Prague events of 1968. Events in Czechoslovakia (1968)

As a sign of protest against the actions of an illegal and stupid member of the “government” of the Russian Federation, I am posting this material. So that history must be known and protected from rewriting and distortion.

The entry of troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968 did not allow the West to carry out a coup in Czechoslovakia using the technology of “velvet” revolutions and preserved life in peace and harmony for more than 20 years for all the peoples of the Warsaw Pact countries.

The political crisis in Czechoslovakia, as in other countries of the socialist bloc, was bound to arise sooner or later after N. S. Khrushchev came to power in the USSR in 1953.

Khrushchev accused I.V. Stalin, and in fact the socialist socio-political system, of organizing mass repressions, as a result of which millions of innocent people allegedly suffered. In my opinion, Khrushchev’s report at the 20th Congress in 1956 took place thanks to the grandiose victory of Western intelligence services and their 5th column inside the USSR.

It doesn’t matter what motivated Khrushchev when he launched a policy of de-Stalinization in the country. It is important that blaming the socialist socio-political system for organizing mass repressions deprived the Soviet government of legitimacy. The geopolitical opponents of Russia and the USSR received weapons with which they could crush the impregnable fortress - the USSR and other countries of the socialist camp.

By 1968, for 12 years, schools and institutes had been studying works that delegitimized the Soviet regime. All these 12 years, the West prepared Czechoslovak society to renounce socialism and friendship with the USSR.

The political crisis in Czechoslovakia was associated not only with the policies of N. S. Khrushchev, which reduced the number of citizens ready to defend the socialist system and friendly relations with the Soviet Union, but also with the national hatred between Czechs and Slovaks fueled by anti-Soviet forces. A significant role was also played by the fact that Czechoslovakia did not fight against the Soviet Union and did not feel guilty before our country.

But for the sake of truth, it must be said that no less Russian blood was shed during the war through the fault of Czechoslovakia than through the fault of Hungary and Romania, whose armies, together with Germany, attacked the USSR in 1941. Since 1938 and throughout the war, Czechoslovakia supplied German troops with a huge amount of weapons, which were used to kill Soviet soldiers and civilians in our country.

Gottwald, who built a prosperous socialist Czechoslovakia after the war, died the same year as Stalin in 1953. The new presidents of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic are A. Zapototsky, and since 1957 A. Novotny became like N. S. Khrushchev. They essentially destroyed the country. A. Novotny was a copy of N. S. Khrushchev and with his ill-conceived reforms caused significant damage to the national economy, which also led to a decrease in the standard of living of the people. All of these factors contributed to the emergence of anti-socialist and anti-Russian sentiments in society.

On January 5, 1968, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia elected Slovakian A. Dubcek to the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee instead of Novotny, but did not remove Novotny from the post of president of the country. Over time, order was restored, and L. Svoboda became the President of Czechoslovakia.

Liberals call the reign of A. Dubcek the “Prague Spring”. A. Dubcek immediately fell under the influence of people who, under the guise of democratization, began to prepare the country for surrender to the West. Under the guise of building “socialism with a human face,” the destruction of the Czechoslovak socialist state began. By the way, socialism has always had a human face, but capitalism, liberalism has always had the face of the Nazis and similar US liberals who killed the children of Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, Lebanon, Syria and other countries that the US considered insufficient democratic. The USA and its citizens were not spared.

After the January 1968 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, frantic criticism of the situation in the country began. Using the criticism of the leadership voiced at the Plenum, the opposition political forces, calling for the “expansion” of democracy, began to discredit the Communist Party, government structures, state security agencies and socialism in general. Hidden preparations for a change in the political system began.

In the media, on behalf of the people, they demanded to abolish the party’s leadership of economic and political life, declare the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia a criminal organization, ban its activities, and dissolve the state security agencies and the People’s Militia. Various “clubs” (“Club 231”, “Club of Active Non-Party People”) and other organizations arose throughout the country, the main goal and task of which was to denigrate the history of the country after 1945, rally the opposition, and conduct anti-constitutional propaganda.

By mid-1968, the Ministry of Internal Affairs received about 70 applications for registration of new organizations and associations. Thus, “Club 231” was established in Prague on March 31, 1968, although it did not have permission from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The club united over 40 thousand people, among whom were former criminals and state criminals. As the newspaper Rude Pravo noted, the club’s members included former Nazis, SS men, Henleinites, ministers of the puppet “Slovak State,” and representatives of the reactionary clergy.

The general secretary of the club, Yaroslav Brodsky, said at one of the meetings: “The best communist is a dead communist, and if he is still alive, then his legs should be pulled out.” Branches of the club were created at enterprises and in various organizations, which were called “Societies for the Defense of Word and Press.” The organization “Revolutionary Committee of the Democratic Party of Slovakia” called for holding elections under the control of England, the USA, Italy and France, stopping criticism of Western states in the press and focusing it on the USSR.

A group of employees of the Prague Military-Political Academy proposed the withdrawal of Czechoslovakia from the Warsaw Pact and called on other socialist countries to liquidate the Warsaw Pact. In this regard, the French newspaper Le Figaro wrote: “The geographical position of Czechoslovakia can turn it both into a bolt of the Warsaw Pact and into a gap that opens up the entire military system of the Eastern bloc.” All these media, clubs and individuals speaking on behalf of the people also spoke out against the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

On June 14, the Czechoslovak opposition invited the famous American “Sovietologist” Zbigniew Brzezinski to give lectures in Prague, in which he outlined his “liberalization” strategy and called for the destruction of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, as well as the abolition of the police and state security. According to him, he fully “supported the interesting Czechoslovak experiment.”

It should be noted that Z. Brzezinski and many oppositionists were not interested in the fate or national interests of Czechoslovakia. In particular, they were ready to give up lands to Czechoslovakia for the sake of “rapprochement” with Germany.

The western borders of Czechoslovakia were opened, and border barriers and fortifications began to be eliminated. According to the instructions of the Minister of State Security Pavel, the spies of Western countries identified by counterintelligence were not detained, but were given the opportunity to leave.

The population of Czechoslovakia was persistently instilled with the idea that there was no danger of revanchism from the Federal Republic of Germany, and that one could think about returning the Sudeten Germans to the country. The newspaper “General Anzeiger” (FRG) wrote: “The Sudeten Germans will expect from Czechoslovakia, liberated from communism, a return to the Munich Agreement, according to which in the fall of 1938 the Sudetenland ceded to Germany.” The editor of the Czech trade union newspaper Prace, Jirczek, told German television: “About 150 thousand Germans live in our country. One can hope that the remaining 100-200 thousand could return to their homeland a little later.” Probably Western money helped him forget how the Sudeten Germans persecuted the Czechs. And Germany was ready to again seize these lands of Czechoslovakia.

In 1968, consultative meetings of representatives of NATO countries were held, at which possible measures were studied to bring Czechoslovakia out of the socialist camp. The Vatican intensified its activities in Czechoslovakia. Its leadership recommended directing the Catholic Church's activities to merge with the "independence" and "liberalization" movements, and to take on the role of "support and freedom in the countries of Eastern Europe", focusing on Czechoslovakia, Poland and the German Democratic Republic. In order to create a situation in Czechoslovakia that would facilitate Czechoslovakia's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, the NATO Council developed the Zephyr program. In July, a special Monitoring and Control Center began operating, which American officers called “Strike Group Headquarters.” It consisted of more than 300 employees, including intelligence officers and political advisers.

The center reported information about the situation in Czechoslovakia to NATO headquarters three times a day. An interesting remark by a representative of NATO headquarters: “Although due to the entry of Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia and the conclusion of the Moscow Agreement, the special center did not solve the tasks assigned to it, its activities were and continue to be valuable experience for the future.” This experience was used during the destruction of the USSR.

The military-political leadership of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries closely followed the events in Czechoslovakia and tried to convey their assessment to the authorities of Czechoslovakia. Meetings of the top leadership of the Warsaw Pact countries took place in Prague, Dresden, Warsaw, Cierna nad Tisou. In the last days of July, at a meeting in Cierna nad Tisou, A. Dubcek was told that if the recommended measures were refused, the troops of the socialist countries would enter Czechoslovakia. Dubcek not only did not take any measures, but also did not convey this warning to the members of the Central Committee and the government of the country, which, when sending troops, initially aroused the indignation of the Czechoslovak communists because they were not informed about the decision to send troops.

From a military point of view, there could be no other solution. The separation of the Sudetenland from the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and even more so of the entire country from the Warsaw Pact, and the alliance of Czechoslovakia with NATO put the grouping of Commonwealth troops in the GDR, Poland and Hungary under flank attack. The potential enemy received direct access to the border of the Soviet Union. The leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries were well aware that the events in Czechoslovakia were NATO’s advance to the East. On the night of August 21, 1968, troops of the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Poland entered the territory of Czechoslovakia. Neither the troops of Czechoslovakia, nor NATO troops, nor units of Western intelligence services dared to openly oppose such a force.

Troops landed at the Prague airfield. The troops were ordered not to open fire until they were fired upon. The columns walked at high speeds; stopped cars were pushed off the roadway so as not to interfere with traffic. By morning, all the advanced military units of the Commonwealth countries reached the designated areas. Czechoslovak troops remained in barracks, their military camps were blocked, batteries were removed from armored vehicles, fuel was drained from tractors.

On April 17, 1969, G. Husak, who at one time was the head of the Communist Party of Slovakia, was elected head of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia instead of Dubcek. The actions of the Warsaw Pact troops in Czechoslovakia in fact showed NATO the highest level of combat training and technical equipment of the troops of the treaty countries.

In a few minutes, the paratroopers captured Czechoslovak airfields and began to take over weapons and equipment, which then began to advance towards Prague. The guards were immediately disarmed and the building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was seized, and the entire leadership of Czechoslovakia was taken to the airfield in armored personnel carriers and sent first to the headquarters of the Northern Group of Forces, and then to Moscow.

The tankers carried out the task accurately and took up positions in an extremely short time according to the operation plan. Several thousand T-54 and T-55 tanks entered Czechoslovakia, and each crew knew its place in the territory where the tank unit was located.

In Czechoslovakia, the most impressive and tragic feat among soldiers was performed on a mountain road by a tank crew from the 1st Guards Tank Army, who deliberately drove their tank into an abyss to avoid running over children posted there as pickets. Those who prepared this vile provocation were confident that the children would die and then would shout to the whole world about the crime of the Soviet tank crews. But the provocation failed. At the cost of their lives, Soviet tank crews saved the lives of Czechoslovak children and the honor of the Soviet Army. This clear example shows the difference between the people of the liberal West, who prepared the death of children, and the people of the socialist Soviet Union, who saved the children.

