters and attack aircraft, including several F-15As. Two helicopters (AN-1 "Cobra" and Bell 212) were shot down by PLO fighters. The Israeli command claimed that all of its lost planes and helicopters were shot down by anti-aircraft missiles.

The inevitable dispute over the number of planes shot down does not negate the fact that Israel won a complete victory in the air battle over the Bekaa Valley, in which fighters from both sides took part. Even the numbers of Israeli casualties cited by the Syrians cannot belittle its significance, calling into question only the extent of Israeli air superiority.

Thus, the good training and skill of the Israeli pilots, as well as the constant military-technical assistance from the United States, provide the Israeli Air Force with a clear advantage in the fight against hostile neighbors.

After the events described, the Israeli Air Force was used in the Second Lebanon War (2006) and Operation Cast Lead (2008). However, in these conflicts, Israel was opposed by Hezbollah and Hamas militants, who did not have serious air defense systems. Under the conditions of absolute air supremacy, Israel used aviation only for launching missile and bomb attacks on enemy targets. But it seems that in the near future, the Israeli Air Force will again meet with serious opponents - Iran and Syria ...

Soviet military pilots, who entered into an air battle with Israeli fighters, lost 5 aircraft without shooting down a single enemy aircraft.

For forty years now, legends have been circulating about this battle. 100 Soviet aces. 50 deadly MiG-21 interceptors of the best modification of the MF for that period. The Russian "legion of death", urgently deployed to the Middle East, was supposed to radically change the balance of power in the air.

Youth and anger. The desire to fight to the last drop of blood - as bequeathed by the fathers who took Berlin. Motherland will provide you with the most the best technique and learn all the necessary skills of a fighter pilot. Squad of winners. Thunderstorm of the air ocean.

Prepare for this fight. For the decisive battle, the best of the best were selected - the 135th Fighter Aviation Regiment of the USSR Air Force, which underwent special training at training grounds in the southern regions of the USSR. While the Soviet "falcons" cut turns over the Crimea and the Caspian Sea, trying to tail each other, the Israelis swallowed the blood of the "war of attrition" and studied, studied, studied, practicing their own air combat techniques.

Only old men go into battle - the best Soviet pilots against Amos Amir, Asher Snir, Abraham Shalmon and Avi Gilad. Only this four aces had more than 20 air victories in total. The command of the Israeli Air Force rightly believed that there was no second such link in the world, equal in quality of training and abilities to the detachment of "air killers" under the command of Amos Amir.
Two teams of professionals. Two scorpions locked in one vessel. Only one must remain alive. Bolivar can't take two.

Ahead is a painful unknown. With a shield or on a shield. Soldiers-internationalists, our country has given you a great honor - the right to represent the interests of the Soviet Union in the region of the Middle East conflict. I have no right to order. Volunteers have gathered here. Please do everything right there and come back alive.
Leaving the room, he added in a stern voice: “Keep in mind, comrades: if you are shot down behind the Suez Canal line, we don’t know you, get out yourself ...” (from the memoirs of the pilots about the meeting with the USSR Minister of Defense A. Grechko)

Secret mission in one of the most dangerous hotspots on the planet. On the wings and keel - identification marks of the Egyptian Air Force. In the forward part of the fuselage there is a tactical number, drawn in fancy Arabic script. The personnel of the unit, all pilots and technicians - “ana khabir rusi” (translated “I am a Russian specialist”). MiGs were based at the Kom-Aushim, Beni-Suef, Janaklis airbases, and the advanced airfield in Katamiye was periodically used.

The all-seeing intelligence Mossad has already reported the arrival of the Russians. These are not ordinary instructors, these people came here to fight. There was a brief confusion on the other side of the Suez Canal: A direct threat to the existence of the State of Israel? But what about neutrality? How justified is shooting at aircraft with Russian crews? Will this be the spark of the Great War?
"No, we must fight," Prime Minister Golda Meir took the initiative - "when necessary, immediately join the fight."

