Katyusha rocket artillery fighting vehicle. Was the first volley of "Katyushas" on the "Katyushas"? Modifications of military equipment Katyusha

The famous installation "Katyusha" was put into production a few hours before the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR. used a salvo fire system rocket artillery for massive strikes on areas, had an average effective range.

Chronology of the creation of rocket artillery combat vehicles

Gelatin powder was created in 1916 by Russian professor I. P. Grave. The further chronology of the development of rocket artillery in the USSR is as follows:

• five years later, already in the USSR, the development of a rocket projectile by V. A. Artemyev and N. I. Tikhomirov began;
• in the period 1929 - 1933 a group led by B. S. Petropavlovsky created a prototype projectile for the MLRS, but ground-based launchers were used;
• rockets were put into service with the Air Force in 1938, marked RS-82, installed on I-15, I-16 fighters;
• in 1939, they were used at Khalkhin Gol, then they began to equip warheads from the RS-82 for SB bombers and L-2 attack aircraft;
• starting in 1938, another group of developers - R. I. Popov, A. P. Pavlenko, V. N. Galkovsky and I. I. Gvai - worked on a multi-charge high mobility installation on a wheeled chassis;
• the last successful test before the launch of the BM-13 into mass production ended on June 21, 1941, that is, a few hours before the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR.

On the fifth day of the war, the Katyusha apparatus in the amount of 2 combat units entered service with the main artillery department. Two days later, on June 28, the first battery was formed from them and 5 prototypes participating in the tests.

The first combat volley of Katyusha officially took place on July 14th. The city of Rudnya, occupied by the Germans, was shelled with incendiary shells filled with thermite, and two days later, a crossing over the Orshitsa River near the Orsha railway station.

The history of the nickname Katyusha

Since the history of Katyusha, as the nickname of the MLRS, does not have exact objective information, there are several plausible versions:

• some of the shells had an incendiary filling with the CAT marking, denoting the Kostikov automatic thermite charge;
• bombers of the SB squadron, armed with RS-132 shells, taking part in the hostilities at Khalkhin Gol, were nicknamed Katyushas;
• in the combat units there was a legend about a partisan girl with that name, famous for the destruction of a large number of Nazis, with whom the Katyusha volley was compared;
• the jet mortar was marked K (Comintern plant) on the body, and the soldiers liked to give affectionate nicknames to the equipment.

The latter is supported by the fact that earlier rockets with the designation RS were called Raisa Sergeevna, the ML-20 Emeley howitzer, and the M-30 Matushka, respectively.

However, the most poetic version of the nickname is the Katyusha song, which became popular just before the war. Correspondent A. Sapronov published in the Rossiya newspaper in 2001 an article about a conversation between two Red Army soldiers immediately after a MLRS salvo, in which one of them called it a song, and the second specified the name of this song.

Analogues nicknames MLRS

During the war years, the BM rocket launcher with a 132 mm projectile was not the only weapon with its own name. According to the abbreviation MARS, mortar artillery rockets (mortar installations) were nicknamed Marusya.

Mortar MARS - Marusya

Even the German Nebelwerfer towed mortar was jokingly called Vanyusha by Soviet soldiers.

Mortar Nebelwerfer - Vanyusha

In area firing, the Katyusha volley outperformed the damage from Vanyusha and more modern analogues of the Germans that appeared at the end of the war. Modifications of the BM-31-12 tried to give the nickname Andryusha, but it did not take root, therefore, at least until 1945, any domestic MLRS systems were called Katyushas.

Characteristics of the BM-13 installation

A multiple rocket launcher BM 13 Katyusha was created to destroy large enemy concentrations, so the main technical and tactical characteristics were:

• mobility - the MLRS had to quickly turn around, fire several volleys and instantly change position until the enemy was destroyed;
• firepower - batteries from several installations were formed from the MP-13;
• low cost - a subframe was added to the design, which made it possible to assemble the artillery part of the MLRS at the factory and mount it on the chassis of any vehicle.

Thus, the weapon of victory was installed on railway, air and ground transport, and the cost of production decreased by at least 20%. The side and rear walls of the cabin were armored, on windshield protection plates were installed. The armor protected the gas pipeline and the fuel tank, which dramatically increased the "survivability" of equipment and the survivability of combat crews.

The guidance speed has increased due to the modernization of the rotary and lifting mechanisms, stability in combat and stowed position. Even in the deployed state, Katyusha could move over rough terrain within a few kilometers at low speed.

combat crew

To control the BM-13, a crew of at least 5 people, a maximum of 7 people was used:

• driver - moving the MLRS, deploying to a combat position;
• loaders - 2 - 4 fighters, placing shells on rails for a maximum of 10 minutes;
• gunner - providing aiming with lifting and turning mechanisms;
• gun commander - general management, interaction with other unit crews.

Since the BM Guards rocket mortar began to be produced off the assembly line already during the war, there was no ready-made structure for combat units. First, batteries were formed - 4 MP-13 installations and 1 anti-aircraft gun, then a division of 3 batteries.

In one volley of the regiment, the equipment and manpower of the enemy were destroyed on the territory of 70 - 100 hectares by an explosion of 576 shells fired within 10 seconds. According to directive 002490, the use of Katyushas less than a division was prohibited at the headquarters.

Armament

A salvo of Katyusha was carried out for 10 seconds with 16 shells, each of which had the following characteristics:

• caliber - 132 mm;
• weight - charge of glycerin powder 7.1 kg, explosive charge 4.9 kg, jet engine 21 kg, warhead 22 kg, projectile with fuse 42.5 kg;
• stabilizer blade span - 30 cm;
• projectile length - 1.4 m;
• acceleration - 500 m / s 2;
• speed - muzzle 70 m / s, combat 355 m / s;
• range - 8.5 km;
• funnel - 2.5 m in diameter maximum, 1 m deep maximum;
• damage radius - 10 m design 30 m real;
• deviation - 105 m in range, 200 m lateral.

M-13 shells were assigned the TS-13 ballistic index.

Launcher

When the war began, the Katyusha volley was fired from rail guides. Later they were replaced with honeycomb-type guides to increase the combat power of the MLRS, then spiral-type to increase the accuracy of fire.

To increase the accuracy, a special stabilizer device was first used. It was then replaced with spirally arranged nozzles that twisted the rocket during flight, reducing spread over the terrain.

Application history

In the summer of 1942, BM 13 volley fire fighting vehicles in the amount of three regiments and a reinforcement division became a mobile strike force on the Southern Front, helping to restrain the advance of the 1st enemy tank army near Rostov.

Around the same time, a portable version was made in Sochi - the "mountain Katyusha" for the 20th mountain rifle division. In the 62nd army, by mounting launchers on the T-70 tank, a MLRS division was created. The city of Sochi was defended from the shore by 4 trolleys on rails with M-13 installations.

During the Bryansk operation (1943), multiple launch rocket launchers were stretched along the entire front, allowing the Germans to be distracted for a flank attack. In July 1944, a simultaneous salvo of 144 BM-31 installations sharply reduced the number of accumulated forces of the Nazi units.

Local conflicts

Chinese troops used 22 MLRS during artillery preparation before the Battle of Triangular Hill during the Korean War in October 1952. Later, the BM-13 multiple rocket launchers, supplied until 1963 from the USSR, were used in Afghanistan by the government. Katyusha until recently remained in service in Cambodia.

Katyusha vs Vanyusha

Unlike the Soviet BM-13 installation, the German Nebelwerfer MLRS was actually a six-barreled mortar:

• a gun carriage from a 37 mm anti-tank gun was used as a frame;
• guides for shells are six 1.3 m barrels, combined by clips into blocks;
• the rotary mechanism provided a 45 degree elevation angle and a horizontal firing sector of 24 degrees;
• the combat installation relied on a folding stop and sliding carriage beds, the wheels were hung out.

The mortar was fired with turbojet rockets, the accuracy of which was ensured by the rotation of the hull within 1000 rpm. The German troops were armed with several mobile mortar installations on the half-track base of the Maultier armored personnel carrier with 10 barrels for 150 mm rockets. However, the entire German rocket artillery was created to solve a different problem - chemical warfare using chemical warfare agents.

For the period of 1941, the Germans had already created powerful poisonous substances Soman, Tabun, Zarin. However, in the Second World War, none of them was used, the fire was carried out exclusively with smoke, high-explosive and incendiary mines. The main part of the rocket artillery was mounted on the basis of towed gun carriages, which sharply reduced the mobility of units.

The accuracy of hitting the target with the German MLRS was higher than that of the Katyusha. However, Soviet weapons were suitable for massive strikes over large areas, and had a powerful psychological effect. When towing, Vanyusha's speed was limited to 30 km / h, after two volleys a change of position was made.

The Germans managed to capture the M-13 sample only in 1942, but this did not bring any practical benefit. The secret was in powder checkers based on smokeless powder based on nitroglycerin. It was not possible to reproduce the technology of its production in Germany; until the end of the war, its own rocket fuel formulation was used.

Katyusha modifications

Initially, the BM-13 installation was based on the ZiS-6 chassis, firing M-13 rockets from rail guides. Later, modifications of the MLRS appeared:

• BM-13N - Studebaker US6 was used as a chassis since 1943;
• BM-13NN - assembly on a ZiS-151 car;
• BM-13NM - chassis from ZIL-157, in service since 1954;
• BM-13NMM - since 1967 assembly on ZIL-131;
• BM-31 - projectile 310 mm in diameter, honeycomb-type guides;
• BM-31-12 - the number of guides has been increased to 12 pieces;
• BM-13 CH - spiral type guides;
• BM-8-48 - shells 82 mm, 48 guides;
• BM-8-6 - based on machine guns;
• BM-8-12 - on the chassis of motorcycles and arosan;
• BM30-4 t BM31-4 - ground-supported frames with 4 guides;
• BM-8-72, BM-8-24 and BM-8-48 - mounted on railway platforms.