The aviation of the Warsaw Pact countries, including special purpose aviation, also distinguished itself in Czechoslovakia. Tu-16 jamming aircraft of the 226th Electronic Warfare Regiment, taking off from Stryi airfield in Ukraine, successfully jammed radio and radar stations on the territory of Czechoslovakia, demonstrating the enormous importance of electronic warfare in modern warfare.

The West initially understood that it would not be allowed to carry out a coup in Czechoslovakia in a Warsaw Pact country, but it waged the Cold War against the USSR with “hot spots.” Soviet troops practically did not conduct combat operations on the territory of Czechoslovakia. At that time, the Americans were fighting a war in Vietnam, burning thousands of Vietnamese villages with napalm and destroying dozens of cities. They flooded the long-suffering land of Vietnam with blood. But this did not stop them from broadcasting on all radio and television channels to the USSR, the countries of Eastern Europe and the whole world that the USSR was an aggressor country.

The topic of Czechoslovakia was discussed in the Western media several years after 1968. To give this topic an ominous overtone, they prepared a suicide bomber, just as terrorists prepare suicide bombers today, they did not spare the Czechoslovakian student Jan Palach and set him on fire, doused with gasoline, in the center of Prague, presenting it as an act of self-immolation in protest against the entry of troops of the Warsaw Pact countries.

The deployment of troops to Czechoslovakia was done in order to protect the security of the Warsaw Pact countries from NATO troops. But the security of the United States was not threatened by either Korea or Vietnam, located thousands of kilometers from the US border. But America waged large-scale military operations against them, killing hundreds of thousands of people from these sovereign states. But the world community prefers to remain silent about this. The Sudetenland remained part of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, their state exists within modern borders, and the nation avoided the huge number of casualties that always occur during a coup d'etat.

Operation Danube. This is exactly what the documents called the strategic exercise of the troops of the five member countries of the Warsaw Pact, the purpose of which was “to protect the socialist gains in Czechoslovakia.”

Under Gorbachev, the entry of troops into the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic on August 21, 1968 was written as “the suppression of the construction of socialism with a human face,” and after the collapse of the USSR, these events are described only in a sharply condemning and sometimes rude form, the foreign policy of the USSR is considered aggressive, Soviet soldiers are called “occupiers”, etc.

Today's publicists do not want to take into account the fact that all events in the world took place, and are still taking place, in a specific international or domestic situation in a given period of time, and judge the past by the standards of today. Question: could the leadership of the countries of the socialist camp and, first of all, the Soviet Union at that time make a different decision?

International situation

1. At that time, there were two worlds in Europe, opposite in ideologies - socialist and capitalist. Two economic organizations - the so-called Common Market in the West and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in the East.

There were two opposing military blocs - NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Now they only remember that in 1968 in the GDR there was a Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, in Poland there was a Northern Group of Soviet Forces and in Hungary there was a Southern Group of Forces. But for some reason they don’t remember that troops from the United States, Great Britain, and Belgium were stationed on the territory of Germany and that the army corps of the Netherlands and France were ready to move out if necessary. Both military groups were in a state of full combat readiness.

2. Each side defended its interests and, observing external decency, tried by any means to weaken the other.

Social and political situation in Czechoslovakia

At the January 1968 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the mistakes and shortcomings of the country's leadership were fairly criticized, and a decision was made on the need for changes in the way the state's economy is managed. Alexander Dubcek was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, who led the implementation of reforms, later called “the construction of socialism with a human face.” The country's top leadership changed (except for President L. Svoboda), and with it, domestic and foreign policy began to change.

4. Using the criticism of the leadership voiced at the Plenum, the opposition political forces, speculating on demands for the “expansion” of democracy, began to discredit the Communist Party, government structures, state security agencies and socialism in general. Hidden preparations for a change in the political system began.

5. In the media, on behalf of the people, they demanded: the abolition of the party’s leadership of economic and political life, the declaration of the Communist Party of Human Rights as a criminal organization, a ban on its activities, the dissolution of state security agencies and the People’s Militia. (People's Militia is the name of the armed party workers' detachments, preserved since 1948, reporting directly to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.)

6. Various “clubs” (“Club 231″, “Club of Active Non-Party People”) and other organizations arose throughout the country, the main goal and task of which was to denigrate the history of the country after 1945, rally the opposition, and conduct anti-constitutional propaganda. By mid-1968, the Ministry of Internal Affairs received about 70 applications for registration of new organizations and associations. Thus, “Club 231” (Based on Article 231 of the Law on the Protection of the Constitution, anti-state and anti-constitutional activities were punishable) was established in Prague on March 31, 1968, although it did not have permission from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The club united over 40 thousand people, among whom were former criminals and state criminals. As the newspaper Rude Pravo noted, the club’s members included former Nazis, SS men, Henleinites, ministers of the puppet “Slovak State,” and representatives of the reactionary clergy. At one of the meetings, the general secretary of the club, Yaroslav Brodsky, stated: “The best communist is a dead communist, and if he is still alive, then his legs should be pulled out.” Branches of the club were created at enterprises and in various organizations, which were called “Societies for the Defense of Word and Press.”

7. One of the most striking anti-constitutional materials can be considered the appeal of the underground organization “Revolutionary Committee of the Democratic Party of Slovakia”, distributed in June in organizations and enterprises in the city of Svit. It put forward demands: to dissolve collective farms and cooperatives, distribute land to peasants, hold elections under the control of England, the USA, Italy and France, stop criticism of Western states in the press, and focus it on the USSR, allow the legal activities of political parties that existed in bourgeois Czechoslovakia, to annex “Transcarpathian Rus” to Czechoslovakia in 1968. The appeal ended with the call: “Death of the Communist Party!”

On May 6, the French weekly Express quoted Antonin Lim, editor of the foreign department of the newspaper Literary Listy, as saying: “Today in Czechoslovakia there is a question of taking power.” The Social Democratic Party and the Labor Party revived their activities underground.

8. In order to create some kind of counterbalance to the Warsaw Pact, the idea of ​​​​creating the Little Entente was revived as a regional bloc of socialist and capitalist states and a buffer between the great powers. Publications on this topic were picked up by the Western press. Notable was the remark of an analyst for the French newspaper Le Figaro: “The geographical position of Czechoslovakia can turn it both into a bolt of the Warsaw Pact, a pact, and into a gap that opens up the entire military system of the Eastern bloc.” In May, a group of employees of the Prague Military-Political Academy published "Remarks on the development of the Action Program of the Czechoslovak People's Army." The authors proposed “the withdrawal of Czechoslovakia from the Warsaw Pact or, possibly, joint actions of Czechoslovakia with other socialist countries to eliminate the Warsaw Pact as a whole and replace it with a system of bilateral relations.” As an option, there was a proposal to take a position of “consistent neutrality” in foreign policy.

Serious attacks from the standpoint of “sound economic calculation” were also made against the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

9. On June 14, the Czechoslovak opposition invited the famous “Sovietologist” Zbigniew Brzezinski to give lectures in Prague, in which he outlined his “liberalization” strategy, called for the destruction of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, as well as the abolition of the police and state security. According to him, he fully “supported the interesting Czechoslovak experiment.”

Calls for “rapprochement” with Germany, heard not only in the media, but also in the speeches of some of the country’s leaders, directly undermined the national interests of Czechoslovakia.

10. The matter was not limited to just words.

The western borders of Czechoslovakia were opened, and border barriers and fortifications began to be eliminated. According to the instructions of the Minister of State Security Pavel, the spies of Western countries identified by counterintelligence were not detained, but were given the opportunity to leave. (In 1969, Pavel was put on trial and shot by the Czechoslovak authorities.)

Activities of foreign authorities, military and media

During this period, consultative meetings of representatives of NATO countries were held, at which possible measures were studied to bring Czechoslovakia out of the socialist camp. The United States expressed its readiness to influence Czechoslovakia on the issue of obtaining a loan from capitalist countries, using Czechoslovakia's interest in returning its gold reserves.

11. In 1968, the Vatican intensified its activities in Czechoslovakia. Its leadership recommended directing the Catholic Church's activities to merge with the "independence" and "liberalization" movements, and to take on the role of "support and freedom in the countries of Eastern Europe", focusing on Czechoslovakia, Poland and the German Democratic Republic.

12. The population of Czechoslovakia was persistently instilled with the idea that there was no danger of revanchism from the Federal Republic of Germany, and that one could think about returning the Sudeten Germans to the country. The newspaper “General Anzeiger” (Germany) wrote: “The Sudeten Germans will expect from Czechoslovakia, liberated from communism, a return to the Munich Agreement, according to which in the fall of 1938 the Sudetenland ceded to Germany.” In the program of the National Democratic Party of Germany, one of the points read: “The Sudetenland must again become German, because they were acquired by Nazi Germany within the framework of the Munich Treaty, which is an effective international agreement.” This program was actively supported by the Sudeten German Community and the neo-fascist organization Witikobund.

And the editor of the Czech trade union newspaper Prace, Jirczek, told German television: “About 150 thousand Germans live in our country. One can hope that the remaining 100-200 thousand could return to their homeland a little later.” Of course, no one anywhere recalled the persecution of the Czechs by the Sudeten Germans.

13. Correspondence from the ADN agency reported that Bundeswehr officers were repeatedly sent to Czechoslovakia for reconnaissance purposes. This applied, first of all, to the officers of the 2nd Army Corps, whose units were stationed near the border of Czechoslovakia. Later it became known that in preparation for the “Black Lion” exercise of the German troops planned for the fall, the entire command staff of the 2nd Corps, up to and including the battalion commander, visited Czechoslovakia as tourists and traveled along the likely routes of movement of their units. With the start of the “exercise,” it was planned to take a short push to occupy the territories seized by Germany in 1938 and present the international community with a fait accompli. The calculation was based on the fact that if the USSR and the USA did not fight over the Arab territories captured by Israel in 1967, then they will not now.

14. In order to create a situation in Czechoslovakia that would facilitate Czechoslovakia’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, the NATO Council developed the Zephyr program.

