Battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Scharnhorst-class battleships

The author of the book talks about little-known facts about the death of the pride of the German Navy, the battleship Scharnhorst, in a strategically important battle during the Second World War. Trying to attack an Arctic convoy and cut off a sea route vital for the USSR, the powerful warship suffered a crushing defeat. Based on factual material, the book recreates the real picture of what happened on Christmas night 1943.

* * *

The given introductory fragment of the book The tragedy of the battleship Scharnhorst. Chronicle of the Last Campaign (Fritz-Otto Busch) provided by our book partner - the company liters.

Tragedy of the battleship Scharnhorst

Chronicle of the last campaign

In memory of the heroically fallen sailors of the battleship Scharnhorst

Introduction

Today, for many, the death of the Scharnhorst is nothing more than a distant event in half-forgotten history. Few people now know what actually happened, since severe wartime censorship restrictions did not allow all the details to be reported at the time. But since the events of that Arctic Christmas night in 1943 occupy an important place in the history of naval warfare, and since the importance of this event has finally been properly appreciated in our time, I consider it necessary to tell the full and accurate story of the sinking of this brave ship.

In 1940, the names of the German battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau appeared quite frequently in the British press. The Scharnhorst was first mentioned in connection with the sinking of the auxiliary cruiser Rawalpindi; then this name flashed in German press reports in connection with the death of the aircraft carrier Glories. Unfortunately, not a single sailor escaped from either the aircraft carrier or the escorting destroyers: Ecasta and Ardenta. Then for some time nothing was heard about Scharnhorst.

And suddenly, in the spring of 1941, the name of the battleship appeared in the news again. Several merchant ships were lost in the Atlantic, so the British navy and air force were sent to search for the ship. This operation continued for several months, but the Scharnhorst disappeared without a trace somewhere in the vast expanses of the Atlantic, swallowed by ocean fogs or hidden by the strong storms that rage in the Atlantic at this time of year.

Then the news came that Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had been brought to Brest. They are finally cornered! The British were confident that their aircraft would find the battleships and destroy them. British reconnaissance planes and bombers headed to this French port in the hope of destroying the battleships. But this did not happen. The Scharnhorst was very well hidden. Trees and bushes grew on its deck, and the camouflage netting was covered with leaves, making observation from the air difficult. True, the ship was still noticed in La Palisa, but the attacks that British planes were able to inflict did not cause serious damage to the battleship. British aircraft continued to pursue the ship for several months - but in vain. The Scharnhorst lay low, preparing for future actions and waiting for the opportunity to strike.

On February 12, 1942, the news spread: “German naval units: Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen are in the English Channel!” The Admiralty received this news with disbelief and amazement.

No one could believe how the ships could arrive unnoticed. All available British forces were immediately thrown towards the enemy - but this was not enough, since the most necessary naval units were located far to the north and could not intervene in time. One or two torpedo boats, several outdated torpedo bombers and bombers got involved in the battle with the German formations. Coastal artillery opened fire. But in vain. The breakthrough was achieved. Once again, accompanied by destroyers, torpedo bombers, torpedo boats, minesweepers and patrol ships, with the help of the Luftwaffe, the almost legendary Scharnhorst slipped out of the enemy trap.

Just under two years later the BBC broadcast the news that the Scharnhorst had been sunk by the British Navy 60 miles northwest of the North Cape. It happened at quarter past seven on the evening of December 26, 1943, Boxing Day.

Biography of the battleship

For sailors, a ship is something animate, having its own life and its own character. There are ships that seem gloomy and even angry; they, like some people, lack liveliness and warmth. Scharnhorst definitely had a soul. Moreover, this ship was beautiful. The wake behind it trembled with that amazing soft rocking motion that is characteristic only of the wake of a battleship. The ship seemed to radiate happiness, and this spirit spread to the entire crew, giving rise to pride that was felt by all the sailors of the Scharnhorst - from the captain to the most junior in rank.

With its grace, elegance, and harmonious lines, the Scharnhorst was, in the opinion of any sailor, very beautiful. Together with the same type battleship Gneisenau, from the very first days of the war she participated in so many military campaigns and victorious battles that she became the most famous ship in Germany. Its name was known in every German home. It became legendary back in the First World War, when another Scharnhorst, an armored cruiser, took part in the Battle of Coronel and was later sunk by superior forces off the Falkland Islands. During the four years of its eventful military career, the second Scharnhorst became a true symbol of good luck and success. Against the ever-changing background of the war, this ship indeed seemed to have a rare favor of fortune - and this impression is confirmed by the war diary of Captain Gissler, who served on the Scharnhorst from the day she first set sail until almost the day when the battleship sank.

The outbreak of war found the ship between the island of Heligoland and the Jade River, where it was undergoing testing after a long period in dock. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were the first battleships built after the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles were lifted. The ship was laid down in Wilhelmshaven in 1935, launched on October 3, 1936, and set out on its first voyage with a crew on January 7, 1939. Its first commander was Captain Ciliax. At that time, Scharnhorst was not yet ready for combat duty, much less for combat operations; In addition, what distinguished it from other ships launched was that its crew was recruited from various coastal units. Experimental overheated high-pressure steam boilers were installed on the battleship. The time to test this new equipment and other first-time and untested devices was sharply reduced by the outbreak of war. The same reason did not give the sailors the opportunity to sufficiently practice firing guns. In addition, due to Ciliax's illness, he had to be replaced by another captain, Kurt Caesar Hoffmann, who prudently and successfully commanded the ship in many operations until 1942.

The “big” ships, called “watchdogs on a chain” in the First World War for their inaction, will no longer rest at their bases doing nothing - they will have to go to sea to attack British merchant ships. Firing from naval anti-aircraft artillery at British aircraft is no longer the only purpose for which these new, powerful ships were built. Unfortunately (for the Germans), the heaviest guns had not yet been installed, and the main armament of the battleships consisted only of 11-inch guns mounted in three turrets of three guns each.

At the beginning of September 1939, after passing through the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal (work to deepen the canal had just been completed, the first time a ship with a displacement of 26,000 tons passed through it), the Scharnhorst moved to Kiel. New secret equipment was housed here, known at the time as "Dete" or "E.M." 2". These were radars. It is a paradox that it was the radars improved by the British that played an important role in the final sinking of the Scharnhorst.

On November 21, 1939, both battleships, transferred to Wilhelmshaven at the beginning of the month, moved down the Jade River. The fleet commander, Vice Admiral Marshall, raised his flag over the Gneisenau. On board the Scharnhorst, Captain Hoffmann announced over the ship's intercom the purpose of the operation - the destruction of enemy forces patrolling between Iceland and the Faroe Islands. The officers and sailors were surprised - during the First World War, none of the warships went so far beyond the territorial waters.

“We’re like rats crawling out of their holes,” the junior lieutenant remarked happily. “And we’ll show them that we can bite.”

The formation of battleships first headed north, passing first behind the so-called "Western Wall", a mine belt designed to protect the North Frisian Islands from attack. Orders were given to install observers at posts. To protect the battleships from enemy submarines, the ships were surrounded by destroyers. The radar antenna on the mast rotated ominously, but it couldn’t catch anything. On November 22 at 2 a.m. the mine belt was behind and the destroyers were released. Now the battleships set off on their own through the impenetrable darkness, without lighting lights, at a speed of about 27 knots. At about noon, the battleships passed through the narrowest passage between the Shetland Islands and the coast of Norway, covered by the Luftwaffe.

Soon the weather began to deteriorate. A southwest wind of force 7-8, long and high waves caused the ship to sway violently, which led to the first cases of seasickness. The guns were damaged due to huge waves hitting the sides. For the sailors, this was a new, previously unfamiliar experience, but it helped to establish closer contact between the ship and the crew. Changing course to the northwest, the battleships continued moving. On the night of November 22-23, they passed the Faroe Islands at a distance of thirty nautical miles and headed towards Iceland. Although visibility was excellent the next day, the battleship did not notice a single ship nearby. The intercepted radio messages also did not give anything encouraging, although it was possible to detect signals from British ships moving as part of large squadrons. At 16.07 a message came from the mast, which immediately put the captain's bridge on alert:

- There's a light on the starboard side, a big steamer! But it's very far away. The details are not yet visible.

“Must be a merchant ship,” suggested Captain Hoffmann, “or perhaps an auxiliary export cruiser.” I have to look at it myself.

The captain climbed onto the formars. After some time, his voice was heard over the intercom:

– The ship constantly changes course, it has no flag.

The order was given to approach the ship. Half an hour later, the captain announced a combat alert and returned to the bridge. He reported his observations to the admiral on board the Gneisenau. When the ship did not respond to orders to stop, Scharnhorst opened fire. The first shells began to explode. The ship returned fire bravely, but without success. Having started to burn, he put up a smoke screen and tried to retreat. At this time, the Gneisenau, hurrying from the south, also opened fire. When it began to quickly get dark, the ship had already turned into a torch, standing defenselessly in place. Morse code signals flashed through the curtain of smoke and flame. From the signal bridge of the Scharnhorst it was reported that the ship was asking for help.

There were boats floating around the ship. The Scharnhorst slowed down so they could come alongside and the survivors could board the battleship. But as soon as the second of the lifeboats approached the Scharnhorst, an order was received from the Gneisenau: “Stop the rescue operation immediately. Follow me". The captain looked questioningly at the first officer, who appeared on the bridge to report on the rescue operation; then a message came from one of the observers: “There is a pursuer right behind.”

Captain Hoffmann rushed to the intercom:

- Give back the painter! All cars full speed ahead!

The battleship headed east at high speed. The British cruiser Newcastle, approaching from behind, tried to catch up with the battleships - but he failed. He picked up the survivors of the ship's crew, which turned out to be an auxiliary cruiser converted from the R&O liner Rawalpindi, of 16,000 tons, whose brave commander, Captain Kennedy, had so heroically entered the battle without any chance of victory. Now the entire fleet of the British metropolis tried to intercept two German battleships near the British Isles - but to no avail. Meteorologists aboard the Scharnhorst predicted poor visibility and strong northerly winds off the Norwegian coast. For two whole days the battleships stood still, waiting for the south wind. Then suddenly the barograph readings dropped sharply. The ships moved south. On the night of November 25-26, with the help of strong winds, they were able to reach a speed of 27 knots on their way to Cape Stadlandet in Norway. The return to base took place in a fierce hurricane. Waves lashed across the deck, spray falling on the bow of the ship, both heavy ships were half in the water almost all the time. For the entire twenty-four hours, Hoffmann commanded the ship from the conning tower as the bridges were completely covered in water. Not far from Bergen, a lone trawler was spotted, which, desperately resisting the waves, moved across the battleships. The wind began to take a southerly direction, and because of this, the front towers began to flood. Near Jutland, the battleships were joined by German destroyers, and on November 27 the ships again anchored in the Jade River.

The first operation was successfully completed. Battleships have proven their worth. With their high speed and long range - the bunkers could hold 6,000 tons of fuel - they were ideal for surprise attacks on British merchant ships. But, and this was much more important, the successful operation in stormy conditions firmly united the team, which acquired sea-hardening, recognized their ship and its capabilities. Under the roar of the guns, the roar of the wind and the sound of the sea, the foundation was laid for that unique, lasting partnership that would later manifest itself so vividly.

In January 1940, tests were carried out in the Baltic, which remained unfinished. The winter was exceptionally cold, there was a severe frost. The ships moored to their buoys in Kiel were frozen into ice, so that on leave the sailors reached the shore on dry land; the sight of sailors wandering seemed outlandish. In March, one of the patrol ships broke the ice and the ships were ordered back to the North Sea for a new mission. To carry it out, it was necessary to wait for some time - like the troops at the Siegfried Line, who had to remain inactive during the “Phantom War”. Soon it became almost unbearable for the sailors to watch how, day after day, ice floes, dotted with seagulls, were carried out to sea with the morning low tide, only to return with the high tide in the afternoon. A short trip to Stavanger, during which nothing happened, broke up the monotony of waiting a little. Gradually the weather became warmer. The number of British air raids increased, which forced anti-aircraft gunners to work quite seriously during the daytime.

The Scharnhorst entered the port for a short time. Everyone was sure that the ship had an important mission ahead of it; however, no one could definitely say anything, and the team was filled with feverish impatience. And in fact, the order for the operation was kept in the secret compartment of the first assistant's desk. This document was called "Weserubung" - the code name for the task of occupying Norway and Denmark.

This daring undertaking was entrusted to the navy, and its execution depended entirely on absolute secrecy. On April 6, when the Scharnhorst was again in the roadstead, the fleet commander came aboard and informed the ship's crew of the upcoming operation. The team responded with joy and pride to the trust shown by the high command.

On the night of April 6–7, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau set sail. Before the island of Wangerooge, they were to be joined by the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper with four escort destroyers and a flotilla of ten destroyers - the so-called “Narvik group”, which later became famous off the coast of Northern Norway. As soon as the entire group connected, British planes suddenly moved towards it at low altitude. An alarming moment ensued, but fire from the Scharnhorst's anti-aircraft guns forced the British to turn, and they disappeared before they could see the other ships in the darkness. The formation moved at high speed in a northerly direction. At dawn, planes took off from the decks to provide air cover throughout the day, while destroyers surrounded the battleships, protecting them from submarines. At noon on April 7, near the Skagerrak, the ships raised the alarm:

- Enemy planes!

As soon as the reconnaissance aircraft approached the ships, anti-aircraft guns entered the battle. On all bridges, the same alarming question was discussed: did the enemy know the purpose of the operation? Why did the British come? Despite doubts and fears, the ships continued to move. The weather was still good. The exceptionally dark night of April 7–8 covered the connection with an impenetrable blanket. When the ships passed the North Sea between the Shetland Islands and Norway, the lookouts began to peer into the darkness of the night with redoubled attention, but to no avail. On the morning of April 8, the weather deteriorated sharply. The rough sea rocked the ships, the wind increased and became significantly colder. The escort ships had the hardest time; they were increasingly transmitting the signal: “We are being pursued by several units of enemy aircraft!”

The speed of the battleships was reduced so that the destroyers could catch up with them. Several escort ships, sailing closer to the Norwegian coast, entered into battle with British ships that same morning. The Admiral Hipper was ordered to turn and approach one of the German destroyers, the Bernd von Armin. On board the Scharnhorst, the captain discussed the situation with his second mate:

- I don't understand. British destroyers set to sea? But we haven't been told about British forces here, have we?

Corvetten-Captain Gissler shook his head:

- No, Herr Captain, not yet...

“Important message on the radio, Herr Captain,” the radio communications officer interrupted him. “A British warning about mines in a wide area off the Norwegian coast has just been intercepted. Apparently they have installed a new minefield here.

Captain Hoffmann studied the text carefully:

- What does it mean? Maybe they had the same idea as us? Do they want to protect themselves from us in order to occupy Norway with their naval forces? Come on, Gissler, let's look at the cards.

