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We can say that it all started with Hitler's desire to hit the Russians in the summer offensive with a massive use of new technology. In general, the reasons for such a desire are quite understandable - the "front-line tests" of the "Tigers" near Leningrad in the amount of several pieces looked like a series of "swims" of heavy tanks across the swampy terrain under the fire of Russian anti-tank artillery without any visible success.
However, the desire of the Fuhrer led to several consequences at once.
Firstly, waiting for new equipment to accumulate in sufficient quantities led to a constant postponement of the timing of the onset until the day after or the day after tomorrow - in Manstein's memoirs, the corresponding chapter is called "Fatal Delay".
Secondly, this also led to the fact that the elimination of various problems - and new technology without glitches is more common in fairy tales than in real life - was sacrificed to the pace of production. As a result, the Panthers of the first mass series of Ausf. D suffered from many "childhood diseases", or, to put it simply, often broke down. Both with minimal enemy impact, and on their own.
"Panthers" before being sent to the front
Another problem was the organizational structure of the units for the new tanks. By this time, the command of the Panzerwaffe had already more or less decided on the "Tigers" - separate heavy tank battalions (Schwere Panzer Abteilung) were formed for them, which were attached to "ordinary" units for their qualitative reinforcement, or companies, which were also included in the existing tank or motorized divisions of the Wehrmacht or the Waffen-SS. But the "Panthers" were planned to replace the main "workhorses" of the Panzerwaffe - PzKpfw III and PzKpfw IV. It seemed that it would be logical to try to re-equip one of the existing units with new tanks - or several, but partially. This decision was also supported by the fact that the training battalions where the Panthers were mastered were created on the basis of tank battalions from front-line divisions. By June 1943, there were eight such training battalions, but only the first two, the 51st and 52nd, managed to get all the equipment required by the state and more or less (and rather “less” than “more”) to get used to it. They went to the Eastern Front. But then everything became, as Alice noted from L. Carroll's book, “Everything is strange and strange! It's getting weirder and weirder!"
Pz.Kpfw. V "Panther" Ausf D with tail number No. 121 from Pz.Abt. 51 advances to the front line
Both "panther" battalions were combined into a regiment - the 39th tank regiment, under the overall command of Major Laukert. At the time of the start of the "Citadel" it had 200 new tanks - 96 in each battalion and 8 "headquarters". The German tank regiment was the main striking force of the tank division. The main one, but far from the only one - even at the beginning of the construction of their tank units, the German commanders quite clearly understood that a lot of tanks are just a lot of tanks, a horde that can more often uselessly burn out than solve assigned tasks. Tanks need the help of artillery to suppress enemy anti-tank guns, they need sapper units that will clear the minefields ahead, they need infantry (with the prefix "moto", on armored personnel carriers or at least trucks) to "clean up" and consolidate a successful blow of the tank fist, own intelligence ... in general, a lot is needed. It was the presence of this "many" in the 41st that allowed the German divisions to successfully repel the counterattacks of the Soviet mechanized corps, break into the defenses of the rifle divisions and move further and further east. But there was no time to build a new division around the 39th regiment "from scratch". Instead, a "cunning knight's move" was made - the "panther" regiment was transferred to reinforce the "Grossdeutschland" panzergrenadier division from the 48th Panzer Corps. This division, of course, had its own tank regiment, and it was commanded by Colonel von Strachwitz - one of the promising commanders, as they say, who received another award for the spring battles near Kharkov - Swords to the Oak Leaves of the Knight's Cross. Given his combat experience and a higher rank than Laukert, von Strachwitz could well expect that the Panthers would be transferred to him at least under operational control. However, the command decided otherwise, and in order not to “overload” Strachwitz with additional leadership of two hundred newest tanks, both regiments were combined into the 10th tank brigade, appointing another colonel, Dekker, as its commander. What Strachwitz thought about this is not known for certain, but, judging by subsequent events, these staff games did not arouse stormy joy in him at all.
However, Dekker was also unlikely to rejoice at his new appointment for long - if at all. The decision to form a brigade was taken literally in the last days before the "Citadel". Assigned to the headquarters of the 10th tank brigade the officers did not even have time to arrive at the front before the start of the offensive; there was also no equipment required - and vital for the normal functioning of the headquarters. Several vehicles were “borrowed” from the “panther” battalions and one mittlerer Kommandopanzerwagen (a mobile command post based on the Sd. Kfz.251 armored personnel carrier) was shared by cameras from “Grossdeutschland”. The freshly baked brigade commander could only hope that the three hundred tanks subordinate to him were more than enough to break through any defense - even with the inevitable control difficulties in this situation.
But for the "Citadel" in the spring and summer of 1943, they were actively preparing on the other side of the front.
The opponent of the German 48th Tank Corps at the first stage of the battle was to be the 6th Guards Army of Lieutenant General I. M. Chistyakov. Since the site of the 6th Army was considered one of the most "tank-dangerous" areas of the Voronezh Front, special attention was paid here to the creation of a powerful anti-tank defense, even in comparison with the rest of the sections of the future "arc of fire". From March to July, the army dug into the ground. As Chistyakov recalled: There is no end to the edge, swarm like moles, day and night". Through the efforts of tens of thousands of people, the area turned into a labyrinth of trenches, anti-tank ditches, barriers, trenches for tanks and artillery positions, anti-tank strongholds - and, of course, minefields. In addition to conventional mines, MOFs were also laid - mine-fire land mines, a combination of mines with incendiary bottles - guided minefields and reinforced charges, which were used as captured German heavy artillery shells. Some of the mines were transferred to mobile obstacle detachments to create minefields right during the battle - their work was later called "impudent mining."
Installation of anti-tank mines by sappers before the start of the German offensive
On the approaches to anti-tank ditches and minefields, roads and just sections of terrain passable for tanks, artillery fire was provided from closed positions. For example, they looked like this combat missions one of the batteries of the 138th Guards Artillery Regiment:
1. The commander of the 7th battery to support the action of the 3/199th Guards Rifle Regiment with the fire of the entire battery and the minrots that are part of the battalion.
Main stream; mark 172.2, additional sector to the right - Yamnoye.
- a) to prevent the breakthrough of enemy infantry and tanks from the directions: Vysokoye, Cossack, Pushkarnoye, Streletskoye-Dragunskoye.
- b) prepare the lights: NZO "E" - block the road at height 230.8, NZO "Zh" - northern exit from the grove (room 2904), NZO "Z" - bridge sowing. 400 m. 191.8.
- c) inside the defense: NZO "Zh" -1 - block the road from elevation 219.8, NZO "Z" -1 east-center Trirechnoye.
- d) prepare SO-106-center Yamnoye, SO-107-center Kazatskoe, SO-108-center Pushkarnoye, SO-109-center Vysokoye, SO-110-northern edge of the grove southwest. 0.8 km. elev. 165.2, SO-111 – northern spurs of the ravine, north west 1 km. elev. 216.1, SO-112-northern edge of the grove, north-east 1.5 km. height 230.8.
- e) prepare a PZO; "Tiger" - on the road from Butovo to height 246.0 (first line of the northern exit from Butovo), PZO "Tiger-1" - along the Butovo-Dubrava road (1st line of the mound +0.5 northeast 0 ,5 km. Height. 244.5), PZO "Elephant" - along the road Cossack-Trirechnoye (1st line of the southwest 0.8 km. Elev. 200.0) PZO "Slon-1" - along the road Dmitrovka (1st line south. 0.5 km. mark 214.1), PZO "Lev" - along the Dragunskoe-Olkhovka road (1st line southwest 0.5 km. mark 215.4) PZO "Lev-1" - along the Dragunskoe-Olkhovka road (1st line east. 0.4 km. height 226.4).
Prepare DON-32 - crossroads high. 223.2, DON-36 - bridge sowing. 0.7 km. elev. 151.2.
The two villages mentioned in this document - Butovo and Dragunskoye - were located in the neutral zone, in the gap between the defense lines of the Soviet and German troops. Before the start of the Battle of Kursk, they were occupied by units of combat (advanced) guards - two battalions of the 67th Infantry Division.
Another means prepared for a “hot” meeting of German tanks was anti-tank artillery units - regiments (iptap) and brigades (iptabr). 6th Guards the army received two anti-tank brigades (27th and 28th) and two separate regiments.
And, of course, our own tanks were to become one of the main means of fighting enemy tanks. Before the start of the Battle of Kursk, the 6th Guards included two separate tank regiments, a tank brigade and a regiment of self-propelled guns. Rather insignificant forces compared to the German tank armada accumulating on the other side of the front line. They didn’t expect miracles from them, the ridge of the German “cats” was supposed to be broken by a heavier club - behind the 6th Army, the 1st Tank Army under the command of Lieutenant General M.E. Katukov occupied the second line of defense.
The course of hostilities on July 4, 1943
Although July 5, 1943 is considered the official date for the start of the battle on the "Fiery Arc", for the soldiers of Chistyakov's army this battle began earlier. As early as July 4, in the afternoon, the Germans attacked units of the forward guard advanced in front of the main line of defense. They really needed advantageous positions to attack the main line. Soviet defense, they needed to pull up a part of the artillery closer to our front line for the artillery preparation of the offensive. Particularly needed were places for observation posts, from where the Soviet defense line could be seen as far as possible.
At 16.00 on 4.7.42, enemy aircraft numbering 23 XE-11, 30 Yu-87, 45 Yu88, 2 ME-110 and 2 ME-109 carried out a massive bombardment of Butovo, height. 230.8. Simultaneously with the air raid, the enemy made a 30-minute heavy artillery fire on the Butovo areas, height 230.8 and battle formations 196 and 199 guards. Until 16.30, under the cover of artillery fire, he pulled up 15 tanks and up to two regiments of motorized infantry to the battle formations of the PO in Butovo and the outposts of the 196th and 199th guards.
At 16.30 began an attack on the forward edge of the PO. The enemy infantry was pinned to the ground in front of the barbed wire and destroyed by all means of fire. 6 enemy tanks broke through the front line of defense, went to the area of the Butovo church, to the command post of the battalion commander; 5 tanks broke into the MTS Butovo area. The battle continued until 19.00. The enemy, trying to break the resistance of our software in the forehead, was not successful. Throwing new forces, he shot down the outposts of the 196th and 199th guards. cn during continuous bombardment from the air, went from the flanks and to the rear of the PO in Butovo, surrounding it.
Further advance was suspended by rifle-machine-gun and artillery fire and was detained at the turn: "Half st." MTS Butovo, height 238.4, Krutoy Log.
During the night he continued to fight with the encircled forward detachment in Butovo. A platoon of 245 TP tanks thrown into the counterattack, a reconnaissance company and a company of 196 Guards Rifle Regiments ensured that part of the PO forces in Butovo escaped from the encirclement and joined the main forces on the defensive.
Behind these short, dry lines of a report from the headquarters of the 67th Guards Rifle Division, there was a drama that would have been enough for more than a dozen Hollywood blockbusters. Even before the start of the Citadel, the desperate resistance of the advanced battalions caused the German clockwork to fail. A protracted battle "ate" the bright hours of a long summer day - and the German artillery, which advanced at night on the former "neutral line", "got tangled" in minefields, in addition creating traffic jams on the few roads cleared by sappers and preventing tank units from advancing to the line of attack. Soviet artillery continued to fire on the columns crowded in hastily made passages. Artillery observers, of course, also didn’t manage to see at least something from the captured heights in the dark - and there was no time left. At 04:00 on June 5, 1943, Operation Citadel began.
According to the plans of the command of the 48th Panther tank corps, the 10th brigade, together with the tanks of Great Germany, were supposed to advance in the area between the villages of Cherkasskoye and Korovino, defended by units of the 67th and 71st guards divisions. The classic attack on the junctions of the formations until this day usually brought success - and the fact that more than three hundred tanks went on the attack, most of which were the latest and "impenetrable", should have guaranteed victory this time as well.
Perhaps if the headquarters of the 48th shopping mall or somewhere higher knew about the Russian proverb " it was smooth on paper, but forgot about the ravines', then the plan would look different.