Tanks T-40, later T-60, were equipped with mortar installations. They were placed on a tracked chassis after the turret was dismantled. The allies of the USSR supplied Austin, International GMC and Ford Mamon all-terrain vehicles under Lend-Lease, which were ideally suited for the chassis of installations used in mountainous conditions.

Several M-13s were mounted on KV-1 light tanks, but they were taken out of production too quickly. In the Carpathians, Crimea, on Malaya Zemlya, and then in China and Mongolia, North Korea applied torpedo boats with MLRS on board.

It is believed that the armament of the Red Army was 3374 Katyusha BM-13, of which 1157 on 17 types of non-standard chassis, 1845 pieces of equipment on Studebakers and 372 on ZiS-6 vehicles. Exactly half of the BM-8 and B-13 were lost irretrievably during the fighting (1400 and 3400 vehicles, respectively). Of the 1800 BM-31s produced, 100 pieces of equipment out of 1800 sets were lost.

From November 1941 to May 1945, the number of divisions increased from 45 to 519 units. These units belonged to the artillery reserve of the High Command of the Red Army.

Monuments BM-13

Currently, all military installations of the MLRS based on the ZiS-6 have been preserved exclusively in the form of memorials and monuments. They are placed in the CIS as follows:

• former NIITP (Moscow);
• "Military Hill" (Temryuk);
• Nizhny Novgorod Kremlin;
• Lebedin-Mikhailovka (Sumy region);
• monument in Kropyvnytskyi;
• memorial in Zaporozhye;
• Artillery Museum (St. Petersburg);
• Museum of the Great Patriotic War (Kyiv);
• Monument of Glory (Novosibirsk);
• entrance to Armyansk (Crimea);
• Sevastopol diorama (Crimea);
• 11 pavilion VKS Patriot (Kubinka);
• Novomoskovsky Museum (Tula region);
• memorial in Mtsensk;
• memorial complex in Izyum;
• Museum of the Battle of Korsun-Shevchensk (Cherkasy region);
• military museum in Seoul;
• museum in Belgorod;
• Museum of the Great Patriotic War in the village of Padikovo (Moscow region);
• OAO Kirov Machine Works May 1;
• memorial in Tula.

Used by Katyusha in several computer games, two combat vehicles remain in service with the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Thus, the installation of the Katyusha MLRS was a powerful psychological and rocket-artillery weapon during the Second World War. The armament was used for massive strikes against a large concentration of troops, at the time of the war it was superior to the counterparts of the enemy.

"Katyusha"- the popular name for rocket artillery combat vehicles BM-8 (with 82 mm shells), BM-13 (132 mm) and BM-31 (310 mm) during the Great Patriotic War. There are several versions of the origin of this name, the most likely of them is associated with the factory mark "K" of the manufacturer of the first combat vehicles BM-13 (Voronezh Plant named after the Comintern), as well as with the popular song of the same name at that time (music by Matvey Blanter, lyrics by Mikhail Isakovsky).
(Military Encyclopedia. Chairman of the Main Editorial Commission S.B. Ivanov. Military Publishing. Moscow. In 8 volumes -2004. ISBN 5 - 203 01875 - 8)

The BM-13 received its baptism of fire on July 14, 1941, when the battery fired the first salvo from all installations at the Orsha railway station, where a large amount of enemy manpower and military equipment was concentrated. As a result of a powerful fire strike simultaneously by 112 rockets, a fire glow rose over the station: enemy echelons were burning, ammunition was exploding. An hour and a half later, Flerov's battery fired a second salvo, this time at the crossing of the Orshitsa River, on the approaches to which a lot of German equipment and manpower had accumulated. As a result, the enemy's crossing was disrupted, and he failed to develop success in this direction.

The first experience of using a new missile weapon showed its high combat effectiveness, which was one of the reasons for its quick commissioning and equipping the Ground Forces with it.

The restructuring of the industry associated with the production of rocket weapons was carried out in a short time, a large number of enterprises were involved in its production (already in July-August 1941 - 214 factories), which ensured the supply of this military equipment to the troops. In August-September 1941, mass production of BM-8 combat mounts with 82-mm rockets was launched.

Simultaneously with the deployment of production, work continued on the creation of new and improvement of existing samples of rockets and launchers.

On July 30, 1941, a special design bureau (SKB) at the Moscow Kompressor plant began to work - the head design bureau for launchers, and the plant itself became the lead enterprise for their production. This SKB, under the leadership of the head and chief designer Vladimir Barmin, developed 78 samples of launchers during the war years various types mounted on cars, tractors, tanks, railway platforms, river and sea ​​ships. Thirty-six of them were put into service, mastered by industry and used in combat.

Much attention was paid to the production of rockets, the creation of new and the improvement of existing samples. The 82-mm M-8 rocket projectile underwent modernization, powerful high-explosive rocket projectiles were created: 132-mm M-20, 300-mm M-30 and M-31; extended range - M-13 DD and improved accuracy - M-13 UK and M-31 UK.

With the beginning of the war, special troops were created as part of the Armed Forces of the USSR for the combat use of missile weapons. These were rocket troops, but during the war they were called guards mortar units (GMCH), and later - rocket artillery. The first organizational form of the HMC was separate batteries and divisions.

By the end of the war, rocket artillery had 40 individual divisions(38 M-13 and 2 M-8), 115 regiments (96 M-13 and 19 M-8), 40 separate brigades (27 M-31 and 13 M-31-12) and 7 divisions - a total of 519 divisions in which numbered over 3,000 combat vehicles.

The legendary Katyushas took part in all major operations during the war.

The fate of the first separate experimental battery was cut short at the beginning of October 1941. After the baptism of fire near Orsha, the battery successfully operated in battles near Rudnya, Smolensk, Yelnya, Roslavl and Spas-Demensk. During the three months of hostilities, Flerov's battery not only inflicted considerable material damage on the Germans, it also contributed to raising the morale of our soldiers and officers, exhausted by continuous retreats.

The Nazis staged a real hunt for new weapons. But the battery did not stay long in one place - having fired a volley, it immediately changed its position. A tactical technique - a volley - a change of position - was widely used by Katyusha units during the war.

In early October 1941, as part of the grouping of troops on the Western Front, the battery ended up in the rear of the Nazi troops. When moving to the front line from the rear on the night of October 7, she was ambushed by the enemy near the village of Bogatyr, Smolensk region. Most of the battery personnel and Ivan Flerov died, having shot all the ammunition and blowing up the combat vehicles. Only 46 soldiers managed to get out of the encirclement. The legendary battalion commander and the rest of the fighters, who fulfilled their duty with honor to the end, were considered "missing." And only when it was possible to find documents from one of the army headquarters of the Wehrmacht, which reported what actually happened on the night of October 6-7, 1941 near the Smolensk village of Bogatyr, Captain Flerov was excluded from the list of missing persons.

For heroism, Ivan Flerov was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st degree in 1963, and in 1995 he was awarded the title of Hero Russian Federation posthumously.

In honor of the feat of the battery, a monument was erected in the city of Orsha and an obelisk near the city of Rudnya.

What the Russian "Katyusha" is, the German - "hell flames." The nickname that the Wehrmacht soldiers gave to the Soviet rocket artillery combat vehicle was fully justified. In just 8 seconds, a regiment of 36 BM-13 mobile units fired 576 shells at the enemy. A feature of salvo fire was that one blast wave was superimposed on another, the law of addition of impulses came into force, which greatly increased the destructive effect. Fragments of hundreds of mines, heated to 800 degrees, destroyed everything around. As a result, an area of ​​100 hectares turned into a scorched field, riddled with craters from shells. It was possible to escape only to those Nazis who, at the time of the salvo, were lucky enough to be in a securely fortified dugout. The Nazis called this pastime a "concert." The fact is that the Katyusha volleys were accompanied by a terrible roar, for this sound the Wehrmacht soldiers awarded rocket launchers with another nickname - "Stalin's organs".

See in the AiF.ru infographic what the BM-13 rocket artillery system looked like.

The birth of "Katyusha"

In the USSR, it was customary to say that the “Katyusha” was created not by any individual designer, but by the Soviet people. The best minds of the country really worked on the development of combat vehicles. The creation of rockets on smokeless powder in 1921 began employees of the Leningrad Gas Dynamics Laboratory N. Tikhomirov and V. Artemiev. In 1922, Artemiev was accused of espionage and the following year he was sent to serve his term in Solovki, in 1925 he returned to the laboratory.

In 1937, the RS-82 rockets, which were developed by Artemiev, Tikhomirov and who joined them G. Langemak, were adopted by the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Air Fleet. In the same year, in connection with the Tukhachevsky case, all those who worked on new types of weapons were subjected to a “cleansing” by the NKVD. Langemak was arrested as a German spy and shot in 1938. In the summer of 1939, aircraft rockets developed with his participation were successfully used in battles with Japanese troops on the Khalkhin Gol River.

From 1939 to 1941 employees of the Moscow Jet Research Institute I. Gvai,N. Galkovsky,A. Pavlenko,A. Popov worked on the creation of a self-propelled multiply charged rocket launcher. June 17, 1941 she took part in a demonstration of the latest models artillery weapons. The tests were attended People's Commissar of Defense Semyon Timoshenko, his Deputy Grigory Kulik and Chief of the General Staff Georgy Zhukov.

Self-propelled rocket launchers were shown last, and at first, trucks with iron guides fixed on top did not make any impression on the tired representatives of the commission. But the volley itself was remembered by them for a long time: according to eyewitnesses, the commanders, seeing the rising column of flame, fell into a stupor for a while. Timoshenko was the first to come to his senses, he sharply turned to his deputy: “Why were they silent and did not report about the presence of such weapons?” Kulik tried to justify himself by saying that this artillery system had simply not been fully developed until recently. On June 21, 1941, just a few hours before the start of the war, after inspecting rocket launchers, he decided to deploy their mass production.

The feat of Captain Flerov

The first commander of the first Katyusha battery was Captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov. The country's leadership chose Flerov to test top-secret weapons, among other things, because he showed himself well during the Soviet-Finnish war. At that time, he commanded a battery of the 94th howitzer artillery regiment, whose fire managed to break through. For his heroism in the battles near Lake Saunajärvi, Flerov was awarded the Order of the Red Star.