They carefully prepared for the general duel - from the first half of April 1970, weekly meetings between Russians and Israelis began. Alas, every time the opponents dispersed in different sides without risking a fight. Israeli pilots carefully observed the behavior of their potential opponents, tracked all their maneuvers and formation patterns during sorties, and studied the manner of controlling Soviet fighters.

I saw the Mirage - do not turn into a turn!

Our pilots are looking at the enemy with no less interest. Here he is! Literally a couple of tens of meters away, the fat-bellied carcass of the Phantom glides to the side. A double American-made fighter is simply a giant - 20 tons of continuous speed and fire - against 8 tons of the maximum takeoff weight of the MiG! McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom suspensions are littered with multiple air-to-air cruise missiles, two engines, a sophisticated on-board electronics suite. An extremely dangerous enemy.

F-4E Phantom II Israeli Air Force

And here - flashed the arrow-shaped silhouette of the Mirage. The graceful French fighter represents almost great danger than the American "monster" - the load on the wing of the Mirage is less than that of the MiG - it is risky for our fighters to engage in close combat with such a nimble enemy. The final touch to the portrait of Dassault Mirage III - two built-in aircraft guns DEFA caliber 30 mm.

Instead of a deadly and senseless "carousel" with French cars, Soviet pilots were advised to "keep their distance" using their trump card - the large thrust-to-weight ratio of the MiG-21. The main thing here is the position at the beginning of the battle and a portion of sharp, energetic maneuvers that allow you to save energy, constantly remaining in a more advantageous position.

How did the legendary MiG-21 look like against the backdrop of an armada of modern foreign technology? A small, light, swift interceptor - the MiG did not have super-powerful radars, long-range AIM-7 Sparrow missiles and impressive sighting and navigation equipment - the combat capabilities of the aircraft were determined solely by the talent of the pilot. In general, the fighter was easy to operate, fast and reliable, and its excellent flight performance allowed an experienced pilot to "sweep" any air enemy from the skies.

... By June 1970, Soviet pilots made about 100 sorties to intercept intruders in the sky of Egypt, alas, every time Israeli aircraft refused to join the battle - if there was the slightest danger of a military collision, the enemy immediately went deep into their territory. The game of hide-and-seek continued until June 25, 1970 - on that day a pair of Soviet MiGs (pilots Krapivin and Salnik) secretly crossed the path of the Skyhawk attack aircraft - one of the R-3 homing missiles fired by the MiGs hit the aircraft engine with the "Star of David" on the fuselage . However, the tenacious Skyhawk managed to stabilize the flight and, smoking with a twisted nozzle, disappeared into the sky beyond the Suez Canal.

The intoxicating taste of victory demanded an immediate continuation - an ambush on the Israeli Mirages was planned for June 27: Egyptian MiG-17s launched a provocative strike on Israeli positions on the eastern side of the canal - then, according to the plan, a Mirage link was supposed to rise to intercept the impudent MiGs . Egyptian planes, used as bait, will lure them into their territory, where three groups of MiGs with Soviet crews will enter the battle. Further, the enemy will simply be smeared in the air.

The plan didn't work. Apparently sensing something was wrong, the Israelis refused to rise to intercept. Having ironed out the Israeli stronghold, the Egyptian planes calmly returned to their airfields. The accident happened in the evening of the same day. The Egyptians repeated the blow - this time four Mirages fell out of the red-hot haze of the Sinai air. They managed to lure them to Egyptian territory, however ... there are no Russian fighters anywhere! The disgusting interaction between the Russian and Egyptian command did not allow the interceptors to be raised in time. The Israelis shot, as in exercises, two MiG-17s and with impunity withdrew beyond the canal line. The beating of the Egyptian MiGs was observed by four "Russian" MiG-21s, however, the ground command post forbade them to engage in battle until the arrival of two other links.