For starters, the Panthers were simply too late to attack. The 39th regiment arrived at the assembly area near the village of Moschenoe late in the evening on June 4, having lost two Panthers on the way from the unloading station, which burned down from a fire in the engine compartment. A few more cars were out of action due to technical problems. As a result, when the Panthers finally finished refueling and began to advance, it was already 08.15 on the clock, and von Laukert had 184 combat-ready tanks.
However, he was in no hurry at that moment.
One and a half kilometers before the Soviet trenches, the field was crossed by a ravine with springs. Preparing to repel the German offensive, Chistyakov's soldiers additionally dug an anti-tank ditch, connecting it with an existing ravine - so that the stream turned the bottom of the ditch into a swamp. The resulting "dish" was generously sprinkled with mines and shot with artillery.
The course of hostilities on July 5–6, 1943
It was in this ditch that the tank regiment of von Strachwitz rested at dawn on July 5. An attempt to force the barrier on their own only led to the fact that several tanks remained at the bottom of the ditch and on the approaches to it - blown up by mines or simply stuck. Meanwhile, the motorized infantry of "Great Germany" had already managed to "knock their foreheads" on the guardsmen who had settled in Cherkasy. In the report of the headquarters of the 67th SD, this was noted as: “ With artillery fire and rifle and machine-gun fire, the enemy infantry is pressed to the ground in front of a wire fence". Attacks without tank support on well-prepared defenses were expensive - the battalion attacking Cherkasy lost about 150 people in less than two hours.
The Germans desperately tried to push at least some of the tanks across the ditch, but they did it poorly.
10.45. "Grossdeutschland" manages to transport a very small number of tanks across a very swampy beam. One "tiger" failed, and therefore the whole movement is delayed. Sappers are feverishly working on the construction of the crossings, but all the material just put into the crossings sinks in deep mud. The Panther tank regiment is still located south of high. 229.8. Forcing the beam will require much more time than previously thought. Intense and very powerful attacks by enemy aircraft were made on the equipment and tanks of the division stuck in front of the beam, which led to high losses, especially among the officers. The headquarters of the grenadier regiment received a direct hit by an enemy shell - the adjutant of the regiment and two other officers died.
"Panthers" reached the ill-fated moat at about 14.00. In the book of the American historian Robert Forczyk (Robert Forczyk), this episode is described as follows:
Like other armored vehicles, the 39th Tank Regiment, faced with this unexpected obstacle, stalled and began to huddle. By the time the Panthers arrived, the sappers of the "Grossdeutschland" had already recognized this part of the ditch as impassable for tanks and were looking for other ways around. After a short hesitation, one of the commanders - von Laukert or the commander of the 51st battalion Meyer - decided to try to cross the ravine. Several "panthers" of the 1st and 2nd companies moved along a narrow strip cleared by sappers from mines, but quickly got stuck in thick mud at the bottom of the ravine.
Seeing this embarrassment, Lieutenant Helmut Langhammer tried to withdraw his trailing 4th company in a westerly direction in order to cross the ravine elsewhere. But the path he chose very quickly ended in a minefield. The commander himself was wounded, and his tank was out of order.
Very soon some 25 Panthers from the 51st Tank Battalion and Brigade Headquarters were immobilized by a combination of mud, mines and technical malfunctions. The Panthers could not maneuver on slippery slopes - when trying to get out of the load, the teeth of sloths at the drive wheels began to crumble. Soviet artillery began shelling the huge mass of stationary tanks in their kill zone. Although the armor of the Panthers was supposed to reliably protect against shelling, Langhammer tank No. 401 was destroyed by a successful ricochet into the lower armor plate. Many other tanks were damaged and at least six tankers were killed.
Apparently, the mentioned 25 "Panthers" include not only losses at the anti-tank ditch, but also along the entire route of advance from Moshcheny. But in any case, by noon on July 5, the score for the Panthers looked completely disappointing - before even firing a single shot at the enemy, the 39th Regiment "shrank" by almost a quarter.
76-mm gun with the calculation of the position in anticipation of the attack of German tanks
This was clearly not the result that the German command had hoped for, sending two hundred of the latest tanks into battle.
Operation "Citadel" had barely begun, and the schedule carefully drawn up by the German staffers was already reminiscent of a broken alarm clock. According to the plan, the village of Cherkasskoye was supposed to be taken by 10.00, however, even an hour later and later, the motorized infantry attacking the village regularly continued to "lie down at the wire fences." And the armored fist of the 10th tank brigade, which was supposed to pave its way through the Russian positions, continued to stand in front of the ill-fated moat - and not just stand, but slowly, like a snowman under the sun, melt under artillery fire and attacks by attack aircraft.
It was only by noon that the situation with the stuck tanks of "Grossdeutschland" could be corrected, when additional sapper units sent by the 48th Tank Corps began work on the crossings. By 15.00, the sappers were able to build several crossings across the ditch, through which over the next hour they managed to push 30 Panthers and 15 tanks from the Strachwitz regiment. Then the crossings again ceased to function and, apparently, the Germans did not succeed in putting them into operation before dark.
18.30. At MD "Grossdeutschland", despite the use of heavy tractors (for "tigers"), the bridge again sank into the mud.
Meanwhile, it was the Great Germany with the 10th brigade that was given a key place in the plans of the 48th tank corps. Without success in its sector - the central one in the offensive zone of the 48th TC - the advance of the neighbors could remain narrow wedges in the Soviet defense, which at any moment could be "cut to the root" by flank attacks of the Soviet troops. Chistyakov's guardsmen had already given more than enough reasons to fear such a thing by this moment, and not only infantry, but also tanks participated in the counterattacks in the morning. Therefore, it was decided to sacrifice further advance on the flanks in order to help the “VG” stuck near Cherkassky. Now tanks of two German divisions were advancing on the village at once - "Grossdeutschland" and the 11th Panzer.
Soviet commanders also quite clearly understood the need to keep the Germans on the first line of defense as long as possible. In the first half of the day, the commander of the 67th Rifle Division sent into battle the reserves attached to him - the 245th Tank Regiment, the 1440th Sap (SU-76 and SU-122 self-propelled guns) and two Katyusha divisions of the 5th Guards. mortar regiment. The commander of the 6th Army, Chistyakov, supplemented the Soviet contribution to the scales with the "weight" of the 27th anti-tank brigade.
It was the Lendliz M3s "Lee" and M3l "Stuart" of the 245th regiment that had to be the first of the Soviet tanks to engage in battle with the Panthers.
A company of M3s tanks "General Lee" moves to the front line, July 5, 1943.
In the combat report of the 67th Infantry Division, the actions of the tankers fit in a short paragraph:
The tanks, together with the reserve of the division commander, counterattacked the pr-ka, who broke into the high. 237.8 and zap.ork.Cherkasskoe.
Losses: 17 tanks. Killed - 5, wounded - 12.
Destroyed: 28 Pr-ka tanks, including 1 T-6 tank, 4 anti-tank guns».
Colonel Dekker was much more emotional in his description:
« Unaware of our latest guns, eight General Lee tanks approached us to about 2,200 meters. With just a few lucky hits, we destroyed them - they flared up like sparklers on a Christmas tree. One of them was hit by a well-aimed shot from my tank..
Such a description does not look very plausible - although technically the Panthers could hit the M3s from such a distance, it is very doubtful that the gunners could do this in the very first battle. Most likely, the distance to the Soviet tanks was less, and much more. In addition, the commander of the 10th tank brigade “forgot” to mention that, in addition to his favorite Panthers, von Strachfitz tanks also fired on the vehicles of the 245th TP.
Dekker's joyful optimism is quite understandable - if the colonel had not found a suitable plot for the song "Everything is fine, beautiful marquise", then the report on the "achievements" of the newest tanks under his direct command would have to be performed to the tune of a song about ten blacks.
While they were driving to the front line, two burned down, a few broke.
184 panthers went on the attack on the morning of the 5th and came across a ravine.
While they were looking for a ford, 25 tanks got stuck, hit mines or broke down ... "
In fact, the episode with the shooting of eight lend-lease tanks was the only bright spot in the description of the actions of the "panther" regiment on the first day of the offensive. Most of the new tanks never managed to engage the enemy. The same 30 Panthers that managed to cross the ditch, after repulsing the counterattack of the 245th TP, soon took part in another attempt to take Cherkasskoye. However, trying to get around the positions of the 196th holding the village rifle regiment, the tanks of the "Gross Germany" came under crossfire advanced to the place of the breakthrough of anti-tankers from the 27th Iptabr and the battery of the 128th artillery regiment located in Cherkasy itself. It can be assumed with fairly high certainty that most (if not all) of the reports of T-6s shot down in this battle refer specifically to the Panthers - since there was no information about them yet, any unfamiliar German tank was automatically considered a Tiger. In addition, in the infernal mess of shell explosions, Katyusha missiles - which hit the accumulations of tanks that day with direct fire - and bombs, it is unlikely that any of the fighters were concerned with the 100% accurate identification of angular silhouettes flickering through the smoke with crosses on the sides. To remember that several piles of burnt iron frozen in front of their positions looked a little different than the usual “threes” and “fours”, they will be later - those who will come out alive from the battle.
"Panthers" with tail numbers 732 and 721 from Pz.Abt. 52 during the pause before the fights
For a long time no one remembered about “take by 10:00” - the fight for a piece of land, consisting of funnels and trenches, but still marked on headquarters maps as “village Cherkasskoye”, continued after sunset.
During the day, the 196th Guards Rifle Division fought a continuous battle with superior enemy forces advancing on Cherkasskoye and Yarki. Having lost in battle more than 2/3 of his personnel and material part, all easel and light machine guns, mortars and artillery, left Cherkasskoye and Yarki and took up defense at the turn: height 232.4, 600 m east. High 246.0.
As a result of the battle, more than 1,500 enemy soldiers and officers were destroyed, 3 tanks were knocked out.
This operational report was compiled by the headquarters of the 67th division at two in the morning on July 6. But the order to withdraw at night did not reach everyone who continued to fight in themselves - according to German data, the battle for Cherkasskoye stopped only at dawn.
On the evening of July 5, our units that retreated to high. 232, 4 took a fierce battle with the German tanks attacking them. At the same time, tanks of 245 tons were able to take a kind of revenge on the Panthers. At 17:00, all the remaining tanks of the 2nd tr 245th TP - 7 "Stuarts" (yes, yes - not "Lee", but light "Stuarts", M3s were knocked out during the day) - " took up defensive positions. 232.4 with the task of supporting the infantry of the 196th Guards. SP fire from a place. As a result of the battle, 5 enemy tanks were knocked out and burned, up to an infantry company was destroyed. Company lost: 1 tank burned down, one hit».
The same episode in the documents of the 10th brigade is described much worse:
At 20.00, a message was received that 51 TB 39 TP reached Yarka, but could not take the height of 232.4 b-n due to strong defensive fire from 10 dug enemy tanks at a height.
Although, as a result of the first day of the Citadel, the 48th Panzer Corps managed to break through the first line of the Soviet defense, its command hardly had a reason to rejoice at both the results achieved and their price. It only remained to hope that now the deadly trap of ditches and minefields had been overcome, and the armored fist, albeit “slightly” shabby, would finally be able to show the high class of a tank strike.
It is worth noting that the size of this “slightly” is still not exactly known, and it is all the more doubtful that it was presented on the night of the 5th to the 6th at the headquarters of the 48th TC. Perhaps they have already received information from the tank regiment of "Grossdeutschland" - 87 combat-ready tanks. The von Strachwitz regiment finished crossing the ravine late in the evening - in the zone of the neighboring 3rd Panzer Division, using the bridges built by it - and thus received enough time, including to clarify the real situation with the materiel. The "Panther" 39th Regiment also had to cross over to more successful neighbors from the 3rd Panzer Division. This process dragged on until the very morning of the 6th, and Dekker with his scant "headquarters", as well as the regimental commander Laukert, simply did not have the opportunity to determine how many vehicles would be ready for further action. The number of combat-ready "Panthers" on the morning of July 6 in various sources varies in a very wide range. Based on their available this moment facts, the authors are inclined to the point of view that no more than 50-80 combat-ready tanks remained in the "panther" regiment.