An article in the Finnish newspaper Päivän Sanomat dated September 6, 1968 reported that in the region of Regensburg (Germany) “an organ has worked and continues to function to monitor Czechoslovak events. In July, a special Monitoring and Control Center began operating, which American officers call “Strike Group Headquarters.” It has more than 300 employees, including intelligence officers and political advisers. The center reported information about the situation in Czechoslovakia to NATO headquarters three times a day.” An interesting remark by a representative of NATO headquarters: “Although due to the entry of Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia and the conclusion of the Moscow Agreement, the special center did not solve the tasks assigned to it, its activities were and continue to be valuable experience for the future.”

Choice
Thus, by the spring of 1968, the countries of the socialist camp were faced with a choice:
- allow opposition forces to push Czechoslovakia off the socialist path;
- open the way to the East for a potential enemy, jeopardizing not only the Warsaw Pact troop groups, but also the results of the Second World War;

OR
— through the efforts of the commonwealth countries, to defend the socialist system in Czechoslovakia and provide assistance to the development of its economy;
- put an end to Munich politics once and for all, rejecting all claims of Hitler’s revanchist heirs;
— to put an obstacle in front of the new “Drang nach Osten”, showing the whole world that no one will be able to redraw the post-war borders established as a result of the struggle of many peoples against fascism.

15. Based on the current situation, at the end of July 1968, the second was chosen. However, if the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia had not shown such weakness and tolerance towards the enemies of the ruling party and the existing political system, nothing like this would have happened. The military-political leadership of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries closely followed the events in Czechoslovakia and tried to convey their assessment to the authorities of Czechoslovakia. Meetings of the top leadership of the Warsaw Pact countries took place in Prague, Dresden, Warsaw, Cierna nad Tisou. During the meetings, the current situation was discussed, recommendations were given to the Czech leadership, but to no avail.

16. In the last days of July, at a meeting in Cierna nad Tisou, A. Dubcek was told that if the recommended measures were refused, the troops of the socialist countries would enter Czechoslovakia. Dubcek not only did not take any measures, but also did not convey this warning to the members of the Central Committee and the government of the country. From a military point of view, there could be no other solution. The separation of the Sudetenland from the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and even more so of the entire country from the Warsaw Pact, and its alliance with NATO put the grouping of Commonwealth troops in the GDR, Poland and Hungary under flank attack. The potential enemy received direct access to the border of the Soviet Union.

17. From the memoirs of the commander of the Alpha group of the KGB of the USSR, Hero of the Soviet Union, retired Major General Gennady Nikolaevich Zaitsev (in 1968 - head of the group of the 7th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR during Operation Danube):

“At that time, the situation in Czechoslovakia looked like this.

... It was no longer even the “progressives” from the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia that began to come to the fore, but non-party forces - members of various “social” and “political” clubs, which were distinguished by their orientation towards the West and hatred of Russians. June marked the beginning of a new phase of aggravation of the situation in Czechoslovakia and the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and in mid-August the Dub-chek team completely lost control over the situation in the country.

It is also noteworthy that some leaders of the Prague Spring believed that the sympathies of the West would certainly materialize in the form of a tough anti-Soviet position of the United States in the event of forceful actions by the Soviet Union.”

18. The task was set: to the group led by G.N. Zaitsev to enter the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and take control of it. The Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs I. Pavel managed to escape the day before. According to numerous testimonies, I. Pavel, as the Prague Spring developed, gradually liquidated state security agencies, getting rid of communist cadres and supporters of Moscow. He threatened his employees who tried to work to neutralize the so-called “progressives” (the Club of Non-Party Activists and the K-231 organization) with reprisals. Before the government's decision, they were given an order: to immediately stop jamming foreign broadcasts and begin dismantling the equipment.

19. ... The documents contained information that the Minister of Internal Affairs I. Pavel and the head of the department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, General Prhlik, “prepared a project for the creation of a leading Center, which should take all state power into its own hands during times of political tension in the country.” It also spoke of the implementation of “preventive security measures aimed against protests by conservative forces, including the creation of labor camps.” In other words, the country was carrying out hidden, but very real preparations for the creation of concentration camps, where all forces opposing the regime “with a human face” were to be hidden... And if we add to this the titanic efforts of some foreign intelligence services and agents of Western influence, who intended to tear off the Czechoslovakia from the Eastern Bloc, then the overall picture of events did not look as clear as they are trying to convince us of it.

20. ... How did you manage to capture a by no means small European country in the shortest possible time and with minimal losses? The neutral position of the Czechoslovak army (which was about 200 thousand people armed with modern military equipment at that time) played a significant role in this course of events. I want to emphasize that General Martin Dzur played a key role in that very difficult situation. But the main reason for the low number of casualties was the behavior of Soviet soldiers, who showed amazing restraint in Czechoslovakia.

... According to Czech historians, about a hundred people died during the entry of troops, about a thousand were wounded and injured.

21. ... I am convinced that at that time there was simply no other way out of the crisis. In my opinion, the results of the Prague Spring are very instructive. If it were not for the harsh actions of the USSR and its allies, the Czech leadership, having instantly passed the stage of “socialism with a human face”, would have found itself in the arms of the West. The Warsaw bloc would have lost a strategically important state in the center of Europe, NATO would have found itself at the borders of the USSR. Let's be completely honest: the operation in Czechoslovakia gave peace to two generations of Soviet children. Or is it not? After all, by “letting go” of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union would inevitably face a house of cards effect. Unrest would break out in Poland and Hungary. Then it would be the turn of the Baltic states, and after that the Transcaucasus.”

Start

22. On the night of August 21, troops of five Warsaw Pact countries entered the territory of Czechoslovakia, and troops landed at the Prague airfield. The troops were ordered not to open fire until they were fired upon. The columns walked at high speeds; stopped cars were pushed off the roadway so as not to interfere with traffic. By morning, all the advanced military units of the Commonwealth countries reached the designated areas. Czechoslovak troops were ordered not to leave the barracks. Their military camps were blocked, batteries were removed from armored vehicles, fuel was drained from tractors.

23. It is interesting that in early August, representatives of the People’s Militia units met with their commander A. Dubcek and presented an ultimatum: either he changes the leadership’s policy, or on August 22, the People’s Militia will put all important objects under its control, take power into their own hands, and remove him from the post of Secretary General and will demand the convening of a party congress. Dubcek listened to them, but did not answer anything concrete. The main thing is that he did not tell the commanders of the armed party units subordinate to him personally about the ultimatum he received in Cierna nad Tisou from the leaders of the GDR, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and the USSR. Apparently he was counting on something. And when the Warsaw Pact troops entered Czechoslovakia on August 21, the leadership of the detachments and ordinary communists considered this an insult. They believed that they could cope with the situation in the country themselves, without bringing in foreign troops. Life showed that then they overestimated their strength. Only after the defeat of the opposition in August 1969 did opponents of the regime go underground for a long time.

Attitude of the local population

24. At first, the attitude of the local population towards the military personnel of the Commonwealth countries was bad. Intoxicated by hostile propaganda, the duplicitous behavior of the top officials of the state, the lack of information about the true reasons for the deployment of troops, and sometimes intimidated by local oppositionists, people not only looked askance at the foreign soldiers. Stones were thrown at cars, and at night the troops' locations were fired upon from small arms. Signs and markers on the roads were demolished, and the walls of houses were painted with slogans such as “Occupiers, go home!”, “Shoot the occupier!” and so on.

Sometimes local residents secretly came to military units and asked why Soviet troops came. And it would be okay if only Russians came, otherwise they also brought “Caucasians” with “narrow-eyed” people with them. In the center of Europe (!) people were surprised that the Soviet army was multinational.

Actions of the opposition forces

25. The entry of Allied troops showed the Czech opposition forces and their foreign inspirers that hopes of seizing power had collapsed. However, they decided not to give up, but called for armed resistance. In addition to shelling of cars, helicopters and locations of allied troops, terrorist attacks began against Czech party workers and intelligence officers. The evening edition of the English newspaper The Sunday Times on August 27 published an interview with one of the leaders of the underground. He reported that by August “the underground numbered about 40 thousand people armed with automatic weapons.” A significant part of the weapons was secretly supplied from the West, primarily from Germany. However, it was not possible to use it.

27. In the very first days after the entry of the Allied troops, in cooperation with the Czech security authorities, several thousand machine guns, hundreds of machine guns and grenade launchers were seized from many hiding places and basements. Even mortars were found. Thus, even in the Prague house of journalists, which was led by extreme opposition figures, 13 machine guns, 81 machine guns and 150 boxes of ammunition were discovered. At the beginning of 1969, a ready-made concentration camp was discovered in the Tatra Mountains. Who built it and for whom was unknown at that time.

Information and psychological warfare

28. Another evidence of the existence of organized anti-constitutional forces in Czechoslovakia is the fact that by 8 o’clock on August 21, underground radio stations began operating in all regions of the country, on some days up to 30-35 units. Not only radio stations that were pre-installed on cars, trains and in secret shelters were used, but also equipment seized from MPVO agencies, from branches of the Union for Cooperation with the Army (such as DOSAAF in the USSR), and from large rural farms. Underground radio transmitters were combined into a system that determined the time and duration of operation. Capture teams discovered working radio stations deployed in apartments, hidden in the safes of leaders of various organizations. There were also radio stations in special suitcases along with tables of wave transmission at different times of the day. Install the antenna supplied with the station and work. Radio stations, as well as four underground television channels, disseminated false information, rumors, and calls for the destruction of Allied troops, sabotage, and sabotage. They also transmitted encrypted information and code signals to the underground forces.

29. The radio transmitters of the West German 701st Psychological Warfare Battalion fit well into this “choir”.

At first, Soviet radio intelligence officers were surprised that a number of anti-government stations were taking direction in the west, but their guesses were confirmed on September 8 by the Stern magazine (Germany). The magazine reported that on August 23, the newspaper Literary Listy, followed by underground radio, reported that “allied troops fired at the children’s hospital on Charles Square. Windows, ceilings, expensive medical equipment were broken...” A German television reporter rushed to the area, but the hospital building was undamaged. According to Stern magazine, “this false information was transmitted not from Czech, but from West German territory.” The magazine noted that the events of these days "provided an ideal opportunity for practical training for the 701st Battalion."

30. If the first leaflets with a message about the entry of allied troops were issued by official government or party bodies and printing houses, then the subsequent ones did not contain any output data. In many cases, the texts and appeals were the same in different parts of the country.

A change of scenery

31. Slowly, but the situation changed.

The Central Group of Forces was formed, Soviet military units began to settle in the Czech military towns liberated for them, where the chimneys were filled with bricks, the sewers were clogged, and the windows were broken. In April 1969, A. Dubcek was replaced by G. Husak, and the country's leadership changed. Emergency laws were adopted, according to which, in particular, showing a fist to a Russian “cost” up to three months of imprisonment, and a provoked fight with Russians - six. At the end of 1969, military personnel were allowed to bring their families to the garrisons where construction battalions had built housing. Construction of housing for families continued until 1972.