As they retreated to the chart room, the bridge officers began discussing the unexpected turn of events. Meanwhile, the ships continued to follow their course. Later, Admiral Hipper with her four escort destroyers left the Narvik group and headed for Trondheimsfjord. When the battleships reached the Westfjord in complete darkness at nine o'clock in the evening, they, in full accordance with the plan, freed all ten destroyers of the “Narvik group” (the flotilla intended to capture Narvik). Scharnhorst and Gneisenau remained near the Lofoten Islands overnight to cover the rear of the destroyer flotilla. A strong storm began, and the battleships had difficulty overcoming the waves, moving to save fuel at low speed. There was snowfall on the morning of April 8th, but overall the weather had improved and visibility was excellent at times. Taking advantage of this, the navigator of the Scharnhorst decided to determine the coordinates of the ship using a sextant. He raised his instrument - and instead of the star he expected, he saw in the mirror the red reflection of a shot from heavy guns!

- Anxiety!

The bell rang, the lookouts ran to their combat posts; Commands were quickly heard from the bridge, signals were given from the flagship, and the first targets for shooting were indicated. A few minutes later, the barrels of 11-inch guns fired with a roar at the enemy - a ship whose silhouette was faintly silhouetted in the west against the dark sky. In a thick snowstorm, two battleships hurried to the north at high speed. Rapid fire continued from 5.10 to 6.59; on the Scharnhorst they fired from the stern. Heavy 15-inch shells exploded close to the battleship, but the captain constantly changed course, which made it possible to dodge each new salvo.

But the British enemy could not compete with the German ships in speed; soon he remained far astern, and then completely lost in a snowstorm.

The Scharnhorst, thanks to its inherent luck, did not suffer any damage. Minor difficulties arose with the machine installation, but given the loads and the fact that the machines were experimental, these problems were to be expected; it didn't take much effort to overcome them.

For several hours the formation of ships sailed north, after which it changed direction to the west, almost reaching the longitude of the solitary rocky island of Jan Mayen.

Meanwhile, a radio message was received on board about the occupation of Norway and Denmark. Reports began to pour in of the British fleet at sea, of fierce air battles in the air and of pockets of resistance on the ground. The battleships themselves did not transmit information, since this could give away their location; The German high command still knew nothing about the artillery duel that had taken place. Only on April 10, a plane took off from the Scharnhorst using a catapult with the task of transmitting a radio message from the commander of the formation; this report was to be delivered to Trondheim and transmitted from there. The plane had to fly to its maximum range. With its tanks full, the Arado 196, piloted by First Lieutenant Schreck, took off; Senior Lieutenant Shreve was appointed observer on this plane. They had only a map of Trondheimsfjord on board - and not a single nautical chart. Could they get to Trondheim and sit next to the Admiral Hipper? Several hours passed in tense anticipation - until finally a message came from the Admiral Hipper that the plane had landed. This was an outstanding feat by the crew of the Arado. Later, the Scharnhorst learned that the commander of the heavy cruiser was very puzzled when an observer from an airplane appeared on his deck.

The battleships were supposed to rendezvous with the Narvik Group destroyer flotilla on their way back - but all ten of these ships were lost. The fuel situation now forced the battleships to return to base. Reports came from Germany that the English aircraft carrier Fueries had put to sea along with many other ships; he was most likely tasked with using aircraft against battleships. Therefore, the commander of the group gave the order to turn west, so that later, in the darkness of the night, being only 60 miles from the Shetland Islands, head south. And again bad weather came to the aid of the lucky ships. Unnoticed by the enemy, they arrived at the agreed meeting place at noon to join the Admiral Hipper and the destroyers protecting it. The ships stopped to allow the aircraft on board to take off in search of enemy submarines. Later, a British reconnaissance aircraft discovered the ships, after which bombers were sent several times to the area, which, however, did not detect the target in poor visibility conditions.

On April 12, the convoy dropped anchor at Wilhelmshaven. An important operation was successfully completed; the sailors went through a good school of war and could consider themselves real sea wolves. Now their faith in themselves, their officers and their ship became unshakable. A thorough inspection and repair of equipment and weapons required six weeks in dock. After this, the battleships and destroyers were again ready for action. Meanwhile, the situation for operations had changed decisively in Germany's favor. The campaign in France was coming to an end. Bases in the west and Norway have now become available. A route was opened through the Skagerrak and Danish waters, so that it was no longer necessary to bypass Denmark through the North Sea, subject to attack by submarines and aircraft. But the battle for Narvik was still ongoing, and its outcome remained in doubt. And it was the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Admiral Hipper, as well as a small number of destroyers, that were supposed to tip the scales in favor of Germany.

On June 4, 1940, the ships, again under the command of Vice Admiral Marshall, sailed from Kiel. They passed the barrier of German mines near Skagen and continued north. There was no definite information about the disposition of British naval forces; the possible presence of battleships in the Narvik area was assumed, as well as the exits of ships from Scapa Flow. Often it was necessary to notice periscopes in the sea - but the submarines were not provided with conditions for an attack. Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft, which could now fly from Trondheim, were able to cover a much larger area. The weather was mostly clear; During rare rains that severely limited visibility, radars were turned on to protect against unpleasant surprises. The destroyers, filled with fuel from the battleships, went along with them all the way this time. For the first time, the formation included a fuel ship, the Diethmarschen, from which the Admiral Hipper could refuel. At the reached longitude at this time the sun shone for almost all twenty-four hours, so refueling could be carried out without interference at any time.

While there was no fighting, the group commander ordered the captains to assemble aboard the flagship. Air reconnaissance of Harstad and Narvik was canceled due to bad weather off the coast, and therefore the admiral had no information about British ships operating in these areas. However, several small convoys were seen moving southwest in the immediate vicinity of the group. On the morning of June 8, all three heavy ships, accompanied by four destroyers, undertook a reconnaissance raid along a wide front and approached the convoys. Reconnaissance aircraft were launched from the battleships using catapults. Soon one of the German destroyers caught up with the tanker and after a short time sent it to the bottom. Several more ships were spotted from ships and planes - and they were also sunk by the Admiral Hipper and the destroyers. The German ships did not touch the hospital ship or even search them; as it later turned out, there were many German prisoners from Narvik on it. At noon, Admiral Hipper and the destroyers were ordered to return to Trondheim to resupply. "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" continued operations in the area of ​​​​Northern Norway. Since there was little air reconnaissance information, the group commander decided not to carry out the order to move to Harstad, limiting himself to actions against the convoys. He moved his battle group forward at 18 knots into the area between Harstad and Tromsø. On June 8 at 16.45 a message came from the Scharnhorst form that a cloud of smoke was visible for some time far ahead.

When the captain asked for details, lookout Goss explained:

“It was a short burst of smoke, like a jellyfish, the kind that happens when there are some problems with steam boilers. I definitely noticed his bearing.

- Combat alert! - Commanded Captain Hoffmann. He ordered to go at full speed in the direction indicated by the forward lookout.

Gneisenau repeated this maneuver. The distance to the unknown ship was rapidly decreasing, and soon a mast, then a squat pipe, and then the ship’s superstructures became visible above the horizon. When the range was first estimated it was 40 kilometers; After this, the senior artilleryman reported:

- Herr Captain, the ship is undoubtedly an aircraft carrier, perhaps it is the Glories with two escort destroyers!

The battleship's heavy guns opened fire from 25 kilometers away; soon after, the destroyers also began firing. The captain, standing with the first mate at the periscope, looked carefully at the aircraft carrier.

- Poor old devil! - he said. - We're lucky again. Two battleships against one aircraft carrier!

The very first salvo covered the deck of the ship, on which the planes were closely parked. Soon the flames turned the runway into a continuous zone of fire. A cloud of smoke covered the unlucky aircraft carrier.

“The destroyers came up with a cunning plan,” the first mate later recalled. “They used the same tactics that the British cruisers used against the Graf Spee on the River Plate.”

The destroyers were named Ardent and Ecasta; they tried in vain to cover their aircraft carrier Glories, while at the same time trying to attack the battleships. Direct hits damaged the superstructures of these brave ships; Despite the hopeless situation, the destroyers moved towards the battleships, hoping to fire torpedoes at close range. Meanwhile, the damaged Glories stood motionless in the middle of columns of water rising from the shells, in a thick cloud of smoke, from which flashes of explosions constantly burst out. Both battleships had to constantly maneuver due to torpedoes launched from the destroyers. The battle had been going on for almost two hours, but the British destroyers did not leave the heroic, but hopeless for them, battle. Forcing the battleships to tack, they confused the aim of the German artillerymen. At 18.39 a message was received from the Scharnhorst bridge:

– A strong explosion at the stern!

Individual reports began to arrive quickly, as if in a training exercise:

- Tower C is being evacuated. The ammunition is filled with water.

The Scharnhorst lost speed.

A rapidly increasing list to starboard soon became noticeable. After this, a report came from the engine room:

- One machine is still working. There was no precise information available regarding the other two. Perhaps a torpedo hit.

The speed dropped to 20 knots. One of the British destroyers sank, but the other was still firing, and its well-aimed hit disabled the gun in turret B. Scharnhorst again approached Gneisenau. At approximately 19.00, the second destroyer also sank.

- Combat alert cleared. Check the wounded.

The crew feverishly set to work; Damage control teams were struggling with water that the ship had already taken on at least 2,000 tons. In the engine room, Chief Engineer Liebhardt was attempting to assess the damage to the center and starboard engines. The port engine was still running. Forty sailors were killed, one tower was disabled. At a speed of 20 knots, the formation of ships headed to Trondheim, where they arrived on June 6. The damaged ship was parked here, and a group of mechanical specialists immediately began work to restore the battleship. After ten days of continuous operation, the central engine started working again. This was a magnificent achievement by the chief engineer and his subordinates, who, together with the crew of the Huascaran ship being repaired, had to work under regular raids by enemy aircraft. One bomb even hit the upper deck, but did not explode. The battleship's own aircraft were entirely occupied with tracking down submarines so that they could not approach Trondheims Fjord. On June 20, the Scharnhorst already had two engines running, and the ship was able to make the return trip. The starboard propeller had to be secured tightly, since it was suspected that the shaft had cracked when hit by a torpedo.

At a speed of 24 knots, the battleship, protected by fighters, left the port and moved along the coast towards the rocky islands of Sharena. On the afternoon of June 21, with strong winds, the Scharnhorst, accompanied by two destroyers and two torpedo boats, will leave the islands and move south. Soon the battleship spotted a British reconnaissance plane nearby. Could this reconnaissance aircraft direct British bombers to the formation? The answer to this question was not long in coming. Near Utsir Island, British planes continuously carried out raids for about two hours, dropping bombs and torpedoes. But the thick cover from anti-aircraft gun explosions made all these attempts fruitless. Several downed British bombers fell into the sea, leaving behind long plumes of smoke. On the Scharnhorst alone, these defensive measures resulted in the consumption of 900 4.1-inch shells, 1,200 37-mm shells, and 2,400 20-mm shells! At 18.15 the captain received a radio message from the Western group:

– Go to Stavanger! Captain Hoffmann read the order with bewilderment.

“Incomprehensible,” he said. “What’s the point of anchoring in this port?” However, they must have some reason for ordering us to go there...

A few hours later the ships dropped anchor in the narrow harbor of Stavanger. As it turned out, the Western group actually had serious reasons to give such an order - the naval command discovered from radio interceptions that almost the entire fleet of the metropolis had gone to sea in search of the Scharnhorst. But just an hour later, as it turned out, the battleship was already heading for the fjord. He got lucky. The next morning, aerial reconnaissance was able to report that the British fleet, consisting of at least four battleships, four cruisers and several destroyers, was returning to Scapa Flow.

Unnoticed by the enemy, the Scharnhorst, accompanied by an escort, again went to sea to slip into Kiel, where work immediately began on its repair.

This operation, in which the crew suffered its first losses, strengthened the sailors’ belief that the entire crew of the ship, from the captain to the sailors, formed a united union capable of overcoming any difficulties. The victorious battle, the dangerous return on a damaged ship, and the successful repulsion of numerous air raids strengthened the general belief that the Scharnhorst was sailing under a lucky star.

Repairs at the dock of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau took almost six months, and only in the fall did the battleships, ready for action, move to Gotenhafen.

Since it was now possible to operate from newly established bases on the west coast of France, the high command began to pay increasing attention to operations in the Atlantic. And so, at the end of 1940, both battleships, led by the new commander, Admiral Lutyens, left Kiel. In the northern part of the North Sea, a strong storm caused significant damage to the Gneisenau, and the entire formation was forced to turn back. But already on January 22, 1941, both ships were ready to leave the harbor again. The order delivered by Admiral Lutyens was unprecedented for German battleships: to wage war against merchant shipping in the North Atlantic. It was clear that with such a method of fighting, clashes with British combat units should have been avoided.

This operation was carefully planned and prepared. Many tankers were sent to the Atlantic with fuel, ammunition and other things needed to replenish supplies. At this time, other German warships were already operating in the Atlantic - the “pocket battleship” Admiral Speer, the heavy cruiser “Admiral Hipper”, a large number of auxiliary cruisers and submarines. This was a rather daring undertaking for the fleet, which before the start of the war had not yet gained strength and was not fully provided with ships.

On the dark night of the new moon, the formation of battleships headed for the southern part of Iceland, and on such a short winter daylight, on January 28, they entered the British trade route. Under the cover of darkness, the formation turned around and headed north, unnoticed by the British. The aircraft that took off from the ship transmitted a message to the Northern Group about the planned actions - first to refuel from the tanker Adria, located east of Jan Mayen, and then to penetrate into the Atlantic north of Iceland along the edge of the pack ice. Both tasks were completed successfully. On February 4, the commander was able to transmit a signal to his unit:

– For the first time in history, German battleships successfully broke into the Atlantic. Now let's get started with the operation!

Having once again refueled from a tanker south of Greenland, the ships began to look for convoys. Finally, on February 8, masts were noticed on the battleships. However, the Scharnhorst soon realized that the convoy was covered by the battleship Ramillies, and in accordance with the instructions they did not attack. Further searches along the northern convoy route were interrupted by severe storms, and Admiral Lutyens decided to move south, where, as had already become obvious, the convoy route had been shifted. It was getting warmer, and the sailors were glad, after a long stay in cold latitudes, to take off their fur and woolen clothes in order to put on something lighter. But the search came up empty again, even on the usually crowded highway between Freetown and Britain. Only one Greek ship was sunk. Refueling occurred approximately every eight days. The weather was fine; visibility was always acceptable. Planes constantly took off from the battleships for reconnaissance flights, but they were unable to see anything until March 7, when another convoy was spotted. For the first time, battleships operated alongside submarines; the battleships cooperated effectively with them during attacks on the convoy, again protected by a battleship, this time the Malaya. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had a share in the success of the U-boat operations, which sank a total of 43,000 ships in two nights. After this, operations moved back north to the route between North America and Great Britain. Two accompanying tankers made it possible to expand the search area. Successful actions against individual ships - these targets were approved by the commander of the formation - gradually increased the score; One ship after another went to the bottom. In less than two days, sixteen ships, with a total tonnage of 75,000, became victims of the battleships. After a long, tedious search, luck finally smiled. It was possible to organize the calculations in such a way that it was possible to sink ships by accurately hitting them at the very waterline. Raging seas and strong winds often made it impossible to bring those escaping on board the boats. All operations had to be carried out as quickly as possible, since the possibility of a sudden appearance of British naval forces had to be taken into account. On March 16 this is what happened. As soon as the Scharnhorst sank the ship, in the descending dusk a radio message came from one of the accompanying tankers:

- I see a battleship!