During the night, the Germans found out with great displeasure that the Russian minefields did not end immediately behind the front line - they were generously dotted with almost all areas of the terrain suitable for tank operations. The only road Butovo-Dubrovo suitable for a further offensive in the northeast direction was in the offensive zone of the 11th TD. and during the night it was intensively cleared of mines by the sapper units of this division. However, at dawn, the commander of "Gross Germany" - which still continued to be considered the main strike force of the 48th TC - using the administrative resource in the form of a corps command, simply "squeezed out" an advantageous route from the neighboring unit. As compensation, the 11th Panzer was promised assistance in clearing mines from the sapper units of the corps.
According to the new plan, the offensive of the 10th Tank Brigade was to begin at 10:40. However, in fact, it turned out that as early as 09:35 (and possibly even earlier), von Strachwitz's tank regiment had already entered the battle and began to move forward.
Destroyed Pz.Kpfw. V "Panther" Ausf D with tail number 434 from Pz.Abt. 51
Pz.Kpfw. V "Panther" Ausf D with tail number No. 312 from Pz.Abt. 51
As for the Panthers, one thing can be said with certainty - if one of the officers of the 48th shopping mall knew the mysterious story of the “disappearance of the Norfolk Regiment”, then he probably remembered it that day, and more than once. In the book of negotiations of the headquarters of the 48th shopping mall, after mentioning that around 05:00 the Panthers were near the Yarki farm, only complaints about the lack of communication follow. I could not establish contact with Dekker's "headquarters" and von Strachwitz, formally subordinate to him. In fact, communication with the 39th tank regiment disappeared and was not restored until the second half of the day - all this time the Panthers, in the best traditions of the Kipling cat, "walked by themselves."
The calculation of the 45-mm anti-tank gun 53-K is preparing for battle
In the previously cited book by Robert Forczyk, the “adventures” of the Laukert regiment on the morning of June 6 are described as follows:
"Panthers" von Laukert lost, moving forward along unfamiliar terrain without guidelines. The regiment was deployed in a double column, with the exception of the advanced company, which moved in a wedge formation. Since the Panthers were moving without infantry, they did not notice any signs of the enemy until, two kilometers east of Cherkassky, they drove straight into a minefield. How many tanks were instantly immobilized. The lead battalion of Major Gerhard Tebbe stood in the kill zone, and Soviet artillery began shelling the German unit that had fallen into a trap. In the first battle of the Panthers against the T-34, the thirty-fours of the 14th tank regiment began to shoot part of the Panther column from the flank from a distance of 1000–1200 meters. Although Soviet artillery fire was not particularly accurate, the Panthers stood motionless, exposing the enemy to thin side armor. The "Panther" of Oberfeldwebel Gerhard Brehme, a platoon commander in the 5th company of the 52nd tank battalion, apparently became one of the first to be destroyed by the T-34, when a 76-mm armor-piercing projectile pierced the port side and ignited one of the fuel tanks. Brema managed to leave the burning tank, but 12 days later he died in the hospital from burns.
Realizing that Tebbe had lost control, Oblt. Erdmann Gabriel, a veteran of the 8th company, took over command, trying to get the tanks out of the fire.
The following two points are worth noting here. Forchik, who wrote the book "Panthers" against the T-34, "considered the impressions of the Germans that their opponents in this battle were precisely the" thirty-four ". However, the 14th tank regiment from the 3rd mechanized corps, according to Soviet data, entered the battle only in the evening, around 18:00. From the information we know from the Soviet units, we can conclude that the Panthers came under fire from the anti-tankers from the 27th Iptabr and heavy artillery of the 6th Army, who were already familiar to them from yesterday evening, covering the minefields in the direction of Dubrovo.
Also, from the post-war stories of the tankers of the 52nd battalion, it follows that the expression "lost control" rather weakly characterizes what happened to Major Tebbe. In particular, the aforementioned Erdmann Gabriel recalled this episode much more emotionally:
The enemy's heavy artillery fired exceptionally accurately at our huddled tanks. From the first salvo, my company lost two tanks - one fell into a deep trench, and the second - the tank of the commander of the 4th platoon, chief sergeant major (in the original letter in English, the rankMasterSergeant) Grunda - was completely destroyed by a direct hit, the entire crew died. Since the situation was extremely dangerous and there were no orders from the battalion commander, I ran to his tank as fast as I could. It was necessary to urgently leave the shelled area in order to avoid further losses. When I looked into the tower from above, I saw the battalion commander trembling with horror. It was Major Tebbe from the Putlos tank school, whom I remembered as a captain when I was studying there. He was sent last night to replace the battalion commander Sievers, who fell ill just before the offensive. It was clearly seen that the baptism of fire, which he had to experience on the first day at the front, turned out to be too strong. After I explained to him that we must immediately start moving in order to prevent further senseless losses (author's note - one can only guess in what terms Gabriel tried to convey this idea to the battalion commander who fell into a stupor!), he was able to squeeze out in response: "Yes, Gabriel, withdraw the battalion!"
However, the chief lieutenant did not have a chance to stay in the role of battalion commander for a long time. – very soon an anti-tank gun shell pierced the port side and exploded in the ammunition rack. The loader died on the spot, the rest of the tankers managed to get out of the burning car, "getting off" with burns - the gunner got the most, who died the next day in the hospital.
The calculation of the 152-mm howitzer-gun fires at the enemy
While deprived of even the semblance of a Panther command, they tried to get out of the shelling, von Strachwitz's tank regiment at first acted more successfully - his regiment, together with units of the 11th TD, managed to break through the defense line of the 67th division. The very units that only last night left the battle, having lost two-thirds of the composition. True, he did not succeed in a quick breakthrough inland either - the road to Dubrovo was covered by the 245th detachment, the 1440th sap and the 1837th iptap. These battered units could not stop the Germans, but instead of the rapid throw of the "Grossdeutschland", they had to slowly bite forward. At about 12:30, the VG regiment went to the anti-tank ditch in front of Hill 241.1, however, having run into all the same minefields and artillery fire, it rolled back. Apparently, by this moment the patience of the command of the 48th TC was finally exhausted - the commander of the 10th brigade, Dekker, was called to the headquarters of the corps, and the leadership of the brigade passed to von Strachwitz. But for the Panthers, this belated change of horses at the crossing did not solve anything - the number of combat-ready tanks on the 39th continued to decline, by the evening of July 6, there were about 40 of them left in the ranks, and by the evening of July 7 - only 10. And although in the future due to the prompt commissioning of mine-destroyed and faulty tanks, German repairmen managed to maintain the number of Panthers at the level of 20–40 vehicles, they could only achieve tactical success. The only day when the introduction of almost two hundred newest tanks into battle could change the entire further course of the battle for Kursk Bulge- July 5, 1943 - became for the "Panthers" a day of forever missed opportunities.
German medium tank during World War II. This fighting machine was created by MAN in 1941-1942 as the main tank of the Wehrmacht. The "Panther" was equipped with a gun of a smaller caliber than the Tiger and, according to the German classification, was considered a tank with medium armament (or simply a medium tank). In the Soviet tank classification, the Panther was considered a heavy tank, designated as T-6 or T-VI. It was also considered a heavy tank by the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. In the departmental end-to-end system of designations for military equipment of Nazi Germany, the Panther had the Sd.Kfz index. 171. Starting from the end of winter (February 27), 1944, the Fuhrer ordered that only the name "Panther" be used for the name of the tank.
For the first time, the Panther was used during the Battle of Kursk, then tanks of this type were actively used by the Wehrmacht and the SS troops in all European theaters of war. According to a number of experts, the Panther was the best German tank of World War II and one of the best in the world. At the same time, the tank had a number of shortcomings, was complex and expensive to build and operate. On the basis of the "Panther" anti-tank self-propelled artillery mounts"Jagdpanther" and a number of special vehicles for the engineering and artillery units of the Wehrmacht.
History of creation
Development work on the design of a new medium tank, intended to replace the PzKpfw III and PzKpfw IV, started in 1938. The project of such a combat vehicle weighing 20 tons, on which Daimler-Benz, Krupp and MAN worked, received the designation VK 20.01. The creation of the new vehicle progressed rather slowly, because the reliable and battle-tested medium tanks fully met the requirements of the German military. But, by the fall of 1941, the chassis design was basically worked out. However, by this time the situation had changed.
After the start of the war with the Soviet Union, German troops met with new Soviet tanks - T-34 and KV. Initially, Soviet technology did not interest the German military, but by the fall of 1941, the pace of the German offensive began to fall, and information began to come from the front about the significant superiority of new Soviet tanks - especially the T-34 - over Wehrmacht vehicles. In order to study Soviet tanks by the German military and technicians, a special commission was created. It included leading German designers of armored vehicles (in particular, F. Porsche and G. Knipkamp). German engineers studied in detail all the advantages and disadvantages of the T-34 and other Soviet tanks, after which they decided on the need to adopt such innovations in German tank building as inclined armor placement, undercarriage with large rollers and wide tracks. Work on the 20-ton tank was curtailed, instead, on November 25, 1941, Daimler-Benz and MAN were ordered to create a prototype of a 35-ton tank using all these design solutions. A promising tank received the symbol "Panther". To determine the most suitable prototype for the Wehrmacht, a "Panzerkommissiya" was also created from a number of prominent military figures of the Third Reich.
In the spring of 1942, both contractors showed their prototypes. The Daimler-Benz experimental vehicle looked very much like the T-34. In their desire to achieve similarities with the "thirty-four", they even suggested equipping the tank with a diesel engine, although the large shortage of diesel fuel in Germany (the overwhelming majority of it went to the needs of the submarine fleet) made this option absolutely unpromising. Adolf Hitler showed great interest and was inclined to this option, Daimler-Benz even received an order for 200 cars. But still, in the end, the order was canceled, and preference was given to a competing project from MAN. The commission noted a number of advantages of the MAN project, for example, a more successful suspension, a gasoline engine, better maneuverability, and a shorter gun barrel reach. There were also opinions that the similarity of the new tank with the T-34 would lead to a confusion of combat vehicles on the battlefield, and consequently to losses from their own fire.
The prototype of the MAN company was made entirely in the spirit of the German tank-building school: the front placement of the transmission compartment and the rear - the engine compartment, an individual torsion bar "chessboard" suspension designed by engineer G. Knipkamp. As the main armament, the tank was equipped with the 75-mm long-barreled Rheinmetall gun specified by the Fuhrer. The choice in favor of a small caliber was determined by the desire to get a high rate of fire and a large transportable ammunition inside the tank. Interestingly, in the projects of both companies, German engineers immediately abandoned the Christie-type suspension used in the T-34, considering its design to be unusable and outdated. A large group of MAN employees worked on the creation of the Panther under the leadership of P. Vibikke, chief engineer of the tank department of the company. Also, a huge contribution to the design and creation of the tank was made by engineer G. Knipkamp (undercarriage) and the designers of the Rheinmetall company (gun).
After choosing a prototype, preparations began for the fastest launch of the tank into mass production, which started in the first half of 1943.
Production
Mass production PzKpfw V "Panther" lasted from January 1943 to April 1945 inclusive. In addition to the development company MAN, the Panther was produced by such well-known German concerns and enterprises as Daimler-Benz, Henschel, Demag, etc. In total, 136 subcontractors participated in the creation of the Panther, the distribution of suppliers by units and assemblies of the tank was like this:
Armored corps - 6;
- engines - 2;
- gearboxes - 3;
- caterpillars - 4;
- towers - 5;
-armament - 1;
- optics - 1;
- steel casting - 14;
- forgings - 15;
- fasteners, other components and assemblies - other enterprises.