A full-fledged baptism of fire "Katyusha" took place on July 14, 1941. Rocket artillery vehicles under the leadership of Flerov fired volleys at the Orsha railway station, where a large number of enemy manpower, equipment and provisions were concentrated. Here is what he wrote about these volleys in his diary Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Franz Halder: “On July 14, near Orsha, the Russians used a hitherto unknown weapon. A fiery flurry of shells burned down the Orsha railway station, all trains with personnel and military equipment of the arrived military units. The metal melted, the earth burned.

Adolf Gitler I met the news about the appearance of a new Russian miracle weapon very painfully. chief Wilhelm Franz Canaris received a thrashing from the Fuhrer for the fact that his department had not yet stolen the drawings of rocket launchers. As a result, a real hunt was announced for the Katyushas, ​​to which chief saboteur of the Third Reich Otto Skorzeny.

Flerov's battery, meanwhile, continued to smash the enemy. After Orsha, successful operations near Yelnya and Roslavl followed. On October 7, Flerov and his Katyushas were surrounded in the Vyazma cauldron. The commander did everything to save the battery and break through to his own, but in the end he was ambushed near the village of Bogatyr. Caught in stalemate, and his fighters took an unequal battle. The Katyushas fired all the shells at the enemy, after which Flerov self-detonated the rocket launcher, the rest of the batteries followed the example of the commander. To take prisoners, as well as to receive an "iron cross" for the capture of top-secret equipment, the Nazis failed in that battle.

Flerov was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st class. On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Victory, the commander of the first Katyusha battery was awarded the title of Hero of Russia.

"Katyusha" against "donkey"

Along the front lines of the Great Patriotic War, the Katyusha often had to exchange salvos with the Nebelwerfer (German Nebelwerfer - “fog thrower”) - a German rocket launcher. For the characteristic sound that this six-barreled 150-mm mortar made when firing, Soviet soldiers nicknamed it "donkey". However, when the soldiers of the Red Army fought off enemy equipment, the contemptuous nickname was forgotten - in the service of our artillery, the trophy immediately turned into a “vanyusha”. True, the Soviet soldiers did not have tender feelings for this weapon. The fact is that the installation was not self-propelled, the 540-kilogram jet mortar had to be towed. When fired, his shells left a thick plume of smoke in the sky, which unmasked the positions of the artillerymen, who could immediately be covered by the fire of enemy howitzers.

Nebelwerfer. German rocket launcher. Photo: commons.wikimedia.org

The best designers of the Third Reich did not manage to design their analogue of the Katyusha until the end of the war. German developments either exploded during tests at the training ground, or did not differ in firing accuracy.

Why was the volley fire system nicknamed "Katyusha"?

Soldiers at the front liked to give names to weapons. For example, the M-30 howitzer was called "Mother", the ML-20 howitzer gun - "Emelka". BM-13, at first, was sometimes called "Raisa Sergeevna", as the front-line soldiers deciphered the abbreviation RS (rocket). Who and why was the first to call the rocket launcher "Katyusha" is not known for certain. The most common versions link the appearance of the nickname:

• with a song popular during the war years M. Blanter into words M. Isakovsky"Katyusha";
• with the letter "K" embossed on the installation frame. Thus, the plant named after the Comintern marked its products;
• with the name of the beloved of one of the fighters, which he wrote on his BM-13.

*Mannerheim line- a complex of defensive structures 135 km long on the Karelian Isthmus.

**Abwehr- (German Abwehr - "defense", "reflection") - the body of military intelligence and counterintelligence in Germany in 1919-1944. He was a member of the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

*** The last combat report of Captain Flerov: "7 Oct. 1941 9 p.m. We were surrounded by the village of Bogatyr - 50 km from Vyazma. We will hold on to the end. No exit. Getting ready to explode. Farewell, comrades."

Weapon of Victory - "Katyusha"

The first combat use of Katyushas is now quite well known: on July 14, 1941, three volleys were fired at the city of Rudnya, Smolensk region. This town with a population of only 9 thousand people is located on the Vitebsk Upland, on the Malaya Berezina River, 68 km from Smolensk, at the very border of Russia and Belarus. On that day, the Germans captured Rudnya, and a large number of military equipment.

At that moment, on the high steep western bank of the Malaya Berezina, the battery of Captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov appeared. From a western direction unexpected for the enemy, she hit the market square. As soon as the sound of the last volley ceased, one of the gunners named Kashirin loudly sang the song “Katyusha”, popular in those years, written in 1938 by Matvey Blanter to the words of Mikhail Isakovsky. Two days later, on July 16, at 15:15, Flerov's battery struck at the Orsha station, and an hour and a half later, at the German crossing over Orshitsa.

On that day, signal sergeant Andrey Sapronov was seconded to Flerov's battery, who provided communication between the battery and the command. As soon as the sergeant heard about how Katyusha went to the high, steep bank, he immediately remembered how they had just entered the same high and steep bank. launchers rockets, and, reporting to the headquarters of the 217th separate communications battalion of the 144th rifle division of the 20th army about Flerov's combat mission, the signalman Sapronov said:

"Katyusha sang perfectly."

In the photo: Commander of the first experimental Katyusha battery Captain Flerov. Killed October 7, 1941. But about who was the first to use the Katyusha against tanks, the opinions of historians differ - too often in the initial period of the war, the situation forced them to make such desperate decisions.

The systematic use of the BM-13 to destroy tanks is associated with the name of the commander of the 14th separate guards mortar division, Lieutenant Commander Moskvin. This unit, assembled from military sailors, was originally called the 200th OAS division and was armed with 130 mm stationary naval guns. Both guns and artillerymen performed well in the fight against tanks, but on October 9, 1941, by written order of the commander of the 32nd Army, Major General Vishnevsky, the 200th artillery division, having blown up stationary guns and ammunition for them, withdrew to the east, but October 12 fell into the Vyazemsky cauldron.

Having left the encirclement on October 26, the division was sent for reorganization, during which it would be re-equipped with Katyushas. The division was headed by the former commander of one of his batteries, senior lieutenant Moskvin, who was immediately awarded the rank of lieutenant commander. The 14th separate guards mortar division was included in the 1st Moscow separate detachment of sailors, which took part in the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow. In late May - early June 1942, during a period of relative calm, Moskvin summed up the experience of fighting enemy armored vehicles and found a new way to destroy them. He was supported by the GMCH inspector, Colonel Alexei Ivanovich Nesterenko. Arranged test firing. To give the guides a minimum elevation angle, the Katyushas drove their front wheels into the dug recesses, and the shells, leaving parallel to the ground, smashed the plywood models of the tanks. So what if you break plywood? skeptics doubted. - You still can't beat real tanks!

In the photo: shortly before death. There was some truth in these doubts, because the warhead of the M-13 shells was high-explosive fragmentation, and not armor-piercing. However, it turned out that when their fragments hit the engine part or gas tanks, a fire breaks out, the caterpillars are interrupted, the towers are jammed, and sometimes they are torn off the shoulder. The explosion of a 4.95-kilogram charge, even behind the armor, incapacitates the crew due to severe shell shock.

On July 22, 1942, in a battle north of Novocherkassk, the Moskvin division, which by that time had been transferred to the Southern Front and included in the 3rd Rifle Corps, destroyed 11 tanks with two volleys of direct fire - 1.1 per installation, while a good result for the anti-tank division out of 18 guns, it was considered the defeat of two or three enemy tanks.

Often, the mortar guards were the only force capable of rendering the enemy organized resistance. This forced the front commander R.Ya. Malinovsky, on July 25, 1942, on the basis of such units, the Mobile Mechanized Group (PMG) headed by the commander of the MCH A.I. Nesterenko. It included three regiments and a BM-13 battalion, the 176th Rifle Division mounted on cars, a consolidated tank battalion, anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery battalions There were no such units either before or after that.

At the end of July, near the village of Mechetinskaya, the PMG collided with the main forces of the 1st German Panzer Army, Colonel General Ewald Kleist. Intelligence reported that a column of tanks and motorized infantry was moving, - Moskvin reported. - We chose a position near the road so that the batteries could fire at the same time. Motorcyclists appeared, followed by cars and tanks. The column was covered with battery volleys to the full depth, the wrecked and smoking cars stopped, tanks flew at them like blind men and caught fire themselves. The advance of the enemy along this road was suspended.

Several such strikes forced the Germans to change tactics. They left reserves of fuel and ammunition in the rear and moved in small groups: in front of 15-20 tanks, followed by trucks with infantry. This slowed down the pace of the offensive, but created the threat of outflanking our PMG. In response to this threat, ours created their own small groups, each of which included a Katyusha division, a motorized rifle company, and anti-aircraft and anti-tank batteries. One of these groups - the group of Captain Puzik, created on the basis of the 269th division of the 49th gmp, using the Moskvin method, destroyed 15 enemy tanks and 35 vehicles in two days of fighting near Peschanokopskaya and Belaya Glina.

The advance of enemy tanks and motorized infantry was suspended. The regiments of the 176th Infantry Division took up defensive positions along the ridge of the hills at the turn of Belaya Glina and Razvilnoye. The front has temporarily stabilized.

observation method invented Captain-Lieutenant Moskvin. Not a single frontal attack by enemy tanks, and even more so by motorized infantry against the volley fire of guards mortar units, reached the goal. Only flanking detours and strikes forced the mobile group to withdraw to other lines. That's why german tanks and motorized infantry began to accumulate in the folds of the terrain, with a false attack they provoked a volley of BM-13s, and while they were reloading, which took five to six minutes, they made a throw. If the division did not respond to a false attack or fired with one installation, the Germans did not leave shelters, waiting for the Katyushas to use up their ammunition. In response, Lieutenant Commander Moskvin applied his own method of adjusting fire. Climbing to the top of the guide trusses, Moskvin observed the area from this height.