32. So, what are these “occupiers” who sacrificed their lives so that civilians would not die, did not respond with a shot to the most blatant provocations, and saved people unknown to them from reprisals? Who lived in hangars and warehouses, and the beds, even in the officers' and women's (for medical staff, typists, waitresses) dormitories, were in two tiers? Who preferred to act not as soldiers, but as agitators, explaining the situation and their tasks to the population?

Conclusion

The deployment of troops from the Warsaw Pact countries into Czechoslovakia was a forced measure aimed at preserving the unity of the countries of the socialist camp, as well as preventing NATO troops from reaching the borders.

33. Soviet soldiers were not occupiers and did not behave like invaders. No matter how pretentious it may sound, in August 1968 they defended their country at the forefront of the socialist camp. The tasks assigned to the army were completed with minimal losses.

34. No matter what modern political scientists say, in that situation the government of the USSR and other countries of the socialist camp made a decision that was adequate to the current situation. Even the current generation of Czechs should be grateful to the Soviet army for the fact that the Sudetenland remained part of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and their state exists within modern borders.

"Notes in the Margins"

35. But here’s what’s interesting and raises questions.

The soldiers who were the first(!) to be called “Internationalist Warriors” are not even recognized as such in Russia, although by Order of the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. Grechko No. 242 dated October 17, 1968, they were thanked for fulfilling their international duty. By order of the USSR Minister of Defense No. 220 dated July 5, 1990, “The list of states, cities, territories and periods of combat operations with the participation of citizens of the Russian Federation” was supplemented by the Republic of Cuba. For unknown reasons, Czechoslovakia (the only one!) was not included in the list, and, as a result, the relevant documents were not handed over to former military personnel who performed international duty in this country.

36. The issues of whether or not to recognize the participants in the operation as internationalist soldiers and combat veterans were repeatedly discussed at various levels.

A group of scientists, having analyzed the materials available for study and after meetings with direct participants in the Czechoslovak events, stated that “in 1968, a superbly planned and flawlessly executed military operation was carried out in Czechoslovakia, during which combat operations were carried out. Both from the point of view of military science and the real situation in the use of forces and means.” And the soldiers and officers who fulfilled their duty during Operation Danube have every right to be called internationalist warriors and fall under the category of “combatants.”

37. However, the Russian Ministry of Defense does not recognize them as such, and in response to questions and requests from regional organizations of participants in Operation Danube, it replies that there were “only military clashes”, and gratitude was announced to them for “fulfilling an international duty”, and not for participating in combat actions.

38. Meanwhile, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine included Czechoslovakia in the corresponding list, and the country’s president issued Decree No. 180/2004 of 02/11/2004 “On the day of honoring participants in hostilities on the territory of other states.” According to the Decree, former soldiers and officers who took part in the defense of social gains in Czechoslovakia in 1968 were given the status of “Combatant”, “War Veteran”, and were provided with benefits within the framework of the Law of Ukraine “On the status of war veterans, guarantees of their social protection” .

39. Today, the youngest participants in Operation Danube are already 64 years old, and every year their ranks become thinner. The last, according to the author of the article, appeal only from the Rostov organization of participants in Operation Danube was sent to the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation in January of this year. Let's wait to see what the new minister will answer.

In 1968, the Soviet Army carried out the most ambitious military action in the post-war years. More than 20 divisions of ground forces occupied an entire country in the center of Europe in one day and with virtually no losses. Even the Afghan war involved a much smaller number of troops (see the corresponding section of the book).

That year again I had to fight the “counter-revolution” in Eastern Europe - this time in Czechoslovakia. The developments in Czechoslovakia and the Prague Spring have long worried the Soviet leadership. L.I. Brezhnev and his comrades could not allow the fall of the communist regime in this country and were ready to use force at any moment. The “Brezhnev Doctrine,” formulated by this time and carefully hidden from everyone, assumed the use of military power to maintain Soviet influence in the socialist countries of Europe without regard to their sovereignty and international norms.

In January 1968, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC), A. Novotny, ceded his post to A. Dubcek, who immediately assured Moscow that he would make every effort to stabilize the situation in the party and society. Being a convinced Marxist, he still considered it necessary to carry out some reforms in economics and politics. Public opinion generally supported Dubcek's reform aspirations - the existing model for building a socialist society did not allow him to catch up with the industrialized countries of Western Europe in terms of living standards.

N. S. Khrushchev and L. I. Brezhnev on the podium of the Mausoleum

Dubcek took the initiative to approve a “new model of socialism.” At the next (April) plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the so-called Program of Action of the Czechoslovak Communists was adopted. If we consider this document from a modern perspective, then in general it was maintained in the communist spirit, with the exception of two points - the party leadership abandoned the command-administrative system of management and freedom of speech and press was declared.

In the country, including in the official press, heated discussions took place on various socio-political problems. The most frequently voiced theses were the removal of government officials who had compromised themselves from government bodies and the intensification of economic relations with the West. The majority of official circles in the countries of the socialist community perceived the events taking place in Czechoslovakia as nothing other than a “counter-revolution.”

Soviet political leaders showed particular concern, fearing a change in the foreign policy course of Czechoslovakia, which could lead to a reorientation to the West, an alliance with Yugoslavia, and then to withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, as at one time almost happened with the Hungarian People's Republic.

During this period, the so-called “Brezhnev Doctrine” was finally formed, which in foreign policy became the cornerstone and connecting link of the entire socialist camp. The doctrine was based on the fact that the withdrawal of any socialist country from the Wars of Internal Affairs or the Comecon, or a departure from the agreed line in foreign policy, would disrupt the existing balance of power in Europe and would inevitably lead to an aggravation of international tension.

One of the main sources of information about the internal situation in Czechoslovakia for the leadership of the USSR were reports from informants and Soviet diplomats. Thus, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia F. Havlicek directly warned about the “inevitable rapprochement of Czechoslovakia with Yugoslavia and Romania,” which would lead to a weakening of the positions of the socialist bloc.

The train of thought of the Soviet leaders is clearly illustrated by the story of the Soviet “curator” in Czechoslovakia, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee K. T. Mazurov: “Despite the nuances, the general position was the same: it is necessary to intervene. It was difficult to imagine that a bourgeois parliamentary republic (!) would appear on our borders, flooded with Germans from the Federal Republic of Germany, and after them Americans. This did not in any way meet the interests of the Warsaw Pact. During the last week before the entry of troops, members of the Politburo hardly slept and did not go home: according to reports, a counter-revolutionary coup was expected in Czechoslovakia. The Baltic and Belarusian military districts were put on state of readiness number one. On the night of August 20-21, they gathered for a meeting again. Brezhnev said: “We will send in troops...”.

Judging by the recollections of eyewitnesses, in December 1968, Defense Minister Marshal Grechko, discussing the issue, indicated that Brezhnev did not want to send troops for a long time, but Ulbricht, Gomulka, and Zhivkov put pressure on him. And our “hawks” in the Politburo (P. G. Shelest, N. V. Podgorny, K. T. Mazurov, A. N. Shelepin and others) demanded that the problem be solved by force.

The leaders of the countries of the socialist community also viewed the Czechoslovak events as a “dangerous virus” that could spread to other countries. This primarily concerned East Germany, Poland and Bulgaria, and to a lesser extent Hungary.

From the point of view of the military (according to the memoirs of the former chief of staff of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact states, Army General A. Gribkov), the main danger of Czechoslovakia’s independence in matters of foreign policy was that it would inevitably lead to the vulnerability of borders with NATO countries, the loss control over the Czech armed forces. The refusal of the Czechoslovak leadership to voluntarily station a group of Soviet troops on their territory seemed, to say the least, illogical and requiring adequate immediate measures.

Preparations for Operation Danube - the entry of troops from the Warsaw Pact countries into the territory of Czechoslovakia - began in the spring of 1968 and were initially carried out under the guise of the Šumava maneuvers. On April 8, the commander of the Airborne Forces Margelov, in preparation for the exercises, received a directive from the Minister of Defense Marshal Grechko, which read: “The Soviet Union and other socialist countries, faithful to their international duty and the Warsaw Pact, were to send their troops to assist the Czechoslovak People's Army in defending the Motherland from danger hanging over her."

At the signal to begin the Šumava exercise, two airborne divisions should be ready to land in Czechoslovakia by parachute and landing methods. At the same time, our paratroopers, who recently wore “speckled” (red) berets at the parade in November 1967, like most special forces units around the world, put on blue hats in the summer of 1968.

This “move” of the Airborne Forces commander, Colonel-General Margelov, judging by the stories of eyewitnesses, later, during the “Danube” operation itself, saved more than a dozen lives of our paratroopers - local residents who tried to resist the Soviet troops, at first mistook them for representatives of the UN peacekeeping forces, the so-called “blue helmets”.

The commanders of regiments and divisions that were supposed to be involved in the invasion operation got acquainted with the roads and cities of Czechoslovakia, studying possible routes for moving troops. Joint Soviet-Czechoslovak exercises were held, after which Soviet units lingered on Czechoslovak soil for a long time and left it only after numerous reminders from the Czech leadership.

“Early in the morning of June 18, 1968, the operational group of the field command of the army crossed the state border of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic,” described the events of those days, the head of the political department of the 38th Army of the Carpathian Military District, S. M. Zolotev. - Three days later, the main forces of the army, allocated to participate in the exercise, crossed the Soviet-Czechoslovak border.

Already from the first meetings on Czechoslovak soil, it became clear that changes had occurred in the consciousness and behavior of a significant part of the Slovaks and Czechs. We did not feel the brotherly warmth and friendliness that distinguished our Czechoslovak friends before; we became wary. On July 22, a group of senior officers of the Czechoslovak People's Army arrived at the headquarters of our army... On behalf of the Minister of National Defense of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, they posed questions to us: why, contrary to the promise given by Marshal I. I. Yakubovsky to withdraw Soviet troops by July 21, they are still in the area teachings; for what reasons are we delayed and what are our future plans... We find ourselves in a difficult situation.”