Fire was opened on the Gneisenau, which was close to the tanker. But the twilight and the onset of rain, which surprisingly often helped battleships in such moments, again allowed them to retreat safely.

Since there was already little prospect of any further success on this route, the operation was completed, and on March 22, 1941, exactly two months after sailing from Kiel, both ships entered a new base on the Atlantic, Brest. Never before had German battleships carried out operations of such a long duration. Although none of the convoys were sunk, it succeeded in creating confusion in British shipping and disorganizing the disposition of the British naval fleet, which from the German point of view was a remarkable success. In addition, it was hoped that the experience gained in the operation could be of serious use in subsequent operations, which were to be carried out in conjunction with the newly built battleship Bismarck. The behavior of the seafarers was again beyond praise - especially the engine room staff, who always performed their work to the required high standard, despite frequent technical problems. Again, fortune smiled on the brother ships.

The French shipyard in Brest, which took over the responsibilities of the shipyard in Wilhelmshaven, quickly carried out all the necessary repair work. However, British planes soon intervened; their raids became more and more difficult from time to time. During one of the bombings, which caused great damage to the city, a shell hit the Gneisenau, as a result of which repairs had to be extended. The Scharnhorst, the “lucky ship,” remained undamaged and was ready for action again by July 1941. By then, however, the British were able to corner and sink the Bismarck as it attempted to break into the Atlantic. The Prinz Eugen, which accompanied this battleship, was able to retreat safely and also found refuge in Brest. The Scharnhorst was now transferred to La Pallis, a port south of Brest. To test the superheater and other pieces of equipment, it needed to leave the harbor. Despite the carefully made camouflage, the battleship was discovered by British aircraft. On the afternoon of July 24, Scharnhorst, under a cloudless sky, was attacked by bombers flying at high altitude. Anti-aircraft fire and fighters could not disrupt the attacks. A row of five bombs hit the ship from stem to stern. Three heavy, armor-piercing bombs penetrated the upper deck but failed to explode. Two smaller bombs exploded on the gun deck but caused only minor damage. The ship took on 3,000 tons of water, but the resulting list could be compensated for; the broken cables were quickly repaired. But even now, the Scharnhorst’s luck did not abandon it, since miraculously no one was injured on the ship. The battleship returned to Brest at a speed of 27 knots - and, despite constant air raids and frequent changes of docks where repairs were carried out, both battleships were repaired by the end of 1941.

Meanwhile, the superiority of British and American troops was established in the Atlantic, and no one wanted to risk two battleships in the North Atlantic. The only opportunity to fight against cargo ships was provided by Arctic convoys moving north of Norway to Murmansk. But how can three large ships be safely transferred from Brest to German waters? After much deliberation, the high command decided to make a breakthrough across the English Channel. This was undoubtedly very dangerous, but provided absolute secrecy and surprise were maintained in the operation, there was a serious chance of success.

Detailed planning began immediately. Vice Admiral Ciliax, who had assumed command, was responsible for the initial preparations. Even before the ships were repaired, flotillas of minesweepers were sent to clear the passage of mines. Constant cover for the Luftwaffe was organized and provided. Two hundred and fifty aircraft could serve as a permanent “umbrella” over the ships. Enormous reserves of fuel were prepared in suitable places. New airfields were built, and communications were established between ships and fighters. The dense network of powerful British radars along the English Channel had to be paralyzed by interference - this also required detailed planning and numerous preparations. Finally, all seaworthy destroyers and torpedo boats had to be assembled at Brest, which meant that they had to be transferred west across the English Channel. Even these obvious preparations apparently went unnoticed by the British and did not arouse their suspicions. Rumors were deliberately spread about the upcoming operation in the Atlantic. The Luftwaffe regimental commander invited the admirals and captains to a grand hunt; elegant invitation cards were mailed. Various types of entertainment were organized in Brest and its surroundings - all methods of camouflage were used. The time of departure depended on the coincidence of several optimal weather conditions: low clouds and fog over the English Channel, a new moon and a strong tidal current in the direction of the ships. Finally, meteorologists were able to report the occurrence of the desired conditions. The minesweepers reported that the route had been cleared, the destroyers were assembled at Brest, and the planes stood ready to create a protective “umbrella” if necessary.

On the evening of February 11, 1942, night combat exercises were announced aboard the Scharnhorst. This made it possible to justify the creation of steam, which, of course, is necessary for such exercises. The release of steam was scheduled for 20.30. Most of the ends had already been given when ordinary British reconnaissance planes appeared over the port and snatched the ships from the darkness with flares. The port and ships had to be quickly covered with a smoke screen, and the formation was able to leave the harbor only two hours later than scheduled. The admiral sailed on the Scharnhorst. However, the concentration of escort ships, which was supposed to create a protective screen for the battleship, happened faster than expected, and one hour was made up. Until then, still only a few officers knew what was really going on. The Scharnhorst's officer of the watch, somewhat concerned about the lack of clear orders, asked the navigator:

– Do we have a new course?

Captain Gissler smiled:

– The next course is 20°. Tomorrow you will kiss your mother, wishing her good night in Wilhelmshaven!

The joy on the bridge, which was soon shared by the entire crew, was indescribable.

Protected by a screen of destroyers, the formation of battleships moved east at a speed of 27 knots. At 7.00 Cherbourg was passed, and at dawn air cover from fighters and light bombers appeared. At night, a flotilla of minesweepers discovered mines that had just been laid at the mouth of the Seine, but the formation passed through the minefield at reduced speed following the minesweepers, after the admiral gave the signal “The passage is marked by floating booms!” Soon, through the fog that had descended on the English Channel, as meteorologists had predicted, the gleaming white cliffs of Dover emerged. Single English planes appeared near the shore, however, they all immediately got shot down and fell into the English Channel, engulfed in flames. At noon, strictly according to schedule, the narrowest part of the channel between Dover and Cape Gris-Nay was passed. Until now, no countermeasures from the British have been noticeable. Why do enemy heavy coastal batteries continue to remain silent? The silence was unsettling. And finally, flashes of gunfire appeared from the fog. A single battery opened fire - its shells fell far on the left side, without causing any damage. The torpedo boats hastily set up a smoke screen. On the Scharnhorst, the officer navigating by stars remarked to the navigator:

– This looks like a training voyage for navigation practice.

As the route passes through many sandbanks near the Thames estuary, the English defenses finally became active.

One squadron of Swordfish torpedo bombers and another of Beaufighters attacked the unit, but both aircraft were shot down. Later, bombers began to attack the ships, one after another, but covering aircraft and the constant fire of the ship's anti-aircraft guns made accurate aiming impossible. The rain began to reduce visibility. The Scharnhorst had to change course frequently to avoid bombs; while the minesweepers continued their work. At 15.30, as soon as the formation passed the buoy ship, a strong explosion shook the entire ship so that it rose out of the water for some time. All engines stopped, the flow of electricity was cut off, and the ship suddenly plunged into complete darkness. Reports began to come in from various posts: for example, the engine room reported a slight ingress of water and that the engines would have to be stopped for a while.

The admiral quickly gave the command to the destroyer to stand nearby and went on board. Whatever happens, he must fulfill the duties of squadron commander.

While the Gneisenau and the Prinz Eugen continued to follow their course, screened by the escort ships, the Scharnhorst was doomed to remain in place for half an hour. But luck smiled on the ship again, since all this time not a single plane was seen in the sky. Finally, a report was received releasing the ship from forced captivity:

– The left engine is running.

The Scharnhorst set off again. Soon all three engines were in order, and at 16.04 the battleship was again sailing at a speed of 27 knots. The ship was protected by several torpedo boats. The other ships were already far ahead. Over the radio, the Scharnhorst learned that the formation had entered into battle with an enemy cruiser and destroyers. The attacks of six hundred aircraft, thrown into battle by the British, began. One torpedo boat received a direct hit; he, accompanied by another boat, had to be sent to Hoek van Holland. The clouds sank lower, but despite the rapidly deteriorating visibility, the battleship's cover by the escort ships generally remained excellent. Air raids did not stop until nightfall, but these raids did not bring any results. The narrow sea passage along the Dutch coast, known as the "easy street", this time turned out to be anything but easy - there were sand banks on the starboard side and mines on the left side. In addition, it unexpectedly turned out that the battleship's echo sounder and radio direction finder were disabled by a mine explosion. Diagonally from the ship, two destroyers were visible through the fog, with a boat moving between them.

- The admiral is on the boat! - exclaimed the boatswain.

Admiral Ciliax was forced to abandon the destroyer due to engine damage and move to another ship. The Scharnhorst had to slow down to prevent the boat from capsizing from the wake. The admiral later said that for him the moment when the Scharnhorst, with the mighty waves coming from it, emerged from the fog, was especially exciting. At first he thought that the ship wanted to find refuge in some Dutch port, where it was prescribed to go in case of emergency. Night fell, moonless and foggy. The Scharnhorst had passed the buoy ship, firmly anchored off the island of Terschelling, on schedule, when another explosion shook the ship to its foundations. Fortunately, again the ship took in only a small amount of water, and again the engines quickly restored their functionality. When Scharnhorst entered Wilhelmshaven on February 13, 1942, the second battleship had already reached the Elbe. What seemed impossible has come true. Having passed the area under heavy artillery fire from the English coast, the German formation, covered by escort ships and the Luftwaffe, slipped under the very nose of the British coastal defense with almost no losses.

“Britain's biggest blunder,” one newspaper commented; The Times bitterly admitted that since the 17th century the British fleet had not experienced such humiliation in its waters.

And what did the sailors of the Scharnhorst say, whose crew had already passed a severe test in which they showed what they were capable of?

“Nothing happened to us,” they said. - We have a lucky ship.

For some time, the Scharnhorst was docked in Wilhelmshaven to assess the damage to the underwater part of the ship. The battleship then went to Kiel for repair work. Now the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau were docked side by side, and the British air force was doing everything in its power to disable these serious opponents. The Gneisenau suffered a precise bomb hit; this led to the detonation of the front turret's ammunition, which caused almost the entire bow of the ship to rotate. The battleship Gneisenau was disabled, while the Scharnhorst remained completely unharmed.

On April 1, 1942, Captain Hoffmann, who had commanded the battleship for three years, received the rank of rear admiral and was awarded the Knight's Cross, transferred command to Captain Huffmeier. In October of the same year the ship was again ready to go to sea, and in January a message was sent from Gotenhafen that she was ready for duty in the firing line. The long-planned plan to transfer the ship to Norway was carried out in March 1943. Without displaying the flag of the admiral on board and accompanied only by two destroyers, the ship sailed to the Westfjord. The entire battle group of Northern Norway was assembled there - Tirpitz, Admiral Speer, Scharnhorst and many cruisers and destroyers. Soon, Tirpitz and Scharnhorst moved to Altafjord and Langfjord in the very north, near the route along which Arctic convoys moved to Russia. In the summer of 1943, Tirpitz and Scharnhorst launched a raid on Spitsbergen, where the Germans destroyed important installations and flooded coal mines. During this raid, however, not a single attack was made on the convoys, since the necessary conditions for this - well-conducted aerial reconnaissance and favorable weather - were not available.

During operations, the Scharnhorst was blown up by a mine and was hit by bombs, torpedoes and shells - but despite this, it remained a successful, “happy” ship. Through selfless camaraderie, devotion and love for their ship, its crew bonded into a close, battle-hardened community, and the ship's fortunes continued until the fateful day in December 1943, when the ship came to an end.

Martial law and the situation at sea in 1943

It is difficult to accurately imagine the last operation of the Scharnhorst, since, according to German sources, most of the crew were killed, out of 1,900 people only 36 were saved, and of these survivors not one had the rank of officer. Therefore, the author has to use evidence and descriptions of both German and English eyewitnesses in a reconstruction that is as accurate and objective as possible.

A study of the circumstances surrounding the Scharnhorst's last combat performance - for example, the actions of the commander and the limited capabilities of the ship itself compared to the resources of the British side - shows that the outcome of the battle was a foregone conclusion long before the start of the operation.

In order to better understand the motives that prompted the command to conceive this last operation for the battleship, it is necessary to recall the military situation in Germany, which sharply worsened at the beginning of 1943.

In February, one of the most fateful events of the war took place - the Battle of Stalingrad. Despite the attacks of German submarines and the activity of the Luftwaffe, the Allies successfully supplied the Russians with huge quantities of military materials. Less than two weeks after the unloading of yet another heavily laden Arctic convoy in Murmansk, the German forces of the Eastern Front began to feel the increasing power of their enemy. The use of heavy naval forces against these convoys became the subject of lively debate both among the high command and among the soldiers at the front.

Grand Admiral Dönitz himself, after being appointed commander of the fleet on November 30, 1943, especially emphasized the need to use heavy naval formations at every opportunity. His position deliberately ignored the possible risk to the few remaining capital ships. Opponents of such a course had no shortage of weighty arguments.

The British probably knew about the weakness of the German naval forces in the Far North. They understood perfectly well the reason why German forces, including heavy formations, were stationed in the waters of Northern Norway. The Germans, for their part, knew that the British were trying to deprive them of any hope of the slightest success, because the Arctic convoys were of the utmost strategic importance. It was necessary to reckon with the absolute superiority of the enemy, that is, with formations of English heavy ships operating in the same waters as the convoys. But even under these conditions there were some chances of success. If it were possible to avoid a collision with heavy British formations and pass by the covering ships or disable them, then the risk could be justified.

However, there were objections, since heavy German formations would be exposed to too great a risk. German aerial reconnaissance was not strong enough, and there were practically no fighters or bombers in the area. This foreshadowed a variety of unpleasant surprises, and the lack of aircraft left the battleships without Luftwaffe support even in case of emergency. Very few ships could be used for reconnaissance operations, and there was no naval aviation at all. The situation was also worsened by frequent changes of personnel on some ships, since the level of training of the crews could not be improved. Many of the sailors in service had no experience at sea, and sometimes it was completely impossible to give them the necessary training.

The next and main objection was that winter is the least convenient time for participation in operations of heavy formations in the Far North. In polar night conditions, large ships are exposed to the risk of night combat with all its dangers. In subpolar latitudes, the day lasts only two hours, and the sun does not fully rise above the horizon. All previous experience showed that it was hardly possible to sink the escort of a convoy and then deal with the merchant ships before darkness fell. The insignificant forces available were completely unable to accomplish both tasks - to engage in battle or destroy the escort ships and at the same time sink the convoy itself. In these circumstances, the battle with enemy forces would inevitably turn into a night battle, and experts constantly reminded that the battleship should not get involved in battles of this type, since at night the escort ships carrying torpedoes had an advantage, that is, a night battle was definitely beneficial to the British.

A less significant factor influencing both sides was the climate factor. Arctic weather is characterized by rapid changes; Sudden and violent storms bring heavy snowfall, intense cold and especially large waves.

The last, most powerful argument against the use of large ships in the fight against convoys was known only to a few. It belonged to English radar equipment. Intelligence reports indicated that the British were already controlling fire using radar. Since German guns could fire over a very limited range using radar, a night battle, if alarming intelligence reports were true, would require German formations to fight almost blindly under accurate enemy fire.