The correction method proposed by Moskvin was recommended to other units, and soon the schedule for the German offensive in the Caucasus was disrupted. A few more days of fighting - and the word "tank" could be removed from the name of the 1st Panzer Army. The losses of the mortar guards were minimal.

At first, the guardsmen fired on tanks from the slopes of the hills facing the enemy, but when our troops retreated to the Salsky steppes during the Battle of the Caucasus, the hills ended, and on the plain the Katyusha could not fire direct fire, but dig a corresponding hole under fire approaching enemy tanks was not always possible.

A way out of this situation was found on August 3 in the battle, which was accepted by the battery of senior lieutenant Koifman from the 271st division of captain Kashkin. She took up firing positions south of the farm. Soon, the observers noticed that tanks and motorized infantry of the enemy approached the village of Nikolaevskaya. The combat vehicles were aimed at the target, which was well observed and was in the reachable zone. A few minutes later, groups of tanks began to leave the village and descend into the hollow. Obviously, the Germans decided to covertly approach the battery and attack it. This evasive maneuver was first noticed by the guards, Private Levin. The battery commander ordered the flank installation to be deployed towards the tanks. However, the tanks had already entered the dead zone, and even with the smallest angle of inclination of the RS-132 guide trusses, they would have flown over them. And then, to reduce the aiming angle, Lieutenant Alexei Bartenyev ordered the driver Fomin to drive his front wheels into the trench trench.

When the nearest tank was about two hundred meters away, the guardsmen Arzhanov, Kuznetsov, Suprunov and Khilich opened fire with direct fire. Sixteen shells exploded. The tanks were shrouded in smoke. Two of them stopped, the rest quickly turned around and retreated into the beam at high speed. There were no new attacks. The 19-year-old lieutenant Barteniev, who invented this method of firing, died in the same battle, but since then the mortar guards began to use infantry trenches to make the guides position parallel to the ground.

In early August, the movement of Army Group A slowed down, which created a threat to the right flank of Army Group B, marching on Stalingrad. Therefore, in Berlin, the 40th Panzer Corps of Group B was redirected to the Caucasus, which was supposed to break into Stalingrad from the south. He turned to the Kuban, made a raid on the Rural steppes (bypassing the SMG coverage area) and ended up on the outskirts of Armavir and Stavropol.

Because of this, the commander of the North Caucasian Front, Budyonny, was forced to split the PMG in two: one part of it was thrown into the Armavir-Stavropol direction, the other covered Krasnodar and Maykop. For the battles near Maykop (but not for victories in the steppes), Moskvin was awarded the Order of Lenin. A year later, he will be mortally wounded near the village of Krymskaya. Now this is the same Krymsk, which suffered from the recent flood.

Already after the death of Moskvin, under the impression of his experience in fighting enemy tanks with the help of Katyushas, ​​the cumulative shells RSB-8 and RSB-13 were created. Such shells took the armor of any of the then tanks. However, they rarely fell into the regiments of Katyushas - at the base they were supplied with rocket launchers of Il-2 attack aircraft.

THE LEGENDARY KATYUSHA IS 75!

June 30, 2016 will mark the 75th anniversary of the decision State Committee defense, a design bureau was created to produce the legendary Katyushas. This rocket launcher with its powerful volleys terrified the enemy and decided the outcome of many battles of the Great Patriotic War, including the battle for Moscow in October-December 1941. At that time, the BM-13 combat vehicles went to the defensive lines directly from the Moscow factory shops.

Multiple launch rocket systems fought on different fronts, from Stalingrad to Berlin. At the same time, the Katyusha is a weapon with a distinctly Moscow “pedigree”, rooted in pre-revolutionary times. Back in 1915, a graduate of the Faculty of Chemistry of Moscow University, engineer and inventor Nikolai Tikhomirov patented a "self-propelled mine of reactive action", i.e. rocket projectile applicable in water and in the air. The conclusion on the security certificate was signed by the famous N.E. Zhukovsky, at that time the chairman of the department of inventions of the Moscow military-industrial committee.

While the examinations were going on, the October Revolution happened. The new government, however, recognized the great defense significance of Tikhomirov's rocket. To develop self-propelled mines in Moscow in 1921, the Gas Dynamics Laboratory was created, which Tikhomirov headed: for the first six years it worked in the capital, then moved to Leningrad and was located, by the way, in one of the ravelins of the Peter and Paul Fortress.

Nikolai Tikhomirov died in 1931 and was buried in Moscow at the Vagankovsky cemetery. An interesting fact: in his other, “civilian” life, Nikolai Ivanovich designed equipment for sugar refineries, distilleries and oil mills.

The next stage of work on the future Katyusha also took place in the capital. On September 21, 1933, the Jet Research Institute was established in Moscow. Friedrich Zander stood at the origins of the institute, and S.P. was the deputy director. Korolev. RNII maintained a close relationship with K.E. Tsiolkovsky. As you can see, almost all the pioneers of Russian rocket technology of the twentieth century were the fathers of the guards mortar.

One of the prominent names on this list is Vladimir Barmin. At the time when his work on a new jet weapon began, the future academician and professor was a little over 30 years old. Shortly before the war, he was appointed chief designer.

Who could have foreseen in 1940 that this young refrigeration engineer would become one of the creators of the world-famous weapons of World War II?

On June 30, 1941, Vladimir Barmin retrained as rocketmen. On this day, a special design bureau was created at the plant, which became the main "think tank" for the production of Katyushas. Recall: work on the rocket launcher went on throughout the pre-war years and ended literally on the eve of the Nazi invasion. The People's Commissariat of Defense was looking forward to this miracle weapon, but not everything went smoothly.

In 1939, the first samples of aviation rockets were successfully used during the battles at Khalkhin Gol. In March 1941, successful field tests of the BM-13 installations (with a high-explosive fragmentation projectile M-13 of 132 mm caliber) were carried out, and already on June 21, just a few hours before the war, a decree was signed on their mass production. Already on the eighth day of the war, the production of Katyushas for the front began at the Kompressor.

On July 14, 1941, the first Separate Experimental Battery of Field Rocket Artillery of the Red Army was formed, led by Captain Ivan Flerov, armed with seven combat mounts. On July 14, 1941, the battery fired a salvo at the railway junction of the city of Orsha captured by the Nazi troops. Soon she successfully fought in battles near Rudnya, Smolensk, Yelnya, Roslavl and Spas-Demensk.

In early October 1941, while moving to the front line from the rear, Flerov's battery was ambushed by the enemy near the village of Bogatyr (Smolensk region). Having shot all the ammunition and blowing up the combat vehicles, most of the fighters and their commander Ivan Flerov died.

219 Katyusha divisions participated in the battles for Berlin. Since the autumn of 1941, these units were given the title of Guards during the formation. Since the battle for Moscow, not a single major offensive operation of the Red Army has been complete without the fire support of the Katyushas. The first batches of them were completely manufactured at the capital's enterprises in those days when the enemy stood at the walls of the city. According to production veterans and historians, it was a real labor feat.

When the war began, it was the Compressor specialists who were instructed to arrange the production of Katyushas as soon as possible. It was previously planned that these combat vehicles would be produced by the Voronezh plant named after. Comintern, however, the difficult situation on the fronts forced them to make adjustments to this plan.

At the front, Katyusha represented a significant fighting force and was able to single-handedly decide the outcome of a whole battle. 16 conventional heavy guns from the times of the Great Patriotic War could fire 16 high-powered projectiles in 2-3 minutes. In addition, it takes a lot of time to move such a number of conventional guns from one firing position to another. "Katyusha", mounted on a truck, it takes a few minutes. So the uniqueness of the installations was in their high firepower and mobility. The noise effect also played a certain psychological role: it was not for nothing that the Germans, because of the strongest rumble that accompanied the volleys of the Katyusha, called it the “Stalinist organ”.

The work was complicated by the fact that in the autumn of 1941 many Moscow enterprises were being evacuated. Part of the workshops and the "Compressor" itself was relocated to the Urals. But all the capacities for the production of Katyushas remained in the capital. There was a shortage of skilled workers (they went to the front and the militia), equipment, and materials.

Many Moscow enterprises in those days worked in close cooperation with the Compressor, producing everything necessary for the Katyushas. Machine-building plant them. Vladimir Ilyich made rocket shells. Carriage Repair Plant. Voitovich and the Krasnaya Presnya plant manufactured parts for launchers. Precise movements were supplied by the 1st watch factory.

All of Moscow united in a difficult hour to create a unique weapon capable of bringing Victory closer. And the role of "Katyusha" in the defense of the capital is not forgotten by the descendants of the winners: several museums in Moscow and on the territory of the "Compressor" plant have monuments to the legendary Guards mortar. And many of its creators were awarded high state awards during the war.

The history of the creation of "Katyusha"

The list of contract work carried out by the Jet Research Institute (RNII) for the Armored Directorate (ABTU), the final settlement of which was to be carried out in the first quarter of 1936, mentions contract No. 251618s dated January 26, 1935 - a prototype rocket launcher on the BT-5 tank with 10 missiles. Thus, it can be considered proven that the idea of ​​creating a mechanized multiply charged installation in the third decade of the 20th century did not appear at the end of the 30s, as previously stated, but at least at the end of the first half of this period. Confirmation of the fact of using vehicles for firing rockets in general was also found in the book "Rockets, Their Design and Application", authored by G.E. Langemak and V.P. Glushko, released in 1935. At the conclusion of this book, in particular, the following is written: "The main area of ​​​​application of powder rockets is the armament of light combat vehicles, like airplanes, small ships, vehicles of various types, and finally escort artillery."