Cooperation in the creation of the Panther was very complex and quite developed. Deliveries of the most important components and assemblies of the tank were duplicated, this was done in order to avoid interruptions in supply in various emergency situations. This turned out to be very useful, since the location of the enterprises that took part in the production of the Panther was known to the Allied air forces, and almost all of them experienced fairly successful enemy bombing attacks. As a result, the leadership of the Ministry of Arms and Ammunition of the Third Reich was forced to take out part of the production equipment to small settlements that were less attractive for massive Allied bombing attacks. Also, the production of Panther units and assemblies was organized in various kinds of underground shelters, a number of orders were given to small enterprises. Therefore, the initial plan for the production of 600 Panthers per month was never achieved, the maximum mass production fell on July 1944 - then 400 vehicles were delivered to the customer. A total of 5,976 Panthers were produced, of which 1,768 were produced in 1943, 3,749 in 1944, and 459 in 1945. Thus, the PzKpfw V became the second largest tank of the Third Reich, second only to the PzKpfw IV in terms of output.
Design Description
Armored corps and turret
The hull of the tank was made of rolled surface-hardened armor plates of medium and low hardness, connected "in a spike" and welded with a double seam. The upper frontal part (VLD) with a thickness of 80 mm had a rational angle of inclination of 57 degrees. relative to the normal to the horizontal plane. The lower frontal part (NLD) 60 mm thick was mounted at an angle of 53 degrees. to normal. The data obtained during the measurement of the captured Panther at the Kubinka training ground differed somewhat from the above: an 85 mm thick VLD had a slope of 55 degrees. to normal, NLD - 65 mm and 55 degrees. respectively. The upper side plates of the hull 40 mm thick (on later modifications - 50 mm) are inclined to the normal at an angle of 42 degrees, the lower ones were mounted vertically and had a thickness of 40 mm. The stern sheet 40 mm thick is inclined to the normal at an angle of 30 degrees. In the roof of the hull above the control compartment there were manholes for the driver and gunner-radio operator. Manhole covers lifted up and moved to the side, as in modern tanks. The aft part of the tank hull was divided by armored partitions into 3 compartments, when overcoming water obstacles, the compartments closest to the sides of the tank could be filled with water, but water did not get into the middle compartment, where the engine was located. Technological hatches were equipped at the bottom of the hull for access to the suspension torsion bars, drain valves of the power supply system, cooling and lubrication, a drain pump and a drain plug of the gearbox housing.
The Panther's turret was a welded structure made of rolled armor plates connected into a spike. The thickness of the side and rear sheets of the tower is 45 mm, the slope to the normal is 25 degrees. A cannon was equipped in a cast mask in front of the tower. The thickness of the gun mantlet is 100 mm. The turret rotated using a hydraulic mechanism that took power from the tank engine; the turret rotation speed depended on the engine speed, at 2500 rpm the turret rotation time was 17 seconds to the right and 18 seconds to the left. In addition, a manual turret rotation drive was also provided, 1000 revolutions of the flywheel corresponded to a 360-degree turret rotation. was basically impossible. The thickness of the turret roof is 17 mm, on the Ausf. G it was increased to 30 mm. A commander's cupola was equipped on the roof of the tower, with 6 (later 7) viewing devices.
Engine and transmission
The first 250 tanks were equipped with a Maybach HL 210 P30 12-cylinder V-shaped carburettor engine with a volume of 21 liters. From the end of spring 1943 it was replaced by the Maybach HL 230 P45. On the new engine, the piston diameters were increased, the engine displacement increased to 23 liters. Compared to the HL 210 P30 model, on which the cylinder block was aluminum, this part of the HL 230 P45 was made of cast iron, due to which the engine weight increased by 350 kg. HL 230 P30 developed 700 horsepower. With. at 3000 rpm. The maximum speed of the car with the new engine did not increase, but the traction reserve increased, which made it possible to overcome off-road more confidently. An interesting feature: the main bearings of the crankshaft of the engine were not sliding, as is customary everywhere in modern engine building, but roller bearings. Thus, the creators of the engine saved (at the cost of increasing the labor intensity of the product) the country's non-renewable resource - non-ferrous metals.
The transmission consisted of the main clutch, driveline, gearbox (gearbox) Zahnradfabrik AK 7-200, turning mechanism, final drives and disc brakes. Gearbox - three-shaft, with a longitudinal arrangement of shafts, seven-speed, five-way, with constant gear engagement and simple (inertialess) cone synchronizers for engaging gears from 2nd to 7th. The crankcase of the gearbox is dry, the oil was cleaned and supplied under pressure directly to the gear engagement points. It was very easy to drive the tank: the gearshift lever set in the right position caused the main clutch to be automatically released and the desired pair to be switched.
The gearbox and the turning mechanism were made as a single unit, which reduced the number of centering work during the assembly of the tank, but the dismantling of the overall assembly in the field was a rather time-consuming operation.
The tank control drives are combined, with a follow-up hydraulic servo drive with mechanical feedback.
Chassis
The undercarriage of the tank with a "staggered" arrangement of track rollers designed by G. Knipkamp provided a good ride and a more uniform distribution of pressure on the ground along the supporting surface in comparison with others technical solutions. On the other hand, this undercarriage design was difficult to manufacture and repair, and also had a large mass. In order to replace one roller from the inner row, it was necessary to first dismantle from a third to a half of the outer rollers. On each side of the tank there were 8 large-diameter road wheels. Double torsion bars were used as elastic suspension elements, the front and rear pair of rollers were equipped with hydraulic shock absorbers. Drive rollers - front, with removable rims, caterpillar engagement is pinion. Small steel caterpillars, each of 86 steel tracks. Cast tracks, track pitch 153 mm, width 660 mm.
Armament
The main armament of the tank was a 75-mm KwK 42 tank gun manufactured by Rheinmetall-Borsig. The length of the gun barrel is 70 calibers / 5250 mm without muzzle brake and 5535 mm with it. To the main design features guns include:
Semi-automatic vertical copier type wedge;
- anti-recoil devices:
-hydraulic recoil brake;
- hydropneumatic knurler;
- lifting mechanism of sector type.
Firing from the gun was possible only with shells with an electric ignition sleeve, the electric trigger button was located on the flywheel of the lifting mechanism. In critical situations, the crew included an inductor directly into the gun’s shutter circuit, the “button” of which, triggered by the gunner’s kick, provided a shot in any situation - the solenoid coil swung in the field of a permanent magnet gave the necessary EMF to the electric igniter of the projectile. The inductor was connected to the gate circuit with a plug, like a table lamp. The turret was equipped with a device for purging the channel of the gun after a shot; it consisted of a compressor and a system of hoses and valves. The purge air was sucked out of the sleeve catcher box.
The ammunition load of the gun consisted of 79 shots for modifications A and D and 82 shots for modification G. The ammunition load included armor-piercing shells Pzgr. 39/42, Pzgr. 40/42 and high-explosive fragmentation Sprgr. 42.
The shots were placed in the niches of the turret box, in the fighting compartment and in the control compartment. The KwK 42 gun had powerful ballistics and at the time of its creation it was capable of hitting almost all tanks and self-propelled guns of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. Only the Soviet tank IS-2, which appeared in the middle of 1944, with a straightened VLD, had a frontal armor of the hull, which reliably protected it from the shells of the Panther cannon at the main battle distances. American tanks The M26 Pershing and the limited-edition M4A3E2 Sherman Jumbo also had armor that was capable of protecting them in frontal projection from KwK 42 projectiles.
Armor penetration tables for the 75 mm KwK 42 tank gun
The data shown refers to the German penetration measurement method. Armor penetration indicators can differ quite noticeably when using different batches of shells and different armor manufacturing technologies.
A 7.92-mm MG-34 machine gun was paired with the cannon, the second (forward) machine gun was located in the front hull plate in a drag mount (a vertical slot for a machine gun closed by an armored flap was equipped in the front hull plate) on modification D and in a ball mount on modifications A and G. The commander's turrets of tanks of modifications A and G were adapted to equip the MG-34 or MG-42 anti-aircraft machine gun. The total ammunition load for machine guns was 4800 rounds for Ausf. G and 5100 for Panthers Ausf. A and D.
As a means of defense against infantry, the A and G tanks were equipped with a "close combat device" (Nahkampfgerat), a 56 mm mortar. The mortar was located in the right rear part of the roof of the tower, the ammunition included smoke, fragmentation and fragmentation-incendiary grenades.
The "Panthers" of modification D were equipped with a binocular telescopic breaking sight TZF-12, tanks of modifications A and G were mounted with a simpler monocular sight TZF-12A, which was the right tube of the TZF-12 sight. The binocular sight had a magnification of 2.5x and a field of view of 30 degrees, a monocular sight had a variable magnification of 2.5x or 5x and a field of view of 30 degrees. or 15 deg. respectively. When changing the elevation angle of the gun, only the objective part of the sight deviated, the ocular part continued to remain motionless; thanks to this, the convenience of working with a sight at all angles of elevation of the gun was achieved.
Also, the commander's "Panthers" began to install the latest equipment - night vision devices: infrared searchlights-illuminators with a power of 200 W were mounted on the commander's turrets, plus observation devices that made it possible to inspect and observe the area from a distance of 200 meters (while the driver did not have such a device and drove the car, guided by the instructions of the commander).
To fire at night, a more powerful illuminator was needed. To do this, a 6 kW Uhu infrared searchlight was equipped on the SdKfz 250/20 half-track armored personnel carrier, which ensured the operation of the night vision device at a distance of 700 meters. Its tests were successful, and Leitz-Wetzlar produced 800 sets of optics for night instruments. In November 1944, the Panzerwaffe received 63 Panthers equipped with the world's first mass-produced active night vision devices.
performance characteristics
Combat weight, t: 44.8
-Layout scheme: control compartment in front, motor rear
- Crew, people: 5
Dimensions:
Case length, mm: 6870
-Length with gun forward, mm: 8660
- Hull width, mm: 3270
- Height, mm: 2995
-Clearance, mm: 560
Booking:
Type of armor: rolled low and medium hardness surface hardened
- Forehead of the hull (top), mm / city: 80/55 degrees.
- Forehead of the hull (bottom), mm / city: 60/55 degrees.
-Hull side (top), mm/deg.: 50/30deg.
- Hull side (bottom), mm/deg.: 40/0deg.
- Hull feed (top), mm / city: 40/30 degrees.
- Hull feed (bottom), mm / city: 40/30 degrees
- Bottom, mm: 17-30
- Hull roof, mm: 17
- Forehead of the tower, mm / city: 110/10 degrees.
- Gun mantlet, mm/deg.: 110 (cast)
-Board of the tower, mm / city: 45/25 degrees.
- Tower feed, mm / city: 45/25 degrees.
Armament:
Gun caliber and make: 7.5 cm KwK 42
- Barrel length, calibers: 70
-gun ammunition: 81
-Machine guns: 2 x 7.92 MG-42
Mobility:
Engine type: V-shaped 12-cylinder carburetor
- Engine power, l. p.: 700
-Speed on the highway, km / h: 46
-Speed over rough terrain, km / h: 25-30
-Storage on the highway, km: 250
- Specific power, l. s./t: 15.6
- Suspension type: torsion bar
- Specific ground pressure, kg/sq.cm: 0.88
The history of the creation of the tank PzKpfw V "Panther" (SdKfz 171)
One of the biggest shocks experienced by the German armored forces in the entire history of World War II was, without a doubt, the first meeting with the Russian T-34 tank. number of Russian T-34s were thrown into the battle and caused heavy casualties among the German tanks." Further, Guderian admits that if up to this point the Germans considered their tanks to be far superior to any enemy armored vehicles, then with the advent of the Russian T-34, the situation completely changed.
Moreover, according to Guderian, if the high command had not been so proud of its undoubted advantage, the Germans would have managed to avoid the bitterness of disappointment. This idea is confirmed by the story given in the memoirs about how in April 1941, at the personal invitation of Hitler, the Soviet delegation visited German tank-building factories and tank schools. Guderian candidly relates that the Russians have repeatedly made it clear that the Germans are fooling them by hiding their latest tank designs, which Hitler personally ordered to show them. They could not believe that the PzKpfw IV was actually the best and heaviest German tank at that time. Such skepticism led many, including Guderian himself, to conclude that the Russians had heavier and more modern tanks than those that the Third Reich had at that time.