Nevertheless, despite all these carefully weighed considerations, Grand Admiral Dönitz continued to believe that heavy forces should be used. This difficult decision was caused by the overall strategic picture, and primarily by the situation on the Eastern Front.

By the end of the year, Germany's military situation was constantly deteriorating, and by December 1943 it had become completely hopeless. The army was forced to constantly retreat, which forced them to abandon front-line fortifications and cost a lot of money. In addition, in many places the Russians made huge breakthroughs, and there their advance went forward without meeting resistance. The ranks of the battle-worn infantry were dangerously weakened, and only skeletons remained of the former divisions - groups of soldiers fighting desperately in the vast expanses of Russia.

The high command at the Fuhrer's headquarters realized that something had to be done to relieve the crushing pressure on the Eastern Front. Having suffered heavy losses, the Luftwaffe was almost incapable of anything. Submarine successes also declined sharply from February 1943. There remained only the 1st battle group high in the latitudes of Northern Norway - the battleship Scharnhorst!

Of the other large ships, none were suitable for operations against Arctic convoys. The Tirpitz was anchored in the Kaa Fjord inside the Alta Fjord after being attacked by one of the British submarines. The Gneisenau was seriously damaged by mines and bombs and was incapacitated in Gotenhafen. The remaining ships - Prinz Eugen, Hipper, Lützow and Speer - were occupied in the Baltic. Only Scharnhorst, with its five escort destroyers, was capable of attacking Arctic convoys.

At this time, the commander of the 1st Battle Group, Admiral Kummertz, was on leave in Germany; Instead, Rear Admiral Bey, who had previously been at the head of the destroyer flotilla, was acting commander. He had never captained a heavy ship before, but since destroyers had always operated successfully under his command, he had earned complete confidence and respect from all.

Meanwhile, the idea of ​​using the 1st Battle Group gained support. During one of the meetings with the Fuhrer (held on December 19 and 20, 1943 at Wolfsschanze in East Prussia), the Grand Admiral took the initiative. Dönitz, well aware of the desperate need to support the Eastern Front and desperately wishing that the Navy could make some decisive effort to help the front, made a statement that left everyone present in complete amazement. He announced that, given the right opportunity, Scharnhorst and several escorting destroyers would attack the next northern convoy from Halifax to Russia. He added that if regular flights on the northern route are resumed, it would be worth increasing the number of submarines operating in the northern region. In the summer of 1943, not a single Arctic convoy was sent to Murmansk. Dönitz said that he had already given the order to transfer more submarines to Arctic waters.

Convoy J.W. on the way to Murmansk

On Christmas Eve, December 24, 1943, Navy Command received word that the long-awaited convoy J.W. was at sea. to Murmansk.

Aerial reconnaissance spotted the ships on December 22, but the information received was not detailed enough to say that the sighted cargo ships were an Arctic convoy. Only after the Christmas report did all doubts about the convoy disappear.

Route J.W. ran along the so-called northern route past Greenland, Iceland, Spitsbergen and around the North Cape to Murmansk. The caravan was covered by the British navy. Small ships - frigates, corvettes, destroyers and patrol ships - served as cover from submarine attacks. Large ships, heavy and light cruisers, sailed without cover, parallel to the convoy and somewhat to the south, that is, in the direction in which the German enemy was expected. The cruisers covered the convoy from attacks by surface ships; they walked separately from the formation and were ready to engage in battle if necessary. The number of cargo ships in the Arctic convoy ranged from twenty-five to thirty—sometimes even more. They carried military materials, mainly armored vehicles and heavy weapons, ammunition. On average, a convoy carried about half a million gross registered tons of cargo - this was a huge figure.

End of introductory fragment.

SMS Scharnhorst

Historical data

Total information

EU

real

doc

Booking

Armament

Artillery

• 2 × 2 - 210 mm/40 guns;
• 4 × 1 - 210 mm/40 guns;
• 6 × 1 - 150 mm/40 guns;
• 18× 1 - 88 mm/45 guns.

Air defense

• 4-8 mm Maxim machine gun.

Mine and torpedo weapons

• 4 × 450 mm TA.

Design

The Scharnhorst class cruisers were the result of an improvement of the Roon type of cruisers developed in 1901. In turn, the “Roon” type was not fundamentally different from the previous “Prince Adalbert” series, with the exception of an increased number of boilers from 14 to 16 and a four-pipe silhouette instead of a three-pipe. When working on the Scharnhorst-class cruiser project, the design bureau of the Imperial Naval Office, which carried out the development, faced the main tasks:

• Increased seaworthiness and ability to operate in more difficult sea conditions.
• Increasing speed - new cruisers were created specifically for colonial service and operations in foreign waters, and good performance was of vital importance for them.

Designed in 1903-1904. The armored cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, compared to their foreign counterparts, had a slight increase in displacement, higher speed, improved protection with a slight increase in armor area.

The division of artillery into three calibers - main, medium and anti-mine - was typical for ships of this class. To strengthen the main caliber, the designers replaced the 150 mm guns with 210 mm ones in four installations in the corners of the casemate on the upper deck, increasing the number of main caliber guns to eight. Thus, a broadside could be fired from six main guns and three 150 mm guns from the deck below.

By eliminating the heavy side gun turrets and slightly changing the contours of the underwater hull, a significant improvement in stability and some weight savings were achieved. In general, the project did not undergo fundamental changes and was therefore completed relatively quickly.

Despite the fact that this type of cruiser was an example of a successful balance between attacking and defensive means, by the time the Scharnhorst-class cruisers were put into operation, their design already had outdated technologies for armor, gun placement and engine installation. In addition to this, the era of battlecruisers was beginning, replacing the outdated armored cruisers.

Building a ship

On June 8, 1906, the Imperial Naval Ministry issued orders for the construction of two cruisers under the designations "C" and "D" to two private shipyards, A.G. "Weser" in Bremen and "Blom und Voss" in Hamburg.

December 28, 1904 on the slipway of the shipyard A.G. "Weser" laid the keel of the first cruiser of the series under the symbol "C", which was called "Gneisenau" upon launching.

On January 3, 1905, at the Blom und Voss shipyard, the keel of the second cruiser of the series under the symbol "D" was laid, which later received the name Scharnhorst.

The cruiser Gneisenau was planned to be the lead ship of the series and was laid down 6 days earlier than the second cruiser of the series, Scharnhorst. But due to a strike by workers at the private shipyard A.G. Weser in 1905, the construction of the cruiser Gneisenau was suspended for 3 months. Therefore, the entire series of ships received the name of the second cruiser.

Preparations for production of the cruiser Scharnhorst lasted about six months. The slipway period for the construction of the cruiser at the Blom und Voss shipyard in Hamburg was 14 months and 20 days. The completion period is 19 months and two days. The total construction time was almost 34 months - five months less than the first ship of the Gneisenau series laid down.

The armored cruiser Scharnhorst was completed as the flagship ship of the commander of the reconnaissance group, taking into account the placement of the flagship and the personnel of his headquarters, for which additional premises were equipped on it.

With the cruiser's staffing schedule, the crew consisted of 764 people, of which the command staff was 38 people. When the cruiser became the flagship, its crew increased to 840 people, of which there were 52 officers.

On March 22, 1906, after a speech was made and the baptism ceremony was performed by Count Haenseler, the ceremonial launch of the cruiser Scharnhorst took place.

Sea trials were delayed due to a visit with the cruiser Königsberg to Vlisingen and Portsmouth, as well as an accident on January 14, 1908, when the cruiser ran aground at Bulk. Taking into account repairs, this amounted to 6 months.

The actual cost of construction was 20 million 318 thousand marks.

Device

Housing, appearance, dimensions, colors

The architectural hull of the Scharnhorst-class armored cruisers retains most of the design features inherent in previous ships of this class.

The hull had a forecastle design, characteristic of most cruiser designs of that time, which plays an important role in the formation of the recognizable silhouette of such warships of the First World War era. The high stem provided the ship with better seaworthiness, and the high-mounted guns on the bow turret made it possible to fire even in rough seas.

The design of such cruisers embodied many innovations, partly taken from battleship designs: forecastle architecture and the merging of the sides of the bow superstructure with a vertical side; high freeboard and bilge keels for improved seaworthiness; rejection of gun sponsons and the use of special side ledges in the hull for casemate artillery; placement of the main and partly the middle artillery in gun turrets; the use of very thick lower masts made of hollow metal pipes with a combat top placed on top of them, and others.

The bow end of the Scharnhorst-class cruisers had a ram shape with a rounded stem, characteristic of German cruisers. The ram in the underwater part was reinforced with a spiron to allow a ramming attack. The hull of the Scharnhorst was riveted using open hearth steel.

For Scharnhorst-class cruisers, the design (normal) displacement included the weight of ammunition, crew, loading of coal, provisions and other special equipment, which amounted to 11,600 tons with a design draft of 7.5 m - 2083-2200 tons more than the previous Roon-class cruisers ". This type of cruiser showed a relatively large increase in displacement compared to its predecessor - by 24.5%.

The length of the ship between perpendiculars was 142.8 meters, and the width at the midship frame along the outer edge of the armor was 21.6 meters, which is longer and wider than the Roon-class cruisers by 16 and 1.4 meters, respectively. The height of the side on the midship frame from the upper edge of the upper horizontal keel sheet to the upper edge of the upper deck beam reached 12.65 m, which is 12.14 meters higher than the predecessor "Roon".

Of all the previously built German armored cruisers, the hulls of the Scharnhorst class cruisers were considered the widest, however, they had the most pointed ends. Even the larger cruisers of subsequent projects had ends that were not so elongated. Among German sailors, the cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were considered the most slender cruisers of the Kaiser's fleet.

From April 15, 1896 until the start of the First World War, the hulls of all ships of the Kaiser's Navy had the following color: the ship's hull up to the height of the main deck, anchors, railings - white; upper deck - teak flooring (natural wood), in some places, incl. on the bridges - red-brown linoleum, superstructures, chimneys, gun turrets and fans - ocher or yellow, barrels, gun shields, boats and boats - white, mooring devices and searchlights - black. The variable waterline belt is spherical. A thin red stripe was applied along the entire body, separating the white and yellow (ocher) colors. The bow and stern decorations were yellow-gold in color.

Internal layout

Hold. German designers continued to make maximum use of dividing the ship's holds with watertight bulkheads into many separate compartments and tanks, along with artificial ventilation of the interior, which was quite advanced for that time. The length of the Scharnhorst engine room was 16.6% of the cruiser's length.

Below the armored deck. There were torpedo tubes and enclosures for storing torpedoes, tunnels for three propeller shafts, a tiller compartment, a steering gear room, five boiler rooms and consumable coal pits. Also located here were: the rear and forward engine rooms, in which the engine installation consisted of three separate vertical four-cylinder direct-acting triple expansion steam piston engines; magazines for ammunition of 210 mm, 150 mm and 88 mm caliber; storage of small arms, ammunition and flares; refrigerator; storerooms for pump spare parts; food pantries in glass containers and meat; drinking water tanks; a room with equipment for preparing and repairing torpedoes.

On the armored deck. On this deck there were various storerooms for wine, food supplies and personal belongings for the ship's commander and officers, and the same storerooms for the admiral and his staff and separately for midshipmen; storerooms for spare parts of mechanisms and steam engines; reserve coal pits; warehouse of ropes and cables; dry food pantries; chain boxes; pantry food in glass containers; boatswain's warehouse; a pantry for breadcrumbs and flour, as well as storage rooms for various property;

On the intermediate deck. Behind the citadel is the living deck, where there were cabins for officers, mechanical engineers and midshipmen. The citadel itself contained various service rooms and ammunition lifts. At the bow end in front of the citadel there were rooms for various workshops and storerooms, quarters for sailors and non-commissioned officers, as well as a galley.

On the battery deck. Here was the aft balcony and the cabins of the admiral and officers. In addition to them, there were utility and service premises, officers' and midshipmen's buffets, and air supply shafts to the engine rooms. There are six rooms with one 150 mm gun in each. In the bow part of the deck are the cabins of the engine crew sailors and the officers' cabins.

On the upper, superstructure deck and bridges. Officer's wardroom, galleys for the admiral and officers, officer's quarters and various service premises. Four rooms with a 210 mm gun in each. At the bow there are four tank-mounted 88-mm guns. On board are officers' cabins and sailors' and non-commissioned officers' quarters. In the aft part of the superstructure deck there was an aft conning tower and four 88-mm guns. On the middle part there are four more 88 mm guns and two boat winches. Also on the deck there was a stationary hospital, rooms for various workshops, in the bow there were spiers of two bow anchors, bollards and two anchor fairleads. On the lower command bridge behind the bow conning tower there was a chart room, cabins for the ship's commander and admiral, behind them the main compass platform, and at the edges of the bridge two 88-mm guns. The pilothouse was located on the upper command bridge.

Spar and rigging. The Scharnhorst-class cruisers were the last German armored cruisers with traditionally large-diameter masts at the bottom and fire control posts located on the combat tops.

Booking

Compared to early-built German armored cruisers, the armor of the latest armored cruisers was further strengthened. The armor belt along the waterline in the middle of the ship's side reached a thickness of 150 mm, was significantly wider than its predecessors and covered the battery deck. In general, along the entire length of the cruiser, the thickness of the armor belt plates from stern to bow was 0 - 80 - 150 - 80 mm on a fifty-millimeter teak wood gasket. The cruiser's armor belt had a total length of 139.2 meters with a ship length of 142.8 meters, covering 96.8% of the waterline.

An important advantage of the cruiser's underwater structural protection was its relatively large depth. With a width of the hull itself of 21.6 meters, taking into account the thickness of the armor belt along the waterline, it had a thickness of 4 meters on each side. Anti-torpedo bulkheads, widely used on 25-30 mm battleships, were absent. The roll angle at which the upper edge of the armor belt goes under water or the lower edge comes out of the water is often used as a criterion for side protection. At a roll of more than seven degrees, the lower edge of the Scharnhorst armor belt came out of the water, and at a roll above 16 degrees, the upper edge of the armor belt went under the water.

Reservation of the citadel. To protect the engine and boiler rooms, ammunition cellar areas and the corridor for supplying ammunition to guns on the armor and intermediate decks, the citadel's armor was ensured by strengthening the side walls using 150-mm armor belt plates along the waterline. To protect against longitudinal hits of shells in the middle of the ship, armored bulkheads running obliquely were installed on the armored deck from the bow and stern. They covered the ammunition supply shafts of the gun turrets and approached the side plating at an angle. The thickness of the transverse armored bulkheads between the intermediate and battery decks was 120 mm, between the intermediate and inclined part of the armored deck behind the armor belt 80 mm.

Reservation of a casemate on the battery deck. A 33.6-meter-long casemate with six 150-mm guns installed in it was located on the battery deck above the citadel. The side walls of the casemate formed 150-mm armored plates of the citadel extending to the upper deck. Longitudinal anti-fragmentation bulkheads made of 30 mm nickel steel were installed between the chimney shafts in sections 4.8 meters long.