In 1938, employees of Research Institute No. 3, by order of the Artillery Directorate, carried out work on object No. 138 - a gun for firing 132 mm chemical projectiles. It was required to make non-rapid machines (such as a pipe). Under an agreement with the Artillery Directorate, it was necessary to design and manufacture an installation with a pedestal and a lifting and turning mechanism. One machine was made, which was later recognized as not meeting the requirements. At the same time, Research Institute No. 3 developed a mechanized salvo rocket launcher mounted on a modified chassis of a ZIS-5 truck with an ammunition load of 24 rounds. According to other data from the archives of the State Research Center of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Center of Keldysh” (former Research Institute No. 3), “2 mechanized installations were made on vehicles. They passed factory shooting tests at the Sofrinsky Artfield and partial field tests at the Ts.V.Kh.P. R.K.K.A. with positive results." On the basis of factory tests, it could be argued that the flight range of the RCS (depending on the specific gravity of the HE) at a firing angle of 40 degrees is 6000 - 7000m, Vd = (1/100)X and Wb = (1/70)X, the useful volume of the OV in the projectile - 6.5 l, metal consumption per 1 liter of OM - 3.4 kg / l, the radius of dispersion of OM when the projectile breaks on the ground is 15-20 l, the maximum time required to fire the entire ammunition load of the vehicle in 24 shells is 3-4 sec.

The mechanized rocket launcher was designed to provide a chemical raid with rocket chemical projectiles /SOV and NOV/ 132 mm with a capacity of 7 liters. The installation made it possible to fire at the squares both with single shots and in a volley of 2 - 3 - 6 - 12 and 24 shots. “The installations, combined into batteries of 4-6 vehicles, are a very mobile and powerful means of chemical attack at a distance of up to 7 kilometers.”

The installation and a 132 mm chemical rocket projectile for 7 liters of poisonous substance successfully passed field and state tests; its adoption was planned for service in 1939. The table of practical accuracy of rocket-chemical projectiles indicated the data of a mechanized vehicle installation for a surprise attack by firing chemical, high-explosive fragmentation, incendiary, lighting, and other rocket projectiles. I-th option without aiming device - the number of shells of one volley is 24, the total weight of the poisonous substance of the release of one volley is 168 kg, 6 vehicle installations replace one hundred and twenty howitzers of 152 mm caliber, the vehicle reload speed is 5-10 minutes. 24 shots, the number of service personnel - 20-30 people. on 6 cars. In artillery systems - 3 Artillery regiments. II-version with control device. Data not specified.

From December 8, 1938 to February 4, 1939, unguided rockets of 132 mm caliber and automatic installations were tested. However, the installation was submitted for testing unfinished and did not withstand them: a large number of failures were found during the descent of rockets due to the imperfection of the corresponding units of the installation; the process of loading the launcher was inconvenient and time consuming; the swivel and lifting mechanisms did not provide easy and smooth operation, and the sights did not provide the required pointing accuracy. In addition, the ZIS-5 truck had limited cross-country ability. (See the gallery Testing an automobile rocket launcher on the ZIS-5 chassis, designed by NII-3, drawing No. 199910 for launching 132 mm rockets. (Testing time: from 12/8/38 to 02/4/39).

The letter of award for the successful testing in 1939 of a mechanized installation for a chemical attack (outgoing NII No. 3, number 733s dated May 25, 1939 from the director of NII No. 3 Slonimer addressed to the People's Commissar of Munitions comrade Sergeev I.P.) indicates the following participants of the work: Kostikov A.G. - Deputy technical director parts, installation initiator; Gvai I.I. - lead designer; Popov A. A. - design engineer; Isachenkov - assembly mechanic; Pobedonostsev Yu. - prof. advising object; Luzhin V. - engineer; Schwartz L.E. - engineer .

In 1938, the Institute designed the construction of a special chemical motorized team for salvo firing of 72 shots.

In a letter dated February 14, 1939, to Comrade Matveev (V.P.K. of the Defense Committee under the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.) signed by the Director of Research Institute No. 3 Slonimer and Deputy. Director of Research Institute No. 3, military engineer of the 1st rank Kostikov says: “For ground troops, the experience of a chemical mechanized installation should be used for:

• the use of rocket high-explosive fragmentation shells in order to create massive fire on the squares;
• use of incendiary, lighting and propaganda projectiles;
• development chemical projectile caliber 203mm and a mechanized installation providing twice the chemical power and firing range compared to the existing one.

In 1939, the Scientific Research Institute No. 3 developed two versions of experimental installations on a modified chassis of a ZIS-6 truck for launching 24 and 16 unguided rockets of 132 mm caliber. Installation of the II sample differed from the installation of the I sample in the longitudinal arrangement of the guides.

The ammunition load of the mechanized installation /on the ZIS-6/ for launching chemical and high-explosive fragmentation shells of 132mm caliber /MU-132/ was 16 rocket shells. The firing system provided for the possibility of firing both single shells and a salvo of the entire ammunition load. The time required to produce a volley of 16 missiles is 3.5 - 6 seconds. The time required to reload ammunition is 2 minutes by a team of 3 people. The weight of the structure with a full ammunition load of 2350 kg was 80% of the calculated load of the vehicle.

Field tests of these installations were carried out from September 28 to November 9, 1939 on the territory of the Artillery Research Experimental Range (ANIOP, Leningrad) (see photos taken at ANIOP). The results of field tests showed that the installation of the 1st sample, due to technical imperfections, cannot be admitted to military tests. Installation of the II sample, which also had a number of serious shortcomings, according to the members of the commission, could be admitted to military tests after significant design changes were made. Tests showed that when firing, the installation of the II sample sways and the knockdown of the elevation angle reaches 15 ″ 30 ′, which increases the dispersion of shells, when loading the lower row of guides, the projectile fuse can hit the truss structure. Since the end of 1939, the main attention has been focused on improving the layout and design of the II sample installation and eliminating the shortcomings identified during field tests. In this regard, it is necessary to note the characteristic directions in which the work was carried out. On the one hand, this is a further development of the installation of the II sample in order to eliminate its shortcomings, on the other hand, the creation of a more advanced installation, different from the installation of the II sample. In the tactical and technical assignment for the development of a more advanced installation (“modernized installation for the RS” in the terminology of the documents of those years), signed by Yu.P. Pobedonostsev on December 7, 1940, it was envisaged: to make structural improvements to the lifting and turning device, to increase the angle of horizontal guidance, to simplify the sighting device. It was also envisaged to increase the length of the guides to 6000 mm instead of the existing 5000 mm, as well as the possibility of firing unguided rockets of 132 mm and 180 mm caliber. At a meeting at the technical department of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, it was decided to increase the length of the guides even up to 7000 mm. The deadline for the delivery of the drawings was scheduled for October 1941. Nevertheless, in order to conduct various kinds of tests in the workshops of Research Institute No. 3 in 1940 - 1941, several (in addition to the existing) modernized installations for the RS were manufactured. The total number in different sources indicates different: in some - six, in others - seven. In the data of the archive of Research Institute No. 3, as of January 10, 1941, there are data on 7 pieces. (from the document on the readiness of object 224 (topic 24 of the superplan, an experimental series of automatic installations for firing RS-132 mm (in the amount of seven pieces. See UANA GAU letter No. 668059) Based on the available documents, the source claims that there were eight installations, but in different time. On February 28, 1941 there were six of them.

The thematic plan of research and development work for 1940 of the Research Institute No. 3 NKB provided for the transfer to the customer - the AU of the Red Army - six automatic installations for the RS-132mm. The report on the implementation of pilot orders in production for the month of November 1940 at Research Institute No. 3 of the National Design Bureau indicates that with a delivery batch to the customer of six installations, by November 1940, the OTK received 5 units, and the military representative - 4 units.

In December 1939, Research Institute No. 3 was tasked with short period time to develop a powerful rocket projectile and a rocket launcher to carry out the tasks of destroying long-term enemy defenses on the Mannerheim Line. The result of the work of the institute team was a feathered rocket with a range of 2-3 km with a powerful high-explosive warhead with a ton explosive and a four-rail mount on a T-34 tank or on a sled towed by tractors or tanks. In January 1940, the installation and rockets were sent to the combat area, but soon it was decided to conduct field tests before using them in combat. The installation with shells was sent to the Leningrad scientific and test artillery range. Soon the war with Finland ended. The need for powerful high-explosive shells disappeared. Further installation and projectile work was discontinued.

Department 2n Research Institute No. 3 in 1940 was asked to perform work on the following objects:

• Object 213 - An electrified installation on a VMS for firing lighting and signaling. R.S. calibers 140-165mm. (Note: for the first time, an electric drive for a rocket artillery combat vehicle was used in the design of the BM-21 combat vehicle of the M-21 Field Rocket System).
• Object 214 - Installation on a 2-axle trailer with 16 guides, length l = 6mt. for R.S. calibers 140-165mm. (alteration and adaptation of object 204)
• Object 215 - Electrified installation on the ZIS-6 with a portable supply of R.S. and with a wide range of aiming angles.
• Object 216 - Trailer-mounted PC charging box
• Object 217 - Installation on a 2-axle trailer for firing long-range missiles
• Object 218 - Anti-aircraft moving installation for 12 pcs. R.S. caliber 140 mm with electric drive
• Object 219 - Fixed anti-aircraft installation for 50-80 R.S. caliber 140 mm.
• Object 220 - Command installation on a ZIS-6 vehicle with an electric current generator, aiming and firing control panel
• Object 221 - Universal installation on a 2-axle trailer for possible polygon firing of RS calibers from 82 to 165 mm.
• Object 222 - Mechanized installation for escorting tanks
• Object 223 - Introduction to the industry of mass production of mechanized installations.

In a letter, acting Director of Research Institute No. 3 Kostikov A.G. on the possibility of representation in K.V.Sh. under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR data for the award of the Comrade Stalin Prize, based on the results of work in the period from 1935 to 1940, the following participants in the work are indicated:

• rocket automatic installation for a sudden, powerful artillery and chemical attack on the enemy with the help of rocket shells - Authors according to the application certificate of the GB PRI No. 3338 9.II.40g (author's certificate No. 3338 of February 19, 1940) Kostikov Andrey Grigorievich, Gvai Ivan Isidorovich, Aborenkov Vasily Vasilievich.
• tactical and technical justification of the scheme and design of the auto-installation - designers: Pavlenko Alexey Petrovich and Galkovsky Vladimir Nikolaevich.
• testing rocket high-explosive fragmentation chemical shells of caliber 132 mm. - Shvarts Leonid Emilievich, Artemiev Vladimir Andreevich, Shitov Dmitry Alexandrovich.