German medium tank T-V Panther "Panther" PzKpfw V "Panther" (SdKfz 171)
However, the victorious start of Operation Barbarossa, when the Germans managed to easily crush the Russian armored forces, dispelled these suspicions. That is why the meeting with the T-34 was a real shock. The situation was aggravated by the need to take response measures in an extremely short time frame. In his report to the commander of the army group, Guderian demanded that a special commission be sent to the front as soon as possible to discuss the problem on the spot. On November 20, 1941, a commission, which included representatives from the Armaments Office of the Army and the Ministry of Armaments, as well as leading tank designers, (Namely: Professor Ferdinand Porsche (NiebeLungenwerke); engineer Oswald (MAN) and Dr. Aders (Henschel.)) and representatives of the largest tank-building firms, arrived in the 2nd tank army. The members of the commission not only examined the wrecked tanks, but also talked with the soldiers and officers of the tank units who were directly involved in the confrontation with the "thirty-fours".
It is curious that the opinions of the military and designers turned out to be diametrically opposed. Front-line officers unanimously suggested copying the T-34 and immediately starting production of exactly the same tanks in Germany, but designers and manufacturers took this proposal with hostility. Describing this conflict in his memoirs, Guderian completely takes the side of the producers. He argues that the designers were not motivated by "aversion to imitation", but by a clear idea of the technical impossibility of the task set by the military. In particular, the T-34 did not use a carburetor engine, like all German tanks, but an aluminum diesel engine as a power plant. However, the shortage of non-ferrous metals in Germany made the production of such motors impossible. In addition, German alloy steel, the quality of which was steadily declining due to the already mentioned lack of raw materials, was significantly inferior to Russian.
German medium tank T-V Panther "Panther" PzKpfw V "Panther" (SdKfz 171)
As a result, a compromise decision was made: firstly, to start production of the previously developed design of the Tiger tank weighing almost 60 tons, and secondly, to design a lighter type of tank weighing about 35 tons, which was supposed to become the prototype of the future Panther. .
On November 25, 1941, the Army Ordnance Department gave Daimler-Benz AG and MAN the task of designing a new medium tank. The terms of the tactical and technical task were as follows:
width up to 3150 mm;
height - 2990 mm;
minimum thickness of frontal armor -60 mm;
sides and stern - 40 mm each;
the hull shape is rational, borrowed from the T-34;
engine with a capacity of 650-700 liters. With;
maximum speed - 55 km / h,
cruising speed - 45 km / h.
The project was given the general name VK 3002. Actually, VK3001 was created in October 1941 and was a logical development of the assault tank variant project, developed back in 1937. Despite the fact that the VK 3001 project had a lot in common with future Panther tanks, he had the greatest influence on the creation of the heavy Tiger tanks.
German medium tank T-V Panther "Panther" PzKpfw V "Panther" (SdKfz 171)
Daimler-Benz AG presented the VK 3002 (DB) project, which weighed 34 tons and looked very much like the T-34. Unlike all German tanks, the Daimler-Benz AG project had a rear engine compartment and drive wheels, a Daimler-Benz MB 507 diesel engine was used as a power plant, and large-diameter road wheels were assembled in pairs in the undercarriage. carts and hung in a checkerboard pattern on leaf springs. It was supposed to arm the new tank with a 75-mm cannon with a barrel length of 48 calibers.
MAN's 35-ton project, the VK 3002 (MAN), created under the direction of engineer Paul Wiebike, was much more similar to traditional German combat vehicles. The silhouette of the tank was somewhat wider and higher than that of the T-34, the hull had sloping armor plates; and the spacious turret moved back somewhat in order to install a long-barreled (70 caliber) 75-mm gun. The Maybach HL 210 carburetor engine was installed in the stern, the driver and machine gunner were located in the front compartment. The track rollers were also staggered, but had an individual torsion bar suspension.
German medium tank T-V Panther "Panther" PzKpfw V "Panther" (SdKfz 171)
Of course, the process of creating a new tank could not do without the intervention of Hitler. At first, the Fuhrer liked the Daimler-Benz AG project, with the condition, however, that the developers replace the tank gun with a more powerful one. The company had already received an order for the creation of 200 advanced combat vehicles of the VK 3002 (DB) type, when the Army Weapons Directorate intervened. As it turned out, high-ranking management officials were very skeptical about the Daimler-Benz AG project.
Firstly, they were embarrassed by the silhouette, so strongly reminiscent of the T-34, that in combat conditions the tanks could easily be confused. Secondly, as already mentioned, equipping the tank with a diesel engine created many additional problems. As a result, the opinion of the customer's representatives began to lean towards the MAN project. All that remained was to persuade Hitler to change his mind. The Fuhrer was most influenced by the argument that it would be impossible to install the required powerful gun in the small turret of the VK 3002 (DB) tank. From now on, the Daimler-Benz project was finally buried.
German medium tank T-V Panther "Panther" PzKpfw V "Panther" (SdKfz 171)
The Armaments Directorate of the Ground Forces recommends that MAN make a prototype of its tank as soon as possible from non-
armor steel. Already in September 1942, the V-1 prototype was sent to a test site near Nuremberg. The second prototype V-2 was tested at the tank track in Kummersdorf. The tests were carried out under the guidance of the chief engineer G. Knipkampf (It is worth noting that the designer Knipkampf was one of the key figures in the development of German tank building in the pre-war period and during the Second World War. Since 1936, he worked in the design department of the Army Armaments Directorate, remaining Kniepkampf was the author of many technical innovations in tank building, in particular, it was he who developed the basic version of the chassis with large-diameter road wheels, which were subsequently used on Panther and Tiger tanks.), which personally took part in the development of the chassis of the MAN project.
German medium tank T-V Panther "Panther" PzKpfw V "Panther" (SdKfz 171)
As a result, the MAN prototype was approved for mass production and received the designation PzKpfw V "Panther" (SdKfz 171). Initially, it was supposed to produce 250 combat vehicles of a new type per month, but already at the end of 1942 this figure was increased to 600. Since the resources of the MAN company were clearly insufficient to ensure such production volumes, the Daimlsr -Benz AG. After some time, two more industrial giants - the Hanoverian MNH and Henschel and Son AG (Kassel) and later DEMAG, as well as many smaller firms that carried out individual orders from the main manufacturers, began to be engaged in mass production of Panthers.
In mid-July 1941, Rheinmetall-Borsig received an order to develop and create a tank gun capable of penetrating 140 mm armor from a distance of 1000 m, and along the way to prepare a design for a turret adapted to be equipped with such a gun. By the beginning of 1942, a prototype of the 75-mm KwK L / 60 cannon was created, however, during the tests, the gun did not reach the required armor penetration, so Rheinmetall-Borsig * received a categorical order until June 1942 to bring the barrel length to 70 calibers. The order was completed on time, and this time the gun completely satisfied the customer. The 75 mm KwK 42 tank gun was put into serial production. Initially, it was equipped with a single-chamber muzzle brake, which was later replaced by a two-chamber one. It was, without exaggeration, a powerful weapon that terrified the Allied tank forces and infantry.
This is how the production of the tank began, which many experts and specialists consider the best combat vehicle of the Second World War. In total, more than 6,000 Panther tanks were produced, quickly gaining fame as the easiest German tanks to manufacture. Indeed, the creation of two "Panthers" took as much time as the production of one "Tiger". Serial production began with the release of 20 vehicles by MAN, which received the designation PzKpfw V Ausf A (although, as we will see later, subsequently they will receive a new name). Tanks "Panther" PzKpfw V Ausf B can be briefly described as a modification with a Maybach-OVLAR gearbox. Since this modification was unsuccessful, the tanks of version B did not get into active parts.
Some sources indicate that 20 Ausf A tanks were in fact the so-called zero series. This statement is based on the fact that tanks that do not have any differences from the prototype cannot be considered a "version *. Since the PzKpfw V A tanks were actually exact copies of the VK 3002 prototype, one can quite agree with this point of view. According to domestic sources, the firms MHX, Daimler-Benz, MAN and Henschel manufactured from January 11, 1943 to April 23, 1945, according to various sources, from 5992 to 6042 medium tanks PzKpfw V "Panther" - Ed.
The first "Panthers" were equipped with a Maybach HL 210 P45 carburetor engine and a ZF 7 gearbox. The thickness of the frontal armor was 60 mm. These vehicles were equipped with 75 mm KwK 42 cannons with a single-chamber muzzle brake L/70. Since the beginning of 1943, some changes have been made to the design of the Panther: for example, due to an increase in bored cylinder bores, the engine capacity is increased from 21 to 23 liters and receives the designation "Maybach" HL 230 R 30. Other changes concerned an increase in the armor of the frontal part of the tank ( up to 80 mm), as well as shifting the commander's turret slightly to the right (in order to simplify the production of the turret).
The appearance of the family of tanks "Panther" by modifications
It is still unknown which tanks received (and received) the designation PzKpfw V С. One can only assume that this designation was reserved for other tank modifications. One way or another, but the first
the large-scale version of the Panther was the Ausf D.
In order to avoid confusion, from February 1943, the PzKpfw V Ausf D tanks began to be designated PzKpfw V Ausf D2 (the PzKpfw V Ausf D1 tanks were, respectively, the former PzKpfw V Ausf A). Tanks of the new model were produced by all four large tank-building firms - MAN, Daimler-Benz AG, Henschel and Son AG and MNH. For nine months - from January to September 1943 - they produced more than 600 new cars. However, such a rush most adversely affected the quality of the first large-scale Panthers. Almost all of them had low technical reliability and, above all, this concerned the transmission and chassis. This was largely due to a design miscalculation that suggested the use of the same transmission and steering for the Panthers as for the previous, light, German tanks. This completely overlooked the fact that a heavier machine with a more powerful engine requires an appropriate chassis design.
Test drive of the tank "Panther"
The same applied to the Maybach HL 230 P 30 engine with a power of 700 hp. s, which at first overheated greatly, and often even ignited. The changes made in the PzKpfw V Ausf D2 tanks mainly affected the commander's cupola and the muzzle brake of the KwK 42 gun, which became a two-chamber one. The thickness of the frontal armor was increased to 80 mm. They installed a new Maybach AK 7-200 gearbox, subsequently mounted it on the Panther Ausf A and G tanks. On the PzKpfw V Ausf D tanks, produced in the first half of 1943, a commander's turret was installed with viewing slots covered with 50-mm armored glass, as on heavy tanks PzKpfw IV Ausf H1. On the first Panthers, two 3-barreled 90-mm NbK 39 launchers for smoke grenades were mounted.
The armor of the PzKptw V Ausf D tanks, produced in the second half of the same 1943, was covered with zimmerite coating, in addition, 5-mm armor screens - bulwarks - were hung on these vehicles. The features of the D2 model tanks include: the absence of a ball mount for the MG 34 course machine gun, which was located inside the hull (and was inserted into a special loophole closed with an armored cover only for firing); the presence on the left side of the tower of a round bed for removing spent cartridges, as well as loopholes for firing from personal weapons in the sides and at the stern of the tower. In addition, these machines had twin exhaust pipes located symmetrically on the aft armor plate. Tanks modification D2 latest releases had exhaust pipes covered with special flame arresters and armored casings. A total of 851 PzKpfw V Ausf D1 and D2 tanks were produced.
German medium tank T-V Panther "Panther" PzKpfw V "Panther" (SdKfz 171)
In March 1943, Guderian, recently appointed inspector general of the armored forces, presented Hitler with a report in which he outlined his views on the prospects for the development of German armored forces for 1943-1945. Soberly assessing the real situation, Guderian bluntly stated that he did not consider it expedient to use technically imperfect Panthers until July-August 1943. pages of his diary serve.So, on June 15, the inspector general of the armored forces writes: "He was engaged in our ward children -" -Panthers "who turned out to be out of order side gears and revealed shortcomings in optics. " All this makes Gude-riaia on report to Hitler the next day, adding that the Panthers need further refinement before they can be successfully used on the Eastern Front.) During this period, according to the inspector general, it is necessary to eliminate the existing technical shortcomings of the new tanks. Hitler did not want to hear about any delay, although, as it turned out later, cautious forecasts zy Guderian were even too optimistic.