Only in early August, after repeated demands from the Czech government, did units of the 38th Army return to their garrisons. Let us again give the floor to S. M. Zolotov: “Soon I received the command to return to the army command post. There was a lot of work to be done here to familiarize ourselves with new units and formations... In addition to the regular army formations, there were already transferred divisions from other regions here. Together with the commander, I visited these formations and talked with people. Although there was no direct talk about a possible push across the Czechoslovak border, the officers understood why such a powerful group of troops was being created in Transcarpathia. “On August 12, the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, arrived in our troops.”

But even earlier, in mid-July, the leaders of the USSR, Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria and Hungary gathered in Warsaw to discuss the situation in Czechoslovakia. At the meeting, a message was developed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, demanding the adoption of energetic measures to restore “order.” It also said that the defense of socialism in Czechoslovakia is not a private matter of this country only, but the direct duty of all countries of the socialist community.

Consultations and exchanges of views between Soviet leaders and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia began in Czerne nad Tisou. As a result, by August 3, when a joint communiqué was signed at the Bratislava meeting of communist parties, it had already been possible to create a split in the ranks of the leadership of the Czech Communist Party. In Bratislava, it was decided that “the defense of the gains of socialism. is. the international duty of all fraternal parties."

The Czechs themselves also did not exclude the possibility of using their own armed forces within the country. Thus, Defense Minister Dzur considered the possibility of dispersing demonstrations in front of the building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia with the help of army armored personnel carriers, and Dubcek at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee on August 12 directly stated: “If I come to the conclusion that we are on the verge of a counter-revolution, then I myself will call in the Soviet troops.”

An analysis of the statements of Western politicians suggested that the United States and NATO would not interfere in the conflict. The main reason for such optimism was the statement of US Secretary of State D. Rusk that the events in Czechoslovakia are a personal matter, first of all, of the Czechs themselves, as well as other Warsaw Pact countries (a similar statement was made during the Hungarian crisis, then the Americans did not officially intervene) . Thus, the intervention of NATO and US armed forces in the conflict was not expected, at least at the first stage, until serious resistance was put up.

At an extended meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on August 16, a decision was made to send troops. This decision was approved at a meeting of leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries in Moscow on August 18. The reason was a letter of appeal from a group of Czech party and government officials to the governments of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries to provide “international assistance.” As a result, a decision was made to change the country's political leadership during a short-term military intervention. After completing this mission, the main group of troops was supposed to be immediately withdrawn, leaving only a few units to stabilize the situation.

On the same day, August 18, the entire leadership of the Armed Forces, the commanders of the armies that were destined to go to Czechoslovakia, gathered in the office of the USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal Grechko. The subsequent conversation is known from the words of the commander of the 38th Army, General A. M. Mayorov:

“The assembled marshals and generals waited for a long time for the late minister, already guessing what would be discussed. Czechoslovakia has long been the number one topic around the world. The minister appeared without preamble and announced to the audience:

I just returned from a Politburo meeting. A decision was made to send troops from the Warsaw Pact countries into Czechoslovakia. This decision will be implemented even if it leads to a third world war.

These words hit those gathered like a hammer. No one imagined that the stakes were so high. Grechko continued:

With the exception of Romania - it does not count - everyone agreed to this action. True, Janos Kadar will present the final decision tomorrow morning, Monday. He has some complications with members of the Politburo. Walter Ulbricht and the GDR Minister of Defense prepared five divisions for entry into Czechoslovakia. Politically this is not yet feasible. It's not 1939 now. If necessary, we will connect them too.

After a short pause, while those present considered what they had heard, the minister demanded a report on the readiness of the troops for the operation and gave the last instructions:

Commander of the first tank!

Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Kozhanov!

Report back.

The army, Comrade Minister, is ready to complete the task.

Fine. The main attention, Comrade Kozhanov, is the rapid advance of the army from north to south. Bring four divisions to the west... Keep two divisions in reserve. KP - Pilsen. Of course, in the forests. The army's area of ​​responsibility is the three northwestern and western regions of Czechoslovakia.

Commander of the Twentieth Army!

Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Velichko.

Report back.

The army is prepared to carry out the task you have assigned.

Fine. Commander, 10–12 hours after “H”, one, or better yet two divisions, you should link up with the airborne division in the area of ​​the Ruzine airfield southwest of Prague.

The commander of the airborne troops, Colonel General Margelov, who was excited by the upcoming operation, expressed himself most temperamentally:

Comrade Minister, the airborne division is on time... We will smash everything to smithereens."

The direct preparation of the group of Soviet troops for the invasion, already under the personal leadership of Defense Minister Grechko, began on August 17–18. Draft appeals to the people and army of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, a government statement from the five participating countries and a special letter to the leaders of the communist parties of Western countries were prepared. All prepared documents emphasized that the deployment of troops was only a forced measure taken in connection with “the real danger of a counter-revolutionary coup in Czechoslovakia.”

Il-14–30D (according to NATO classification - Crate) was intended to transport 30 paratroopers or 3 tons of cargo

During the direct training of troops, a white stripe was applied to armored vehicles - a distinctive feature of Soviet and other “friendly” troops being brought in. All other armored vehicles were subject to “neutralization” during the operation, preferably without fire damage. In case of resistance, “stripeless” tanks and other military equipment were subject, according to the instructions communicated to the troops, to destruction immediately upon opening fire on our troops. When meeting, if something like this happens, with NATO troops, they were ordered to immediately stop and “do not shoot without a command.” Naturally, no “sanction from above” was required to destroy the Czech equipment that opened fire.

The last time the date and time for the start of the operation was clarified and finally approved was August 20, approximately late in the evening. According to the general plan, during the first three days, 20 divisions of the countries participating in the Warsaw Warsaw Forces enter Czechoslovakia, and in the following days, another 10 divisions are introduced. In case the situation worsens, 6 of the 22 military districts of the USSR (which is 85–100 combat-ready divisions) are put on heightened combat readiness. All forces armed with nuclear weapons had to be brought to a state of full combat readiness. In Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Bulgaria, an additional 70–80 divisions were deployed to wartime levels to be deployed if necessary.

By August 20, all preparatory activities were completed. Formations of the 1st Guards Tank, 20th Guards Combined Arms and 16th Air Armies of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, 11th Guards Combined Arms Army of the Baltic Military District, 5th Guards Tank and 28th Combined Arms Armies of the Belarusian Military District, 13 1st, 38th combined arms armies and 28th Army Corps of the Carpathian Military District, 14th Air Army of the Odessa Military District - up to 500 thousand people in total. (of which 250 thousand were in the first echelon) and 5,000 tanks and armored personnel carriers were ready for action. Army General I. G. Pavlovsky was appointed commander-in-chief of the group of Soviet troops.

However, even on the eve of the deployment of troops, Marshal Grechko informed the Czechoslovakian Defense Minister about the impending action and warned against resistance from the Czechoslovak armed forces.

The political and state leadership of the country was “temporarily neutralized,” which was not in the plan approved in advance. But it was necessary to stop possible incidents like the speech of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on Prague radio. A reconnaissance company led by Lieutenant Colonel M. Seregin captured the building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia at seven o'clock in the morning, disarming the guards and cutting all telephone wires. A few minutes later, the paratroopers already burst into the room where the Czechoslovak leaders were meeting. To the question of one of those present: “Gentlemen, what kind of army has come?” - followed the exhaustive answer:

It was the Soviet army that came to defend socialism in Czechoslovakia. Please remain calm and remain in place until our representatives arrive; security of the building will be ensured.

Fighting on the streets of Prague - the outcome is clearly a foregone conclusion...

Soviet BTR-152 on a city street

At seven o'clock in the afternoon on August 21, the entire Czechoslovak leadership, on two armored personnel carriers, under the escort of paratroopers, was taken to the airport and flown by plane to Legnica (Poland), to the headquarters of the Northern Group of Forces. From there they were transported to Transcarpathia, and then to Moscow for negotiations with Soviet leaders.

Column of T-54A with identification stripes “friend or foe”

Some of the paratroopers took up positions along the highway from the airfield to Prague in order to stop possible attempts by the Czechoslovak army to prevent the invasion. But at about four in the morning, instead of Czech cars, blinding the soldiers with headlights, the first column of Soviet tanks from the 20th Guards Army thundered.

A few hours later, the first Soviet tanks with white stripes on the armor appeared on the streets of Czechoslovak cities so that they could distinguish their vehicles from similar Czech tanks. The roar of tank diesel engines and the roar of caterpillars woke up peacefully sleeping townspeople that morning. On the streets of morning Prague, even the air was infused with tank smoke. Some people, both soldiers and civilians, had an uneasy feeling of war, but in general one can notice that for the most part the Czechs turned out to be passive - the introduction of troops aroused curiosity rather than fear in them.

The main role in the operation to establish control over the situation in the country was given to tank formations and units - the 9th and 11th Guards Tank Divisions of the 1st Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General of Tank Forces K. G. Kozhanov from the GSVG, 13th Guards tank division from the Southern Group of Forces, the 15th Guards Tank Division of Major General A. A. Zaitsev from the Belarusian Military District, the 31st Tank Division of Major General A. P. Yurkov from the 38th Combined Arms Army of the Carpathian Military District and tank regiments of motorized rifle divisions.

Given the difference in speed of movement, the Soviet command ordered the ground group to cross the border while the paratroopers were still preparing to land. At one in the morning on August 21, 1968, units and formations of the 38th Army of Lieutenant General A. M. Mayorov crossed the state border of Czechoslovakia. There was no resistance from the Czechoslovak side. The advanced motorized rifle division of Major General G. P. Yashkin covered 120 km in 4 hours.

At 4 a.m. the loss account was opened. 200 km from the border, near the small town of Poprad, a Volga stopped in front of a reconnaissance patrol of three T-55 tanks, in which the commander of the 38th Army, General Mayorov, was sitting. Lieutenant Colonel Shevtsov and the head of the Special Department of the Army, Spirin, approached the car, accompanied by KGB special forces (they were assigned to the general on the eve of the invasion, and they controlled his every step). Mayorov ordered Shevtsov:

Lieutenant Colonel, find out why the tanks stopped.

Before the general could finish speaking, one tank rushed towards the Volga. Spirin grabbed Mayorov by the shoulder and pulled him out of the car. The next moment, the Volga crunched under the tank’s tracks. The driver and radio operator sitting in the front seats managed to jump out, and the sergeant sitting next to the general was crushed.

What are you bastards doing?! - the army commander yelled at the tank commander and driver, who jumped to the ground.

We need to go to Trencin... Mayorov ordered,” the tankers made excuses.

So I am Mayorov!

We didn’t recognize you, Comrade General...

The cause of the accident was fatigue of the driver.