On July 30, a general battle was given. That battle, which has been awaited for so long and for which they have been preparing so intensely. In a number of Russian sources, this event takes place under the designation "Battle over El Sokhna." Official Israeli name: Operation Rimon-20.

For 40 years, this story has acquired such an incredible amount of myths and legends that it is almost impossible to establish the exact details, nature and chronicle of the fierce air battle between the Soviet Air Force and Hel Haavir (Israel Defense Forces Air Force) that took place on July 30, 1970. The only thing that can be said with some degree of certainty is: the approximate composition of the forces, the names of some participants and, most importantly, its tragic results - that day, several MiGs with Soviet crews were indeed shot down. As a result of air combat, the following died:

Zhuravlev Vladimir Alexandrovich - captain, senior pilot. He was awarded (posthumously) the Order of the Red Banner and the Egyptian Order of the Star of Military Valor.

Yurchenko Nikolai Petrovich - captain, flight commander. He was awarded (posthumously) the Order of the Red Banner and the Egyptian Order of the Star of Military Valor.

Yakovlev Evgeny Gerasimovich - captain, flight commander. He was awarded (posthumously) the Order of the Red Banner and the Egyptian Order of the Star of Military Valor.

One thing is absolutely clear - it was an organized ambush by the Israeli Air Force (that's what it is called - Operation Rimon-20). But how did it happen that the Soviet pilots were trapped? And why couldn't they get out of it?

There are many answers. According to Israel's jingoistic version, twenty Soviet MiG-21s pounced on a "defenseless" pair of reconnaissance Mirages (bait). Alas, to their surprise, the Russians found four close-flying fighters in front of them, so that only 2 marks were displayed on the screens of Egyptian ground-based radars. Realizing that this was some kind of set-up, the Russians twitched and SUDDENLY found themselves surrounded by 12 more Israeli Air Force aircraft.

20 MiGs against 16 Phantoms and Mirages. As a result, experienced Israeli fighters shot five Soviet aces like partridges, and, without losing a single aircraft, returned to their airfields. That night, a feast was buzzing at the air bases of Hal Haavir - happy pilots drank away their bonuses for the Russians they killed ... Happy ending!

The version is vulgar and, of course, very far from the truth. For example, one of the noteworthy versions from the Ukrainian researcher V. Babich is as follows:

There was no 20 vs 16 fight in sight. On that day, there were several battles spaced apart in time and space - and each time the MiGs fought with the enemy many times superior in strength - when one Soviet four entered the battle, the other four MiGs were already leaving the battle with a critical balance of fuel. The Israelis calculated everything and were able to achieve a concentration of forces in the right place and at the right time.

Captain Yurchenko was the first to be shot down - his MiG exploded in the air from a Sidewinder missile. A few minutes later, captains Yakovlev and Syrkin had to eject - alas, upon landing, captain Yakovlev fell into a crevice and crashed to death (there is a version that the canopy of his parachute was burned by a jet stream of a fighter flying nearby).

It is still not known exactly how Captain Zhuravlev died - according to eyewitnesses, he fought alone against four enemy aircraft until he was shot down by a stray Mirage cannon burst. There is an opinion that two Israeli pilots Ifta Spektor and Avraham Salmon almost became its victims, having barely reached the territory of Israel in damaged cars.

Explosion of the Mirage

The Mirage of the Israeli ace Asher Snir also received heavy damage - the R-13 rocket fired at close range damaged the plane, but the warhead of the small R-13 was too small to stop the Mirage's flight - Asher Snir left the battle and urgently sat down at the air base Refadim (his combat colleague Amos Amir writes about this in his book Fire in the Sky).

Yurchenko - shot down, killed; Yakovlev - shot down, killed; Syrkin - shot down, survived; Zhuravlev - shot down, killed.
But what about the fifth downed Russian plane? And he disappeared! Nothing is known about the downed plane and its pilot.