The basis for submitting Comrade Stalin for the Prize was also the Decision of the Technical Council of the Research Institute No. 3 of the National Design Bureau dated December 26, 1940.

№1923

scheme 1, scheme 2

galleries

On April 25, 1941, tactical and technical requirements No. 1923 were approved for the modernization of a mechanized installation for firing rockets.

On June 21, 1941, the installation was demonstrated to the leaders of the CPSU (6) and the Soviet government, and on the same day, just a few hours before the start of World War II, a decision was made to urgently expand the production of M-13 rockets and M-13 installations (see Fig. scheme 1, scheme 2). The production of M-13 installations was organized at the Voronezh plant named after. Comintern and at the Moscow plant "Compressor". One of the main enterprises for the production of rockets was the Moscow plant. Vladimir Ilyich.

During the war, the production of component installations and shells and the transition from mass production to mass production required the creation of a broad structure of cooperation on the territory of the country (Moscow, Leningrad, Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg), Nizhny Tagil, Krasnoyarsk, Kolpino, Murom, Kolomna and, possibly, , other). It required the organization of a separate military acceptance of guards mortar units. For more information about the production of shells and their elements during the war years, see our gallery website (further on the links below).

According to various sources, in late July - early August, the formation of Guards mortar units began (see:). In the first months of the war, the Germans already had data on new Soviet weapons (see:).

In September-October 1941, on the instructions of the Main Directorate of Armament of the Guards Mortar Units, the M-13 installation was developed on the chassis of the STZ-5 NATI tractor modified for mounting. The development was entrusted to the Voronezh plant. Comintern and SKB at the Moscow plant "Compressor". SKB performed the development more efficiently, and prototypes were manufactured and tested in a short time. As a result, the installation was put into service and put into mass production.

In the December days of 1941, the Design Bureau, on the instructions of the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army, developed, in particular, a 16-charger installation on an armored railway platform for the defense of the city of Moscow. The installation was a throwing installation of the M-13 serial installation on a modified chassis of a ZIS-6 truck with a modified base. (for more details on other works of this period and the period of the war as a whole, see: and).

At a technical meeting in the SKB on April 21, 1942, it was decided to develop a normalized installation, known as the M-13N (after the war BM-13N). The aim of the development was to create the most advanced installation, the design of which would take into account all the changes made earlier to various modifications of the M-13 installation and the creation of such a throwing installation that could be manufactured and assembled on a stand and assembled and assembled on a chassis cars of any brand without major revision of technical documentation, as was the case before. The goal was achieved by dismembering the M-13 installation into separate units. Each node was considered as an independent product with an index assigned to it, after which it could be used as a borrowed product in any installation.

During the development of components and parts for the normalized BM-13N combat installation, the following were obtained:

• increase in the area of ​​fire by 20%
• reduction of efforts on the handles of guidance mechanisms by one and a half to two times;
• doubling the vertical aiming speed;
• increasing the survivability of the combat installation due to the reservation of the rear wall of the cabin; gas tank and gas pipeline;
• increasing the stability of the installation in the stowed position by introducing a support bracket to disperse the load on the side members of the vehicle;
• increase in the operational reliability of the unit (simplification of the support beam, rear axle, etc.;
• a significant reduction in the amount of welding work, machining, the exclusion of bending truss rods;
• reduction in the weight of the installation by 250 kg, despite the introduction of armor on the rear wall of the cab and gas tank;
• reduction of production time for the manufacture of the installation by assembling the artillery unit separately from the chassis of the vehicle and mounting the installation on the chassis of the vehicle using mounting clamps, which made it possible to eliminate drilling holes in the spars;
• reduction by several times of the idle time of the chassis of vehicles that arrived at the plant for installation of the installation;
• reduction in the number of fastener sizes from 206 to 96, as well as the number of parts: in the swing frame - from 56 to 29, in the truss from 43 to 29, in the support frame - from 15 to 4, etc. The use of normalized components and products in the design of the installation made it possible to apply a high-performance flow method for the assembly and installation of the installation.

The launcher was mounted on a modified chassis of a Studebaker series truck (see photo) with a 6 × 6 wheel arrangement, which was supplied under Lend-Lease. The normalized M-13N installation was adopted by the Red Army in 1943. The installation became the main model used until the end of the Great Patriotic War. Other types of modified truck chassis of foreign brands were also used.

At the end of 1942, V.V. Aborenkov suggested adding two additional pins to the M-13 projectile in order to launch it from dual guides. For this purpose, a prototype was made, which was a serial M-13 installation, in which the swinging part (guides and truss) was replaced. The guide consisted of two steel strips placed on edge, in each of them a groove was cut for the drive pin. Each pair of strips was fastened opposite each other with grooves in a vertical plane. The field tests carried out did not give the expected improvement in the accuracy of fire and the work was stopped.

At the beginning of 1943, SKB specialists carried out work on the creation of installations with a normalized throwing installation of the M-13 installation on the modified chassis of Chevrolet and ZIS-6 trucks. During January - May 1943, a prototype was made on a modified Chevrolet truck chassis and field tests were carried out. The installations were adopted by the Red Army. However, due to the presence of a sufficient number of chassis of these brands, they did not go into mass production.

In 1944, Special Design Bureau specialists developed the M-13 installation on the armored chassis of the ZIS-6 car modified for the installation of a throwing installation for launching M-13 shells. For this purpose, the normalized “beam” guides of the M-13N installation were shortened to 2.5 meters and assembled into a package on two spars. The truss was made shortened from pipes in the form of a pyramidal frame, turned upside down, served mainly as a support for attaching the screw of the lifting mechanism. The elevation angle of the guide package was changed from the cab using handwheels and a cardan shaft for the vertical guidance mechanism. A prototype was made. However, due to the weight of the armor, the front axle and springs of the ZIS-6 vehicle were overloaded, as a result of which further installation work was stopped.

In late 1943 - early 1944, SKB specialists and rocket developers were asked to improve the accuracy of fire of 132 mm caliber shells. To give rotational motion, the designers introduced tangential holes into the design of the projectile along the diameter of the head working belt. The same solution was used in the design of the regular M-31 projectile, and was proposed for the M-8 projectile. As a result of this, the accuracy indicator increased, but there was a decrease in the indicator in terms of flight range. Compared to the standard M-13 projectile, whose flight range was 8470 m, the range of the new projectile, which received the M-13UK index, was 7900 m. Despite this, the projectile was adopted by the Red Army.

In the same period, specialists from NII-1 (Lead Designer Bessonov V.G.) developed and then tested the M-13DD projectile. The projectile had the best accuracy in terms of accuracy, but they could not be fired from standard M-13 installations, since the projectile had a rotational motion and, when launched from ordinary standard guides, destroyed them, tearing off the lining from them. To a lesser extent, this also took place during the launch of M-13UK projectiles. The M-13DD projectile was adopted by the Red Army at the end of the war. Mass production of the projectile was not organized.

At the same time, SKB specialists began research design studies and experimental work to improve the accuracy of firing of M-13 and M-8 rockets by working out guides. It was based on a new principle of launching rockets and ensuring that they were strong enough to fire the M-13DD and M-20 projectiles. Since giving rotation to feathered rocket unguided projectiles in the initial segment of their flight trajectory improved accuracy, the idea was born to impart rotation to projectiles on guides without drilling tangential holes in the projectiles, which consume part of the engine power to rotate them and thereby reduce their flight range. This idea led to the creation of spiral guides. The design of the spiral guide has taken the form of a trunk formed by four spiral bars, of which three are smooth steel pipes, and the fourth, the leading one, is made of a steel square with selected grooves forming an H-shaped section profile. The bars were welded to the legs of the annular clips. In the breech there was a lock to hold the projectile in the guide and electrical contacts. A special equipment was created for bending guide rods in a spiral, having different angles of twisting along their length and welding guide shafts. Initially, the installation had 12 guides rigidly connected into four cassettes (three guides per cassette). Prototypes of the 12-charger M-13-SN were developed and manufactured. However, sea trials showed that the chassis of the car was overloaded, and it was decided to remove two guides from the upper cassettes from the installation. The launcher was mounted on a modified chassis of a Studebeker off-road truck. It consisted of a set of rails, a truss, a swing frame, a subframe, a sight, vertical and horizontal guidance mechanisms, and electrical equipment. In addition to cassettes with guides and farms, all other nodes were unified with the corresponding nodes of the normalized M-13N combat installation. With the help of the M-13-SN installation, it was possible to launch M-13, M-13UK, M-20 and M-13DD shells of 132 mm caliber. Significantly received best performance in terms of accuracy of fire: with M-13 shells - 3.2 times, M-13UK - 1.1 times, M-20 - 3.3 times, M-13DD - 1.47 times). With the improvement in the accuracy of firing with M-13 rocket projectiles, the flight range did not decrease, as was the case when firing M-13UK shells from M-13 installations that had beam-type guides. There was no need to manufacture M-13UK shells, complicated by drilling in the engine case. The M-13-CH installation was simpler, less laborious and cheaper to manufacture. A number of labor-intensive machine work has disappeared: gouging long guides, drilling a large number of rivet holes, riveting linings to guides, turning, calibrating, manufacturing and threading spars and nuts for them, complex machining of locks and lock boxes, etc. Prototypes were manufactured at the Moscow plant "Kompressor" (No. 733) and were subjected to ground and sea trials, which ended with good results. After the end of the war, the M-13-SN installation in 1945 passed military tests with good results. Due to the fact that the modernization of the M-13 type shells was coming, the installation was not put into service. After the 1946 series, on the basis of the order of the NKOM No. 27 dated 10/24/1946, the installation was discontinued. However, in 1950 a Brief Guide to the BM-13-SN Combat Vehicle was issued.