Having stopped the car to transfer control to a replacement, he left the tank on the brake without turning off the first gear, and forgot to say about it. The driver started the car and released the brake. The tank jumped onto the Volga standing in front of it. Only a happy accident saved General Mayorov from death, otherwise the whole army could find itself without a commander in the very first hours of its stay on foreign soil.

By the end of August 21, the troops of the 38th Army entered the territory of Slovakia and Northern Moravia. Ordinary citizens began the fight against uninvited guests. In Prague, young people hastily tried to build flimsy barricades, sometimes throwing cobblestones and sticks at the military personnel, and removing signs with street names. The equipment that suffered the most was left unattended, even for a second. During the first three days of our stay in Czechoslovakia, 7 combat vehicles were set on fire in the 38th Army alone. Although there were no hostilities, there were still losses. The most impressive and tragic feat was performed on a mountain road by a tank crew from the 1st Guards Tank Army, who deliberately sent their tank into the abyss to avoid hitting the children posted there as pickets.

The Soviet BTR-40, despite its obsolescence, again performed very well on paved roads

At five o'clock in the morning, the first Soviet T-55 tank appeared on the right bank of the Vltava. He stopped at the main entrance and turned his gun towards the building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. He was followed by dozens of other combat vehicles. The commander of the 20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division was appointed commandant of the city. Several thousand tanks appeared on the streets of Czechoslovak cities, marking the end of the Prague Spring.

T-55 and next to it a German anti-tank gun from the Second World War Pak-37

All power in the country ended up in the hands of the mysterious “General Trofimov,” who for some reason appeared in public wearing a colonel’s uniform. Only a few knew who this man was, who passionately wished to remain anonymous. The role of a simple army general was played by K. T. Mazurov, a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Sending his comrade-in-arms on a “combat mission,” Brezhnev admonished him:

We need to send one of us to Prague. The military can do such a thing there... Let Mazurov fly.

General I. G. Pavlovsky, who led Operation Danube, described the events of those days as follows: “I received my appointment on August 16 or 17, three to four days before the start of the operation. Initially, it was planned to put Marshal Yakubovsky at the head of the allied forces. He organized all practical training. Suddenly Defense Minister Grechko calls me: “You are being appointed commander of the formations that will enter Czechoslovakia.”

I flew to Legnica (in Poland), to the headquarters of the Northern Group of Forces. I found Yakubovsky there. He showed on the map which divisions were leaving from which direction. The start of the operation was scheduled for August 21 at zero one o'clock. Grechko warned: “The team will be from Moscow, your job is to ensure that it is carried out.” At the appointed hour the troops left.

And then Grechko called again: “I just spoke with Dzur (Minister of National Defense of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic) and warned that if the Czechs, God forbid, open fire on our troops, it could end badly. “I asked to give a command to the Czechoslovak units not to move anywhere, not to open fire, so that they would not offer resistance to us.” After the troops left, about an hour later, Grechko called again: “How are you?” I report: such and such divisions are there. In some places people take to the roads and create rubble. Our troops are avoiding obstacles... He warned me not to leave the command post without his permission. And suddenly a new call: “Why are you still there? Fly to Prague immediately!”

We flew up to Prague, made two or three circles over the airfield - not a single person. Not a single voice is heard, not a single plane is visible. We sat down. With Lieutenant General Yamshchikov, who met me, we went from the airfield to the General Headquarters to see Dzur. We immediately agreed with him: that there should be no fights between our soldiers and that no one would think that we had arrived with some tasks to occupy Czechoslovakia. We brought in troops, that's all. And then let the political leadership sort it out.

The Soviet embassy recommended meeting with the President of Czechoslovakia L. Svoboda. I took with me a Hungarian general, our German one. I said: “Comrade President, you know, troops of the Warsaw Pact member states entered Czechoslovakia. I came to report on this issue. And since you are an army general and I am an army general, we are both military. You understand, the situation forced us to do this.” He replied: “I understand...”.

Two decades later, in 1988, I. G. Pavlovsky admitted the fact that “the attitude of the population towards us was not friendly. Why did we come there? We scattered leaflets from the plane, explaining that we entered with peaceful intentions. But you yourself understand that if I, an uninvited guest, come to your home and start giving orders, you won’t like it very much.”

The Czechoslovak army did not offer resistance, showing its discipline and loyalty to the orders of its superiors. For this reason, large casualties were avoided.

T-55 took a position on the streets of Prague

However, there were still losses: during the deployment of troops from August 21 to October 20, 1968, as a result of hostile actions of individual Czechoslovakian citizens, 11 military personnel, including 1 officer, were killed. During the same period, 87 people were wounded or injured, including 19 officers. On the Czechoslovak side, from August 21 to December 17, 1968, 94 civilians were killed and 345 were seriously injured.

From a military point of view, it was a brilliantly prepared and executed operation, which came as a complete surprise to the NATO countries.

In total, in the first three days, according to the plan, 20 foreign divisions (Soviet, Polish, Hungarian and Bulgarian) entered the territory of Czechoslovakia, and in the next two days - another 10 divisions.

However, despite the military success, it was not possible to immediately achieve political goals. Already on August 21, a statement appeared from the XIV Extraordinary Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which condemned the introduction of troops. On the same day, representatives of a number of countries spoke at the Security Council with a demand to bring the “Czechoslovak issue” to a meeting of the UN General Assembly, but consideration of this issue was blocked by the “veto power” of Hungary and the USSR. Later, the representative of Czechoslovakia demanded that this issue be removed from the agenda of the General Assembly.

Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania and China condemned the “military intervention of five states.” However, most of these “protests” were purely declarative in nature and could not have a noticeable impact on the situation.

"Striped" T-54

The heads of the main states of Western Europe, and indeed the United States, considered the Prague Spring and the related disagreements within the Eastern Bloc a “domestic squabble of the communists” and avoided such interference in the affairs of Eastern Europe, which could be regarded as a violation of the results of Yalta and Potsdam. Another aspect was the ongoing negotiations on arms limitation, which began to take on real features (in 1972, an ABM treaty would be concluded), and interference in the internal affairs of the countries participating in the Warsaw Warsaw War could nullify the entire progress of these negotiations.

But, despite the “non-interference” of the West, there was no quick normalization of the situation. The expectation of receiving broad support from opposition groups also did not materialize. The successful military action, as noted in one of the documents, “was not accompanied by the mobilization of healthy forces in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.” Moreover, as one of the Czechoslovak reformers M. Miller put it, the “healthy forces” were suppressed and frightened, faced with the unanimous condemnation of the “interventionists” and their assistants from Czechoslovak society.

Finding themselves in a political deadlock on this issue, the Soviet side was forced to return to its previous policy. Since it was not possible to form a “revolutionary workers’ and peasants’ government,” we had to return to attempts to put pressure on A. Dubcek and his colleagues in order to direct his domestic policy in the right direction. But now the position of the Soviet side was already much stronger - the Czechoslovak leaders brought to Moscow signed a corresponding agreement, and the presence of allied troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia gave a certain carte blanche.

The new line of “normalization” began to be implemented immediately, during the visit of the Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia O. Chernik to Moscow on September 10. The Czech comrades were promised not only significant economic assistance, but also certain political pressure was exerted on them. Demanding that Chernik immediately implement the Moscow Agreement, the Politburo insisted that the precondition for the withdrawal or reduction of Allied troops was “a complete cessation of the subversive activities of anti-socialist forces and the granting of conservative leaders a more active role in political life.”

After three weeks, the situation in Prague and other large cities of Czechoslovakia had almost completely stabilized: the President of Czechoslovakia L. Svoboda appointed a new government, which immediately declared the importance of friendship and close cooperation with the socialist countries.

Sometimes the “striped” ones burned

On September 10–12, the main formations and units of the Soviet troops and troops of the countries participating in the Warsaw Warsaw War were withdrawn and headed to their places of permanent deployment. By November 4, 1968, 25 divisions had been withdrawn from the country.

"We're here for a while..."

And on the territory of Czechoslovakia until 1991, the Central Group of Forces of the Soviet Army remained, which included the 15th Guards and 31st Tank Divisions, the 18th, 30th Guards, and 48th Motorized Rifle Divisions. When signing the agreement on the temporary presence of a group of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia (this happened on October 16), it was determined that its strength could not exceed 130 thousand people. This force was quite sufficient to stabilize the situation, taking into account the fact that the Czechoslovak army at that time numbered 200 thousand people. When confirming Colonel General A. Mayorov for the post of commander, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev told him as parting words: “The Group’s troops will be stationed temporarily under the agreement. But it’s not without reason that they say: there is nothing more permanent than temporary. We are talking, Alexander Mikhailovich, not about months, but about years.”

The Central Military Command proved its effectiveness already at the end of 1968, when our troops managed to disrupt a major anti-government political strike. Democratic forces have scheduled mass political demonstrations for December 31. However, the day before, in accordance with the commander’s pre-developed plan called “Gray Hawk”, 20 Soviet motorized rifle and tank battalions were introduced into all major cities “to control order” during the demonstration - anti-government demonstrations did not take place. The usual demonstration of equipment was enough; there was no need to use weapons.

The situation in the country began to gradually normalize only in mid-1969, when the reorganization of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the government of Czechoslovakia was completed (that is, when the main “troublemakers” were politically isolated).

Well, the events in Czechoslovakia were then considered for quite a long time in military academies as an example of the clear organization and conduct of a large-scale operation in the European theater of operations to provide “fraternal assistance to friends and allies.”

However, in 1989, the last Soviet leader M. S. Gorbachev officially admitted that the introduction of troops was an unlawful act of interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign country, which interrupted the democratic renewal of Czechoslovakia and had long-term negative consequences. In 1991, the Central Military Command was liquidated as soon as possible, and the troops were withdrawn to their homeland.

A few years later, the “democratic” traditions, so praised by the first and last president of the USSR M. S. Gorbachev, finally took over, and the country, which had collapsed into two sovereign states (Czech Republic and Slovakia), entered into the American program of “NATO expansion to the East.”

Notes:

15 developing countries have ballistic missiles in service, and another 10 are developing their own. Research in the field of chemical and bacteriological weapons continues in 20 countries.

Mayorov A. M. Invasion. Czechoslovakia. 1968. - M., 1998. S. 234–235.

Quote by: Drogovoz I.G. Tank sword of the Soviet country. - M., 2002. P. 216.

USA, England, France, Canada, Denmark and Paraguay.

Quote from: Russia (USSR) in local wars and military conflicts of the second half of the 20th century. - M., 2000. P. 154.