Reservation of the casemate on the upper deck. The casemate on the upper deck with four 210 mm guns installed in it was located above the casemate on the battery deck. The side walls of such a casemate formed 150-mm armor belt plates extending to the superstructure deck. All other walls of the casemate also had a thickness of 150 mm. The thickness of the shields and roof of the 210 mm guns installed in the casemate on the upper deck was 40 mm and 150 mm.

Deck reservations. The lowest layer of all armored decks was assembled from ductile shipbuilding steel, the remaining two upper layers were made from armor steel, with the exception of the bevels of the armor deck running along the sides from hardened nickel steel with a low nickel content. The thickness of the upper layer of the deck inside the citadel above the waterline was 20 mm, outside it - 25 mm. Below the waterline, the thickness of the top layer of the armor deck was also 25 mm throughout the ship. The thickness of the second layer of the upper deck was 40 mm, and the lower one - 25 mm. The total thickness of the armored deck thus ranged from 50 mm to 65 mm. The armor bevels had a thickness from 40 mm to 55 mm

The battery and upper decks were continuous and ran through the entire hull from stem to sternpost. The battery deck outside the citadel had 8 mm, and inside - 6 mm. Parts of the battery deck, located above the citadel at a height of 2.2 meters above the armored deck, outside the battery casemate, were armored with two layers of shipbuilding fabric: 10 mm lower and 15 mm upper. The upper deck, located 2.3 meters above the battery deck, was 8 mm thick. The upper deck was armored only in the parts located on top of the casemate, as was the superstructure deck, consisting of two layers of shipbuilding steel 10 mm lower and 15 mm upper.

Reservation of main battery towers. The armor of the rotating parts of the turrets was an optimal combination of shape and size; armored caps for the turret commander and gunner were installed on the roof of each turret. The towers had 170 mm thick front and side walls made of nickel steel plates with a hardened outer layer. The doors in the rear wall were made of two 50-mm armored plates, the roof and flooring were made of 30-mm nickel steel plates. The barbettes of the gun turrets were installed on a supporting bottom plate made of two 15-mm steel sheets. The armor plates of the barbettes were 170 mm thick, hardened nickel steel.

Conning tower. The forward conning tower, which had an oval shape, had walls made of 200-mm armor plates of nickel steel with a hardened outer layer, in which inspection slits were cut. The roof consisted of a 30-mm plate of the same steel, and the flooring consisted of a 30-mm plate of low-magnetic nickel steel. The entrance was covered by several 80-mm plates of the same steel.

Main power plant

To operate the three steam engines of the cruiser, steam was generated by 18 water-tube marine-type boilers of the Schulz system in the boiler rooms. All boilers were fired with coal, with the exception of a few that were fired with oil. Coal was the main fuel for the Germans for the following reasons: Coal was considered an important addition to armor protection, since coal pits were located longitudinally along the side walls; There were no oil deposits on German territory, while there were sufficient coal deposits. Oil supplies to Germany, which at that time were carried out exclusively by sea, could easily be cut off in the event of war. Coal heating had a number of significant disadvantages: an increase in the ship's crew; difficulties in loading onto the ship; habitat difficulties due to coal dust.

The actual parameters of the cruiser's power plant were 28,783 hp. and 23.5 knots speed.

Electricity was generated by four turbogenerators with a total power of 260 kW and a voltage of 110 V. All electrical devices were powered by four DC dynamos manufactured by Brown, Boveri and Co., directly connected to steam turbines of the same company.

Armament

Poor visibility during the winter period in the northern sea conditions made battles at that time over long distances unlikely. Therefore, the main caliber was reduced, and the middle artillery was abandoned. Savings in the weight of machinery and heavy artillery made it possible to increase the thickness of the armor, as well as the size of the armored area, so that it turned out to be significantly larger than that of the British ships.

Main caliber artillery.

The main caliber artillery consisted of eight 210-mm rapid-firing naval guns of the 21-cm.S.K.L/40 type (Schnell Kanone Lafette) with a barrel length and breech of 40 calibers (8400 mm). Of these, four guns, placed two each in turret carriages, were installed at the bow and stern ends on a rotating gun platform with the possibility of separate vertical guidance. Four more such guns were installed one at a time in a casemate on the upper deck. The 210 mm guns formed a central battery of equal power on each side. With this arrangement of guns, six out of eight guns could take part in a salvo. Compared to Roon-class cruisers, the main caliber artillery was increased by 50%. The rate of fire of 210 mm guns is 4 rounds per minute. Two types of projectiles weighing 108 kg each were used: high-explosive and solid steel blank projectiles.

Medium caliber artillery.

Six 150-mm rapid-fire guns of the 150-cm.S.K.L/40 type with a barrel length and breech of 40 calibers (6000 mm) were placed in the casemate on the battery deck. Rate of fire - 10 rounds per minute. They fired three types of shells of the same weight, 40 kg each: high-explosive, high-explosive with increased armor penetration and solid steel blank shells.

Anti-mine artillery.

On the cruiser, the anti-mine artillery consisted of eighteen 88-mm rapid-fire guns of the S.K.L/35 type, with a barrel length of 35 calibers (3080 mm). The rate of fire was up to 20 rounds per minute. Such guns fired only one type of cartridge - high-explosive fragmentation. The guns were mounted on the cruiser in five groups of two to four guns each: the first group of four guns on the upper deck under the forecastle; the second of two guns on the lower command bridge; the fourth of four guns on the rear deck superstructure; the fifth of four guns on the battery deck in the aft admiral's cabin.

Torpedo weapons.

Traditionally, German armored cruisers' torpedo armament consisted of four underwater 450-mm torpedo tubes. All TA rooms were located below the armored deck: one each at the stern and stem and two side ones closer to the bow. TA were horizontally located solid pipes, fixedly fixed. Their targeting was ensured by maneuvering the ship.

Additional weapons.

In addition to the main and anti-mine caliber guns, the cruiser had two 60-mm landing guns 6-cm.S.Bts.K.L/21 (Schnellfeuer Boots Kanone) with a 21-caliber barrel length, intended for use in landing operations.

In addition to artillery, the cruiser's armament kit included four 8-mm machine guns, small arms in the amount of 225 rifles of the 1898 model and 90 pistols of the 1904 model.

Ship's service history

1908

Commissioned into the High Seas Fleet on May 1 to replace the armored cruiser York as the flagship of the commander of the reconnaissance forces, Rear Admiral Heeringen.

1909

After a training cruise to the Atlantic and to the shores of Spain, the cruiser heads to East Asia, where she becomes the flagship of the East Asian cruiser squadron under the command of Rear Admiral von Ingenohl. The squadron is based in Qingdao. In addition to the Scharnhorst, the squadron includes the light cruisers Leipzig and Arkona, the gunboats Iltis, Jaguar, Tiger and Lux, the river gunboats Vorwarts, Qingdao and Vaterland. , as well as the destroyer "Taku" and S-90.

1910

Visiting Bangkok, Sumarta and Borneo islands, calling at Manila and returning to Qingdao. From April to May - a hike around the Japanese islands.

After replacing the squadron commander, Vice Admiral von Ingenohl, with Rear Admiral Gunther, the cruiser sails to the southern seas to the islands of Samoa, Truk and Ponape. Return to Qingdao. In November he goes on a trip to Nanjing and Hong Kong.

1911

Leaving Admiral Guler in a local hospital, the cruiser heads to the area of ​​the southern group of German stations and then to Saigon, Singapore and Batavia. Then he returns to Qingdao, visiting Hong Kong and Amu along the way.

Rear Admiral Krosigk becomes commander of the squadron, the cruiser makes a voyage to the shores of Japan. Then it goes to Qingdao for repairs.

1912

The cruiser visits Japan several times and visits Vladivostok. Delivers Prince Henry of Prussia to Japan for the coronation of the new Japanese Emperor Hirohito.
Arrives in Shanghai, where Rear Admiral Count Maximilian Johann Maria Humbert von Spee replaces von Krosigk as commander of the East Asian squadron.

1913

Several trips around the Indonesian islands, in the area of ​​the southern group of islands of the colonial possessions of Germany, to Sunda, Singapore and Batavia, around Japan. After returning to Qingdao, a new trip begins with a visit to the Mariana and Admiralty Islands, Hermit Atoll, Rabaul Island, Yap Island, New Guinea and about. Friedrich-Wilhelmshaven.

After an urgent return to Qingdao due to the revolutionary situation in China and standing at the Wuzun roadstead, the cruiser sets off on a cruise to the shores of Japan. Then he returns to Shanghai, from where he goes to the region of the southern islands of the colonial possessions of Germany.

1914

Outside German territorial waters, the East Asian squadron with the flagship Scharnhorst was the only German fleet in the world's oceans. After several trips to the area of ​​​​German colonial possessions, visits to Port Arthur and Beijing, Scharnhorst leaves the Qingdao base forever.

See also

• Fill the article with internal links
• Understand formatting
• Add/fill out a card

Types of ships of the German Navy during the First World War

Battleships	Nassau Helgoland Kaiser König Bayern L-20 project X
Armadillos	Brandenburg Kaiser Friedrich III Wittelsbach Braunschweig Deutschland
Battlecruisers	SMS Von der Tann SMS Seydlitz Derfflinger Mackensen X Ersatz Yorck X Moltke
Armored cruiser	SMS Furst Bismarck SMS Prinz Heinrich SMS Blucher Prinz Adalbert Roon Scharnhorst
Armored cruiser	SMS Kaiserin Augusta Gazelle Victoria Louise
Light cruisers	Bremen Königsberg (1905) Dresden Nautilus Kolberg Magdeburg Karlsruhe Graudenz Pillau Wiesbaden Königsberg (1915) Cöln project FK X
Advice	SMS Hela
Destroyers	D-1 D-7 D-9 D-10 S-90 S-102 G-108 S-114 S-120 S-125 S-126 S-132 S-137 S-138 V-150 V-162 G- 169 S-176 V-180

Battlecruiser (or is it still a battleship?) Schanghorst.

Total displacement is 39 thousand tons. GBP-350mm, deck-95mm. Max speed is 31.7 knots.

AGK-3x3x280mm,

anti-mine caliber 4x2x150mm, 4x1-150mm.

Air defense artillery:

14-105mm; 16-37mm; 10-20mm.

TA-2x3x533mm

Air group - 3 Arado Ar 196 A-3, one catapult.

There were 2 Gneisenau and Scharnhorst battleships or battlecruisers. For a battleship, their AGK-280mm is rather weak (there were plans to change the AGK to 3x2x380mm). For a battlecruiser, they are too well protected and do not have an overwhelming advantage in speed over new battleships, as was the case during WWI (where the difference in speed reached 8 knots).

Scharnhorst at sea.

Prince of Wales. Duke of York sister ship. One project.

Total displacement 45 thousand tons. The GBP varied not only in length, but also in height, amounting to 152 mm along the lower edge, 356 mm along the waterline and 330 mm along the upper edge in the area of ​​the main caliber (GK) cellars, and in the area of ​​the EU, 127, 330 and 305 mm, respectively.

AGK-2x4x356mm. 1x2x356mm. Anti-mine artillery - 8x2x133mm. Air defense Oerlikon-1x18, Bofors-20x2x.

KRL Belfast. Standard English light cruiser.

AGK4x3x152 mm. speed 33 knots, displacement 13 thousand tons.

Light cruiser Jamaica (Crown Colony series) - well, basically a smaller version of Belfast. Total displacement - 11 thousand. tons with the same AGK and speed.

In the second half of 1943, the position of the German army in Russia became critical. Since the threat from the German squadron had significantly diminished, the British Admiralty, yielding to the persistent demands of its Russian allies, agreed to resume convoy escort to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. Remembering the sad experience of 1942, the British abandoned large convoys of 40 ships and began to divide them in two. The new cycle began on November 1 with the departure of 13 empty ships from Arkhangelsk (R.A.-54 A), and in a month and a half it was possible to conduct three eastern convoys without losses (JW-54 A, JW-54 B, JW-55 A) and two western ( R.A.-54 A And R.A.-54 B). The convoys were accompanied by a traveling escort of destroyers, frigates and corvettes, which was joined by a local escort at the final stages of the route. In the most dangerous sector - south of Bear Island - they were accompanied by a close cover of cruisers, and a long-range cover, which included a battleship, patrolled from 10 miles to the east to 200 miles to the north-west of the island, covering both convoys at once, which met as times in this area.

Convoy JW-55 AThe Germans discovered but did not attack, and all 19 ships safely reached the Kola Bay and Arkhangelsk. However, on December 19-20, at a meeting with Hitler, the commander-in-chief of the fleet, Admiral Dönitz, announced that Scharnhorst and the 4th flotilla would attack the next convoy. After two days of discussion, Hitler authorized the operation, giving the surface ships one last chance to prove themselves. The temporary commander of the strike force, Rear Admiral Erich Bey (in fact, he commanded the destroyers and in this operation replaced the absent Admiral Kümmetz) on December 22 received an order from Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz to switch to three-hour readiness. For the commander of the Scharnhorst, Captain Fritz Hintze, this was his first time at sea in his new position.

Convoy JW-55 Bof nineteen transports and tankers left Loch Ew on December 20, guarded by 10 destroyers, 4 corvettes and 3 minesweepers. A convoy came out to meet him R.A.-55 A, which was escorted by 10 destroyers, 3 corvettes and a minesweeper. In the Barents Sea, both convoys were covered by Formation 1, consisting of the cruisers of the 10th squadron of Vice Admiral R. Burnet: the flagship Belfast, Sheffield and the heavy Norfolk. Formation 2, consisting of the battleship Duke of York (the flag of the commander of the Home Fleet, Admiral Bruce Fraser), the cruiser Jamaica and 4 destroyers was supposed to coverJW-55 Bfrom 27° to 38° E, and then return to Scapa Flow, covering R.A.-55 A. December 22, 400 miles west of the Norwegian port of Tromsø convoy JW-55 Bdiscovered by German aircraft. The commander of the North group, Admiral Schniewindt, at first decided that a landing in Norway was being prepared, but the panic soon subsided. Two days later, the convoy was again discovered north of Norway and it was determined that it was heading to the USSR. On Christmas Day, December 25, at about 9.00, a German submarineU-601 reported the exact coordinates of the convoy and Admiral Dönitz ordered an interception. His order to Admiral Bey contained the following:

“The operation can be interrupted at your discretion. In principle, you must interrupt the battle if superior enemy forces appear. A tactical situation must be exploited with skill and audacity. The fight shouldn't end in stalemate. Every opportunity to attack should be taken. The Scharnhorst's superior gun power offers the best chance of success, and it must be taken advantage of. Destroyers should be used later. Inform crews accordingly. I have full confidence in your offensive spirit."

The order was contradictory, as it convinced Bey to attack in any case, but also demanded that the battle be interrupted when a stronger enemy appeared. Admiral Bey planned to attack the convoy at about 10 a.m. on December 26, if the weather and visibility were favorable and information about enemy forces was correct. With only six hours of darkness and only 45 minutes of daylight, the battle had to be fought very quickly.