German medium tank T-V Panther "Panther" PzKpfw V "Panther" (SdKfz 171)
Here is what Lieutenant Colonel von Grundherr wrote in his diary immediately after the first combat use of the Panthers on the Eastern Front ("For the first time, the Panthers took part in the hostilities during the Battle of Kursk, the timing of which the Nazi command deliberately postponed in order to be able to throw against the Soviet troops their new tanks. The results of the Battle of Kursk confirmed all of Guderian's darkest fears. The Panther tanks were definitely not ready for combat use. Thus, when a tank brigade was advanced to its original position for the offensive, about one quarter of the vehicles simply broke down as a result of technical problems. )
“... To be honest, I just could not resist saying a few words about this sad story, whose name is “Panther”. Everything happened exactly as I expected ... How many people had special hopes for the use of this new, never yet tried weapon! Needless to say, what a depressing effect it had on them
the defeat suffered ... And it all started with the Führer's order, with those supernatural expectations that he gave rise to ... It just doesn’t fit in my head how you can create a powerful, modern, expensive weapon, and at the same time supply it with an absolutely unnecessary gasoline pump, a bunch of extra pads and other rubbish?! I have not a shadow of a doubt that most of the technical problems stem from the use of unsuitable materials that do not meet elementary quality requirements. Particularly noteworthy is the “efficiency” of the use of “Panthers *,” the author caustically remarks and continues: From a distance of 7224 m, the T-34 hit them with one shot ”(“ Quoted from: The Ordnance Department Planning Munitions for War. I still have there are serious doubts about the reliability of the figures given in the document.It can be assumed that the T-34s hit the Panthers from a distance of 1737 or even 2650 m, but the figure of 7224 m seems to me completely fantastic.)
Of the 200 tanks that made their debut near Kursk, 160 failed by the end of the first day, and after another 9 days only 43 Panthers remained in service.
German medium tank T-V Panther "Panther" PzKpfw V "Panther" (SdKfz 171)
Many broke already on the way from the railway to the front line, and big weight vehicles made towing much more difficult ... "According to domestic sources, 196 PzKpfw V Ausf D tanks took part in the Citadel operation, of which the Germans lost 162 Panthers only for technical reasons. In total, the Wehrmacht irretrievably lost 127 "Panther". See Baryatinsky M. Heavy tank "Panther". M „ 1997.C. 19- - Approx. ed.
In fairness, it should be said right away that subsequently most of these problems were successfully eliminated, and the Panthers gained well-deserved fame as the best battle tank of the Wehrmacht. However, as we will see later, in the course of the further operation of the Panthers, the crews and designers often had to deal with various technical problems.
The crew of the "Panther" Ausf A posing on the stern of his tank. You see how one of the tankers is moving the MG-34 anti-aircraft machine gun. mounted on the protective turret FliegerBeschussgerat, in position for firing at air targets. Since the end of 1943, many PzKpfw IIIs have been equipped with such installations for anti-aircraft machine guns; PzKpfw IV, "Panthers" and "Tigers". (Photo courtesy of Horst Rebenstahl.)
In late August - early September 1943, production began on the next version of the Panther - PzKpfw V Ausf A (and not E, as one would expect). The new Panther, like the previous ones, was produced by four companies already known to us (MAN, MNH, DEMAG, Daimler-Benz AG). Only about 1788 tanks of this model were produced. The distinguishing features of the "second A" were, first of all, a new improved commander's turret, which replaced the previous one, which received the playful name "garbage bin" for its bulky cylindrical silhouette. Some changes also affected the location and equipment of viewing slots. The turret was equipped with 7 periscopes and a Fliegerbeschussgerat anti-aircraft turret for the MG-34 machine gun. The MG-34 detachable course machine gun was replaced by a stationary machine gun in a ball mount, and instead of the TZF 12 binocular sight, the gunner got a monocular TZF 12a type. The gun loader also received its own periscope. Other minor changes affected the location of the ammunition racks, the elimination of hatches in the side walls of the turret for firing personal weapons, and changing the elevation angle of the turret gun. (In the Panther tanks of the D2 model, the gun elevation angle was -8° +20°; in the A model -8° +18°) (from 16 to 24) and change the location of the track roller bearings. The exhaust system has changed, now consisting of 2 exhaust pipes and 2-3 additional ones.
The most numerous modification of the Panthers was the Ausf G. From March 1944 to April 1945, MAN, MNH and Daimler-BenzAG produced 3,740 tanks of this type. PzKpfw V Ausf G had reinforced armor - the front of the tower up to 110 mm, side (50 mm instead of the previous 40) and a greater slope of the sides (61 °), while Ausf D and A had an angle of inclination of 50 °. For this option, the designers provided for a new type of frontal armor, the armor protection of which was enhanced by eliminating the driver's rectangular viewing hole. Instead of a viewing hole, the driver received a rotating periscope mounted on the ceiling of the fighting compartment. The shape of the access hatches for the driver and gunner in the turret box has also changed. Hinged hatches began to be equipped with special springs, which greatly facilitate opening and closing, changes were made to the design of fans, engine shutters, exhaust pipes, etc. The ammunition load increased from 79 to 82 artillery rounds, and on a number of tanks the guns received a new design of a mask with a special a ledge that protects the base of the tower from jamming when a projectile hits. On the latest copies of this model, the standard ZF AK7-200 gearbox was replaced by the ZF AK 7-400. In addition, the latest machines of the G version assumed the use of night vision devices and other technical innovations, which, however, could not be implemented until the very end of the war. In November 1944, 63 Panther Ausf G tanks received the world's first mass-produced passive infrared night vision devices FG 1250, which made it possible to monitor the battlefield at a distance of up to 700 m.
On February 27, 1944, Hitler by his order banned the use of the designation PzKpfw V, ordering from now on to call the new tank only "Panther". Accordingly, the PzKpfw V Ausf G vehicle has since become known as the Panther Ausf G.
General description of the tank PzKpfw V "Panther"
As we have already seen, thanks to the efforts of the chief engineer G. Knipkampf and the “tank committee”, the design of the Panther remained traditional for German tanks. The control compartment in front of the tank, which housed the main clutch, gearbox, turning mechanism, controls, instruments, course machine gun, part of the ammunition load, radio station and places for the driver and gunner-radio operator. The fighting compartment was located in the middle of the tank. The turret housed weapons - a cannon and a machine gun coaxial with it, observation and aiming devices, vertical and horizontal guidance mechanisms, places for the tank commander, gunner and loader. The engine compartment was located in the stern, separated from the combat by a metal fireproof partition. However, the new tank turned out to be significantly larger and heavier than all previous models.
View of the place of the loading gun. Inside the tank "Panther" (Panther)
View of the loader. Inside the tank "Panther" (Panther)
View of the place of the driver (left) and gunner-radio operator (right), in the center you can see the elements of the transmission. Inside the tank "Panther" (Panther)
Another view of the place of the driver and gunner-radio operator. Inside the tank "Panther" (Panther)
View of the tank commander. Inside the tank "Panther" (Panther)
View of the tank commander. The tank commander at the surveillance devices. Inside the tank "Panther" (Panther)
Tank "Panther" in the section (Panther)
View of the breech of a tank gun. The gunner's sight is clearly visible. Inside the tank "Panther" (Panther)
The workplace of the driver was equipped on the left. Directly in front of him was a rectangular viewing slot, protected by a 24.8 mm armored cover, driven by a lever. During the stop, the driver used two fixed periscopes installed in the roof of his compartment, with one periscope heading forward and the other slightly to the left. However, this whole system provided a very mediocre view, therefore, on the Ausf G Panthers, the viewing slot was eliminated and replaced with a rotating periscope. The place of the driver was arranged as follows, they went to the right: the hand brake lever, the left lever for turning the tank, the main clutch pedal; brake pedal; accelerator pedal; right tank turn lever; Shoe brake adjusting device; gear lever; in front - a control panel (with a speedometer, tachometer, oil pressure sensor and ammeter). In addition, there was an electric starter button on the dashboard, but in cold weather (in winter) or if the batteries were discharged in the tank, it was necessary to use an inertial starter. The starter was driven by a crank, which had to be turned by two crew members at once, so in the latest modifications of the Panther * this system was replaced by a new one, easier to operate.
On the right side of the control compartment was the place of the gunner-radio operator. On the first samples of the Panthers, the MG-34 machine gun was removable, firing from it was carried out through a special loophole in the armor. On subsequent modifications, a course machine gun was installed in a ball mount. By right hand the radio operator housed a radio station, and on top were periscopes, exactly the same as those of the driver. Both the driver and the gunner-radio operator had their own escape hatches located in front of the hull cover. On the early Panthers, to enter and exit the car, the manhole covers were lifted up and set aside using a special lifting and turning mechanism. In Ausf G, a more convenient mechanism was installed, in which the hatches were folded back on hinges equipped with springs.
An eight-speed (seven front and one rear) gearbox of the ZF AK 7-200 type was placed between the radio operator and the drivers. The gearbox was quite difficult to manage, so the driver required special skill. From the gearbox, the torque was transmitted through the gearbox to the drive wheels located in front. The turning mechanism consisted of two planetary gearboxes. Power was transmitted to the final drives by short transverse rollers with gear couplings at the ends, with which it was possible to put one or another drive wheel against the course in order to slow down the caterpillar on the required side and thereby make a sharper turn. This innovation made it possible to significantly increase the turning radius of the tank (5 m at the first speed and 80 m at the seventh). The driving wheels had two removable gear rims with 17 teeth. The tank control drives are combined, with a follow-up hydraulic servo drive with mechanical feedback. The driver steered the car with the help of the steering wheel.
Chassis "Panther". Torsion suspension. The undercarriage for one side had eight double rubber-coated road wheels of large diameter, installed in a checkerboard pattern. This design of the suspension was very difficult to manufacture, but it provided an exceptionally smooth and even ride of the tank. On the "Panthers" of later modifications, a fundamentally new suspension design with all-metal track rollers was used. As we will see later, such rollers will subsequently be used on the "Tigers", caterpillars, small-linked 660 mm wide, consisted of 86 links. The driving wheels are raised high above the ground. The tension was adjusted using the rear guide wheels.
Suspension of the tank "Panther" (chassis)
View of the suspension of the tank "Panther" from below. True, the picture shows the Tiger tank, but its suspension was similar to the Panther, the only difference was that two successive torsion bars were used, which made it possible to further reduce the rigidity of the tank's suspension.
Panther tank turret. The tower with a solid floor was installed in the center of the tank and was driven by a hydraulic drive. A 75-mm KwK 42 L / 70 cannon with a vertical wedge breech and copy-type automatics was mounted in the cast mask of the turret. A telescopic sight was mounted on the left, and an MG-34 turret machine gun coaxial with a cannon was mounted on the right. The elevation angle of the gun ranged from -8° to +20°. The walls of the tower consisted of two large armored plates, which were slightly approaching from behind and had the shape of a truncated cone with a connection into a spike and a wall slope of 65 °, the slope of the roof did not exceed 6 °. The tower housed weapons, observation and aiming devices, vertical and horizontal aiming mechanisms and jobs for three crew members (commander, gunner and loader). The commander's place was equipped at the rear, directly under the commander's turret, in front of him was the gunner's place - on the left side, and on the right side of the tower - the loader's place. The crew seats rotated with the turret. The breech of the gun divided the combat compartment of the tower into two parts.
Panther tank turret
Tower tank "Panther" with a rotating basket.
The commander's cupola of the tank "Panther"
Muzzle brakes of the guns of the tank "Panther"
Initially, the commander's turret, 26 cm high, had 6 periscope observation devices, which were closed by a 56-mm steel ring moving along the diameter of the turret and driven by a manual mechanism. This design has undergone modernization, and already on the "Panthers" Ausf A, the commander's cupola was equipped with a more advanced surveillance system. An MG 34 machine gun was mounted above the hatch on the Fligerbeschussgeral anti-aircraft turret, from which it was possible to fire at air targets. The first "Panthers" had very imperfect surveillance systems that did not correspond to the changed silhouette and increased height of the tank, so the crew experienced great difficulties when moving and during the battle. The figure below clearly shows what a nightmare the observation turned into when the tank was on rough terrain or behind a ridge. In subsequent versions of the PzKpfw V, these comments were taken into account, in particular, the place of the loader was equipped with its own periscope.