Mayorov A. M. Invasion. Czechoslovakia. 1968. - M., 1998. P. 314.

On the night of August 21, 1968, the temporary entry of troops of the USSR, the People's Republic of Bulgaria (now the Republic of Bulgaria), the Hungarian People's Republic (now Hungary), the German Democratic Republic (GDR, now part of the Federal Republic of Germany) and the Polish People's Republic (now the Republic of Poland) to the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR, now the independent states of the Czech Republic and Slovakia) in accordance with the then understanding of the leadership of the Soviet Union and other participating countries of the essence of international assistance. It was carried out with the goal of “defending the cause of socialism” in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, preventing the loss of power by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC), and the country’s possible withdrawal from the socialist commonwealth and the Warsaw Pact Organization. (OVD).

By the end of the 1960s, Czechoslovak society was faced with a set of problems, the solution of which was not possible within the framework of the Soviet-style socialist system. The economy suffered from disproportionate development of industries, loss of traditional sales markets; democratic freedoms were virtually absent; national sovereignty was limited. In Czechoslovak society, demands for radical democratization of all aspects of life grew.

In January 1968, the President of Czechoslovakia and the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Antonin Novotny, was removed. A representative of the liberal wing of the Communist Party, Alexander Dubcek, was elected leader of the Communist Party, and Ludwik Svoboda became the President of Czechoslovakia. In April, the program of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was published, which proclaimed a course for the democratic renewal of socialism and provided for limited economic reforms.

Initially, the leadership of the USSR did not interfere in the internal party problems of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, but the main features of the proclaimed “new model” of socialist society (synthesis of a planned and market economy; relative independence of state power and public organizations from party control; rehabilitation of victims of repression; democratization of political life in the country, etc.) ) went against the Soviet interpretation of Marxist-Leninist ideology and caused alarm among the leadership of the USSR. The possibility of a “chain reaction” in neighboring socialist countries led to hostility towards the Czechoslovak “experiment” not only of the Soviet, but also of the East German, Polish and Bulgarian leadership. The Hungarian leadership took a more restrained position.

From a geopolitical point of view, a dangerous situation arose for the USSR in one of the key countries of Eastern Europe. As a result of Czechoslovakia's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, there would be an inevitable undermining of the Eastern European military security system.

The use of force was considered by the Soviet leadership as the last alternative, but nevertheless, in the spring of 1968, it decided on the need to take measures to prepare its armed forces for operations on the territory of Czechoslovakia.

The deployment of troops was preceded by numerous attempts at political dialogue during inter-party meetings of the leadership of the CPSU and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, mutual visits of government delegations, multilateral meetings of the leaders of Czechoslovakia and socialist countries. But political pressure did not produce the expected results. The final decision to send troops into Czechoslovakia was made at an expanded meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on August 16, 1968 and approved at a meeting of the leaders of the Warsaw Pact member states in Moscow on August 18, based on an appeal from a group of party and government officials of Czechoslovakia to the governments of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries with request for international assistance. The action was planned as short-term. The operation to bring in troops was codenamed "Danube", and its overall leadership was entrusted to Army General Ivan Pavlovsky.

Direct training of troops began on August 17-18. First of all, equipment was prepared for long marches, supplies were replenished, work maps were worked out, and other activities were carried out. On the eve of the deployment of troops, Marshal of the Soviet Union Andrei Grechko informed the Minister of Defense of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Martin Dzur about the impending action and warned against resistance from the Czechoslovak armed forces.

The operation to send troops into Czechoslovakia began on August 20 at 23.00, when the alarm was announced in the involved military units.

On the night of August 21, troops of the USSR, Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria crossed the Czechoslovak border from four directions, ensuring surprise. The movement of troops was carried out in radio silence, which contributed to the secrecy of the military action. Simultaneously with the introduction of ground forces to the airfields of Czechoslovakia, contingents of airborne troops were transferred from the territory of the USSR. At two o'clock in the morning on August 21, units of the 7th Airborne Division landed at an airfield near Prague. They blocked the main facilities of the airfield, where Soviet An-12 military transport aircraft with troops and military equipment began to land at short intervals. The paratroopers were supposed to take control of the most important state and party facilities, primarily in Prague and Brno.

The rapid and coordinated entry of troops into Czechoslovakia led to the fact that within 36 hours the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries established complete control over Czechoslovak territory. The troops brought in were stationed in all regions and major cities. Particular attention was paid to protecting the western borders of Czechoslovakia. The total number of troops directly taking part in the operation was about 300 thousand people.

The 200,000-strong Czechoslovak army (about ten divisions) offered virtually no resistance. She remained in the barracks, following the orders of her Minister of Defense, and remained neutral until the end of events in the country. The population, mainly in Prague, Bratislava and other large cities, showed discontent. The protest was expressed in the construction of symbolic barricades on the path of the advance of tank columns, the operation of underground radio stations, the distribution of leaflets and appeals to the Czechoslovak population and military personnel of the allied countries.

The leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was actually arrested and taken to Moscow. However, the political goals of the action initially failed to be achieved. The plan of the Soviet leadership to form a “revolutionary government” from Czechoslovak leaders loyal to the USSR failed. All sectors of Czechoslovakia's society came out sharply against the presence of foreign troops on the country's territory.

On August 21, a group of countries (USA, England, France, Canada, Denmark and Paraguay) spoke at the UN Security Council demanding that the “Czechoslovak issue” be brought to a meeting of the UN General Assembly, seeking a decision on the immediate withdrawal of troops from the Warsaw Pact countries. Representatives of Hungary and the USSR voted against. Later, the representative of Czechoslovakia demanded that this issue be removed from consideration by the UN. The situation in Czechoslovakia was also discussed in the NATO Permanent Council. The governments of socialist-oriented countries - Yugoslavia, Albania, Romania, and China - condemned the military intervention of five states. Under these conditions, the USSR and its allies were forced to look for a way out of this situation.

On August 23-26, 1968, negotiations took place in Moscow between the Soviet and Czechoslovak leadership. Their result was a joint communique, in which the timing of the withdrawal of Soviet troops was made dependent on the normalization of the situation in Czechoslovakia.

At the end of August, Czechoslovak leaders returned to their homeland. At the beginning of September, the first signs of stabilization of the situation emerged. The result was the withdrawal of troops of the countries participating in the action from many cities and towns of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to specially designated locations. Aviation concentrated on designated airfields. The withdrawal of troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia was hampered by persistent internal political instability, as well as increased NATO activity near the Czechoslovak borders, which was expressed in the regrouping of the bloc's troops stationed on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany in close proximity to the borders of the GDR and Czechoslovakia, and in conducting various types of exercises. On October 16, 1968, an agreement was signed between the governments of the USSR and Czechoslovakia on the conditions for the temporary presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia “in order to ensure the security of the socialist community.” In accordance with the document, the Central Group of Forces (CGV) was created - an operational territorial association of the Armed Forces of the USSR, temporarily stationed on the territory of Czechoslovakia. The headquarters of the Central Military Command was located in the town of Milovice near Prague. The combat strength included two tank and three motorized rifle divisions.

The signing of the agreement became one of the main military-political results of the entry of troops of five states, which satisfied the leadership of the USSR and the Warsaw Department. On October 17, 1968, the phased withdrawal of allied troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia began, which was completed by mid-November.

The action of the troops of the Warsaw Pact countries, despite the absence of military operations, was accompanied by losses on both sides. From August 21 to October 20, 1968, as a result of hostile actions by citizens of Czechoslovakia, 11 Soviet soldiers were killed, 87 people were wounded and injured. In addition, they died in accidents, due to careless handling of weapons, died from diseases, etc. another 85 people. According to the government commission of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, between August 21 and December 17, 1968, 94 Czechoslovak citizens were killed, and 345 people were injured of varying degrees of severity.

As a result of the entry of troops into Czechoslovakia, a radical change in the course of the Czechoslovak leadership occurred. The process of political and economic reforms in the country was interrupted.

In the second half of the 1980s, the process of rethinking the Czechoslovak events of 1968 began. In the “Statement of the leaders of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland and the Soviet Union” dated December 4, 1989 and in the “Statement of the Soviet Government” dated December 5, 1989, the decision on the entry of allied troops into Czechoslovakia was recognized as erroneous and condemned as unjustified interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign states.

On February 26, 1990, an agreement was signed in Moscow on the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia. By this time, the CGV was located in 67 settlements in the Czech Republic and 16 in Slovakia. The combat force included over 1.1 thousand tanks and 2.5 thousand infantry fighting vehicles, more than 1.2 thousand artillery pieces, 100 aircraft and 170 helicopters; the total number of military personnel was over 92 thousand people, civilian personnel - 44.7 thousand people. In July 1991, the Central Military Command was abolished due to the completion of the withdrawal of troops to the territory of the Russian Federation.