After the end of the Great Patriotic War, one of the directions for the development of rocket artillery was the use of throwing installations developed during the war for mounting on modified types of domestic-made chassis. Several options were created based on the installation of the M-13N on the modified truck chassis ZIS-151 (see photo), ZIL-151 (see photo), ZIL-157 (see photo), ZIL-131 (see photo) .

Installations of the M-13 type after the war were exported to different countries. One of them was China (see photo from the military parade on the occasion of the National Day of 1956, held in Beijing (Beijing) .

In 1959, when working on a projectile for the future M-21 Field Rocket System, the developers were interested in the issue of technical documentation for the production of the ROFS M-13. This is what was written in a letter to the Deputy Director for Research at NII-147 (now FSUE GNPP Splav (Tula), signed by Chief Engineer of Plant No. 63 of the SSNH Toporov (State Plant No. 63 of the Sverdlovsk Economic Council, 22.VII.1959 No. 1959с): “In response to your request for No. 3265 dated 3 / UII-59. about sending technical documentation for the production of ROFS M-13, I inform you that at present the plant does not produce this product, but the classification has been removed from the technical documentation.

The factory has obsolete tracing papers technological process mechanical processing of the product. The plant has no other documentation.

Due to the workload of the photocopier, the album of technical processes will be blue-printed and sent to you no earlier than in a month.

Compound:

Main cast:

• Installations M-13 (combat vehicles M-13, BM-13) (see. gallery images M-13).
• Main rockets M-13, M-13UK, M-13UK-1.

• Ammunition transport vehicles (transport vehicles).

The M-13 projectile (see diagram) consisted of two main parts: the warhead and the reactive part (jet powder engine). The warhead consisted of a body with a fuse point, the bottom of the warhead and an explosive charge with an additional detonator. The jet powder engine of the projectile consisted of a chamber, a nozzle cover that closed to seal the powder charge with two cardboard plates, a grate, a powder charge, an igniter and a stabilizer. On the outer part of both ends of the chamber there were two centering thickenings with guide pins screwed into them. The guide pins held the projectile on the guide of the combat vehicle until the shot and directed its movement along the guide. A powder charge of nitroglycerin gunpowder was placed in the chamber, consisting of seven identical cylindrical single-channel checkers. In the nozzle part of the chamber, the checkers rested on the grate. To ignite the powder charge, an igniter made of smoky gunpowder is inserted into the upper part of the chamber. Gunpowder was placed in a special case. Stabilization of the M-13 projectile in flight was carried out using the tail unit.

The flight range of the M-13 projectile reached 8470 m, but at the same time there was a very significant dispersion. In 1943, a modernized version of the rocket was developed, which received the designation M-13-UK (improved accuracy). To increase the accuracy of fire of the M-13-UK projectile, 12 tangentially located holes are made in the front centering thickening of the rocket part (see photo 1, photo 2), through which, during the operation of the rocket engine, part of the powder gases escape, causing the projectile to rotate. Although the range of the projectile was somewhat reduced (to 7.9 km), the improvement in accuracy led to a decrease in the dispersion area and to an increase in the density of fire by 3 times compared to the M-13 projectiles. In addition, the diameter of the critical section of the nozzle of the M-13-UK projectile is somewhat smaller than that of the M-13 projectile. The M-13-UK projectile was adopted by the Red Army in April 1944. The M-13UK-1 projectile with improved accuracy was equipped with flat stabilizers made of steel sheet.

Tactical and technical characteristics:

According to the English catalog Jane's Armor and Artillery 1995-1996, section Egypt, in the mid-90s of the XX century due to the impossibility of obtaining, in particular, shells for combat vehicles of the M-13 type, the Arab Organization for Industrialization (Arab Organization for Industrialization) engaged in the production of 132 mm caliber rockets. An analysis of the data presented below allows us to conclude that we are talking about a projectile of the M-13UK type.

The Arab Organization for Industrialization included Egypt, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, with most of the production facilities located in Egypt and with the main funding from the Gulf countries. Following the Egyptian-Israeli agreement in mid-1979, the other three members of the Persian Gulf withdrew their funds intended for the Arab Organization for Industrialization from circulation, and at that time (data from Jane's Armor and Artillery catalog 1982-1983) Egypt received other assistance in projects.

Testing and operation

The first battery of field rocket artillery, sent to the front on the night of July 1-2, 1941 under the command of Captain I.A. Flerov, was armed with seven installations made in the workshops of Research Institute No. The battery wiped out the Orsha railway junction from the face of the earth, along with the German echelons with troops and military equipment on it.

The exceptional effectiveness of the actions of the battery of Captain I. A. Flerov and the seven more such batteries formed after it contributed to rapid buildup the rate of production of jet weapons. Already in the autumn of 1941, 45 divisions of three-battery composition with four launchers in the battery operated on the fronts. For their armament in 1941, 593 M-13 installations were manufactured. As military equipment arrived from industry, the formation of rocket artillery regiments began, consisting of three divisions armed with M-13 launchers and an anti-aircraft division. The regiment had 1414 personnel, 36 M-13 launchers and 12 anti-aircraft 37-mm guns. The volley of the regiment was 576 shells of 132mm caliber. At the same time, the manpower and military equipment of the enemy were destroyed on an area of ​​over 100 hectares. Officially, the regiments were called Guards Mortar Artillery Regiments of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command. Unofficially, rocket artillery installations were called "Katyusha". According to the memoirs of Evgeny Mikhailovich Martynov (Tula), former child during the war years, in Tula at first they were called infernal machines. From ourselves, we note that multi-charged machines were also called infernal machines in the 19th century.

In the protocol of interrogation of German prisoners of war, it was noted that "two captured soldiers in the village of Popkovo went crazy from the fire of rocket launchers", and the captured corporal stated that "there were many cases of insanity in the village of Popkovo from the artillery cannonade of the Soviet troops."

T34 Sherman Calliope (USA) Multiple launch rocket system (1943). It had 60 guides for 114 mm M8 rockets. Mounted on the Sherman tank, guidance was carried out by turning the turret and raising and lowering the barrel (through the rod)

One of the most famous and popular symbols of the weapons of the victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War is the BM-8 and BM-13 multiple launch rocket systems, affectionately nicknamed "Katyusha" by the people. The development of rocket projectiles in the USSR was carried out from the beginning of the 1930s, and even then the possibilities of their salvo launch were considered. In 1933, the RNII, the Reactive Research Institute, was established. One of the results of his work was the creation and adoption by aviation in 1937-1938 of 82- and 132-mm rockets. By this time, considerations had already been expressed about the advisability of using rockets in the ground forces. However, due to the low accuracy of their use, the effectiveness of their use could only be achieved when firing simultaneously with a large number of shells. The Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) at the beginning of 1937, and then in 1938, set the institute the task of developing a multiply charged launcher for firing volley fire with 132-mm rockets. Initially, the installation was planned to be used for firing rockets in order to conduct chemical warfare.

In April 1939, a multiply charged launcher was designed according to a fundamentally new scheme with a longitudinal arrangement of guides. Initially, it received the name "mechanized installation" (MU-2), and after the SKB of the Kompressor plant was finalized and put into service in 1941, it was given the name "BM-13 combat vehicle". The rocket launcher itself consisted of 16 groove-type rocket guides. The location of the guides along the chassis of the vehicle and the installation of jacks increased the stability of the launcher and increased the accuracy of fire. Rocket loading was carried out from the rear end of the rails, which made it possible to significantly speed up the reloading process. All 16 shells could be fired in 7 to 10 seconds.

The beginning of the formation of guards mortar units was laid by the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of June 21, 1941 on the deployment of mass production of M-13 shells, M-13 launchers and the beginning of the formation of rocket artillery units. The first separate battery, which received seven BM-13 installations, was commanded by Captain I.A. Flerov. The successful operations of rocket artillery batteries contributed to the rapid growth of this young type of weapon. Already on August 8, 1941, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin, the formation of the first eight regiments of rocket artillery began, which was completed by September 12. Until the end of September, the ninth regiment was created.

tactical unit

The main tactical unit of the Guards mortar units was the guards mortar regiment. Organizationally, it consisted of three divisions of rocket launchers M-8 or M-13, an anti-aircraft division, as well as service units. In total, the regiment had 1414 people, 36 combat vehicles, twelve 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, 9 anti-aircraft machine guns DShK and 18 light machine guns. However, the difficult situation on the fronts in the reduction in the release of anti-aircraft artillery guns led to the fact that in 1941 some units of rocket artillery did not actually have anti-aircraft guns. artillery battalion. The transition to a full-time organization based on a regiment ensured an increase in the density of fire compared to a structure based on individual batteries or divisions. A volley of one regiment of M-13 rocket launchers consisted of 576, and a regiment of M-8 rocket launchers - of 1296 rockets.

The elitism and importance of batteries, divisions and regiments of rocket artillery of the Red Army was emphasized by the fact that immediately upon formation they were given the honorary title of Guards. For this reason, and also in order to maintain secrecy, the Soviet rocket artillery received its official name - “Guards mortar units”.

An important milestone in the history of the Soviet field rocket artillery was GKO Decree No. 642-ss of September 8, 1941. According to this resolution, the Guards mortar units were separated from the Main Artillery Directorate. At the same time, the post of commander of the Guards mortar units was introduced, who was supposed to report directly to the Headquarters of the High Command (SGVK). The first commander of the Guards mortar units (GMCH) was the military engineer of the 1st rank V.V. Aborenkov.

First experience

The first use of Katyushas took place on July 14, 1941. The battery of Captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov fired two volleys from seven launchers at the Orsha railway station, where a large number of German echelons with troops, equipment, ammunition, and fuel had accumulated. As a result of battery fire, the railway junction was wiped off the face of the earth, the enemy suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment.

T34 Sherman Calliope (USA) - multiple launch rocket system (1943). It had 60 guides for 114 mm M8 rockets. It was mounted on a Sherman tank, guidance was carried out by turning the turret and raising and lowering the barrel (through traction).