According to rumors, the Israelis managed to shoot down Captain Kamenev's plane, but there is no evidence of this. In addition, Captain Kamenev himself subsequently continued to serve in the USSR Air Force. Rumors, rumors... sometimes they say that one of the MiGs made an emergency landing at one of the Egyptian airfields. Nobody knows what really happened.

At the same time, there are testimonies of witnesses, according to which, after the battle, Israeli search and rescue helicopters were circling over the battlefield - did the "indestructible" Hal Haavir suffer any losses? Not excluded. Many Mirages from 101, 117 and 119 squadrons, as well as Phantom multirole fighters from 69 squadron of the Israeli Air Force took part in the operation. There is a high probability that the fact of the loss of one (or several) vehicles was carefully hidden, and the results of the battle were falsified.

Without resorting to dubious conspiracy theories, the following reliable facts can be established:
As a result of the battle on 07/30/1970, 4 MiG-21s were shot down, while three Soviet pilots died.
Reliable losses of the Israeli Air Force - the lined Mirage by Asher Snir, which landed at the Refadim airbase.

After battle

Sad and instructive story. Not at all wanting to “rig the facts” (we shot down not us, but we them!) or “find the guilty” (there were more of them! It’s not fair), I note that the Israeli pilots really had a number of serious advantages.

1. The Israeli Air Force had the opportunity to thoroughly study the MiG-21 fighter.
On August 15, 1966, Iraqi pilot Munir Redfa hijacked a MiG-21 to Israel (Operation Penicillin). The aircraft was carefully studied, disassembled and even flown - the Israelis got a complete picture of the design, combat capabilities and secrets of the Soviet fighter. Soviet pilots, alas, they did not have such an opportunity - acquaintance with the enemy "Mirages" and "Phantoms" took place directly in an air battle.

2. The Israelis used the latest tactics - excellent organization of the battle, the use of electronic warfare- flurries of electronic interference “hammered” all Soviet communication lines, completely upsetting the control of the battle.

3. Combat experience. The Israeli Air Force really had an impressive practice of conducting air battles- daily, for many years, Hel Haavir fighters flew to intercept air targets - regular air battles over the entire range of altitudes, dashing chases and missile exchanges, sorties to escort strike groups ... Such things leave their mark on the organization of aviation combat work.
One of the clearest examples is scrupulous coverage of the situation in the air: not only the current courses of the aircraft, but also their radio communications were plotted on the combat tablet - this made it possible to understand the situation in a matter of seconds and redirect the aircraft to where they were most needed.

4. Most important. Pilot training and combat control system.
In an interview, the commander of the Israeli Air Force, Lieutenant General Mordechai Hoth, said: "We tell the squadron commander what needs to be done, and he himself decides how to do it." Analyzing the results of sorties, the Israeli Air Force moved the center of gravity of the preparation for battle to the link level. The squadron commander independently planned the scenario for the upcoming operation, using "home-made preparations" and accumulated data on the behavior of enemy aircraft in the air.

Unlike Israeli pilots, Soviet fighters were shackled by a monstrous chain of prohibitions, recommendations and regulations. It is no coincidence that immediately after the tragic events of 07/30/1970, all participants in the battle were gathered by the commander of the Soviet aviation group in Egypt, General Grigory Ustinovich Dolnikov:

The meaning of what was said was that all prohibitions and restrictions on aerobatics and combat maneuvering are being lifted. We had to start air training from scratch and be guided in it by our common sense, and not someone else's conscience. The general urged us to believe in our own instincts and intuitions, and he himself pledged to believe in our common luck.

"Egyptian Fighters in the 'War of Attrition'", History of Aviation, No. 2/2001

http://www.skywar.ru
http://www.hubara-rus.ru
http://airwar.ru
"Fire in the Sky" by Amos Amir (brigadier-general). UK: Pen & Sword Aviation, 2005

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