1896
Faina Georgievna Ranevskaya (nee Faina Girshevna Feldman)
Soviet actress. Born in Taganrog. Father - merchant of the 2nd guild Girsh Feldman. Mother, Milka Rafailovna (Zagovailova) is a fan of literature and art, a passionate admirer of A.P. Chekhov. From her, apparently, Faina inherited sensitivity, artistry, and a love of poetry, music, and theater. At the age of 14, Faina's passion for theater began. The first visits to the city theater left indelible impressions in the soul of the teenage girl, but she experienced a real shock in 1913, when she attended the play “The Cherry Orchard” by A.P. Chekhov on the stage of the Moscow Art Theater, where the stars of those years played. Under the influence of this play, the pseudonym “Ranevskaya” appeared. Faina Grigorievna studied at a private theater school. She considered Pavel Wulf, who would accept the largest enterprises - the “provincial Komissarzhevskaya”, as her teacher. She began her stage activities in 1915 at the Malakhovsky Dacha Theater (near Moscow). Then she played in Kerch, Rostov-on-Don, in the traveling “First Soviet Theater” in Crimea, Baku, Smolensk and other cities. She settled in Moscow in 1931, having already played dozens of roles. Ranevskaya's first stage successes were associated with her performances in sharp-character roles: Charlotte (The Cherry Orchard by A. Chekhov), Zmeyukina and Merchutkina (Wedding, Anniversary by A. Chekhov), Gulyachkina (Mandate by N. Erdman), Dunka ( “Yarovaya Love” by K. Trenev). Since 1931, F. Ranevskaya has been an actress at the Moscow Chamber Theater, and since 1933 at the Central Theater of the Red Army. In 1934 she began acting in films, and she immediately became widely known. Ranevskaya was equally successful in satirical, everyday, grotesque and dramatic images. Natural talent, incredible work ethic and dedication to art helped her become one of the most beloved actresses by viewers. Ranevskaya's talent was most fully revealed in the role of Vassa Zheleznova (1936) in the play based on the play of the same name by M. Gorky. The image of Vassa acquired both a tragic and satirical sound in her performance, and was distinguished by the depth and completeness of its psychological and social characteristics. In 1943-1949, Faina Ranevskaya worked at the Drama Theater (now the Mayakovsky Theater), where she played the role of Birdie in Lillian Helman's play “Little Chanterelles” (1945) with great success. In 1949-1955, Ranevskaya worked at the Mossovet Theater, and since 1955 she has been an actress at the Moscow Pushkin Theater. In 1963, Ranevskaya returned to the Mossovet Theater, where in 1966 she played the title role in the play by J. Patrick's The Strange Mrs. Savage. For thirteen years, Ranevskaya played the role of Lucy Cooper in the play “Next - Silence” (based on the play by V. Delmar) with great success. In the same performance, Faina Ranevskaya last appeared on stage on October 24, 1982. Ranevskaya's acting talent combined the fullness of realistic character development with a sharp, sometimes grotesque manner. The actress was fluent in all genres - from tragedy to farce. Faina Grigorievna Ranevskaya is more familiar to the general public from the films “Pyshka”, “Wedding”, “Man in a Case”, “Dream”, “Spring”, “Cinderella”, “Elephant and String”, “Foundling” (starred in her 20s films). Faina Ranevskaya was awarded the USSR State Prize three times. The editorial board of the English encyclopedia "Who is who" ("Who is who") included in the ten most outstanding actresses of the twentieth century (1992).
Faina Georgievna was distinguished in life by her sharp, merciless tongue. “You have to live in such a way that even the bastards remember you,” these are her words.
* * *
Ranevskaya was constantly late for rehearsals, Yu.A. Zavadsky was tired of this, and he asked the actors that if Ranevskaya was late again, then simply not notice her.
Faina Georgievna runs out of breath into the rehearsal:
- Hello!
Everyone is silent.
- Hello!
Nobody pays attention. Then she for the third time:
- Hello!
Same reaction again.
- Oh, there’s no one?! Then I'll go piss.
* * *
Oleg Dahl's favorite story about Ranevskaya:
It is filmed on location. In an open field. But Ranevskaya’s stomach is not good. She retires to a green house somewhere on the horizon. No and no, no and no. They send the dead man several times: has something happened? Ranevskaya responds, reassures, says that she is alive, and again she is not there and not. Finally he appears and majestically says: Lord! Who would have thought that there is so much shit in a person!
* * *
When the film "Foundling" was released, Ranevskaya's popularity, especially among children, reached its apogee. When Faina Georgievna walked down the street, a gang of boys ran after her and shouted: “Mulya! Mulya! Mulya!” Somehow she got very tired of this, she turned around, adjusted her pince-nez and said, grazing:
- Pioneers, go to hell!
* * *
When Ranevskaya was asked why she changed so many theaters in her life, she answered:
- When I was young, I experienced all types of love, except bestiality.
* * *
About her last theater in her life - the Mossovet Theater - she said:
“I have lived with many theaters, but have never experienced pleasure with any of them. Zavadsky’s rehearsals are a mass in chaos.”
* * *
"Starting in a bad movie is like spitting into eternity."
* * *
Faina Grigorievna said about her life: “I, by virtue of the talent given to me, squeaked like a mosquito.” “I spent my entire life swimming in the toilet butterfly style.”
* * *
Already at an advanced age, Faina Georgievna was walking along the street, slipped and fell. Ranevskaya lies on the sidewalk and shouts in her unique voice:
- People! Lift me up! After all, folk artists don’t lie on the road!
* * *
The images created by Ranevskaya are characterized by a combination of high drama and lyricism with comedy, realistic depth with satire and grotesqueness. The actress is fluent in the art of tragicomedy. Winner of the Stalin Prize (1949, 1951). She was awarded 2 orders and medals. Faina Grigorievna Ranevskaya gained legendary popularity, was awarded high titles and awards, and was friends with many outstanding people. She had everything except family and personal happiness: she never became either a wife or a mother. While I had strength, everything was occupied by the theater. Faina Grigorievna appeared on stage for the last time at the age of 86. In 1983, she left the theater, explaining that she was "tired of feigning health." no one knew then that she had the last year of her life left. F.G. Ranevskaya died on July 19, 1984, she was buried in the cemetery of the Donskoy Monastery in Moscow along with her sister Isabella. A memorial plaque was installed on the house in Taganrog where the actress was born in August 1986.
“Character actress? - Osip Naumovich Abdulov was perplexed. - Nonsense! She's a whole troupe. Yes Yes! In the old days, the entrepreneur selected actors based on their roles. So, Faina is a “heroine”, and a “travesty”, and a “grand coquette”, and a “noble father”, and a “hero-lover”, and a “fat”, and a “simpleton”, and a “soubrette”, and “dramatic crone” and “villain.” All roles are in her alone.” Now it’s clear: Ranevskaya is a one-man show. More precisely, a theater man. And the greatest injustice lies in the fact that such a person, in essence, never had “his own theater”, where he could replay to his heart’s content everything his heart desired. Faina Georgievna once sadly told the widow of Bertolt Brecht about this, who, being completely delighted with Manka the Speculator from the play “Storm,” “insistently asked” the actress to play Mother Courage. Y. Zavadsky then assured the playwright that he would certainly stage his play, but he did not keep his promise. Moreover, the ill-fated Manka, this tiny episodic role, entirely improvised by Faina Georgievna and, without exaggeration, became the highlight of the entire performance (“What are you digging?”), the theater management finally decided to “remove” from the historical-revolutionary “Storm” - from out of harm's way. And that’s the real problem with this Ranevskaya: as soon as she left the stage, most of the audience left the auditorium. At times she really made a role out of nothing. “One day a director called me and asked me to film with him,” said the actress. - When asked what the role was, he replied: “Actually, there is no role for you. But I really want to see you in my film. There is a pop in the script, and if you agree to act, I can make him a pop.”<…> This director was a talented, sweet man, Igor Savchenko. I remember how he put a cage of birds in front of me and said: “Well, talk to them, say whatever comes to your mind, improvise.” And I began to address the birds with the words: “My dear fish, you keep jumping and jumping, giving yourself no rest.” Then he led me to the nook where the pigs stood: “Well, now talk to the pigs.” And I say: “Well, my dear children, eat to your health.” Sometimes Ranevskaya’s irrepressible talent felt a little cramped even within the framework of a completely finished image. They wrote about her “Strange Mrs. Savage”: “Ranevskaya was immeasurably taller than her heroine. The whole, enormous personality of a brilliant actress hovers like “God’s spirit” over the play, over the role...” What a blessing that Faina Georgievna, in different years of her life, also plucked from her enormous “tart talent” (A.N. Tolstoy) for the children a little piece! This is how the funny and touching Lelya appeared from the comedy “Foundling” (“Mulya, don’t make me nervous”), the kind Grandmother from the film “The Elephant and the Rope”, the mischievous and charming Stepmother from Shvartsev’s “Cinderella”... It’s amazing, but also in “Cinderella” the great the actress managed to “get into co-authorship”, adding a number of witty, memorable lines of her own. Needless to say, any seemingly meaningless remark in Ranevskaya’s mouth turned almost into an aphorism. Miss Bok, voiced by her, from the cartoons about Carlson, was completely dispersed into quotes. According to rumors, the actress herself even grumbled in surprise about this: just think, she said a few words in front of the microphone, but the noise, the noise... But it’s really surprising. In the play “Storm” by V. Bill-Belotserkovsky at the State Academic Theater named after Mossovet, F. Ranevskaya played the small role of a speculator in such a way that this image became one of the brightest images of the play (from the collection of the radio fund, recording 1952). And the role of Lucy Cooper performed by F. Ranevskaya on the stage of the same theater in the play “Next - Silence ...” (directed by A. Efros) caused a real emotional shock among spectators and listeners - the performance was recorded in 1976 and is stored in the collection of the radio fund. The Radio Foundation also has a recording of scenes from the play “The Last Victim” by A. Ostrovsky. F. Ranevskaya - in the role of Glafira Firsovna. In search of “her own theater,” F. Ranevskaya more than once moved from one Moscow group to another. In the collection of the radio fund there is a recording of the play “The Law of Honor” by A. Stein of the Moscow Drama Theater (now the Moscow Academic Theater named after Vl. Mayakovsky). F. Ranevskaya - in the role of Nina Ivanovna, and scenes from the performance of the Moscow Drama Theater named after A.S. Pushkin “Trees Die While Standing” by A. Kason. F. Ranevskaya - in the role of Grandmother. The first radio play with the participation of F. Ranevskaya was recorded on the radio in 1946 - “David Copperfield” by Charles Dickens, in the role of Miss Trotwood. Cast: V. Sperantova, M. Yanshin, E. Fadeeva, O. Wiklandt and other artists of Moscow theaters. And in the radio play (one-act comedy) “According to Audit” she played a bright, characteristic role of Ryndychka. Other roles: M. Yanshin, N. Gritsenko, O. Wiklandt, A. Kubatsky. The “pearls” of the radio fund’s collection are the radio play “Granny” by F. Dostoevsky (based on the novel “The Player”), in the role of Granny, and the staged story by A. Chekhov “A Defenseless Creature”. Cast: F. Ranevskaya, O. Abdulov, N. Yakushenko. Over the years, F. Ranevskaya recorded on the radio the literary works of N. Leskov, A. Chekhov, V. Ardov. And in the recording of the program based on the works and with the participation of A. Barto, she sang two children's songs based on the poems of A. Barto: “At the corner, at the crossroads, they were green, like in a garden” and “I ask you, pioneers, protect the trees.” A recording of F. Ranevskaya’s speech about the beginning of her stage activity in 1915 at the Malakhovsky Dacha Theater near Moscow has been preserved. About the meeting with the wonderful actor Illarion Pevtsov and his influence on the future creative life of the actress. The collection of the radio fund also contains documentary recordings of speeches about F. Ranevskaya - Yu. Zavadsky, D. Zhuravlev, A. Adoskin, G. Bortnikov, A. Batalov, G. Volchek. They remember F. Ranevskaya’s spiritual generosity and charm, her high demands on herself, the roles she played in the theater, on the radio and in the cinema.