German formation (Scharnhorst, destroyers Z-29, Z-30, Z-33, Z-34, Z-38) went to sea at about 19:00, and at 23:00 the Norwegian coast disappeared beyond the horizon. Admiral Bey maintained constant contact with the headquarters of the naval group "North" and at 3.19 the fleet command conveyed to him the decision of the German Admiralty on the return of the destroyers in case of worsening weather and on the action of the Scharnhorst alone. The British were able to intercept and decipher this message, and when Bey read the new order, the British admirals Burnet and Fraser were already holding its English translation in their hands. At 7.03 on December 26, a German formation, located 40 miles southwest of the island. Bear, turned to the point where in the morning twilight - about 10 o'clock - according to calculations, a meeting with the convoy was supposed to take place. The destroyers were searching 10 miles southwest of Scharnhorst, the crews were in a state of full combat readiness from 03.00. In the stormy sea the destroyers had a hard time and their speed had to be reduced to 10 knots.

At a long-range cover formation that left Iceland on December 23, located 270 miles west of the North Cape, Admiral Fraser received an Ultra interception that the Scharnhorst was rushing towards the convoy. British intelligence was able to decipher the order - “East Front (17.00). “Scharnhorst” will go to sea on the 25th at 17 o’clock,” and Admiral Fraser was asked to prepare for action to cut off the German battleship’s path back to Norway. By 0925, Fraser's ships were 125 miles southwest of Scharnhorst, and Admiral Burnet was informed of Fraser's plans and the contents of the Ultra decryption. Admiral Fraser ordered the 36th Destroyer Division from the convoy escort R.A.-55 A, which was prudently sent north of the intended battle area, to join the convoyJW-55 B(the main goal of Scharnhorst). Vice Admiral Burnet positioned his formation between the convoy and the possible direction of the Scharnhorst's appearance. The commander of the Soviet Northern Fleet, Admiral A. Golovko, ordered the submarines L-20, K-21 and S-102 to go to the North Cape area and intercept the German raider. At the same time, the destroyers at the base were warming up the turbines, and the planes at the airfields were armed with torpedoes and bombs.

When the Belfast radar detected the Scharnhorst at 8.40 on December 26 from a distance of 33,000 m at a bearing of 295°, a combat alarm was sounded on the close-cover ships. The German raider at this moment was approximately 32 miles from the convoy, and three British cruisers began to approach the enemy. The Scharnhorst did not yet suspect the presence of British ships, since for greater secrecy it did not turn on its radar. At 9.21, the signalmen of the cruiser Sheffield spotted a German ship from a distance of 11,000 m at a bearing of 222°, and three minutes later the Belfast opened fire with illuminating shells from a distance of 8,600 m. At 9.25, the first salvo from the cruiser Norfolk landed just 500 meters from the side of the Scharnhorst, which responded with a salvo from the Caesar turret, and then began to retreat at 30 knots. "Belfast" and "Sheffield" used flameless gunpowder, and "Norfolk" used an older gunpowder that gave strong unmasking flashes. The British used artillery radars and in this they were superior to the enemy, who had an advantage in speed and gun power. During the 20-minute firefight, the Scharnhorst was hit by three 203 mm shells. The first hit the upper deck from the left side between the deck 150-mm installation and the torpedo tube and, without exploding, went into the cockpit of the watertight compartmentIX. A small fire that started there was quickly extinguished. Another shell a few minutes later hit the bow rangefinders and showered the anti-aircraft artillery staff with shrapnel. It destroyed the bow radar antenna, and fragments penetrated into the cabin of the receiving radar station, killing all the personnel there. The ship was “blind” from the bow angles, approximately 69-80°, since the stern radar, located below the bow, had a limited forward angle. The third shell hit the forecastle and exploded in the cockpit.

Trying to get out of the battle, Scharnhorst changed course several times. At 9.55 Admiral Bey radioed about the battle with the British cruisers, but a few minutes later he was able to break away from the enemy, who in the stormy sea could not give more than 24 knots. Having an advantage of 4 - 6 knots, the Scharnhorst quickly increased the distance from its pursuers. At 10.30 the 36th Division joined Burnet's cruisers, forming a wake column to port and forward of Belfast.

Breaking away from the cruisers, Scharnhorst again began searching for the convoy and by 12 o'clock reached the northeast of it. Five minutes later, Belfast restored radar contact with the Germans, but only at 12.21 were the British cruisers able to close the distance. At this moment, Scharnhorst detected them with its stern radar, and then visually. The British fired flare shells, but the battlecruiser quickly opened fire from the bow turrets and again changed course to the northwest, bringing the stern turret into the battle. This turn prevented the British destroyers from launching a torpedo attack. Three salvos hit the end ship of the 36th division, Virago, which had just passed under the noses of the cruisers.

At 12.23 "Norfolk" was hit in the area of ​​the stern pipe. A few seconds later, a second 283 mm shell hit the barbette of his turret.X", taking her out of action. To prevent the cellar from exploding, the towers had to be flooded. The first hit turned out to be more serious. The shell pierced the superstructure on the starboard side and exploded right next to the left side skin, tearing it apart over a large area. The fragments completely disabled the radar installation, after which the cruiser could not maintain accurate fire. There were 7 killed (1 officer) and 5 wounded. Tower "B" fired 4 more salvos using the old data, and then "Norfolk" temporarily ceased fire. A few minutes later, Sheffield was bombarded with a hail of large fragments. An erroneous order from his artillery officer sharply reduced the intensity of fire - instead of firing with the whole side, the cruiser switched to turret fire. At 12.41, when the situation began to turn out badly for the British - after all, Scharnhorst was much stronger than the three cruisers, Admiral Bey changed course and increased speed. He did not want to continue the unpleasant battle with the cruisers; his goal was the convoy. After the end of this phase of the battle, Admiral Fraser's ships approached from the southwest, and Burnet's cruisers continued to stay outside the Scharnhorst's fire, maintaining radar contact and reporting the enemy's coordinates to their battleship.

The German destroyers saw the illumination shells that the British cruisers fired in the morning battle, but they were far from the Scharnhorst. Admiral Bey ordered them to go northeast to join the flagship, but at 11.58 sent them west again to search for the convoy. After this, there was no longer any tactical interaction between the Scharnhorst and the German destroyers. At about 1 p.m., the destroyers, unknowingly, passed only 15,000 m south of the convoy. Finally, at 1:43 p.m., Admiral Bey ordered them to stop searching and return to base. The next day at about 10.00 they returned to Kaa Fiord. Their absence in the final phase of the battle at the North Cape turned out to be fatal for Scharnhorst. After all, if its bow radar failed, the destroyers could detect the enemy in a timely manner, help the flagship repel torpedo attacks, and they themselves would pose a serious danger to British ships, having 150-mm guns and 8 torpedo tubes.

The eldest of the surviving members of the Scharnhorst crew, non-commissioned officer Willy Godde, who was on the bridge according to the combat schedule, described the battle with the cruisers as follows: “Shortly after 12.30, I and some others noticed the shadows of three ships ahead, which was immediately reported to the commander. The alarm had already been announced because the enemy had been detected by radar a little earlier. However, before our guns opened fire, illumination shells exploded above the Scharnhorst. The enemy's volley fell very close. But our first salvo from 28-cm guns also pinned the enemy down. I saw that after three or four salvoes a strong fire started on one of the cruisers in the area of ​​the stern tube, the other cruiser began to burn strongly in the bow and stern and was enveloped in thick smoke. After the next salvos, I saw hits in the bow of the third cruiser. At one point, a huge tongue of flame shot up into the sky, which then disappeared. Observing thick smoke around the cruiser, I assumed that it was burning heavily. The enemy's fire began to weaken, and when we changed course, the enemy cruisers turned away and disappeared behind the rain and snow squalls. During this battle the enemy was in front on both sides. These cruisers were fired at by our Anton and Bruno turrets, which were occasionally joined by two bow 150-mm turrets. I did not hear, either on the phone or in any other way, about any hits against us in this phase of the battle. Although the enemy was barely visible during the first contact, this time, in the daylight, we could easily determine that they were cruisers. The distance was also shorter than in the morning battle.”

At about 1:15 p.m., Admiral Bey decided to return to base, not expecting any more skirmishes. The ship's crew, not fed since the morning, started lunch, but combat readiness remained. The stern radar was turned off so as not to be detected by its operation. At 15.25 Bey radioed the North Group headquarters with his estimated time of return. He did not know that he was going right to the intersection of the course of the Duke of York, the Jamaica and four destroyers, which were being radioed by the cruisers. With the bow radar destroyed and the stern one turned off, and also unable to search directly ahead, the Scharnhorst walked straight into a trap from which there was no way out. 75 kbt behind (with visibility at 70), like a pack of hounds, in front formation, closed so as not to clog the screens of their radars with unnecessary marks, were Burnet's cruisers and the 36th division. This peculiar “rut” lasted more than three hours. There was a moment at the beginning of five o'clock in the afternoon when the situation could change. The Norfolk reduced speed to put out the fire, and 7 minutes later the Sheffield slowed down to 8 knots, on which the bracket of the left inner propeller shaft broke. But already at 16.17 the search radar of the British battleship detected the enemy at a distance of 225 kbt. The death warrant for Scharnhorst was signed. Fraser ordered to continue tracking until the ships came within effective fire range.

At 16.32, the Type 284 artillery radar on the Duke of York found a target at 147 kbt (27,200 m) and 11 minutes later Fraser ordered Belfast, Burnet’s only cruiser that could join the battle, to open fire with illumination shells, and his destroyers - be ready for a torpedo attack at the admiral's signal. "Duke of York" and "Jamaica" set course 80 to use the stern towers. The German ship was sandwiched between Formations 1 and 2.

When at 16.47 the shells of the first salvo exploded in the sky, the British were surprised to find that the main caliber turrets on the Scharnhorst were deployed to the stowed position. A minute later, the Duke of York opened fire with 133-mm illumination shells, and two minutes later began firing in salvoes from a distance of 11,000 m. At 16.52, the cruiser Jamaica joined it from a distance of 12,000 m, achieving coverage with a third salvo (one hit ). Although Scharnhorst was taken by surprise, after the explosion of illumination shells, she quickly returned fire and, without hesitating a moment, turned north. The duel between him and the battleship Duke of York was unequal - German 283-mm shells could not penetrate the thick armor that protected the vital parts of the English battleship. At 16.55, a 356-mm shell from the first salvo hit the starboard side of the Scharnhorst opposite the Anton tower. The turret was jammed with the guns raised, and the horizontal and vertical aiming drives were out of order. A fire started in the cellars from hot fragments, and the fragments also pierced the flameproof door to the cellars of the Bruno tower. The cellars of both towers had to be flooded, but under the Bruno tower they were drained so quickly that this had almost no effect on its rate of fire. The supply servants worked waist-deep in icy water, trying to save at least part of the ammunition. Despite the damage, the ship maintained high speed. The second shell damaged the ventilation duct of the Bruno turret, which is why its fighting compartment was filled with gases and smoke after each opening of the gun lock. Another shell hit near the Caesar turret and punched a hole 0.5 m in diameter in the battery deck. The hole was quickly repaired, but the compartments where the shell exploded were flooded with water and not drained. Two planes were riddled with shrapnel, several anti-aircraft guns were destroyed, and most of their personnel were destroyed. After this, Captain zur See Hintze ordered the survivors to take cover.

These hits have not yet posed a danger to the Scharnhorst. The main thing is that he maintained his advantage in speed and began to break away from the enemy. Only the destroyer Savage was able to follow him, which the Germans could not throw off the tail, although the shells fell only 20 meters from it. The destroyer came so close that it was forced to turn away without receiving the order to launch a torpedo attack. Having come under fire from Belfast and Norfolk, Scharnhorst turned east and quickly increased its range at a 30-knot speed. Fraser ordered the destroyers to attack, but they could not get close to the target. "Savage" and "Somarets" were kept to the left rear, and "Stord" and "Scorpion" were to the right rear of the pursued enemy. At 17.42, due to the increased distance, the Jamaica ceased fire, and only Fraser’s flagship continued to methodically fire salvos at the retreating Scharnhorst.

Fortunately for the British, the Duke of York's shooting was accurate. One after another, gun turrets came out on the German ship; fragments of heavy shells even penetrated into the cellars, knocking out the servants working in the supply. And at about 18.00, a shell hit the starboard side, piercing the thin belt of the upper citadel (45 mm) and the battery deck, ricocheting along the 80-mm lower armored deck, piercing the glacis of the same thickness above boiler room No. 1, exploding in the latter. On the ship at first it seemed like it was a torpedo hit - the impact and explosion were so strong. Numerous steam pipes of four boilers located in this department were torn apart. Shell fragments pierced the double bottom, causing the compartment to flood to the floor level. The ship's speed dropped to 8 knots. Emergency measures were taken quickly and effectively, but with the watertight doors and hatches closed

25 people were locked in the boiler room. The steam pressure was increased, and the chief engineer, frigate captain Otto König, reported to the bridge: “I can make 22 knots,” to which the ship’s commander, Hintze, replied: “Bravo, hold it!” "Scharnhorst" fired from a distance of 15,000 - 20,000 m and covered the "Duke of York" with several salvos, the side of which was covered with fragments, and with a direct hit on the foremast, one of its supports was blown overboard and temporarily disabled an artillery radar of the type 284. Lieutenant Bates, who climbed the mast, managed to repair the broken cable between the antenna and the radar screen, and the fire was able to continue with the same efficiency. The rest of the damage on the English battleship was caused by its own fire: demolished ventilation fungi, damaged deck, broken boats.

The artillery duel lasted almost 90 minutes, and the Scharnhorst received significant damage. Its superstructures were pierced in many places by shrapnel, and in some places destroyed by direct hits from 152 mm, 203 mm and 356 mm shells. Fires started, sometimes accompanied by explosions. Under these conditions, the crew continued to do their job skillfully and calmly. The fire in the hangar, which destroyed two seaplanes, was extinguished within 10 minutes, but an attempt to launch the remaining aircraft from a catapult failed because it destroyed compressed air supplies. Almost all artillery installations and torpedo tubes on the left side were destroyed or disabled. The surviving servants were ordered to take cover and fight the fires. At 17.30, 356-mm shells hit both bow 150-mm turrets: the right one was completely destroyed, killing all the people in the turret and on the feed, and the left one was jammed. But after 10 minutes it completely failed.

The torpedo officer, under hurricane fire, bravely rushed to the port side torpedo tube even before the latter was disabled. He was able to deploy the device and fired two torpedoes, and the third got jammed in the pipe. According to eyewitnesses, this officer was killed by fragments of a shell that exploded nearby or by a shell that hit a jammed torpedo, which detonated in the apparatus. The shell that hit the forecastle broke the chain of the right anchor, which fell into the sea with the remains of the chain. Soon the same thing happened with the bow anchor.

Rear Admiral Bey now knew for sure that he was driven into a corner and at 18.24 he ordered the last radiogram to be sent to Hitler: “We will fight until the last shell.”

At 18.42, the Duke of York ceased fire, firing 52 salvoes, of which 31 were covered and scored at least 13 direct hits. These shells and shells from cruisers killed and wounded a large number of people on board the Scharnhorst and disabled almost all of the 150-mm guns. However, Scharnhorst was still maintaining high speed, and Admiral Fraser, fearing that the enemy would escape, ordered the destroyers to launch a torpedo attack.