On August 8, Katyushas were involved in the Kiev direction. This is evidenced by the following lines of a secret report to Malenkov, a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks: “Today at dawn, new means known to you were used in the Kiev UR. They hit the enemy to a depth of 8 kilometers. The setup is extremely efficient. The command of the sector where the installation was located reported that after several turns of the circle, the enemy completely stopped pressing on the sector from which the installation was operating. Our infantry boldly and confidently went forward. The same document indicates that the use of new weapons caused an initial mixed reaction. Soviet soldiers who had never seen anything like it before. “I am transmitting as the Red Army soldiers said: “We hear a roar, then a piercing howl and a large trail of fire. Panic arose among some of our Red Army soldiers, and then the commanders explained where they were shooting from and where ... this caused literally the jubilation of the fighters. Highly good review gunners give ... ”The appearance of the Katyusha came as a complete surprise to the leadership of the Wehrmacht. Initially, the use of Soviet rocket launchers BM-8 and BM-13 was perceived by the Germans as a concentration of fire from a large number of artillery. One of the first mentions of the BM-13 rocket launchers can be found in the diary of the head of the German ground forces, Franz Halder, only on August 14, 1941, when he made the following entry: “The Russians have an automatic multi-barreled flamethrower gun ... The shot is fired by electricity. During the shot, smoke is generated ... When capturing such guns, report immediately. Two weeks later, a directive appeared entitled "Russian gun throwing rocket-like projectiles." It said: “Troops report the use by the Russians of a new type of weapon that fires rockets. A large number of shots can be fired from one installation within 3-5 seconds ... Each appearance of these guns must be reported to the general, commander of the chemical troops at the high command, on the same day.

By June 22, 1941, the German troops also had rocket mortars. By this time, the chemical troops of the Wehrmacht had four regiments of six-barreled chemical mortars of 150 mm caliber (Nebelwerfer 41), and the fifth was under formation. The regiment of German chemical mortars organizationally consisted of three divisions of three batteries. For the first time, these mortars were used at the very beginning of the war near Brest, as mentioned in his writings by the historian Paul Karel.

There is nowhere to retreat - behind Moscow

By the autumn of 1941, the main part of rocket artillery was concentrated in the troops of the Western Front and the Moscow Defense Zone. Near Moscow there were 33 divisions out of 59 that were at that time in the Red Army. For comparison: the Leningrad Front had five divisions, the South-Western - nine, the South - six, and the rest - one or two divisions each. In the Battle of Moscow, all armies were reinforced by three or four divisions, and only the 16th Army had seven divisions.

The Soviet leadership gave great importance the use of Katyushas in the battle of Moscow. In the directive of the Headquarters of the All-Russian Supreme Command "To the Commander of the Fronts and Armies on the Procedure for the Use of Rocket Artillery", issued on October 1, 1941, in particular, the following was noted: "Parts of the active Red Army have recently received a new powerful weapon in the form of combat vehicles M-8 and M-13, which are the best remedy destruction (suppression) of the enemy's manpower, its tanks, motor units and fire weapons. The sudden, massive and well-prepared fire of the M-8 and M-13 battalions provides an exceptionally good defeat of the enemy and at the same time has a strong moral shock to his manpower, leading to a loss of combat capability. This is especially true in this moment when the enemy infantry has much more tanks than we do, when our infantry most of all needs powerful support from the M-8 and M-13, which can be successfully opposed to enemy tanks.

A battalion of rocket artillery under the command of Captain Karsanov left a bright mark on the defense of Moscow. For example, on November 11, 1941, this division supported the attack of its infantry on Skirmanovo. After the volleys of the division, this settlement was taken almost without resistance. When examining the area in which volleys were fired, 17 wrecked tanks, more than 20 mortars and several guns abandoned by the enemy in a panic were found. During November 22 and 23, the same division, without infantry cover, repelled repeated enemy attacks. Despite the fire of submachine gunners, Captain Karsanov's division did not retreat until it had completed its combat mission.

At the beginning of the counter-offensive near Moscow, not only the infantry and military equipment of the enemy, but also the fortified defense lines, using which the Wehrmacht leadership sought to detain the Soviet troops, became objects of Katyusha fire. The BM-8 and BM-13 rocket launchers fully justified themselves in these new conditions. For example, the 31st separate mortar division under the command of political instructor Orekhov spent 2.5 divisional volleys to destroy the German garrison in the village of Popkovo. On the same day, the village was taken by Soviet troops with little or no resistance.

Defending Stalingrad

In repelling the enemy's continuous attacks on Stalingrad, the Guards mortar units made a significant contribution. Sudden volleys of rocket launchers devastated the ranks of the advancing German troops, burned them military equipment. In the midst of fierce fighting, many Guards mortar regiments fired 20 to 30 volleys a day. Remarkable examples of combat work were shown by the 19th Guards Mortar Regiment. In just one day of the battle, he fired 30 volleys. The combat rocket launchers of the regiment were located along with the advanced units of our infantry and destroyed a large number of German and Romanian soldiers and officers. Rocket artillery was greatly loved by the defenders of Stalingrad and, above all, by the infantry. The military glory of the regiments of Vorobyov, Parnovsky, Chernyak and Erokhin thundered on the entire front.

In the photo above - Katyusha BM-13 on the ZiS-6 chassis was a launcher consisting of rail guides (from 14 to 48). The BM-31-12 installation (“Andryusha”, photo below) was a constructive development of the Katyusha. It was based on the Studebaker chassis and fired 300-mm rockets from guides not of a rail type, but of a honeycomb type.

IN AND. Chuikov wrote in his memoirs that he would never forget the Katyusha regiment under the command of Colonel Erokhin. On July 26, on the right bank of the Don, Erokhin's regiment participated in repelling the offensive of the 51st Army Corps of the German Army. In early August, this regiment entered the southern operational group of troops. In the first days of September, during German tank attacks on the Chervlenaya River near the village of Tsibenko, the regiment again fired a salvo of 82-millimeter Katyushas at the main enemy forces in the most dangerous place. The 62nd Army fought street battles from September 14 to the end of January 1943, and the Katyusha regiment of Colonel Erokhin constantly received combat missions of the commander V.I. Chuikov. In this regiment, the guide frames (rails) for the shells were mounted on a T-60 tracked base, which gave these installations good maneuverability in any terrain. Being in Stalingrad itself and having chosen positions behind the steep bank of the Volga, the regiment was invulnerable to enemy artillery fire. Erokhin quickly brought his own combat installations on caterpillar tracks to firing positions, fired a volley and with the same speed again went into cover.

In the initial period of the war, the effectiveness of rocket launchers was reduced due to the insufficient number of shells.
In particular, in a conversation between Marshal Shaposhnikov of the USSR and General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, the latter stated the following: “volleys for R.S. (rockets - O.A.) it takes at least 20 to be enough for two days of battle, and now we give negligible. If there were more of them, I vouch that it would be possible to shoot the enemy with only RSs. In the words of Zhukov, there is a clear overestimation of the capabilities of the Katyushas, ​​which had their drawbacks. One of them was mentioned in a letter to GKO member G.M. This shortcoming was especially clearly revealed during the retreat of our troops, when, due to the threat of the capture of this latest secret equipment, the Katyusha crews were forced to blow up their rocket launchers.

Kursk Bulge. Attention tanks!

In anticipation Battle of Kursk Soviet troops, including rocket artillery, were intensively preparing for the upcoming battles with German armored vehicles. Katyushas drove their front wheels into dug recesses to give the guides a minimum elevation angle, and the shells, leaving parallel to the ground, could hit tanks. Experimental shootings were carried out on plywood models of tanks. In training, rockets smashed targets to pieces. However, this method also had many opponents: after all, the warhead of the M-13 shells was high-explosive fragmentation, and not armor-piercing. It was necessary to check the effectiveness of Katyushas against tanks already during the battles. Despite the fact that rocket launchers were not designed to fight against tanks, in some cases, Katyushas successfully coped with this task. Let us give one example from a secret report addressed personally to I.V. Stalin: “July 5-7, the guards mortar units, repelling enemy attacks and supporting their infantry, carried out: 9 regimental, 96 divisional, 109 battery and 16 platoon volleys against enemy infantry and tanks. As a result, according to incomplete data, up to 15 infantry battalions were destroyed and dispersed, 25 vehicles were burned and knocked out, 16 artillery and mortar batteries were suppressed, and 48 enemy attacks were repulsed. During the period July 5-7, 1943, 5,547 M-8 shells and 12,000 M-13 shells were used up. Particularly noteworthy is the combat work on the Voronezh Front of the 415th Guards Mortar Regiment (regiment commander Lieutenant Colonel Ganyushkin), who on July 6 defeated the crossing across the Sev River. Donets in the Mikhailovka area and destroyed up to one company of infantry and on July 7, participating in the battle with enemy tanks, firing direct fire, knocked out and destroyed 27 tanks ... "

In general, the use of Katyushas against tanks, despite individual episodes, turned out to be ineffective due to the large dispersion of shells. In addition, as noted earlier, the warhead of the M-13 shells was high-explosive fragmentation, and not armor-piercing. Therefore, even with a direct hit, the rocket was not able to penetrate the frontal armor of the Tigers and Panthers. Despite these circumstances, the Katyushas still inflicted significant damage on the tanks. The fact is that when a rocket projectile hit the frontal armor, the tank crew often failed due to severe shell shock. In addition, as a result of Katyusha fire, the tracks of the tanks were interrupted, the turrets jammed, and if fragments hit the engine part or gas tanks, a fire could start.

Katyushas were successfully used until the very end of World War II, earning the love and respect of Soviet soldiers and officers and the hatred of Wehrmacht servicemen. During the war years, the BM-8 and BM-13 rocket launchers were mounted on various vehicles, tanks, tractors, installed on the armored platforms of armored trains, combat boats, etc. The "brothers" of the Katyusha were also created and participated in the battles - launchers of heavy rockets M-30 and M-31 caliber 300 mm, as well as launchers BM-31-12 caliber 300 mm. Rocket artillery firmly took its place in the Red Army and rightfully became one of the symbols of victory.