Dead (not visible) space near Panther tanks
Initially, the PzKpfw V Ausf D tanks were equipped with a TZF 12 binocular sight, but later on Ausf A and G this sight was replaced by a monocular TZF 12a. The sight was equipped with special scales for each type of shells (armor-piercing, sub-caliber, cumulative, etc.). A special scale with double magnification was also used to point the machine gun. When the vertical angle of the armament was changed, the position of the objective part of the sight also changed, while the ocular part remained stationary, which made it possible to work with the armament over the entire range of the vertical pointing angle without changing the position of the gunner. The rotation of the tower was carried out by a hydraulic drive, which was driven by a gearbox. Thus, with the engine turned off, the turret had to be rotated manually.
In order to make a quick turn of the tower, the driver and gunner had to work together. At high speed, with a number of revolutions of the order of 2500 per minute, the full rotation of the tower was performed in 17-18 seconds, and if the number of revolutions per minute dropped to 1000, this operation took 92-93 seconds. The last jerk was always done manually, while the handwheel handle on the gunner's side had to be moved to the vertical (neutral) position. If it was required to turn the turret to the left, the lever was pulled back, and when moving to the right, forward. Turning a 7.5-ton turret by hand was not an easy task, requiring not only strength, but also endurance. Suffice it to say that a full turn of the flywheel of the manual drive ensured that the turret rotated by only 0.36 °. At the same time, due to the unbalance of the turret, it was impossible to turn it manually when the tank rolled over 5 °.
The position of the gun relative to the hull of the PzKpfw V Ausf D tank was determined using two round scales divided by
the principle of dial-hour type and located near the sight. The left dial had two scales - an internal one, divided into 12 divisions, and an external one, divided into 64 divisions. The right dial was graduated in thousandths. A scale divided into 12 divisions was also applied to the gear mounted on the inside of the commander's cupola. This scale operated on the “counterclockwise” principle, that is, when the turret turned, the scale turned in the exact opposite direction, but at the same speed. The number 12 was always on the center line of the tank and indicated the direction of its movement. Based on these guidelines, the commander could In later A and G tanks, this complex target designation system was no longer necessary, as the commander's position began to be equipped with more advanced optics, so that he could direct fire without protruding from the tank.
Cannon of the tank "Panther". A few words about the turret gun produced at the plants of the Rheinmetall-Borsig concern - the 75-mm KwK 42 L / 70 cannon, with a total length of 5.85 m, was a truly formidable weapon. At an angle of 60 °, an armor-piercing tracer , launched from this gun, pierced armor 90 mm thick. From a distance of 457 m, 80 mm armor was pierced by the same projectile at a distance of 915 m. From a distance of 800 m, the gun could hit the Soviet T-34 tank, and from a distance of 1000 m it easily building American Shermans.The electric trigger increased the accuracy of fire.A properly installed and aimed gun could cause much more trouble.
Types of masks of the guns of the tank "Panther"
Tank 75-mm gun KwK 42 L/70 tank "Panther"
The gun ammunition included the following types of artillery rounds. "Panthers" Ausf A and D were equipped with ammunition in 79 artillery rounds located in the ammunition racks in the lower part of the fighting compartment. In the combat vehicles of the subsequent Ausfz (G), their number was increased to 82. combat department. 4200 cartridges for machine guns were stored in special boxes. (According to domestic sources, the ammunition load for tank machine guns for PzKpfw V Ausf A and D was 5100 rounds. And for PzKpfw V Ausf G - 4800 rounds. See Panzer Kampfwagen V-Panther "History of creation and use. M .. Eastern Front, I995.C. 8. - At, ed.)
On the first Panthers, three NbK 39 90 mm smoke grenade launchers were installed on both sides of the turret. The short barrel was placed at an angle of 60 °. Grenade launchers could not only create a smoke screen, but also hit enemy infantry with high-explosive fragmentation grenades. On tanks of later modifications, smoke grenades were fired from inside the tank.
Turret smoke grenade launchers NbK 39 caliber 90 mm mounted on the tank "Panther"
As noted above, until the advent of the Panther Ausf A, the loader did not have his own periscope, and, if necessary, to urgently leave the tank, he used a large round hole for ejection of spent shell casings, located in the rear part of the tower, as an evacuation hatch. Next to this opening was originally a small hatch for firing small arms. Exactly the same hatch, covered with a removable cover, was on the left side of the tower. In the Panthers Ausf G, these hatches were eliminated. Machines of this type also had an additional fighting compartment fan installed on the left side of the turret roof. The gas contamination of the fighting compartment was reduced by a special unit for purging the gun barrel after a shot with compressed air and suction of powder gases from the sleeve catcher box. There were three locks in the tower - in the right front part there was a tower lock, another lock was on the cannon and the third one was attached to the frontal part of the tank roof. The barrel in the turret was fixed in the stowed position at an angle of 0 degrees using a special chain and clamping nut. At the same time, for the same purpose, a rigidly fixed folding rack served in front of the roof of the hull to fix the barrel in the stowed position.
The engine compartment of the tank. In the stern of the tank was a 12-cylinder Maybach HL 230 P30 700 hp carburetor engine. and a maximum speed of 3000. Access to the engine was through a large sunroof in the roof of the engine compartment. The engine compartment was divided into three compartments, separated by watertight bulkheads. The two extreme compartments, when overcoming water obstacles, could be flooded with water. The central compartment with the Maybach HL 230 P30 engine mounted was sealed. The side compartments were closed from above with armor grilles, four of them served for the inflow of air, which cooled the radiators, and the two middle compartments for its removal. The disadvantage of the engine was its large size and the resulting tightness in the engine compartment. As a result, the engine was not cooled well and often in the summer the temperature of the water in the cooling system exceeded the norm of 80 ° C. For this reason, a special fire extinguishing system was provided in the tank, which automatically came into action as soon as the engine temperature rose above 120 ° C. The system operated as follows. As soon as the engine temperature exceeded the critical temperature, an emergency light came on on the driver's dashboard, signaling that the engine needed to be cooled immediately. At the same time, six nozzles on the fuel pump and carburetor began to spray a special fire-fighting mixture *CB*.
Fuel (730 liters of gasoline) was transported in five gas tanks located in the engine compartment as follows: two on each side and one at the rear. Fuel consumption varied from 0.25 liters per 1 km when driving on the highway to 0.14 liters per 1 km when driving but on rough terrain. "Panthers" could reach a maximum speed of 46 km / h with a cruising range (the distance that a tank can travel along the highway without additional refueling) of 200 km.
In addition, the designers of the "Panthers" provided that the car would be able to ford rivers, the depth of which at the intersection did not exceed 1.9 m. However, this figure turned out to be somewhat overestimated, and the actual depth that the "Panthers * were able to ford was about 1, 7 m. 1.9 m were able to overcome only improved modifications of the Panthers - command and reconnaissance tanks (they will be discussed further).
The Panther tanks could also dive completely, but only in cases where the depth did not exceed 4 m. However, the German designers did not manage to fully develop such an option and turn the Panthers into real "amphibious tanks".
Tank booking. The Panther Ausf G had very good armor protection from rolled armor plates installed at rational angles. The upper frontal sheet of the hull was located at an angle of 38 ° to the horizontal, the lower - at an angle of 37 °. The lower side sheets are vertical, the upper ones are inclined at an angle of 48 °, the stern sheet is at an angle of 60 °. In one of the first Soviet reports on the appearance of new tanks in service with the Wehrmacht, the hardness of the frontal armor was determined at approximately 262 HB on the Brinell scale.
Additional armor screens with a thickness of 5 mm provided protection for the upper part of the chassis and weakened the effect of the impact of cumulative projectiles.
At the end of 1944, the British managed to capture the Panther Ausf G tank and they conducted a complete study of it. Here are the conclusions drawn from the test results “The tank is invulnerable to shells, anti-tank artillery cal. 37-57 mm, however, when the tank was fired from aircraft cannons from an aircraft at an angle of 30 °, the hit of shells in the air intake holes of the engine compartment led to serious destruction of the tank radiator. Even greater damage can be achieved by shelling the tank from the air with 20-mm high-explosive fragmentation shells.
Both high-explosive fragmentation and armor-piercing shells fired from large-caliber field guns and hitting the forehead of the hull below the horizontal of the tank gun may well penetrate the armor, hit the roof of the fighting compartment, or lead to jamming of the tower. Damage to the sides can lead to the ignition of the ammunition.
Rolled armor plates are quite fragile, which makes the less protected areas of the tank particularly vulnerable. So, the roof of the tower is easy to break through both with the help of high-explosive fragmentation shells and with fire from an aircraft. Nevertheless, the interlocked joints of the tank, connected in a spike and welded with a double seam, provide it with greater strength and allow it to maintain overall stability even in the event of destruction of the welds of the armor plates.
A frontal attack, shelling a tank with PIAT anti-tank grenade launchers does not bring success; shelling from the sides seems to be much more effective.
Anti-tank mines, even weighing 1.8-6.8 kg, can damage the tracks only if they detonate exactly in the middle of the latter ...
In conclusion, it should be noted that the design of this tank is truly unique, its stability and strength exceed all samples that have existed so far. Particularly impressive effective method blocking of tank plates. Based on the results of the tests, it can be stated with all certainty that the German Panther tank is the most formidable weapon of the Wehrmacht. Certainly, and it has its weak spots, however, it would be an unforgivable mistake to underestimate the danger that the Panther can pose, especially with proper protection of its sides.
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Data source: Quote from the magazine "Armored collection" M. Bratinsky (1998. - No. 3)
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My old article, almost a decade ago, which unexpectedly spread very widely on the net. I update the address and invite the general public to read and discuss it again.
In various books and TV shows, I constantly came across an assessment of Panther as one of best tanks World War II. And in the program on the National Geographic channel, he was generally called absolutely ahead of his time.
Heavy tank PzKpfw V "Panther" Ausf D (SdKfz 171).
History reference:
, abbr. - German tank of the Second World War. This combat vehicle was developed by MAN in 1941-1942 as the main tank of the Wehrmacht. According to the German classification, the Panther was considered a medium tank. In the Soviet tank classification, the Panther was considered a heavy tank. In the departmental end-to-end system of designations for military equipment of Nazi Germany, the Panther had the Sd.Kfz index. 171. Starting from February 27, 1944, the Fuhrer ordered that only the name "Panther" be used to designate the tank.
The combat debut of the "Panther" was the Battle of Kursk, subsequently tanks of this type were actively used by the Wehrmacht and the SS troops in all European theaters of war. According to a number of experts, the Panther is the best German tank of the Second World War and one of the best in the world. At the same time, the tank had a number of shortcomings, was complicated and expensive to manufacture and operate. On the basis of the Panther, the Jagdpanther self-propelled artillery mount (ACS) and a number of specialized vehicles for the engineering and artillery units of the German armed forces were produced.
Well, what was the real significance for the course of the war of such an outstanding machine? Why did Germany, having such an outstanding tank, not utterly defeat the Soviet armored forces? Here is an interesting article, I quote it in full:
Panther Battalions on the Eastern Front. Period from the end of 1943 to 1945
The Panthers that survived on the Kursk Bulge were assembled as part of the 52nd tank battalion, which was renamed I. Abteilung / Panzer-Regiment 15 on August 24, 1943. The 51st battalion received new 96 Panthers in early August and remained in part of the grenadier division "Grossdeutschland". By the end of August, the 52nd Battalion had irretrievably lost 36 Panthers. As of August 31, 1943, the 52nd tank battalion had 15 combat-ready tanks, another 45 vehicles were under repair.
At the end of August 1943, 1. Abteilung / SS-Panzer-Regiment 2, which was part of the SS Panzer Division "Das Reich", arrived at the front. This battalion consisted of 71 Panthers. Three command tanks were at the headquarters, and each of the four companies had 17 vehicles: two in the headquarters section and five in each platoon. On August 31, 1943, the battalion had 21 combat-ready tanks, 40 vehicles needed repair, 10 were decommissioned.