Thanks to the drop in speed of the Scharnhorst, destroyers of the "S"from Compound 2 we managed to get closer to it by 60 cables. The German ship no longer had the means to repel such attacks, which allowed the destroyers to approach torpedo salvo range almost without opposition. At about 18.50, “Stord” and “Scorpion” on the right circulation, being on both sides of their victim, fired 8 torpedoes each from a distance of 1650 and 1900 m. “Scharnhorst” turned sharply to the right, but three torpedoes still reached the target. With this turn, he exposed the side of the destroyers Savage and Somarets. The first fired eight torpedoes, and the second, approaching 1600 m, came under fire from the few surviving small guns on the starboard side and one main gun turret of the German ship. The shells pierced the director and rangefinder on the destroyer, shrapnel riddled the side and superstructures, and its speed dropped to 10 knots. An officer and 10 sailors were killed on the ship, 11 people were wounded. Somehow they recruited people to crew one torpedo tube, but the second one was still destroyed. Having fired four torpedoes, the Somarets turned away, laying a smoke screen. They even set fire to the smoke buoy at the stern, after which the crew, deciding that the destroyer was on fire, flooded the stern cellars.

Damage from torpedoes . Available information on torpedo damage is very sketchy. One torpedo exploded on the starboard side opposite the Bruno turret, jamming the horizontal and vertical guidance drives in it, as well as the main entrance hatch, so that the servants could not get out onto the deck for a long time. The cellars began to flood. Another torpedo hit the port side boiler room area and caused some flooding behind the torpedo bulkhead. The third hit the stern from the left side in the place where several compartments were already flooded, and damaged the propeller shaft. The fourth torpedo hit the bow from the same side. All torpedoes had a 340 kg charge.

Analyzing the damage to the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau from torpedoes in previous battles, we can confidently assume that in this case there was significant flooding of internal volumes. Obviously, a torpedo hit in the area of ​​the Bruno tower was very dangerous. It caused not only a powerful blow, but also destroyed the PTZ, leading to huge flooding. The underwater defense system in this place was especially vulnerable, not having sufficient width due to the sharp contours of the hull. The 340-kg charge of a British torpedo was enough to destroy the protection in the area of ​​the boiler room. The damage there would have been more significant if the layer of empty compartments in the torpedo protection system, which absorbed most of the flooding, had been filled with water.

As a result of torpedo hits, the Scharnhorst's speed dropped to 12 knots, although the chief engineer reported that he was ready to maintain 22 knots. The Duke of York was able to get closer again, now at a “pistol” distance of 9100 m for 356-mm shells. The final execution of the German ship began, which could not even adequately respond: two of its bow turrets were jammed, and the third was experiencing a shortage of shells. All available crew members (probably servants of the 105 mm guns) worked on transferring ammunition from the Bruno turret magazines to the Caesar turret, which resumed fire a few minutes later.

As the hull filled with water, the Scharnhorst's speed dropped to 5 knots and it almost did not obey the rudder. Even after the battle with the Bismarck, the British realized that it was impossible to sink a large German ship with artillery alone. Therefore, Admiral Fraser ordered the cruisers to finish off the Scharnhorst with torpedoes.

At 19.25, the Jamaica, which had previously fired 22 broadside salvos at the enemy, fired two torpedoes from the left tube (the third tube turned out to be faulty). Two minutes later, Belfast released three more. Then the Jamaica turned around and, approaching 3500 m, 10 minutes later fired three torpedoes from the other side. The hits were impossible to distinguish due to smoke and fog. The cruisers left the battle arena, into which the destroyers of the 36th division entered. The Musketeer, having passed 900 m from the Scharnhorst crawling at 3 knots, fired 4 torpedoes on the starboard side at 19.33 and saw three explosions between the funnel and the mainmast. A minute later, Matchless tried to do this, but a huge wave, covering the ship, damaged the aiming mechanisms of the devices. The second wave, which flooded the bridge, disabled the in-ship communication devices, so the order to turn the devices to the right did not reach the torpedo officer. Matchless had to return to attack on the port side. "Opportune" discharged one apparatus 19.31 from a distance of 1900 m, the other - two minutes later from 2300 m, and its observers clearly saw one hit from each salvo on the starboard side of the battle cruiser between the mainmast and the chimney. The effect of their explosion was insignificant, since the Scharnhorst was already deep in the water, and the torpedoes hit the main armor belt. At 19.34, the Virago fired seven torpedoes from a distance of 2500 m, also claiming two hits. After these attacks, the German ship practically stopped, enveloped in thick smoke and steam. Little could be seen from the English ships - a dim glow could be seen and dull explosions could be heard. The veil of smoke was so dense that neither searchlight beams nor flares could pierce it.

At about 7 p.m., the Scharnhorst commander ordered all secret documents to be burned. Since all the other guns were already silent, he told the servants of the 150-mm turret No. 4: “... it all depends on you.” The ship tilted to starboard and sank nose-first. The last turret of 150 mm guns fired until its ammunition lift jammed. The 20mm gun on the roof of the Bruno turret continued to fire. By 19.40 the roll had increased greatly, and the bow almost went under water. All hatches and watertight doors were reinforced to contain flooding and give the crew more time to escape. However, torpedo damage deprived the ship of most of its buoyancy reserve. At 19.45 "Scharnhorst" nose went under the water with slowly rotating propellers. For some time a strong roar could be heard from under the water. The British recorded a strong explosion before the flooding, attributing it to the cellars. Belfast intended to carry out a second torpedo attack at 19.48, but the target was lost. “Match-less” also did not find “Scharnhorst” and, together with “Scorpio”, began to pick up people floundering in the icy water. Until 20.40, the destroyers Belfast and Norfolk were looking for survivors. "Scorpio" picked up 30 people, and at one time the ship's commander Hintze and the senior officer of the frigate captain F. Dominic were seen from it. But Hintze died before help arrived, and Dominic, although he managed to grab the thrown line, was unable to climb it to the deck; he was picked up already dead. Of the 1968 crew, only 36 were saved.

When sinking the Scharnhorst, the British expended 446 356 mm shells, 161 203 mm, 974 152 mm, 531 133 mm (plus 155 lighting) and 83 102 mm, as well as 55 torpedoes, of which 11 hit the target: “Jamaica” and “Virago” scored 2 hits each, “Masketeer” and “Savage” scored 3 each, and “Scorpio” scored 1 hit. When shooting with large caliber, there were some difficulties with equipment failure. Because of this, for example, in the bow turret of the Duke of York, with 77 salvoes given, one gun fired 71 shells, and the rest 47, 6 (!) and 64.

Admiral Fraser was amazed at the heroic actions of the German crew. On the return passage to Scapa Flow from Murmansk, when the Duke of York passed the site of the death of the Scharnhorst, he ordered a wreath to be thrown into the water in memory of the German sailors who had fulfilled their military duty.

The Germans themselves explained the death of the Scharnhorst by the lack of escort destroyers and the superiority of British radars. After the war, Admiral Karl Dönitz wrote: “... The operation undertaken by the battlecruiser Scharnhorst and a group of destroyers in December, after a successful covert start, seemed to have every chance of success, given the enemy’s deployment and weather conditions. But it failed, obviously due to an underestimation of the local situation, and Scharnhorst was lost..."

As we now know, the operation did not have a hidden beginning, since Ultra deciphered the German codes. The commanders of both British battle groups were reasonably well informed about the planned movements of the Scharnhorst and, under such conditions, could prepare their response.

One way or another, Scharnhorst became the last Kriegsmarine ship to take offensive action. His death put an end to the threat posed by the German surface fleet and seriously undermined Germany's position in Norway.

The end of Gneisenau is less sad, but still significant.

On the night of February 27, 1942, the Gneisenau, which had just arrived in Kiel, was hit by a British 454-kg armor-piercing bomb in the area of ​​the first turret. The explosion caused enormous destruction and fire (230 main-caliber powder charges ignited at once). 112 sailors were killed and 21 wounded. The battleship was towed to Gotenhafen (Gdynia) for repairs. During the latter, by the way, it was planned to replace the main artillery with six 380-mm guns. Alas, these plans remained on paper. In January 1943, all work was stopped.

Py.sy. The shameful death of the pride of the Reich, the death of 1,467 crew members, infuriated Hitler. Furiously, he blurted out: “There is no need for any mourning events! This is the lot of traitors who are unworthy to be Aryans!”

All the same, Adolf Alozievich was a rare bitch.

A significant part of German historians believe that the battleship Scharnhorst died due to an unfavorable combination of circumstances: codes broken by the British, inconsistency of reconnaissance actions, successful first shots from the enemy... But the true cause of death should probably be sought in the design flaws of the ship: the same type of Scharnhorst and "Gneisenau" lost the battle to the veteran "Rinaun", and later "Scharnhorst" was sunk by almost the least armed battleship of the Second World War

The decision to build the battle cruiser Scharnhorst and the cruiser Gneisenau of the same type is the result of the Kriegsmarine command’s refusal to build the fourth and fifth ships of the Deutschland class (in German sources appear as battleships “D” (“Ersatz Elzass”) and “E” ("Ersatz Hessen") in favor of a ship of an improved design with a standard displacement of up to 26,000 tons and an additional third three-gun artillery turret of 280 mm caliber. The cruiser "Scharnhorst" was laid down at the Navy shipyard in Wilhelmshaven on June 15, 1935 and was named in honor of the Prussian general during the Napoleonic Wars, whose name was Gerhard von Scharnhorst.

"Scharnhorst" in the spring of 1939. The ship is equipped with a design stem

Specifications

The design of the new cruiser was carried out in a short time with the expectation of maximum use of the reserve remaining from the unfinished construction of the battleships “D” and “E”. As a result, the ship received a traditional smooth-deck hull design with an external vertical armor belt that protected the citadel from the first bow to the stern main caliber turret, as well as a double bottom extending 79% of the total length of the ship. The construction of the body was carried out according to a longitudinal scheme with extensive use of electric welding. The use of advanced technologies made it possible to launch the ship on October 3, 1936.

Scharnhorst scheme. Below is a view of the cruiser "Gneisenau", of the same type according to the modernization project

Source: Sergey Patyanin “Kriegsmarine. Navy of the Third Reich"

When designing the cruiser, engineers abandoned the diesel power plant in favor of an experimental turbine unit consisting of three turbo-gear units and twelve steam boilers (total power - 160,000 hp), located in three boiler rooms and two engine rooms, located in a linear pattern and separated cofferdam compartments. The ship's power plant had low reliability and provided a cruising range below the design one (7100 and 8200 miles, respectively, at a speed of 19 knots).

The armor of the cruiser Scharnhorst was quite comparable to that of the English battleships of the King George V class or the German Bismarck class, which allowed German experts to classify the Scharnhorst as a battleship.

The design of artillery weapons was carried out in accordance with the classic scheme for battleships of the 30s, which provided for the presence of:

1. Main caliber artillery (356–406 mm), designed to destroy enemy battleships;
2. Medium caliber artillery (150–203 mm), designed to destroy enemy cruisers and destroyers;
3. Universal artillery (88–127 mm), designed to destroy both lightly armored surface targets and remote air targets;
4. Anti-aircraft guns (20–40 mm), designed to destroy high-speed air targets in the immediate vicinity of the ship.

However, in accordance with the original project, nine 283-mm C/34 guns, which were a modernized version of the guns installed on Deutschland-class ships, were supposed to be used as the main caliber artillery for the Scharnhorst cruiser. The main caliber guns were placed in three three-gun turrets, similar in design to those installed on the Deutschland (two bow and one stern turret - Anton, Bruno and Caesar, respectively). Such armament for a ship with a total displacement of 37,000 tons initially seemed insufficient and already in 1935 led to the development of a project that provided for arming the cruiser with three two-gun turrets of 380 mm caliber. To avoid delays in the construction of the ship, the project was postponed (there is a seemingly unlikely version that the choice of main caliber guns was due to political considerations), and in 1942 it was finally abandoned.

Main caliber turrets "Anton" and "Bruno" of the cruiser "Scharnhorst". The water filling your nose is clearly visible. Photo taken in 1940 during the Norwegian Campaign

When choosing medium-caliber guns, German designers were forced to take into account the existing stock of 150-mm turrets manufactured for the fourth and fifth Deutschland-class ships. As a result, Scharnhorst received medium-caliber artillery of twelve 150-mm guns of the C/28 model, eight of which were installed in two-gun turrets, and another four in single-gun turrets. The long-range anti-aircraft battery consisted of fourteen 105-mm universal guns of the C/33 model, housed in seven twin LC/31 mounts.

Potential capabilities of the main and medium caliber guns of the cruiser "Scharnhorst" to destroy surface and air targets

Purpose of guns	Hitting surface targets	Hitting surface targets	Defeat surface and air targets
Number of guns
Caliber, mm
Barrel length in calibers
Firing range, m
Projectile weight, kg
Rate of fire, rounds per minute
Estimated number of shells during 10-minute firing
Estimated mass of a 10-minute salvo, tons

The cruiser's light anti-aircraft armament consisted of sixteen 37-mm semi-automatic guns of the S/30 model in eight twin stabilized LC/30 mounts and eight S/30 anti-aircraft guns of 20 mm caliber, which provided the so-called “two-echelon” cover of the ship from air attack: the first echelon consisted longer-range installations of 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, the second echelon - faster-firing 20-mm anti-aircraft guns. During combat service, the number of 20-mm machine guns was repeatedly increased (in 1939 two machine guns were installed, in mid-1941 - six quad and two single machine guns, by mid-1943 the cruiser had three quad and ten single 20 mm machine guns).

The fire control system for main and medium caliber artillery included three command and rangefinder points - on the conning tower (equipped with a 6-meter stereo rangefinder), on the bow superstructure and in the stern (equipped with 10.5-meter stereo rangefinders). Initially, each main caliber turret was also equipped with a 10.5-meter rangefinder, but later the rangefinder from the front bow turret was removed due to constant flooding with water when moving. The fire control of the 105-mm guns was carried out by four stabilized SL-6 “type 33” posts equipped with 4-meter rangefinders. In 1939, the ship was equipped with the FuMO-22 radar, and by 1943 - with FuMB-1, FuMB-3, FuMB-4 and FuMB-7 electronic intelligence stations.

Aviation

In accordance with the fashion that existed in the 30s for the use of seaplanes for arming large surface ships (planes were supposed to be used for anti-submarine defense, reconnaissance and fire adjustment), the cruiser Scharnhorst was armed with an air group consisting of three seaplanes, which were launched using two catapults located on the hangar and the aft main caliber tower. After completing the task, the seaplanes landed on the water and were lifted on board by a crane. In 1940, the catapult from the artillery tower was dismantled.

Seaplane "Arado" Ar-196 on board the "Scharnhorst". Photo taken in 1940 during the Norwegian Campaign

Source: Walter Hubach "The Capture of Denmark and Norway"

Mine and torpedo weapons

Initially, there was no mine-torpedo armament on the cruiser, which was consistent with existing views on the range of weapons of battleships, but in 1941, for an unknown reason, two three-tube torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber, removed from the light cruiser Nuremberg, were installed on the ship.

Combat service

The cruiser Scharnhorst was commissioned on January 7, 1939, but already in the middle of the year the ship was modernized: a new mainmast was installed on it, located closer to the stern, and the straight stem was replaced with the so-called “Atlantic” one to improve seaworthiness.