The fourth Panther battalion that ended up on the Eastern Front was the II. Abteilung/Panzer-Regiment 23. The battalion had 96 Panthers, of which the majority were Ausf. D, but there were also several Ausf. A. The fifth was I. Abteilung/Panzer-Regiment 2, equipped with 71 Panthers, mostly Ausf. A. From the report of the 13th Panzer Division of October 20, 1943:
“Due to the threatening situation at the front, the battalion was thrown to the front line, barely having time to unload. The battalion operated in squadrons. Due to the haste, it was not possible to establish interaction with the grenadiers. Often unnecessarily turning into counterattacks, tank squads supported the actions of the infantry. As it turned out later, such use of tanks was contrary to basic tactical principles, but the situation at the front left no choice.
Below are excerpts from the reports of the commander of I. Abteilung / Panzer-Regiment 2. Hauptmann Bollert, covering the period from 9 to 19 October 1943:
"Tactical training.
Insufficient tactical training of the crews did not seriously affect the combat effectiveness of the battalion, since more than half of the battalion personnel have combat experience. In such an environment, young soldiers quickly improve their skills. Many young driver-mechanics, who had just graduated from tank school, kept their tanks in combat-ready condition with great diligence. In any case, it is highly desirable to have an experienced platoon leader.
Technical training in Germany:
During several weeks of training, drivers and technical staff did not always study what is required on the front line. Some of the soldiers were engaged all the time in any one task, for example, changing road wheels. Thus, many did not have a holistic view of the design of the PzKpfw V. Under the guidance of an experienced instructor, young soldiers sometimes achieved excellent results in a very short time. There is an opportunity to study the materiel at every plant that assembles tanks.
Mechanical problems:
Cylinder head seal burned through. Destroyed fuel pump shaft.
The bolts on the large final drive gear are torn off. Often there is a loss of plugs, which leads to leakage of oil. Oil also often leaks through the seam between the final drive housing and the side of the tank. The bolts that secure the final drives to the side of the hull often come loose.
The upper fan bearing often sticks. Lubrication is insufficient even if the oil level is normal. Fan damage is often accompanied by damage to the fan drive.
Driveshaft bearings fail. The drive of the hydraulic pump wears out.
Armament issues: Compressor clutch stuck, interfering with barrel scavenging system. The TZF 12 sight fails as a result of hits in the gun mantlet. Optics consumption for the sight is very high.
It is absolutely necessary to equip the tank with a forward machine gun to fight enemy infantry. The need for a course machine gun is felt especially acutely when the coaxial machine gun falls silent.
The frontal armor of the PzKpfw V is very good. 76.2 mm armor-piercing shells leave dents on it no deeper than 45 mm. "Panthers" fail with a direct hit by 152-mm high-explosive shells - the shell breaks through the armor. Almost all Panthers received frontal hits from 76-mm shells, while the combat effectiveness of the tanks practically did not suffer. In one case, the gun mantlet was pierced by a 45-mm projectile fired from a distance of 30 m. The crew was not injured.
However, the side armor is very vulnerable. The side of the tower on one of the "Panthers" was pierced by an anti-tank rifle. The side of another "Panther" was also pierced by a small-caliber projectile. All these damages occur during the fighting on the streets or in the forest, where it is not possible to close the flanks.
A direct hit by an artillery shell and the lower part of the frontal armor led to the fact that the welds burst, and a piece several centimeters long broke off from the armor plate. Obviously the seam was not welded to the full depth.
The skirt performed well enough. Sheet fastenings are not sufficiently reliable and are very inconveniently located. Since the sheets are suspended at a distance of 8 cm from the side of the tank, they are easily torn off by branches of trees and shrubs.
New road wheels did not cause any complaints. Almost all "Panthers" lost their course due to explosions of high-explosive shells. One track roller was pierced right through, three were damaged. Several road wheels broke. Although 45mm and 76mm shells penetrate tracks, they cannot immobilize a tank. In any case, the Panther can leave the battlefield under its own power. During long marches at top speed, rubber tires on the road wheels wear out quickly.
The gun proved to be excellent, only a few minor problems were noted. The frontal armor of the KV-1 confidently breaks through from a distance of 600 m. The SU-152 breaks through from a distance of 800 m.
The new commander's cupola has a rather successful design. The diopter, which greatly helped the tank commander in pointing the gun at the target, is missing. The three front periscopes should be moved a little closer to each other. The field of view through the periscopes is good, but it is impossible to use binoculars. When shells hit the turret, the periscope optics often fail and need to be replaced.
In addition, the driver's and radio operator's periscopes should be better sealed. When it rains, water gets inside and makes work very difficult.
Bergepanther tugs have proven to be excellent. One Bergepanther is enough to evacuate one tank in dry weather. In deep mud, even two tugs are not enough to evacuate one Panther. To date, Bergepanther tugs have evacuated 20 Panthers. In total, damaged tanks were towed over a distance of 600 m. Bergepanthers were used only to tow wrecked tanks from the front line to the near rear. The experience of the battalion shows that it is necessary to have at least four Bergepanther tugs, albeit at the expense of conventional 18-ton tugs. The equipment of tugboats with radio stations turned out to be handy. During the battle, the Bergepanther commanders received instructions by radio.
To tow one Panther in dry weather, two Zugkraftwagen 18t tractors are required. However, in deep mud, even four 18-ton tractors cannot move the tank.
On October 16, the battalion launched an attack with 31 tanks. Although the distance traveled was short, 12 Panthers failed due to mechanical failures. By October 18, 1943, the battalion had 26 combat-ready Panthers. 39 tanks needed repair and 6 vehicles had to be written off. Between October 9 and 19, the average number of combat-ready tanks was 22 Panthers.
Results: 46 tanks and 4 self-propelled guns were knocked out. 28 anti-tank guns, 14 artillery pieces and 26 anti-tank rifles were destroyed. Our irretrievable losses are 8 tanks (6 were hit and burned down during the fighting, two were dismantled for spare parts).
Due to the mechanical unreliability of the Panthers and the high level of losses. On November 1, 1943, Hitler decided to send 60 tanks without engines to the Leningrad Front, which were to be dug into the ground opposite the Kronstadt Bay. From November 5 to November 25, 1943, 60 Panthers (fully combat-ready) were sent to the command of the Army Group North.
On November 30, 1943, the command of the L Army Corps reported that 60 Panthers had come under the jurisdiction of the 9th and 10th Luftwaffe field divisions. "Panthers" were dug in threes along the line of defense, having a clear space of 1000-1500 m in front of them. If for some reason it was not possible to dig three tanks side by side, a single vehicle was reinforced with infantry and anti-tank gun. The 10 most combat-ready vehicles were left on the move as a mobile reserve.
60 people were allocated from the I. Abteilung / Panzer-Regiment 29 (20 commanders, 20 drivers, 15 gunners and 5 gunners-radio operators). On December 26, III Panzer Corps was ordered to collect all Panthers that had retained mobility as part of I. Abteilung / Panzer-Regiment 29. The dug-in Panthers remained under the control of divisions.
In November 1943, two Panther battalions arrived on the Eastern Front. These were I. Abteilung / Panzer-Regiment 1, which numbered 76 Panthers (17 tanks in a company), as well as I. Ableilung / SS-Panzer-Regiment 1. fully equipped (96 Panthers), Both battalions operated as part of their divisions.
In early November, the 1st Battalion of the 15th Tank Regiment received reinforcements in the form of 31 Panthers. At the end of December 1943, the 1st Battalion of the 1st Tank Regiment received 16 new Panthers. Not counting the 60 Panthers sent to the Leningrad Front, a total of 841 Panthers were sent to the Eastern Front in 1943. By December 31, 1943, the Germans had only 217 Panthers, of which only 80 remained operational. 624 tanks were decommissioned (74% loss).
From 5 to 11 December 1943, 76 Panthers were delivered to the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Tank Regiment. Another 94 Panthers arrived as replacements for other battalions. However, all these tanks were first used in combat as early as January 1944.
“As the experience of recent battles has shown, the Panther has finally been brought to mind. A report dated February 22, 1944, received from the 1st Tank Regiment, states: “In the current version, the Panther is suitable for front-line use. It is significantly superior to the T-34. Almost all shortcomings are eliminated. The tank has excellent armor, armament, maneuverability and speed. Currently, the average mileage of the motor is in the range of 700-1000 km. The number of engine breakdowns has decreased. Final drive failures are no longer noted. The steering and transmission are reasonably reliable.”
However, this report from the 1st Panzer Regiment was premature. Indeed, the Panther felt good in winter on frozen ground, but already in a report dated April 22, 1944 from the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Tank Regiment, numerous technical problems caused by spring impassability were reported:
Engine Maybach HL 230 P30;
Panther - a new fighting vehicle of the Third Reich, which was supposed to replace the older German tanks PzIII and PzIV. It began to be produced in 1942 and, along with the heavy tank Tigr, put an end to the qualitative superiority of Soviet tanks that had taken place at the beginning of the war. In the Wehrmacht, the Panther was considered a medium tank, and the Soviet and American specialists it was believed that this tank belongs to the heavy class. And they had every reason for that - the Panther in terms of dimensions and weight was approximately comparable to the Soviet heavy tank IS. During the entire war, German industry was able to produce about 6,000 tanks of this type.
In general, the new engines are much more reliable than their predecessors. Sometimes the engine runs up to 1700-1800 km without repair, and 3 Panthers, having covered this distance, still remain on the move. But the nature of the breakdowns has not changed: the destruction of mechanical parts and damage to bearings.
Description
Unlike its predecessors ("PzIII" and "PzIV"), this tank was able to easily cope with the main Soviet tank "T-34" and its upgraded versions due to its powerful gun. With the new Soviet heavy IS tanks, things were more complicated. In booking, the Panther was inferior to the Soviet IS-1 and IS-2, as well as inferior to them in firepower. The armor of the IS made its way from the Panther's gun only at a distance of 700-800 meters, while the Soviet giant could hit the "German" from a distance of over 2.5 kilometers! The Soviet SU-100 and ISU-152 self-propelled guns also posed a great danger to the Panther, penetrating its armor at almost any effective combat distance, and a direct hit from the ISU-152 projectile tore off the turret from the Panther..jpg)
The combat debut of the Panther medium tank took place on the Kursk Bulge. In general, estimates of the combat effectiveness of the Panthers are ambiguous. On the one hand, reliable frontal armor withstood the fire of Soviet guns in 1943, excellent optics helped to quickly detect the enemy, and good weapons effectively destroyed Soviet tanks and firing points, on the other hand, side armor was weak and even penetrated by the Soviet 45mm field gun on almost all distances. The weak side armor of the Panthers was quickly noted by Soviet military experts and the Red Army used the weaknesses of the German machine, as a result of which the Panther tank formations suffered monstrous losses. Another disadvantage was the frequent failure of the undercarriage and transmission, which was exacerbated by the difficulty of repairing the tank compared to Soviet vehicles, which were very well repaired in the field. All this led to the fact that the tank had to be sent to the rear for repair in the factory and the German Eastern front on the for a long time lost much-needed tanks. In general, the Panther did not act very successfully against the eastern opponents who had learned to fight. .jpg)
On the Western Front in 1944-1945, the Panther medium tank was a real threat to the Allies advancing on Berlin through France. The British and Americans practically did not use the advantages of the mobility of tank formations and the Panthers were able to fully realize their strengths in front armor and the power of the Sherman gun, which easily hit the main Allied tanks. A very indicative survey was conducted among Eisenhower's tankers, who unanimously argued that it was very difficult to fight the Panther on the Sherman. Despite a number of serious shortcomings, many consider the Panther one of the best tanks in Germany along with the Tiger, which, however, is beyond doubt, because Germany simply did not have a large number of more effective combat vehicles. But the serious shortcomings of this tank, especially low reliability, played a role. The Panther was never able to replace the reliable and trouble-free PzIV, which remained the main German tank until the end of the war.