Taking into account the weakness of the cruiser's artillery armament, almost the entire period of its combat service, the Scharnhorst was used only together with the same type cruiser Gneisenau. The ships' first combat operation was patrolling the passage between Iceland and the Faroe Islands at the end of November 1939, during which the British auxiliary cruiser Rawalpindi was sunk.

Later, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau took an active part in the Norwegian campaign. The very first battle of two German ships with a single, obsolete (commissioned in 1918) English cruiser Rinaun, which took place on April 9, 1940, confirmed the mistake in the choice of main-caliber guns and the unfortunate location of the front bow turrets of the main caliber. The Anton main caliber towers on the cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were flooded with water, which led to a short circuit in the ammunition supply electric drive circuits and forced the German ships to fight with their stern towards the enemy for a significant part of the time in order to avoid further water entering the towers. When trying to break away from the English cruiser, problems arose with the power plant on the Scharnhorst, which is why it was unable to reach a speed of more than 25 knots. Ammunition consumption was: 54 shells of 283 mm caliber and 10 shells of 150 mm caliber on the Gneisenau, and 195 shells of 283 mm caliber and 91 shells of 150 mm caliber on the Scharnhorst. Despite the significant consumption of ammunition, there is no evidence of damage from German shells hitting the Rinaun (according to some reports, there were hits, but the shells could not penetrate the armor). In turn, the cruiser "Rinaun" managed to hit the "Gneisenau" with a 381 mm caliber shell (the artillery command post was disabled) and two 114 mm caliber shells (one shell destroyed the rangefinder of the main caliber front bow turret, the other hit the superstructure deck on the left board next to the stern 105 mm anti-aircraft gun). The Scharnhorst, which had been trailing in the wake for a long time, received a hole in the stern during the pursuit (presumably from a 381 mm caliber shell).

The battle on June 8, 1940, despite the victory won by the Germans (the English aircraft carrier Glories and the accompanying destroyers Ardent and Acasta were sunk), only confirmed the correctness of the opinion about the design shortcomings of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. During the battle on the Scharnhorst, a boiler pipe ruptured, causing the speed to drop to 28.5 knots. At 18:38, the Scharnhorst was torpedoed by the destroyer Akasta and received a hole in the starboard side in the area of ​​the main caliber turret (the length of the hole was 12 meters, the height was 4 meters). As a result of the torpedo hit, the aft turret of the main caliber and the IV turret of the middle artillery on the starboard side were damaged, the ship took on 2,500 tons of water and received an increasing list to the starboard side. However, the Scharnhorst managed to arrive under its own power at the Norwegian port of Trondheim (June 9 at 16:00). During the battle, which ended with the sinking of an aircraft carrier and two destroyers, the Gneisenau expended 175 and the Scharnhorst 212 rounds of 283 mm caliber; in total, both ships fired 1,448 rounds of 150 mm ammunition. Due to the damage received on June 8, the Scharnhorst was sent to dry dock in Kiel, where it remained until the end of 1940. In December 1940-March 1941, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau launched two raids into the Atlantic. The raid in December 1940 was interrupted due to malfunctions in the Gneisenau power plant. During a raid on the Atlantic from January 22 to March 22, 1941, Scharnhorst destroyed 8 merchant ships with a total tonnage of 48,886 GRT (Gneisenau - 14 merchant ships with a total tonnage of 66,449 GRT). During the raid, the German cruisers avoided contact with large British ships. Thus, the attack on convoy HX-106 was stopped after the appearance of the British battleship Ramilles, and on convoy SL-67 when the battleship Malaya appeared.

Scharnhorst in the Atlantic. Photo taken in early 1941

Source: Sergey Patyanin “Kriegsmarine. Navy of the Third Reich"

On July 24, 1941, the Scharnhorst was damaged during an English air raid in La Pallis, and on February 11–13, 1942, together with the Gneisenau, it made a breakthrough from the French Brest to Norway, while on February 12, the cruiser was twice blown up by mines. The transition of the cruisers to Norway indicated that the Kriegsmarine command had ceased to regard the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau as a real threat to convoys in the Atlantic, but hoped to use them together with the battleship Tirpitz and the cruiser Admiral Scheer as a potential threat to Arctic convoys with the aim of diverting large Allied surface ships to this theater of operations.

The presence of large German warships in Norwegian ports objectively posed a fairly strong threat to the safety of convoys and served as one of the official reasons put forward by the Allies as justification for stopping the sending of convoys to the USSR (in Soviet historiography, the refusal to send convoys was usually explained by the machinations of capitalist governments). The situation on the Soviet-German front and the low capacity of the routes for transporting military cargo to the USSR through Iran and the Far East forced the Allies on November 1, 1943 to resume sending Arctic convoys to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. To protect them, an original scheme was used, which took into account the geographical features of the theater of military operations, as well as the possibilities of the combat use of surface and submarine forces of the Kriegsmarine. Allied convoys traveling from the USSR (code RA) and to the USSR (code JW) consisted of 10–20 merchant ships, which in the initial stages of the journey were guarded by destroyers, frigates and corvettes, providing reliable anti-submarine defense. The convoys, moving towards each other, simultaneously entered the most dangerous area south of Bear Island, where formations of large surface ships of close and long cover began to protect them. The close cover, consisting of cruisers, escorted the convoys, and the long cover, which included a battleship, patrolled the area from 10 miles east to 200 miles northwest of the convoy route. Such a cover scheme made it possible, using very limited funds, to create a layered defense. During the period from November 1 to mid-December 1943, the Allies managed to conduct three convoys to the USSR (JW-54A, JW-54B, JW-55A) and two from the USSR (RA-54A and RA-54B) without losses. Such activity in cargo turnover between the ports of Great Britain and the USSR made it meaningless for the presence of German battleships and cruisers in Norwegian ports. It seemed rational to carry out at least one successful attack on a convoy by a large surface ship, which at a minimum would force the enemy to stop transportation for some time (until the end of the analysis of the events that occurred), and at maximum could serve as a reason for re-abandoning the idea of ​​Arctic convoys. In order to organize the raid, the Germans traced, without taking active military action, the entire route of the JW-55A convoy, which made it possible to reveal the system for organizing the security of the convoys.

The target for the raid was convoy JW-55B (nineteen transports and tankers), which left the British Bay of Loch Ew on December 20, guarded by ten destroyers, four corvettes and three minesweepers, and was discovered on December 22 by a German reconnaissance aircraft 400 miles away. west of the Norwegian port of Tromso. In accordance with the adopted security scheme, convoy RA-55A, accompanied by ten destroyers, three corvettes and one minesweeper, moved towards convoy JW-55B. Close guard of the convoys in the threatened zone was carried out by the English heavy cruiser Norfolk and the light cruisers Sheffield and Belfast. Long-range security was carried out by a formation consisting of the battleship Duke of York (belonged to the Prince of Wales class, sometimes referred to in Russian-language literature as the Duke of York), the cruiser Jamaica and four destroyers. According to the German plan, the formation consisting of the battle cruiser Scharnhorst and five destroyers was supposed to avoid meeting with long-range guards (literally, the order for the operation sounded like this: “ In principle, you must interrupt the battle if superior enemy forces appear."), intercept the convoy and inflict maximum damage on it (« The fight shouldn't end in stalemate. Every opportunity to attack should be taken» ) , and also having repeatedly evaded the meeting with the distant guard, return to the port. It is not entirely clear why the Scharnhorst was chosen for the operation, which required long, high-speed passages, since it did not have a speed advantage over the escort ships and had repeatedly demonstrated the unreliable operation of the power plant.

Justification from the order (“ The superiority of the Scharnhorst in gun power offers the best chance of success, and it must be used") also does not explain the decision of the German command - it is not clear what advantage in weapon power we are talking about. The Scharnhorst had nine 283 mm caliber guns with a firing range of 40 km and twelve 150 mm caliber guns with a firing range of 22.2 km, of which 9 and 6 guns could be used respectively in linear combat. In turn, the British had ten 356 mm caliber guns with a firing range of 35 km on the battleship Duke of York, eight 203 mm caliber guns with a firing range of 24 km on the Norfolk, and thirty-six 152 mm caliber guns with a firing range 20 km (twelve guns each on Belfast, Sheffield and Jamaica), all of which could be used simultaneously. In addition, the British could use eight 133-mm guns with a firing range of 22.2 km, installed on the battleship Duke of York (in total, the battleship had sixteen 133-mm guns, installed eight per side).

Kriegsmarine

Construction has started June 15, 1935 Launched October 3, 1936 Commissioned January 7, 1939 Removed from the fleet December 26, 1943 Current status Sunk in the Battle of the North Cape Options Tonnage 31,552 tons standard;
38,900 tons total Length 235.4 m total;
229.8 m at waterline Width 30.0 m Draft 9.91 m - full Booking main belt - 350 mm;
deck - 95 mm Technical data Power point 3 turbines from ABB; Screws 3 three-blade propellers, diameter 4.8 m Power 161,164 hp Speed 31 knots Sailing autonomy 10,100 nautical miles at 19 knots Crew 1,968 people (60 officers, 1,909 sailors) Armament Artillery 3 × 3 283 mm;
4 × 2 + 4 × 1 150 mm Torpedo and mine weapons 2 × 3 533 mm torpedo tubes Anti-aircraft weapons 14 × 105 mm;
16 × 37 mm;
10 × 20 mm Aviation 3 Arado Ar 196 A-3, one catapult

Very few sailors volunteered to serve on the Scharnhorst. Most of the crew members were transferred from other ships. This was a necessary measure, since the sailors thought that the ship was cursed even during construction. As her hull was being assembled in drydock, the Scharnhorst rolled on its side, killing 60 to 70 workers. After this, the mother of one of the killed workers cursed the ship. Subsequent incidents only strengthened this rumor. On the day of launching, the ship broke from its moorings and slid into the water, where it rammed a cruiser, which was out of action for several months. The incident was never fully investigated. Just a few months before its death, while sailing in one of the Norwegian fjords, the ship's radar could not cope with thick fog and Scharnhorst rammed a German airliner used to transport soldiers. Although I myself Scharnhorst Almost undamaged, the liner was out of action for several months.

Beginning of the war

Cruiser in 1939

First combat operation Scharnhorst was patrolling the passage between Iceland and the Faroe Islands at the end of November 1939 together with Gneisenau, where they sank an English armed transport. Spring 1940 Scharnhorst And Gneisenau ensured the invasion of Norway (Operation Weserübung). On April 9, 1940, near Norway, they met in battle with an English battle cruiser Renown, British and Gneisenau caused minor damage to each other, Scharnhorst suffered from the elements. In the flooded Anton turret (1st main caliber), a short circuit occurred in the ammunition supply electric drive circuits, and the turret failed. In addition, due to the need to maintain full speed, the right car was damaged. Scharnhorst, but the Germans still managed to break away from the outdated British cruiser. Scharnhorst And Gneisenau sank a British aircraft carrier Glorious and his escort: destroyers and, June 8, 1940, about 64 degrees north of Norway. During the fight Scharnhorst was damaged by a torpedo Acasta, 50 sailors were killed and the left propeller shaft was damaged. Soon, due to flooding, the middle machine also had to be turned off. The cellars of the Caesar tower (3rd main caliber) were flooded. June 13, standing in the harbor Scharnhorst Blackburn Skua dive bombers raided from an aircraft carrier Ark Royal. The raid was ineffective: out of 15 aircraft, 8 were shot down, only one bomb hit the target and even it did not explode.

Due to the damage received on June 8 Scharnhorst was sent to dry dock in Kiel, where he remained until the end of 1940.

At the end of December 1940 Scharnhorst And Gneisenau tried to break through the British blockade and enter the North Atlantic trade routes, but were forced to turn back due to a breakdown Gneisenau.

A page from a World War II US Navy pamphlet describing the cruiser.

Raid to the Atlantic

Main article: Operation Berlin

Breakthrough across the English Channel

While in Brest, German ships became targets of constant air raids. In July 1941, Scharnhorst moved to the port of La Rochelle, south of Brest. Warned about the Scharnhorst's departure from the port by aerial reconnaissance and Resistance agents, the Allies were confident that this was another raid. To prevent a raid, they scrambled 15 heavy bombers. Halifax British Air Force. The damage caused by the bombing was severe enough to force Scharnhorst to return to the port of Brest for repairs. Damage from the bombing, together with damage received during the raids, as well as problems with cooling the boilers, kept the Scharnhorst in port until the end of 1941, when it was decided to send the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, as well as the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, back to Germany . Since it was very risky to try to break through the North Atlantic, on February 11-13, three large ships, accompanied by dozens of minesweepers and other support vessels, made a breakthrough across the English Channel, called Operation Cerberus. The British were not prepared for such a decisive and unexpected breakthrough, their coast guard was not ready to stop the breakthrough, and the jamming of British radars by the Germans did not allow an air attack. However, and Scharnhorst, And Gneisenau were damaged by mines, Scharnhorst two, and Gneisenau one. Repair delayed Scharnhorst docked until March, after which she sailed to Norway to rendezvous with the battleship Tirpitz and other German ships to attack Arctic convoys bound for the Soviet Union. The next few months were devoted to training and acclimatization, ending with the bombing of Spitsbergen together with Tirpitz.

The end of Scharnhorst

• KzS Fritz Hintze - October 13 - December 26 (died)

Notes

Links

• History Center, US Navy Department of Official Publications (en).
• The Story of the Battleship Scharnhorst: Professionalism versus Heroism.
• Royal Navy: The Second World War 1939-1945 (English)

Literature

• Breyer, Siegfried, Battleships and Battlecruisers 1905-1970. (Doubleday and Company; Garden City, New York, 1973) (originally published in Germany as Schlachtschiffe und Schlachtkreuzer 1905-1970, J.F. Lehmanns, Verlag, Munchen, 1970). Contains various diagrams and drawings of the ship, how it was planned and how it was built.
• Busch, Fritz-Otto, The Sinking of the Scharnhorst. (Robert Hale, London, 1956) ISBN 0-86007-130-8. The story of the Battle of the North Cape, told by a survivor from Scharnhorst
• Claasen, A. R. A., Hitler's Northern War: The Luftwaffe's Ill-Fated Campaign, 1940-1945. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001. pp. 228–234. ISBN 0-7006-1050-2
• Garzke, William H., Jr. and Robert O. Dulin, Jr., Battleships: Axis and Neutral Battleships in World War II. (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1985). Includes stories about the ship's creation and combat operations, weapons information, and other statistical information about Scharnhorst
• Alf Jacobsen Battleship "Scharnhorst" = Alf R. Jacobsen "SHARNHORST". - M.: Eksmo, 2005. - 304 p. - ISBN 5-699-14578-8

Kriegsmarine
Commanders	Grand Admiral Erich Raeder Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz Hans Georg von Friedeburg Walter Warzeha (liquidator)
Large surface ships
Battleships	Type "Bismarck": Bismarck Tirpitz Scharnhorst type: Scharnhorst Gneisenau Deutschland type (battleships): Schlesien Schleswig-Holstein
Aircraft carriers	Graf Zeppelin class: Graf Zeppelin Aircraft Carrier B De Grasse (from a cruise ship) Seydlitz (from a cruiser)